

# Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

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# Students Begin to Mobilize

## China Issues More Warnings



LAIRD: "Tough days ahead" in Laos. See page 171.

Uruguay:

**Tupamaros State Why  
They Back Popular Front**

Appeal from West Bengal:

**Hunted Peasant Leader  
Scores Police Atrocities**

**LEON TROTSKY — First Time in English:**

# **Polish Fascism and the Mistakes of the CP**

## Protest Czech Trial

"Activists of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International], with Alain Krivine leading them, entered the offices of the Czechoslovak consulate on 18 Rue Bonaparte, Paris 6, February 12," the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported February 14. "For about twenty minutes they distributed pamphlets and waved red flags. They hung up a banner saying 'Free Peter Uhl and his comrades. Socialism, Yes. Stalinism, No.' The demonstrators dispersed before the police arrived."

At a press conference quickly set up in the offices of the Czech consulate, Krivine, the Ligue Communiste candidate in the 1968 presidential elections, explained to reporters that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest against the impending trial in Czechoslovakia of nineteen youths accused of "Trotskyist activity."

"These militants have not been fighting for a restoration of capitalism," Krivine said, "but against the bureaucracy, for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, and for real socialism."

Krivine challenged the French Communist party, which has been anxious to disassociate itself from the Soviet-backed "normalization," to specify its attitude toward the upcoming prosecution of the alleged Trotskyists. The CP deputy first secretary Georges Marchais has said that his organization would oppose any political trials in the militarily occupied country.

The Czech authorities installed by the Soviet army reacted to the Ligue Communiste demonstration with the same brutality and crude slanders they have employed against their critics at home. Not only did they call the French police against the demonstrators, but the Czech ambassador complained that the Gaullist regime had not taken strong enough action against the Trotskyists. He "protested energetically" to the French foreign office against "this vulgar act of hostility."

In Prague, a formal protest was delivered to the French ambassador against this "provocation perpetrated by a group of troublemakers." □

### Our New Address

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No, we haven't moved out of Manhattan; just to a more convenient location. We don't know why it's called a "village."

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# 'China Will Not Remain with Its Arms Folded'

By Allen Myers

The U.S.-Saigon invasion of Laos would encounter "some tough days ahead," Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird admitted February 16. In the midst of the non-news, evasions, silence, and lies emanating from official Washington, this little glimpse of the reality from Nixon's war chief suggested that the American escalation in Indochina had reached a dangerous plateau indeed.

Would Nixon send in U.S. troops if Saigon's "army" took a beating in Laos? Above all, would China stand aside while Nixon spread the war to the whole of Indochina?

Nixon himself said nothing for the first eleven days of the "allied" invasion, while American bombers and helicopters blasted the population of southern Laos to clear the way for the South Vietnamese and U.S. invaders.

Finally on February 17 at an untelevised press conference in the White House, the president deigned to provide the world and the American public with a statement on the new war to which he had committed the country. The "tough days ahead" disappeared under another dose of the soothing syrup Nixon has dispensed with each past escalation. "The operation . . . has gone according to plan."

Nixon dismissed the possibility that China might react to an American invasion of one of its immediate neighbors. "As far as the actions in southern Laos are concerned," the president said, "they represent no threat to Communist China and should not be interpreted by Communist Chinese as being a threat against them."

But neither the Chinese government nor virtually anyone else, including important sections of the American ruling class, gave Nixon's assertion any credence.

As the Saigon troops with their U.S. bombing and strafing escort plunged deeper and deeper into Laotian territory, the statements coming from Peking took on a graver tone and the warnings to Nixon became more explicit.

The first official response to the invasion, by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 4, did not go much beyond the routine denunciations that have met past American escalations, although a general warning was voiced:

"The Chinese Government and people sternly condemn U.S. imperialism for its new crime of aggression against the three peoples of Indo-China . . . And the 700 million Chinese people who uphold proletarian internationalism absolutely will not allow U.S. imperialism to do whatever it pleases in Indo-China. It is our duty and obligation to give all-out support to the three peoples of Indo-China till complete victory in the war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation." (*Peking Review*, February 12. Emphasis added.)

The ministry's statement of February 8 went further, accusing Nixon of plotting an attack on North Vietnam, and emphasizing the geographical proximity of Laos and China and the consequent threat to China represented by the invasion:

"The large-scale invasion of Laos by U.S. imperialism is a grave provocation not only against the three peoples of Indo-China but against the Chinese people and the people of the whole world as well. Laos is a close neighbour of China. The Chinese and Laotian peoples are intimate brothers. The Chinese Government and people have long been resolved to make all-out efforts in giving support and assistance to the peoples of Laos, Viet Nam and Cambodia to 'defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs.'" (*Peking Review*, February 12. Emphasis in original.)

The government statement of February 12 was still more specific in recognizing the U.S. threat to China:

"The Chinese government and people indignantly condemn U.S. imperialism for its savage crimes of aggression against Laos. Laos is a close neighbour of China. U.S. imperialism's aggression against Laos is also a grave menace to China. The Chinese

people absolutely will not remain indifferent to it!

"The Chinese government reaffirms: the 700 million Chinese people provide a powerful backing for the three peoples of Indochina; the vast expanse of China's territory is their reliable rear area. It is the unshirkable duty of the Chinese people to support the Laotian, Vietnamese and Khmer peoples in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The Chinese people will take all effective measures to give all-out support and assistance to the three peoples of Indochina so as to thoroughly defeat the U.S. aggressors and their running dogs." (*Hsinhua*, February 13. Emphasis added.)

On February 18, Xuan Thuy, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator at the Paris talks, described the invasion as a threat to both North Vietnam and China. A spokesman for the delegation later warned: "China will not remain with its arms folded." It is highly unlikely that the North Vietnamese would make such remarks unless they had received assurances from the Chinese government.

Following Nixon's news conference, the Chinese reiterated in the Communist party newspaper *Renmin Ribao* of February 20 that Nixon's remarks could not change the fact that the invasion was a "grave menace" to China.

The *New York Times* reported February 21 that Peking had announced increased economic and military aid to North Vietnam. Whether the Chinese aid would include the sending of troops remained anybody's guess.

A significant section of the U.S. ruling class appeared convinced that China would be forced to send troops into the war, particularly after Nixon, during his February 17 news conference, hinted broadly at an invasion of North Vietnam.

Asked if he would "restrain" an attempt by the Saigon regime to invade the North, Nixon replied, "I would not speculate on what South Vietnam may do in defense of its national se-

curity." But Nixon's puppets in Saigon cannot sneeze without his permission. The implication was clear: Nixon was keeping open the option of sending Saigon troops, supported by U. S. aircraft, across the so-called demilitarized zone.

"I am not going to place *any* limitation upon the use of air power," Nixon said, "except . . . to rule out . . . the use of tactical nuclear weapons." (Emphasis added.)

