


## Pentagon Leak Becomes a Flood



MITCHELL: His Justice Department works overtime trying to keep public from learning truth about war.

Italian Elections Show  
Increased Fascist Danger

Jose Revueltas:

***Padilla's Letter and  
Fidel Castro's Words***

The 'Economic Miracle'  
and Torture in Brazil

## ***Chou Offers Guns Against Ceylon Rebels***

## New Strides in Weather Forecasting

Anyone who has ever been caught in an unexpected rainstorm will appreciate the great strides in weather forecasting that have been made with the help of Mao Tsetung Thought.

Hsinhua, the Chinese government news agency, described June 16 how staff members of the meteorological station in Shuicheng county, Kweichow province, had used Mao's articles "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" to achieve a dialectical-materialist understanding of weather.

"In June 1963," Hsinhua reported, "they heard that chickens roll themselves in the dust just before rain."

Meteorologists inclined to take the capitalist road would have presumably connected this phenomenon with bourgeois myths about the sky falling. Not so the Communists of the Shuicheng county station:

"They set about verifying this by observation. They found that rain sometimes fell one or two days after such a thing but that at other times it did not. Later they studied Chairman Mao's teaching [that] 'each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it' and linked up the chicken phenomenon with temperature, moisture and atmospheric pressure. . . ."

Following this method, Hsinhua said, the forecasters were able to achieve 91 percent accuracy in their predictions. Moreover, they are able to make valid forecasts as far as 150 days ahead.

It may not be beyond the possibilities of bourgeois or revisionist science to build a single instrument that incorporates a thermometer, hygrometer, and barometer. But only Mao Tsetung Thought can devise such a combination that regularly lays an egg. □

## Hypersensitive Pigs

April 27 will go down as a date to be remembered in St. Ives, Huntingdonshire. That was when the magistrates, after a five-hour hearing, refused to let the borough council grant a request by the police to rename the town's oldest thoroughfare.

The bobbies had argued that Pig Lane would be an embarrassing address for their new £44,000 police station, since the word "pig" is defined in the dictionary as swine or hog, and colloquially as a greedy, dirty, salty, obstinate, or annoying person. "It was first used in reference to the police in the nineteenth century."

An old-timer, John Dawson, who is a legal executive, made a telling counter-argument: "Anyone who is embarrassed by the name Pig Lane, is being unnecessarily snooty. I have the greatest respect for the police, but I think they are being hypersensitive."

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## Leak of Pentagon Papers Becomes a Flood

By Jon Rothschild

JUNE 27—The cases of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* versus the U. S. government reached the Supreme Court yesterday. In the course of the litigation, the government abandoned two of its earlier arguments for censoring the newspapers' disclosures: that the papers had unilaterally declassified "top secret" material; and that they had violated the espionage laws.

The sole pillar of the Justice Department's case thus became its assertion that the government has the right, in the interests of national security, to censor newspapers. This is the first time in U. S. history that any administration has sought to test such a claim before the courts. The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the two cases within several days.

While the government attempted to close off the public flow of information on the real history of the Indochina war, it also moved to convince any other person who might possibly leak "secret" documents to the press that such an act could be quite costly. The Justice Department announced yesterday that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Daniel Ellsberg, the man reputed to have provided the *Times* with Xeroxed material, on charges that he had "unauthorized possession of top-secret documents and failed to return them." Lawyers for Ellsberg announced that he would turn himself in to federal authorities on June 28. Leonard Boudin, a leading U. S. civil-liberties attorney, explained Ellsberg's position on the warrant to the *New York Times*: "What we are saying is that even if everything charged against Mr. Ellsberg is true, there has been no crime committed."

Despite the two-pronged government assault on the right of the people to hear the truth about the war—the warrant for Ellsberg's arrest and the injunctions against several newspapers—reports on the Pentagon study have continued to appear in the U. S. press.

Following the restrictions on the *Times* and the *Washington Post*, the *Boston Globe* began running a similar

series. It was then also enjoined by the Justice Department. Later the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* initiated a series, and it was enjoined. The *Chicago Sun-Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the Knight newspaper chain, which includes eleven publications, followed suit.

The *New York Times* of June 25 reported that a "random check" of major U. S. newspapers indicated that as much material as is available on the Pentagon study is being used. The *Times* said that the *Atlanta Constitution*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, and the *Milwaukee Journal* had all printed at least excerpts from the secret study, relying on news agency releases for source material.

One of the results of this proliferation has been that the government has been forced to give up trying to enjoin all the newspapers that are printing the information. The Justice Department has announced that it will not seek court action against the *Sun-Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, or the Knight chain.

While continuing its attempts to keep the secrets from the eyes of the public, the administration has yielded to congressional demands for access to the documents. On June 23, Nixon announced that a copy of the report would be turned over to the House Armed Services Committee. The House Government Operations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are also expected to receive copies.

In announcing this move, Nixon reiterated that the report would maintain its "top secret" classification, and that Congress therefore could not release the contents to the public.

In their attempts to discredit the *Times* revelations, supporters of the U. S. aggression in Indochina have unwittingly added to popular distrust of the government and strengthened pressure to hear the truth on the history of the war. For example, General Maxwell Taylor, in a special column

that appeared in the June 23 *New York Times*, claimed that the *Times* did not have access to all the secret material on the war, and that its interpretation of the study is therefore incomplete.

Taylor implied that the *Times* had tried to make Lyndon Johnson's administration look worse than it actually was. The truth, however, is apparently just the opposite. The conservative Boston daily *Christian Science Monitor* of June 19 noted that "many officials here [Washington] privately view the Pentagon Vietnam war disclosures as something less than catastrophic." One reason for this view was explained as follows:

"The *Times* has apparently used some discretion in printing the documents. Officers in the Pentagon who have compared the published reports in the *Times* with the still-guarded and highly classified originals are telling defense officials now that some potentially damaging material, particularly in terms of America's relations with other nations, has been omitted."

A glimmer of the huge amount of material that is hidden in the Pentagon was revealed on June 24 by William G. Florence, a recently retired air force employee who has spent years reviewing classification procedures. The June 25 *New York Times* quoted Florence as estimating that "there are at least 20 million classified documents, including reproduced copies" in the Defense Department alone.

Florence claimed that the classification policy is unreasonable; that only one-half of one percent of the classified documents actually involves national security.

For example, Florence reported that a note written by one of the Defense Department service chiefs to other service chiefs suggesting that too many documents were being classified "top secret" was itself stamped "top secret."

That the *New York Times* was less than thorough in its revelations should surprise no one. The fact that in 1964 the *Times* chose to ignore evidence that Johnson had already planned to escalate the war while posing as the "peace" candidate was sarcastically noted by Barry Goldwater in a column published in the June 25 *Times*. After saying that he expected that the *Times* would receive "many journalistic awards" for its Vietnam

series, Goldwater recommended an additional honor:

"By the same token, I believe The New York Times deserves some kind of a booby prize for its failure to detect the intentions of the Johnson Administration during the Presidential campaign of 1964. . . .

"In the atmosphere that prevailed in 1964 I have a feeling that logic was not uppermost in the minds of

people who were feverishly bent on the election of L. B. J."

So far the Pentagon revelations have not involved the Nixon administration — the report does not go beyond 1968. But Nixon must certainly be uneasy about the precedent that has been set and about the increasing public demand that the full truth be revealed. As Ellsberg himself aptly put it: "There's a lot more to come." □

## Sino-Soviet Split Played a Role

# Secret Documents Show Pentagon Feared Spread of World Revolution

By Allen Myers

With the publication by various newspapers of documents from the Pentagon's study of the Indochina war, the claim of Secretary of State William Rogers that such publication might upset diplomatic relations between the U. S. and its allies becomes increasingly credible.

Some of these allies might begin to suspect, to take just one example, that Washington had worked out contingency plans for overthrowing them similar to those actually used against Ngo Dinh Diem, the late unlamented "president" of the Saigon regime.

On June 22, the Chicago *Sun-Times* published secret papers that demonstrated the Kennedy administration's backing of the coup that overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963.

Among these documents was an August 30, 1963, memorandum prepared by Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman concerning "courses of action that Diem and Nhu [Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother] could take to maintain themselves in power and the United States responses thereto."

It is evident from Hilsman's references to "the coup group" that the planning of the coup was already well advanced when he wrote. He listed eleven actions Diem might take and the U. S. counterstrategy for each. Number six, for example, read as follows:

"DIEM-NHU MOVE: Political move toward the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] such as opening of neutralization negotiations, or rumors and indirect threats of such a move.

"U. S. RESPONSE:

"(A) Ambassador Lodge should give Diem a clear warning of the dangers of such a course, and point out that its continued pursuit will lead to cessation of U. S. aid.

"(B) Encourage the generals to move promptly with a coup.

"(C) We should publicize to the world at an appropriate moment any threats or move by Diem or Nhu toward the DRV in order to show the two-edged game they are playing and help justify publicly our counteractions.

"(D) If the DRV threatens to respond to an anti-Diem coup by sending troops openly to South Vietnam, we should let it know unequivocally that we shall hit the DRV with all that is necessary to force it to desist.

"(E) We should be prepared to take such military action."

If Diem attempted to negotiate with "the coup group," Hilsman advised, among other measures:

"We should use, or encourage the coup group to use: Military measures to prevent any loyal forces outside Saigon from rallying to Diem's support. For example, we can jam radio communications between Diem and these forces and we can encourage interdiction of transportation by blowing up bridges."

"The documents show," Morton Kondracke and Thomas B. Ross wrote in the *Sun-Times*, "that Kennedy decided at a National Security Council meeting on Sept. 17, 1963, to put 'escalatory pressure' on Diem to get rid of

his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of the secret police. . . .

"The NSC also decided to send Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam.

"They reported back on Oct. 2 and from that point, the documents indicate, there was a growing consensus at the top of the Administration that it would not be possible to get rid of Nhu without also getting rid of Diem."

The Pentagon study thus confirms what Americans opposed to the war said at the time. For example, following the coup, the revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant* wrote in its November 11, 1963, issue:

"The new regime, in another transparent lie, denies that the U. S. was involved with the coup. Yet Washington has been seeking for months to persuade military officers to put an end to Diem's rule."

"Embarrassed before the world by the Buddhist revolt," *The Militant* added, "Kennedy dumped Diem not so much because he was a tyrant as that he had become an unreliable one, unable to control his own oppressed people."

In fact, one of the major embarrassments for the U. S. government in the publication of the Pentagon documents is how often they confirm what the antiwar movement has been saying all along.

The "domino theory," which is still being invoked by Nixon, appears in the Pentagon study in its true form: the fear of the example that would be set by a successful revolution in South Vietnam.

On January 22, 1964, General Maxwell Taylor, at that time chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, wrote in a memorandum to Robert McNamara:

"In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to US durability, resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in Africa and in Latin America."

McNamara himself, in a March 16, 1964, memorandum to Johnson, was

'Follow That Car—And That One—And That One—'



Herblock in the Washington Post

even more blunt. The heavy U.S. involvement, he wrote, "... accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist 'war of liberation.'"

As the *New York Times* commented in its summary of the material, "... behind these foreign-policy axioms about domino effects, wars of liberation and the containment of China, the study reveals a deeper perception among the President and his aides that the United States was now the most powerful nation in the world and that the outcome in South Vietnam would demonstrate the will and the

ability of the United States to have its way in world affairs."

One of the most interesting aspects of the Pentagon papers, and one that has been generally ignored by capitalist commentators, is the insight they give into the role of the Soviet Union and China in the warmakers' plans.

The left wing of the antiwar movement has consistently pointed out that Soviet and Chinese aid to Vietnam in quantities sufficient at least to match the U.S. escalations would have been the surest deterrent to further aggression by Johnson and Nixon. For example, the March 5, 1965, issue of *World Outlook* [the former name of *Intercontinental Press*] declared:

"The truth is . . . that either of two immediate possible turns can cause the White House to hesitate and even retreat—a further rise in the revolution in South Vietnam or the sending of massive Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Either or both of these turns would not cause American imperialism to give up its long-range war plans, but it would cause the Washington warmongers to once again ask their electronic computers if this were not the wrong front at the wrong time, as they did in Korea."

A week later, following the sending of U.S. marines to South Vietnam, *World Outlook* wrote:

"This latest move taken by Johnson is another step in the 'escalation' through which the Pentagon is probing the defenses of North Vietnam, the People's Republic of China and, in the final analysis, the Soviet Union. The 'escalation' will proceed, according to all indications, until the Pentagon feels that it has run up against solid resistance."

The Pentagon papers published so far prove that the probable response of the Soviet Union and China was a major concern for the imperialist planners as they plotted the escalation of the war. The Sino-Soviet dispute naturally encouraged them to take even more aggressive actions than would otherwise have been the case.

