

Plan Massive Antiwar Campaign



ANTIWAR CONFERENCE sponsored by National Peace Action Coalition met in New York City July 2-4 and voted to build a series of protests leading up to mass demonstrations in sixteen

cities November 6. The conference, attended by 2,300 delegates, was major step forward in reunification of antiwar movement despite attempts at disruption by small band of ultraleftists.

Witch-Hunt Victims Freed

June 16 marked exactly nine months since the Trudeau government invoked the War Measures Act, abolishing constitutional guarantees in Québec. In taking this action October 16, 1971, the Canadian premier argued that the kidnapping of Québec Labor Minister Robert Laporte by a group calling itself the FLQ [Front de Libération du Québec—Québec Liberation Front] was part of a conspiracy to stage an armed rebellion in the French-speaking province.

A witch-hunt was unleashed and five prominent Québécois nationalists were arrested and held in prison for long months on charges of "seditious conspiracy."

On June 15, the government's case against the "Montréal Five" finally collapsed. Jacques Larue-Langlois and Charles Gagnon were acquitted. The charges had previously been quashed against Michel Chartrand, president of the Montréal Central Council of the Confederation of National Trade Unions; and Robert Lemieux, a well-known defense lawyer.

The trial of the last of the Montréal Five, Pierre Vallières, has been postponed to the fall of this year because of his poor health. But since all his codefendants have been acquitted, the government appears to have no conceivable case against him.

"It takes at least two to make a conspiracy," a prosecution lawyer admitted, according to the June 16 issue of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*.

Depression Strikes Another Industry

A Copenhagen "sex fair," featuring pornographic movies and live performances, closed June 7 after attracting only 5,000 visitors. The previous fair, in 1969, drew 50,000.

Summer Schedule

This is a reminder that we will soon change to our summer schedule.

During August no issues will be published.

We will resume our regular weekly schedule in September.

In This Issue

		FEATURES
Alan Jones	666	Georg Lukacs—Distinguished Victim of Stalinism
		ANTIWAR
Jon Rothschild	643	2,300 Delegates Plan Massive Actions
	644	New Zealand Demonstrations Set for July 30 U. S. A.
	644	Supreme Court Bows to Pressure, Backs "Times"
	653	Women Open Battle for Right to Abortion
	663	Call for Release of Secret Papers on China
		INDOCHINA WAR
George Novack	645	Nixon Plan Called for Five to Ten Years More War
Allen Myers	647	Role of Imperialist Allies
	649	Peace Plan Causes Problem for Nixon
		MIDDLE EAST
	650	Top CIA Man in Israel
		PAKISTAN
	651	Why 6,000,000 Have Fled Bangla Desh
S. B. Kolpe	652	2,000,000 Reported Slain by Yahya's Army
		ITALY
Livio Maitan	654	After the June 13 Election
		PERU
	656	Hugo Blanco, Hector Bejar Interviewed
		BRAZIL
Eduardo Pinheiro and J. Mattos	658	The Revolutionary Left
		FRANCE
Ruth Schein	662	"Rouge" Indicted for Calling a Cop . . . a Cop
		FINLAND
Pekka Haapakoski	664	CP Divided in Face of Radicalization
		ANGOLA
	668	Cleric Held in Seven Prisons
		CHINA
Herman Volker	669	Mao Converts Rumania Back Into a Socialist Country
		ARGENTINA
	670	An Appeal for Ana Maria Villarreal
		DOCUMENTS
	670	The ERP in Action
	671	Why the ERP Kidnapped Sylvester
		PHOTOS
Ed Weaver	641	NPAC convention plans fall antiwar campaign
Bobi Sourander	657	Hugo Blanco
		DRAWINGS
Copain	649	Nguyen Thi Binh; 650, Moshe Dayan; 650, Richard Helms; 650, Golda Meir; 663, Chiang Kai-shek; 666, Georg Lukacs
Luis	651	Yahya Khan

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

MANAGING EDITOR: Allen Myers.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Jon Rothschild.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of

Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guemeene, Paris 4, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright ©1971 by Intercontinental Press.

2,300 Delegates Plan Massive Antiwar Actions

By Jon Rothschild

"The power to end the war is at hand. The time for launching a knock-out blow against Nixon's war policies is NOW. The strategy continues to be to involve gigantic masses of people in action in support of the central, unifying demand for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of U. S. military forces, warplanes, ships, and matériel from Southeast Asia. . . .

"April 24th was a tremendous step forward for the antiwar movement—and this fall's actions will be the next big step. With the deepening of antiwar sentiment in recent weeks, and with the newly forged unity of virtually all the antiwar forces, it is now possible to hold demonstrations on the scale of April 24th in every section of the country. Simultaneous mass demonstrations on November 6th in a dozen or so regional centers can bring huge numbers of people into the streets in every center to demand immediate, unconditional, and total U. S. withdrawal from Indochina."

With these words the broadest conference yet held of the U. S. antiwar movement voted overwhelmingly to endorse a call for a massive summer-fall antiwar offensive.

The conference, sponsored by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), the group that organized the historic April 24 demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco, was held in New York City on July 2-4.

The attendance statistics for the conference substantiated the claims of NPAC organizers that the movement has reached a new pitch: 2,300 people registered for the conference. There were representatives from 197 cities in 42 states; 385 organizations sent members or representatives; 35 trade unions sent either official delegates or members. Of the total participants, 1,015 were college students and 197 were high-school students.

The conference opened with an evening rally and continued with two days of political discussion and debate. The final session projected a series of antiwar actions to culminate

November 6 in massive regional demonstrations. The series calls for local demonstrations during the week of August 6-9 (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Week), a national moratorium on October 13, and a day of solidarity with Vietnam veterans on October 25. The October 25 actions will open a National Peace Action Week. This will close with demonstrations in sixteen major cities on November 6.

A resolution was adopted calling for united action between NPAC and the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), a coalition consisting largely of forces influenced by the Communist party, of pacifists and the Mayday Tribe.

That resolution stated in part: "All parties agreed that there is a pressing and immediate need for unity of the peace forces so that the massive power of the people's opposition to the war can be effectively exercised. To that end, the parties have agreed upon a common program of action. This program includes a series of peaceful, orderly, non-confrontation actions which will be presented to the convention of each of the coalitions for their approval. It is recognized that each of the coalitions will be conducting other activities related to other issues of national concern."

The Hiroshima actions, the October 13 moratorium and the November 6 mass actions were specifically mentioned as activities that both groups will build.

The only sour note at the conference came from the supporters of the formerly Maoist Progressive Labor party and the pro-PL remnants of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). PL and SDS showed at the opening rally that they had no intention of allowing the discussion at the conference to proceed peacefully, as desired by the vast majority of those attending. Leaflets issued before the rally by supporters of SDS and PL stated that they objected to the presence of Senator Vance Hartke and United Automobile Workers leader

Victor Reuther, and urged the crowd to shout them down.

When conference participants failed to act on this suggestion, PL and SDS decided they would try it on their own. Well over a hundred of them rose to their feet and screamed when Hartke, and later Reuther, attempted to speak. After repeated appeals for order by the chair were ignored, groups of disrupters were ushered out.

The rally continued as planned. Despite the fact that they had tried to impose their will on the entire conference and had even attempted to occupy the platform before the conference started, SDS and PL were still permitted to present their point of view during the political discussion, although the conference voted to exclude those individuals who had participated in the attempted disruption.

But this did not satisfy SDS. The day after the rally, they tried to raid the conference and break it up. The attack was repulsed by a well-organized defense. At its final session the conference voted to commend the marshals for ensuring the right of the majority to conduct a democratic conference.

The participants came away with the clear feeling that the U. S. antiwar movement had reached a new level. This sentiment was best expressed by James Lafferty, one of the NPAC coordinators, in his speech to the opening rally: "I hope that when we leave this convention we will have served notice on the Nixons and the Hoovers and the Mitchells and the Ichords that we cannot be tricked. We cannot be frightened. We cannot be forced off the streets. And we cannot be *divided*."

"We must pledge among ourselves that together we will stay in the streets until every last United States soldier and plane has been withdrawn from Vietnam. Coming back again and again and organizing like hell in between our street actions. And when the war is finally over, we will be back in the streets again—pledging to ourselves and to all humanity never, never to let it happen again." □

Supreme Court Bows to Pressure, Backs 'Times'

On June 30 the U. S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 3, ruled that the government could not prevent the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* from publishing articles based on the secret Pentagon Vietnam report. The following day both newspapers resumed their stories.

While the decision represented a victory for freedom of the press, it was ambiguous enough to invite new attempts by the government to censor journalistic reports.

There were three major positions expressed by the various justices. Since no single opinion had the support of a majority, the only statement that stands as a precedent is the unsigned decision. That decision asserted that any attempt to restrain the press comes into court bearing a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Because of this, the government "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint." The court ruled that in this case the government "had not met that burden."

Thus, the decision did not rule out press censorship in general, but only stated that in this case the Justice Department had not convinced the court that censorship was justified.

Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall held that the government had no right whatsoever to restrain the press, regardless of considerations of national security.

Justices William Brennan Jr., Potter Stewart, and Byron White said that the press could be censored in cases where published material would cause immediate and irreparable damage to the nation, but that the Pentagon study did not pose such a threat.

Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun and John Harlan said that if any executive official of cabinet rank claimed that material was dangerous to foreign relations and should not be published, the court had no right to challenge that assertion.

Contained in the decision was a warning, supported by four justices, that the press could be criminally prosecuted for printing the documents.

White, one of those who had voted against restraining the newspapers, said that he "would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions" if the *Times* and *Post* were prosecuted, even though he was not in favor of prior restraint.

The obvious reluctance of three of the justices to rule against the government was a clear indication that it was the massive public pressure in support of freedom of the press that finally determined their votes. Despite the loopholes left open by the court, it will be extremely difficult, because of the ever-growing wave of popular sentiment demanding the truth about the Indochina war, to block further disclosures like those that have just been published.

The *Times* itself made clear that it was not demanding the "absolute right to publish anything under all

circumstances." In a July 1 editorial, the *Times* said that it was only seeking the right to "publish these particular documents at this particular time without prior Governmental restraint."

Despite its defeat, the Justice Department announced July 1 that it intended to continue its criminal prosecutions.

"The Department of Justice is continuing its investigation and will prosecute all those who have violated Federal criminal laws in connection with this matter. As further developments occur relative to Justice Department action, they will be announced at the proper time."

Secretary of State William Rogers was asked whether the government intended to prosecute newspaper editors and reporters. He declined to answer. □

New Zealand

Antiwar Demonstrations Set for July 30

Following on the success of the massive April 30 demonstrations throughout New Zealand [see *Intercontinental Press*, May 24, p. 467], the antiwar movement has planned a new mobilization for July 30.

General meetings of antiwar coalitions in Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch voted unanimously to build demonstrations on that date, and antiwar groups in Dunedin and some smaller towns have indicated that they will support a nationwide mobilization.

The June 22 issue of *Socialist Action*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Wellington, reported that prospects for large demonstrations are good:

"With the various organisations (including school, trade union, church and women's groups) which set themselves up shortly before April 30 already in existence, far more can be done this time than for the previous mobilisation. The ball can start roll-

ing much earlier. Advance publicity in the media can also be expected to be better: *everyone* is going to know about July 30!"

The Maoists of the New Zealand Communist party, who attacked the April 30 demonstrations as "counter-revolutionary," have continued their policy of trying to obstruct the growth of a massive, independent antiwar movement. At a June 12 delegates' meeting of the National Liaison Committee (NLC), the national coalition of antiwar groups that coordinated the April 30 marches, a large number of CP members who represented no organization but their own party cooperated with a red-baiting attack on the Socialist Action League launched by the president of the New Zealand University Students' Association. This alliance in effect voted to dissolve the NLC.

This maneuver, however, was not able to deflect the antiwar movement from its intention of building massive July 30 demonstrations. Responsibility

ty for national publicity has been taken by the Wellington Committee on Vietnam, and preparations for the mobilization are well under way.

"8,000 buttons (3,000 more than last time) have been ordered," *Socialist Action* reported. "More than twice as

many leaflets will be issued as were produced for April 30—250,000. A greater variety and larger numbers of stickers and posters will also go out. Endorsements for the July 30 mobe [mobilization] have been coming in for some time.

"With the organizing work now under way, the antiwar movement can look forward to even broader sponsorship for July 30, and the involvement of more layers of the population and more cities and towns than ever before in the antiwar movement." □

Why Did the 'Times' Do It?

Nixon Plan Called for Five to Ten Years More War

By George Novack

[The following article has been reprinted from the July 9 issue of *The Militant*, a socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

The Vietnam war has been the longest in American history and is still not over. It has provoked the most widespread organized antiwar movement during hostilities in any imperialist country since the Russia of 1905 and 1917. The mightiest military machine ever built faces defeat at the hands of a revolutionary, predominantly peasant people fighting for national independence and social liberation.

These circumstances are the setting for the confrontation between the government and the press that has arisen from the publication of the Pentagon

papers. This fight dramatizes the division among the rulers of the United States that has been widening and deepening ever since some of their more perspicacious heads began to realize that Vietnam was a losing venture. Secretary McNamara's project to search the Defense Department's secret files for a critical review of the events and decisions leading to the failure was itself a product of this mood at the summits of power.

Johnson, who was obliged to abdicate, was the first political casualty of this situation, and the defeat of his vice-president, Humphrey, in the 1968 elections the second. Those elements of big business and high finance favoring disengagement were then willing to give Nixon the time he asked to extricate the U. S. armed forces from Vietnam.

Nixon, however, has pursued a different course. Though promising a phased withdrawal, he and his military chief still aim at achieving a military victory to save the mercenary Saigon regime and force the Vietnamese to accept a Korea-style stand-off.

According to an article by Noam Chomsky in the June 17 *New York Review of Books*, Senator Thomas Eagleton reported that in briefings last month in Vietnam, two U. S. generals (Weyand and Milloy) informed him that "the plans under which they were operating called for a residual American force indefinitely into the future and for a protracted period of massive American air power, including helicopters, based in Thailand and Okinawa and various places in Indochina."

Chomsky quoted William Selover of the *Christian Science Monitor*, who wrote April 1, 1971, that selected correspondents who have attended confidential briefings report that the president apparently has in mind between five and ten years of continued war, and he is strongly hinting that the long-term U. S. presence in South Vietnam "could remain at the 50,000 level indefinitely."

As the months have rolled by, the highly placed "doves," whose ranks have greatly increased, have grown more and more impatient with Nixon's maneuvering. They note that despite the reduction in the number of troops, he has extended the war to the rest of Indochina and stepped up air operations. They fear that the president does not intend to get out of Vietnam but to stay on under cover of "Vietnamization."

The decision of the *New York Times* to make public the top-secret Pentagon papers was not motivated solely by the newspaper's desire to score a journalistic scoop or to reaffirm the freedom of the press. Nor was it the result of a sudden onrush of moral indignation against the double-dealing of the White House and the Pentagon, from Truman to Nixon. The editors and top correspondents of the *Times* have been better informed about what was being done in Washington and Southeast Asia than most members of Congress.

The publication was a deliberate political act in a campaign to pressure the Nixon administration to change its diplomatic and military orientation, stop stalling, and speed up the timetable of disinvolvement. They're put-



Justus in the Minneapolis Star

Best-Kept Secret

ting the president on notice that he has little time left for retreating in good order.

This was emphasized by George Ball, undersecretary of state under Johnson, who said over CBS television June 27: "They haven't got a great deal more time to get American troops out of this situation without a real blowup in the United States."

The White House has replied by taking steps to stop further printing of the documents. Its unprecedented effort to suppress the news prior to publication on the specious ground of national security has posed the issue of freedom of the press and of the people's right to know, in its purest form.

This constitutional question of democratic rights is exceptionally important. But much more is involved in the conflict.

Nixon's military policy is now being opposed by a powerful phalanx of media that speak for the central core of America's ruling families. The *New York Times*, which initiated the revelations, is closely associated with the Rockefellers, Morgans, Lehmans, and the rest of what is called "the Eastern Establishment." It has been backed up by some of the most prestigious of the press baronies: the *Washington Post*, the Knight chain, the *Boston Globe*, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, and even the *Los Angeles Times*—all of which have been calling for a liquidation of the Vietnam venture for some time.

They are questioning not the fundamental international strategy of American imperialism but its results in Vietnam. They are saying that the twenty-five years of intervention there have failed to attain the objective of crushing the insurgency of a colonial people. The war has turned out to be too costly and politically risky to maintain. So the boss is instructing his agents in high office: your mission has failed. Cut your losses and get out before greater disasters occur.

The "doves" were apparently prompted by a still more immediate concern. This was revealed by Daniel Ellsberg, who made the Pentagon papers available to the *New York Times*. Nixon and his advisers have been discussing a reescalation of the war to strengthen their position in "negotiations." As Ellsberg told *Newsweek*: "I smell 1964 all over again."