Nixon's remarks were so bellicose that the *New York Times* reacted with an attack that shattered the usual ground rules of debate within the ruling class. The influential Eastern daily no longer professed to believe in Nixon's "sincerity" or to regard "Vietnamization" as anything but the propaganda maneuver it is. Describing Nixon's policy as "an increasingly desperate gamble," the *New York Times* wrote in a February 21 editorial:

"President Nixon's threat to employ American air power without restraint throughout Indochina and his refusal to rule out a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam remove virtually all doubt that the President is still thinking in terms of the will-o'-the-wisp of military victory in Southeast Asia.

"The President's policy of Vietnamization has been exposed as essentially an illusion. It is not a policy likely to succeed in winding down the war and in extricating the United States from an unsound position on the Asian mainland, as the American people had been led to believe."

Having thus in effect called Nixon a liar, the newspaper went on to spell out its chief concern:

"It is altogether unrealistic to assume that China can remain indifferent to an expanding conflict on its borders or that the Soviet Union will fail to seek new ways to fulfill its commitments to Hanoi. The possibility of a new confrontation of the super-powers in Asia cannot be summarily dismissed."

But the *New York Times'* comments were mild compared to those of its associate editor Tom Wicker, which were also published in the February 21 issue:

"His [Nixon's] Vietnam policy is by no means one of steadily withdrawing Americans from South Vietnam, then letting the people of Indochina work out or fight out their own affairs. It

is instead a policy of escalation by American air power and South Vietnamese manpower, with the aim of military victory."

Wicker described Nixon's claim that the invasion was designed to protect American troops as a "blatant deception" and "fraud."

"The clear threat to turn loose the South Vietnamese to invade North Vietnam," Wicker wrote, "under a protective umbrella of American planes and behind a destructive barrage of American bombs, may be in part psychological warfare. But if the President cannot get his victory in Laos, as he could not get it in South Vietnam or in Cambodia, there is only one other place to seek it, and *every reason to believe that Mr. Nixon will do just that.*" (Emphasis added.)

Nixon's policy, Wicker added, is ". . . calculated to bludgeon North Vietnam to its knees, without appalling American casualty lists; it is also a policy that risks retaliation elsewhere—in northern Laos or in Thailand—and might bring Chinese entry into the war. . . .

"It is a policy of indiscriminate aerial warfare and blind firepower on the ground that means death and destruction wholesale, not just body counts of enemy dead, but a slaughter of innocents—women and children and old people—villages destroyed, the earth ravaged, refugees in their miserable thousands wandering homeless and hungry. For the people of Indochina, it is a wanton lie that this Administration is 'winding down' the war; it is spreading the war like a holocaust."

Other spokesmen for sections of the ruling class added their warnings that Nixon was heading for a confrontation with China—one that could involve the use of nuclear weapons.

Senator William Fulbright declared February 18 that Nixon was "taking the bit in his teeth and going all out for a military victory in Indochina." Senator George McGovern told a news conference the same day:

"By spreading this war into Cambodia and Laos, and suggesting that American air power might be used to support a South Vietnamese strike into [North Vietnam] . . . President Nixon is flirting with World War III and courting Chinese intervention."

In a February 18 speech, Averell Harriman, formerly the chief U. S. ne-

gotiator in Paris, said that with an invasion of North Vietnam "we will have the world war which we are trying to avoid."

One congressman even suggested that Nixon could be impeached because of the invasion. Paul McCloskey, a Republican from California, said February 18:

"I do not advocate impeachment, but the question is certainly one which justifies a national discussion and debate, if only to bring home to the President the depth of despair many of us feel over his recent moves without the prior consent of the Congress."

The measure of the servility of the American congress is the fact that not one senator or congressman dared to put a motion of impeachment on the floor. But even the fact that it could be seriously discussed suggests the depth of the crisis America's rulers sense is impending over the Laos invasion.

One of the most revealing insights into the risks Nixon is running came from one of the president's supporters. Joseph C. Harsch, chief editorial writer for the conservative Boston *Christian Science Monitor*, took up "The Chinese angle" in his February 18 column. This Washington-based editor-columnist is known for his close ties with the Pentagon and State Department and for the reliability with which he passes on views originating in those places. His discussion of China dealt with the circumstances under which Washington "China watchers" believed Peking would send troops into Indochina. The internal evidence suggests that Harsch drafted his report before Nixon's February 17 press conference.

Harsch pooh-poohed the danger of a Chinese military intervention, but then added two conditions that the Washington "China watchers" believed would push Peking over the edge:

"It is presumed here that it [China] would intervene in North Vietnam in the event of an invasion from the south. It would undoubtedly intervene in Laos if the present operation turned northward and seemed to be aimed at destroying the Pathet Lao forces in the north."

But an invasion of North Vietnam is precisely what Nixon has refused to rule out; U. S. planes are already heavily engaged in supporting the CIA's mercenary army in its fight

against the Pathet Lao in northern Laos; and "Saigon" has put no limit on how far it will try to go into Laos.

But if the specific character of the Chinese response is still a matter for speculation, the liberation forces in the Laotian panhandle are already providing the "tough days" of which Laird spoke.

This fact emerged despite a virtual news blackout usually relieved only by fabrications.

Thus the February 11 *Washington Post* reported that Saigon forces had seized the town of Tchepone [Sepone] on February 10, and even described engineers of the Saigon army "rebuilding Sepone's bomb-damaged dirt airstrip." The Associated Press gave a similar account that was printed in the *New York Times*.

Two days later, it was again reported that Tchepone had been captured, although this was qualified by the *New York Times* with "indications" that only hills around the town had been taken and Saigon's troops had "not yet" entered the town itself.

Nine days after the second "capture" of Tchepone, the *New York Times* reported: "A spokesman reported that the farthest point of the South Vietnamese advance was 20 miles across the border and about 6 miles east of Tchepone . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Despite the difficulty of unraveling conflicting reports, it was clear that the U. S.-Saigon invasion had run into serious trouble.

In the northwest corner of South Vietnam, an American outpost called Fire Support Base Scotch was attacked and apparently surrounded on February 16. Henry Kamm reported in the February 19 *New York Times*: "American fighter-bombers flew 18 sorties in support of the unit Tuesday night [February 16], but bad weather prevented efforts to reinforce the company yesterday [February 17]."

Following this report, mention of the base suddenly disappeared from the press, indicating that the administration was censoring bad news.

Inside Laos, even the Saigon regime was forced to acknowledge that the invasion had bogged down. At first this was attributed to bad weather and the need to search for hidden supplies, but this pretense was abandoned February 20, as Saigon's forces came under heavy attack.



—McNally in the Montreal Star

The *New York Times* reported February 21:

"South Vietnamese Rangers were said to have suffered heavy casualties a few miles west of the Laotian village of Phu Loc, where they have established an artillery base. Dense anti-aircraft fire was said to be severely hindering helicopter supply and rescue missions and three more American helicopters were reported downed.