In his January 22, 1964, memorandum, Maxwell Taylor argued for removal of "restrictions" on U.S. forces in Indochina, and indicated that this could be done without a counterescalation by the workers states:

"It appears probable that the economic and agricultural disappointments suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about undertaking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia."

Two months later, on March 20, Johnson cabled Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. "ambassador" in Saigon, that he had decided to await a deepening of the Sino-Soviet split before openly attacking North Vietnam:

"There is additional international reason for avoiding immediate overt action in that we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties soon and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown."

The limited aid that has been provided to North Vietnam by China and the Soviet Union was considered "ac-

ceptable" by Washington as far back as 1965. In a February 18, 1965, draft paper arguing for sustained bombing of North Vietnam, William Bundy wrote that little short of an attack on Chinese territory could bring Peking to intervene actively:

"Communist China might supply additional air defense equipment to the DRV, but we do not believe they would engage in air operations from Communist China, at least up to the point where the MIGs in the DRV were engaged and *we had found it necessary to attack Fukien* or possibly—if the MIGs had been moved there—Vinh." (Emphasis added.)

Thus the unwillingness of the Mao government to take timely action to defend Vietnam had convinced one of Johnson's top advisers that it was safe to embark on a course that could lead to the bombing of China.

As for the Soviet bureaucrats, Bundy's analysis showed that they were expected to pursue "peaceful coexistence" at almost any cost:

"The Soviets would supply air defense equipment to the DRV and would continue to protest our air attacks in strong terms. However, we do not believe they would make any new commitment at this stage, and they would probably not do so even if the Chicom [Chinese Communists] became even more deeply involved—provided that [we] were not ourselves attacking Communist China. At that point, the heat might get awfully great on them, and they would be in a very difficult position to continue actively working as Co-Chairman. However, their approach to the British on the Co-Chairmanship certainly suggests that they would find some relief in starting to act in that role, and might use it as a hedge against further involvement, perhaps pointing out to Hanoi that the Co-Chairman exercise serves to prevent us from taking extreme action and that Hanoi will get the same result in the end if a political track is operating and if, in fact, South Vietnam keeps crumbling. They might also argue to Hanoi that the existence of the political track tends to reduce the chances of the Chicom having to become deeply involved—which we believe Hanoi does not want unless it is compelled to accept it."

Disclosures like these are nearly as embarrassing to the bureaucracies of the workers states as they are to the American imperialists. Perhaps some of the Nixon administration's ex-

pressed concern for the "confidentiality" of diplomatic messages is based on the fear that Peking and Moscow will be restrained by fear of further

disclosures from providing Washington with such clear indications of their reluctance to oppose U.S. aggression. □

## Cite Success of April 24

# Unionists Back U.S. Antiwar Convention

Twelve prominent labor union officials have issued a call to unionists throughout the United States to attend the July 2-4 national antiwar convention in New York City.

The convention is sponsored by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), which organized the massive April 24 protests in Washington and San Francisco. All opponents of the war are free to attend and present their proposals for the strategy of the antiwar movement. All decisions at the convention are decided democratically by majority vote.

"The convention," the unionists said in their call, "will give us a chance to be in touch with other sections of the movement and to directly participate in the decision making. At the same time, as trade unionists we have special concerns and problems. We will meet in the labor workshop to discuss ways of increasing labor participation, to work out the most effective methods of participation, as well as organization and structure for a peace movement within the trade unions which can collaborate and work side by side with other sections of the antiwar movement."

The union officials indicated that NPAC's demand for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and its efforts to unite as many forces as possible around that demand had been a prime reason for their decision to participate in the convention:

"We believe that the April 24 demonstrations proved that the National Peace Action Coalition is capable of uniting large numbers of people on the basis of their common opposition to the war. It is a broadly based and democratically organized coalition with a completely responsible program of action to which labor can easily relate. It has assembled a representative leadership, including many from the trade union movement. . . .

"On April 24 nearly a million Amer-

icans showed their opposition to the war in massive, legal and peaceful demonstrations.

"For the first time in large numbers, trade unionists participated, under union banners, demanding an immediate end to the war and its disastrous domestic consequences. The myth of labor reaction and support for the war can no longer be maintained.

"This fact could not have been lost on the Nixon administration, which understands what it means when organized labor, with its tremendous political power and economic weight, actively joins the fight to end the war. Nor was it lost to the hundreds of thousands of young people, Blacks, Brown, Chicano, Women and peace activists who look to labor to play a decisive role."

The call was signed by Victor Reuther, director of the international department of the United Auto Workers; Murray Findley, vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; Art Carter, president of the Contra Costa [California] Labor Council; Moe Foner, executive secretary, Local 1199 [New York], Drug and Hospital Workers; Anthony Mazzocchi, legislative director, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers; David Livingston, president, District 65 [New York], National Council of Distributive Workers; Harold Gibbons, international vice president, International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Abe Feinglass, vice president, Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen; Dick Niebur, international vice president, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE); Bob Kasen, public relations director, Alliance for Labor Action; Raoul Teilhet, president, California Federation of Teachers; and Mae Massie, civil rights director, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE). □



## Senate Approves 'Antiwar' Amendment

By a vote of 57 to 42, the United States Senate on June 22 approved an "antiwar" amendment introduced by majority leader Mike Mansfield.

The Mansfield amendment is by far the mildest of several legislative proposals by which members of Congress have hoped to distance themselves from the war in the eyes of the voters without interfering with American imperialism's goals in Indochina. Its passage nevertheless reflects a defeat for Nixon and a recognition by these capitalist politicians that publication of the secret Pentagon study on the Vietnam war is likely to give a fresh spur to massive demonstrations demanding immediate and unconditional U. S. withdrawal.

Mansfield's amendment, which must still be passed by the House of Representatives and signed by Nixon, "urges and requests the President" to set "... a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States contingent upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government, such date to be not later than nine months after the date of enactment of this act."

The amendment also asks Nixon to negotiate a cease-fire and "a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of phased releases of Amer-

ican prisoners of war. . . ."

The White House responded to passage of the Mansfield bill by pointing out that it was "not binding," indicating Nixon's intention of rejecting even minor concessions to the overwhelming antiwar sentiment of the American people.

The Senate and the House both have the power to end the war simply by cutting off the funds for it. The fact that they prefer instead to issue vague requests to the chief warmaker only confirms the view that the antiwar movement cannot depend on the congressional "doves." It must rely on its own power, and mobilize mass demonstrations to bring the war to an end. □

### Progress in Manila

Although the Philippines is not a highly industrialized country, it has a high level of air and water pollution, according to a Reuters dispatch in the June 8 *Los Angeles Times*.

The problem is most severe in the Manila area. The Pasig River, which flows through the city, has been declared dead, and the Marikina River, which supplies part of the city's drinking water, is used by at least thirty-seven factories as a sewer for dumping industrial wastes.

Air pollution has reached such a point that the Bureau of Health Services recently warned against lingering in the Plaza Miranda because of the high concentration of gases from automobile exhausts. □

## Canada

## Conference Set to End War Complicity

"The publication by the *New York Times* of a Pentagon study of how the U. S. entered the Vietnam war proves categorically the claim by the Canadian anti-war movement that successive Canadian governments, including the present one, are guilty of conscious and premeditated complicity in U. S. aggression in Indochina.

"... The government has lied to the citizens of Canada. Canada's claim to neutrality in South East Asia, as a member of the International Control Commission (ICC), has been exposed as a fraud."

The Canadian antiwar movement has responded to the *New York Times* revelations with plans to mobilize more Canadians than ever before against their government's complicity in the war. The quotation above is from a statement issued by George Addison, executive secretary of the Vietnam Mobilization Committee (VMC) in Toronto, announcing a national antiwar conference "to plan a new cross-Canada offensive against Canadian complicity and for the withdrawal of U. S. troops."

The conference, Addison said, "will be the broadest, most representative gathering of anti-war activists yet,

with the strength to build a fall offensive which can begin the process of forcing the Trudeau Government to end its criminal and genocidal complicity." □

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## Chou Offers Guns to Help Wipe Out Rebels in Ceylon

On June 17 the Bandaranaike regime declassified "top secret" documents providing further evidence of the lengths to which the Mao regime has gone in backing the effort to crush the rebellion in Ceylon.

An opposition speaker in the Ceylon Senate had charged that the recent loan granted by the Chinese government to Ceylon was "conscience money," presumably to compensate for stirring up the rebellion or for providing it with material aid.

Chelliah Kumarasurier, the minister of posts and telecommunications, responded by stating that he had been given permission by Bandaranaike to read out some "top secret" documents. The June 24 *Ceylon News* gave the following account of the revelations:

"Mr. Kumarasurier read out a telex message sent by Ceylon's Ambassador in China on 5-1-71 saying that he had read newspaper reports of the refusal of the World Bank and the IMF on the loan taken, and that it was possible to obtain substantial aid from China in view of the excellent relations existing between the two countries. He also read further messages that passed between the Ceylon Government and the Ceylon Embassy in this connection.

"He then read a letter sent by Ceylon's Ambassador on a talk he had with the Chinese Prime Minister [Chou En-lai].

"In his letter the Ambassador had said that the Chinese Prime Minister was highly worried and concerned about the developments in Ceylon, especially with regard to suspicions that Chinese arms were being smuggled in crates that were delivered at the construction site of the Bandaranaike Memorial Hall.

"The Chinese Prime Minister had also said that the Che Guevara movement\* was a new movement which

China disapproved of. He had described it as a counter revolutionary movement aimed at deceiving the masses and disrupting the Government. China, he had said, disapproved of the theories of Che Guevara.

"Mr. Chou En-lai had also referred to the expulsion of two CIA agents from Ceylon, and said that the CIA was adopting new tactics of ultra leftism. He had described the Che Guevara movement as a counter revolutionary movement and expressed surprise how a left government in Ceylon could be attacked by counter revolutionaries. He had also

said that China had had good relations with the governments of Mr. and Mrs. Bandaranaike.

"The Chinese Prime Minister had also expressed regret that China was unable to provide military aid to Ceylon as Chinese ships carrying arms to Tanzania had left Colombo before Ceylon's request was made. Mr. Chou En-lai had said that China could give both financial and military aid to the Ceylon Government. The Chinese Premier in conclusion had promised wholehearted support to the Ceylon Government, saying, 'Whom else can we support in Ceylon except the Government of Mrs. Bandaranaike.'" □

### Kenya

## Government Claims Conspiracy Broken

Twelve persons accused of plotting to overthrow the government of Jomo Kenyatta were sentenced in Nairobi June 8. The twelve, who were reported to have confessed, received prison terms ranging from seven to nine and a half years.

The trial was widely regarded as preparing the way for charges to be brought against high government officials. None of those sentenced June 8 was considered to be in a position to carry out a coup.

In describing the alleged conspiracy to the court, the prosecutor was reported to have mentioned the names of armed forces chief of staff General J. M. L. Ndolo and the widow of Tom Mboya, the union leader who was assassinated in 1969. The twelve were said to have believed that Ndolo was a party to their plot.

On June 10, Kenyatta's government announced the arrest of Gideon Mutiso, a member of parliament. Mutiso was alleged to be the person assigned to recruit Ndolo to the plot.

The prosecutor charged that the conspirators had sought to enlist the aid of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who refused their request. Two of those



JOMO KENYATTA

sentenced, Joseph Owino and Benedict Aoko, were arrested by Tanzanian police. □

\* The reference is to the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front). The label "Che Guevara Movement" emanated from the government. For the Kremlin's version of the uprising and the repression, see *Intercontinental Press*, June 7, p. 515. For more on Peking's attitude, see *Intercontinental Press*, June 14, p. 541. — IP



## Elections Show Increased Fascist Danger

Rome

Elections were held in Italy June 13-14 for some city and provincial councils, as well as for the Sicilian regional assembly. Because of the political juncture and because about one-fifth of the total electorate was involved, the elections aroused considerable interest, even though the areas involved—mainly in Southern Italy—are probably out of step with much of the central part of the country and the North.

The following parties participated in the elections on a wide scale: the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party], PSIUP [Partito Socialista Italiano d'Unità Proletaria—Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity, the section of Italian Social Democracy committed to the alliance with the CP], the PSI [Partito Socialista Italiano—Italian Socialist party, considered to be to the "left" of Social Democracy internationally, like the Swedish and Finnish parties], the PSDI [Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano—Italian Democratic Socialist party, a grouping that split from the PSI in 1969 because of the latter's "receptivity" to the Communists], the DC [Democrazia Cristiana—Christian Democracy], the PRI [Partito Repubblicano Italiano—Italian Republican party, a left liberal group similar to others in Europe that try to offer a "progressive" alternative to the traditional working-class and bourgeois parties], the PLI [Partito Liberale Italiano—Italian Liberal party, an anticlerical bourgeois-democratic party like the PRI but more closely linked to the bourgeoisie], the PDIUM [Partito Democratico Italiano d'Unità Monarchica—Italian Democratic party of Monarchist Unity, a grouping that favors the return of the king], and the MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano—Italian Social Movement, the neofascists].