After the public revulsion against the aggressions in Cambodia and Laos, Nixon's opponents in the ruling class fear the consequences of so reckless a move. The domestic price would be too heavy. According to all recent polls, the majority of the nation is heartily sick of the war and wants to see it ended quickly. The antiwar movement has demonstrated its capacity to mobilize hundreds of thousands for action in the streets. The documents were disclosed to raise a public furor that could deter Nixon from a repetition of Johnson's folly.

The Nixon administration for its part seeks to censor and suppress the documents not for the sake of national security but to guard the security of its own operations. It wants to keep its real plans hidden and prevent the airing of its own secrets.

Its success is dubious because the White House is under siege from a diversity of forces. The attitude of defeatism toward the war extends from the ruling circles to the GIs. The organized antiwar movement that assembled half a million protesters at the Capitol and 300,000 in San Francisco April 24 voices the sentiments of the bulk of the people. Even Congress is taking action, timid though it is, against the war, as indicated by the Senate vote June 23 advising the president, under certain conditions, to pull out all troops from Vietnam in nine months. As the stream of disclosures signify, the administration cannot even rely upon the loyalty of its "think-tanks."

The Pentagon papers not only reveal the class consciousness of the rulers and the cynical deceptions practiced upon the American people. They show that the sovereigns of capitalism have behaved, ever since their victory in the second world war, as though they could do anything they pleased with impunity. They considered themselves inviolable and invulnerable.

These insolent conspirators are now having to learn that their freedom of action is not unlimited. They thought they could crush any and all revolutionary struggles of the oppressed in the colonial world. They have not succeeded in breaking the will of the Vietnamese, the vanguard of the colonial revolution. They counted on a docile and inert people at home that could be tricked into tol-

erating any military adventure for any length of time and at any sacrifice. The ever-expanding antiwar sentiment proved they were wrong. The American masses refuse to be sheep that can be led to any slaughter.

The revelations have shaken the nation to the depths. As James Reston observed in the June 27 *New York Times*, "the nation is seething with distrust of the government." The extent of the distrust and discredit of the capitalist politicians is something new in American politics. Its effects will be felt in many ways from now on.

The conflict in the ruling circles has been exacerbated by a growing fear of the usurpation of power by the executive that has enabled successive administrations to drag the country into large-scale military operations hatched in secret behind the backs of Congress and the people. The pressure campaign mounted by Nixon's opponents also seeks to impose certain restraints upon the abuse of presidential power.

Both Nixon and his critics are parts of the same system. The *New York Times* and the rest of the communications media supported the Vietnam war with its skulduggery until it clearly became a losing proposition for big business. Nonetheless, the anti-imperialist forces ought to take full advantage of the sharp differences between them. Nixon's attempts to curb the press must be fought.

The Pentagon disclosures have amply vindicated the positions and slogans of the antiwar movement. It can now move ahead with strengthened confidence to organize and mobilize the newly aroused millions, expose the lies of the conspirators, and further frustrate the plans of the warmakers. □

Problems of the American 'Century'

The chairman of the House banking and currency committee has charged that many U. S. banks defraud their customers by figuring interest on loans on the basis of a 360-day "year." Representative Wright Patman said that on a five-year loan, banks following this practice would collect an extra month's interest.

Patman estimated that "overcharges resulting from this calendar manipulation approach \$150,000,000 a year."

On the other hand, the banks could defend themselves by pointing out that at the current rate of inflation, borrowers are repaying loans with 80-cent "dollars."

Role of Imperialist Allies in Indochina War

By Allen Myers

One aspect of the material from the Pentagon's secret study of the Indochina war that can be expected to produce continuing repercussions around the world is the clear evidence of the importance of the complicity of a number of different governments in the U. S. aggression.

Although this subject has not been a major focus of the material so far printed by the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, the documentation demonstrates, almost in passing, that the U. S. warmakers have relied heavily on their allies both for political support and for more concrete forms of assistance.

As early as November 1961, the study indicates, President John Kennedy expressed the necessity of "free world" backing of his plan to violate the Geneva Agreement of 1954 by sending combat troops to South Vietnam. Kennedy counted on such backing primarily to overcome opposition within the United States, according to notes recorded at a November 15 meeting of the National Security Council:

"Pres[ident] expressed concern over 2-front war. Another bother him, no overt Chicom [Chinese Communist] aggression in SVN, unlike Korea. These Diem's own people; difficult operating area. If go beyond advisers need other nations with us . . . Pres receiving static from Congress; they against using US troops."

Another document from the same period, and one of the most interesting to be published to date, provides details of "allied" aggression in Indochina going back at least to 1961, and in one case to the battle of Dienbienphu in 1954. As described in the document, the allied governments in question—Thailand, the Philippines, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan—are little more than a screen for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The memorandum, "apparently from July, 1961," according to the *New York Times*, was entitled "Resources for Unconventional Warfare, SE Asia," and was prepared by Brig-

adier General Edward G. Lansdale, a Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare. Lansdale, who is also an important figure in the CIA, wrote of the Thai government's involvement in Laos:

"The PARU [Police Aerial Resupply Unit] has a mission of undertaking clandestine operations in denied areas. 99 PARU personnel have been introduced covertly to assist the Meos in operations in Laos, where their combat performance has been outstanding.

"This is a special police unit, supported by CIA (CIA control in the Meo operations has been reported as excellent), with a current strength of 300 being increased to 550 as rapidly as possible. . . ."

Lansdale also reported that the CIA was busy on the spot in Laos:

"Political leadership of the Meos is in the hands of Touby Lyfoung, who now operates mostly out of Vientiane. The military leader is Lt-Col Vang Pao, who is the field commander. Command control of Meo operations is exercised by the Chief CIA Vientiane with the advice of Chief MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] Laos. . . ."

"There is also a local veteran's organization and a grass-roots political organization in Laos, both of which are subject to CIA direction and control and are capable of carrying out propaganda, sabotage and harassment operations. Both are located (in varying degrees of strength and reliability) throughout Laos."

In Taiwan, Lansdale continued, the CIA operates its own airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT).

"CAT is a commercial air line engaged in scheduled and non-scheduled air operations throughout the Far East, with headquarters and large maintenance facilities located in Taiwan. CAT, a CIA proprietary, provides air logistical support under commercial cover to most CIA and other U. S. Government agencies' requirements. CAT supports covert and clandestine air operations by providing trained and experienced personnel,

procurement of supplies and equipment through overt commercial channels, and the maintenance of a fairly large inventory of transport and other type aircraft under both Chinat [Chinese Nationalist] and U. S. registry.

"CAT has demonstrated its capability on numerous occasions to meet all types of contingency or long-term covert air requirements in support of U. S. objectives. During the past ten years, it has had some notable achievements, including support of the Chinese Nationalist withdrawal from the mainland, air drop support to the French at Dien Bien Phu, complete logistical and tactical air support for the Indonesian operation,* air lifts of refugees from North Vietnam, *more than 200 overflights of Mainland China and Tibet*, and extensive air support in Laos during the current crisis. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Although the Filipino employees of the CIA appear not to have engaged in flying over China, in most other respects their activities were just as far flung as those of CAT.

Among the CIA's fronts in the Philippines, Lansdale wrote, was the Eastern Construction Company, which he described as "similar to an employment agency" with the difference that, unlike most employment agencies, it has "an almost untapped potential for unconventional warfare."

The company had good connections in the Philippine government, Lansdale noted, and went on to give an unusually frank description of its activities:

"The head of Eastern Construction is 'Frisco' Johnny San Juan, former National Commander, Philippines Veterans Legion, and former close staff assistant to President Magsaysay of the Philippines (serving as Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner directly under the President). . . ."

"Eastern Construction was started in 1954 as Freedom Company of the

* Presumably this is a reference to the CIA-backed rebellions in Sulawesi and northern Sumatra in 1958.

Philippines, a non-profit organization, with President Magsaysay as its honorary president. Its charter stated plainly that it was 'to serve the cause of freedom.' It actually was a mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries, for unconventional operations, under cover of a public service organization having a contract with the host government. Philippine Armed Forces and government personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and served abroad. Its personnel helped write the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, trained Vietnam's Presidential Guard Battalion, and were instrumental in founding and organizing the Vietnamese Veterans Legion."

Eastern Construction, Lansdale added, had found that governments would pay for counterrevolution, and it had continued as a commercial venture after direct U.S. subsidies were "largely terminated."

"Public service" is a popular pastime among Filipino reactionaries, to judge from Lansdale's memorandum.

"There is another private Filipino public-service organization," he wrote, "capable of considerable expansion in socio-economic-medical operations to support counter-guerrilla actions. It is now operating teams in Laos, under ICA [International Cooperation Administration] auspices. It has a measure of CIA control.

"Operation Brotherhood (OB) was started in 1954 by the International Jaycees [Junior Chambers of Commerce], under the inspiration and guidance of Oscar Arellano, a Filipino architect who was Vice President for Asia of the International Jaycees. The concept was to provide medical service to refugees and provincial farmers in South Vietnam, as part of the 1955 pacification and refugee program. Initially Filipino teams, later other Asian and European teams, served in OB in Vietnam. Their work was closely coordinated with Vietnamese Army operations which cleaned up Vietminh stay-behinds and started stabilizing rural areas. . . ."

Last but not least, the memorandum describes the Security Training Center (STC):

"This is a counter-subversion, counter-guerrilla and psychological warfare school overtly operated by the Philippine Government and covertly sponsored by the U.S. Government through CIA as the instrument of the

Country Team. It is located at Fort McKinley on the outskirts of Manila. Its stated mission is: 'To counter the forces of subversion in Southeast Asia through more adequate training of security personnel, greater cooperation, better understanding and maximum initiative among the countries of the area.'"

Of course, not all of American imperialism's allies are quite so dependent as the puppet regimes in Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Pentagon study indicates that the assistance of these more autonomous governments is enlisted in a manner more diplomatic than simply issuing orders through the CIA. The difference in status of various governments is apparent in the Pentagon study.

In late 1964, the Johnson administration worked out a two-stage plan for the escalation of the war against North Vietnam. Phase I was to consist of thirty days of raids along the coast and gradually increasing "reprisal" air strikes at North Vietnam. Phase II was to be the sustained air war, which actually began in late February 1965. A meeting at the White House on December 1, 1964, gave final approval to the plan.

"The meeting then moved," Neil Sheehan wrote in the June 14 *New York Times*, "into a discussion of which allied countries were to be briefed on the proposed air war. The President said he wanted 'new, dramatic effective' forms of assistance from several, specifically mentioning Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Philippines. These briefings by special envoys were included in the draft position paper laying out the bombing plan as the important diplomatic element in Phase I.

"In each case,' the study says, 'the representative was to explain our concept and proposed actions and request additional contributions by way of forces in the event the second phase of U.S. actions were entered.'"

U.S. imperialism's allies were not all told the same story, however. Sheehan reported:

"Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain was 'thoroughly briefed on the forthcoming U.S. actions' during a state visit to Washington Dec. 7 to 9, the narrative continues, while other envoys briefed the Canadians and the Asian allies. The writer notes that while Britain, Australia and New Zealand were given 'the full picture,'

the Canadians were 'told slightly less' and the Philippines, South Korea and the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan were 'briefed on Phase I only.' What the Thais and the Laotians were told is not made explicit."

All these governments, whether "democratic" regimes or puppet dictatorships, cooperated in Johnson's plans at least to the extent of concealing and providing political cover for the U.S. aggression.

The New Zealand government, the study says, raised doubts about the plan—not because of any scruples, but for fear that it would be ineffective.

The Australian government headed by Robert Menzies, which was briefed in early December by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, responded helpfully to Johnson's desire for "new, dramatic effective" assistance. On April 29, 1965, Menzies announced that he was sending an infantry battalion to South Vietnam. The decision, he said, was in response to a request from the Saigon "government."

The Canadian government throughout the course of the war has acted as Washington's courier to Hanoi and in the process has occasionally picked up useful bits of information outside of diplomatic channels. A report from J. Blair Seaborn, Canada's representative on the International Control Commission, provided the Pentagon in March 1965 with evidence that it needed to increase the scope of its bombing raids on North Vietnam.

Another Canadian diplomat, Chester A. Ronning, undertook a mission to Hanoi in June 1966, at a time when the U.S. was planning to escalate the air war by bombing oil storage facilities in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was in Europe at the time, cabled Johnson, urging that the air strikes be postponed until Ronning returned.

"I am deeply disturbed," Rusk said, "by general international revulsion, and perhaps a great deal at home if it becomes known that we took an action which sabotaged the Ronning mission to which we had given our agreement. . . ."

"When Mr. Ronning returned," Fox Butterfield wrote in the July 2 *New York Times*, "Assistant Secretary [William] Bundy flew to meet him in Ottawa, but quickly reported that the Canadian had found no opening or

flexibility in the North Vietnamese position."

The air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were launched shortly thereafter.

On July 4 of this year, however, Ronning told the *New York Times* that the Pentagon study was inaccurate in its description of the information he had brought back from Hanoi. His June trip, he said, was the second he had made.

In March of 1966, Ronning continued, he had spoken with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, who offered Johnson two major concessions in an attempt to get negotiations started. The North Vietnamese, Ronning said, offered to drop their demand for U.S. recognition of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and their insistence that U.S. troops withdraw prior to negotiations.

Johnson's decision to ignore these concessions and escalate the war further thus meant that Ronning's second trip had no point—unless the Canadian government was deliberately providing cover for the U.S. If the Hanoi-Haiphong air raids aroused too much revulsion, Johnson could point to the second Ronning mission, claiming that he had attempted to open peace talks but had been rebuffed by the North Vietnamese.

The tiny fraction of the Pentagon study so far published thus implicates the governments of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Taiwan in the U.S. aggression against Indochina. The forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon papers must contain large amounts of additional evidence on the complicity of these and other governments. □

military men of all parties and the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam), so that they may all rapidly return to their homes.

"These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date."

The proposal also offered a cease-fire "as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal."

The PRG initiative created a real dilemma for Nixon, who has no intention of withdrawing all U.S. troops until he can assure the maintenance of a puppet regime in Saigon. His difficulties were noted even by such capitalist newspapers as the *Washington Post*, which commented in a July 2 editorial:

"Just to the extent that the new offer makes it easier for the United States to retrieve the prisoners, however, it will be objectionable to Mr. Nixon, for it does not promise to satisfy his primary war aim which is to give the Saigon government a reasonable chance to survive without continuing American ground combat support. . . . Throw in the obvious point that a commitment to complete withdrawal would preclude Mr. Nixon's planned 45,000-man residual force . . . and it is not hard to see why he may find Mrs. Binh's plan 'objectionable.'"

Nixon appeared to have decided that the best means of dealing with the PRG proposal was to stall. Officials of the administration insisted on a need for "clarification" of the plan. Terence Smith observed in the July 3 *New York Times*:

"It seems more likely that the Administration will first probe the meaning and motive behind the other side's offer, and then perhaps respond with a proposal that conforms more closely to its own goals."

In the July 2 *Times*, James M. Naughton noted the "possibility" that Nixon, ". . . determined not to undercut the position of President Nguyen Van Thieu, would attempt to delay any resolution of the issues in Paris until after the presidential elections in South Vietnam in October."

But Nixon may have less time to stall than he would like to think.

The massive demonstrations against the war planned for the fall may now be swelled by hundreds of thousands of persons who realize that they can help force Nixon to bring *all* the troops home now. □

Vietnamese Offer to Free POW's

Peace Plan Causes Problem for Nixon

The seven-point peace proposal submitted July 1 by Nguyen Thi Binh, chief of the Provisional Revolutionary Government's (PRG) delegation to the Paris talks, has removed virtually the last prop from Richard Nixon's attempts to find some support for his war policies among the American people.

For months, Nixon has proclaimed that he would not withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam prior to the release of American prisoners of war. The government has engaged in a massive propaganda campaign designed to convince Americans that the prisoners are poorly treated and threatened with indefinite captivity.

The PRG proposal, which was supported by the North Vietnamese delegation, made it clear that the prisoners would be freed as soon as Nixon stopped the U.S. aggression in Indochina. The relevant portion of the text, according to a Reuters dispatch, reads as follows:

"If the U.S. Government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree



NGUYEN THI BINH

on the modalities:

"A. Of the withdrawal in safety from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp,

"B. Of the release of the totality of

A New Web Being Spun?



MOSHE DAYAN

"Have contacts been established between Israel and the USSR with a view toward resuming diplomatic relations between these two countries?" the well-informed Paris daily *Le Monde* asked in a front-page editorial June 30.

"Despite official denials, a certain number of indications enable us to answer this question in the affirmative. The following all seem to indicate that Israel and the Soviet Union want to normalize their relations:

"The authorities tried hard to conceal the visit to Israel June 13-18 of a Soviet journalist, Victor Louis, and the conversations he had with political figures in Jerusalem. In the past, Louis seems to have been entrusted with official missions. Rumors circulated last month that Golda Meir met secretly with Kremlin emissaries in Lapland. There is also Abba Eban's recent statement that he 'would not be surprised' if diplomatic relations were reestablished between Jerusalem and Moscow 'in the near future.'