"A South Vietnamese military spokesman reported that a Ranger company had been routed from a night defensive position in a four-hour battle 11 miles northwest of the village of Laobao, astride Route 9."

The same article described the situation further:

". . . reports reaching Saigon from the field said that two hilltop positions held by Rangers less than a mile apart and linked to the Phu Loc base had been under heavy North Vietnamese artillery, mortar and rocket attack since Thursday.

"According to these reports, a flight of 20 American helicopters was turned back in an attempt to relieve the position."

Radio news broadcasts February 20 reported that one of these bases had been overrun and quoted officials in

Saigon as saying casualties were "immense." The next day, it was said that two of the bases had been evacuated, with the survivors fighting their way to the third base.

In spite of the U. S. air support, the Saigon forces thus appeared to be facing a very real prospect of a major defeat. The more the invasion bogs down, the more Nixon will feel impelled to drop even the pretense of American noninvolvement and send massive numbers of U. S. troops to the rescue.

Antiwar actions have already occurred spontaneously throughout the world in response to the Laos invasion. Big demonstrations are scheduled in Washington and San Francisco April 24. If Nixon sends more U. S. troops into Laos, he faces at home a repetition of the social explosion that rocked the country after the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970. The next time it may not be limited to the campus and may not be contained so easily. □

#### Filipinos Unemployed

Eight percent of the Philippine labor force is unemployed. Another 12 percent is able to find work only occasionally. About one million persons join the work force every year.

## U.S. Students Launch Spring Antiwar Offensive

Some 2,500 young antiwar activists meeting at an emergency conference in Washington, D.C., February 20-21, voted overwhelmingly to undertake a wide-ranging "spring offensive" against Nixon's latest escalation of the Indochina war.

The conference of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam [SMC], the country's largest antiwar youth organization, called for a period of intensified antiwar activities, culminating in massive demonstrations set by the National Peace Action Coalition [NPAC] in Washington and San Francisco April 24.

The conference, held on the campus of Catholic University, took place in an atmosphere described by antiwar activists as the most serious and determined ever at such a gathering. The youthful participants discussed and voted on twenty-two resolutions designed to set the organization's policy in the coming period.

The body adopted as its program a proposal submitted by Don Gurewitz, SMC's national executive secretary, and Debby Bustin of the national SMC staff.

The program declared that the "overwhelming majority of the American people are fed up with Nixon's war in Southeast Asia." It sketched the growing willingness to act against the war on the part of students, GIs, women, Blacks, Chicanos, and other Third World peoples, and the organized labor movement. In this situation, it said:

"The responsibility of the antiwar movement is that of a catalyst—to convert the mass sentiment against the war which is now once again nearing the boiling point into mass action in the streets around the demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Southeast Asia. It will take a giant, independent mobilization of the American people to force the withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia and to prevent the U.S. government from continuing its policy of destroying Southeast Asia in order to 'save it.'"

"Without such independent mass ac-

tion," the resolution said, "Nixon can continue indefinitely to talk about 'peace' while continuing the aggression."

The action program centers on the massive and peaceful demonstrations called for April 24:

"The spring offensive to stop the war should focus on the April 24 demonstrations for immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops in Washington and San Francisco. Initiated by the National Peace Action Coalition, these projected mass actions have already won the support and endorsement of a broad range of organizations and individuals from all sectors of society. The April 24th demonstrations provide the focus for maximum unity of all antiwar forces and groups, and provide the vehicle that can be utilized to broaden the antiwar movement in a way that will give it new power and effect."

Other activities in the spring offensive approved by the conference include:

- Coordinated actions demanding the abolition of the draft on March 15.

- Local demonstrations April 2-4 commemorating the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

- Campus actions on May 5 to mark the first anniversary of the Cambodia invasion and the murder of students at Jackson State College in Mississippi and Kent State University in Ohio.

- Solidarity actions with antiwar GIs on May 16, Armed Forces Day.

The SMC elected as its officers Don Gurewitz and Debby Bustin, respectively national field secretary and national coordinator.

The breadth of the opportunities open to the antiwar movement was indicated not only by the large student attendance, impressive as that was. Participants came from 38 of the 50 states. Represented were 173 college campuses, more than 70 high schools, and 10 junior high or elementary schools. More than 100 reporters covered the conference, ap-

proximately three-fourths of them from campus newspapers.

José Garza, the La Raza Unida party assistant city manager of Crystal City, Texas, told the conference that La Raza Unida had organized a Chicano Moratorium and planned to have delegations from Crystal City in both Washington and San Francisco on April 24.

Garza also spoke at a rally the night before the conference opened. Other speakers included Ron Dellums, Black congressman from Berkeley, California; Rob Olson of the Concerned Officers Movement, an organization of antiwar military officers; Michael Harris, the student body president of Howard University; Leon Page of the Cairo, Illinois, Black United Front; and Charles Chang, an officer of the District of Columbia teachers union.

Feminists at the conference, pointing out that the war "consumes lives and resources that should be allocated to the needs of women and other oppressed sectors," decided to organize a United Women's Contingent in the April 24 demonstration.

In the week following the invasion of Laos, an estimated 60,000 persons took part in protest demonstrations around the country. While this figure is significant considering the fact that the demonstrations were organized on very short notice, it represents only a fraction of those who can be mobilized—particularly as the U.S. public becomes more aware of the extent of American involvement and the dangers this poses.

The April 24 date can serve as a focus for protests not only in the United States but throughout the world to give the warmaker in the White House the rebuff he has coming to him. □

### Jobs Short in Singapore

The International Monetary Fund estimates that 7 percent of the labor force of Singapore is unemployed.

### Inflation in South Korea

Prices of consumer goods in Seoul rose 12.7 percent in 1970.

# Women Workers Force Bureaucrats to Retreat

By Gerry Foley

On February 15 the Polish bureaucracy made its most far-reaching concession to the workers since the mid-December revolts in the Baltic ports threatened to ignite a full-scale revolution. Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz went on nationwide television to announce that the price rises that had sparked the crisis were being rescinded.

By this move, the Warsaw government seemed to indicate that it remains under irresistible working-class pressure. Even in face of the December fighting that left hundreds dead and wounded, the regime—which has exhausted its economic reserves—had refused to make this decisive capitulation to the workers' demands. Following the strike of the textile workers in Lodz February 11, the regime's resistance collapsed.

The significance of the government's surrender was increased by the fact that, by Jaroszewicz's admission, the measure had been made possible only by an extension of credit from the Soviet Union. Hard pressed by the demands of its own workers, the Kremlin bureaucracy can ill afford to pick up the tab for the Polish bureaucracy's mismanagement of its economy. Secondly, the victory of the Polish workers, the greatest economic triumph ever won by the proletariat of a bureaucratized workers state, cannot help but fan the flames of working-class rebellion throughout Eastern Europe. Moscow must have viewed the situation in Poland as extremely menacing to agree to finance such a concession.