In order to give a clearer picture of the party lineup, the following facts should be noted:

1. The PSIUP has been crisis-ridden for three years because of its leadership's refusal to move to the left of the PCI and to criticize the Stalinist regime. At a time when the PCI itself has assumed an "autonomous" attitude

toward the Soviet bureaucracy, the PSIUP has tended objectively to become a substitute spokesman for Moscow. This policy has resulted in notable defections, even at the leadership level.

2. Although remaining an essential component of the center-left government, since the 1969 split the PSI has sought to improve its relations with the Communists. It has done this both by cooperating more with the Communists at the local government level and by officially proposing a policy of "more advanced equilibria," that is, by declaring its willingness to accept Communist support and collaboration.

3. The DC has been perennially torn by deep divisions between a left wing, which also favors a receptive attitude toward the Communists, and an extremely conservative right wing. In the last phases of the campaign, it tried to give the appearance of uniting on a rightist position, for fear of losing votes among its reactionary electoral following.

4. The present ruling majority is made up of the DC, the PSI, and the PSDI, with the PRI supporting the government from outside the cabinet. The disparate composition of this bloc means that it is all the government can do to maintain a shaky equilibrium. The coalition partners are unable to achieve a unified line on the main questions of interest to the public.

The left wing backs a reform policy, which is supported from the outside by the unions and the PCI itself. The PSDI is the main supporter of a conservative, repressive policy, but it cannot find sufficient backing to carry it forward. The government oscillates continually back and forth between these two policies.

Of course, in order to interpret the election results correctly we need to know the economic and political context in which they occurred. So a brief explanation of the conditions at the time the vote was held is required:

As is well known, Italy has experienced a wave of economic and political struggles over the last three years that is unprecedented in the post-war period. This phase began in early

1968 with the eruption of a student movement similar in its characteristics to those in other European countries and in the United States. The radicalization continued in the fall of the same year with the opening up of workers' struggles over the renewal of national labor contracts.

In the following year, struggles developed at the industry level among the largest and most militant categories, such as the metalworkers. These contingents started up a wave of strikes and demonstrations, both in the streets and in the factories, which was marked by an extremely high level of mobilization and combativity.

Following the example of the workers, numerous petty-bourgeois groups (state employees, small tradesmen, white-collar workers in the service industries, etc.) mobilized successively in struggles demanding—in various forms—a better standard of living.

This radicalization did not culminate in a revolutionary crisis like the French May. But the breadth of these economic struggles, combined with the inadequacy of essential social services (housing, health, education, etc.), objectively raised a more general political problem. The regime itself was put in question. And the challenge contained clearly anticapitalist elements.

The unions and the left parties did everything they could, not only to prevent the ranks from taking a hand in running their own struggles, but to keep the conflict strictly nonpolitical. Despite all these efforts, embryonic forms of dual power arose spontaneously (e.g., the factory delegates).

The resentments and frustrations of the Southern Italian population exploded with particular violence. The South of Italy is still a vast, heavily populated, underdeveloped territory. Its income levels are one-third to one-fourth that of the North. Moreover, it has an extremely high rate of unemployment and a strong outflow of emigration to other areas of Italy and abroad.

In the South, more than anywhere else, there has been a spontaneous tendency to see the "system" as the enemy and to demand not "reforms" but a real radical change. For months on end, a Southern city, Reggio di Calabria, has been the scene of a virtual insurrection.

In view of the picture briefly outlined here, how should we interpret the results of the June 13 elections? First of all, we should note the

changes in the percentage of votes won by the various parties, as compared with what they got in the same area in the June 1970 regional elections:

	1970	1971	Shift
PCI	25.0	21.1	
PCI-PSIUP		3.2	
PSIUP	3.4	2.0	
Total	28.4	26.3	-2.1
DC	35.2	31.0	-4.2
PSI	10.3	11.0	+0.7
PSDI	6.7	7.8	+1.1
PRI	4.0	4.2	+0.2
PLI	5.7	3.5	-2.2
PDIUM	1.2	1.0	-0.2
MSI	8.2	13.9	+5.7

It is clear from this table that the fascist MSI increased its strength markedly at the expense of the other rightist groupings (the PLI and PDIUM) and the DC.

The left (the PCI and PSIUP) came out of the elections weakened, with its losses going to the smaller coalition parties.

In reality, for a more correct judgment of the meaning of the vote, and most importantly one that can give us some indication of the way the masses are moving, it is essential to break down the results by regions. A total of 5,910,747 ballots were cast. Of these, 10.83% were cast in the North (including 9.04% in Genoa), 49.52% in Sicily and another three Southern centers, 33.24% in Rome, and 6.42% in other Southern Central cities.

Because of the great disparities in the economic and political situations in the North, Center, and South, it would make no sense to extrapolate such a poll to the country as a whole. Only 10% of the vote came from the North, which accounts for more than half of the country's population. Moreover, Sicily, which represents a little more than 8% of the population and which has peculiar features (which the bourgeois administration has recognized, moreover, by making the island a region "with a special status"), contributed 40.34% of the vote.

The results in Genoa give an example of the trend among the Northern voters. The PCI maintained its positions. The PSIUP vote was cut in half. The government parties improved their positions by a few points, with the PSI standing out as the biggest gainer. On the other hand, the MSI vote rose from 4.5% to 5.5%, with the increase coming exclusively

at the expense of the other rightist parties, whose losses, moreover, exceeded the MSI gains.

From the results in Genoa, confirmed by those in the other Northern municipalities, it can be concluded first of all that the overall shift was slight. Secondly, it can be seen that a part of the electorate—already rightist-oriented—is becoming more belligerent and going over openly to the fascists, who still represent a small minority, however, as they do throughout the North. But the most important thing these results showed was that the left wing of the coalition is beginning, although slowly, to make inroads into the strength of the parliamentary far-left, winning votes from the PSIUP and the PCI (whose losses were compensated by its own gains from the PSIUP).

This development indicates that a part of the poor voters, mobilized by the left parties and unions in their campaign for "reforms," may be beginning to look toward those forces, which, because they are in the government, are believed to have some influence on decision making. What this means in substance is that the PCI's committing itself to "participate in the system," to support the left wing of the government bloc, compels it in fact to enter the government apparatus.

Of course, the PCI's willingness to take the final step to the right does not mean that Italian political conditions will permit it. The radicalization of the right suggests that a "new majority" (including the PCI) will run into enormous difficulties and provoke reactions which cannot be disregarded.

The result in Rome was almost the same as in Genoa. The PCI increased its vote by 0.1% over last year, but the PSIUP vote dropped from 2.6% to 1.6%. The government parties gained a few points, but not the DC. The fascist vote went from 10.7% to 15.6%, with almost all the increase coming from the other rightist parties. The social composition of the electorate in the capital is predominantly petty bourgeois. As a result the right-wing total increased by 1.4%, probably reflecting a shift of the law-and-order voters weary of the agitation in recent years and perhaps frightened by the national demonstration in Rome called by the unions shortly before the elections, in which

150,000 workers from all over Italy participated

In Rome the MSI seems to have gained votes also in the *borgate*, the belt of subproletarian slums that surrounds the city. These communities have recently been the scene of sharp struggles and confrontations with the police, chiefly over building occupations by shack-dwellers. Since there are still no breakdowns of the vote by area, this report is unconfirmed. If it turns out to be true, it would indicate that the rise of the fascist vote in Rome was partly a result of the same phenomenon occurring in the South, which will be considered further on.

Thus, the returns in Rome and Genoa reveal two main trends: (1) a certain weakening of the parliamentary far-left; (2) reinforcement of the far right at the expense of the other rightist parties. The second trend, of course, is not a matter of indifference. It implies that sectors of the bourgeoisie have chosen different political tactics. Correspondingly, this requires tactical shifts on the part of the workers. But the shift does not represent a substantial change in the relationship of class forces. Nor does it mean the development of mass support for a policy of open repression.

The election results in the South, on the other hand, indicate that the extreme right has the ability to win a mass base through demagogic denunciations of the system, defying the laws, and openly attacking the regime. It is precisely the returns in Sicily and the other areas in the South that are most disturbing because (after the events in Reggio Calabria) they confirm the possibility of the fascists winning a mass base in the South, in the subproletariat, and among the most poverty-stricken masses.

In Sicily the combined vote of the PCI and the PSIUP dropped 1.3%. But this time the PSIUP was not the only loser. In the districts where the PCI ran alone, it also lost votes. The government parties other than the DC scored no gains. Altogether the coalition parties' vote increased by only 0.1%. The MSI vote rose from 7.2% to 16.4%, an increase of 9.2%, while the other rightist parties (PLI and PDIUM) lost only 1.9%. The fascists thus garnered a protest vote of 7% against the center-left government, which among other things, is linked to the Mafia. In a situation of social decomposition such as exists in the

South, the PCI is not only not making any gains. Its vote is on the decline. It is incapable of attracting the protest vote of the poor strata.

In Bari the PCI vote dropped from 20.7% to 15.9%; the PSIUP vote from 3.1% to 2.4%. In Ascoli Piceno the PCI vote was cut from 20.4% to 14.9%. In Foggia it dropped by 2%. Throughout the South, the trend was toward a shift in the relationship of class forces.

Tired of promises of reform, of a "Southern" policy that has only increased the disparity between North and South, the subproletariat, the unemployed, the disinherited masses recognize the logic of the PCI's "participation" in the capitalist system. Because they are declassed, these masses have become disoriented. Unlike the workers in the North, they have reacted to the pressures of the social crisis by becoming the pawns of demagogic and reactionary maneuvers.

Of course, the changes that have occurred in the Italian social and economic structure in the postwar period have markedly reduced the specific weight of the Southern masses (as well as the absolute number of people in the South). Thus, it cannot be supposed that this phenomenon will upset the balance of forces on a national scale. But although there is an army of socialist-oriented workers and although the fascists are blocked in the Northern cities, this cannot overshadow the gravity of the fact that for the first time, if only in part of the country, the fascists have ceased to be an association of "old comrades" and become a mass party.

The major responsibility for this state of affairs falls obviously on the parties of the reformist left, which have been incapable of rallying and leading the protest of a large part of the poor population against the capitalist system. In fact, these parties have become the defenders of this system, with some of them joining the bourgeois government and others wanting to. (The PCI has gone to the point of publishing a manifesto claiming that it is the party of "real law and order.")

But the so-called extraparlimentary extreme-left bears no small part of the responsibility as well. It is still incapable of offering an alternative rallying point to the left. It is still fragmented into a myriad of sects and splinter groups, sometimes on the basis of principled differences, but sometimes also merely because of petty-bourgeois ultraleftism. □

## Piracy and Pornography

### U.S. Seized Cuban Boats on High Seas

Four Cuban fishermen now confined in a Florida jail were thirty-five miles from U.S. territory when they were arrested on charges of illegally fishing inside the U.S. twelve-mile limit, according to a description of the incident in the June 6 English-language Weekly Review of *Granma*, official organ of the Cuban Communist party central committee.

Eight fishermen in four small boats were seized by U. S. Coast Guard vessels on May 26. Four of the fishermen were released on May 31. The others were taken in chains into a Florida court June 9 and were each sentenced to six months in prison and a \$10,000 fine.

The boats seized were operating as part of a fleet from two mother ships, the Lambda 110 and Lambda 107, *Granma* reported. The latter were anchored thirty-five miles west of the Dry Tortugas, the nearest U. S. territory. The American government's account of the incident placed the small boats twenty-four miles distant from their mother ships.

"This is impossible," *Granma* noted, "since the diesel-powered 16-foot boats have an autonomy of four or five hours and can only travel three miles from the mother ships."

Moreover, the seizure of the boats was clearly visible to personnel aboard the Lambda 110 and Lambda 107. *Granma* reported that Captain José Antonio Castilla Nápoles radioed the following account of the attack on the Cuban fleet:

"We are finishing the work of taking in the line after lunch; we saw the [U. S. Coast Guard] cutter leave the Sondero 28 and Lambda 41, heading toward us at full speed (after having spent the entire morning sailing in circles around us). It was doing 15 miles an hour. It reached the group of our boats, coming alongside two or three of the boats that were close together. We saw one of our boats approach the cutter and then draw away, the boat crew refusing to tie up to the cutter.

"We saw them lower four speedboats, and hurriedly tie up ours, our men being taken aboard their boats. Their

boats sailed off with ours to the west and the cutter remained in this position. . . .

