

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania


the Americas

Vol. 9, No. 14

©1971 Intercontinental Press

April 12, 1971

50c



MAO GREETES PAKISTANI DICTATOR YAHYA during latter's November visit to Peking. Maoist regime has joined conspiracy of silence on Yahya's massacre of East Bengal freedom fighters, and published Yahya's condemnation of Indian aid to Bangla Desh. Mao prefers diplomatic ties with Yahya rather than supporting just struggle of Bengali people as indicated by caption

on this photo from January 1971 **China Pictorial**: "Chairman Mao warmly shakes hands with President Yahya Khan. Chairman Mao . . . met General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and his party, and had a cordial and friendly conversation with the distinguished Pakistan guests."

After Laos Rout, Calley Verdict:

Demand Grows: Out Now!

When U.S. Troops Were in Siberia

More than fifty years after the fact, a U.S. district court judge has ruled that the American military intervention in Siberia during the Russian Revolution was in fact a military intervention. The court ruling was necessary because the U.S. government has maintained that part of its expeditionary force were really employees of Kerensky.

The decision was handed down March 24 in a suit brought by veterans of the "Russian Railway Service Corps." It will entitle them to the same benefits as those received by other military veterans.

The men were railway workers recruited for the ostensible purpose of keeping Russian railroads in repair as part of the war effort against Germany. They were commissioned as officers in the U.S. army and paid from funds the U.S. treasury said were credits for the Kerensky government. Sanford J. Ungar described their experience in the March 25 *Washington Post*:

"... by the time the railroad workers—equipped with uniforms and weapons—had arrived at the Siberian port of Vladivostok in 1917, Kerensky had fallen and the Bolsheviks were in power. . . .

"They [the Americans] maintained control of the railroad until their departure in 1920 despite clashes with both White and Red Russian forces who sought to take it over for their own ends."

The government is now considering whether it will appeal the district court's ruling. A successful appeal would provide Nixon with an invaluable precedent. He could then rename his Indochina expeditionary force "Southeast Asia Reconstruction Society" and announce that there were no more U.S. troops in Indochina. □

Child Labor in U.S.

One-fourth of all agricultural wage laborers in the United States are under sixteen, according to a study released March 21 by the American Friends Service Committee.

The group reported on an investigation of child farm labor in five states—Washington, Oregon, California, Ohio, and Maine. The study found children as young as six working ten hours a day in 100-degree heat.

The children's wages ranged from a piecework rate of 12 cents a crate for picking strawberries to an average of \$1.12 an hour in California, the highest paying state. Federal law sets a minimum wage of \$1.30 an hour for farm workers.

Our New Address

It's easy to remember: *Intercontinental Press*, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

In This Issue

	FEATURES
	322 When U.S. Troops Were in Siberia
	ANTIWAR
	323 Antiwar Leaders Demand Right to Answer Nixon
	325 Antiwar Group to Carry Mail to Vietnam
	INDOCHINA WAR
	324 Bad News for Nixon's Colonial Army
	324 Calley Verdict: Washington Found Guilty
	PAKISTAN
	326 Bloodbath Fails to Crush Bengali Resistance
	GREAT BRITAIN
Ross Dowson	328 Passage of Tory Bill Spurs Labor Militancy
	BOLIVIA
Gerry Foley	329 "People's Assembly" Formed
	NEW ZEALAND
Hugh Fyson	332 Mass Antiwar Demonstration Set for April 30
	CANADA
John Steele	333 Protest in Ottawa for Prague Nineteen
	VENEZUELA
Gerry Foley	334 How Moscow Split the Communist Party
Alfonso Ramirez	335 The MAS—Not a Plus for the Workers
	JAPAN
Susumu Okatani	338 600,000 Workers Demand Higher Wages
	U.S.A.
George Novack	340 The Importance of the Mandel Case
	MEXICO
	341 Echeverria Releases 16 More Political Prisoners
	342 Statement of Freed Victims
	DOCUMENTS
	343 Statements by the Fourth International
	343 Forward to April 24
	343 Down with Anti-Communist Campaign
	of the Sudanese Government
	344 Declaration on Argentina
	344 Declaration on Uruguay
	PHOTOS
	321 Mao Tsetung welcomes Yahya Khan to Peking
	332 New Zealand antiwar conference in Wellington
White	333 Canadian Trotskyists demand freedom for Prague 19
	339 Sanrizuka farmers fight to keep their land
	DRAWINGS
Copain	336 Teodoro Petkoff; 337, Pompeyo Marquez

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

MANAGING EDITOR: Les Evans.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Allen Myers, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.

TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein, Steven Warshell, Jack Wood.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July, not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors,

which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 95 rue du Faubourg Saint-Martin, Paris 10, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1971 by Intercontinental Press.

Antiwar Leaders Demand Right to Answer Nixon

Nixon's advisers, wrote Robert B. Semple Jr. in the April 4 *New York Times*, have been afflicted with "the shattering sense that the bottom may have dropped out."

Semple was referring to the rising demand for an end to the war, which has been spurred in recent weeks by the defeat in Laos and the war-crimes conviction of Lieutenant William Calley.

At a March 30 press conference, representatives of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) demanded that television and radio networks provide live coverage for the massive April 24 antiwar demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco. The wide support for these protests, which are sponsored by NPAC, has already caused Vice-President Spiro Agnew to attack the news media in the hope that they can be intimidated into ignoring the marches. (The same tactic produced an almost total "embargo" on coverage of the largest previous antiwar demonstrations, on November 15, 1969.)

NPAC announced on March 31 that it would also demand equal time to reply to Nixon's April 7 speech on the Indochina war. "We will ask the networks for equal time under the fairness doctrine," the Associated Press quoted an NPAC official as saying. "We will publicize the [April 24] rally but we also believe the American people have the right to answer the President."

The press conference was attended by Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana, a Democratic presidential hopeful, who announced his support for NPAC's equal-time demand and for an antiwar memorial meeting being organized by the Concerned Officers Movement (COM), a rapidly growing organization of military officers opposed to the war.

Lt. Louis Font, a spokesman for COM, announced an April 23 memorial service for the war dead in the Washington National Cathedral. While military personnel are not allowed to demonstrate in uniform, they are encouraged to wear uniforms to church services. COM is organizing

a similar memorial service in San Francisco.

Font reported that, in the last few weeks, COM has grown from 200 to 700 members. He predicted that a large number of GIs would participate in both the April 23 and 24 actions.

The antiwar mood continues to deepen on the campuses as well. On April 2, nearly 500 editors of college newspapers and student body presidents sent an open letter to Nixon charging that ". . . our policymakers have never considered the cost in Asian lives of the policies they pursue."

Concerning "Vietnamization," the student leaders wrote: ". . . changing the color of the corpses does not end the war."

The Student Mobilization Committee (SMC), the country's largest antiwar youth organization, is now distributing 1,000,000 buttons advertising the April 24 demonstrations. On April 19, high-school members of the SMC will leaflet high schools all over the country with information about the marches.

NPAC has issued an international call to the people of the world "to join in public demonstrations for the immediate withdrawal of all U. S. troops, war planes and matériel from Southeast Asia."

"It is the common responsibility of all those who respect the right of the Southeast Asians to self-determination," the statement said in part, "to mobilize massive and powerful opposition to the policies of the U. S. government. Only the unified strength of the people of the world can be an effective answer to Nixon's and the Pentagon's ambitions. . . ."

"Massive and international public activities around the date of the 24th can be the greatest outcry yet against the war-makers in Washington."

Opposition to the war has become so widespread that the newspapers and politicians of the ruling class are forced to acknowledge its breadth. In the April 2 *New York Times*, for example, Max Frankel wrote:

"Whatever the past divisions between hawks and doves, or conservatives

and liberals, it is clear from the polls and the discussions in Congress that more and more of the country is united in its desire to quit Indochina—sooner rather than later and, for a growing segment of the population, regardless of the consequences there."

A sign of the direction in which things are moving was provided in the House of Representatives April 1 when two conservative Democrats from the Deep South announced that they would vote against extension of the draft as a concession to their constituents' antiwar feelings. The two, John J. Flynt Jr. and Phil M. Landrun, represent rural districts in Georgia.

John W. Finney, writing in the April 2 *New York Times*, explained the two congressmen's abandonment of their earlier prowar position:

"In the last six months or so, Mr. Flynt said he had detected a major shift in sentiment about the war among his constituents from an initial attitude of 'win the war' to 'win the war or get out' to an attitude now of 'get out.'"

Still another indication of how the capitalist politicians evaluate opposition to the war was provided by Senator Edmund Muskie, who is considered to be the leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. James M. Naughton wrote in the March 31 *New York Times* that Muskie ". . . is said to consider his brief history of opposition to the war as his chief hurdle."

The senator, who had said nothing against the war prior to last October, accordingly utilized a March 31 television interview to explain that he had had "doubts" as far back as 1965!

Nixon has not yet undergone any such ex post facto conversion. On the contrary, his plans call for "indefinite involvement with airpower and at least 'advisory' support on the ground" in both Vietnam and Cambodia, as Max Frankel put it in the April 2 *New York Times*.

A massive turnout April 24 will be a significant blow against Nixon's aggressive schemes. □

Bad News for Nixon's Colonial Army

"One objective of the 45-day allied operation against the Ho Chi Minh Trail network in Laos," Craig R. Whitney wrote in the April 4 *New York Times*, "was to prevent a Communist offensive in the northern regions of South Vietnam. But last week, only a few days after the operation ended, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces struck in a series of attacks that were more costly in American and South Vietnamese lives than any in the area since last summer."

On March 28, National Liberation Front troops overran a U. S. position south of Chulai, killing 33 American troops and wounding 76, according to figures released by the U. S. command. At the same time, NLF forces began a three-day siege of the provincial capital of Ducduc, causing heavy losses to Saigon troops. And on March 31, two Saigon infantry companies and their U. S. advisers were driven from a firebase near Dakto. The base was later "recaptured"—after the NLF forces had withdrawn.

These new attacks, destroying Nixon's last pretense for claiming a victory in the Laos invasion, underlined the magnitude of the defeat suffered by his colonial army. Attempts to prove victory by means of invented statistics had already collapsed of their own absurdity.

Alvin Shuster in the April 1 *New York Times* quoted an American officer who pointed out that Saigon's claims of casualties inflicted would indicate that the North Vietnamese and NLF forces had lost 12,000 more troops than they had in the area.

"The South Vietnamese casualty figures for the troops in Laos are also open to question," Shuster wrote. "Saigon says that 1,163 were killed and 4,299 wounded, with 240 missing, for a total of . . . 5,700 or about 25 per cent of the force involved. Some unconfirmed reports circulating in Saigon put the total casualties at 10,000, or about 50 per cent, which the Saigon command absolutely denies."

Thieu's officers also claimed to have destroyed 176,246 tons of ammunition—"more than the equivalent load," Shuster noted, "of 10,000 of the largest cargo plane at work in Vietnam."

The explanations for the rout suffered by Saigon's troops do not bode well for Nixon's professed aim of building a reliable colonial army. A reluctance to die for the goals of American imperialism seems to have been widespread among the "elite" units of the invasion force. Iver Peterson reported in the March 30 *New York Times*:

"American helicopter pilots reported frequent instances of South Vietnamese officers abandoning or failing to control their men. One reason the troops often broke ranks under fire and ran for the helicopters, the pilots said, was that their officers had already left."

American helicopters proved inadequate to the task of ferrying sup-

plies, Peterson wrote, not only because of the intense antiaircraft fire but also because Thieu's three armored battalions failed to keep open Route 9. If the armor did anything except run for cover, the fact is a military secret:

"As it is, commanders of the South Vietnamese armored forces refused to say just what their men and machines did in Laos, except for a small tank force sent into action too late to be of use on Hill 31, one of the hotly contested strongpoints."

Even Thieu himself may have failed to fill the role prescribed for him. Several reporters suggested that the puppet had escaped his strings long enough to order a retreat when Nixon would have preferred to continue the invasion.

It is hardly surprising that, one week after the invasion ended, Senator William Fulbright derided the "massive misjudgment on the part of our political or military leaders." □

War Crimes in Vietnam Correction

Calley Verdict: Washington Found Guilty

Convicted of mass murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, Lieutenant William L. Calley Jr. has become the center of a political storm in the U. S. that is increasingly embarrassing for the Nixon administration.

In finding Calley guilty of murdering "no less than" twenty-two unarmed civilians in the village of Mylai 4 in March 1968, the Fort Benning court-martial finally provided an official admission that the U. S. has committed war crimes in Vietnam. Acquittal was impossible for the military court because of the worldwide outrage over the massacre and Calley's open confession of his crimes. But once the verdict was in, it proved impossible to convince the American public that the guilt for Washington's genocidal war rested on the shoulders of one obscure lieutenant.

Even before Calley's sentence was announced March 31—two days after his conviction—letters and telegrams had begun to pour into the White House charging that Calley was being used as a scapegoat.