"A larger number of exit visas have been granted this year to Soviet Jews (emigration has reached the record figure of several thousand persons). Finally, the Zionist organizations have put the wraps on their world-

wide campaign on behalf of the Soviet Jews."

In late June the Israeli paper *Maariv* published a report claiming that Finnish Foreign Minister Vaino Leskinen has acted as a "diplomatic mailbox" for Soviet-Israeli contacts.

United Press International cabled June 27: "Maariv quoted sources close to the American mission to the United Nations in New York as reporting the existence of the contacts which, they said, were a direct continuation of efforts begun during Premier Golda Meir's visit to Finland May 29. . . .

"It added that additional contacts between Israeli and Soviet representatives took place in Finland."

Victor Louis visited Israel ostensibly for medical reasons, to have his lumbago treated at the Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv. Observers did not fail to note, however, that the director of this hospital is Arieh Harel, former Israeli ambassador to Moscow.

"During his stay . . . Victor Louis . . . met various Israeli personalities," correspondent André Scemama reported in the June 30 issue of *Le Monde*. "The name of only one has been revealed—Simha Dinitz, Golda Meir's political secretary. . . . The two men had met in Moscow, where Dinitz was stationed in the Israeli embassy. Victor Louis, who has proclaimed his Jewish origin, visited the Wailing Wall, where, it is said, he did not hide his emotions."

Important wheeling and dealing in the Middle East also seemed indicated by the visit to Israel June 29 of Richard Helms, the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Among the main purposes of Mr. Helms's visit is believed to be an examination with Israeli authorities of the growing Soviet role in the Arab world and the eastern Mediterranean," a *New York Times* dispatch reported June 29.

The following day, a second dispatch noted: "Richard Helms has conferred with Premier Golda Meir and other top Israeli leaders. . . .

"Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Foreign Minister Abba Eban were among the other officials with whom



RICHARD HELMS



GOLDA MEIR

Mr. Helms discussed Middle Eastern problems, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said."

The June 30 *Le Monde* editorial noted: "Some in Israel fear resuming relations will lead to territorial concessions. Moreover, the USSR must convince all its Arab allies that its sending a representative to Jerusalem will not mean that it is going to sell out their interests." □

Why 6,000,000 Have Fled Bangla Desh

"We are determined to cleanse East Pakistan once and for all of the threat of secession, even if it means killing off two million people and ruling the province as a colony for 30 years." This was the message, Anthony Mascarenhas wrote in the June 13 London *Sunday Times*, that he heard "repeatedly" from high Pakistani military and civilian officials in East Bengal.

Mascarenhas's account of Yahya Khan's genocidal war against the Bengali people is all the more convincing in that the writer is a West Pakistani. He is, or was, the assistant editor of the Karachi *Morning News*, as well as Pakistan correspondent of the *Sunday Times*.

In early April, Mascarenhas and seven other Pakistani journalists were flown by the Yahya government to East Bengal. They were clearly given to understand that their task was to confirm the dictatorship's propaganda.

Mascarenhas, however, was so appalled by what he saw that he felt he had to publish the truth. In mid-May, he arranged for the *Sunday Times* to print his story, asking only that it be delayed until he could get his family out of Pakistan.

Mascarenhas's experiences left no room to doubt the kind of war that Yahya is waging:

"... as I travelled with the officers of the 9th Division headquarters at Comilla I witnessed at close quarters the extent of the killing. I saw Hindus, hunted from village to village and door to door, shot off-hand after a cursory 'short-arm inspection' showed they were uncircumcised. I have heard the screams of men bludgeoned to death in the compound of the Circuit House (civil administrative headquarters) in Comilla. I have seen truckloads of other human targets and those who had the humanity to try to help them hauled off 'for disposal' under the cover of darkness and curfew. I have witnessed the brutality of 'kill and burn missions' as the army units, after clearing out the reb-



YAHYA: His army plans to kill millions to maintain East Bengal colony.

els, pursued the pogrom in the towns and the villages.

"I have seen whole villages devastated by 'punitive action.'

"And in the officers mess at night I have listened incredulously as otherwise brave and honourable men proudly chewed over the day's kill."

The army justifies its actions on the basis of reactionary religious and racial prejudices. Hindus are the enemy and Bengalis are regarded as corrupted by Hinduism.

"The Hindus had completely undermined the Muslim masses with their money," one officer told Mascarenhas. "... It had reached the point where Bengali culture was in fact Hindu culture, and East Pakistan was virtually under the control of the Marwari businessmen in Calcutta. We have to sort them out to restore the land to the people, and the people to their Faith."

"The people here," said another officer, "may have Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are

Hindus at heart. . . . Those who are left will be real Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu."

Mascarenhas described the army's activity as "genocide conducted with amazing casualness."

"Sitting in the office of Major Agha, Martial Law Administrator of Comilla City, on the morning of April 19, I saw the off-hand manner in which sentences were meted out. A Bihari sub-inspector of police had walked in with a list of prisoners being held in the police lock-up. Agha looked it over. Then, with a flick of his pencil, he casually ticked off four names on the list.

"'Bring these four to me this evening for disposal,' he said. . . .

"Later that evening I saw these men, their hands and legs tied loosely with a single rope, being led down the road to the Circuit House compound. A little after curfew, which was at 6 o'clock, a flock of squawking mynah birds were disturbed in their play by the thwacking sound of wooden clubs meeting bone and flesh."

Yahya's policy, Mascarenhas wrote, is to convert the formerly semicolonial province into an open colony. In army headquarters in Dacca, the three-point government program was explained to him as follows:

"(1) The Bengalis have proved themselves 'unreliable' and must be ruled by West Pakistanis;

"(2) The Bengalis will have to be re-educated along proper Islamic lines. The 'Islamisation of the masses' — this is the official jargon — is intended to eliminate secessionist tendencies and provide a strong religious bond with West Pakistan;

"(3) When the Hindus have been eliminated by death and flight, their property will be used as a golden carrot to win over the underprivileged Muslim middle-class. This will provide the base for erecting administrative and political structures in the future."

"The first consideration of the army," Mascarenhas discovered, "has been and still is the obliteration of every trace of separatism in East Bengal.

This proposition is upheld by the continuing slaughter and by everything else that the government has done in both East and West Pakistan since March 25. The decision was coldly taken by the military leaders, and they are going through with it—all too coldly. . . .

"The crucial question is: will the killing stop?"

"I was given the army's answer by Major-General Shaukat Raza, commanding officer of the 9th Division, during our first meeting at Comilla on April 16.

"'You must be absolutely sure,' he said, 'that we have not undertaken such a drastic and expensive operation—expensive both in men and money—for nothing. We've under-

taken a job. We are going to finish it, not hand it over half done to the politicians so that they can mess it up again. The army can't keep coming back like this every three or four years. It has a more important task. I assure you that when we have got through with what we are doing, there will never be need again for such an operation.'"

Bengali Officer Describes Liberation War

2,000,000 Reported Slain by Yahya's Army

By S. B. Kolpe

[The following article originally appeared in the Bombay daily *Free Press Journal* of June 15. It was the concluding installment of a three-part series based upon an interview with a captain of the Bengali Mukti Fouj (Liberation Army).]

* * *

AGARTALA: The Captain of the Mukti Fouj was confident that the people of Bangla Desh would emerge victorious despite the ordeals they had to undergo during the last two months.

His own estimate was that about ten lakh [one lakh equals 100,000] civilians were killed by troops in Dacca, Chittagong and the other major towns and cantonment areas. Another ten lakhs might have been killed in the villages that have been destroyed or burnt down.

He said: "A proper assessment can be made only after our nation is liberated. But we know that every family in Bangla Desh has had at least one member killed or wounded in the war."

What would be the casualties suffered by the Pakistani army?

He thought at least 20,000 combat troops had been killed by the resistance forces and another 10,000 wounded.

As for other former Bengali personnel of the EPR [East Pakistan Rifles], BR [Bengali Regiment] and the Police now in the Mukti Fouj, he said that more than 75 per cent had survived the onslaught. Only those who were

caught sleeping in the barracks among the EPR and the BR men fell prey to machine-guns.

The EPR had a strength of about 18,000 and the BR men stationed in Bangla Desh numbered 7,000. More than 80 per cent among them were Bengalis.

At least three battalions of the BR, according to him, are disarmed and held prisoner in West Pakistan while one battalion had managed to escape from the West and join the Mukti Fouj in Bangla Desh. The Mukti Fouj, whose ranks were swelled by the auxiliary forces belonging to the armed police, Ansars and Mujjahids, had an initial strength of about 30,000 of trained soldiers.

The Captain said that at least 10,000 new recruits joined the Fouj by the end of May and another 20,000 were expected to be recruited by the end of June. New recruits are given rigorous training in the use of arms and guerilla techniques in fifteen different "sector camps" spread all along the Bangla Desh borders.

The overall command of the Mukti Fouj is provided by a team of four top officers. All the four field commanders have pledged their loyalty to the People's Republic of Bangla Desh headed by Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as its titular head.

How did the Fouj manage to arm itself?

The Captain said: "There is no mystery about it. We have carried what-

ever arms and ammunition we could. We also captured large quantities of arms from West Pakistani soldiers. Even now our commandos are capturing arms and ammunition from the enemy. But to tell you the truth, these are not enough to fight an organised Army equipped with the most sophisticated weapons supplied by USA, Britain, USSR and China. We need more."

How did he explain the reverses suffered by the Mukti Fouj?

His answer was equally candid. "We could not hold the major towns and cantonments without adequate fire power of heavy weapons like long-range mortars, artillery, etc. There were aerial bombings of the liberated zone. We needed anti-aircraft guns to defend ourselves, but we did not have them."

"The Pakistani Army numbering about 60,000 combat troops are dispersed all over Bangla Desh. They are now confined only to heavily protected cantonments. They hide inside bunkers near major check-posts on the borders. We have an advantage over the army which is surrounded by a totally hostile population. The Mukti forces have greater mobility. They are better acquainted with the terrain, roads and waterways."

"Our initial strategy of open confrontation with the army did not yield the required results. In some cases it proved costly. Therefore we decided to withdraw from big towns and resort to guerilla action. The enemy forces are vulnerable in the rural areas. We

can fight them on the battle fronts we choose for ourselves instead of providing ready targets for them to attack."

Could the Mukti Fouj not entrench itself in some parts of the liberated territory?

The Captain said: "Our Supreme Command decided against it. Rightly so. We can dislodge the enemy forces and capture some of the districts any day. But to retain control over them, we need better arms. We need our own fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns. Till we get them the guerilla war is the only correct strategy. We do not want our fighting forces to be so easily liquidated. The time is coming when the Pakistan Army will be forced to vacate the whole of Bangla Desh."

The Captain explained that despite the terror let loose by the army, the people in towns and villages welcomed Mukti Fouj Commandos and gave them every possible help.

He said: "In villages people have fought the marauding troops with bamboos, sticks and spears and have killed enemy forces. Temporarily there appears to be a lull. But people are fighting all the same."

He added: "I feel guilty. I am leading a second life as it were. My mother and sister are there inside. They are sending me messages of cheer. The people are recovering from the shock they suffered immediately after the commencement of the army operations which they never expected."

Asked about his own political convictions, the Captain said he had a "poor experience" about different political parties in Bangla Desh. "People belonging to different parties come to us. We don't ask them which party they belong to. It is enough that they are with us."

Was he aware of any extremist pro-Peking groups in Bangla Desh like the Naxalites in India?

His reply: "We have no Naxalites like those you have in your country. If by Naxalites you mean some sort of militant anarchist groups then the whole of our nation has become Naxalite! There is no room for any pro-Chinese group in our midst today."

The Captain regretted that the Chinese leaders should have adopted a policy of encouraging Yahya Khan in his genocide. "They seem to have forgotten the lessons of their own revolution."

The Captain made a particular reference to the "so-called" Muslim countries, like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. "We have deep contempt for the rulers of these countries. We have also contempt for the USA which continues to support Yahya Khan."

He was very apologetic about the situation created by the unprecedented influx of refugees into the Indian territory as a sequel to military operations inside Bangla Desh.

He said: "We are grateful to the Government and the people of India for giving our people the much-needed shelter. We do not wish to impose any further burdens on you. We assure you that all our people, Muslims and Hindus, will go back the moment it is possible for us to return."

It was about three in the morning. The Captain looked at his watch meaningfully. An additional batch of commandos had just returned after an "excursion" into Bangla Desh. There were reports about several soldiers having been killed; some road bridges having been blown up. There was a great deal of excitement all round.

The Captain asked me if I would join him in a minor "excursion" into Bangla Desh. I readily agreed. "There are risks in your accompanying us," he said, "but we hope to bring you

back safe. We won't go very far."

We, some five of us, walked across a field. The Captain said the area was safe. "The Army patrols seldom passed that way."

There was a kutchra [makeshift] road at the end of the field. A jeep was waiting for us. We got into the vehicle. The jeep speeded along the rough road. From a distance we could still hear exchanges of mortar fires. The Captain showed me a couple of villages totally deserted and the houses practically destroyed. There was no sign of human life anywhere.

After about two hours' drive the jeep stopped at a point near the Indian border. We got down. It was nearing day-break. The Captain shook hands with me.

"Farewell, dear friend," he said. "I hope to see you soon, maybe in Dacca, the capital of independent Bangla Desh." He added, still clasping my hand, "I have a message to convey through you to your journalist colleagues. We are all grateful to them for the wonderful work they have done to project our cause. We need their support."

We embraced each other. I promised to meet the Captain in Dacca before long. I saw my two guides waiting for me in another vehicle. We drove straight to Agartala. □

Women Open Battle for Right to Abortion

The Committee for a National Abortion Coalition has announced a U. S.-wide women's conference to be held in New York City on July 16, 17, and 18. The purpose of the conference will be to organize a national campaign to repeal all laws restricting women's rights to abortion.

The committee has received extensive support, including the participation of groups in every state, and the endorsement of women from Planned Parenthood, the National Organization for Women, the Welfare Rights Organization, campus women's liberation groups, abortion clinics, the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws, and nearly all radical political organizations.

The conference was planned at a June 12 meeting attended by more than 200 women.

The call to the conference states that the committee intends to involve all women in the repeal struggle: "Black, Chicana, Latina, Asian, Puerto Rican and Native American women, campus women, gay women, high-school students, housewives, professional, welfare and working women, young women and older women, women from churches, political organizations, trade unions, the military, and communities across the country." □

Missed the Important Point

A study by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration of the effectiveness of 3,000 drugs found that 15% were "ineffective," about 35% "possibly effective," 7% "probably effective," 19% "effective," and about 25% effective but with various reservations. The study did not cover the effectiveness of the drugs in producing profits for their manufacturers.

After the June 13 Election

By Livio Maitan

Rome

Although firmly rejecting the bugbear of a fascist or military coup d'etat, raised to cover the opportunist line of the traditional workers' parties, we pointed some time ago to certain tendencies in the Italian situation that are not without danger. In recent months especially, fascist or neofascist activity has been assuming more and more important proportions, as well as a consistency and aggressiveness never before possible. All this indicates that not unimportant groups of industrialists and landowners have decided to give financial support to the fascists. It confirms, moreover, that the extreme right is being favored with increasingly extensive complicity in the state apparatus, the police, and the courts.

The tumultuous episodes in Reggio di Calabria, and to a lesser extent in L'Aquila, have, in certain respects, been still more alarming. For the first time since the end of the war, fascist groups have succeeded in dominating and exploiting movements of popular discontent arising even in areas where the left parties have electoral influence. Other incidents, although far less spectacular, have also revealed that a fascist backlash is developing among petty-bourgeois strata fed up with the protracted social and political instability.

The results of the June 13 elections, which come within this context, represent another alarm bell. Of course it was, after all, only a local election, limited for the most part to regions in the center and south of the country. The Genoa results were a small part of the whole and did not seem to follow the trend that shaped up in Sicily, Rome, or Foggia. But even taking all this into account, the signs are still clear, and the worst policy would be to pretend that nothing is happening.

In their comments, the bureaucrats of the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party] put the blame for the neofascist success on the sterility of the center-left government and the turn to the right made

in recent months by the DC [Democrazia Cristiana—Christian Democracy].

There is no doubt that the center-left's inability to achieve its original objectives has been one of the main factors in the present crisis. In the years 1962-68 the Italian bourgeoisie proved itself incapable of a preventive reformist operation, thereby creating favorable conditions for the explosion in the last three years. Time after time it has failed to apply remedies—despite powerful pressures from below.

Certain laws passed recently, such as the rural-development-funds bill and the housing bill (the latter has not yet been ratified by the Senate) are textbook examples of rotten compromises that produce exactly the opposite of the desired result. Because of their inconsistent and contradictory character, such measures cannot satisfy the strata that are supposed to benefit from them. Therefore, these strata do not mobilize in support of them. But, at the same time, such reforms alarm more reactionary strata, which fear being hurt by them and which resort to any and all means to mount a counterattack.

The projected reforms in education, especially in higher education, have had the same effect. They are totally incapable of meeting the most elementary demands of the students. Nonetheless they have aroused bitter resistance from the more retrograde interests.