"We'll remain here until the problem is resolved and will continue fishing. At no time have those s.o.b.'s come here to talk to the captain of the boat, and if they don't come here and tell us why they have hijacked our boats on international waters we'll stay here and await orders to see if we go and get them. We are outraged over this shameless act of banditry by imperialism, and we want it clearly understood that we'll stay here fishing 35 miles west of the Tortugas Light. Let it be known that we do not agree with or allow any bastard to keep us from fishing in international waters, which are free for all."

The account of one of the four fishermen released May 31 indicated that the U. S. government had hoped to top off its acts of piracy with a propaganda victory by intimidating or enticing some of the Cubans into remaining in the United States. Jesús Font Pedrosó told *Granma*:

"One of them [the U. S. sailors], who is from California, said they were going to shoot all eight of us during the night. They kept us covered with a machine gun while we were being taken to Florida. . . .

"When the Czechoslovak consul was present, we were treated better, but when he wasn't we were treated badly by the officers. At the insistence of the Consul we were taken to another ship, because conditions on the one where we were being held were very bad.

"They brought us clothes and magazines with pictures of nude women and showed us cars, asking us if we had cars in Cuba, if Cuba was the same as Florida, if we liked the United States. They asked us to stay and not return to Cuba.

"We replied that though we didn't have cars we'd return to Cuba. 'We were born in Cuba and we are revolutionaries' we said." □

#### Young at Heart

The birthday of President Tito is celebrated in Yugoslavia as "Youth Day." Tito is seventy-nine.

## Bengali Liberation Army Fighting Partisan War

Calcutta

The partisans known as the Mukti Fouj in East Bengal are estimated at about 30,000 men at present. Of these at least 20,000 are former personnel of the East Pakistani Rifles (EPR), the Bengal Regiment (BR), and the auxiliary forces like the police, Ansars, and Mujahids. About 10,000 newly trained guerrillas have joined the Fouj since April—mostly students and youth who crossed into India as refugees. Another 30,000 guerrillas are under training.

Four former majors of the EPR and BR are providing the general command for the Fouj: Majors Zia-ur-Rehman (Chittagong-Comilla region), Usman (Nadia-24 Paaragana region), Khaled Musharaf (Meghalaya-Assam region), and Shafi Ullah (North Bengal region). The entire border of Bangla Desh is divided into fifteen sectors for operational and recruitment purposes.

The Fouj is not in physical possession of any big area in East Bengal. It has withdrawn into the borders for tactical reasons. Its main strategy is of guerrilla action—hit and run. Since the Pakistani army, estimated at about 60,000 combat troops, is concentrated only in major cities, cantonments, and towns, the Fouj has easy access to vast rural areas. There are about 62,000 villages in Bangla Desh, of which about 30,000 have been fully or partially destroyed by the Pakistani army.

The Fouj commanders claim that with their present strength and equipment they can easily capture some districts like Sylhet, Comilla, Mymensingh, or Kushtia, but they cannot retain control of these areas against a concentrated attack by the Pakistani army without heavy mortars, artillery, and antiaircraft guns to meet aerial bombings.

The Mukti Fouj has the support of more than 80 percent of the Bengali population despite the attempts by the army to strike terror among the people. This support is the main strength of the Fouj. The Pakistani army is surrounded by an entirely hostile population of Bengali-speaking people. Non-Bengalis who might help the army constitute less than 5 percent of

the population, but are concentrated in big urban centres.

The army is subjected to constant harassment by guerrillas. A number of soldiers are killed by partisans almost daily. Means of communication between different districts have been disrupted. Agricultural and industrial operations have almost come to a standstill. The army has failed to create even the semblance of a civil administration with the help of quislings.

Judging from a purely military point of view, the Fouj has enough strength and organisational sweep to win the liberation war, provided: (1) it is able to replenish its stock of arms and ammunition, and (2) India continues to provide shelter and food supplies to the guerrillas. The Fouj commanders, who owe allegiance to the Awami League politically, are afraid that the five million refugees who have crossed into India might create political problems for them with the Indian authorities.

The Fouj can establish a base in "liberated territory" inside East Bengal if it is supplied with an adequate number of fighter planes and antiaircraft guns, which they do not possess at present. They have small weap-

ons, some supplied by India and the bulk captured from the Pakistani army. If the Bangla Desh government is recognised by India or any of the "major powers," the character of the freedom struggle will change rapidly. But the fighting forces do not feel demoralised because of the apathy shown by various governments in relation to their struggle.

The Awami League of Sheik Mujibur Rahman still commands the support of the majority of the people in Bangla Desh, although most of the leaders of the party elected to the National and Provincial Assemblies fled the country after the army operations began. Some of them, including Mujib, are in prison.

As a party committed to parliamentary methods, the Awami League was totally unprepared for the situation created by the brutal armed confrontation. It was not at all acquainted with the techniques of partisan warfare, unlike parties such as the Communist party of East Bengal [CPEB] (pro-Moscow), which has been banned since 1952; the leftist National Awami party (NAP) led by Professor Muzaffar Ahmed; the National Awami party led by Maulana Bhashani; and the

### Nixon Sends Arms to Yahya

The Nixon administration has continued to provide arms to the Yahya Khan dictatorship, despite an officially proclaimed embargo on such assistance.

Tad Szulc disclosed in the June 22 *New York Times* that the Pakistani ship *Padma* was leaving New York loaded with U. S. military equipment. In the next few days, it was revealed that at least two other ships had carried weapons from the United States to Karachi since March 25, the day on which the arms ban supposedly went into effect. The cargoes have included ammunition and spare parts for the aircraft, armored vehicles, and jeeps—all of which are

being used against the Bengali resistance movement.

The Nixon administration attempted to brush aside the disclosures by cynically denying the obvious. Szulc reported in the June 27 *Times*:

"For three days, State Department spokesmen and newsmen argued over the official claim that ammunition was not a 'lethal' item. This stemmed from an earlier State Department admission that the military sales to Pakistan, confined to 'nonlethal' items, included ammunition. On the third day, a reporter asked: 'When does ammunition become lethal?' The State Department spokesman replied: 'This is a theological question.'"

various Maoist groups (that have broken with Maulana Bhashani), which have worked underground for many years.

All these parties are actively participating in the resistance movement. Maulana Bhashani, once considered pro-Peking (though not a Marxist), is unconditionally supporting the leadership of Sheik Mujib. The CPEB, led by Moni Singh (recently liberated by Mukti Foj from Rajshahi jail), and the NAP of Professor Ahmed have been demanding the formation of a "National Liberation Front" of all the partisan forces. The proposal for a front is being resisted by the bourgeois leadership of the Awami League so far, on the ground that it is the only democratically elected leadership of the people that could constitute a government.

Inside Bangla Desh, however, all-party resistance committees, known as "Sangharsh Samities," have been formed at different levels. Initially only the supporters of the Awami League were allowed to join the Mukti Foj, but now all those who want to join are encouraged.

The Indian government preferred to deal only with the Awami League, for obvious political reasons. New Delhi's policy has been that of "containing" the Bangla Desh revolution within the framework of bourgeois property relations.

There are three known "pro-Chinese" groups in East Bengal. Until recently, all of them were working inside the NAP led by Maulana Bhashani. In fact, Mohamed Toaha, leader of the Maoist group known as the Communist party of East Pakistan (Marxist-Leninist) [CPEP(ML)], the counterpart of the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist), was the general secretary of Bhashani's NAP. His group broke with the parent organisation when Bhashani decided to put up some candidates to contest the 1970 general elections. Toaha favoured boycotting the elections.

The Toaha group appears to be taking a "neutralist" stand in the present war. It has not openly supported the Yahya regime, as the Chinese government has done. The group characterises Sheik Mujib as an American agent and a bourgeois leader, and has accused him of sabotaging the class struggle by raising the secessionist demand for an independent Bangla Desh. The Toaha group is said to be active in Sylhet and My-

mensingh districts in the north, where Bhashani is also powerful.

There are two other pro-Chinese groups, both calling themselves Communist party of East Bengal—one led by Matin Allauddin, a 42-year-old peasant leader who seems to have some base among the peasantry and industrial workers in the Pabna area. The other group is led by Kazi Jafer and Rashid Khan Menon, and has some influence among workers, but more among students in Dacca and Chittagong districts.

The Jafer-Menon group controls the Chhatra (Student Union) of East Pakistan, as opposed to a rival Student Union led by Mrs. Motia Choudhary (belonging to the CPEB). The largest student organisation, the Chhatra League, is led by the Awami League. Both of these one-time Maoist groups are now extremely critical of the Chinese leadership and are supporting the liberation war. Political differences dividing these groups are not clearly known as yet.

As an old colleague of Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haque, Bhashani commands great popularity among the peasantry. But he has no organisation of his own, apart from those built by the Maoists who were with him. The general secretary of his NAP, Mashi-ur-Rehman, for example, is considered to be an opportunist not trusted by his own followers. Bhashani's friendly relations with the Chinese were largely influenced by the Maoist groups who were working with him during a period when the Chinese were openly fraternising with Islamabad—especially under Ayub Khan. After the 1968-69 popular upsurge, when Yahya stepped in to replace Ayub, this relationship changed.

By the eve of the 1970 election, Bhashani broke with his Maoist supporters and called for an "independent Bangla Desh" when Sheik Mujib and his Awami League were not prepared to go beyond the demand for autonomy.

After the army launched its offensive on March 25, Bhashani publicly criticised the Chinese support to Yahya Khan. He wrote a personal letter to Mao Tsetung, demanding that the Chinese support the liberation war of Bangla Desh. Some of Bhashani's supporters believe that China has not specifically condemned the liberation movement and that the Chinese leadership might even now change their

stand if a new leadership emerges in Bangla Desh.

The leaders of the Communist party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] in West Bengal have established contacts with Bhashani and are supposed to be assisting his supporters. The Maulana is understood to have assured the Indian authorities that he would not seek any relations with left parties in India. He is now staying somewhere near Calcutta along the Bangla Desh border.

As a regional bourgeois party opposed to communism and communists, the Awami League enjoyed good relations with U. S. imperialism, which has big stakes in East Bengal. American capital investments in the region are estimated at 30,000,000,000 rupees [7.5 rupees equal US\$1].

It has even been reported that Mujib was in constant contact with the American consulate in Dacca during his negotiations with Yahya in January and March. The U. S. officials are said to have a tape recording of the Yahya-Mujib talks. The Americans supposedly gave Mujib every assurance that they would stand by him in the event the negotiations broke down.

When the talks collapsed March 25 and the masses chose independence for Bangla Desh, the U. S. government evidently changed its policy. Washington was not prepared to antagonise Islamabad at that juncture without knowing the future relationship of forces. This has caused a great deal of bitterness among Mujib's supporters, who think that American advice restrained him from countering Yahya's manoeuvres.

Mujib's military experts had two plans. One was to arrest Yahya, Bhutto, and others and to hold them as hostages during negotiations for the withdrawal of the Pakistani army. The second was to capture the Chittagong region with all its military installations and supplies of arms and ammunition (including the ship M.V. Swat, which had anchored in Chittagong harbour) on March 23, when a Bengali officer, Brigadier Mazumdar, was in command of the military in the region. Both these plans were rejected by Mujib, supposedly on the advice of the Americans.

When one meets Awami League leaders today, they ask one question repeatedly: "What are the Americans doing?" There is a great deal of bitterness and disappointment among

them over the U. S. role.

They had been led to believe that the Soviet Union and China, as "communist countries," could not be trusted. Soviet President Podgorny's statement condemning the genocide has been well received by the Awami League leaders, but the leftist parties, including the CPEB, are disillusioned that the Soviet Union has not extended any material support in the form of

arms. Moscow's reluctance to recognise the Bangla Desh government is also criticised.

The situation along the border is very bad, with more than 5,000,000 refugees having crowded into camps in West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura. Already there is a great deal of resentment in the border states against the refugees being settled in their midst. The resentment is partic-

ularly vocal in Meghalaya and Assam, where anti-Bengali sentiments are predominant. There are fears of communal and language riots breaking out in these states. This is one of the reasons that compelled the Indian government to shift the refugees to other states. The reactionary capitalist parties in India are trying to give a communal twist to the whole situation. □

## Seven Years of Military Dictatorship

# Brazil's 'Economic Miracle' and...Torture

By Eduardo Pinheiro and J. Mattos

[We have translated the following article from the February-March and April-May issues of *Quatrième Internationale*, a revolutionary-socialist magazine published in Paris.]

\* \* \*

In 1968 the student and popular movement in the big cities, which in turn set in motion the advanced sectors of the workers' movement, reminded world public opinion that a military dictatorship had existed in Brazil since the April 1964 coup d'etat. It also revealed the opposition to the regime growing in different strata of the population.

In 1969 the kidnapping of the American ambassador to Brazil revealed to the eyes of the world the activity of a new revolutionary left, again raising the banner of opposition to the dictatorship after the ebb of the 1968 mass movement.