Conservative veterans' organizations attempted to give the protests a superpatriotic character, but events

soon made evident that most persons were disgusted with the hypocrisy of proclaiming Calley *solely* responsible for the Mylai massacre. The scale of the protest showed that the public had not swallowed Nixon's contention that Mylai was an isolated incident untypical of the war as a whole.

Important sectors of the bourgeois press admitted the discrepancy between the verdict and the choice of defendants. Thus the *New York Times* said editorially March 30:

"Although Lieutenant Calley's personal guilt is beyond question, there remain grounds for the complaint of his attorney that Calley has been made a scapegoat—'the pigeon—the lowest officer on the totem pole.' There is ample precedent at Nuremberg and Tokyo for a much broader assignment of responsibility at higher levels of command for the war crimes committed at Mylai and elsewhere throughout Indochina. . . ."

Right-wing politicians such as Alabama Governor George Wallace sought to attribute the protest at Calley's conviction to racist and chauvinist sentiments among the U. S. pop-

ulation — that no American soldier should be punished for any crime done to people of another country. Nixon implicitly endorsed this position when he intervened in the Calley case on April 1, ordering Calley released from prison until his appeals are completed. Two days later Nixon announced that he would personally make the final decision on Calley's fate—a virtual promise of leniency.

But the findings of a Gallup poll reported in the April 4 *New York Times* showed that the great majority of people who disapproved of the verdict in the Calley case were in no way prepared to accept the commission of war crimes by "their" government in Washington.

The survey showed that 79% of those questioned disagreed with the verdict in the trial. But of these, 71% gave as their reason the fact that others shared the responsibility for the crimes. Only 20% excused Calley's actions. Sixty-nine percent specifically said Calley was being used as a scapegoat by higher officers. Significantly, 50% of those questioned said they believed that war crimes such as the one in Mylai were commonly committed by American forces in Indochina. Only 24% disagreed with this assessment.

The reaction to the Calley verdict has scuttled Nixon's efforts to limit public discussion of the war to the question of the number of U. S. soldiers killed each week. As Anthony Lewis put it in his column in the April 3 *New York Times*:

"Americans are not only worried about American casualties in Vietnam. More and more of them want to stop the killing all over Indochina. More and more of them feel a national responsibility for terrible things that have happened and are still happening in Indochina, and they want those things to end."

The next day, *Times* vice-president James Reston added:

"Calley was undoubtedly pitiless, but the U. S. bombing policy in Indochina is also pitiless and even premeditated, and it is not an isolated incident out of the past but a continuing policy. . . .

"The elemental and premeditated crime is clearly the continuation of the war itself."

The logical demand, and one that may be heard with increasing frequency, is not "Free Calley!" but rather "Jail Nixon!" □

Army Seizes Literature

Antiwar Group to Carry Mail to Vietnam

At an April 2 press conference, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) announced a broad campaign against army interference with the right of GIs to receive antiwar literature. Bob Wilkinson, editor of the SMC's *GI Press Service*—an antiwar paper for servicemen and servicewomen—said the antiwar group would shortly send a delegation to Vietnam to take literature to GIs there and to hear their complaints of interference with their mail.

The SMC campaign came in response to an article by Richard Halloran in the March 31 *New York Times* that disclosed illegal interception of mail addressed to GIs. Halloran had obtained a secret directive sent out by army headquarters at Longbinh last May 22.

The directive, Halloran wrote, ordered commanders to seize antiwar material after intelligence units had opened—illegally—letters sent to GIs in Vietnam by the *GI Press Service*.

"The Army dispatch said that the return address on the envelope, which was used to identify the letters, gave the name of Allen Myers, former editor of the G. I. Press Service, and the street address of the press service office here [Washington]. Mr. Wilkinson confirmed that.

"The Army became aware of the mailings, according to the message, when the 525th Military Intelligence Group intercepted an envelope bearing Mr. Myers' return address and from which the mailing label had slipped off. Mr. Myers was known to military intelligence in Vietnam, having been barred from entering the country by the South Vietnamese police in January, 1970."

Wilkinson described plans for GIs to lead the April 24 mass demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco, and pointed out that soldiers in Vietnam have more right than anyone to be informed of antiwar activities.

"We are forming a delegation to go to Vietnam in the immediate future," he said. "One purpose of this delegation will be to hand-carry the April issue of *GI Press Service* to every GI in Vietnam who wishes to receive it.

In addition we will take affidavits from GIs who have reason to believe their mail has been illegally intercepted."

Wilkinson said that civil-liberties attorney James Lafferty of Detroit, who is a coordinator of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), had agreed to be part of the delegation. Discussions are under way with officials of postal unions and members of Congress to secure their representation on the trip.

Wilkinson released copies of an April 1 letter from members of the House subcommittee on postal service to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The letter said in part:

"It has been brought to our attention that the United States Army has acted without legal authority to confiscate and/or censor private, first class mail addressed to members of the Army serving in Vietnam.

"The postal laws relating to first class mail clearly prohibit and make inviolate such mail without court intervention."

The letter threatened a Congressional investigation unless the order on seizing mail was promptly revoked.

Wilkinson also announced that the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (NECLC) would shortly file suit against army interference with the mail of GIs. □

to:

Intercontinental Press
P. O. Box 116
Village Post Office Station
New York, N. Y. 10014

from:

Name _____
Street _____
City _____
State _____ Zip _____
Country _____

[] \$15 enclosed for one year.

[] \$7.50 enclosed for six months.

Bloodbath Fails to Crush Bengali Resistance

"By the grace of Allah, the unity of Pakistan has been saved in the nick of time," West Pakistan bourgeois leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto told reporters March 26 in Karachi, according to correspondent Gérard Viratelle writing in the March 30 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. Bhutto was returning from the former East Pakistani capital of Dacca, where central government troops began their "pacification" operations the day before.

In launching its assault on the Bengali people, the army of General Yahya Khan tried to pull down a curtain of censorship around the entire province of East Pakistan. Penned up in their quarters as soon as the fighting started, foreign correspondents were quickly and unceremoniously expelled from the country. Hundreds of Bengali journalists perished in the burnt-out ruins of newspaper offices. Even many foreign journalists were threatened with execution by the military authorities. To cut all possible links with the outside world, the occupation commanders demanded that amateur radio operators turn over their equipment to the army.

Despite this ruthless censorship, news of an enormous slaughter of unarmed Bengalis leaked into the world press. By the first days in April, the Pakistani dictatorship was convicted in the eyes of world public opinion of deliberate mass murder on a scale that has few parallels since the end of World War II.

"In the name of 'God and a united Pakistan' Dacca is today a crushed and frightened city," Simon Dring of the London *Daily Telegraph* cabled March 29 from Bangkok, after being hustled out of East Bengal.

"Led by American-supplied M-24 World War II tanks, one column of troops sped to Dacca University shortly after midnight. Troops took over the British council library and used it as a fire base from which to shell nearby dormitory areas.

"Caught completely by surprise, some 200 students were killed in Iqbal Hall, headquarters of the militant antigovernment students' union, I was told. Two days later, bodies were still smoldering in burnt-out rooms,

others were scattered outside, more floated in a nearby lake, an art student lay sprawled across his easel."

The army did not stop at physically liquidating the Bengali nationalist vanguard, such as the students and political activists. It applied the "final solution" to large sections of the Bengali masses themselves: "In the Hindi area of the old town, the soldiers reportedly made the people come out of their houses and shot them in groups," Dring continued. "This area, too, was eventually razed."

Despite the ruthless surprise attack, Pakistani troops seemed unable to stamp out the resistance of the Bengali people. As fighting persisted, the Western powers began to evacuate their nationals. In Singapore, some members of a group of 102 British citizens flown out of East Bengal described the carnage they had seen. An April 3 UPI dispatch reported their story: "'Each day I could see fresh groups of bodies piled up on the pavements,' said one man who had been an employe of the East Pakistani provincial government. 'There were men, women, even babies with bayonet and gunshot wounds. Some appeared to have been crushed.'"

Within a week after the start of the massacres, foreign reporters were able to visit areas held by the Bengali liberation forces and see the evidence of the Pakistani dictatorship's crimes at close range.

"The dead of Jessore were being buried today in communal graves," an AP dispatch from that besieged city reported April 2. "Scores of unarmed men, women and children were killed, resistance leaders said, when some of the Pakistani troops emerged from their positions two nights ago and swept through Jessore.

"A column of troops backed by armored cars was said to have destroyed rows of peasant homes. Whole families, resistance leaders said, were killed by machine gun fire as they fled.

"Bodies lying in fields and ditches showed evidence of bayonet wounds."

Recruited mainly from the so-called martial peoples of the old Northwest frontier provinces, the Pakistani army

carries on the traditions of the colonial military caste fostered by British imperialism. The master-race mentality and fanaticism of the military tribes—similar to that instilled by the British imperialists in the Irish Protestant minority—seems to have prepared the West Pakistani commanders for merciless slaughter of the ethnically different Bengalis.

"Hardly anywhere was there evidence of organized resistance," Dring wrote about the Dacca massacres. "Even the West Pakistani officers scoffed at the idea of anybody putting up a fight.

"'These bugger men,' said one Punjabi lieutenant, 'could not kill us if they tried.'

"'Things are much better now,' said another officer. 'Nobody can speak out or come out. If they do we will kill them—they have spoken enough—they are traitors, and we are not. We are fighting in the name of God and a united Pakistan.'"

After a week of fighting, it seemed clear that a full-scale civil war was spreading across the territory of East Bengal.

The occupation army, estimated at between 30,000 and 70,000 men—which is being reinforced and supplied by planes flying thousands of miles around the tip of the Indian subcontinent—seemed incapable of even attempting to occupy the densely populated countryside.

On April 3, streams of refugees began to pour out of East Bengal into India, apparently fleeing terror bombing of the countryside.

"At other points along the border," *New York Times* correspondent James P. Sterba cabled from New Delhi April 3, "people who had first fled from towns to neighboring villages crossed over, saying they had feared that West Pakistani planes would bomb their rural sanctuaries next. . . .

"East Pakistanis at the border reported heavy fighting in several towns.

"In general, however, it appears that West Pakistani troops are beginning to have difficulty maintaining their resupply system and that the East Pakistanis, while disorganized,

are beginning to mount stiffer guerilla resistance as West Pakistani troops attempt to spread their control from cities to district towns."

Unarmed and with little leadership, the Bengali masses appeared to be paying a terrible price to keep the occupation army pinned down. "What we are doing against the army of occupation has possibly not been done anywhere in the world," a resistance fighter told an Indian journalist, according to a dispatch published in the April 2 issue of the *New York Times*. "We are fighting in human waves with almost no weapons and replying to the rockets with only rifles and revolvers."

Furthermore, in this densely populated region, where 75,000,000 people live just above the starvation level, the interruption of agricultural work and the movement of food supplies threatens to create a famine. When British troops used scorched-earth tactics in this area during the second world war to block a Japanese invasion, millions died of starvation.

With the revolutionary struggle in East Bengal becoming a magnet and a rallying point for Bengalis under Indian rule, the hope of conservative forces in both religion-based states on the subcontinent may be to create a general famine that could break the momentum of the mass upsurge.

In the early 1969 spontaneous uprisings against the military dictatorship, East Bengali peasants moved rapidly to challenge the capitalist state, setting up organs of direct popular rule in some areas. If an effective revolutionary leadership existed in East Bengal, there seems little doubt that the outcome of the present struggle would be a socialist republic of Bengal, able to serve as a revolutionary pole of attraction for all of southern Asia. The bourgeois Bengali autonomist leader Sheik Mujibur Rahman expressed his fear of such a development in an interview with Agence France-Presse before the start of the massacres: "Doesn't the government of West Pakistan realize that I am the only one who can save East Pakistan from Communism?"

"If they decide to fight, I will be pushed out of power by the Naxalites [this is the name of a Maoist grouping, but here it seems to be used as a general label for the far left]."

It is not yet clear how far the East Bengali left has developed since 1969 when it failed to project a convinc-

ing revolutionary alternative to Sheik Mujibur's Awami League. The attitude of the Peking regime remains an important factor. Because of the obvious power of China and the revolutionary-sounding language of the Chinese CP, the Peking government has exercised a strong influence among radical youth in both East and West Pakistan.

In its struggle against the Pakistani dictatorship in the past, however, the left has received no support of any kind from Peking. The past and present military dictators were extolled in the Chinese press as anti-imperialist fighters. Diplomatically and politically isolated, Peking was apparently willing to trade its revolutionary principles for military and trade pacts with an amenable capitalist dictatorship in its own back yard.

Since West Pakistan shares a common border with China, Peking has obviously been anxious to lure Islamabad away from the American-sponsored regional security pacts. East Bengal, the Maoist leaders in China have evidently noted, is entirely surrounded by India.

Peking's policy of political support for the Pakistani bourgeois regime was foreshadowed in similar backing given to the "anti-imperialist" regime of Sukarno in Indonesia. Because of Peking's support for the established regime, the Maoist Indonesian Communist party did not prepare its followers for the struggle against the reactionary forces, relying on the bourgeois nationalist Sukarno to protect them. As a result, like the vacillating bourgeois reformist Sheik Mujibur, the Indonesian Maoists led their

Another Paradise Lost

The U.S. ruling class leaves no spot untouched in its search for profit. The latest territory to attract the attention of real-estate speculators, hotel builders, and other such representatives of the American way of life are the New Hebrides islands in the South Pacific.