But we should note before going any further that the Communist party bureaucrats share the responsibility for this policy, inasmuch as they have provided important cover for the government (in the case of the housing law, it has been noted that the abstention of the Communist deputies was decisive in achieving passage).

Furthermore, the reform program that the PCI is advancing, primarily through the intermediary of the unions, would not in fact be free from difficulties similar to those associated with the reformism of the center-left. In the last analysis, there is no quali-

tative difference between the PCI and the government coalition in this area. The Communists' fundamental contradiction lies in projecting a reformist solution for the workers' movement at a time when the profound crisis of Italian society makes possible, in fact demands, a revolutionary perspective.

For precisely this reason, the PCI opportunists have also been unable to avoid a substantial sterility. They have given up revolutionary struggle against the system. At the same time they cannot implement their reformist policy. In the vacuum left by the lack of general political solutions, it was almost inevitable that retrogressive tendencies would set in.

The right turn of the DC was far from being an "error" or simply a tactical maneuver. It corresponded to a specific need of the ruling class in this phase. It was not by chance that only a few days apart the secretary of the DC, Forlani, and the chairman of the industrialists' association, Lombardi, expressed similar orientations.

The priority task for the bourgeoisie and the government is to bring about a return to "normalcy," first of all to reestablish the authority of the bosses in the plants, in order to permit a steadier pace of production. If this objective is not achieved in a relatively short time, the political and social crisis will worsen and disruptive tendencies will increase. Let us repeat: It was the vital need of the ruling class to avert this danger—and not simply or even primarily electoral opportunism—that determined the most recent positions of the Christian Democratic leadership.

The June 13 elections revealed—most of all in the cases of Sicily, Rome, and Foggia—that there are capitalist and landowning groups ready to use neofascism to achieve their objectives. At the same time, the vote showed that important strata of the petty bourgeoisie and urban middle-bourgeoisie, to say nothing of sectors of the popular masses in economically and socially disrupted areas, can now provide mass support for these maneuvers.

What are the prospects for the near future? The variant of the government enlarging its base by overtures to the PCI has become still less probable than before. On the other hand, the situation has changed with respect to the chances for a governmental bloc weighted more to the right. The fascist and neofascist organizations came

out of the June elections strengthened. They will probably try to increase their role as an instrument of repression and reactionary violence operating outside of the "legal" state apparatus.

But the weight of the neofascists has also increased notably in the area of parliamentary politics. In the present context, the DC will be compelled to rely increasingly on support from the MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano—Italian Social Movement, the neofascists] for its conservative projects and to counterbalance any balking by the Socialists (with Communist support). It is significant that in the statements he made immediately after the elections, the fascist leader Almirante made an overture in this direction, calling on his followers to demonstrate a sense of responsibility and restrain themselves from expressions of joy that might provoke incidents. It need scarcely be added that tendencies in the state apparatus toward complicity with the neofascists will receive considerable encouragement from the increase in the MSI vote.

The conditions for a complete about-face by the DC and thus for a rightist bloc, to be sure, do not exist. Thus, the center-left still seems the only possible alternative. This is all the more true because the Christian Democratic losses were in part compensated for by the rather good showing of the Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans.

But in the aftermath of these elections, the center-left will be rent by still more acute conflicts. (We need only think of the fact that the Socialists will have to react to the increased strength of the extreme right in a way opposite to the direction in which the DC will inevitably seek to move.) Moreover, the center-left will now be strongly tipped to the right. The gains of the Republicans, and even more of the Social Democrats, represent a strengthening of the moderate wing.

It is not insignificant that in its comment on the elections, *La Stampa*, the mouthpiece of the FIAT company, although it has been in the forefront of the center-left and has flirted with reformism, called the Christian Democratic and Socialist left to order, declaring "all these rebellious speeches and gestures on the left gained no votes."

If, despite all these considerations, we must still avoid impressionistically drawing any pessimistic conclusions,

it is essentially because the struggles in recent months and in these last weeks themselves—from FIAT to Zanussi—have proved that the workers' upsurge is far from running out of steam.

These battles have demonstrated that the workers in the strongest and most advanced categories are not ready to see the gains they made in 1969-70 wiped out by higher prices and a rationalization that results in increased exploitation. The workers have also shown that they are unwilling to return to "their place" and subject themselves once again to a rigidly hierarchical organization within the plants, or to yield to the threat of higher levels of unemployment. They are continuing to struggle for a system of organizing work that would be at least bearable and for consolidation of the relationship of forces established in the last three years.

Unless there are failures and setbacks in this struggle, the day of victory will never come for the conservatives, and the system will not overcome its crisis of disintegration. Demonstrations such as the one May 30 in Rome and the one June 12* in Milan are additional indications that there are ample possibilities for successfully meeting the offensive of the conservatives and reactionaries.

In order to achieve this result, however, certain definite conditions are required. The first is that the struggles in progress or in prospect be led with an understanding of the overall situation and the relationship of forces. In other words, it is essential to make every effort to assure a successful outcome of such important struggles as those at FIAT and Zanussi. But it is no less essential to prevent the proliferation of conflicts and to avoid provoking explosions light-mindedly, without worrying too much about their chance of success.

Similarly, we must be attentive to the fact that struggles that stretch out too long, or are started up again after too brief a respite, produce symptoms of attrition and fatigue. We need not waste many words on explaining how dangerous such phenomena are in the present context.

* The far-left organizations, including the Italian section of the Fourth International, organized a demonstration of 30,000 persons in Milan in support of workers struggling for better housing and in protest against police attacks on homeless people squatting in empty apartments.

The need for a strategy based on transitional demands—demands with an anticapitalist dynamic—is still more urgent. The points we have raised several times in *Bandiera Rossa* (as well as in the editorial in the first issue in the new series of the magazine *IV Internazionale*) on workers' control, housing questions, the sliding scale of wages, prices, taxes, etc., remain on the agenda. It is more than ever important for the workers to defend the democratic bodies that arose in the great struggles—to defend them from all attacks by the bosses and from all bureaucratic distortions.

In the face of fascist and reactionary attacks, the left must free itself from all sectarian reflexes and must understand the need for a united-front policy. And if we want a united front, we obviously cannot leave out the unions—or the opportunist parties, either.

If the revolutionary left is able to move in this direction, it will not only help to prevent a dangerous evolution in which we would be the first victims. At the same time, we can begin to be seen by broad working-class strata as offering a real alternative solution, and we can start to take decisive steps along the road to building the Leninist revolutionary party. □

Germans Tap British Asset

The British and West German governments are currently examining ways of controlling the flow of skilled labor from Great Britain to Germany.

There are already 15,000 British subjects working in Germany, and the German embassy in London reported that it has received a similar number of entry applications in the first five months of 1971.

Many of the emigrants were employees of Britain's ailing steel industry, which plans new layoffs during the next year.

The London *Times* of June 14 reported that "certain diplomatic sources in Germany" have expressed "surprise" that Britain seems so willing to allow one of its greatest assets—skilled labor—to leave the country. Far from being concerned about overpopulation, the German government has stated that it is ready to absorb as much skilled British labor as is available.

Meanwhile, British capitalism, on whose empire the sun never used to set, has been put in the embarrassing position of choosing between two hardly world-conquering alternatives: allowing thousands of valuable workers to emigrate, or seeking to attract German investment to England so that British workers may be able to find jobs. □

Hugo Blanco, Hector Bejar Interviewed

[We have translated the following interview from the June 10 issue of the Stockholm daily *Dagens Nyheter*. From the text it appears that the Swedish correspondent, Bobi Sourander, may not have talked to Hugo Blanco and Héctor Béjar together, but has put together a composite interview. While this is not specified, it seems to be indicated by the statement that since their release from prison "they have not even met."]

* * *

Peru is a country deformed by centuries of social injustice, a typical part of the third world.

For two and a half years it has been ruled by a junta of generals—there is not a single civilian minister. These generals lead an army whose outstanding military exploit during this century was suppressing the 1962-65 peasant uprisings and outbreaks of guerrilla warfare.

Hugo Blanco and Héctor Béjar were jailed in those years.

The generals rapidly gained attention by a long series of reforms and by running the country's economy with an iron hand. New, intelligent decrees issued from their ministries—decrees on land reform, industrial co-operatives, nationalizations . . . and finally a surprising decree granting full amnesty to all political prisoners. Why was this decree issued?

Héctor Béjar, who spent five years in Lurigancho, Peru's only model prison, answered:

"Yes, why? They were taking a lot of political risks in both the domestic and international context. Nevertheless, we are out. This is the first unconditional amnesty ever granted in this country. I think that it is a token of the government's good intentions to respect all opposition. It was an attempt, moreover, to improve their reputation, which had been tarnished during their campaigns against the radical left."

Hugo Blanco, who spent six years [actually almost eight years—*IP*] in prison, most of them in the Gehenna of El Frontón, answered:

"Under the pressure of European

public opinion, they released the best-known prisoners. I was sentenced to death before a long series of well-known intellectuals spoke out on my behalf. In Sweden, Amnesty International chose me as political prisoner of the year. If it had not been for this, I would never have been released. There are still at least fifty political prisoners in Peru. They are less well known than we are."

Question: What induced these officers, led by President and General Juan Velasco, to take power and produce this series of reforms?

Béjar: Although they approached the problem from a different position, they, like us, wanted to put an end to the domination of this country by the U. S. and the big landowners. It would take a long explanation to show why they took this attitude, but it is likely that precisely their campaign against us served as a stimulus to reflection. These generals come from the same middle class as we student and peasant leaders. They have never been and never will be mercenaries of big capital. The fact is that they are on the road to making our revolution.

Blanco: The rise of the generals is an indication that imperialism has changed. First the U. S., with the support of our ruling class, stole our raw materials. Now a number of highly developed industrial countries need new markets. Our ruling generals want to bind Peru to this bloc—for their own survival.

Question: Are they succeeding?

Béjar: They have already succeeded. They have guided Peru's first steps toward economic liberation both from the U. S. and from the all-powerful Peruvian ruling class. Just look at the big sugar plantations in the north. Who is making the decisions there? Not the U. S. embassy, or the Grace or Guildemeister families either!

Blanco: The generals can never succeed. There is no way for any country in the third world really to catch up with the industrialized capitalist countries.

Question: What is the greatest difficulty the generals are facing?

Béjar: Their biggest problem is one that always exists when reforms come from the top—to win the support of the common man for their methods. You can see that the people are reacting passively to the government's reforms, however well disposed they are to them.

Blanco: The people! The generals don't dare permit a movement arising directly from the people's needs. The popular minister of the interior, General Artola, was obliged to suppress squatters in the slum area of Pamploña by force. After that he had to resign his post . . .

Question: Is Peru a democracy where every citizen can defend his beliefs?

Béjar: It all depends on the circumstances . . . But, to answer briefly. This country is achieving important revolutionary objectives, maintaining a large measure of freedom of expression at the same time.

Blanco: They won't let me leave Lima. I have been absolutely forbidden to go to the valley of La Convención, where the peasants are waiting for me. I was jailed for twenty-four hours after criticizing the government at a rally.

The land reform, the military government's first big project, will soon be two years old and strikes have begun to develop.

Béjar: The government has made mistakes and has been impeded by a reactionary bureaucracy. But the reason for the strikes is that some formerly privileged groups of workers have made errors.

Blanco: At the Casa Grande sugar plantation, the so-called owners have gone on strike against themselves! Overpaid functionaries were running the revolution from the former bosses' houses. The plantation is a state enterprise, not a cooperative.

The peasants in the highlands are afraid; I know it. They do not dare oppose a reform that is not the kind they want. Why, for instance, should they pay for the land when it was once taken from them?

Question: Are you both still politically active?




Photo by Bobi Sourander

HUGO BLANCO IN LIMA: Since his release from prison last December, the government has barred the Trotskyist leader

from returning to the area where he led a peasant rebellion in 1962-63.

Béjar: I am a socialist. I support the military men insofar as they are working for the same goals I want to see achieved. But is there any reason they should cease doing so? Isn't it possible that they, like many other Peruvians, feel a willingness to make sacrifices to raise their country from poverty? Must a revolution be made by socialists?

Blanco: I am a Trotskyist. Revolutions are not made by ordering the people to make them. And when a revolution has started, no one can tell it what to do.

Question: What do you think about prisons?

Béjar: Being imprisoned is the worst thing that can happen to a man. The government has issued a decree on prison reform but it hasn't gone into effect.

Blanco: The prisons mirror the cruelest truths about any country. In

El Frontón, 90 percent of the prisoners were homosexuals.

* * *

Héctor Béjar and Hugo Blanco each give their own picture of their country. Since their release they have not even met.

Despite his expression of sympathy for the government, Béjar gives no impression that he is acting against his convictions. He works as a journalist for the political weekly *Oiga*. He met me along with his wife, Ana María, who visited Sweden during her campaign to win her husband's release. Béjar argues with wit and good humor.

He obviously enjoys his freedom.

Hugo Blanco lives alone, in what can clearly be called poor circumstances. He makes his living by writing articles and resides in a cheap rooming house. He was waiting for a delegation of peasants from La Con-

vinción. When they failed to come, he was visibly disappointed.

He obviously longs to be in La Convención, the valley where it all started, the whole process that brought the officers to power. □

Boasting About Silent Partner?

During the May election campaign in Trinidad and Tobago, Prime Minister Eric Williams, leader of the only party that did not boycott the elections, was reported to have said, "I am the power. I say come and they cometh. I say go and they goeth."

He could be right if, as we presume, "they" are the U. S. marines.

British Paper Won't Pay Piper

"We all admire the way Prince Philip has pitched in to help take the enormous weight of royal engagements off the Queen's shoulders. But when Philip wants £1,600 a week for doing so, the time has come to call a halt." — *News of the World*, commenting on a suggestion that Philip's salary be doubled.

The Revolutionary Left in Brazil

By Eduardo Pinheiro and J. Mattos

[Continued from last issue.]

We have pointed out the deep contradictions corroding underdeveloped Brazilian capitalism. Despite its relative stabilization, the military dictatorship is incapable of resolving the political and social contradictions engendered by the system of exploitation and oppression it upholds. It thus cannot allay the discontent and rebelliousness of the popular masses.

What Stage Have the Revolutionists Reached?

Nonetheless, the regime will not automatically collapse under the weight of its contradictions.

What is needed is a revolutionary leadership capable of uniting the struggle on different fronts and focusing it on overthrowing the system through a prolonged revolutionary war.

The ripening of objective conditions alone cannot assure a revolutionary outcome. Subjective forces must crystallize, capable of intervening in the situation consciously.

From this standpoint, the decisive factor for the continued development of the political situation is to form this revolutionary leadership, this revolutionary vanguard. For all consistent revolutionary militants, this task takes priority.

In order to estimate how far we have gone in the direction of forming such a revolutionary leadership in Brazil, we must first examine the present stage of the Brazilian far left and the place of the different revolutionary organizations within it. In short, we must give an accounting of the subjective forces as they exist today.

The Brazilian revolutionary left today is divided into a large number of organizations and groups. In general, they can be said to have originated in the wake of the Cuban revolution, developing from the repercussions that the crisis of the official Communist movement had on the traditional left organizations (the Stalinists and the nationalists). This develop-

ment was accelerated by the formulations of the Castroist leadership and, to a lesser extent, by the Sino-Soviet debate.

But in a more specific sense, these organizations were formed because, after the 1964 defeat, many activists took stock of the failure of the reformist policy of the Stalinists and nationalists. When the military managed to carry off its coup d'etat without any real mass response, these activists became critical of past practices.

The revolutionary left organizations have been formed through an extremely complex process of ruptures, splits, and regroupments. Splits have occurred not only in the official PCB [Partido Comunista Brasileiro—Brazilian Communist party] led by Luis Carlos Prestes, but also in left nationalist sectors such as those linked to the former governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola,⁸ as well as in Polop! [Política Operária—Workers Politics],⁹ which was the main organization standing to the left of the PCB before 1964; and in AP [Ação Popular—People's Action], the organization of radicalized Catholics.

It is possible to separate out a few principal tendencies or currents that can serve as points of reference enabling us to get a clearer view of the complex panorama represented by the far left today. Obviously this classification can only be schematic. Important differences persist within these major currents, and some organizations occupy an intermediate ground between them. Nonetheless, the recent evolution, the alliances knitted in action, and the regroupments that have tended to develop offer a basis for making such a classification that no one could call subjective.

8. The brother-in-law of President Goulart and the leader of the left wing of the Brazilian Labor party.

9. Founded in 1961 by elements coming from the Socialist and Worker Youth and Luxemburgian intellectuals from the Independent Socialist Youth.

(A) *A Current That Calls Itself a "National Liberation Movement" and Styles Itself the "Armed Left"*

This is the way we might designate the current constituted around the pole of the VPR [Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária—Revolutionary People's Vanguard] and the ALN [Ação Libertadora Nacional—National Liberation Action]. These organizations characterize the Brazilian revolutionary process as a struggle for national liberation.¹⁰

The VPR and the ALN have been the groups that have carried out the armed actions against the military dictatorship in the recent period. As a result they have become the center of the opposition to the regime, the focus of the prestige and sympathy inspired by the stand of the revolutionary left but also by the intensity of the repression.