The scales appear to have been tipped against the Polish bureaucracy by the entry into the struggle of new and decisive contingents of the proletariat—the women workers, who represent 40 percent of the country's labor force. The 10,000 striking textile workers in the old industrial center of Lodz, where in 1830 the red flag was raised for the first time over a working-class barricade, were predominantly women.

In late January, Communist party

chief Gierek seemed to have temporarily pacified the workers in the coastal cities who had been moving toward a new confrontation with the regime. For the moment, the new ruling team's recognition of democratically elected workers committees and the de facto right to strike, its promises of new concessions at the party Central Committee meeting scheduled for the end of January, as well as Gierek's move in going into the factories to appeal to the workers directly, stemmed the resurgent tide of rebellion.

But, according to correspondent Dan Morgan, writing in the February 5 *Washington Post*, the men warned Gierek that their wives were in no mood to trust his promises. "You have convinced us you are with us," some workers are supposed to have said. "Now we must convince our wives."

On February 14, a four-man Politburo delegation headed by Premier Jaroszewicz spent eighteen hours in Lodz trying to convince the striking women that their demands for a 15 percent wage hike were "unrealistic." Apparently the women could not be persuaded, and their example threatened to spread to the Ursus tractor factory in Warsaw.

The next day the regime surrendered, abrogating the December 12 price increases. The working women of Lodz had won for every worker in Poland effective wage raises comparable to what they were demanding for themselves.

Initially the Polish bureaucracy had reacted to the threat posed by the women strikers in Lodz with the same authoritarian arrogance that characterized its response to the shipyard workers' protests in December. Bureaucratic officials had blamed the outbreaks in the coastal cities on "hooligans." The Lodz strikers were represented as "hysterical" and "unrealistic" females.

The attitude of the local leaders was described by correspondent James

Feron in the February 16 issue of the *New York Times*. "Entry into the plant was refused to foreign newsmen. One city official said the women did not want to see anyone, not even local reporters. Another said the women tended to get excited and thus interviews were being refused."

The militancy of this newly mobilized section of the working class forced the bureaucracy to eat its words for a second time.

The women workers had greater cause for determination than the shipbuilders who faced the guns and tanks of the repressive forces in mid-December.

The establishment of collective property forms and the resulting industrialization in Poland enabled masses of women to enter the work force for the first time. In this way the conditions were created for women to escape the vegetative existence to which they had been condemned by the reactionary clericalist prewar regime.

But at the same time, bureaucratic management of the collectivist system has imposed even greater burdens on female than on male workers. Since Stalinist authoritarianism preserved the traditional family system, women remain responsible for rearing children and maintaining the household, even though most of them now hold jobs.

Inadequate housing and social services are provided for the workers streaming into the new industrial cities. With their older relatives remaining in the countryside, many uprooted young couples have no one to watch their children while they are at work.

The women are the ones who have had the primary responsibility for coping with the food and consumer-goods shortage produced by Stalinist overemphasis on heavy industry. They were the ones who had to stand in the long lines.

In fact, housewives' protests foreshadowed the December explosion, even in the privileged Silesian coal fields, then the personal fief of the



new party boss Eduard Gierek. Correspondent Eric Bourne wrote in the January 14 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*: "There had, in fact, been a whiff of summer trouble in Silesia over the lack of fresh fruit. When Silesian housewives demonstrated, however, the Katowice leadership reacted by hurrying in supplies and selling them at the pitheads and factory gates."

Wages have been particularly low and conditions particularly bad in light industry where the largest numbers of women are employed.

The application of the "criterion of profitability" in industry led factory managers to cut investment in already inadequate social services and amenities.

Furthermore, at the end of October 1970, the party organ *Trybuna Ludu* admitted that 41 percent of the year's housing plan for workers remained unfulfilled.

In addition to the structural disadvantages suffered by women under the bureaucratic system, arbitrary male factory managers have been grossly indifferent to their needs. For example, in the February 4 issue of the *Washington Post*, Richard Homan quoted *Trybuna Ludu's* commendation of the managers of a bicycle factory in Bydgoszcz, a town halfway between Gdansk and Lodz. The factory bosses had "worked out a plan for the implementation of social and living conditions" that involved providing for the first time "proper footwear for about 2,500 female workers, who now use heavy men's boots for work."

A week before the outbreak of the Lodz strike, the bureaucracy showed signs of realizing that discontent was building up among women workers. On February 3 in Warsaw, leaders of the state trade-union federation announced a plan for improving the conditions of the female work force. The projected reforms were implicit testimony to the disabilities and neglect women had been subjected to by bureaucratic rule. *Washington Post* correspondent Dan Morgan reported February 4:

"The trade union leadership said that the number of jobs for women should be sharply increased, more managerial posts should be entrusted to women, vocational training for girls should be stepped up, and more

jobs should be opened up to women. . . .

"On the social side, the labor board recommended better health and gynecological facilities, abolition of night work, more kindergartens and day care centers, and prolongation of maternity leave, which is now 12 weeks."

Of Poland's 4,000,000 female workers, seven out of ten are married, Morgan wrote. "But trade union executives conceded that day care centers and other services for them were inadequate."

However, caught in an economic crisis and fighting a defensive battle against the demands of the port workers, the bureaucracy moved too late to meet the grievances of women. And the regime now fears that the triumph of the Lodz strikers will inspire the rest of the Polish working class to raise new and more portentous demands.

The day after Jaroszewicz announced the government's capitulation on the price issue, official sources issued a warning that absolutely no more economic concessions would be made. A communiqué by the state news agency PAP [Polska Agencja Prasowa—Polish News Agency] declared: "There is absolutely no further possibility of decreasing prices and increasing wages. Any further step would verge on economic irresponsibility." The dispatch argued that "the country has no economic reserves."

However, the Polish workers cannot have helped noticing the fact that at the Central Committee plenum preceding the textile workers' strike, the regime not only made it clear that it had no intention of making more than the token concessions it had made up until then, but it was even attempting to backtrack on its promises of more political freedom.

In the February 10 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, correspondent Bernard Marguerite described Gierek's speech to the plenum, which was held February 6-7. "On certain points Gierek shifted into reverse gear. He did not mention the need for holding truly democratic elections at the various levels of the party, the unions, and the workers councils, although this was discussed at Szczecin with his approval. He limited himself to saying that 'real functioning democracy in the party does not consist so much in guarantees of a formal

nature as in guarantees of a political character.'

"These statements represented a retreat from those the party first secretary made even on the day of election December 20, when he promised to create 'political conditions guaranteed by appropriate organizational forms' to facilitate the participation of all in administering affairs. Likewise, Gierek did not mention the demand for rotation of leading functions, although it was discussed during the plenum."

No major new economic concessions were projected at the CC plenum. Instead, it was agreed to speed up preparations for the next party congress. It was this meeting, to be held late in 1971 or early in 1972, that, according to the resolution adopted, was to "mark out the country's perspectives for development and formulate a program for carrying forward the construction of socialism, taking into consideration the interests and aspirations of the working class and the people."