Stolen from the native inhabitants by the British and French in 1887, and used by the United States as a military base during World War II, the New Hebrides are jointly ruled today by Britain and France. U.S. travel agencies advertise the islands as a haven from the crush of urban living, free from environmental pollution, civil unrest, nationalism, radicalism, etc.

However, American tourists visiting the

party into a slaughter in which as many as 1,000,000 persons perished.

But even the early 1969 mass uprising against the Pakistani dictatorship could not convince the Mao leadership that it was unwise to place all its bets on the "Islamic state."

The Chinese press has never to this day reported the massive demonstrations and clashes that forced Ayub Khan to abdicate in favor of a less bloodstained military dictator.

On July 13, 1969, the Peking regime gave a special banquet in honor of Air Marshal Nur Khan, a member of the ruling military junta that had crushed a popular uprising only a few months before. Chou En-lai pledged the militarist commander "on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, our resolute support to the Pakistan Government and people [the "Islamic" people?] in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national dignity. . . ." (*Hsinhua Selected News Items*, July 21, 1969.)

Even the present massacres in East Bengal seem not to have changed the Mao leadership's position of diplomatic support for the dictatorship.

On April 4 Agence France-Presse reported: "China broke its silence on the Pakistan crisis today by citing and apparently approving President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan's protests against alleged Indian interference in Pakistan's affairs." The dictatorship has protested against Indian sources publicizing the massacres and sending supplies to the Bengali rebels.

The Chinese press has followed the example of its diplomatic ally in Islamabad by suppressing any mention of the bloodbath being perpetrated by Yahya's troops. □

islands have given glowing reports about the investment possibilities. Robert Trumbull, writing in the *New York Times* of March 20, says that more than two hundred overseas companies, many of them American, have registered to take advantage of the taxless economy of the New Hebrides. U.S. real-estate interests have been selling and reselling land in the islands, and one American lawyer there said that Vila (a town of 4,000 on Efate Island) "is potentially the financial center of the Pacific basin."

The airport near Vila has already been reconstructed to accommodate jet aircraft.

Trumbull reports that the islanders' response to the U.S. business invasion has been to develop a growing "militant land reform movement."

Passage of Tory Bill Spurs Labor Militancy

By Ross Dowson

MARCH 25—Yesterday the Heath government moved the third reading of its sharply contested Industrial Relations Bill. Just one week earlier the special assembly of the Trade Union Congress held at Croydon narrowly voted down a powerful bloc of unionists who fought to win it to a policy of general strike action to block passage of the bill. By an even smaller margin the congress defeated the demand that all unions should refuse to register under the Tory measure, should it become law.

The Labour party MPs attempted to talk out the third reading of the bill in the House of Commons, but after sixty-three divisions and a twenty-one hour and forty-one minute nonstop sitting, the Tories closed the debate by a surprise withdrawal of some forty-two amendments. The government majority carried the vote and the bill now goes on to the House of Lords, thence to become law.

As he moved the third reading, Robert Carr, secretary of state for employment, declared that with this bill curbing the trade unions, Britain joins all the other advanced capitalist countries.

But having won, Carr was far from jubilant. On the contrary he warned—addressing himself directly to boards of directors and top management—that "any employer who imagines this bill will remove problems and reduce responsibility is greatly mistaken."

Such sobriety in victory is easy to understand, for the Tories have won what they must themselves sense has many elements of being an empty victory. When Harold Wilson and Barbara Castle prepared somewhat similar legislation to make British capitalism work, they split the ranks of Labour and its supporters down the middle and suffered electoral defeat.

The mere passage of this bill, not to speak of its enforcement, has tremendously heightened the unity of labor. It has forced the right-wing Labour party shadow cabinet to lead a strong fight in the house against it and in support of an opposition campaign that the Trade Union Con-

gress brass have been reluctantly driven into. And it has thrust millions of workers into massive industrial actions, the scope and militancy of which have not been seen in Britain since the great general strike of 1926, thus preparing the ground for the creation of a new leadership.

They commenced with the February 21 protest called by the Trade Union Congress leadership itself, which saw nearly 140,000 register their opposition to the bill in Trafalgar Square in the biggest organized demonstration ever staged in Britain. This was followed by a massive one-day strike on March 1, which was in turn surpassed by the March 18 one-day strike.

Almost 1,500,000 workers across the country downed tools on March 1. The March 18 demonstration against the bill, called by the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) and sections of the Transport and General Workers Union, brought out "possibly two million workers," according to the *London Times*.

Whereas almost none of the Rolls Royce workers at Derby came out on March 1, this time over 40 percent stayed off work. Bristol and Liverpool dockworkers walked out and were joined by Manchester workers, despite appeals from union leaders to stay on the job. Some 15,000 miners, against instructions of the National Union of Mineworkers, came out to raise the Scottish total to 150,000 on strike.

The outcome of the vote at the special March 18 Trade Union Congress in Croydon was as expected. The addition of the blocks of votes held by those union heads who had already opposed the two political strikes gave the Victor Feather leadership a majority. Furthermore, Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW, the most vigorous spokesman for the March 1 and 18 actions, committed his union in advance to accept the decision of the Croydon congress, as did Jack Jones of the Transport and General Workers Union.

Nonetheless, Feathers' policy of compliance, but noncooperation, carried by only a five-to-four vote—5,366,000 votes for, to 3,992,000 votes against—because it did not include any call for militant actions such as one-day mass stoppages or a general strike of some duration.

Feather's proposal on behalf of the General Council, which merely "strongly recommended" unions not to register under the act, carried by a small margin—5,055,000 for, to 4,242,000 votes against supporting a policy that would commit all unions to refuse to register.

It is improbable, even with the passage of the bill through the House of Lords and onto the statute books, that there will be even a temporary lull in the rising militancy of the British workers.

The government succeeded in driving the postal workers back on the job and into arbitration after refusing to grant their demands on the claim that it could concede no more than an 8 percent increase unless there were productivity concessions. But Heath has since granted 140,000 civil servants a 9.5 to 13 percent increase, and the Post Office Executive Engineers won an arbitration award of 14.8 percent.

The strategically situated locomotive operators' union has rejected the British Railway Board's 9 percent offer.

On March 18, backing up their demand for a 15 percent increase, the National Union of Teachers lobbied the government and gave 70,000 London students a half-day off.

Some 50,000 Ford workers in twenty-six plants, their ranks solid, are now in their fifty-second day of strike. Some 30,000 Vauxhall workers are demanding parity with the best paid—in their case a 14 percent basic pay rise.

Henry Ford provided an American industrialist's view of the situation in a press interview following his reception luncheon with Prime Minister Heath. Ford summed it up in the comment, "There is no stability in Britain." □

Torres Regime Buffeted by Polarizing Forces

By Gerry Foley

"It is already definite that after the fifteenth of this month [March], the People's Assembly will deliberate in the hall of parliament. Where popularly elected deputies once sat, a kind of 'little soviet' will carry on its work. Sooner or later, this body can become a sword of Damocles over President Torres. The head of the Bolivian government has just taken bold steps in domestic policy. These have undoubtedly enabled him to fully consolidate his power. How long will this consolidation last? Perhaps only until the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana—Bolivian Federation of Labor], the peasants, and the students turn their backs on him."

A. Montesinos Hurtado, a correspondent of the Buenos Aires daily *Clarín*, cabled the above lines from La Paz on March 11. By mid-March there was abundant evidence that, despite its left nationalist demagogy and extensive concessions to the masses, the Torres government had failed to achieve any solid social base.

"On January 12, in the historic Plaza Murillo in this city," Montesinos noted in a March 3 dispatch from La Paz, "the powerful Central Obrera Boliviana called a gigantic meeting of support for the government of President Juan José Torres. Political observers here estimated the crowd at 50,000 persons. All shouted for the revolutionary general to declare himself for socialism. A chorus of 50,000 persons shouted, 'Torres, socialism, socialism, socialism.' President Torres replied, 'I will do what my people want me to do.' This answer was greeted with vivas and applause by the entire crowd."

In mid-February this powerful thrust toward socialism gave rise to the People's Assembly. Writing in the February 23 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, correspondent Andrés Soliz described this new organ of direct popular representation:

"It . . . was formed by the workers' organizations affiliated to the COB, the two Communist parties (pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet), the Revolutionary Christian Democrats, the Spartacus group, the MNR [Movimiento Nacio-

nalista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Nationalist movement] led by Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Suazo, the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario—Revolutionary Workers party] . . . and the PRIN [Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista—Revolutionary party of the Nationalist Left], the organization led by the veteran labor leader Juan Lechín."

Soliz explained the role of the People's Assembly: "This organization, which has no legal status, proposes to 'keep a check' on the government, to prevent it from making concessions to the right, and to propose laws designed to 'deepen the anti-imperialist process' going on."

The People's Assembly is an outgrowth of the Popular Command, a united front of workers', students', and left organizations that sprang up in response to the attempted right-wing take-over led by General Rogelio Miranda in October 1970.

The body is composed of 220 delegates. According to the rules it has adopted, 60 percent of these delegates must come from the working class; 30 percent from the salaried middle classes and the agricultural sector; and 10 percent from the political parties.

According to Soliz, the body has not yet clearly defined its attitude toward the Torres government.

"Some in the assembly want official recognition by the government, which would give the new organization the facilities to function and would permit it to meet in the old legislative hall, where the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have met since the founding of the Bolivian Republic.

"Others, more radical, have thought that the assembly must remain 'on the outside' and impose its decisions on the government by mobilizing the workers."

Almost immediately after the formation of the People's Assembly, Torres attacked it, centering his fire on its most discredited component—the MNR, the demagogic party raised to power by the revolution of 1952, which, by the time it was ousted by a

military coup in 1964, had totally exhausted its political credit.

Even before the 1964 coup led by General René Barrientos, the MNR had lost its labor base when Juan Lechín split from the party. After its ouster from power, it continued to suffer splits, defections, and attrition of its popular support.

But in the political vacuum created by the failure of the October 1970 rightist coup and the split in the military, the old demagogic bourgeois politicians of the MNR have tried to make a comeback. At the beginning of February, the leaders of the two main factions, Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Suazo, met in Lima. Allegedly burying their differences, they issued a statement of reunification February 8 which declared that "the workers will achieve power . . . through the MNR," adding "we will be the guides of new chapters . . . in Bolivian history."

The reactivation of this discredited formation provided a useful straw man for the Torres government. "For the second time in a week, President Juan José Torres has attacked the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario . . . which, according to observers, is trying to recover the power it lost more than three years ago," a February 20 AP dispatch published in *Clarín* noted.

"Last night, President Torres read his message to the nation. But the speech was directed especially at the workers.

"I have come to denounce the grave-diggers of the April 9 [1952] revolution," he said.

"He emphasized the administrative record of the MNR regime, which he characterized as selling out to imperialism. Later he claimed that the MNR was implicated in conspiratorial actions against his regime and warned that he would take a firm stand against those attempting to sow chaos in the country.

"Torres said that subversive movements were still operating 'in a blind determination to drag the country in-

to an armed confrontation." He accused the MNR of being the instrument of an imperialist offensive.

The "subversive movements" Torres was referring to seemed to be two alleged attempts at reviving guerrilla warfare that came to light in early February.

On February 8, an AP dispatch in *Clarín* reported: "The government announced today that the army has discovered and occupied a guerrilla training camp. The camp was occupied by the leader of the [pro-Chinese] Bolivian Communist party, Oscar Zamora."

The alleged guerrilla camp was in the Rancho Nuevo region, three kilometers from the city of Santa Cruz in eastern Bolivia.

Learning of the army's action, the CUB [Confederación Universitaria Boliviana—Bolivian Student Confederation] put its members on an emergency alert. In response to the protests of the students, the right-wing commander of the armed forces, General Luis Roque Terán, issued a threat of stepped-up repression, warning that the army "would take decisive action against any outbreak of subversion from the right or the left."

In view of the weakness of the regime, the Bolivian authorities have held off on staging any new trials of guerrillas. On February 12, the news agency Ansa reported that three of the four so-called guerrillas captured by the army had been exiled to Chile. There was no indication whether the Maoist leader Zamora was among them, or what attitude the government proposed to take toward him.

Late in February, there were reports of renewed activity by the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Army, the guerrilla force led by Che Guevara in 1967]. A statement purportedly from the ELN, announcing the resumption of guerrilla warfare, was delivered February 17 to journalists in Cochabamba.

On February 25, a Reuters dispatch reported: "Information received yesterday in Santa Cruz confirms that a series of explosions occurred inside the air-base area February 23 in this eastern city. The authorities, however, have made no official statement about this.

"Yesterday afternoon the local press in Santa Cruz received a communiqué from the far-left group, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, claiming responsibility for the attack."

Despite the weakness of the Torres

regime, there have been no indications as yet that guerrilla activity represents a serious political or military challenge to the authorities.