The ALN was led first by Comrade Carlos Marighella and then by Comrade Joaquim Camara Ferreira, who was known as "Toledo." Both were killed by the repressive forces. The ALN was constituted mostly by activists coming from the PCB. Marighella's statements and manifestos provided the political basis around which the ALN coalesced.

Marighella made his main contribution after returning from the OLAS conference. In the intense ideological debate of 1967-68, he stressed the primacy of revolutionary action and initiative, no matter what their origin. This nonauthoritarian conception of revolutionary activity was embodied in the organizational practice of the ALN. It tends to be very broadly federative in character, leaving the local groups almost complete freedom of action.

On the strategic level, the ALN defined rural guerrilla warfare as the dominant form of struggle in the Brazilian revolution. Urban actions were characterized sometimes as a means of preparing the way for rural guerrilla warfare, sometimes as a tactical feint to confuse the repressive forces awaiting the guerrillas in the rural areas.

But it was the VPR, the organization

10. Smaller groups could also be classed as part of this current, such as the Tiradentes Revolutionary Movement, Democratic Resistance, and even the October 8 Revolutionary Movement (MR-8, the former Communist opposition group in Rio de Janeiro).

that was led by Carlos Lamarca and included many activists coming from left nationalist circles and from splits in Polop,¹¹ that went furthest in its attempts to make up a theory to fit its political practice. This was exemplified in *The Path of the Vanguard*, a collection of documents written by Comrade Jamil.¹²

In the introduction to Comrade Jamil's pamphlet, a balance sheet is drawn of the activity of the "armed left" that is sometimes quite lucid. It recognizes the highly empirical character of this activity and the way actions designed to accumulate forces, which had little explicit political context, in a specific context made this current the only real opposition to the dictatorship.

At the same time the introduction pointed up the main problem of this "armed left"—its isolation from the main strata of the popular masses that have revolutionary potential. Moreover, it did not overlook the "armed left's" political shortcomings, especially the gaps in its conception of armed propaganda.

Comrade Jamil also recognized quite correctly that the Brazilian revolution can only be socialist and that the alternative of an anti-imperialist revolution as opposed to a socialist one does not exist. But he did this only preliminarily to explaining, by means of very dubious arguments, that out of tactical reasons the VPR must consider its fight a national liberation struggle.

In fact, the origin of what we believe to be the false conceptions of the VPR lies in its misunderstanding the relationship of the vanguard to the masses. The VPR does not understand the vanguard's task of educating the masses. Therefore, it does not see the need for a program of demands and slogans that interlock dialectically and link the immediate concerns and aspirations of the popular sectors to

11. More precisely, the VPR arose in 1968 out of the fusion of a group of members of the old Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, an organization of military officers linked to Brizola; and the group that split from Polop in Sao Paulo.

12. This pamphlet was published in Portuguese and dated 1970 (September?). It was a collection of internal documents. Jamil was one of the forty-one prisoners freed in exchange for the German ambassador.

the political struggle, the armed struggle.

It seems clear that without such a program it is impossible to reach the point of integrating significant sectors of the masses into the armed struggle. That is, unless we have a program of this type, we can never break the isolation of the vanguard, which for the moment has taken on alone the tasks of accumulating forces, of armed propaganda, and of harrying the dictatorship in the present stage of the revolutionary war. It is essential to make progress in breaking this isolation before we can move on to a higher stage in the struggle.

In their desire to wipe the slate clean of all traces of Stalinist reformism, the VPR has espoused one-sided and schematic formulations reflecting the influence of Comrade Debray's writings. In this they have in fact disregarded the lessons of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the Latin American and worldwide revolutionary movement. But, no matter whether they are advanced by the Stalinists or by Comrade Debray, abstract schemata cannot serve as useful guides to action.

Thus, for example, the VPR defends setting standards for membership and maintaining freedom of political debate internally as essential principles for any revolutionary organization. Nonetheless, it rejects Leninism, failing to see that these principles represent Lenin's concepts of the need for imposing serious criteria for party membership and of the need for democratic centralism, the only correct guide for political discussion in a revolutionary party.

The VPR confuses these still valid and necessary *Leninist principles* with the *organizational system* that may flow from them at a given moment and which was embodied in the Bolshevik party at the time of the Russian revolution. The repellent image of the Stalinist parties has certainly contributed to bringing about this confusion between Leninist principles of vanguard organization and the bureaucratic and paralyzing caricature of which the PCB was a good example.

It is also true that no sector in the entire Brazilian left has proved capable of applying Leninism to contemporary problems and defending it effectively. No sector has been able to show concretely how Leninism could answer the problems posed in a way that could educate the rest of the rev-

olutionary militants, instead of relying on abstract and wordy admonitions.

It is no less true that organizations like the VPR and the ALN have had the merit of posing, in acute form, the need for armed struggle in Brazil. They have thus helped considerably to clear away all reformist and pacifist illusions.

(B) *A Current That Calls Itself "Socialist" or "Proletarian"*

This tendency is centered around the VAR-Palmares [Vanguarda Armada Revolucionaria-Palmares—the Palmares Armed Revolutionary Vanguard] and the POC [Partido Operário Comunista—Communist Workers party]. These organizations concur in characterizing the nature of the Brazilian revolution as socialist and share the aim of playing a role in building a revolutionary workers' party. They consider such a party essential to victory.

The VAR-Palmares arose out of various splits in Polop. A unification in 1969 with the forces that today make up the VPR¹³ proved ephemeral. Since then these organizations have moved continually further apart in their formulations and practice. The elements composing the VAR-Palmares contributed to the first wave of armed actions in 1968. They were hard hit by repression. Furthermore, a prolonged internal debate has largely paralyzed the organization.¹⁴

The POC was founded in 1968, as the product of a fusion between Polop and the Leninist Opposition in the PCB in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The objective of this organization was to offer an alternative to the organizations belonging to the "armed left" current, which it criticized as "militarists." It wanted to incorporate armed actions into the perspective of developing its industrial work, through a campaign of armed propa-

13. In fact, the VPR united with the National Liberation Commandos (Colina, which originated in the splits from Polop in Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais) and adopted the name of VAR-Palmares. The armed sector of the new organization split away immediately, resuming the name VPR.

14. In 1970 the VAR-Palmares addressed an open letter to the opposition group in Rio de Janeiro, to the POC, and the PRT, making proposals for unity in action on a permanent basis.

ganda that would be another side of its work in the factories.

In practice the POC was unable to constitute such an alternative. Marked by the past experience of Polop, whose activity was mainly taken up with the ideological struggle against nationalism and Stalinist reform, the POC was unable to adapt to the new conditions of the class struggle in Brazil. Furthermore, its national isolation and indecisiveness with regard to the problems of the international Communist movement—in short, the centrism it inherited from Polop—prevented it from understanding the crisis of Stalinism as it was developing in Latin America, a crisis made more acute by the Cuban revolution.

As a result, the POC proved incapable of organizing a regroupment on a large scale of the sectors that had split from the PCB after their internal struggles. Since it never really had a tactic for building the party, the POC, like Polop before it, was restricted to exercising an abstract and diffuse ideological influence. Almost all the new militant cadres in Brazil have gotten their training in the ABC's of Marxism from Polop, but they have quickly joined the other revolutionary left organizations in course of formation.

The POC's failure to formulate a tactical course was also reflected in the confused character of the perspectives it advanced for the workers' movement. It showed a failure to grasp the relationship between the economic and political struggles of the working class. This was concretized when the POC made a dichotomy between economic demands on the one hand and an abstract political perspective of socialist revolution on the other.

The POC likewise could find no clear organizational alternative to project vis-à-vis the state-controlled unions, nor could it indicate any intermediary steps leading in this direction. In short, this predominantly petty-bourgeois organization, which concentrated its forces in industrial work, had neither the political equipment nor the organizational instruments for gaining a foothold in the working class.

These serious gaps in its program, and the deviations resulting therefrom, meant that the POC not only did not constitute the *practical* alternative to the "armed left" that it hoped to be. But one might go so far as to doubt

that it posed a *theoretical* alternative either. Its ill-timed as well as abstract, dogmatic, and sectarian critique of "militarism" incline us to think that it did not.

At the end of 1969, an opposition tendency appeared, developing a thoroughgoing critique of the POC leadership. In 1970, as soon as they realized that the opposition group was winning a majority, the leadership split away, resuming the name Polop.¹⁵ In this way, it cut short the political discussion challenging its traditional orientation. On that occasion, the POC showed how formally and superficially it had learned the lessons of Leninism.

The new leadership of the POC, the comrades who had previously headed the opposition group, began to draw a balance sheet of the Brazilian revolutionary left, including a criticism of themselves, which was a correct method.¹⁶ With the encouragement of some of its members who do not hide the fact that they sympathize with Trotskyism¹⁷ and have been influenced by it, the POC seems to have made an effort at working out a tactical course, incorporating the concept of a transitional program. But it is clear that it has not yet solved the political and organizational questions that must be solved before the party can expand its influence in the workers' movement, which up until now

15. It is now called the "*Politica Operaria* Marxist-Leninist Combat Organization," and refers to itself as the proletarian faction of the POC.

16. In the July 1970 issue of *Politica Operaria*, the organ of the POC.

17. In Brazil Trotskyism has long been identified with the Posadas group, which today is entirely disoriented and demoralized as a result of its poor political line. The events of May 1968 in France and the role played by the Jeunesse Communiste Revolutionnaire [Revolutionary Communist Youth] have had a rather important impact. As a result, the prestige of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League], the French section of the Fourth International; of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [Revolutionary Workers party], the Bolivian section of the Fourth International, led by Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso; and of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores [Revolutionary Workers party] in Argentina has had the effect of making known the analyses and the activity of the Fourth International. But there is no organization in Brazil belonging to the Fourth International or maintaining any special relationship with it.

it has considered its most important arena of work.

(C) *A Reformism of a New Type—Maoism*

There are two Brazilian Maoist organizations—the PC do B [Partido Comunista do Brasil—Communist party of Brazil] and the AP [Acção Popular—People's Action].

The PC do B was formed in 1962 as the result of the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the old pro-Moscow PCB headed by Prestes. It was the first organization to develop as a pro-Chinese alternative to the traditional Communist parties anywhere in the world. A number of old Stalinist cadres, including former national leaders of the PCB, headed it up.

Before the 1964 coup d'etat, the PC do B carried on only low-level activity of the propagandistic type. Since 1964, it has grown hardly at all, having difficulty in distinguishing itself in action from the line of the Prestes PCB. This is understandable in view of the fact that the PC do B, the Maoist group given official recognition by the *Peking Review*, carried over to Brazil the whole schema of revolution by stages, the bloc of four classes, etc., developed by the Stalinists. Seasoning this with the sauce of "people's war" changes nothing in the strategic perspectives it implies. The objectives of the struggle and the sought-for class alliances remain the same.

The young, dynamic, and rising wing of Brazilian Maoism is represented by the AP. Founded in 1961, it was originally a grouping of radicalized Catholics, which rapidly gained hegemony over the student movement through the UNEB [União Nacional dos Estudantes do Brasil—National Union of Students of Brazil]. Before 1964, the AP was the typical expression of the political inconsistency of a populist petty-bourgeoisie incapable of extricating itself from the nationalism dominant on the left.

The AP subsequently evolved progressively toward Marxism first and then Maoism, finding in Maoism the "materialist" or "class struggle" theoretical basis for the populism which is still its dominant trait. This process of radicalization was long and difficult, involving many ruptures and splits. One of these breakaways was the group of activists who left with the former priest Alipio de Freitas,

and founded the PRT [Partido Revolucionario dos Trabalhadores—Revolutionary Workers party]. This formation characterizes the Brazilian revolution as socialist and rejects the conception of revolution by stages.

In its work and recruitment, the AP profited from the crisis in the Catholic church and in organizations like the JOC [Juventude Operária Católica—Catholic Worker Youth] and the JUC [Juventude Universitária Católica—Catholic Student Youth]. It also underwent a change in the character of its membership in the period which it itself calls ultraleft today, when it sent its student members into the countryside to begin "people's war." Through this policy it got rid of a good number of the dilettante elements that had traditionally composed it.

Today the AP is more Maoist than the official Maoists of the PC do B themselves. The strength it represents and its potential for expansion have already won it recognition from *Peking Review*. The AP advances the perspective of fusing with the PC do B to form a "united Marxist-Leninist party," a "proletarian party of a new type," to be sure. So far it has been blocked by the reluctance of the old Stalinist cadres of the PC do B, who understand very well that a fusion would in fact mean that they would be absorbed by the younger and more dynamic force represented by the AP. In any case, such a fusion would make Brazil the only country in Latin America apart from Colombia where the Maoists constituted anything substantial from the organizational point of view.

Of course, it will be said that the political line represented by Maoism is untenable in Latin America. Even though it proclaims its support for "people's war," Maoism remains in its political formulations a Stalinist reformism of a new type. And the political formulations are decisive. The fact that the PCV [Partido Comunista Venezolano—Venezuelan Communist party] and the PGT [Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo—Guatemalan party of Labor, the Communist party] joined in the armed struggle did not alter their reformism in the least. These Stalinist parties maintained their perspective of a bourgeois-democratic revolution as the first "stage," involving the habitual alliances with the sector of the ruling class that they call the national bourgeoisie.

Of course, the AP's sectarianism and

dogmatism repels many. They have no fear of seeming ridiculous, apparently, since their organ *Libertação* went to the point of criticizing the kidnapping of the German ambassador as a diversion, because German imperialism was a "secondary" factor with respect to American imperialism, which represents the "main contradiction." AP's analyses of the Castroist leadership and the Cuban regime as "petty bourgeois" are also hard for Latin Americans to swallow. In their eyes, socialist Cuba remains the first territory of this continent liberated from imperialist domination and capitalist exploitation.

But this is not enough to seal the fate of Maoism in Brazil. There are structural factors that give a certain staying power to the Maoist current. First and most importantly, there is the weight of People's China in the international relationship of forces, its role as a center in the crisis of the traditional Communist movement. Moreover, the social structure in Brazil, in which the peasants have considerable weight, lends a certain measure of credibility to the Maoist conceptions of people's war. Finally, in view of the crisis of the Cuban leadership as a leadership for the continental struggle, the Maoist current might seem to some disillusioned sectors to offer an alternative, despite its sectarian critique of "petty-bourgeois foquismo."

For these reasons it would be wrong for those who are dedicated to building a genuinely revolutionary leadership in Brazil to underestimate the political opponent the Maoists represent in the present conjuncture. The Maoists' refusal to engage in struggles in the workers' movement that have an anticapitalist dynamic, and the braking role they are always ready to play because of their abstract schemas, give some notion of how pernicious their activity can be. From this standpoint, it is not enough to ignore them, as many Brazilian revolutionists do. They must be combated politically.

What About the PCB?

Finally, although it is harder and harder to class this group as part of the far left, we should say a word or two about the Stalinist PCB of Prestes.

The whole body of Stalinist revisionist analyses and reformist perspectives

was discredited by the military coup of 1964. The PCB was hard hit by the crisis that swept it as a result, and by numerous splits which deprived it of its best cadres and most dynamic sectors. It was virtually bled white. And the crisis affected the top circles of the party as well, not just the rank and file.¹⁸ The party also lost all the influence it had in the student movement, as well as the prestige it enjoyed in the workers' movement, where it no longer had the means to carry on its reformist policy of applying pressure to win concessions.

However, its inactivity must not lead us to believe that the PCB has vanished totally and forever from the political scene. Because of its ties with Moscow, the Stalinist apparatus can survive and rebuild the party, no matter how deep the crisis it has undergone. It represents in this country the current that finds its *raison d'être* in submission to the Soviet bureaucracy and in defending the international interests of this stratum. Despite the increasingly acute crisis of international Stalinism, this current will survive for some time.

In Brazil, more specifically, the apparatus headed by the veteran Prestes is adopting the same attitude today that it held under the Vargas dictatorship. It is waiting for things to change, waiting for better times. It hopes that then it will again be able to play a role. The experience of the team of pro-Moscow CP civilian cadres in Peru offers an example of such a possibility. They have taken advantage of the opportunity provided by the reformist military junta and a political conjuncture favorable to their perspectives to win new bases of support and solidify their positions. And they have done this despite the fact that the Peruvian party, led by Eudocio Ravines, suffered serious blows in the preceding period.

These factors give continued relevance to struggling against the reformist and revisionist formulations of Stalinism.

A Necessary Balance Sheet

The present situation demands that the revolutionary left pause for a mo-

18. It must be remembered that prestigious leaders like Marighella, Mario Alves, Jacob Gorender, and others split from the party.

ment of reflection. It must add up the pluses and minuses of its three years of experience in armed struggle and draw the necessary lessons for its future action.