Gierek had succeeded in putting off the demands of the port workers in January by promising that big new changes would come out of the plenum. He apparently hoped he could use this delaying tactic again, this time extending the truce to a year or more and opening the way for indefinite further delays.

If he was sparing in granting economic benefits to the population, Gierek was generous with the heads of his fellow bureaucrats. The main head to fall was that of Stanislaw Kociolek, whom Gierek had made party economic czar December 20. The party chief read a letter of resignation from his erstwhile protégé containing an abject confession of failure. Kociolek said that when he was sent to Gdansk December 12 to head off the workers' rebellion, he "had been unable to fulfill his responsibilities and was incapable of halting the tragic course of events."

Kociolek is particularly hated by the workers of the coastal cities, who regard him as one of the officials mainly responsible for the mid-December massacres. In their late January work stoppages, the shipyard workers had made Kociolek's ouster from the Central Committee one of their principal demands. The fact that Gierek had appointed this "technocratic" brain truster as the politburo econom-



ic chief, despite his role in the December events, indicated his importance for the new team. Kociolek's resignation was a major victory for the workers.

As expected, Gomulka's ouster from the Central Committee was confirmed and the two politburo members closest to him were expelled from the party's leading body. Zenon Kliszko, Gomulka's chief ideologist; and Boleslaw Jaszczuk, his economic administrator, were hastily dumped with scarcely an opportunity to defend themselves. Antoni Walaszek, first secretary of the Szczecin provincial CP during the December fighting, resigned from the Central Committee.

In the two weeks following the CC plenum, high party officials were replaced in Wroclaw, Opole, Cracow, Lodz, Warsaw province, Katowice, Rzeszow, and Poznan.

Despite vague press reports about a factional struggle within the bureaucracy, however, no clear political pattern has yet emerged from the party shake-up. While Gierek was forced to sacrifice Kociolek, for example, the man most hated by the workers, General Mieczyslaw Moczar, was confirmed in his new position in the party secretariat. He holds the portfolios for the army, state security, administration, and health. At the time of the December revolts, Moczar had command over the riot police, the most merciless section of the repressive forces.

Polish commentators have both indirectly and openly raised the question of a split in the party. Their purpose in doing this, however, is subject to suspicion. As an example of this type of discussion, a February 19 dispatch from *New York Times* correspondent James Feron cited an article by Ryszard Wojna, deputy editor of *Zycie Warszawy*. Wojna wrote: "We should realize that a sharp battle is taking place on many levels between the old and the new. Opponents of general renewal in Poland are ready to act to support the false thesis that society should be ruled over rather than ruled with."

"One cannot exclude the fact that for these people ["the old"] it is very convenient to propose extremist demands, such as, for example, 20 percent wage increases."

The reference to a "20 percent" wage increase apparently referred to the demand of the Lodz strikers. Wojna's

intention seemed to be to use the ultra-Stalinist Moczar faction as a bogey, trying to persuade workers to put their trust in Gierek, who, he hinted, was fighting their fight behind the scenes. If the workers demanded too much, according to this logic, they would weaken the progressive faction and bring the Stalinist hangmen to power.

It is not unlikely that Gierek's continuing retreats before working-class pressure and his shake-up of the top level personnel have upset some sections of the bureaucracy. But in view of the power, persistence, and new widening of the working-class upsurge, an open split in the bureaucracy seems unlikely at present.

Although the Gomulka leadership came under sharp criticism at the plenum, this critique was tempered with praise for his earlier accomplishments. Gierek seemed reluctant to blame the crisis on any one section of the bureaucracy, even the discredited old leadership. "That would be too easy," he said, "we have all committed errors."

In his speech to the plenum, Gierek repeated his earlier disavowals of the slanders the old party leadership had employed against the striking port workers. "The former leaders asserted at the time [the December outbreaks] that we were faced with a counterrevolution. But there was no counterrevolution. The movement was not aimed against socialism."

This admission and the acknowledgment of previous bureaucratic errors does not seem to have won Gierek plaudits from any section of the ruling caste. In the February 9 issue of *Le Monde*, Bernard Margueritte described the reception given to the first secretary's report. "Tired and haggard, the first secretary read his more than sixty-page-long report for more than two hours without once being interrupted by applause."

This was a clear violation of bureaucratic etiquette for such occasions. Transcripts of speeches by top bureaucrats are normally interspersed with such comments as "stormy applause," "prolonged stormy applause," etc.

In fact, no section of the bureaucracy appears to have very much to gain in the coming period. The developments since December 12 have produced profound changes that are incompatible with continued bureaucratic rule and which will be extremely

difficult to reverse. An interview with some representatives of the new workers' leadership thrown up by the December rebellions published in the February 6 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor* indicated the type of challenge facing the bureaucracy.

"We cannot imagine life without socialism but we want a right socialism, a Polish socialism, which means it must represent not one person but all the people," said youthful Mieczyslaw Dopierala, newly elected head of the party organization at the giant Adolf Warski Shipyards."

Dopierala, a thirty-five-year-old technician, was the head of the strike committee that controlled Szczecin during the December 17-22 uprising in that city.

"There was nothing antisocialist, nothing anti-Soviet in our strikes," Dopierala continued, "and the fact that I became first party secretary at the yards proves this."

"We respect our elders. They won freedom for us and rebuilt Szczecin. But man is born with egotistic traits and many leaders looked only to their personal advantage."

"We want now to change the style and method of work. There must be greater contact with the people, there must be individual responsibility for one's acts. And we demand rotation in office."

"We are not dogmatists. I did not finish a party school and none of us here has a political education. We got it in production, in our jobs."

When the Western interviewer, Charlotte Saikowski, mentioned the hopes that the workers had placed in Gomulka in 1956, another member of the Szczecin strike committee said: "The situation cannot be repeated. I remember 1956. I was 23 years old. Now no one can blind me again. We have learned our lesson. There must be effective work and systematic responsibility within the party." □

#### Unemployment Increasing in Indonesia

About 1,000,000 persons join the Indonesian labor force every year. In spite of foreign aid totaling \$600,000,000 annually, the economy provides these new workers with only 150,000 jobs.

#### Still Two to Go

The Australian government has removed seven novels by Henry Miller from its list of banned books. *Sexus* and *Quiet Days in Clichy* are still forbidden.

## Hunted Peasant Leader Describes Police Atrocities

In the face of a campaign of police terror against the peasant movement in West Bengal, the Palli Shramik Kri-shak Sangh [PSKS—Village Workers and Peasants Union] has issued a broad appeal for support.

Jagdish Jha, secretary of the PSKS, made the appeal in a January 12 letter addressed to left political parties, trade unions, and peasant groups throughout India. Jha, a member of the Socialist Workers party [SWP—Indian section of the Fourth International], is one of the organizers of the peasant movement in Bankura district and is being hunted by the police on seventeen different frame-up charges, including murder. A reward of 10,000 rupees [\$1,333] has reportedly been offered to the person who kills the Trotskyist peasant leader. [See *Intercontinental Press*, February 15, page 138.]