Torres' inability to establish a government strong enough to launch a new repression seems, however, to have inspired another attempted coup by the right wing of the officer corps.

"Yesterday [March 3] forty-five trucks carrying about 2,500 peasants erupted into the peaceful city of Santa Cruz," Montesinos cabled March 4 from La Paz. "The peasants ousted the prefect appointed by President Torres [Marcelo Velarde, a member of the MNR] and put in his place the commander of the Eighth Army Division, Colonel Remberto Torres [a right-winger who took a prominent part in the trial of Régis Debray]. They immediately called for the removal of five ministers from the national government: secretaries of the interior, Dr. Jorge Gallardo Lozada; of planning, Lic. José Luna; of labor, Abel Avoroa; of education, Huáscar Taborga; and the secretary of the Ministry of State, José Ortiz Mercado. All are members of the MNR. The peasants accused these ministers of belonging to the 'infantile left.' The march on Santa Cruz was called a 'March Against the Infantile Left.'"

As for the local garrison, Montesinos reported, they made no attempt to halt the peasant seizure of the town. "Colonel Torres accepted the position offered him by the peasants, that is, he supported their removal of the prefect. Instead of placing himself under the orders of the government, he put himself at the command of the peasants. . . . This game was backed by no less a force than a garrison of the importance of the one in Santa Cruz."

In its March 7-8 issue, *Le Monde* reported: "The rebel peasants occupied the prefecture, a radio station belonging to the COB. And they tried, without success, to invade the campus of the Gabriel René Moreno University. . . . The powerful National Confederation of Agricultural Workers, in fact controlled by the present minister of agriculture, Colonel Hugo Cespedes, supported the position of the Santa Cruz peasants. Thus a paradoxical situation arose. One of General Juan José Torres' ministers was indirectly demanding the resignations of five of his colleagues."

As in other attempts by the right wing to seize power since October 1970, the putsch was blocked by the

decisive action of a united front of workers, students, and the left parties.

"But the popular reaction was not long in coming," *Le Monde* continued. "In Santa Cruz itself, the departmental council of the COB, strongly supported by the students, called an all-out general strike. It demanded the immediate resignation of Colonel Remberto Torres, evacuation of the radio installations, and ouster of the minister of agriculture, Colonel Cespedes. In La Paz, the COB issued a call for a nationwide general strike."

The confrontation brought strong pressures to bear on a delicately balanced regime. "Torres is now caught in this play of forces," Montesinos reported in his March 4 dispatch. "Either he will keep the promise he made to the workers January 12 to do what they ask, or else he will have to turn against those who today are his most reliable supporters.

"Observers wonder whom the revolutionary president will listen to. To the Central Obrera Boliviana, which will call for punishing the instigators of the events in Santa Cruz, or the peasants who demand the ouster of five ministers and the appointment of Colonel Remberto Torres as prefect. . . .

"In the meantime the country is threatened by a general strike called by the Central Obrera Boliviana, the student alert, and possible outbreaks of violence. The Falangist leader Mario Gutiérrez threw more fuel on the fire yesterday, applauding the events in Santa Cruz."

Fragmentary reports in the Argentinian and international press in the days following the peasant invasion of Santa Cruz indicated that President Torres gave way again to the demands of the workers, while making certain concessions and promises to the right-wing peasant organization.

"Three ministers went to Santa Cruz to seek a solution," the March 7-8 issue of *Le Monde* reported. The peasant organization leaders apparently agreed to order their followers out of the city, accepting arbitration of their demands by the ministerial commission. In the meantime the chief of the armed forces, Roque Terán, proclaimed his loyalty to the Torres government.

"In an extraordinary document," an Ansa dispatch reported March 6, "the ministerial commission arrived at a solution to the threat made by the workers to go out on a general strike

tomorrow. According to the provisions of this decision, Radio Pirai will be returned to the Santa Cruz COB, Prefect Marcelo Velarde will be confirmed in his position, Colonel Remberto Torres will be relieved of his command of the Eighth Army Division, and a military trial will be initiated against Colonel Andrés Selich, commander of the Macheo Rangers regiment."

Two right-wing leaders in Santa Cruz were arrested—Ambrosio García, a former Falangist deputy; and Raúl Portugal, head of the Falangist youth. In La Paz, the top leader of this current, Gutiérrez, was also arrested.

Although the peasant organization leaders expressed outrage at the decision of the ministerial commission and threatened to lead their followers back into the city, the confidence of the popular forces seemed greatly reinforced by their victory.

"In Santa Cruz," *Le Monde* of March 7-8 reported, "the return of Prefect Marcelo Velardo was the occasion of a spectacular demonstration of support for the government. Greeted by thousands of workers and students, he was escorted in triumph to the prefecture."

At the same time, however, Colonel Cespedes, apparently the real power behind the putsch, was not removed from his post. On March 6 Torres made a speech denouncing left "extremism," which ironically, was also the proclaimed target of a major insurrection against his government a few days before.

"Bolivia," Torres said, "does not need to follow anybody's patterns to achieve its liberation. The Bolivian problems will be solved by the Bolivian people itself."

"The Bolivian revolution is struggling against time and against pernicious extremists."

However, Torres failed to establish a new equilibrium and was forced in the next two weeks to make important new concessions to the masses that further undermined the stability of capitalist rule in Bolivia.

On March 14, the La Paz daily *Hoy*—which was seized by students and workers during the October 1970 mobilization—published disclosures extremely damaging to extensive sectors of the military caste. The paper accused former president General Alfredo Ovando Candía of having murdered his predecessor, General

René Barrientos, as well as a number of other people. Ovando's motive, reportedly, was to cover up his involvement in an international arms racket, with all the earmarks of a CIA operation.

Montesinos summed up the revelations in a March 14 dispatch: "Barrientos died in what until today, at least officially, has been described as an accident . . . But today *Hoy* presented a version claiming murder and a political plot. It said it had the documents to support these accusations."

"After Barrientos' death, three crimes followed which shocked the country. In November 1969 the peasant leader and former minister in the Barrientos government Jorge Soliz Román fell victim to an ambush. In February 1970 former minister Jaime Otero Calderón was strangled to death. A month later a little package arrived at the home of the journalist Alfredo Alexander, founder of *Hoy*. It exploded, killing him and his wife."

"According to the investigations, these crimes were related to arms traffic, apparently directed by presidents Barrientos and Ovando. The sum of \$50,000,000 was involved. The Bolivian government bought this amount of arms when it was waging a struggle against the guerrillas led by Che Guevara. The arms did not reach Bolivia but were directed to Israel, which was under an arms embargo following the end of the Six Day war."

An Agence France-Presse dispatch in the March 19 issue of *Le Monde* reported more of the disclosures: "Fearing blackmail, General Ovando is supposed to have had the president then in power killed, ordering Captain José Faustino Rico to shoot down his helicopter. . . ."

"President Barrientos died on the afternoon of April 27, 1969, when his helicopter exploded, allegedly running afoul of some cables in the town of Arque some 350 kilometers north of La Paz. Today it is said that machine-gun fire from a hill hit the fuel tank of the helicopter, setting it afire."

"Later ex-President Siles Salinas [who assumed the post of president after Barrientos' death until he was ousted by Ovando in a coup September 26, 1969] suffered a criminal attack on his life as he was going to the Palacio de Gobierno. Siles had ordered an investigation of the murders, and when it was on the point of completion he was overthrown by General Ovando."

Four days after the Barrientos scandal broke, Torres reshuffled his government. "Practically all the conservative tendencies in the cabinet have been eliminated," Andrés Soliz reported from La Paz in a dispatch published in the March 20 issue of *Le Monde*. Among the conservatives eliminated was Colonel Cespedes. He was replaced as minister of agriculture by Colonel Mario Candía.

Commenting on the governmental shakeup, Soliz wrote: "The new government was formed in the midst of a political scandal. The papers are running sensational headlines about revelations claiming that former president René Barrientos was murdered on the orders of General Ovando."

The response to the scandal, Soliz thought, would tend to strengthen Torres' position. "While 'the affair' threatens to cause a deterioration in the political climate, it will doubtless have the effect of reinforcing General Torres' authority. His right-wing opponents in the military have been dealt a blow by the revelations against General Barrientos, whom they can claim as one of their own. The more moderate, 'centrist' officers have been dealt a still harder blow by the accusations against General Ovando, who was rather representative of them. Thus, at the moment, General Torres seems to be the only guarantor of stability in a particularly unstable country."

By discrediting the armed forces, the Barrientos scandal may have temporarily reduced pressure on Torres from one side, giving him a freer hand for maneuvering. But the exposure of the principal governmental representatives of the capitalist system in the country as a band of gangsters murdering each other in shady deals involving imperialist money can only strengthen the demands of the masses for an entirely different type of system. And an alternative popular government, although embryonic and deformed, already exists in the People's Assembly. □

Correction

In the article "Sanrizuka Farmers Win Support in Airport Fight" by Wataru Yakushiji (page 274 of our March 29 issue), the date of local elections in Japan was inadvertently given as April 17. This should have been April 11 for mayoralty and gubernatorial elections and April 25 for election to local assemblies and minor mayoralties.



NEW ZEALAND antiwar conference March 14 voted to organize mass demonstrations throughout the country on April 30. The Wellington meeting, the largest such gathering ever held

in New Zealand, involved representatives of the Labour party, trade unions, students, church groups, and left political parties. Only Maoists opposed the plan for mass actions.

New Zealand

Mass Antiwar Demonstrations Set for April 30

By Hugh Fyson

Wellington

More than 600 persons attended the National Antiwar Conference held in Wellington March 13-14. It was by far the largest gathering ever held in New Zealand to plan antiwar activity, and there were participants from all over the country, representing many different organizations.

The conference voted almost unanimously to support a national antiwar mobilization on April 30, in as many cities and towns as possible, to demand the immediate withdrawal of all New Zealand and U. S. forces from Indochina. The antiwar movement in Australia is also holding mass demonstrations on this date, and the actions on both sides of the Tasman Sea are part of the international protests scheduled for late April.

Internationalism was a keynote of the conference, with telegrams of sol-

idarity coming from the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign of Australia, the Vietnam Peace Committee in Hanoi, and the Canadian Vietnam Mobilization Committee. The U. S. antiwar movement was represented by two visiting speakers, Patricia Iiyama of the Socialist Workers party, and Michael Uhl, a Vietnam veteran and former U. S. army intelligence officer who is now on the staff of the National Committee for a Citizens' Inquiry on U. S. War Crimes in Vietnam.

The two speakers toured the country immediately prior to the conference, and the attention accorded them by the mass media made a significant contribution to the success of the gathering. They spoke in five cities, and in addition to local engagements made three appearances on national network television and radio.

Uhl spoke on the genocidal nature

of the war, drawing on his own experiences and on testimony collected by the Citizens' Commission of Inquiry from more than 300 veterans.

Iiyama, who has been for several years a leading activist in the U. S. antiwar movement, discussed the growth of the movement, its effect on the administration, and the need for a mass action strategy to end the war.

The breadth of support for the conference was very encouraging. The list of sponsors included nationally known figures from the trade unions, the Labour party, churches, academics, authors, and student leaders. Bill Martin, president of the New Zealand Seamen's Union, pointed out that the Federation of Labour has a good policy on Vietnam, and that the antiwar movement should use this fact to bring workers "into the mass movement."

No less than six Labour party Mem-

bers of Parliament were among the sponsors. Phil Amos, M.P., chaired the final session. His praise for the Labour party's stand on the war was received with scepticism, for although the party has a written policy of support for immediate withdrawal, the leaders at the last general election in 1969 refused to put forward this demand.

To accommodate the wide representation, the conference divided into workshops to plan activity in the various areas of work, such as high schools, trade unions, and the Labour party. The women's workshop voted to establish an ongoing women's caucus within the antiwar movement, through which to draw women into all levels of activity, and to begin to overturn the subordinate role of women in the movement.

The best attended workshop was on demonstrations, and it unanimously approved a proposal from the Wellington Committee on Vietnam for a nationwide mobilization April 30.

With so many tendencies involved in supporting the conference, the pro-Peking Communist party of New Zealand [CPNZ] was noticeable for its hostility. It attacked the conference in three consecutive front-page articles in its weekly *People's Voice*, and in its concluding report painted the conference as a fight between the "revolutionaries" (the CPNZ) and "an alliance of counter-revolutionary forces."

CP delegates voted against the April 30 mobilization resolution.

In contrast to the sectarian abstentionism of the Maoists, the Socialist Action League participated very successfully in the conference, being among the foremost proponents of mass action on April 30 for immediate withdrawal. The league's impact was indicated by sales at the conference of forty subscriptions to its fortnightly paper *Socialist Action*. The Socialist Action League also sponsored the tour of Patricia Iiyama, whose speech to the conference was strongly applauded.

On March 18, Prime Minister Holyoake announced the withdrawal of New Zealand's artillery battery from South Vietnam, leaving 264 servicemen there. The proximity of Holyoake's announcement to the National Antiwar Conference was not likely to have been an accident. □

April 12, 1971



CANADIAN TROTSKYISTS at door of Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa demand freedom for "Prague 19." Officials responded by calling cops to restore "law and order."