Stalinism has been a straitjacket for the revolutionary vanguard. Even critiques made of it have not always succeeded in breaking free of the schemas and conceptions imposed in the preceding period. Such formulations have been very costly for the revolutionary vanguard that formed in the wake of the Cuban revolution. They have resulted in defeats, lost opportunities, and the death of courageous fighters. Empiricism has received a new boost, and, along with Stalinism, the experiences of the preceding revolutionary struggles have been rejected, as well as the lessons of Marxism-Leninism.

The Brazilian revolutionary left has followed its course in singular isolation not only from the struggles being waged in the rest of the world but even in the rest of the Latin American continent. However, the strategic and tactical problems arising anew to confront the Brazilian left cannot be dealt with in isolation. In the last analysis, moreover, in view of the reality of American imperialism and its role as the policeman of the international capitalist system, the Brazilian revolutionary process can only be successful on a continental scale. Thus the perspective of uniting the Brazilian far left on the basis of a revolutionary Marxist line today involves clarification and fraternal po-

litical discussion in which all forces working for the victory of the world socialist revolution will have their contribution to make.

But above and beyond the political questions that must be faced, the primary problem facing the Brazilian revolutionary left is one of physical survival. All the organizations are numerically very weak. The military dictatorship is using repressive methods worthy of the Nazi torturers. A large number of activists have already been

murdered. Many are in prison, subjected to the worst tortures. In this situation, active solidarity with the Brazilian revolutionists facing fascist-style repression is a task of top importance for the internationalist militants of all countries. This job must not be left to liberals and humanitarians of all sorts. Only revolutionists can expose the class nature of the terrorism used by the Brazilian military. It is their duty to do so.

January 1971

Battle for Free Press in France

'Rouge' Indicted for Calling a Cop . . . a Cop

By Ruth Schein

A five-count indictment for libeling the police, answerable on July 6 in a Paris court, was recently returned against Charles Michaloux, executive editor of the weekly *Rouge*, official organ of the Ligue Communiste (Communist League), French section of the Fourth International.

Based on articles appearing in five different issues, dating from last October 12 to March 15 of this year, the crimes with which *Rouge*, in the person of its executive editor, is charged include publicly insulting and slandering the police through articles "of such nature as to cast aspersions on the honor and repute of the police department, a public service." Each offense is punishable by eight days to one year in jail, plus a fine.

The first of the five articles cited in the indictment, a report on how Raymond Marcellin (who, as minister of interior, heads the police) had demanded that the minister of cultural affairs censor the film "Un Condé," ended with the words: "Go see 'Un Condé': You'll see the cops as they are in the street, in their headquarters, watchdogs of the ruling class—not as Marcellin would have us believe they are, honest functionaries in the service of the 'Republic.'" In addition to calling the cops "watchdogs of the ruling class," the report contained some of the censored dialogue.

The second of the offending articles, entitled "The Police, Justice, and the Regime," stated that in many cases policemen give false testimony, accus-

ing the defendant of having struck or insulted them, when generally the defendant has been worked over by these same cops! The article also alleged that cops who had come to the courthouse in an ambulance left the courthouse in perfect health, on their own two feet, after giving their testimony.

In the three remaining articles figuring in the indictment, *Rouge* (1) accused the French police of turning Spanish militants over to their Franco counterparts; (2) expressed doubts about the circumstances surrounding the death of a young worker, Jean-Pierre Thévenin, in the police headquarters at Chambéry; and (3) spoke about collusion between the police and the fascistlike *Ordre Nouveau* (New Order), with special reference to a meeting in the Palais des Sports.

More interesting than the charges themselves is the timing of the indictment. It is well known that the French bourgeoisie has a habit of moving against the working class during the months of July and August, when workers and students are on vacation and the risk of reaction is minimal. (The devaluation of the franc a couple of summers ago is a case in point.)

Even the Paris daily *Le Monde*, which can hardly be accused of leftist sympathies, felt constrained to comment on the timing of these charges:

"It remains to be seen if such prosecutions, launched more than eight months after publication of the first of the cited articles and more than

How to subscribe

If you'd rather not cut up this issue by using the subscription blank . . .

Put your name and address on any old piece of paper and send it with \$7.50 for a six-month subscription.

Intercontinental Press
P. O. Box 116
Village P. O. Station
New York, N. Y. 10014

[] Enclosed is \$7.50 for a six-month subscription.

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

three months after the appearance of the last, are inspired by concern for making the police respected or by the same politically opportunistic considerations that have already led to charges against Jean-Paul Sartre and to various proceedings against left-wing movements and the left-wing press. After getting through the dangerous months of May and June without too many incidents, on the eve of the vacation period (which, they hope, will temporarily disperse the militants), didn't the powers-that-be figure that the moment was favorable for neutralizing the most active elements without fear of too strong a reaction—and didn't they think it a good time to strengthen their position this way, in preparation for the return to work and school in the fall?"

There can be no doubt that this attack on *Rouge* is part and parcel of a general attack on the press. As *Rouge* itself comments: "What Marcel-

lin is conducting is a frontal attack against the French press. Today it is evident that although he starts off with the far left, he has no intention of limiting himself to this. His ideal is a situation in which, just like his own subordinates, journalists take an oath of office—to be submissive, servile, Gaullist. . . .

"The Committee for the Defense of Journalists, aware of the danger, is today waging a battle for freedom of the press. The defense of our paper is part of this larger battle, and we will see to it that *Rouge's* trial becomes a forum of struggle for freedom of the press."

A call for solidarity with *Rouge* has been signed by many of France's finest intellectuals, writers, and luminaries in all the arts. The signers declare themselves "ready to act as witnesses at the trial, thus demonstrating their determination to oppose the gradual installation of a police state in France."

The three professors called for the immediate recognition of the People's Republic of China and its admission to the United Nations as the sole representative of that country.

Professor Whiting, a former deputy consul general in Hong Kong, said that in a "white paper" issued in 1949 by the State Department, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson completely misrepresented the nature of the emerging Chinese Communist government.

The "white paper" contended that Mao Tsetung and the other leaders were subservient to Moscow. This was not the truth, said Professor Whiting. Mao and his comrades were in actuality trying to establish relations with the United States in order to avoid total dependence on the Soviet Union.

According to Professor Whiting, in January 1945, Mao Tsetung and Chou En-lai secretly informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt that they were willing to meet with him in Washington to explore the possibility of American military and economic assistance. They made other overtures in addition.

Secretary Acheson "suppressed all information about them in the 1949 white paper."

Professor Whiting continued: "The resultant image of monolithic Communism directed from Moscow dominated American thinking until the early nineteen-sixties."

The three professors were opposed by Senator Peter H. Dominick, a Colorado Republican, who testified with Professor David N. Rowe of Yale University at his side.

According to Dominick, it would be wrong to support the admission to the United Nations of "a regime that practices tyranny at home and encourages revolution and warfare around the world."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, favored releasing the secret documents. He said that Professor Whiting's testimony had showed that the effort of the Nixon administration to suppress the Pentagon study on how the U. S. became involved in Vietnam was "neither an aberration nor an exception. Rather it shows it as part of a deliberate and long-standing procedure to keep the Congress from getting the information it needs to exercise its authority." □

'Acute Embarrassment' for Chiang

Call for Release of Secret Papers on China

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 28, three prominent China scholars urged the Nixon administration to declassify the secret portions of a State Department study of the Chinese civil war.

Known as the "Special China Series," the multivolume study was made in 1953 at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was controlled by the Republicans at the time.

Several volumes, dealing with the World War II period, have been declassified and released. The 1946 volume is in page-proof, and will be issued within a few months.

One of the scholars, Professor James C. Thomson Jr. of Harvard University, said: "The evidence in the study is so incriminating about the nature of Chiang's regime that the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, ordered it placed under lock and key in the nineteen-fifties."

This evidence still remains under lock and key. According to Professor Thomson, repeated requests that the material be declassified have been refused on the ground that it would cause "acute embarrassment" to



CHIANG: Hopes Nixon will keep "incriminating" study secret.

Chiang Kai-shek and his government on Taiwan.

Professors Allen S. Whiting of the University of Michigan and Mark Mancall of Stanford University joined Professor Thomson in stating that the classified portions of the study would demonstrate the "internal corruption and manipulation" of the Chiang regime in the 1946-49 period.

Finnish CP Divided in Face of Radicalization

By Pekka Haapakoski

Helsinki

The first six months of 1971 in Finland have seen the final collapse of the popular-front experiment, which began in 1966; the biggest strike wave since the general strike of 1956; and a new *de facto* split in the Communist party and all its mass organizations. Thus a deep crisis has touched all levels of Finnish society—the economy and the political situation, as well as the working-class organizations—in a way that justifies speaking of a "creeping May."

At the same time, however, there is an astonishing backwardness in ideology. The lack of revolutionary consciousness and any kind of anticapitalist strategy is a serious weakness in all sectors of the left. This contradiction must be overcome and new alternatives outside Stalinism must be found if the coming struggles are to produce lasting victories and convert May into October.

The popular-front government was completely unable to fulfill the expectations of either the capitalists or the CP reformists. It produced neither the "stability" demanded by the former nor the "conditions for socialism" promised by the latter.¹

The crushing defeat of the governmental parties in the 1970 spring election seemed to be the final blow to the coalition. The CP, however, decided on a strategy intended to maintain the alliance with the bourgeois parties while not causing the Communists to lose all credibility with the masses.

Thus a bourgeois "nonpolitical" government was created for the summer of 1970. In a short time, it passed a long list of reactionary measures, including an "emergency law" very similar to the "Notstandsgesetze" in West Germany.

In the autumn the CP reentered the government. At this time, the continuation of the incomes policy was being debated.

While the entire CP entered the government willingly, it was not ready to take responsibility for further "stabilization." The "Stalinist" left wing of the party acted with complete independence in relation to the government, and even voted against many of its decisions, including a law that practically eliminated the right of state employees to strike.

Because the CP leadership didn't want a new split at that time, it had to take a more "uncompromising" attitude toward its coalition partners. By the end of 1970, when the CP opposed the UKK agreement,² the coalition was worn out.

The third and last popular-front government fell in March 1971, when the CP voted against price increases considered essential by Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen of the Center party.

A new government of the Social Democratic party (SDP) and bourgeois center parties was established. It has continued building the self-defense mechanisms of capitalism. For instance, a bill on compulsory mediation of strikes is now being prepared.

During May and June a new wave of increases in prices and indirect taxes hit the workers. This has caused some problems for the SDP because the price rises clearly surpass the limits of the UKK agreement and the CP is in a position to benefit from the resulting dissatisfaction. Thus the partnership of the SDP and its bourgeois allies is a little unstable, and it will be difficult in the coming months to maintain equilibrium on the governmental level.

By the autumn of 1970, the resistance of the workers to the incomes policy had become so great that something special was needed if a third stabilization agreement was to be accepted. In December, after long, fruitless negotiations between unions and employers, President Kekkonen, trust-

ing to his great authority, proposed a total agreement on prices, wages, and other incomes for the next year.

The SAK [Suomen Ammattiyhdistysten Keskusliitto—Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions] accepted this offer quickly, but the two biggest unions—the metalworkers and building workers—refused to accept the proposed wage rise. This led to the biggest strikes in Finland in fifteen years.

The metalworkers' strike began February 8 and lasted until the end of March. The struggle involved 70,000 workers.

The building workers also wanted to start their strike in February but the government was able to force a two-week postponement, and the strike did not begin until March 11. At the same time, the employers started a lockout. The strike involved only the largest workplaces of the building industry, and the number of strikers was, at the highest, 20,000.

The general attitude of the workers during the strikes was very militant. There were big mass meetings all over the country, with speeches denouncing the bourgeoisie and class collaborationists, especially by speakers of the CP left, one of whom even proposed a general strike. The left students launched a massive solidarity campaign unprecedented in the history of Finnish student radicalism.

However, something very essential was lacking. No organized political group (including the Maoists) tried to politicize the strike or even to suggest the advisability of workers' control and structural changes in the organization of work. The demands of the strikers and the slogans of the supporting students remained completely economist.

On this level, partial gains were made, but under pressure from the Social Democratic unionists and the capitalists, the metalworkers decided at the end of March to go back to work. The decision was approved by a small majority after two analogous offers

1. See "The Lesson of 'Popular Frontism,'" *Intercontinental Press*, November 17, 1969, p. 1026.

2. The proposal on incomes policy advanced by President Urho Kalera Kekkonen in December 1970.

had earlier been rejected by big margins. The building workers ended their strike immediately after the metal workers.

During the spring, many smaller unions launched wage struggles, and the number of "illegal" local strikes rose. At the same time, the "law and order" tendency was strengthened among the Social Democratic union leaders. During a local busmen's strike in Helsinki in May, the union leadership went all out to break the strike and even sacked an official who had supported the strikers.

The main contradiction in the unions is less and less the old division between the CP and SDP. At the beginning of June, the leaders of these parties reached an agreement on the distribution of positions in the bureaucracy of the SAK.

The main contradiction in the coming months will probably be that between local strike struggles supported by the CP left and the "normalization" line of the new SAK leadership. At the same time, the latter will probably take a slightly harder line toward the employers and the government because of the price increases. Thus there is no doubt that massive wage struggles will be seen in the autumn of 1971 and winter of 1972.

After the February 1970 reunification,³ the new sharpening of the crisis in the CP came into the open in autumn of the same year, in connection with the laws limiting the right of state employees to strike. Since then, the internal situation of the party has deteriorated and all the CP-led mass organizations have split in two.

A sharp factional struggle has been going on continuously at the level of the CP's district organizations and local branches. Members have been forced to side clearly with one wing or the other. In the struggle, both wings of the party have used all the old Stalinist methods, from physical violence and "purges" to finer organizational techniques.

The factional struggle entered a new phase after the CP left the government in March. The "revisionist" wing seems to have decided to restore order in the party. One reason for this is its desire to return to the government.

3. See "The 'Reunification' of the Finnish Communist Party," *Intercontinental Press*, March 16, 1970, p. 222.

A more important factor, however, may be that the "Stalinists" have been gradually strengthening their position and have made particularly big gains in the student and youth organizations. Thus the "revisionists" needed to act to prevent further losses.

They therefore expelled "Stalinist" officials of the youth organization and cut off funds from a district organization controlled by them. In the student organization, which is headed by the "Stalinists," the "revisionists" formed a faction and started to publish their own newspaper. The leadership of the youth organization has begun a primitive slander campaign against the students, one very similar to the French CP's attacks on students.

In the party itself, a purge of "Stalinists" from key positions may not be far off. This is a question of survival for the "revisionists," since the "Stalinists" have been growing stronger because of their position as the "left opposition" of the party.

Another complicating factor in the crisis of the Finnish CP is the left socialist tendency in the party's electoral organization, SKDL [Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto—Finnish People's Democratic League]. This tendency supports the right wing of the party, but it also wants much more independence in relation to the Soviet Union. On questions of domestic policy, it represents classical reformism decorated with phraseology borrowed from bourgeois social scientists. Some time ago the left socialists in SKDL held a national meeting. Thus they also seem likely to play an important role in the deepening factional struggle of the Finnish left.

Developments in Finland in recent years have led to a rapidly growing radicalization of two key sectors of the population: workers and students. The first is seen in the increase of strikes, often against the opposition of the union officials. The second is expressed in the growth of the Communist student organization from a discussion club of a few "modernist" academic radicals into a powerful mass organization in opposition to the conservative wing of the Communist party.

Despite the promising direction of developments, there are serious weaknesses in the present situation. The forces that form the left opposition in

the trade unions demand 30 or 50 pence or maybe one mark [4.2 marks equal US\$1] more than the "revisionists." They even organize militant local struggles on this basis (although most local struggles have started without the influence of any political group). But while the 50 pence are, of course, important to the workers, not even this can be won without the raising of other kinds of demands.

Unfortunately, transitional demands and independent organs of workers' power are completely alien to the trade-union left. If political slogans are brought into the struggles, they concern only pressure on the government to adopt a "pro-working-class policy" or to "create a true popular front." Student support is welcomed, but on condition that it is limited to raising money, and provided that no "troublemakers" are involved.

In many countries, the student movement has stimulated revolutionary ideas in other social groups. In Finland, however, the student movement is completely under Stalinist hegemony. The role of students is limited to passive support for workers' economic struggles. The international line of the Soviet Union is supported even in its crudest and most reactionary expressions. Discussion of strategic questions and democratic norms of organization are completely absent. And, worst of all, the formula of popular frontism and "antimonopoly" strategy is wholeheartedly accepted.

Until these defects are overcome, it is impossible to speak of a revolutionary organization in Finland. The development of such an organization will require that Marxist theory be converted into revolutionary practice.

Other What?

"Laying the baskets of fragrant flowers in an endless stream with solemnity, the people expressed infinite respect for and adoration of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the great Leader, looking up to his image of the monument curved in high relief.

"Infinite happiness of living under the guidance of the sagacious Leader gripped the people who were looking up to the image of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander and military strategist-genius, who is issuing an order to annihilate the enemy, holding a field-glass in one hand and pointing to the desperate enemy by the other."— *The Pyongyang Times*

Georg Lukacs — Distinguished Victim of Stalinism

By Alan Jones

[The following article is from the June 15 issue of *The Red Mole*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in London.]