In 1970, however, the international bourgeois press, from the *New York Times* to *Le Monde*, talked about the successes of the military dictatorship, especially in the area of its economic policy. Hard hit by the repression, the far left seemed to be getting nowhere.

In fact, the present political conjuncture in Brazil presents a relationship of forces extremely disadvantageous to the revolutionary left. It would be equally dangerous either to deny this fact or to fail to try to understand the reasons for it.

This favorable relationship of forces for the military dictatorship is shown by the great ideological offensive it

has mounted. It is explained by the fact that after winning a series of military victories over the revolutionary left, the dictatorship has scored a number of political points. Thus, it has regained the initiative and, as a result, is enjoying its first period of relative stability since it came to power in 1964.

The distinctive thing about the military dictatorship is not its systematic, savage repression of any potential threat. The thing that distinguishes the dictatorship is that it has recast the entire state repressive apparatus, creating new bodies, remodeling others, and centralizing them all. At the same time it has made it clear that repression is, and always will be, an essential element of its policy. The militarization of state and political life is bound up closely with the type of solution required for the survival of capitalist exploitation and imperialist domination of the country.

This fact was shown clearly in 1970. At the same time the government was announcing its greatest successes, the repression, torture, and murders reached a level never before seen on this continent. The generals in power claim that the economy is on the rise, that the population supports the government, and that the "terrorist" groups have been crushed.

What must be understood is the relationship that exists among these factors.

The period of overall capitalist growth is over. The capitalist system as a whole is no longer capable of progressing. Growth is possible in certain countries and in certain branches

of economic activity, but only through distortions and to the detriment of other countries and other branches. This idea, developed by Trotsky,<sup>1</sup> is more relevant than ever as a basis for explaining the kind of economic "expansion" undergone by Brazilian capitalism these last three years.

The overall growth rate, according to government sources, was 8.3% in 1968, 9% in 1969, and about 9% in 1970. By comparison with the recession of 1961-67, these figures reflect a new phase of expansion. In the period after 1964, when the ruling classes equipped themselves with the political instruments of military dictatorship, they were able to bring the economy through a phase of transition. What this involved from the economic and political standpoint was the rise of the monopolistic industrial and financial sectors to dominance within the bloc of the ruling classes.

The new phase of economic expansion already reflects the transformations that have occurred since 1964. Thus it is not a resumption of the preceding period of expansion but a new stage of "development within underdevelopment" in Brazil.<sup>2</sup> That is, the expansion of the productive forces is being accomplished through the introduction and intensification of increasingly important distortions.

In fact, what is distinctive in this new phase of capitalist expansion in Brazil is the following:

1. In *The Third International After Lenin*.

2. According to the term popularized by A. Gunder Frank in his works.



1. An increase and not a lessening of the dependence of Brazilian capitalism on, and its integration into, the international imperialist system. It is those sectors of the economy most dominated by monopolies—that is, those most completely controlled by imperialist capital—that have been the driving force of this expansion, in particular the consumer durables sector. On the basis of these monopoly-dominated sectors, the big financial corporations have invaded the Brazilian market, strangling the local banking system, one of the last areas where national capital retained a certain freedom of action.<sup>3</sup>

2. The urban and rural working masses have been clearly excluded from any share in the benefits of this expansion. In the preceding phase of expansion from 1956 to 1961, that is, during the regime of President Juscelino Kubitschek, the crumbs were shared with the urban wage-earners. In the present boom, the wage freeze that the military dictatorship imposed in 1964 in a period of recession is being maintained. The fact that, with the fourth straight year of economic expansion in prospect, the regime is continuing its wage-control policy means that the deformations of underdeveloped capitalism have gone a step further. The nature of the market has changed. The capitalists are interested first in government orders—electrical equipment, petrochemicals, telecommunications, etc. Secondly, they are interested in the market for consumer durables—automobiles in particular. Thus, increasing the consumption of the poor population is no longer essential to capitalist expansion in this stage.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time as industrial production is growing and the capital market is expanding, the working class is being subjected to a process of absolute pauperization. The working class is suffering a clear decline in its buying power (for the peasants, this has always held true).<sup>5</sup>

3. According to a report on the earnings of the ten biggest companies published in December 1968, foreign concerns controlled 78.4% of the consumer durables sector, national concerns, 21.6%.

4. This explains the rapid decline of the textile, shoe, and food industries that occurred in the midst of this period of expansion.

5. By the end of 1969 the minimum real wage of Brazilian workers had fallen to an index level of 56, with 1963 represent-

It is on the basis of this type of economic "solution" that the military dictatorship has been compelled to make torture a standard practice, trying to prevent the revolutionary left organizations from capitalizing on the enormous explosive potential of the worker and peasant masses. A system which, even while it is proclaiming its "economic miracle," continues to keep a freeze on the wages of the population must make systematic repression a permanent part of maintaining itself. Today, the annihilation, physical if possible, of revolutionary groups and activists is a precondition of the government's economic policy and of the survival of Brazilian capitalism.

Under the leadership of General Médici, the military dictatorship, in the last analysis, succeeded in 1970 in reversing the relationship of forces vis-à-vis the revolutionary left that had existed in 1968-69. With this objective in view, it used the so-called economic expansion to break out of the social isolation in which it found itself until the end of 1969. Focusing its repression on the revolutionary movement, it regained the political initiative. By a colossal ideological campaign, it succeeded in limiting the armed propaganda actions of the revolutionary left, as well as the effect of those that could be carried out.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of this operation, the dictatorship won the support of the urban petty-bourgeois strata—especially the white-collar workers of the new petty bourgeoisie. It also managed to neutralize the other petty-bourgeois sectors, which were demoralized by the political defeats and terrorized by the existence of the all-powerful military state. The petty bourgeoisie

ing 100. In October 1969, official agencies estimated the minimum budget for a family of five at around \$130 per month, while the minimum wage in the same period hovered around \$30.

6. The following are some of the episodes in this ideological campaign conducted in the censored press and in the mass media, such as radio and television: the exploitation of Brazil's winning the world soccer championship; the "revelations" made on television by renegades from the revolutionary left who went over to the side of the dictatorship; Project Rondon, designed to channel the energies of the student youth into research and investigation for "national development"; the defense of the right to a 200-mile limit of Brazilian territorial waters; the construction of a great Trans-Amazonian highway supposed to promote "national unification"; the Social Integration Plan, which established profit-sharing for the workers.

shared in the dividends of the economic expansion, constituting a market that could absorb a large part of consumer durable production—automobiles, electrical appliances, electronic devices, etc.

At the same time, the military dictatorship's regaining the political initiative created the conditions for isolating the revolutionary left. The social base of the revolutionary current, the result of the 1968 mass mobilizations, consisted essentially of radicalized sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and the student movement, which was disorganized by the repression that came in the ebb of 1968.

Isolated in society, the revolutionary left suffered blows whose effects were magnified many times over because it lacked a social base that could protect it from the repression. The government's victory in winning over some sectors of the middle classes and in neutralizing others—because of their fear of demoralization—left the revolutionary groups particularly vulnerable to repression.

In a chain reaction, the dictatorship's military and political victories increased its unquestionable political potency both in the eyes of the ruling classes and of the workers, defenseless and unorganized in the face of the government's ideological and political offensive.

Nonetheless, this offensive by the military dictatorship has definite limits. From the economic standpoint, the regime faces a permanent danger that the market for its industrial production will run dry.<sup>7</sup> Every new year is proclaimed "the year of the foreign market," as was the case in 1971. But now more than previously this road is closed. The protectionism imposed by the United States, which finds itself in economic difficulties, has already produced cutbacks in Brazil's foreign sales, which are already insufficient.

From the ideological standpoint, the government has tried to build up its image as a "great initiator of public works" and as a "nationalist" regime. These feeble slogans hold up only because of the failure of revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

But it is in the political sphere that

7. As the example of Volkswagen shows. This "dynamic" concern, which has already produced more than a million cars, has been forced to cut back production and lay off workers.

the military regime shows its greatest weaknesses. By using the armed forces as their national party, the bourgeoisie and imperialism have gained greater security, greater "order" for maintaining their system of exploitation.

However, while the military has destroyed or demoralized parliamentary political life, it has not succeeded in replacing these institutions with other organic forms through which it could link itself to the ruling classes and

the other social strata supporting the government.

The result has been a vacuum in the political life of the country, a vacuum which is at the root of the continual resurgence of attempted coups d'état by various discontented sectors of the bourgeoisie that have no channels for applying pressure or for political representation. As the saying goes, you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. As least you can't sit on them for very long.

[To be continued.]

## 'Sadness and Moral Anguish'

# Padilla's Letter and Fidel's Words

By Jose Revueltas

[The well-known Mexican novelist José Revueltas wrote the following letter May 3 from Lecumberri prison in Mexico City. He was sentenced November 12, 1970, to sixteen years in prison as the "intellectual instigator" of the 1968 student and popular movement. Revueltas was released from prison on May 13 as part of the new government's policy of freeing the most prominent political prisoners jailed when the 1968 movement was repressed.]

[The prize-winning novelist was held in prison for about two and a half years. He was one of the victims of the January 1, 1970, assault on political prisoners by drug-crazed convicts.]

[This was not the first time Revueltas, an old revolutionary militant, had been jailed for his political ideas. In the early thirties, at the age of fourteen, he was sent to the infamous prison colony of Islas Marias for being a member of the Communist youth organization.]

[Revueltas broke with Stalinism in the early 1950s over the question of "socialist realism" and artistic freedom. We have translated his letter from the May 19 issue of the weekly magazine *Siempre*, published in Mexico City.]

\* \* \*

In recent days two events have distressed the revolutionary writers of all countries, that is, all of us who have

a clear-eyed love of the Cuban revolution, and who, because of this love and this understanding, have not lost our confidence in this revolution and will never do so.

The first of these developments was the letter that the poet Heberto Padilla addressed April 26 to the revolutionary government of Cuba. The second was that part of the speech Compañero Fidel Castro gave May 1 to the First National Congress on Education and Culture in which he made contemptuous and offensive references to the problems created by the imprisonment of this poet.

I used the word "distress" and I meant it in its strict sense, "sadness and moral anguish." Not anger, not desperation—only anguish and sadness. Writers have no weapon but the word. It is as good as a hammer, a sickle, or a tractor. But it is different—it has its special function.

The materials shaped by this tool are the feelings and thoughts of men, of Man. Through feelings we try to discover thought; and through thought, clarify feelings. We only clarify feelings, discover their deeper meaning hidden from the eyes of those who are busy with other things—from the eyes of the blacksmith, the public accountant, or the politician or the street sweeper—although all of their eyes are perceptive too.

Our job then as writers is only to clarify feelings. This, of course, is not a simple task. It is no simpler than the jobs of the blacksmith, the street

sweeper, or the politician. That is, the writer's work—as much as anyone else's—needs to be checked by a critical eye, to see that it is done with integrity.

Integrity does not come easy. The streets have to be swept clean. Iron has to be forged skillfully. The people have to be led in a principled way. We have to write with authenticity. That is, we writers must immerse ourselves in undertakings that are by nature contradictory. In seeking truth, we must delve for it in the real world where it is mixed in with its opposites—filth, unscrupulousness, and falsity.

What unites us all is the need to gain an understanding of our work, the struggle to master its mysteries. Streets that are clean, yes; and iron that is well wrought. But we are not going to make street cleaning a matter of national security (unless political prisoners are forced to sweep them), nor political policies into literary or aesthetic truths.

A limpid result requires that each one abide by the discipline of his work. Thus, the government cannot subordinate literary work to its political needs. The writer cannot try to be like a street sweeper instead of writing; nor can he be obliged to join with the party and the state in an area of political activities that is not properly his and which it is his duty to struggle against—unless he wants to compromise his own professional integrity. A writer must raise his voice against the element in a party or a state that resists criticism, that combats it, that represses it—thereby repressing, silencing, or mythologizing the very function of a writer. Writers seek to gain understanding, to clarify their thoughts and feelings. But in this they must have freedom, because without it the task is impossible.

So, we were distressed by these two developments, which aroused sadness and anxiety in us—Heberto Padilla's letter and Fidel's words on May 1. But this was not because of the subjective material of our work as writers—feelings. It was because of the rational process we want to illuminate through them. Our sadness and anxiety were *political*.

No, the poet Padilla's letter is not the outcome of physical torture. In his letter Heberto Padilla asserts one truth as the basis for renouncing the truth as such. He repents that he tried to achieve understanding, clarity. And

so he defines himself in a mythologized way, in terms of state security. What greater torture is there for a writer than counterposing his work to *that*? And all the more when the state is a socialist one. The "heretics" of the Middle Ages in recanting offered much less resistance to Jesuit sophistry than to boiling lead poured into their eye sockets.