Protest in Ottawa for Prague Nineteen

By John Steele

Ottawa

A delegation of leaders of the Young Socialists/Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes (YS/LJS) was forcibly evicted from the Czechoslovak embassy here March 25 while attempting to lodge a protest with the ambassador against the jailing of nineteen alleged Trotskyists in Prague. The police, who roughed up the Canadian Trotskyist youth leaders, were called by embassy officials.

The Young Socialists, carrying red flags and a banner reading, "Free the Prague 19—Socialism Yes—Bureaucracy No," confronted an embassy official—a Mr. Novotny—at the door and demanded to see the Czechoslovak ambassador.

A statement on behalf of the YS/LJS was read by Jacquie Henderson, Central Office organizer of the YS/LJS. The statement said, in part: "We who have experienced our government's attack on our civil liberties with the War Measures Act and the Public Order Act . . . feel the outrage, shock and horror of the Czechoslovakian

people at this criminal act of political repression."

The Young Socialists found themselves surrounded by uniformed Ottawa cops with a row of police cars parked in the street in front of the embassy. The delegation refused to move.

A little later, the cops moved in. The delegation was pushed and shoved down the embassy stairs. One member of the YS/LJS was attacked by a cop, knocked to the ground, forced into a waiting police car, and taken to police headquarters for questioning. Others were manhandled, threatened with arrest, and had their clothing ripped.

A statement later released by the YS/LJS condemned both the refusal of the Czechoslovak embassy officials to hear their delegation and the outrageous "use of the Ottawa cops to avoid answering the questions raised by the delegation."

Both Canada-wide television networks and the Canadian Press news service reported the action. □

How Moscow Split the Venezuelan Communist Party

By Gerry Foley

"The Fourth Congress of the Venezuelan Communist party, held in Caracas January 23-27 . . . clearly and decisively demonstrated the loyalty of Venezuelan Communists to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, giving an example of uncompromising struggle against opportunism," according to I. U. Kozlov in the February 17 issue of *Pravda*.

"The Congress approved a resolution expelling the anti-Leninist splitter faction of Márquez and Petkoff."

The week before, January 14-18, the Márquez-Petkoff group, which had claimed the support of a majority of party members and all the Communist youth during the factional struggle, held a congress to found a new party—the MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement Toward Socialism].

It was evident that the dissident grouping had taken a very substantial section of the party, if not the majority, with them, leaving the Venezuelan CP an aging and ossified sect. The Kremlin's insistence that Teodoro Petkoff be purged at all costs seems to have forced the split, as well as widening and deepening it. The young CP leader became the target of scurrilous attacks from Moscow after he wrote and published two books criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as the Stalinist line in the third world of supporting the national bourgeoisie.*

The *Pravda* writer, however, had some cause for satisfaction in the wreck of the Venezuelan CP. The Kremlin had achieved its fundamental objective. Once again it had a dependable mouthpiece in the country. The radical wing led by Petkoff had been excommunicated from world Stalinism. The principle of monolithism in internal CP life had been reconfirmed.

Kozlov noted the rump Venezuelan CP's effusive pledges of loyalty to Moscow: "In the session on interna-

tional questions, the congress declared: 'In the struggle against imperialism and its allies, the decisive role is played by the socialist camp and its basic pillar of strength—the Soviet Union. Our party affirms its unshakable determination continually to strengthen our friendly ties with the KPCC [Kommunisticheskii Partiiia Sovetskogo Soiuz—a Communist party of the Soviet Union] and the vanguard of the working class in other countries, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism. There is no place in our ranks for anti-Sovieters or those who under various theoretical veils make concessions to pernicious tendencies promoting disunity in the Communist movement.'

About a month and a half before the Venezuelan CP congress was originally scheduled to open (December 4), the October 20 issue of *Pravda* carried an article anathematizing Petkoff. Circulated in Venezuela by the Soviet press service TASS, the text of this denunciation left no doubt as to what the Kremlin expected from its Venezuelan supporters:

"The provocative activity of Petkoff and his group cannot fail to create certain difficulties for the revolutionary movement of Venezuela. However, the experience of the international Communist movement shows that when all the healthy forces of the party rally around the leadership in a resolute struggle, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, against opportunism, all attempts to divert the party from the true Leninist path will suffer rebuff."

The October 20 *Pravda* article referred to Petkoff, then still a leading member of the PCV, as an anti-Leninist, a hater of the "socialist countries," and a "renegade." The young dissident's criticism of the Soviet-sponsored invasion of Czechoslovakia drew the heaviest fire: "In his book *Czechoslovakia—Socialism as a Problem*, Petkoff solidarizes fully with the imperialist circles in his evaluation of the events in that country, and defends the anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary forces that were trying to take Czecho-

slovakia out of the socialist camp."

Pravda openly supported the ultra-Stalinist wing of the party then engaged in a public slander campaign against the popular young leader:

"Petkoff's writings are filled with frank hatred of the world's first socialist state—the Soviet Union—and of the party of Lenin. How correctly the prominent Venezuelan CP activists P. Ortega Díaz and A. García Ponce answered the renegade in their pamphlet 'The Antisocialist Views of T. Petkoff,' writing that 'anti-Sovietism is the thread that runs through Petkoff's book from the first page to the last.'"

The leaders of the rump PCV congress, Kozlov indicated, acknowledged their debt to the Kremlin:

"The delegates of the congress expressed their deep gratitude to the sister parties and above all the KPCC for the help they have given the PCV in the difficult moments of its history. Venezuelan Communists declared their unwavering loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism and their determination to strengthen their friendship with the KPCC."

The campaign against Petkoff had been out in the open since at least the February 1970 Central Committee plenum. One of the most rabid attacks came in a pamphlet entitled *Indispensable Answers* by the general secretary of the PCV, Jesús Faria. Petkoff came under fire not only from the right but also from the centrist group led by Pompeyo Márquez, which was opposed to the revolutionary implications of the young leader's critique of Stalinism.

The fact that Moscow felt it necessary to intervene heavy-handedly in the dispute suggests that the right-wing leadership was unable to rally the support needed to "restore order" in the party ranks. In fact, press reports in Venezuela indicate that the right was forced to organize a split in advance of the congress to save itself from certain defeat. In so doing it drove out the center grouping of Márquez as well as the radicals following Petkoff, thereby shattering the

* See "Crisis in the Venezuelan CP over Czechoslovakia," *Intercontinental Press*, May 18, 1970, page 469; "Venezuelan Stalinists in Crisis over Petkoff Book," *Intercontinental Press*, September 7, 1970, page 733.

Venezuelan CP.

"After more than 600 conferences of Communist cells and sixteen or seventeen regional conferences (including the Caracas and Miranda regions) have been held, the results of the congress could be predicted," the Caracas weekly *Vea y Lea* wrote in its December 7 issue. "The most dogmatic sector, headed by the García Ponce family, would suffer a defeat in its efforts to get a monolithic, quiet party, that would be content with surviving 'until better times.'

"This did not mean that the congress would be dominated by the most radical sectors of the so-called left wing of the CP, or that the Communist leadership was going to be totally changed, or that the PCV was going to take a radical turn programmatically. No. What had been assured (by the results of important regional conferences like those in Aragua and Monagas, to say nothing of Caracas and Miranda) was the continuation of the process of discussion and internal reform. What had been assured was the defeat of the folkloric version of Stalinism.

"And confronted precisely with these results, the García Ponces and Eduardo Machados launched an attack in the PCV. They could not permit the members to decide by majority vote because they were 'confused.' They demanded that the political bureau of the PCV expel Teodoro Petkoff before the congress and suspend its convocation indefinitely until a congress of true Communists could be organized."

Shortly after making this demand, the PCV right wing moved to precipitate a physical split. In its December 14 issue, *Vea y Lea* reported:

"1. The Stalinist clique met in Junquito, the center of García Ponce's fief, to decide to sabotage the resolutions of the Central Committee of the PCV and provoke an immediate split.

"2. On Tuesday, December 8, they carried out their plans. They showed up at various plenums in the Federal District (El Valle, Santa Rosalía, El Recreo) with a statement in the name of Jesús Faria which declared: (a) that the PCV was already split; (b) that a group of cadres headed by Pompeyo Márquez was going to found another party; (c) that this group, therefore, could not attend the congress . . .

"3. After making this report known, they called on all 'true Communists' to walk out of the plenums being held. They achieved the following results.

"In El Valle, out of thirty-two attending the plenum, nine withdrew. Of fourteen delegates elected to the Regional Conference, four withdrew. Of twenty-three attending the plenum in Rosalía, three withdrew."

At the Central Committee plenum on the eve of the congress, the split was consummated. All leaders of the party and of the youth critical of old-fashioned Stalinism announced at Communist Youth headquarters that they had definitively split from the super-loyal nucleus supported by the Kremlin.

In an interview in the December 21 issue of *Vea y Lea*, the centrist leader

Pompeyo Márquez explained the reasons that produced such an extensive split in the PCV:

"I maintained that it was necessary to go into the congress and come out of it united. This means dealing ideologically with the problems under discussion, dealing politically with errors, and giving adequate treatment to the problem of cadres. I thought that the PCV had a great historic opportunity to become the leading party of the Venezuelan left if it succeeded in overcoming this situation [presumably, the internal dispute] and presenting a fresh image of an up-to-date party with sufficient flexibility in handling its internal problems and with one policy and one leading center.

"Opposing this idea were comrades who used theory as a dogma, who recited a Marxist-Leninist catechism, who conceived of proletarian internationalism in the old way, as if we were in the infancy of the Third International, who continued to speak of a single leading center of the international Communist movement, who regarded any opinion of a comrade in a powerful sister party as an order.

"There was a conflict between the concept of respecting the sovereign will of the membership as expressed in cell and regional conferences and the concept that the party had to be purged before the congress, of making the 'Petkoff question' the key question in the party and for the Venezuelan revolution. In this situation the dogmatists tried to carry out a 'coup d'état.' We rebelled against it. The responsibility for the split is obvious."

Offspring of the Communist Party

The MAS—Not a Plus for the Venezuelan Workers

By Alfonso Ramirez

Caracas

The founding congress of MAS [Movimiento al Socialismo — Movement Toward Socialism (the initials spell the Spanish word for "more")] took place January 14-18 in Caracas. In a long report, Pompeyo Márquez, who was elected general secretary of the new organization, recounted the vicissitudes of the internal crisis in the PCV [Partido Comunista Venezolano — Venezuelan Communist Party] that

culminated in a split and the formation of a new party.

In the public statements heralding the appearance of the MAS on the political scene, the differences that impelled its members to break from the PCV were listed, along with the planks of its present platform of struggle. Examination of these points will enable us to gauge how much the new party differs from the old. The dis-

tance is not always very great, as we shall see.

In their indictment of the PCV, the leaders of the MAS chose to attribute its failures to dogmatism. That is, they claimed that the PCV chiefs had proved incapable of comprehending the Venezuelan reality, which is very different from the schema the party has been following since 1936. Trying to throw off this dogmatism, the MAS offered an analysis of the na-


tional situation in its *Tesis* [Theses], which I will comment on.

This analysis, whose economic points and class focus I consider correct, leads to a political conclusion calling for a total challenge to the capitalist system in Venezuela. In this, it breaks (at least in theory) with the traditional postulate of "comunismo criollo" [the Latin-American CPs] that the Venezuelan revolution must be fundamentally anti-imperialist but not anticapitalist.

Does this mean that the MAS has adopted the principle maintained by Teodoro Petkoff (the No. 2 figure of the organization) in his book *Socialismo para Venezuela* [Socialism for Venezuela]—i.e., "in our time if a revolution does not become socialist, it is not a revolution"? The answer must be sought both in the *Proposiciones de Tesis Programaticas* [Proposed Programmatic Theses], which were approved by the first congress of the MAS, and in the actual course followed by this party.

This question is linked to a second one that casts a good deal of light on the real differences separating the MAS from the PCV: Are there distinct and separate stages in the revolutionary process? In his book, Petkoff explicitly denies the existence of such stages.

Like the Bible, the *Tesis Programaticas* lend themselves to the most diverse interpretations. The document was drawn up by a commission presided over by Pompeyo Márquez, that based its work on a draft written by Márquez himself to be submitted to debate at the Fourth Congress of the



PETKOFF: Second in command of the MAS.

PCV. The split in the party prevented its being discussed there.

On the one hand, the *Tesis* state: "4) As an alternative to the prevailing system of class rule, the Venezuelan revolution has a fundamental task — to break down and eliminate the imperialist-dominated capitalist structure and build a society free from exploitation or oppression. In order to achieve this, we must completely oust imperialism and the old ruling classes from power and establish a new kind of state as the decisive lever of social transformation. 5) Achieving the ultimate objectives of the revolution cannot be done all at once in one grand stroke. To the contrary, it presupposes an ascending course of development with successive and, in general terms, qualitatively more advanced gains being scored."