* * *

The death of Georg Lukacs* breaks one more link with the Europe that existed at the time of the Russian Revolution. Like Amadeo Bordiga, who also died recently, Lukacs was a living representative of the disputes which, in its revolutionary period, took place in the Third International.

However, unlike Bordiga, we cannot simply say of Lukacs that despite wrong theories, he nevertheless remained absolutely faithful to the proletarian revolution. We are regretfully forced to conclude that, no matter what his subjective intentions may have been, Lukacs became, by 1935 at any rate, an opponent of the working-class revolutionary movement. He became a dazzling theoretical appendage of Stalinism.

But in exactly the same way that Lenin always maintained that much was to be learned from Plekhanov, despite his counterrevolutionary political positions, so we must critically examine Lukacs's work to see if anything is to be taken from it.

Marxism did not spring fully formed out of nowhere. Neither did Marx develop his ideas in a vacuum. On the contrary, the formation of Marx's ideas would have been inconceivable without the background of the economics of Ricardo, the philosophy of Hegel, the ideas of Owen and the Utopian socialists, etc. Nevertheless, Marx did not just take these ideas and fit them together in some sort of easy synthesis. On the contrary, it was only by restructuring these theories totally, adding new discoveries of his own and refuting elements in previous theories, that Marx was able to produce a logically internally consistent and coherent theory, which broke radically with all previous socialist theories.



GEORG LUKACS

At various times, other Marxists have engaged in the same sort of activity. Lenin, for example, recast entirely, but utilized many of the ideas of, bourgeois theories of imperialism such as those of Hobson and Hilferding.

However, no one has ever tried to incorporate into Marxism so many bourgeois insights as Lukacs. In fact, in one sense we can see his entire life's work as an attempt to combine Marxism and some of the ideologies and accomplishments of the bourgeoisie. It is this aspect of Lukacs which of course made him, or at least some of his writings, the idol of those, like Lucien Goldmann, who wish to strip Marxism of its proletarian revolutionary content and turn it into a shallow theory of Humanism. However, Lukacs cannot be entirely blamed for the sins of his "followers."

If at times Lukacs succeeds in restructuring Marxism so as to make it acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie—and this is particularly the case in

books such as *The Historical Novel*, and *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*—nevertheless, in other areas and at other times, Lukacs succeeds in enriching Marxism by his restructuring of bourgeois insights.

The bourgeois theories with which Lukacs was battling when he wrote the famous collection of essays that became *History and Class Consciousness* were those of Hegel and Sorel. From Hegel, Lukacs took the concept of "totality," which he counterposed to the economic determinism of Kautsky, Bernstein, Adler, and the other theorists of Social Democracy.

In doing this, it would appear that Lukacs was only following in the footsteps of Plekhanov who, in his essay "On the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Death of Hegel," had himself counterposed the concept of totality to that of economic determinism. However, the resemblance to Plekhanov—or even to the Lenin of the early writings on economics, which also deal with the question of the relation of the economic and the totality—is only superficial.

When Plekhanov and Lenin, in their early works, used the concept of totality, they were emphasizing that in Marxism the political, the economic, the social, etc., are merely differing types of abstraction and are not separate levels of analysis. For Lukacs, however, "totality" refers not to the total of all aspects of "reality," but to a particular way of structuring that reality so that it can never constitute anything but a totality.

This method of logical structuring is what Lukacs defined as Marxism. This is made clear in perhaps his most famous single passage, his definition of Marxism in *History and Class Consciousness*. He wrote:

"It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality. The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts, is the essence of the

* June 5th in Budapest, Hungary, at the age of eighty-six.

method which Marx took over from Hegel and transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science."

The analysis that led Lukacs to this conclusion represents perhaps the most significant question asked in Marxism, outside the writings of Lenin and Trotsky. What Lukacs in effect did was to ask: How does the logical structure of a proletarian conception of reality differ from that of the bourgeoisie?

We may well not agree with the answer that Lukacs gave, but then in Marxism, as in any other science, it is frequently not those who give the right answer who are the most important, but rather those who think of the right questions. Lukacs, by showing that such a question existed, settled at least two points that had previously bedeviled Marxism.

On the one hand, he showed that the differences with Adler, Kautsky, etc., were questions of method and not of "fact" or interpretation, and in so doing he raised the whole polemic against reformism to a qualitatively more profound level. On the other hand, Lukacs solved the problem of the relation of Marxist and bourgeois theory.

Before *History and Class Consciousness* there had been a tendency to fall into one of two traps. Either the difference between Marxism and academic theories was held to be in the conclusions they reached, which reduced the difference between the two to a pure question of "fact," with Marxism bound to lose, as the bourgeois concept of fact was accepted in the initial premises, or there was a tendency to assimilate Marxism to bourgeois theory in those areas which Marx himself had never dealt with.

This latter tendency is particularly marked in the case of Hilferding. Because bourgeois research was making remarkable strides in many subjects, it was believed by the Social Democrats that these results could simply be incorporated, as they stood, into Marxism. However, because these bourgeois theories logically followed from theories which dealt with areas Marx had touched on, a contradiction grew up between the parts of bourgeois theory accepted by the Social Democrats and those parts which conflicted with Marxism.

Faced with this problem, the Social Democrats either retreated into dogmatism, abandoned themselves to

eclecticism, or renounced Marxism altogether.

Lukacs solved the problem once and for all by showing that the incompatibility of Marxism and bourgeois theory lay not at the level of data but at the level of logical structure. Even if his conception of the nature of the difference involved is incorrect, the way Lukacs posed the question was *precisely* correct and establishes his claim to be noted among major Marxist theorists.

After *History and Class Consciousness*—which was at the time condemned by the Comintern and which Lukacs himself later renounced—Lukacs never wrote anything of equal intellectual power. His book on Lenin is thought-provoking, and its concept of "The Actuality of the Revolution" is a key one; but, unfortunately, the book is marred by being based on a series of statements that are straightforward lies—such as, for example, the statement that Lenin was initially alone in opposing the first world war from a revolutionary-defeatist position.

Unfortunately, from the late 1920s onward, Lukacs's writings also became tinged with another theme, which was to lead to intellectual decay and compromise with Stalin and the bourgeoisie. This was the theory of phenomenal, as opposed to structural, realism in art, which is made most explicit in *The Historical Novel*. This theory was used in an attempt to show how the products of high bourgeois art and the art of Stalinist Russia, with its "socialist realism," its threnodies to departed tractors, the struggle for production on a collective farm, etc., could be combined.

Through the development of these types of ideas, Lukacs must be held responsible for giving ideological backing to much of the staleness and barrenness of Marxist artistic criticism, despite the fact that his own particular studies are interesting and, in an episodic way, brilliant.

From 1924 onward, Lukacs came to support the Stalin faction inside the Russian Communist party. He did this on the worst possible basis, by accepting the totally ridiculous theory that it was possible to exceed the standard of living provided by the entire capitalist economies simply on the basis of the economic resources of the Soviet Union. This was the notorious theory of "socialism in one country."

From then on, with remorseless logic, Lukacs's theories and ideas degenerated.

Lukacs's failures at the theoretical level were compounded by what can only be described as political cowardice. For example, he notes of an inner party struggle that although he firmly believed he was correct, "When I heard from a reliable source that Bela Kun was planning to expel me from the Party as a 'Liquidator', I gave up the struggle, as I was well aware of Kun's prestige in the International, and I published a 'Self-Criticism'."

This was to be the first of many such "confessions" which at various times led Lukacs to denounce any number of his works. Lukacs was, of course, far too intelligent to accept all the grosser aspects of Stalinism, but all he was prepared to do about it was to keep up an irregular sniping fire at some of its aspects in the aesthetic field.

To those who eulogize Lukacs and his ilk, we can unhesitatingly say that the struggle of even the most obscure Left Oppositionist against Stalinism contributed infinitely more to the cause of the proletarian revolution than did the entire output of Lukacs in this period.

It is easy to become a communist, as Lukacs did, at a time when the enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution was sweeping the world. What is infinitely more difficult is to remain a communist in a period of twenty years of defeat, and by that criterion, Lukacs, for all his brilliance, failed miserably.

This failure extended even to his short reentry into politics in 1956. Here he sided not with the workers' councils and the fighting proletariat of Budapest, but with the reformist Stalinist government of Nagy, which would have been swept away along with the Russian tanks, if only the Hungarian workers had been victorious.

Marx once remarked that some people believe that an intellectual can soar above all classes. In so doing, he noted, they only reveal that they are the petty bourgeoisie, tossed helplessly back and forth between the working class and the bourgeoisie. This statement could be applied not only to Lukacs himself but also to those who will undoubtedly use the occasion of his death to try to glorify his undoubted intellectual achievements while ig-

noring his political activities. We should ignore neither and, instead, try to do what Lukacs himself was an advocate of—namely, try to restructure his own (bourgeois) ideas so as to enrich Marxism.

The only difference is that revolutionaries must understand that this cannot be done as Lukacs tried to do it—in opposition to the interests of the working class and in abstraction from revolutionary practice. □

The Case of Father Pinto de Andrade

Angolan Cleric Held in Seven Prisons

[Under the heading, "The Seven Prisons of the Reverend Father Pinto de Andrade," *Le Monde* of May 30-31 carried portions of an undated but recent letter from the Angolan cleric to his Lisbon judge. The translation below includes *Le Monde's* introduction to de Andrade's letter (in italic type), and was done by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Sentenced to three years in prison for "separatism" last March 30 by the Lisbon criminal court, the Reverend Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, Angolan priest, has just been transferred to the jail for political prisoners at the Peniche fort. Until then he had been interned in the Security Police headquarters' prison at Caxias, near Lisbon.

In ten years, the Reverend Father de Andrade has been incarcerated seven times. Not only was his last sentence coupled with loss of his civil rights for fifteen years, but a fine was levied against him amounting to the equivalent of four francs [one franc equals US\$0.18] per day during his imprisonment. He wrote a long letter to his judge, from his Caxias prison, several passages of which appear below.

After detailing how in 1959 he became chancellor of the archdiocese of Luanda, capital of Angola, and professor at the seminary, he writes:

That year (1959) the first mass arrests of Angolan nationalists took place in Luanda. The PIDE (political police) did everything they could to indict me, to the extent of torturing prisoners in efforts to extract confessions that would implicate me. This stratagem failed. . . .

A spontaneous movement of solidarity with the prisoners and their fam-

ilies arose in the city, and people then decided to centralize financial aid in the hands of someone whose character and moral prestige were of such nature as to inspire confidence and afford assurance that the money and the various kinds of assistance (food and clothing) would be equitably distributed and that funds would not be misused. Everyone agreed that I be asked to accomplish this task. I believed it my duty to accept, since it was a work of Christian charity and human solidarity. I nevertheless asked the bishop for his advice. Not only did he give me his moral support, but went further and made a financial contribution. . . .

Children Taken as Domestic

In charge of the experimental parish in the poor Samba district (museke), I was continually confronted with the arbitrary measures of administrative authorities. Children from the missionary school were often arrested, under the pretext of vagrancy, and carried off to be servants in white households. The police would burst into the children's huts at dawn, in a brutal fashion, and would pull them from their straw pallets.

On June 25, 1960, toward 1:00 p.m., I was arrested by the PIDE as I was leaving my work at the chancery of the archdiocese. After a week of interrogation about my allegedly subversive activities, the PIDE director, Inspector Anibal de S. José Lopez, told me: "I have sent your statements to the governor-general. We have decided that there is no reason to keep you in prison. You could be released immediately. However, your presence in this city is dangerous. . . ."

Thus, under guard, I was taken to Lisbon. But, instead of the promised freedom, a PIDE brigade chief con-

ducted me to the Aljube prison, where I was held in complete solitary confinement more than four months.

In November of 1960, they threw me, accompanied by a PIDE agent, onto a freighter. During a twenty-day voyage, I was kept in ignorance of our port of destination. I was forced to disembark at the island of Puerto-Principe, where I was handed over to the local PIDE post. Agent Moreira informed me that I was on probation, that I could not leave the island, and that I had to report to PIDE headquarters every day. All my correspondence was to be censored. To the question of how I could find a place to live in a strange country without a penny in my pocket, the PIDE agent replied: "That's your problem." I then asked for asylum at the local Catholic mission, where I was sheltered for five months.

In order to get better conditions of detention, I went on a hunger strike for four days. And on August 19, 1961, two PIDE agents conducted me to the Singeverga monastery, in the province of Minho. I was forbidden to leave the monastery grounds, to preach, to hold confession. This was another eleven months of isolation.

In the Hole

On July 12, 1962, I was arrested again in the Singeverga monastery and taken to the Porto prison, without explanation.

One month later, they threw me into an extremely narrow (one by two meters) cell in the Aljube prison, where light and air, filtered through two iron doors, entered by a slit fifteen to twenty centimeters in size—which, furthermore, was always closed. On the board that passed for a bed lay a straw mattress, hard as a rock and full of lumps, which was so painful to sleep on and so dirty that, to avoid contact with so repulsive an object, I was forced to sleep curled up on a towel. Sheets were forbidden. When I sat on the board, my knees touched the wall.

On January 5, 1963, after 177 days of preventive imprisonment, without charges, I was released—only to be immediately rearrested at the Aljube prison gate and transferred to Caxias.

On January 8 of the same year, I was conducted to PIDE headquarters and informed that I had been freed three days earlier and arrested again

at the prison gate for "new subversive activities." But where had I engaged in these subversive activities? Inside the prison or at the prison gate? The only answer to my question was curse words.

On August 14, 1963 (after 221 days of preventive detention or, rather, 398 days of continuous imprisonment without charges), I was released, but had to live in the town of Ponte-dosor, district of Portalegre.

I was placed under the surveillance of the Republican National Guard. Plainclothes and uniformed guards were stationed day and night at the gate of my lodging house and fol-

lowed me at a distance of ten meters wherever I went in this town, beyond whose limits I could not pass. On January 24, 1964, as I was eating breakfast in my lodging house, I was arrested once again.

Taken to Lisbon, I was immediately locked into one of the Aljube's cells, where I remained for ten days without any interrogation, without any charges being placed. On February 3, 1964, I was released, but taken to Vilar-do-Paraiso (in the Vila-Nova-de-Gaia area). My residence there was to be the Boa-Nova seminary, run by the Fathers of Overseas Missions. At Gaia my movements were restricted,

my telephone and my correspondence were under surveillance, and my visitors supervised. PIDE agents and other spies were on the watch day and night at the seminary gates, and followed me everywhere. It was under these conditions that I remained at Vilar-do-Paraiso for three years (1964-1967).

On April 7, 1970, I was arrested for the sixth time—in the street, as I was leaving my residence—in the most fantastic way, like a Latin American kidnapping. Again I was put in jail. And I am still there.

J. Pinto de Andrade

Mao's Magic Touch

Converts Rumania Back Into a Socialist Country

By Herman Volker

[We have translated the following article from the June 10 issue of *Rood*, the weekly paper of the Revolutionaire Arbeiders Liga (Revolutionary Workers League, the Belgian section of the Fourth International).]

* * *

The diplomacy of the Chinese People's Republic in recent months has been marked by an "opening." First there was the ping-pong affair and then Mao's invitation to Nixon to visit China. Today, Rumania's top bureaucrat, Nicolae Ceausescu, was given a triumphal reception.

China wants to break out of its isolation. That is very correct and no one can object to it. This isolation is a serious drag on the economic development of the country and thus to the progress of the workers and peasants. A partial breakthrough has been achieved. U. S. imperialism has suffered heavy blows in Vietnam and it has to settle its accounts with two other imperialisms, Japan and the Common Market. So, it has to pull its horns in a little now.

There is a great deal of turmoil in American capitalist circles, and it is very likely that American policy will shift in the coming months. Nixon has lifted the embargo on selling a number of products to China that were previously considered "strategic"

goods. This is all to the advantage of the People's Republic of China.

And now China has turned to an East European country. This is a continuation of its new policy of "overtures." Some years past, Mao branded the Soviet Union and the other East European countries as "social imperialist" states where capitalism had been restored. Sometimes even the word "fascist" was used. This also seems to be coming to an end.

Previously, according to Mao, there were two "socialist" countries—China and Albania. Now there is one more—Rumania. Thus, whether or not a country is socialist can change, depending on shifts in the wind and the whims of one individual.

The very same Ceausescu who greeted Nixon with open arms in 1969—and had the children of the workers wave American flags—has now become a socialist brother.

As socialists, we cannot object when a country where a socialist revolution has been carried out makes diplomatic or economic agreements with imperialist countries. At times a revolutionary state needs a breathing space in order to gather strength for a redoubled offensive.

Such agreements, however, must not be made at the expense of the workers' struggle in other countries. And the Chinese CP, which claims to be the

leadership of the Chinese workers and peasants, is doing just that. At the same time it seeks a rapprochement with the USA, it is betraying the struggle of the Pakistani and Ceylonese masses, who are supposed to bow to their governments' decisions.