"The police in the district of Bankura," Jha writes, "in collaboration with jotedars [large-scale capitalist farmers] have . . . instituted a number of false court cases and have let loose repression against unarmed working people. Organized gangs, armed with lathis [bamboo clubs] and guns, have been attacking the landless agricultural labourers and poor peasants (including share-croppers) with a view to suppressing their legitimate democratic movement.

"We have repeatedly complained to the authorities against these police repressions and have asked the Bankura district collector, the Governor of West Bengal, and his principal adviser to stop the police atrocities. But those complaints of ours have been of no effect. We see that the police atrocities are on the increase day by day."

The police practice, Jha said, is to surround a village, arrest the workers, and beat everyone they seize. He reported the following list of police attacks:

(1) "On November 24, 1970, the police, taking the side of the jotedars, charged with lathis and firearms a group of poor peasants of Fulmati village in the Taldangra P. S. [police station]. They also arrested some poor peasants of the village and took them

to the police station where they subjected them to brutal torture. The jotedars here want to illegally retain their possession of lands which are not actually recorded in their names."

(2) "During the night of November 25, 1970, without having any valid warrants, thirteen policemen of the Roshna police camp armed with rifles went to arrest the labour leader Sadhan Duley from the Mukunapur village . . . But as the women of his house did not allow them to enter . . . the police struck four women with lathis and fired three rounds of bullets. In the morning of November 26 these women, along with others in a body, went to the police station to lodge their complaints. The officers in the police station sent them to the hospital for treatment of the injuries caused by the brutality of the police the previous night, but refused to record their complaints.

"In the afternoon two officers accompanied me from Bankura to Simlatal . . ." to investigate the attack. "The women again came to the police station and narrated their grievances to the officers. But as a result, two women, Bishakhi Duley and Mal-ti Duley, were arrested along with Sadhan Duley at the police station itself. Joileshi Duley, an old woman who was released from the hospital later, was also arrested and sent up for trial along with the others. The . . . top police officers in the district knew the facts but they did not admit them. Instead they instituted false cases against countless poor peasants and their womenfolk with the false charges that they, armed with various weapons, attacked the police camp under my leadership in the early hours of November 26 with the intention of killing policemen at the camp."

(3) On the night of December 14, the police surrounded the village of Krishnapur, where the headquarters of the PSKS are located, and "launched an indiscriminate attack on the villagers, men, women, children, the old and infirm. They also arrested some of their victims. When some of the villagers protested, the police fired six

to seven rounds of bullets and wounded Nagen Roy . . . in the chest, and another in the leg . . ."

The next morning, as the villagers were carrying Nagen Roy to the hospital, the police seized him and put him in the Bankura hospital under police custody. Two of the villagers carrying him were arrested and beaten.

Among those arrested in the raid on Krishnapur, Jha writes, was Gangadhar Roy, an aged veterinary doctor of the district. He was severely beaten, as was Mohan Chandra Roy, a veteran of the revolutionary independence movement of the 1930s.

Since then, the police have waged "an undeclared war against the landless labourers and poor peasants of the Bankura district," concentrating on the villages around the PSKS headquarters.

(4) "On December 18, 1970, at night, two batches of policemen . . . of the Simlatal police station twice raided my house. They forcibly entered my house and in my absence insulted and beat up the inmates, including my wife, my 96-year-old mother and my children. They broke open my almirah [cupboard], took out all necessary files and papers, and threw them into the nearby well. The rope used for drawing water was also thrown into the well. They raided the houses of other poor villagers also and broke the utensils and other things which they found in their possession and took away the things which they considered valuable. They also robbed the clothing of the womenfolk.

"The matter did not end there. The police have been raiding this village almost every day ever since. On December 19 they arrested another man, Shri Anil Roy, who has been suffering from tuberculosis for the last ten years. The police also robbed him of a sum of thirty rupees [7.5 rupees equal US\$1], the only money which he had for his subsistence for the month. But it is very strange that the district officers have remained indifferent to all these incidents of police torture of in-

nocent agricultural labourers and others in the village, although they were informed time and again. They failed to take proper steps to stop the villainous activities of the police."

(5) On December 21, the police arrested and tortured three persons who live within four or five miles of Krishnapur: Doctor Murmu, Daram Saren, and Haripada Roy.

(6) On the morning of December 24, the Simlapal police again raided Krishnapur and "created a reign of terror in the village." They entered houses, destroyed the household belongings, and beat the inhabitants.

Two men were arrested and then tortured in the police station. Among those beaten was Jha's aged mother.

(7) "The police have instituted about 40 false cases so far involving about 400 agricultural workers and poor peasants of about 60 to 70 villages under Simlapal, Taldangra, and Onda police stations. To complete the plot the jotedars sent their petitions to the court complaining against agricultural labourers and poor peasants. The police, to assist the cause of the jotedars, sent their reports in favour of the jotedars."

(8) The jotedars, Jha writes, are even trying to confiscate lands legally held by poor peasants. Police reports have falsified the ownership of land to which poor peasants held the legal title.

(9) The police are also aiding the jotedars in their attempts to seize "the cultivable forest lands, shoals of rivers or riverbeds and other Government lands, which the landless peasants and labourers have tilled either collectively or individually." The police certify falsely that these lands are being cultivated by the jotedars.

"The Forest Department have, however, claimed their right to ownership in respect of certain lands but . . . the police have submitted false reports stating that the jotedars have the right to possession of lands recorded in the name of the Forest Department."

The police force, Jha notes, was originally created by the British imperialists. Following formal independence, they were "easily purchased by the jotedars," who use them for their own purposes.

Jha attributes the viciousness of the ruling class's attacks on the PSKS to the peasant movement's sharp posing of the class struggle.

Jha's letter concludes with the fol-

lowing appeal:

"Under the circumstances I would request you and your Party, which is fighting for the cause of the working-class people, to stand by our side to resist the reactionary force and lodge your protests with the Central and

the State Governments against the said oppressions and repressions of the police against the working-class people and landless labourers in the areas under the Simlapal and Taldangra Police Stations in the Bankura district." □

## West Germany

### 2,000 Protest Prague Witch-hunt Trial

West Berlin

At its first public meeting February 10, the newly organized West Berlin local of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten [GIM—International Marxist Group, the German section of the Fourth International] scored an impressive success. More than 2,000 students, young workers, and intellectuals turned out for the occasion.

The meeting was held at the Technical University of West Berlin, the same place where the youth congress was held in February 1968 that gained international attention for its size, spirited defense of the Vietnamese revolution, and opposition to U.S. imperialist aggression in Indochina. [See *World Outlook* (the former name of *Intercontinental Press*), March 8, 1968, page 198.]