This statement is unobjectionable since, in the last analysis, the socialist revolution cannot be made overnight but presupposes a whole process of uninterrupted development. However, the *Tesis* very quickly go on to assert completely contradictory ideas. Here is what they say in the very next two paragraphs.

In the first: "Based on this general concept, we can state that the advance of revolutionary transformations will pass through different periods or stages in the development of the changes defining the revolution and by which it will be deepened, consolidated, and strengthened."

And in the second paragraph: "The experience of successful revolutions does not, however, support the idea of a process proceeding in completely distinct, well-defined stages according to a rigorous and obligatory order."

When the *Tesis* attempt to be a little more specific, we get the following projection: "Given the economic and social structure of Venezuela, the task of eliminating foreign domination and its fundamental bases of support in Venezuelan society takes on a certain preeminence and priority in the general course of the revolution. Hence, as a prominent part of the overall revolutionary process, we must envision an antilatfundist, antioligarchical, and anti-imperialist stage, in which the tasks of social change focus on breaking American domination, liquidating the political and economic power of the sectors of the big bourgeoisie in the service of American imperialism, overcoming the vestiges of backwardness, and liquidating big

landed property, the latifundio."

What difference is there between the idea put forth in this last paragraph and the PCV's official theory that in Venezuela and, in general, in Latin America, a bourgeois-democratic, or "popular-democratic" stage, as Márquez terms it, must come first? What form would this first stage take? From the *Tesis*, it would not be too much to assume that three models already exist for the initial stage of the socialist revolution in Latin America—the cases of Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. The *Tesis* point to these cases as examples. Moreover, in discussing the revolutionary state, the *Tesis* maintain: "In order to liquidate foreign domination and its bases of support within the country, we must form a popular, anti-imperialist government."

To characterize a political group, it is not enough to read their documents, above all, if they are written in the sybilline language typical of Pompeyo Márquez. Besides Márquez's standard "dialectical" doubletalk, we also find some equally standard warning signs: "Theory and program cannot anticipate the exact course of the revolutionary process."

To characterize a political group, you have to observe its day-to-day activity. The new party held its first big public meeting February 5. Present on the platform as invited guests were representatives of the bourgeois opposition parties—the URD [Unión Republicana Democrática—Democratic Republican Union], the MEP [Movimiento Electoral de Pueblo—People's Electoral Movement], and the FDP [Fuerza Democrática Popular—Popular Democratic Force]. Along with them were independent political figures who have made a profitable profession out of their nonalignment. Seeing them all sitting there, I remembered a sentence in the MAS's Message to the Workers: "The MAS offers a different kind of image from that of the dogmatists and reformists."

The point made in this meeting and taken up in the party weekly is that the MAS is seeking an alliance with the URD and the MEP for the 1973 elections, in order to "create the conditions for a single slate of the anti-imperialist and socialist left."

The MAS leadership has realized that the masses are once again beginning to move and it seems that it wants to give impetus to the mass

movement by an alliance with the bourgeois opposition parties.


In fact, the Venezuelan masses have not been dormant in recent years. They have been unable to find a political leadership that could give a focus to their profound discontent. Up to now, the only kind of candidates for political leadership they have seen are a Luis Beltrán Prieto and a Jóvito Villalba. The first, like Juan Bosch in Santo Domingo, wants to eliminate the evils of the bourgeoisie by elevating the petty bourgeoisie. The second, after thirty-five years of political somersaults, has seen no other way of achieving his secret presidential ambitions than dressing up his speeches in phony radical verbiage.

Some 400,000 Venezuelans demonstrated their repudiation in 1968 of the corrupt democracy that rules us by voting for Pérez Jiménez. Today this sentiment has spread to a much larger number. These people have seen that the supporters of the former dictator are quite content to draw their salaries as senators and deputies, and rake in the graft. But since Pérez Jiménez remains outside the country, they assume that he is also outside the system that they detest. And, if the real fighters for socialism do not offer a revolutionary solution to these alienated, unemployed strata, the deception will persist.

It is not just a matter of appealing to those sectors of the population that live on the fringes both of production and of the cities. The fact is that if you want to form a party of the Venezuelan working class—which has never existed up to now—you cannot tie yourself up with any other force than the workers. The MAS wants to develop a revolutionary consciousness in the workers. But it will never achieve this aspiration if it seeks pacts with the bourgeoisie, big or small. Like the peasants and the so-called marginal sectors, the petty bourgeoisie may follow a historically revolutionary course, but only insofar as it accepts the leading role of the working class. And in order to play its leading role, the proletariat must be organized independently.

We agree with the MAS that no revolutionary Marxist can light-mindedly abstain from using the electoral arena in educating the masses on the ways and means of carrying out the revolution. But in order to do this, the revolutionary party must "present a

different image." The Venezuelan masses are sick of the usual parties—the PCV, MEP, URD, FDP, and FND [Frente Nacional Democrático—National Democratic Front], to say nothing of the alternating twins of two-



MARQUEZ: "Dialectical" doubletalk.

party democracy.* And today a group that proclaims itself fundamentally hostile to the established system comes on the scene saying: "We must develop ties with the most progressive, politically and socially conscious sectors in the country." If you don't think that a mass party can be built that is not bound to the system, then develop ties with those sectors.

From the contrast between the ideas of the left wing, advocated by Petkoff in his two books; and those of the center, which Pompeyo Márquez asserted in his PCV draft program, it seemed logical that these groups would develop in opposite directions. We expected the center to evolve toward an understanding with the right wing that remained in the PCV, to the point of taking over the right's old ground. Conversely, we expected the left wing to break definitively from Stalinist reformism. We did not think it was possible for these two groups to fuse in-

* Accion Democratica [Democratic Action, an old anti-imperialist party turned reactionary] and COPEI [Comite Organizado por Elecciones Independientes—Committee for Independent Political Action, the Christian Democratic party] are the big bourgeois parties in Venezuela. They have been trying to establish a two-party system on the American model. — IP

to one party. What happened? The ideas expressed by Petkoff are not those the MAS is putting forward today.

At the very least, there is the first of Petkoff's books, which firmly condemned the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Do the *Tesis* also condemn this action? By no means. They do not even refer to it by name. The only reference is these four words: "The events in Czechoslovakia." What about the bureaucracy in the workers states? Petkoff did not explore the nature of this phenomenon in depth, but he did recognize the existence of a privileged, oppressor stratum. It seems that for the MAS there is no Soviet bureaucracy, just as there was no invasion of Czechoslovakia.

From Marquez's standpoint the worst of all sins is "anti-Sovietism"—indulged in, as he sees it, not only by the enemies of the Soviet Union but also by the critics of the bureaucratic and repressive regime imposed on the Russian people. And the latter group includes Petkoff. How could Petkoff and the people apparently following him agree to be part of a movement whose statement of principles more or less parallels that of the old party from which they have broken? Are we seeing a capitulation, or is there an internal struggle going on that we do not know about and which must lead to the split we regarded as inevitable?

Some elements of the equation are missing, such as Teodoro Petkoff and Pompeyo Márquez added together. From what we have been able to learn from reliable sources in the party, the mathematical symbol "MAS" [more, or plus] seems to be a minus. The following figures are indicative. Before the split, the PCV branch in the Caracas parish of Catia had 200 members. After the split, only 35 remained in the PCV and barely 15 joined MAS. The other 150 did not abandon politics but remained active outside the two organizations. This, in varying proportions, is what happened in all the branches.

The MAS has broken with the PCV only halfway. It was not for nothing that at the inaugural meeting of the new party, the portrait of Gustavo Machado [the leader of the PCV in Stalin's time] was to be seen alongside Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, and other international leaders in the mural behind the speakers' platform. Old Venezuelan Stalinist leaders, with Pom-

peyo Márquez at the head of the list, have been included in the leadership of the MAS.

In opposition to the authoritarian and autocratic regime that Guillermo Ponce, with foreign backing, tried to fasten on the PCV, and impressed by the evidence of the worldwide break-up of Stalinism, these men and wom-

en left the decrepit PCV without changing their Stalinist ideas. Like the Catholic Church after the Vatican Council, they have modernized their rituals. Their masses are no longer said in the dead language of Stalinism. But in their new language, without quotations from Stalin, they continue to repeat the same litanies.

The MAS is not the party needed by the Venezuelan revolution. There was a reason why those who left their old home in the PCV did not cross the threshold of the new party. But the party needed in Venezuela is gestating. Upon its birth, the MAS, by comparison, will seem but a feeble effort. □

On Eve of Elections

600,000 Japanese Workers Demand Higher Wages

By Susumu Okatani

More than 600,000 workers gathered at rallies in 221 towns and cities on March 14 as the spring offensive of the Japanese labor movement opened. The rallies, organized by the Cooperative Committee for the 1971 Spring Offensive, stressed the struggle for higher wages as well as the fight against rising prices and taxes, housing shortages, and pollution.

At the Tokyo rally, in which 100,000 workers took part, Makoto Ichikawa, chairman of Sohyo (the largest national federation of trade unions) and the Cooperative Committee, called for united action by all unionists to win the demands of the offensive. Representatives of Zenkoku Kinzoku [National Trade Union of Metal and Engineering Workers] and Kokuro [National Railway Workers' Union], speaking for workers in the private and public sectors respectively, pledged their determination to carry the struggle through to victory.

Last year the metal and engineering workers spearheaded the offensive, winning initial wage increases of 10,000 yen per month [360 yen equal U. S.\$1]. Other unions, following the success of the metal and engineering workers, won average increases of 18 percent, the highest achieved to date.

This year the railway workers are expected to play a leading role in the offensive.

One of the slogans carried at the Tokyo rally, "For Victory in the Gubernatorial Elections," was in support of the candidacy of Ryokichi Minobe, who is running for his second term of office as governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture on a joint Communist-Socialist party ticket. Minobe addressed the rally, calling on the par-

ticipants to recover "the blue sky and green environment," which can only be achieved, he said, by fighting the policies of the ruling Liberal Democratic party [LDP].

Local elections are scheduled for April and elections to the upper house in June. Already workers' candidates have taken the platform at rallies.

The election of eighteen governors to be held on April 11 is the main focus of the local elections. At the same time there will be mayoralty elections in Osaka and Yokohama, local assembly elections throughout the country, and ward assembly elections in Tokyo. Mayoralty elections in smaller cities, elections of municipal assemblies, heads of towns and villages, and members of town and village assemblies will take place on April 25.

The Liberal Democratic party has its own candidates for governor, or is supporting conservative candidates, for all the contested seats. The Communist party is running opposing candidates in all election districts. In three cases—Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka—the Communist party and the Socialist party have agreed on joint candidates. The SP itself, the main opposition party, is fielding only six candidates. In the nine remaining gubernatorial races it is divided between supporting either the Communist or Liberal Democratic candidates. Both the Komei [right-wing Clean Government party] and the Democratic Socialists are taking a passive attitude to the gubernatorial elections. In no case are the Socialist, Komei, and Democratic Socialist parties joining forces to field a united candidacy.

As illustrated by the number of its candidates, the Communist party is making an all-out effort to increase its strength through electoral activity. It ran candidates in all election districts in recent general elections. Presenting an image of a party "on the move" by its day-to-day activities, it has increased its proportion of the vote at successive elections.

In 1969 the Communist party received 6.8% of the vote, up from 4.8% in the previous election. The Liberal Democrats dropped from 48.8% to 47.6% over the same period, while the Socialist party dropped from 27.9% to 21.5%.

It seems certain that the success of the Communist party in increasing its share of the votes will continue in the coming local elections. The success of the Communist party should be recognized on this point. However, militant workers and students have criticized the tactics the CP uses to bolster its electoral power. During the elections the CP poses as a "lovable" and peaceful party and avoids radical struggles. Active unionists feel that the local elections are monopolizing the attention of the CP leaders, while the workers are struggling for the demands of the spring offensive.

The election for governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture has aroused the most attention. The incumbent Minobe is being challenged by Akira Hatano, former superintendent general of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, who is running as a Liberal Democrat. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who is waging an all-out effort to win the elections for the Liberal Democrats, has said: "We

cannot say we have won the election if we lose Tokyo."

The number of eligible voters in Tokyo, the world's most populous metropolis, is estimated to be about 8,000,000. Assuming that voter turnout will be approximately 65%, a minimum of 2,500,000 votes will be necessary to win the election. In the 1969 general election, the LDP received 1,515,941 votes in Tokyo, against the SP's 733,939 votes and the CP's 704,512. Thus, the victor this time must win over the 1,300,000 votes of the Komei party and the Democratic Socialist party, as well as other uncommitted voters.

The success of the LDP in nine gubernatorial elections already held this year cannot be ignored, but the LDP mayoralty candidates in Kyoto and Toyama were defeated by candidates run jointly by the CP and the SP. The LDP's loss in Toyama is attributable to the pollution problem, which is becoming one of the main election issues.

The Minobe camp is stressing the slogan "Stop Sato." They insist that after two decades of LDP government nationally, victory should be theirs in Tokyo, which contains 10% of the country's population.