As a "statesman," Lenin also made agreements with imperialism, but at the same time he was doing this the Bolsheviks also called on the German workers to overthrow capitalism in their own country. Lenin definitely never sent any congratulatory messages pledging his support to dictators.

But that is what Chou En-lai does (see his telegrams to dictator Yahya Khan of Pakistan and Mrs. Bandaranaike of Ceylon).

In recent years China's Communist party has been able to exercise an attraction on many youth sick of Moscow's betrayals and petrified methods. Encouraged by the prestige of its revolution and by its left critique of Moscow, they saw a new hope in China. But now it has become very clear that we can no longer place any hopes in Peking. The Chinese CP, just like the Russian, represents a bureaucratic caste which values its interests higher than those of the world proletariat. Such an attitude can never lead to socialism.

And an increasing number of work-

er militants are coming to realize this. Today they are joining the ranks of revolutionary organizations completely independent of any bureaucratic group, organizations that want to fight for the socialist revolution.

The pole of this process is the Fourth International, which defends

Argentina

An Appeal for Ana Maria Villarreal

[The following appeal has been translated by *Intercontinental Press* from the June 1 issue of *Combate*, the newspaper of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Ana Maria Villarreal de Santucho is a militant of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores [Revolutionary Workers party—the Argentinian section of the Fourth International] and of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo [Revolutionary Army of the People, the guerrilla organization sponsored by the PRT], who was recently shot by the police, and who is being held in prison at present under the unconstitutional Terrorist Law.

This comrade was wounded and arrested while participating with a commando of the ERP in distributing foodstuffs, which had just been expropriated from a big capitalist, among the people of a slum in the city of Córdoba.

The circumstances and the way in which Ana Maria was wounded show the mentality and methods of the henchmen of the regime, since it occurred when she was leaving the scene of action and was defenseless.

The Argentine dictatorship considers Ana Maria Villarreal to be a dangerous criminal and terrorist. In reality she is a refined and generous revolutionary militant, who has dedicated her life to the cause of national liberation and the socialist revolution.

The circumstances under which she was wounded and arrested are the best proof of that. Some additional facts about her life are sufficient to destroy the repelling and false image

the historic interests of the workers in the highly industrialized capitalist countries, of socialist workers' democracy in the workers states, and of the masses in the underdeveloped and colonialized countries. From Berlin to New York and from Bengal to Prague, the new revolutionary generations are joining its ranks. □

of her personality which the dictatorship wants to create.

Compañera Ana María Villarreal de Santucho is a well-known sculptress, very active in the cultural field in the province of Salta and throughout northern Argentina both before and after she became a revolutionist.

She graduated as a teacher of painting and drawing at the National University of Tucumán, then taught painting and drawing at the National Aca-

Documents

The ERP in Action

[The following list of actions undertaken by the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) in January and February of this year appeared originally in the April issue of *Estrella Roja* (Red Star), the monthly journal of the Argentine guerrilla organization. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

We know that the official press defends the interests of the ruling class, that it is never going to reflect those of the revolution, and that instead it will always try to discredit them. Because of this, in order to make up for omissions and misrepresentations, we are listing the actions undertaken by our army this year along the road of consolidating the Revolutionary War of the Argentine People:

Calendar for January

2 The Ivar Tejada Commando of the ERP expropriated a mimeograph and a typewriter at the agency of INTA de Metan (in Salta).

8 A commando of the ERP in Rosario attached some communication equipment from the "Talcom" repair shop in that city.

demy of Fine Arts in Santiago in the province of Santiago del Estero. She gave many short lecture courses and collaborated with literary magazines as an illustrator. She is the mother of three children.

The dictatorship singled her out, not only because of her activities in behalf of the revolution but because it wanted her as a hostage in reprisal for the consistent, unflinching role played by her husband, and companion in struggle, as a leader of the PRT. The dictatorship is at present conducting a manhunt for him.

It is for this particular reason that her situation is becoming more precarious—not only her liberty but even her life is at stake.

Her fate must be of concern to all revolutionists; action must be taken to stay the hand of the dictatorship.

We revolutionists of Bolivia, along with the sectors that believe in democracy, must speak out, demanding that the Argentine dictatorship release her, since her only crime is to have struggled for national liberation and to have helped in improving things for the poor of her country. □

11 Four ERP combatants, Hugo Alberto Sosa, Domingo Mana, Alicia Quinteros, and Eduardo Fotti, were arrested in Córdoba. The last-named was shot and wounded in the head while sleeping in his room.

13 A commando of the ERP made a surprise attack on the "Atlantica Vasin, Inc." construction company on Route 36 in Córdoba, overpowered the guards, and expropriated four uniforms, eight revolvers, and four portable transistor radios.

14 The Che Guevara Commando of the ERP disarmed a policeman of the province of Córdoba and recuperated for the revolutionary struggle an 11.25-caliber pistol and two clips.

17 The Angel Bengochea Commando of the ERP made a surprise attack on the dike construction on the Reconquista River in Moreno, Buenos Aires, and overcame a police corporal. He was deprived of his service pistol. The political commissar of the commando gave a speech to the workers that were present, and the combatants fraternized with the workers and those living in the vicinity.

20 A commando of the ERP carried out distribution of meat in Bajo Saladillo (Rosario) after expropriating a truck loaded with beef and sausages.

21 The 29 de Mayo Commando of the ERP deprived a policeman of his pistol, a Colt 11.25, along with a clip, four grenades, a cap and a belt—in Altos de San Martín, Córdoba.

22 The Luis N. Blanco Commando of the ERP expropriated a tape machine and two automatic mimeographs from a business dealing in printing supplies in Rosario.

24 The 29 de Mayo Commando of the ERP overcame a policeman in Córdoba and attached his belt, cap, coat and insignia, rubber truncheon, an 11.25 pistol, a clip, and eight grenades.

28 The 29 de Mayo Commando of the ERP deprived two soldiers of the Cdo. Radioeléctrico of Córdoba of two 11.25 pistols, six clips, 29 grenades, a belt, and a cap.

28 Two combatants of the ERP in Tucumán were arrested: Clarisa Leaplace, and Jorge W. Paul.

31 A commando of the ERP attached a bus in the mountains of Córdoba. Three provincial policemen, who were traveling in it, were deprived of their uniforms, belts, and service pistols. During the action, shooting occurred when the police opened fire on a retreating combatant, using a pistol they had concealed. As a result a passenger was slightly wounded and the police were the target of four shots fired from an 11.25-caliber pistol.

Calendar for February

1 A commando of the ERP carried out a distribution of 100 lambs in a slum of Pueblo Nuevo in Rosario, after attaching the truck in which they were being transported.

1 A commando of the ERP expropriated arms and 180,000 pesos [US\$450] from the home of the bourgeois Alberto Martins, in Rosario, after overcoming the inhabitants.

2 The Angel Bengochea Commando of the ERP hoisted the organization's flag in the Plaza of the Primera Junta district in Buenos Aires while distributing leaflets and pasting up a poster.

3 A commando of the ERP expropriated 15 revolvers, seven pistols, three telescopic sights, three shotguns, four carbines, cartridges and grenades, from a gunshop in Rosario.

3 The Che Guevara Commando of the ERP burned a Gladiator police patrol car in the city of Córdoba.

4 A Hawk Commando, which said it belonged to the ERP, attached the sum of 325,000 pesos [US\$812], documents, and checks from the offices of doctors J. C. Pereira Duarte and Anselmo C. Lopez, whom it accused of usurious activities, in Córdoba. The ERP stated afterward that the said commando did not belong to the organization.

6 The Angel Bengochea Commando of the ERP overcame the San Lucas clinic in San Isidro, Buenos Aires, and expropriated anesthetics, alkaloids, an electric needle, a case of orthopedic instruments, serums, drugs, hypodermic syringes, a typewriter, etc.

8 A commando of the ERP overcame the police detachment at "La Florida"

Baths in Rosario. A sergeant resisted and was killed in the exchange of fire. Arms and munitions were recuperated for the revolutionary struggle.

10 The 29 de Mayo Commando expropriated from a gun collector in Monteros, Córdoba, one Johnson automatic rifle, one FAP rifle, one 9 mm. automatic Bereta carbine, one M-1 rifle, one Mauser, one Remington, etc.

11 The Ricardo Masseti Commando of the ERP distributed rice, sugar, and blankets in the Francetti slum in Rosario and explained that the merchandise had been purchased with the money recently expropriated from Alberto Martins, a well-known bourgeois of that city.

12 The 29 de Mayo and Che Guevara commandos of the ERP expropriated 121,000,000 pesos [US\$302,500] and a 38 special revolver from an armored car of the Bank of the Province of Córdoba, ambushing it between San Nicolás and Yocsina, on Route 20.

13 An ERP commando expropriated seven automatic 32-caliber pistols, 15 shotguns, five 32-caliber revolvers, one 22-caliber, and a large quantity of grenades from a gunshop in the city of Santa Fe.

16 The Raquel Gelin Commando of the ERP expropriated seven typewriters and

adding machines from a business in the city of Santa Fe.

24 The 29 de Mayo and Che Guevara commandos delivered: Powdered milk, syringes, needles, medical equipment, a baby scale, breast pumps, and medicines to the Municipal Dispensary No. 7 in Corral de Palos, Córdoba. An electric water pump with a 2-HP motor and accessories to the people of Villa Urquiza in Córdoba. A refrigerator, medicines, and clothing to the Las Violetas health center in Córdoba. Topcoats, notebooks, house slippers, trousers, blankets, and sweaters to families in the Montelet y Siburu district of Córdoba. In a communique it was explained that these commodities were purchased with part of the 121 million pesos recently expropriated from the armored car.

25 A commando of the ERP donated 50,000 pesos [\$125] to the students of the Department of Mathematics of Rosario during an assembly of that department, explaining that it was part of what had been expropriated from the armored car in Córdoba.

27 The ERP responded to an appeal for solidarity in Santa Fe and donated an orthopedic leg, acquired with part of the 121 million pesos expropriated from the armored car in Córdoba. □

Why the ERP Kidnapped Sylvester

[In previous issues of *Intercontinental Press*, we have presented material from various sources concerning the activities and views of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary Army of the People), the Argentine guerrilla organization initiated by the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary Party of the Workers), the official section of the Fourth International in Argentina.

[The following document is of special interest as the main statement issued by the ERP after it had kidnapped Stanley M. F. Sylvester, the manager of Swift de la Plata meat-packing company in Rosario, who also served as honorary British consul in that city.

[It was published in the May 28 issue of *La Razón*, one of the big dailies of Buenos Aires, from which we have translated it.]

* * *

To the People:

As we have announced in previous communiqués, Mr. Stanley Sylvester, placed at the disposition of popular justice, is being submitted to a revolutionary trial by the ERP. Mr. Syl-

vester represents the interests simultaneously of two enemies of the Argentine people — British imperialism and the powerful Yankee monopoly DELTEC International, of which the Swift meat-packing plant is a subsidiary. The latter has operated in our country since the beginning of the century. Throughout this period, it has amassed fabulous sums of money, which, earned by the Argentine workers, has filled the pockets of the foreign imperialists. From the beginning of their activities, enterprises like Swift have intervened in the decisions of the Argentine puppet governments. In the most shameless way, functionaries of these governments, like Kriger Vasena, economics minister of the Onganía military dictatorship, have served as lawyers for DELTEC, or other monopolies. And curiously these gentlemen are the ones who condemn us as "spokesmen of foreign ideologies"!

At present, Swift and DELTEC continue to maintain close economic relations with the current president, Lieutenant General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, whose family, in addition to its other business interests, is one

of the big ranch owners and a supplier of livestock for the meat-packing plant, as Mr. Sylvester has already admitted during the interrogations. But where the bloodsucking, octopus nature of this enterprise stands out most clearly is in the conditions of life and labor imposed on the meatworkers. They are the worst paid in the industry, subject to arbitrary firings and layoffs. In recent months, in its frenetic drive for bigger profits, this enterprise's manipulations, in collaboration with the military dictatorship, have made meat a luxury item for the people. For the workers in the meat-packing plant, this meant loss of work for some months. The work guarantee was reduced to eighty hours a fortnight, with pay amounting to 20,000 pesos [about US\$50] per month. Could Mr. Sylvester and his family in their Fisherton mansion live on this? These months have meant anguish and despair for thousands of poor families. Today many workers are still laid off, being forced to rely on the wages of relatives, their small savings, and Christmas money.

All the communications media have hastened to say that there are no union conflicts in the meat-packing plant. The fact that the "trade-union leaders" do not engage in struggle is not owing to lack of conflicts but to their role as traitors to the workers and accomplices of the exploiters. Inhuman work conditions exist in the meat-packing plant. The production norms are set beyond the capacity of the workers, entailing efforts that are dangerous to their health and well-being. Not a day passes without compañeros suffering injuries or becoming ill. Those who go to the infirmary are sent back under threat of being fired or laid off. The heads of personnel, supervisors, stewards, foremen, and guards belong to an association which, in connection with the detention of Mr. Sylvester, hastened to make public "its repudiation of such a reprehensible action which deeply violates the sanctity of the human personality." Despite being in the position of wage earners, they act like police against their compañeros. These people, on a par with "leaders" like . . . [indecipherable] who prefer to defend the imperialist interests and collaborate with the exploiters, should reflect seriously on the consequences

that their betrayal of the working people can hold for them.

The detention of the consul Sylvester is intended to begin the application of popular justice to an imperialist enterprise that enjoys the support of the reactionary courts in its crimes against the workers and its robbery of the country. The action calls attention to how this justice and its police-military apparatus try desperately to free the kidnapped Sylvester while watching passively or, worse still, taking a direct part in the kidnapping and assassination of workers and patriots like Vallese, Baldú, Martins, Zenteno, and many others. This action is likewise part of our backing to the workers in the meat-packing plants, who suffer company exploitation, the betrayal of their leaders, and the oppression of the puppet military dictatorship. It is in connection with all this that the Revolutionary Army of the People demands in return for the definitive liberation of Mr. Sylvester:

(1) Reinstatement of the workers who are still suspended (official notification with figures as proof); (2) payment of all moneys owed to the workers; (3) reduction of the production norms in all departments; (4) cessation of the police work against the workers carried on by the heads of personnel, supervisors, stewards, foremen, and guards; (5) medical attention and respect for the right of sick leaves; (6) less freezing temperatures in the departments—this has already affected the health of many compañeros and compelled pregnant women to give up working; (7) by way of indemnification to the meatworkers, because of all the injuries caused by the manipulations of recent months, the Swift enterprise must distribute 25,000,000 pesos [US\$62,500] in food supplies to certain designated neighborhoods; (8) full publication by all the communications media of the communiqués of the ERP.

Compañero workers, this action has been undertaken by us, as part of the struggle of the workers, in our role as the Revolutionary Army of the People, which has arisen from the people and which is entirely at the service of the people. We want to contribute to the organization and revolutionary mobilization of the workers. Without the active participation of the masses, victory is impossible,

even the smallest one. The power of the people must unfold, transforming every attitude, and its backbone will be the ERP, together with the other armed sister organizations. New forms of struggle and organization must arise and surge over the heads of the traitorous leaders: commands of the ERP within the factories, underground trade-union groupings linked to the ERP, and all possible forms of preparing for the popular struggle. *Compañeros*: The situation of hunger, misery, and exploitation has sharpened the conditions for struggle. The proconsul Lanusse has declared war on us; we respond with people's war. Every man and woman of the people, every patriot has a combat post in the Revolutionary Army of the People.

There is no possibility of gaining justice, work, and freedom until the organized people, armed and solidly united, defeats the enemy: Yankee imperialism, the capitalists, and their armed forces and puppet police. Argentiniens, to arms until every citizen is a combatant, every neighborhood, factory, and university a fortress. Win or die for Argentina.

*The Luis N. Blanco Commando
Revolutionary Army of the People*

'People' Not Invited

One of the proofs of the superiority of a planned economy over capitalism is the contrast between the famine that constantly threatens in India and the ability of the Chinese economy to feed the entire population, even if modestly.

To judge from a report by Audrey Topping in the June 23 *New York Times*, it now appears that the Chinese economy must be making great leaps forward. Topping, her husband, and several other journalists were dinner guests of Chou En-lai in Peking. The menu, she reported, included an hors d'oeuvre of cold chicken with paprika, stuffed crab meat, tomatoes and cucumbers, ham, sliced pork, bean curd, string beans, and "untold side dishes of buns, stuffed dumplings and boiled rice." This was followed by: seaweed consommé; sea cucumbers; steamed chicken slices, shrimp, and peas flavored with green peppers and ginger; shad with sweet and sour sauce; bean puree; soybean pastries dipped in sesame seeds and sandwiched in almond paste; and watermelon and bananas. Liquid refreshment consisted of beer, sweet red wine, and mao tai, a liquor made from sorghum.

Topping's reports, unfortunately, have not mentioned the diet of Chinese workers, but she did write, presumably with a straight face, that Chou wore a button reading "Serve the people."