## Dominican Republic

# Torture in La Victoria Prison

"From about five in the morning until eleven at night, the terrifying screams of those under torture can be heard without letup, echoing in the gloomy passageways along with the loud laughter of the sadists. . . .

"Eight desperate men have tried to commit suicide.

"Cell No. 11 is called the 'pavilion of the desperate.' Those who are to be tortured are brought here. It is a room about eight meters wide and ten meters long, in which 100 prisoners selected for torture are placed. Farther along is cell No. 9, which is called the 'gas chamber' or 'death chamber.' This is where eight sadists, almost naked, work with electric cables from an inch to an inch and a half thick, clubs, and other objects. They receive the men they are to torture four at a time."


The summer issue of the *USLA Reporter*, the bulletin of the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, reprinted—from the Dominican magazine *Renovación*—an exposé of conditions in La Victoria prison outside Santo Domingo. The passage quoted above is from this report.

Since the government of President Joaquín Balaguer was installed under the watchful eye of American military forces sent in to crush the April 1965 revolution, terror has continued against all opposition political groups.

A large percentage of the approximately 2,000 prisoners in La Victoria are "politicals."

In an interview in the June 21 issue of the Santo Domingo weekly *Ahora*, ex-President Juan Bosch discussed the

This is not an "insignificant" problem, as Compañero Fidel Castro presented it at the Congress on Education, when he said that "some intellectuals" thought it should be considered by an assembly devoted to discussing the problems of culture. Unless there is freedom in this sphere, then, in essence, nothing else can be significant. □



DOMINGO QUEZADA

scope and purpose of the repression that has been going on.

The interviewer, Carlos María Gutiérrez of *Prensa Latina*, began by saying: "I have found in the last few days by reading the papers and speaking to some people that there is a situation here that can be called 'white terror.' That is, people are being murdered at the indirect instigation of the government and police. What is your view of the situation?"

The moderate former president an-

swered: "I do not think the repression has been instigated by the government and the police. I think that it is being carried out by the police, tolerated by the government, and directed by U.S. elements—by the CIA. It is a very severe terror. . . .

"The terror goes on every day. People are arrested, attacked, kept in prison even when the judges order their release, even when they are considered innocent, even when they have served their terms. . . .

"The Americans are eliminating, annihilating the revolutionists, because they think that is the way to rule out the possibility of a revolution in the Dominican Republic. As you know, they have put this method into practice in Guatemala and other Latin American countries, apparently with some success."

A typical recent case of political victimization is the jailing of Domingo Quezada, a thirty-four-year-old member of the *Sindicato Artes Gráficas* [Graphic Arts Union]. Quezada was arrested in late May on the charge of "Communist activity" and sent to La Victoria. He has been held in La Victoria for about a month already, and it is not yet clear whether he will get a trial. Of course, even if a judge orders him released, that is no guarantee the prison officials will let him go, as other cases have demonstrated.

At about the same time Quezada was sent to La Victoria, a committee of political and common-law prisoners in that institution smuggled out an appeal, which was published in the May 30 issue of *Renovación*. Among other things, the appeal said: "It is essential that political, cultural, trade-union, student, and professional organizations mobilize in order to halt the terrorism and crimes against the prisoners. We do not know how long we can prevent the kind of situation Colonel Soto Pimentel is waiting for to justify a mass machine-gunning.

"Hundreds of prisoners are jammed into a single cell; from five to six are dragged out each day, asphyxiated. These cells are nothing but hog pens. The prison has been converted into a ghetto for experiments in torture reminiscent of the Nazis. . . .

"We appeal in particular to the press and other media to aid us in reaching public opinion." □

## Mexican Stalinists in Crisis Over Student Upsurge

By Ricardo Ochoa

Mexico City

The sharpening political and social tremors in Mexico over the past three years have not failed to affect the left political groupings in the country.

First of all, the development of violent clashes between the government and massive sectors of the population, especially high-school and university students, has posed a severe test for the far-left groups, which generally lived a ghetto existence before 1968.

From the vantage point of today, we can see clearly that virtually all these formations were thrown into a crisis by the 1968 student movement. They were caught off guard by the peculiar nature of the movement, which most of them did not anticipate, and were hard hit by the government's brutal repression, which reached its peak in the massacre of Tlatelolco October 2, 1968, and the mass arrests that followed it.

The great student and popular mobilizations revealed the incurable sectarianism of the Maoist groups, especially the LCE [Liga Comunista Espartaco — Spartacist Communist League], which took an outspokenly ultraleftist and ultimist position toward the movement. As the Maoist cadres succumbed to the pressure of events, the organization cracked. Currents arose like the "Ho Chi Minh Cell," which tried to escape the stifling sectarianism of the LCE by initiating a populist tendency.

This populist line was crystallized in the "Brigadas Populares" [People's Brigades], which were established primarily in the IPN [Instituto Politécnico Nacional—National Polytechnic Institute]. They reached their peak in 1969 and then went into a deep crisis, from which they have not yet emerged.

Another Maoist group, *Prensa Revolucionaria* [Revolutionary Press], was formed at the end of 1969. But when it discovered "a Trotskyist group" in its ranks, it dissolved itself, fusing with the Brigadas Populares.

As for the Movimiento Marxista Leninista de México [Marxist-Leninist Movement of Mexico] centered in

some IPN schools and with some groups in the provinces, it has vanished virtually without a trace. There is only a dying echo from some of its members who have stayed in some skeleton "Comités de Lucha" [Struggle Committees, the organs of the 1968 student movement], which have degenerated and no longer have any representative character (above all in the IPN).

One splinter group from the LCE, the "Brigadas Emiliano Zapata," has some influence in the UNAM [Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México—National University of Mexico], but its evolution is like that of the other Maoist groups.

In contrast to the LCE, which last published its organ *Militante* in 1969, the internationalist Trotskyist current—which reorganized immediately after the Tlatelolco massacre into the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [Internationalist Communist Group, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International]—has become an ever stronger pole of attraction.

The development of a strong Trotskyist grouping, on the other hand, has helped to deepen the crisis of the largest left organization in Mexico, the PCM [Partido Comunista Mexicano—Mexican Communist party] and its affiliate, the JCM [Juventud Comunista Mexicana—Mexican Communist Youth].

The development of a militant, mass student movement presented great problems for the pro-Moscow Stalinists, who dominated the Mexican left before 1968. Following October 2, an open split occurred in the JCM, with the dissidents being led by a number of political prisoners. Diverging factions arose in the JCM, leading to informal splits that divided and subdivided the clubs to the point where the JCM virtually ceased to exist as an organization. The factional warfare in the JCM also led to public conflicts in the PCM.

In this situation, the Maoist currents continued their policy of avoiding the key questions posed by the struggle. They did not offer a clear general

line. That is, they did not draw the lessons of the crisis in the revolutionary movement after 1968, evaluate its consequences, propose perspectives. In short, no Maoist group was capable of serving as a center for developing political analyses and orientations. Instead, they submerged themselves in sterile and obscurantist populism.

In contrast to this, the GCI took on the responsibility of posing the question in a Leninist manner.<sup>1</sup> It stated clearly that what was missing in 1968 was a revolutionary Marxist organization and that it hoped to be the nucleus, or one of the nuclei, in forming such a party.

The PCM would not, of course, have been precipitated into such a deep crisis, if it had not been for a series of events marking the world crisis of Stalinism, of which it is a subsidiary part. But there is no doubt that the existence of an organized Marxist group exerting pressure by its actions and ideas on the most honest elements of the PCM and the JCM has had a certain effect.

At the end of 1970, the JCM held a congress where the "functionaries" (as the opponents of the bureaucracy call them) faced a number of opposition currents. These factions differed from one another politically—their only common denominator being violent aversion to the leadership. They presented no viable alternative.

Fundamentally, the fight was between the bureaucratic faction and the left wing. But the situation was confused by the heterogeneity of the "left." It included neanarchists, spontanéists, romantic anti-Stalinists, etc. In all, it is a pathetic mélange of revolutionists completely confused by the ideological and political decay of the body they are trying to bury.

The tragic thing about this new left

1. One of the first things published in *La Internacional*, the organ of the GCI launched in 1969, was a long document of the Fourth International on the balance sheet of the struggles in 1968 throughout the entire world.

inside the PCM (which is concentrated among the youth) is that without realizing it, it continues to be guided by the bureaucratic training it has received inside the Stalinist movement. Thus, although this new left wing may be broader than the various anti-PCM splinter groups that developed in student circles in the 1960s (since it includes sectors of the JCM in the provinces), it is less alert to problems of theory.<sup>2</sup>

Last year the PCM tried to canalize this discontent by publishing its "Tesis sobre los problemas del desarrollo del Partido Comunista Mexicano" [Problems in the Development of the Mexican Communist Party]. These "Tesis" were supposed to show the party members how advanced the leadership was and how ready it was to analyze problems in the history of the PCM. But the leadership overreached itself. Instead of satisfying the discontented, the "Tesis" added new fuel to the fire. Honest militants were stimulated in their desire to get to the bottom of things, to the root of the evil. A brief summary of the theses and their background will make clearer why this was so.

The present PCM leadership is the product of a shift in the bureaucratic hierarchy brought about by the repression in 1959. After the railroad workers' strike was crushed, the traditional Stalinist leadership headed by Dionisio Encina was jailed. Encina had been elected at the famous Congreso Extraordinario (Special Congress) in 1940, where among other things it was decided behind the scenes to involve the Central Committee in organizing the assassination of Leon Trotsky.

To replace these old Stalinist hacks, "youth" like Martínez Verdugo, who is the first secretary of the presidium today, rose to the national leadership. They had been in the leadership of the Federal District Committee of the PCM. These new chiefs could not, however, win confirmation of their position without making compromises with the old leadership. One of these deals included expelling the critical group headed by José Revueltas at the Thirteenth Congress in May 1960.

In their beginning section, the "Tesis" insist on fixing this as the date of the real turn in the life of the PCM.

This turn, according to the "Tesis," "made it possible to enrich and deepen the perspective we adopted then of making the party into a force capable of leading a radical transformation of Mexican society."

For the present leadership, the Thirteenth Congress is sacrosanct. It will not permit any questioning of it: "The Thirteenth Congress ended the profound crisis that had afflicted the party and opened up a new stage in its activity," the "Tesis" say. In this way, they set a *non plus ultra* to the critical spirit expressed timidly but persistently throughout.

We find phrases like the following: "we must eliminate the internal obstacles posed by our own errors and deficiencies by means of a profound and responsible self-examination"; "the party's organizational weakness in the political field and its small amount of influence in the working class and other sectors of the working population"; "the political and theoretical weakness from which a great many members and units of the party suffer"; "marked weaknesses in the political work of the national leadership and local bodies which make it difficult to mobilize the membership in a well-organized way and impede the militant activity of the party on all levels"; "grave and disturbing deficiencies exist in the organization of the party, in the functioning of its national and local apparatus, persistent failings in most of its cells"; "the party's forces are inefficiently utilized and a large number of members remain outside the party bodies"; "since 1964-65 the party has been threatened with stagnation in its organizational development"; "the party needs to make a deepgoing self-criticism"; "the party's propaganda suffers from serious inadequacies and limitations." There are many other similar phrases.

All this breast-beating calls for a critical examination of a drastic state of affairs. However, the present leadership wants to keep such criticism within the framework of the "renovation carried out at the party's Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Congresses."

So far, the contradiction between calling for a critical examination and blocking it has not been resolved. First of all, the "Tesis" offer no "deepgoing" explanation of the disastrous condition which even the leadership admits the PCM is in. Secondly, the "new program" adopted at the Fourteenth Congress and "enriched" in the

Fifteenth is no new point of departure toward breaking with the PCM's traditional conception of the struggle in Mexico.

The "Tesis" point to a series of concrete historical reasons for the party's weakness and outline "ways to overcome it."

The first such reason cited is the fact that reformist conceptions have predominated in the workers' movement since the failure of the anarcho-syndicalism of the leaders of the Casa del Obrero Mundial [International Workers' House].

Next comes "the caudillismo [strong-manism] and paternalism of the bourgeoisie and the low cultural level of a large section of the workers."

The third reason is the fact that "for the most part today's working class developed in the 1930s, as a result of the rapid increase in industrial production that occurred in those years. This period coincided with the crisis in the Party (1940-1960), thus enabling reformist and bourgeois nationalist currents to spread bourgeois ideology among the worker masses." Here, apparently, the "Tesis" offer as an explanation for the crisis of the PCM . . . the fact of this crisis itself. They cannot go very far this way, as becomes obvious when you analyze the fourth and unquestionably most important reason for the weakness of the PCM cited in the "Tesis."