Credit for success in the gubernatorial and mayoralty elections in Kyoto last year and early this year must be given to the Communist party, although the candidacies were jointly sponsored by the CP and the Socialist party. The secretary general of the SP pointed out that there had been some victories in cases where the SP and CP jointly sponsored candidates, but that where the SP had joined with the DSP or the Komei party there were only losses. Minobe in Tokyo, Ryoichi Kuroda in Osaka and Shinnen Tagaya in Fukuoka are all hoping that the CP-SP alliance will bring success.

Active Socialists in Osaka are not happy about the alliance with the CP, however temporary it may be. They view it as capitulation by their leaders to CP sectarianism, rather than as real united action.

This suspicion is based mainly on the attitude of the CP in previous campaigns. The CP refused to join the SP and Sohyo in united action against the war in Vietnam and the U. S.-Japan Treaty. It likewise abstained from the fight for the return of Okinawa to Japan.

The reason given by the CP leaders for abstaining from these struggles



SANRIZUKA FARMERS resist attempts by riot police to evict them from their land. Since 1968, farmers in the area intended for a new Tokyo international airport have lost all but 1,400 acres. In March, the Japanese government mobilized 5,000 police to complete the dispossession. Supported by more than 10,000 workers and students, the farmers fought back against police attacks. Police reported 461 arrests.

was that revisionists and Trotskyists were participating in the campaigns.

There were many active rank-and-file leaders in the campaigns who left the Communist party in 1961 after it supported the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet rift, but who are now critical of the Soviet Union because of its invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

A Trotskyist professor was among the top leaders of the Cooperative Committee Against the U. S.-Japan Treaty. Young Socialists feel that their leaders have pandered to the CP and excluded so-called revisionists and Trotskyists, known to have been

prominent in real workers' struggles, in order to attain the electoral alliance.

Militant unionists, busy organizing united-action groups of young workers, are trying to draw together discontented workers who oppose the sectarian SP-CP bloc.

They will probably assimilate the lessons of the gubernatorial election in Chiba Prefecture. Under the pressure of militant struggles by peasants, workers, and students against the government's proposed expansion of Tokyo International Airport, the SP in Chiba is running its own radical candidate. □

The Importance of the Mandel Case

By George Novack

The favorable federal court ruling in Brooklyn March 11 on the Mandel case was especially noteworthy for three reasons. First of all, it upheld the right of the internationally known Belgian Marxist to secure a visa to lecture in the United States, along with the right of the academic plaintiffs to hear his views in person.

Two of the three judges declared that the government could not exclude an alien from coming to this country on account of his revolutionary ideas and affiliations. They granted a preliminary injunction against Attorney General Mitchell and Secretary of State Rogers, who had twice prohibited Mandel from fulfilling speaking engagements here in the fall of 1969.

Their decision also rendered unconstitutional and inoperative two sections [212(a) (28) and 212(d) (3) (A)] of the Immigration and Nationality Act, better known as the McCarran-Walter Act. Congress enacted this legislation at the height of the cold-war hysteria in 1952 and passed it over President Truman's veto. It has since been a cornerstone of the rampart erected by the forces of reaction against the free exchange of ideas across international boundaries.

The majority opinion has dealt the hardest blow to the McCarran-Walter Act since it was put in the statute books. Justice Dooling wrote in his thirty-page opinion: "The sole and effective effect of the statute is to operate as a means of restraining the entry of disfavored political doctrine, and it is a forbidden enactment." A March 22 *New York Times* editorial, acclaiming the decision, expressed the hope that "this reaffirmation of a nation unafraid of free traffic in ideas, even beyond the national boundaries, ought to set the scene for the too-long delayed elimination of the McCarran Act in its entirety."

These two victories by themselves give great significance to the decision. But a constitutional issue of a far more fundamental character was likewise clarified by the district court.

The plaintiffs' attorneys, Leonard Boudin and David Rosenberg, had argued that the right of Americans to hear the most diverse views from all quarters is an integral part of the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. The right to hear is inseparable from the right to know, the right of free assembly, and the right of free expression. The Mandel case presented this point for adjudication in the most clear-cut manner.

This was recognized by both parties in the case and by both the minority and majority of the three-judge panel. The government argued that it had unrestricted sovereign authority to exclude anyone from the United States—on any ground. This was necessary, it claimed, for the self-preservation of the existing system against the menace of Communist subversion. Thus "the Attorney General is not required to have factual support for or to justify his discretionary decision not to grant temporary admission since the power to exclude is absolute and waiver of

exclusion purely a matter of grace." The dissenting judge, Bartels, agreed with this contention.

The Brooklyn court majority took the contrary position. While it acknowledged the validity of the country's concern with "the threat of international Communism" and doctrines aiming at the overthrow of the established order, it placed the First Amendment guarantee of free expression above any real or alleged apprehension about the dangers of subversion from without through the admittance of individuals preaching revolutionary ideas.

It interpreted the First Amendment as an independent and inviolable part of the Constitution. In Justice Dooling's opinion, "the First Amendment is not in its primary and most significant aspect a grant of the Constitution to the citizen of individual rights of self-expression but on the contrary reflects the total retention by the people as sovereign to themselves of the right to free and open debate of political questions."

The pertinent sections of the McCarran-Walter Act were proclaimed invalid because they imposed "a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication." Neither Congress nor the executive can override the rights protected by the First Amendment.

"The prevention of the teaching and advocacy that is not incitement or conspiracy to initiate presently programmed violence is not in any degree a legislative objective but a forbidden one," Dooling wrote. "It is forbidden, in ultimate analysis, because the public interest—expressed in the First Amendment—requires that citizens as sovereign have access to evaluation and accept or reject that teaching as well as every other teaching and advocacy."

He pointed out that the Supreme Court had clearly distinguished between advocacy and acts, and had upheld the legality of the former. There is "a dichotomy between the protected freedom to preach the doctrines thus legislatively pronounced to be abhorrent to the nation's free institutions and the punishable illegality of taking significant action to initiate subversion and revolution."

The majority emphasized that the First Amendment guaranteed "to the people as sovereign" their right to "an open and wide-ranging debate, publication and assembly, to review the government they have created, the adequacy of its functioning and the presence or absence of a need to alter or displace it." This is an unusually strong affirmation of First Amendment rights against attempts by the legislative and executive branches to restrict or deny them.

Most cases on constitutional questions brought before the federal courts hinge on the defense of the freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. These are essential in view of the recurrent efforts made by the authorities, especially in periods of repression, to violate or pare them down.

It is not often that a decision in a constitutional case explicitly and positively affirms the *extension* of a right whose status has previously been moot and in a twilight

zone. Such is the prime significance of the Mandel case. The majority ruling declares in unmistakable terms that the right to hear is a vital ingredient of the constitutional liberties of American citizens and that the government does not have unlimited power to impose restrictions upon its exercise. The court said that if Mandel's ideas can be introduced by mail, television, the press, and by tapes, they cannot be kept out by preventing his personal visit.

The issues at stake fully justify the initiative taken by the group of distinguished figures from leading Eastern universities who were coplaintiffs with Ernest Mandel in the suit. They are Professor Norman Birnbaum, department of anthropology-sociology at Amherst; Professor Noam Chomsky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Richard A. Falk, professor of international law, Princeton; Professor Robert Heilbroner, New School for Social Research; Professor Wassily Leontiev, Harvard, who is chairman of the American Economics Association; Professors David Mermelstein and Louis Menashe, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn; and Professor Robert Wolff, department of philosophy, Columbia.

The court recognized that these scholars had a special interest in the free flow of ideas. It cited the 1957 case of *Sweezy v. New Hampshire*, showing that "the essentiality of freedom of debate within the community of universities has been repeatedly recognized and has drawn from the [Supreme] Court very strong expressions of the heightened importance of First Amendment rights in the field of edu-

cation." The fact that Mandel's projected visit was largely centered in the academic community gave these professors "a specificity of interest in his admission, reinforced by the general public interest in the prevention of any stifling of political utterance," it concluded.

It remains to be seen whether the Justice Department will persist in its refusal to lift the ban on Mandel after the federal court ruling and the State Department's previous recommendation that it do so. The Attorney General is highly unlikely to acquiesce in a situation where the provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act restricting entry of aliens with views abhorrent to the Nixon administration have been knocked out. Thus the lower court ruling will almost certainly be appealed to the Supreme Court.

If the high court should sustain the position enunciated by Justices Dooling and Feinberg, the Mandel case will be a landmark in recent constitutional litigation over the freedoms of the American people. In this connection it is interesting to note how many of the precedents mentioned in the majority opinion, such as *Lamont*, *Kent*, *Sweezy*, and *Zemel*, were actions taken to the Supreme Court by the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee since its founding in 1951. The Mandel case is the latest in its twenty-year series designed to defend and reinforce our constitutional liberties.

March 29, 1971

Mexico

Echeverria Releases 16 More Political Prisoners

Mexico City

Continuing its policy of "waiving" the sentences of small groups of political prisoners, the regime of President Luis Echeverría on March 9 released sixteen more victims of the 1968 witch-hunt against the student and popular movement in Mexico.

The latest group included one of the most prominent critics of the regime, Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, former publisher of the oppositionist magazine *Política*; as well as Florencio López Osuna, director of the Escuela Superior de Ingeniería Mecánica y Eléctrica of the Polytechnic Institute; Félix Sánchez Hernández Gamundi of the same institution; and William Rosado Poblete, a Puerto Rican. All had been held in prison for more than two years.

Under pressure from world and domestic public opinion, the new government in Mexico has adopted more flexible tactics of political repression. By releasing a few political prisoners at a time, and trying to create the impression that the jails are being

emptied, the government apparently hopes to demobilize the campaign for the release of all victims of the repression.

At the same time, facing a rise in popular struggles, the regime wants to maintain the level of political intimidation. Thus, the prisoners are being released on the basis of "waivers" by the prosecution. They have to put up a bond, report to court every eight days, and are liable to reimprisonment at any time. Furthermore, releasing a few prisoners at a time has two other advantages for the regime. It makes it seem that the authorities are not giving way to popular pressure. It enables the government to carry on more effective, selective victimization of those prisoners considered most dangerous, or most useful as examples.

This method was used against the leaders of the 1959 railroad strike, for instance. Most of those arrested were released in a relatively short time. But Valentín Campa and Deme-

trio Vallejo were kept in prison for eleven years.

The psychological pressures that the government can put on political prisoners by this method of arbitrary and selective releases were indicated by its latest action March 9. It was announced that Carlos Sevilla would be released the next day, March 10. He was not, and the government has given no reason why.

The courage of the released prisoners and the militancy of their supporters, however, are a powerful answer to the government's tactic. Upon walking out of Lecumberri prison, Manuel Marcué Pardiñas read a militant statement, stressing: "My release and that of these young students, teachers, workers, and peasants is not a big-hearted concession by the regime of Luis Echeverria. It is really and objectively a victory won by the struggles of the Mexican people."

Two days later, Friday, March 12, the prisoners held a press conference before a huge audience to denounce

the repression and call for increased efforts to free their comrades still in jail.

The conference was marked by a contagious spirit of militancy and combativity exemplified by the newly liberated prisoners. Despite the threat of being returned to jail, the speakers fearlessly attacked the government, to the applause of the almost 2,000 students who packed the Science School auditorium on the University of Mexico campus.

The main task of the student movement at present, said Professor César Molina Flores—one of the prisoners just freed—was to get rid of the gangsters that have taken over some of our schools. He was referring to the police-sponsored goon squads that have been especially active in the preparatory schools attached to the University of Mexico. These groups see their principal task as destroying the Struggle Committees. To this end, they have been trying to intimidate the students, robbing them and beating them up.

"It was stressed in the discussion," a special supplement to *La Internacional*, the organ of the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [Internationalist Communist group] reported, "that we are on the eve of profound and historic struggles in which the workers and peasants will put a limit to the arbitrariness and undemocratic procedures to which we are being subjected. The speakers pointed out that we must strive to build revolutionary and popular organizations capable of forcing respect for the rights of the masses.

Finally, they said that they were going to see the attorney general to ask him: 'Why are Gamundi, Osuna, and the others free and not Raúl Alvarez, Guevara, Heberto Castillo, José Revueltas, and all the other imprisoned compañeros?'"

Plans for a mass rally in support of the political prisoners March 17 were announced at the press conference. Some 10,000 copies of the special supplement of *La Internacional* reporting the statements of the prisoners and calling for attendance at the rally are being distributed.

Letters and telegrams supporting demands for the release of the political prisoners can be sent to President Luis Echeverría, Palacio Nacional, Mexico 1, D. F., Mexico. □

Statement of Freed Victims

Solidarity with Those Still in Lecumberri

[The following statement, signed by the Mexican political prisoners released March 9, was read at a press conference March 12 in the Science School auditorium on the University of Mexico campus. It was published in a special supplement to *La Internacional*, the organ of the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist Group), from which we have translated it.]

* * *

1. Our release was not brought about by a deal. It was the result of the pressure brought to bear by the popular sectors and the government's attempt to restore the democratic facade lost because of the 1968 repression.