The featured speakers at the February 10 meeting were Ernest Mandel, Herwar Achterberg, and Alain Krivine.

Representing the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, Ernest Mandel spoke on the deepening crisis of Stalinism as manifested in the current upsurge of the working class in Poland.

Achterberg, representing the GIM, dealt with the rise in militancy of the workers in West Germany as shown by a number of struggles.

Alain Krivine, one of the leaders of the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International, spoke on the interrelationship of the current radicalization of the campus, the building of a revolutionary-socialist party, and the struggle for political leadership of the working class.

The success of the meeting represented a shift in influence among the radicalized students and young workers of West Berlin. Last year the preponderancy was still held by tenden-

cies under the influence of Stalinism. Some were in the orbit of Maoism, others of the official West Berlin Communist party [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Westberlin—the Socialist Unity party of West Berlin].

The shift could be gauged by the response to a resolution presented by Ernest Mandel vigorously protesting against the witch-hunt trial in Prague victimizing members of the Revolutionary Socialist party (including Sibylle Plogstedt, a student of West Berlin).

The resolution voiced full solidarity with the struggle of the RSP for workers democracy and workers councils in Czechoslovakia.

The big audience adopted the resolution with only three persons voting against it.

During the discussion, the GIM proposed that a public demonstration be organized to protest against the Prague witch-hunt trial. This met with a favorable response among various groups of the far left in West Berlin and such a demonstration is now being organized. □

### Finnish Steelworkers Strike

Finland's 70,000 steelworkers went on strike February 8. The February 9 *Le Monde* reported: "This strike will affect not only the steel industry, but the 80,000 workers in light metals who are ready to join the steelworkers if it is prolonged.

"The negotiation of annual union contracts is very late this year. It appears that President Kekkonen's intervention in December was not decisive. Despite the Kekkonen agreement's attack on the doctrine of stabilization, the discontent has persisted and even deepened. The metals industry is not the only sector involved. Sunday [February 7], the Federation of Construction Unions, which defends the interests of 60,000 workers, put down an advance strike notice for February 25."

## Popular Front Formed in Uruguay

Montevideo

The first meeting of the Frente Amplio [broad front] was held February 5 in the anteroom of the Uruguayan Senate. Under sponsorship of a "Provisional Executive Committee," the participants set up various commissions and formally launched the new organization.

The Frente Amplio was first proposed in the weeks following Salvador Allende's electoral victory in Chile September 4.

After some preliminary soundings and conversations, a call was issued October 7 by a group of liberal bourgeois elements, prominent leftists, and some trade-union leaders, notably Héctor Rodríguez of the Textile Workers union. The document appeared in the October 9 issue of the well-known Montevideo weekly *Marcha*.

The group, which became known as the Comité Ejecutivo Provisorio [provisional executive committee], called for organization of a broad political front, an "anti-imperialist, nationalist, and antioligarchical coalition."

The declaration made clear that no group would be excluded because of its views, that the front would function in other ways besides engaging in electoral activities, and that nationalization of some of the larger capitalist firms was favored.

The call was followed by "round table" discussions throughout the country. These included all the groups of the left that cared to participate and to voice their views.

A number of organizations and well-known persons issued declarations supporting the "new 'Popular Front' or 'Broad Front,' or whatever is finally decided on for a name," as José Batlle Martínez put it in a letter published in the October 30 issue of *Marcha*.

By the time of the February 5 meeting, the groups that had indicated their intention to support or to participate in the Frente Amplio included the following:

Partido Demócrata Cristiano [PDC], a formation led by Senator Zelmar Michelini that split away from the ruling Partido Colorado (one of Uru-

guay's twin bourgeois parties, the other being the Partido Nacional or "Partido Blanco"); the Movimiento Blanco, Popular y Progresista [MBPP], a group led by Senator Francisco Rodríguez Camusso that split from the Blancos; the Partido Comunista; the Frente Izquierda de Liberación [F.I. de L. or FIDEL], an electoral front set up by the CP; the Partido Socialista; the Federación de Juventudes Batllistas; Movimiento Popular Unitario; Grupos de Acción Unificadora; Movimiento Femenino Battlista de Avance Social; Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental; the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskyista) [the POR led by J. Posadas]; the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Uruguay) [Trotskyists adhering to the Fourth International]; Núcleo de Ciudadanos Independientes (Nucleus of Independent Citizens to which Dr. Carlos Quijano, the publisher of *Marcha*, belongs); Acción Sindical Uruguaya (Trade Union Action of Uruguay); many other organizations, and prominent persons like Dr. Arturo Balañas, General Liber Seregni, Washington Fernández (a former minister of public works), and Professor Raúl Goyenola.

The decisive forces in the coalition are the left-bourgeois elements and the Communist party.

Although a tug-of-war can be expected between the leaders of the CP and their bourgeois allies over organizational details in the front, they agree on the decisive questions—program and central leadership. They see eye-to-eye on maintaining these within a bourgeois framework.

Their principal immediate objective is to make a strong showing in the elections scheduled for next November. Perhaps they hope to repeat in Uruguay what was done in Chile under the banner of Salvador Allende.

The Tupamaros [Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (Tupamaros)] have come out in favor of the Frente Amplio. In a statement dated "December 1970," which was published in the January 8 issue of *Marcha*, the Tupamaros said they did not honestly believe that in Uruguay today it is pos-

sible to achieve a revolution by means of elections. They seem to have shifted, however, as to the possibility in other Latin-American countries: "It is incorrect to transpose [to Uruguay] the experiences of other countries." The reference would seem to be at least to Chile. [See the text of their declaration elsewhere in this issue.]

The only leftist groups that have refused to participate in the front are the anarchists (Federación Anarquista), who oppose electoral activities in principle, and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria [MIR], the Maoist grouping which has stated that it is willing to form a bloc with the national bourgeoisie, but not one that includes the Communist party.

A decisive sector of the organized working-class movement, including the trade unions, is entering the front.

For the Trotskyists of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Uruguay) this fact was crucial in determining their own course of action. The PRT(U) is the only group participating in the forum provided by the Frente Amplio that opposes formation of a class-collaborationist popular front.

Upon publication of the October 7 call for a nationwide discussion on how Uruguay could achieve independence from imperialism and win domestic reforms, the PRT(U) stated that it would participate, presenting its own program for consideration and debate.

The position of the PRT(U) is that a popular front headed by a sector of the national bourgeoisie and committed to maintaining bourgeois property relations can neither win independence from imperialism nor solve the economic and social problems confronting the masses.

The PRT(U) holds that the national independence movement in Uruguay must be led by the working class and that it must fight to establish a workers government.

In the discussions that were opened preparatory to launching the Frente Amplio, the PRT(U) proposed, first, that programmatic questions be dis-

cussed among the constituent organizations at a rank-and-file level, above all by committees in the plants and factories, before final action is taken in adopting an official program.