This is "the dogmatic conceptions that left a profound imprint on all the Party's activity." But as soon as the PCM leadership approaches the heart of the question, it retreats in terror. It is sufficient to say that in a long list of such "dogmatic errors," the document never refers to bureaucracy, Stalinism, or any social or concrete political source of this dogmatism. As a reason for this failing, the leadership points to a theoretical incapacity on the part of the PCM:

"This dogmatic attitude is explained by our failure for many years to understand the need for developing a revolutionary theory based on Marxism-Leninism but suited to the particularities of the country and rooted in the tradition of the struggles of the Mexican people."

Because of this dogmatism, the leadership considered that "applying the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete reality of Mexico continues to be our party's most important theoretical task. And the development of the party itself is de-

2. See "Crisis interna en el PCM," *La Internacional*, enero-febrero de 1971.

pendent on fulfilling this task." (Emphasis added.)

So, the problem is in the area of theory. But the leadership limited its theoretical critique to the banalities cited above. There was a total lack of real *concrete* criticism of the Stalinist party's sinister past, an omission reflecting the philistinism ingrained in the present leadership by decades of Stalinism. For example, when the "Tesis" alluded to the period of the 1930s, the key period in the history of the PCM, when it became Stalinized and sowed the seeds of the disastrous situation in the 1950s and subsequent years, they had only these few words to offer:

"In the conditions created by the upsurge of the democratic and workers' movement from 1935 to 1940, when the workers' movement and the party joined in a broad coalition with representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, we should have followed Engels's guideline: 'Any movement that does not keep its sights fixed on the final objective of destroying the wage-labor system is bound to go astray and fail.' We should have made this the cardinal principle of all the party's activity in the working class and the mass movement. Because of our failure to do this, the struggle for immediate demands in those years took on a certain economist character. *Petty bourgeois ideology penetrated the ranks of the movement and the party itself more or less freely.*" (Emphasis added.)

How was this penetration of petty-bourgeois ideology into the PCM expressed? What happened inside the PCM with this ideology rotting its foundations? Was this the form Stalinism took in Mexico? The reader of the "Tesis" will search in vain for an adequate answer to these questions. The PCM leadership has never dared venture into the treacherous waters of criticizing Stalinism, not even at the local level, to say nothing of criticizing the Soviet CP and the Communist International.

So, when the leadership approaches these sensitive points, it veers away sharply. It shifts to organizational questions, trying to solve its political and ideological crisis in the purest bureaucratic manner.

As far as the leadership is concerned, the fundamental theoretical question was resolved in the Thirteenth Congress and those that followed it. But you need only glance

at the Fifteenth Congress documents to see that this is not so.

For example, on page 166 of "Una perspectiva revolucionaria para México" [A Revolutionary Perspective for Mexico], the political resolution of the Fifteenth Congress, one reads: "The existing contradictions make it clear what the alternative is. Our imperialist-dominated capitalist system is already headed toward stagnation and chronic crisis. On the other hand, an independent system, free of monopolies, parasitic capital, and big landed property offers the perspective of accelerated and sustained development."

This political resolution "clearly defined" the party's strategic perspective as "oriented toward a popular-democratic anti-imperialist revolution." So we would be justified in saying that there is no difference between the line in force previous to the Thirteenth Congress and the one adopted at this congress. This is the same line of popular-front cretinism as in the 1930s. The same line of "revolution by stages" is advocated in the supposedly different orientations before and after 1960.

So, the third and concluding section of the "Tesis" is devoted to an attempt to get the party out of its crisis by organizational means, to conjuring away this chronic crisis by mechanical trickery.

A notable feature in the PCM's disintegration, moreover, is that the theoretical incapacity that has characterized this party throughout its history has led in its decay to an incredible mediocrity and sterility. There has been nothing remotely resembling the Garaudy case or the other types of conflicts that have shown up in other CPs.

It fell to the old Stalinist Siqueiros to provide the main stimulus to discussion. On January 30, he published his "Llamado a los comunistas" [Appeal to Communists]. From an openly pro-Soviet position, the old painter attacked the PCM leadership for its lack of tolerance and democracy. This is the approach he took: "The leadership's losing sight of the Leninist norms in the party, its abandoning the historic tasks of a Communist party, the bureaucratization of its methods of work and . . . its moving away from the masses and . . . its loss of the essential moral authority in the eyes of the people."

Further on, the man who tried to murder Trotsky and who headed the

gang that did murder one of his guards, this cynical old Stalinist, dared to say: "Another of the PCM's bad old habits has been its irresponsibility in calling comrades traitors, Trotskyists, agents of imperialism, revisionists, reformists, anarchists, etc., whenever they develop any differences with the current set of national leaders."

Probably Siqueiros's move was part of the international campaign of the Soviet bureaucracy to put pressure on all the CPs that adopted a "critical" stance toward its policy in Czechoslovakia. The case of the PCE [Partido Comunista de España—Communist party of Spain] is already known. With Soviet support Líster formed a faction to oppose the Carrillo leadership, although without much success.

García Ponce was much more successful in the PCV [Partido Comunista Venezolano—Venezuelan Communist party]. He forced all those who refused to condemn Teodoro Petkoff, a sharp critic of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the bureaucratic system in the East European countries, to leave the party.

But in contrast to Líster in the PCE, who had some strength among the Spanish refugees in the bureaucratized workers states; and García Ponce in the PCV, who succeeded in rallying a Stalinist minority and forced Petkoff and Márquez to form a new centrist organization, Siqueiros has found no support in the active sectors of the PCM. (Such sectors are very few, by the way.) He has gathered around himself only the most discredited and conservative ultra-Stalinists.

Siqueiros's failure is all the more notable because the dominant faction of the PCM headed by Martínez Verdugo has publicly expressed its support for Petkoff and Márquez's organization, MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement Toward Socialism]. When Garaudy was in Mexico a few months ago, it officially invited him to a meeting of the Central Committee. And the good relations between Verdugo and Santiago Carrillo of the PCE are well known.

The right-wing critique of the veteran opportunist Siqueiros centered on two points, one international and the other local. In the area of domestic politics, he chided the PCM leadership for criticizing "Echeverría's first gropings." Siqueiros claimed that "signs are beginning to show up that the new president wants to make some



changes that point in the direction of an opening toward greater democracy."

It was very easy for the PCM leadership to refute this claim in its reply February 5. When Echeverría launched his campaign of anti-Soviet hysteria a month later over the MAR<sup>3</sup> guerrilla case, Siqueiros himself was forced to retract his assertion that the PCM leadership was treating the new president unfairly.

This brings us to what was really behind Siqueiros's criticism of the incumbent Martínez Verdugo leadership—the fact that this leadership condemned "the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by the five Warsaw Pact powers" in 1968. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the PCM wrote: "The question of the PCM's attitude toward this problem in the world Communist movement was one of the main motives of Siqueiros's article." There is no doubt of it.

Siqueiros claimed: "When the August 1968 events occurred, the national leadership reacted hastily. It did not wait until it had sufficient, reliable, clear information before writing a resolution on this theoretically and tactically important development, a resolution that condemned the action taken by the Warsaw Pact countries."

Siqueiros marshaled the most extreme Stalinist arguments: "As later became evident, the Czechoslovak case was not an internal problem. It did not concern a confrontation of views and attitudes among the Czech people themselves. Basically, what was involved was a dangerous maneuver by American imperialism. It was trying, through neo-Nazi forces of the West German government, to take over Czechoslovakia. This maneuver was endangering the integrity of the socialist community. A hands-off attitude by the Warsaw Pact countries would have been a betrayal of this sister nation and of the principles of proletarian internationalism."

The PCM leadership had no difficulty in answering these arguments: "As the later evolution showed, the objective of the action by Warsaw Pact troops was to change the course that

had been adopted by the Czechoslovak Communists in the months following the January 1968 plenum. The Czechoslovak Communists were moving toward a renewal of socialism, toward strengthening and extending socialist democracy, assuring the healthy growth of the national economy, and eliminating the grave errors committed in the previous period."

The leadership began to take a sharp tone: "When Siqueiros talks about hastiness, he can only mean that he did not want our party to raise its voice to condemn an action that compromised the aims of socialism, in time to have any effect."

In responding to the attacks of the old Stalinist gunman, the PCM leadership was forced to go further than the "Tesis" in disavowing the heritage of Stalinism. It accused Siqueiros of throwing a smokescreen over the party's efforts "to root out the decrepit habits and methods which Stalinism passed on to the immense majority of Communist parties." It challenged the old Stalinist to make good his charges that the PCM leadership witch-hunted its opponents.

"Siqueiros cannot prove his statements, if he attributes such actions to the present leadership. He cannot cite the names of comrades unjustly labeled as Trotskyists or enemies of the party, or unjustly expelled for 'some difference.'"

In one of the ironies of history, the Central Committee of the Mexican Stalinist party accused this old Stalinist assassin of being a falsifier: "But Siqueiros has taken a wrong path, the path of falsifying the facts in internal matters and of right-wing opportunism in political problems."

Thus, as can be seen, the dynamic of the crisis has led the PCM leadership to overstep the limitations on criticizing the party's past that it itself set last year in its "Tesis." An article in the March 15 issue of the party magazine *Oposición* shows even more clearly where the logic of the situation is leading the PCM leaders. It also indicates how much the PCM is feeling the pressure of Trotskyism.

In his article "Las alegres cuentas del Trotskismo" [The Trotskyists' Funny Stories], Antoni Franco wrote: "We Communists do not accept the alternative of choosing between two airtight systems of dogmas—Stalinism and Trotskyism. Both leave no room for creative development. The objective of our rectifications is to return

to Leninism and help to develop it, rejecting all the caricatures of it. In a certain sense, the best way to defeat Trotskyism is to overcome Stalinism. The Mexican Trotskyists, both of the Fourth International<sup>4</sup> and the just plain International,<sup>5</sup> adopted both concepts, manipulating them to *hook Communists*." (Emphasis added.)

This "new left" sleight of hand is not likely to solve the problem of Trotskyism, any more than the organizational gimmicks in the third part of the "Tesis" have solved the chronic crisis of the PCM. The breakup of the JCM, with the cadres of this organization being drawn into different currents or falling into an abyss of confusion, is a fact that the PCM bureaucrats cannot deny. This situation haunts them because it is the prelude of what will soon develop in the party itself.

With great new struggles looming on the horizon in Mexico, both Stalinist opportunism and ultraleftism are collapsing. Only the Trotskyists can face the future with confidence. □

4. Franco is referring here to a small, eccentric, ultraleftist grouping led by Juan Posadas, which makes a fetish of calling itself "The Fourth International." This grouping, with its bombastic pretensions, has offered opponents of Trotskyism a useful straw-man. — IP

5. Franco is referring to the GCI whose organ is *La Internacional* (The International). — IP

## Playing With Garbage

Coca Cola—well-known for its contribution to pollution through its bottles and cans—is seeking to improve its public image in Britain by sponsoring a classroom game to be played by secondary school children.

The name of the game is *Man in his environment*. It comes in a kit that includes a magnetized board representing a geographical area, and ten "projects," such as an airport, road, shopping center, or high-rise apartments. The class debates each project before voting whether to include it in the "environment."

## Wait Till He Takes Up Golf

For the first time since Mao Tsetung came to power, a plurality of Americans favor admitting China to the United Nations. A Gallup poll in May found 45% in favor, 38% against, and 17% undecided. Last fall, before Mao became widely known as a ping-pong enthusiast, 49% of Americans opposed having China in the UN and only 35% were in favor.

3. Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria—Revolutionary Action Movement. For details on this case, see "Echeverría Discovers Another 'Communist Plot,'" *Intercontinental Press*, April 19, 1971, page 360; and "Who Was Behind the 'Communist Plot'?" *Intercontinental Press*, May 31, 1971, page 504. — IP

## The Split in the Black Panther Party

By Jon Rothschild

"Sometime ago when the Party started, Bobby [Seale] and I were interested in strengthening the Black community, that is, a comprehensive set of institutions, because there is one thing we lack and that is community. We do have one institution that has been around for some time and that is the church. After a short harmonious relationship with the church, in fact a very good relationship, we were divorced from the church, and shortly after that we found ourselves out of the good favor of the whole Black community. . . .

"We see the church itself as going through phases of development. Sometimes it has found itself somewhat isolated from the community. Today the church is striving to come back into the favor of the community; so with the church the Black Panther Party will attempt this also."

So spoke Black Panther party Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton at the Black Odyssey Festival of the Center for Urban-Black Studies Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California, on May 19. The return to religion is the latest step in the evolution of the Newton faction of the Black Panther party.

When the dispute between Newton and Eldridge Cleaver first became public, at the end of February, the political issues dividing the two factions were obscured by the personal attacks between the two leaders of the party. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 29, page 272.) Since then, the Newton group, which apparently holds the allegiance of most Panther members and supporters in the United States, has clarified its direction of development considerably.