2. More than 100 compañeros are still being held as political prisoners in Lecumberri and many more in provincial jails.

3. Many contradictions are involved in our release. Like the other compañeros still in prison, we were accused before the same courts, given similar sentences, and our trials were also alike. Thus, there is no legal reason why the majority of the political prisoners should remain behind bars while we have been set free.

4. In October, November, and December, the attorney general's office waived prosecution of many compañeros, who regained their freedom as a result. The method used for releasing these compañeros was political and selective. The authorities had to wait two years before using it again. The procedure today is the same, but no reasons have been given for the action, as the law demands. The standard being applied is different now because the latest waivers are in the cases of compañeros whose guilt was "ascertained" by a judge and "reflected" in prison sentences.

5. In the case of every person released, our sentences were merely suspended or we were forced to put up bail. In this way, the authorities are continuing their control and persecution of the "freed" prisoners.

6. It is obvious that the present waivers do not meet the legal requirements. Therefore, the cases against the

prisoners must be dropped immediately, unconditionally, and completely.

7. Our release is no guarantee that the rest of our compañeros will be freed. The official silence proves this.

8. The procedures involved in both our trials and our release, as well as the conditions imposed in exchange for "our freedom," show that the courts are only an instrument of the executive.

9. The democratic paths for our country that are being talked about so much cannot be opened up as long as a single political prisoner remains in jail.

10. Democratizing the political life of our country is still on the agenda. The present regime's ambiguous attitude on the question of releasing the political prisoners makes it an accomplice of its predecessor, with all the implications this involves. Freedom of assembly, demonstration, and expression are still to be achieved. Respect for individual rights is an urgent need.

The immediate tasks of the student movement are to fight labor fakery in the unions, strengthen the student organizations, and support all popular struggles. We publicly declare our determination to keep on fighting until we win the unconditional release of our comrades, and we pledge to stay in the front line of the struggle to liberate our people. □

Double Duty

A London cop, Sergeant Barry Wright, has been ordained a priest in the Church of England. Press reports did not indicate how the sergeant-father plans to apply his various skills to his two trades but some ideas come to mind. Certainly his training in interrogation should be helpful in extracting confessions from guilty parishioners. On the other hand, if in the course of his police duties he should feel inclined to kill some miscreant, he is in a position to give his victims the last rites before dispatching them.

Nobody Wears 'Charles Jackets'

Mao Tsetung has been named one of the 100 best dressed men in the world by the British magazine *Tailor and Cutter*, according to a March 24 Reuters report. Prince Charles, heir to the British throne, was omitted from the list.

Statements by the Fourth International

Forward to April 24

The invasion that U.S. President Nixon launched into Laos is turning into a disaster. It is not only a military debacle for the U.S. and its imperialist satellites—it spells the bankruptcy of their proclaimed policy of the Vietnamization of the war in Indochina and represents an inspiring victory of the forces of the Vietnam revolution. But at the same time, faced with this debacle, the imperialists may well turn to even more desperate actions—such as the employment of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear belt—or possibly an invasion of the North.

April 24, the worldwide day of protest, offers new possibilities to mobilize broader forces than ever before against the war, and it thrusts on us all an increased responsibility to exert every effort to make it the most powerful united front action yet in support of the Vietnamese revolution.

In the United States the most massive coalition of forces yet has united behind the two key actions for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops being focused on Washington and San Francisco. New support is coming from important sectors of the trade-union movement, and for the first time it would appear that out of this action a continuing organization with a broad

base will be consolidated. The actions in Canada organized in communities from coast to coast through united front committees promise to be broader and larger than ever before. A high point will be in the capital city of Ottawa where the delegates will adjourn the session of the labor party convention to join the demonstration. Once again Londoners will be rallying behind the banners of a reconstituted Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. Special efforts are being made to mobilize the British youth. In France, following successful assemblies, one of which was honored by the participation of Vietnamese and Cambodian representatives, an Indochinese Solidarity Front has been organized. It plans an appropriate action on April 24. In Germany there have already been successful demonstrations and meetings at various points, and plans are afoot to bring this campaign to an effective climax on April 24. In Italy and in many other major sectors of the globe there have recently been meetings and actions in solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution.

It is vital that militants everywhere make every possible effort to make this April 24 a day that will never be forgotten.

United Secretariat of the Fourth International
March 22, 1971

Down with Anti-Communist Campaign of the Sudanese Government

The witch-hunt of Communist militants and the suppression of the CP is on the order of the day in Sudan. Anticommunism is now part of the official ideology of the nationalist military regime that came to power on May 25, 1969. And it was with the political support of "the so-called Communist party" that this regime came to power. Statements by the Sudanese chief of state General Nimeiry, broadcast by Radio Omdurman on February 13, 1971, confirm that the so-called progressive Arab states, as a whole, have now entered an open counterrevolutionary course following the defeat of the Palestinian resistance in Jordan in September 1970.

The military have launched a bloody war on Communist militants: "From now on all those who declare themselves Communists or who admit to belonging to a Sudanese Communist organization will be crushed and destroyed. Communists have no place in the revolution and they will be thrown out." It is clear; there is not the slightest ambiguity. Nimeiry's justifications for his counterrevolutionary actions are the traditional ones used by Arab nationalist anticommunism when in power: "for having tried to sabotage the country's economy, for having undermined national unity and for having compromised the foreign relations of Sudan." That accordingly justifies the stand that "the existence of this Communist party is impermissible in any case. The members of this party are in fact isolated from the rest of the country and we intend to purge from all government offices, from all public services and all trade unions any Communist elements wherever they are found."

Above all, as a defender of the economic and political interests of the petty bourgeoisie, General Nimeiry, as a good disciple of Nasserism, knows the importance of the support and of the aid of the Soviet Union for the stabilization of his own regime. He lost no time in declaring that the measures taken by "the revolution" in respect to the Sudanese Communist party "will not in any case affect the close relation of the Sudan with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries."

Nasser accustomed us to such violent and bloody declarations. They are in reality only a pale reflection of the old master, Nimeiry has expanded in imitation, which is always the style

of the Sudanese petty bourgeois in relation to his Egyptian senior. But, behind the words and the traditional demagoguery of Arab nationalism in state power, the objectives of Nimeiry are clear.

He wants to build a power which is still after two years of existence quite weak, in a difficult period when all the so-called progressive Arab states are veering to the right. So ends the historically anti-imperialist and progressive role of the Arab petty bourgeoisie in those countries where it took power through military coups: in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. In view of its incapacity to advance in an anti-imperialist direction without risking being swept aside by the motion of the masses, it resorts to a course of eliminating all political forces on the left—notably the Sudanese CP.

Sudan today is not Egypt of yesterday! The Sudanese petty-bourgeois military leadership exercises a power of a Nasserite bonapartist type, or rather it tries to. It has had on several occasions in the past two years to call up the Sudanese CP to smash several right-wing plots and to eliminate the religious right wing which was directly linked with imperialism. The fact that the regime needed the CP's help was evidence of its grave weakness. Now the regime wants to crush the left which is as a whole embraced by the CP, which has a mass influence in the working class and amongst the peasants thanks to its trade-union base. The Egyptian CP was never in such a position.

The dissolution of the Egyptian CP into Nasser's Arab Socialist Union occurred during a period of Nasserist strength under the pressure of the Soviet Union, which found it a small price to pay in order to penetrate Egypt. The Sudanese petty bourgeoisie comes to power today after Nasserism has reached its peak. Because of its weakness it was prevented from coming to power earlier—it could only do so thanks to the help of the Sudanese CP.

The Sudanese CP has followed the course of the Egyptian except in a reverse way. The Sudanese CP did not agree to the dissolution of the Egyptian CP. One of the leaders of the Sudanese CP, Mohamed Ibrahim Naqd, openly revealed the position of his party on this question. In his open letter "To a progres-

sive Egyptian" (see *Al-Hurriya*, No. 554, February 14, 1971) he declared: "The Sudanese CP, despite the importance and the scope of the links that it has with all progressive Arab circles, does not accept the intervention of an authority, even of the Sudanese authority, in its affairs. It regrets any infringement on its autonomy."

Mohamed Ibrahim Naqd reports that liquidationist and dissolutionist tendencies in the "power structure" appeared in 1966-67, following the dissolution of the Egyptian CP in 1965 into the Arab Socialist Union of Nasser. He adds: "It is possible that our Egyptian Communist friends will understand how much we suffered in 1966 from the right-wing liquidationists' deviation that harmed our party when we tried to learn from their experience. We are still paying the price of this deviation. We thought that it was a mistake to consider the dissolution of the Egyptian CP as a new type of experience." Therefore the line of the Sudanese CP leadership on this point is in complete contradiction to the Soviet Union, which always pushed the Arab CPs to go as far as possible to submit themselves to the Arab nationalist regimes, as in Syria and Iraq.

This Sudanese crisis is of great importance. It puts into question the traditional Stalinist policy of Popular Fronts at the very moment the Arab world sees a general counterrevolutionary offensive against all progressive forces.

It is the implementation of Popular Front politics in Sudan which triggered the crisis. What is locally called the Democratic National Front is largely composed of two political forces:

(1) The petty bourgeoisie represented by the military government; (2) the CP and its mass organizations, among which are the working-class trade unions. Far from refusing the perspective of Popular Front, expressing through this its Stalinist doctrinal basis, the leadership of the Sudanese CP stands against the maneuvers of the military government to discipline everything.

In his open letter Mohamed Ibrahim Naqd says that "the members of the Sudanese CP are acting to stop the decline and the right-wing offensive in order to open the way to power for the Democratic National Front." And he adds, it is "thanks to their consistent persevering work wherever the forces of the Front are, that these activists are convinced that the origins of the present crisis lie in the monopoly of the authority by a single element among the forces of this National Front."

The Sudanese CP is against the application of Popular Front politics by the Sudanese military government. In his broadcast speech, General Nimeiry said: "The Communist party joined

reaction in its opposition to the present revolutionary regime in order to usurp power," and that "this explains why the Sudanese Communists attacked all decisions which were not theirs. They opposed the federation between UAR, Libya, Sudan, and later Syria."

What is at stake in this political struggle are the conflicting interests between the military government and the CP. On the one hand a military power seeks to integrate Sudan in an Arab economic entity (and possibly political, later on) according to the interest of the ruling class of these countries. To implement this perspective, the government has to gather all the necessary guarantees by liquidating the left political forces which still maintain their independence of action.

On the other hand the Sudanese CP has made public that it won't dissolve itself and that it will act on a contradictory line to that of the Egyptian CP. The left wing is leading the Sudanese CP. It is then possible that a confrontation will occur between the two main political forces in Sudan.

Without presuming the future political positions of the Sudanese CP and of the preparedness of its leadership to go as far as possible in this crisis, we have to understand that in the present context of a right-wing orientation of the so-called progressive Arab regimes, the stand taken by the Sudanese CP expresses in these countries the only answer by the workers movement after the defeat of the Palestinian resistance to the counterrevolutionary enterprises of these regimes.

Although isolated, the Sudanese Communists are involved in a conflict the end of which will have a liberating effect on the working class of these Arab countries if it is victorious.

It is finally the relationship between the leadership of this CP and Moscow that will determine its decision to fight or not.

Behind its silence until now we can easily foresee that Moscow will try everything to strengthen its state and bureaucratic interests to the detriment of the Sudanese CP and the working-class and peasant masses it leads.

Revolutionary Marxists stand firmly against anticommunist and counterrevolutionary attacks on the Sudanese CP.

More than the fate of the CP is at stake. The fate of the entire independent working-class movement is jeopardized by the threats of General Nimeiry, which may soon be translated into deeds.

Solidarity with the Sudanese Communist party in its principled stand!

Long live the Arab Socialist Revolution!

United Secretariat of the Fourth International
March 22, 1971

Declaration on Argentina

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International has analyzed the development of the Argentinian situation, which is characterized by an accentuation of mass mobilizations and where the class struggle has reached the stage of armed confrontations.

It draws the attention of the International and of the revolutionary workers movement to the importance of the Argentinian events and to the tasks of international solidarity which flow from it.

The United Secretariat sends its warmest greetings to the PRT (Revolutionary Workers party), Argentinian section of the Fourth International, which—through the audacious actions of the Revo-

lutionary People's Army (ERP)—has established itself in the front ranks of the organizations which support armed struggle, and which conducts this struggle within the framework of large mass mobilizations.

The United Secretariat expresses its fraternal solidarity with the militants who are victims of the dictatorship's repression and imprisonment, to whom thousands of Cordoba militants during the recent general strike demonstrated a most moving homage.

United Secretariat of the Fourth International
March 22, 1971

Declaration on Uruguay

In view of certain slanderous reports which have appeared in the press of the Communist parties and in other papers in Western Europe concerning some form of participation by Trotskyists in the "Frente Amplio" which was recently constituted in Uruguay, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International wishes to make the following clarifications:

1. That there is no section of the Fourth International in Uruguay.

2. That it is totally opposed, as it always has been, to any kind of collaboration whatsoever by revolutionary Marxist forces in Popular Fronts, i.e., with bourgeois forces, whenever and wherever they happen to exist.

United Secretariat of the Fourth International
March 22, 1971