Feeling its isolation from the masses of Blacks in the United States, the Newton grouping has virtually abandoned its previous ultraleft rhetoric of "picking up the gun." This rhetoric has been replaced, however, not with a series of transitional demands aimed at mobilizing the Black community in struggle against the U.S. ruling class, but with a "survival program" consisting wholly of reformist social work.

In the April 10 issue of the *Black Panther*, official weekly organ of the party, Newton explained the character of the Panther's new minimum program:

"And I would like to say that the survival program is not a revolutionary program. It's a program instituted in the community so that the people may survive pending revolution. In other words, people make revolution. If we suffer genocide, then revolution will not occur, because we won't be around."

The sum total of the day-to-day activity of the Panther party now is centered on the survival program: "What we will do is start to make golfing bags under contract to a company and with the surplus we will buy material to make free clothes. Our members will do this. We will have no overhead because our collective—we'll exploit our collective by making them work free." (Huey Newton in the *Black Panther* of May 29.)

In his address to the Black Odyssey Festival, Newton gave up his earlier ultimattistic bombast, replacing it with appeals for reform: "We can jump too far ahead and say that the system absolutely cannot give us anything which is not true, the system can correct itself to a certain extent. What we are interested in is for it to correct itself as much as it can do and after that if it doesn't do everything that the people think is necessary then we'll think about reorganizing things."

"To be very honest again I think there's great doubt whether the particular arrangements can do this. But until the people feel the same way I feel then I'll be rather arrogant to say dump the whole thing just as we were arrogant to say dump the church. Let's give it a chance, let's work with it in order to twist as many contributions and compromises out of all the institutions as possible and then criticize after the fact. We'll know when that time comes, when the people tell us so."

The previous position of the Black Panther party that U.S. capitalism could be destroyed only through armed struggle contained an element

of truth in its recognition that to merely seek reforms and to rely on the ruling class parties meant suicide for the oppressed nationalities and the working class.

But the leadership of the Panthers never understood the necessity of mobilizing masses of Blacks to effect their own liberation, nor of the necessity of constructing a Leninist revolutionary party capable of advancing transitional demands in the struggle, fostering revolutionary consciousness among the masses, and thereby challenging the reformists for leadership of the mass movement.

The ultraleft rhetoric of the Panther party was combined with abstention from real community struggles around nationalist demands. Consequently, the party became isolated from the community, and was made vulnerable to vicious government witch-hunt attacks. When these attacks brought the party to a state of near ruin, the Newton leadership altered its course, not toward revolutionary Marxist theory and practice, but toward reliance on groups such as the church and Black elements in the Democratic party. This, Newton reasoned, would end the isolation of the Panthers.

Lack of understanding of the role of the vanguard party and its relation to mass independent struggle has led the Newton leadership from ultraleftism to reformism. The April 3 issue of the *Black Panther* contained an advertisement urging readers to vote for the Berkeley coalition, a reformist slate linked to the Democratic party, in the April 6 city elections.

The Cleaver group has insisted that the Black Panther party has been subverted by the policies of David Hilliard, the party's chief of staff, and the main leader of the party during the time that Newton was in jail in California.

Cleaver's criticisms center on two points: Newton's abandonment of the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare, and the development of a personality cult and bureaucracy around Newton.

In the first issue of *Right On!*, a publication of the Cleaver faction, Cleaver spells out his view of the evolution of the split:

"Now the contradiction developed and developed and developed. The Party itself developed into a very bureaucratic machinery for dealing with mass demonstrations, around political prisoners, publishing newspapers,

getting out leaflets, and all of that mass mobilization apparatus, rallies, the whole ability to do that. Much of the Party's resources and personnel were channeled into that. Those who were dedicated to mass mobilization tended to favor and select people out of the mass of the Party who were similarly oriented. And cats who didn't fit into that, were kind of shuttled to the side, dropped out of the Party, and all kinds of things."

The focus of the differences, Cleaver wrote, was around the strategy to be followed in defending the Panther political prisoners, one of the central activities of the party for several years. To mass mobilizations, Cleaver counterposed the tactic used by Jonathan Jackson, a Black youth who was killed in an alleged attempt to free three Black prisoners from the Marin County courthouse in California. (The indictment of Angela Davis stems from this incident. See "International Protest Over California Political Trial," *Intercontinental Press*, January 18, page 27.)

Wrote Cleaver: "And even though Jonathan Jackson was not a member of the Black Panther Party, we have no problem or contradiction relating to the great revolutionary initiative he took. In the first place, the Black Panther Party is a vanguard organization. It is not a mass membership organization, and its job is to vanguard tactics [sic] and disseminate information so that the people will know how to move and how to move on target. The type of action that Jonathan Jackson took has everything to do with the way the Black Panther Party was moving, helping to create the right climate, helping to discredit the judiciary and turn people against it so that the gun would be picked up."

The party is fundamentally divided, according to Cleaver, on the question of the role of armed struggle: "The Black Panther Party has developed a left wing and a right wing. The right wing is based on the whole apparatus that relates to the mass organizing, the legal, above ground apparatus, and then the brothers who are moving, outlaws, underground, those who have gotten down—those who have transformed politics into war—constitute the left wing of the party."

In the same issue of *Right On!* an article signed by Central Headquarters, Black Panther Party, described Cleaver's conception of the party: "Our party is one that abides by the prin-

ciples of democratic centralism. Their decisions flow from the top to the bottom and if there are any discrepancies, the redress of grievances are dealt with under the same structure, and the criticisms flow from the bottom to the top."

This conception of the content of democratic centralism is consistent with Cleaver's view of the party solely as a means of integrating military struggle into politics. The party should be run on an essentially military basis, with the membership's right to criticize decisions tacked on as a corrective measure.

Cleaver's group has correctly pointed out that the "survival program" of Newton is a reformist one. But they counterpose to the "survival program" not transitional demands, but rhetoric about "offing pigs."

The two perspectives are graphically illustrated in the full-page drawings on the back pages of both the *Black Panther* and *Right On!* The former frequently depicts a Black family, or just children, eating breakfast, with an appropriate "serve the people" quotation at the top of the page. The latter, in the April 3 issue, for example, shows a Black revolutionary, pistol in hand, taking aim at a cop. The caption states that "we have no hang ups about revolutionary violence."

Most tendencies within the U. S. left have maintained silence on the Panther split. The Communist party has yet to analyze the degeneration of the BPP, or to express itself on the current division. The formerly Maoist Progressive Labor party has also not commented.

One inconsistent commentator on the Panther developments has been the Workers League, the American voice of the British Socialist Labour League, a sectarian grouping that claims adherence to Trotskyism.

In the immediate aftermath of the split, the *Bulletin*, weekly organ of the Workers League, was apparently taken in, in a highly impressionistic manner, by the fact that Newton flirted briefly with dialectics. Following his political idols Kim Il Sung and Mao Tsetung, Newton constantly asserted that his new turn was guided by dialectical materialism, and he urged all revolutionists to study Marxist philosophy, from which they would understand the necessity of "survival programs," "serving the people," etc.

The *Bulletin* of April 12 characterized this as a great leap forward for the Panthers:

"But the very experiences of the Panthers and the development of the class struggle have in fact forced the Panthers, and in particular Newton, to go beyond this perspective [that the Blacks in the U. S. are an oppressed nation and had to prepare for armed struggle]. Thus Newton began to take up sharply the need to turn from nationalism to socialism, to the fight against capitalism and above all to the study of theory, to dialectical materialism.

"It is this turn which precipitated the split between Newton and Cleaver. It is Cleaver, who as Newton points out was hostile to political questions, to theory, that now [?] becomes the advocate of simply 'picking up the gun,' of urban guerrilla warfare, of nationalism and race war."

The Socialist Workers party, we are told by the *Bulletin*, "distorts Newton's position, ignores his turn to dialectics. . . ." The *Bulletin* tells us that the split between Newton and Cleaver "reflects a class difference, that is covered over by the Socialist Workers Party whose position is a 'plague of both houses.'"

The *Bulletin* continued to maintain the same attitude for several weeks, urging Newton to take his next logical step and embark upon a study of Trotskyism.

In the May 31 issue, the editors of the *Bulletin* suddenly changed their minds. The appearance, in the *Black Panther* of May 15, of an adulatory article on the history and role of the Black church tipped them off. Something was going on here, but it wasn't dialectical materialism.

Newton's turn toward dialectics, we are suddenly informed, "remains idealist." Not only that, but "There is no good religion."

The SWP, which six weeks before was allegedly interested in concealing the working-class basis of Newton's position, now turned out to be Newton's philosophical ally. "Trotskyism itself has been under attack for over a decade from within [?!] by idealism in the form of Pabloite revisionism. Therefore it is not accidental that the Socialist Workers Party, which has embraced Pabloite revisionism, has also embraced the most reactionary idealist trends of our time." One such reactionary idealistic trend, to believe the *Bulletin*, is Black nationalism.

The Socialist Workers party has, in fact, been the only organization on the left to offer a serious analysis of the de-

cline and split of the Black Panther party. Tony Thomas, in the April 9 *Militant*, explained the basis of the isolation of the BPP from the Black community: "Recognition of the revolutionary dynamic of Black nationalism and the promotion of a program to mobilize and organize the Black community around its nationalist demands are the touchstone of revolutionary action in the Black community. It is the Panthers' failure to meet this test that provided the basis for their demise."

And farther along in the same article: "The facts are that both [factions] are responsible for the Panthers' zigs and zags in both directions [opportunism and ultraleftism]. It was Cleaver who was the presidential candidate of the reformist Peace and Freedom Party. It was Newton who counterposed

forming armed bands of twos and threes to mass action.

"The answer to these problems is not primarily in criticizing the organizational moves made by both sides. The organizational life of a political group is related to and flows from its program.

"The only answer is the repudiation of the political confusion and vacillation of the Panthers and the adoption of a strategy of mobilizing Black people to 'control the institutions of their community,' as Malcolm X put it."

The degeneration of the Black Panther party was a defeat for the Black liberation struggle. But the potential for mobilizing the massive nationalist sentiment in the Black community remains. This material base will give rise to new expressions of that sentiment. □

tember in Santiago, to which our party sent eight cadres.

The classes lasted ten days and went from 6:00 in the morning to 9:00 at night. In addition to theoretical and political study, time was devoted to sports such as karate and hiking.

The subjects of study were the following:

1. Current problems of Marxism-Leninism. Historical and dialectical materialism.

2. Marxist political economy.

3. History of the Russian revolution.

4. The theory of the permanent revolution and its application to today's world.

5. The economic, social, and political situation in the world. The workers states, the capitalist centers, and the colonial and semicolonial countries.

6. The political situation in Latin America. The economic changes and the revolutionary process.

7. The Chilean revolution. The Allende government and its repercussions throughout the continent.

8. The Bolivian situation. Defining the character of military reformism. The mass movement and the immediate perspectives. The role of the party in this process.

9. The roads to power in Latin America and Bolivia indicated by the present concrete historical situation. Armed struggle on a continental scale. The conception of revolutionary and guerrilla warfare advanced by the Trotskyists.

10. The situation of the Fourth International and the Bolivian POR.

11. The history of the Fourth International.

On each of these subjects, the comrades received a mimeographed text. Other comrades who would like copies of these texts can get them by asking their Comités Regionales.

The devoted work of the Chilean comrades deserves special emphasis. They demonstrated an internationalist attitude at all times and a dedication to training Trotskyist cadres for Latin America. □

### Surgical Precision

The secret Pentagon study published in part by the *New York Times* included the information that in an air raid on North Vietnam in February 1965, Nguyen Cao Ky dropped his load of bombs on the wrong place.

Asked about this by newsmen June 17, Ky replied that he hadn't missed. All of North Vietnam, he said, was the target.

## Documents

# Bolivian Trotskyists Hold Cadre School

[We have translated the following article from the May 1-15 issue of *Combate*, the organ of the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario—Revolutionary Workers party, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International).]

\* \* \*

As part of the party's program for improving the theoretical and political

education of its middle-level cadres, a training school was held in Santa Cruz at the end of March. Forty comrades from the various Comités Regionales [Regional Committees] attended. Another school was held later in Oruro, with twenty comrades in attendance.

Three comrades from the Chilean section of the Fourth International were on the staff of lecturers organized by the party.

These schools were quite successful. The classes were both enthusiastic and strictly businesslike. Besides creating ties of comradeship and understanding among activists from different provinces, the experience of living, studying, and discussing together enabled the participants to gain the maximum benefit from the sessions.

Seminars were held, involving a lecture by the teacher, direct consultation of sources, use of mimeographed discussion questions, and reports by participants.

The seventy participants and the eight teachers worked with real Trotskyist dedication. This was the second project carried out jointly by the Bolivian and Chilean revolutionists in a real internationalist spirit. Another international school was held last Sep-

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