The PRT(U) proposed, secondly, that in the coming elections the same committees choose the candidates and that the majority of the candidates be factory workers.

The Uruguayan Trotskyists do not believe that the bourgeoisie can be toppled and the working class brought to power along the electoral road. They believe that it is necessary, however, to participate in elections and to utilize them in advancing a revolutionary program calling on the working class to break from the bourgeoisie, both its imperialist and national sectors.

In the opinion of the PRT(U) only armed struggle, growing out of the mass working-class movement, can achieve final victory.

Alert to the danger of sectarianism, the PRT(U) is doing its utmost to extend its proletarian base by actively participating in the country's living political process.

The PRT(U) is a new organization, built in the past two years. Its membership includes both students and workers.

Although the repression under the Pacheco regime has forced it to function underground, the PRT(U) publishes a newspaper, *Tendencia Revolucionario*.

Last year some of its central leaders were imprisoned during one of the sweeping raids conducted by the government against the left. After two months they were freed without a trial — and without an explanation.

In their effort to build a revolutionary party, the PRT(U) militants are seeking to utilize every possible opening to crystallize a working-class tendency within the Frente Amplio. Already various working-class groups, including trade unions, have indicated interest in forming a bloc with the PRT(U) on the basis of a program that includes transitional and democratic demands of revolutionary import in Uruguay.

The PRT(U) is hopeful that the pressure from the working-class groups inside the front will succeed in winning the demand for a full pro-

grammatic discussion on a rank-and-file level among the constituent groups.

Uruguay has elaborate electoral provisions that permit declared factions to run slates of their own while still adhering to a national party or political formation.

## U.S.A.

# For the Right to Hear Bernadette Devlin!

Bernadette Devlin, still the youngest member of Britain's parliament nearly two years after her election, is making her second speaking tour of the United States. The bourgeois press and politicians are giving the Northern Irish civil-rights fighter a rather different reception from the one she received the first time around in August 1969.

Then she was a symbol of the struggle of the nationalist minority. Even though the official Irish-American community was outraged by her socialist views, it was forced to welcome her as a heroine and give her the red-carpet treatment. New York's Mayor Lindsay, it will be remembered, even gave her the key to the city in an official ceremony.

Not so today. In the interim, the young M.P. has served four months in a Northern Irish prison on charges of "inciting to riot." Moreover she emphasizes the word "socialist" when she speaks, and champions such causes as that of Angela Davis. Thus at a February 9 forum at Washington's Georgetown University, Devlin declared: "I hope in San Francisco to be able to visit Angela Davis in prison, or at least attend a Free Angela Davis rally. . . . I see Angela Davis as a political prisoner . . . facing charges because she is . . . black and a communist."

No less an authority on civil rights than the *New York Times* hastened to advise Bernadette Devlin that if she really wanted to help "her people," she should go back where she came from and support the reactionary Stormont regime. In a February 16 editorial the *New York Times* said:

"If Miss Devlin had been interested in a systematic but gradual effort to improve the lot of Ulster's Catholics she would long ago have thrown her support behind the reforms Major Chichester-Clark advanced courageously despite powerful opposition in his own Unionist party. If she were interested now in sparing her people further bloodshed and hardship she would call off her lecture tour in America and go home to lend her eloquence to the demand for an end to violence and acceleration of peaceful reform."

The students at Georgetown University resoundingly rejected the *Times'* specious advice. An audience of more than 800 gave Bernadette Devlin a standing ovation, and more than 1,000 persons

Thus it may be possible for a working-class tendency to appear on the ballot in its own name in the coming election without being excluded from the new movement that is dominated at present by bourgeois elements and their chief supporters, the leaders of the Uruguayan Communist party. □



BERNADETTE DEVLIN

gathered after her talk to ask questions.

As for the young M.P. herself, she indicated in a letter to the February 18 *New York Village Voice* that she was well prepared for the hostile reaction from American defenders of capitalist privilege:

"I don't expect that too many eminent members of American society will be anxious to shake me by the hand. Mayor Lindsay would probably prefer to jump in his polluted river rather than meet me. Too bad; he's still not going to get his key back." □

### In the Land of the Free

A federal study released January 6 revealed that 52 percent of the inmates of city and county jails in the U. S. had not been convicted of a crime.

# How Third World Advances Victory of Socialism

By Gisela Mandel

[On December 17, Marxist sociologist Gisela Mandel addressed students at the University of Zurich at the invitation of the school's Commission on Underdeveloped Countries. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 1, page 93.)

[Her speech was later printed in the January 16 issue of the Swiss German-language daily *Badener Tagblatt*, apparently from a tape recording. We have translated it from this source.]

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In classical Marxist theory the concept "socialism" is understood as something concrete: namely, a classless society, a society without commodity production and without wage labor—even though a social division of labor and a partial inequality stemming from this division may survive. In this sense, it was the view of both Marx and Lenin that it is impossible to complete the construction of such a socialist society in an underdeveloped country, and generally, in any one country.

The construction of a completely classless society requires more than the development of the productive forces to the point where the entire basic needs of the population can be satisfied without difficulty. It presupposes that the working masses have sufficient free time and material possibilities to educate themselves to the extent that, in Lenin's words, "every cook" can in fact routinely take a hand in administering the economy and the state.

But when the given level of labor productivity forces an eight or nine-hour day on every worker in order to meet his most basic needs; when every additional skill can be acquired only by an additional investment of time; when concern with consumption, conditioned by scarcity, still plays a decisive role in the expenditure of one's

limited free time; then the material preconditions simply do not exist for a state in which the masses of the population routinely manage affairs through elected councils and in which bureaucracy can be reduced to a minimum.

And when, in addition, the society is too poor to give every youth access to high school or university, there is a dangerous monopoly of education that inevitably becomes a source of additional social inequality and increased bureaucratization.

From the Marxist standpoint, every higher stage of society in history has distinguished itself in the final analysis by a higher degree of labor productivity.

The level of productivity reached under capitalism arises, among other things, from the international division of labor. Thus it already seems improbable that a socialist commonwealth confined within national borders would be able to surpass this level, even if it were constructed in an industrially developed country. In fact, it can be established that the Soviet Union is a long way from having achieved the labor productivity of the United States.

But if it seems impossible to build a fully developed socialist commonwealth in the economically backward countries, that in no way means that these underdeveloped lands cannot have a socialist *revolution*. Before and after the first world war, precisely the opposite view was held by the Social Democrats. They believed that these countries were foreordained to reach a high level of capitalism before they could even think of revolution. In part, this tendency believed its view was based on Marxist orthodoxy.

Formally, the opinion of the classical Social Democracy was based on a fairly clear-cut syllogism:

It is modern capitalism that first creates the preconditions for social-

ism and the socialist revolution by its development of the material productive forces of big industry. In the underdeveloped countries such a capitalism either scarcely exists or is present to a completely insufficient degree. Therefore there can be neither socialism nor a socialist revolution.

In this view, capitalism must get a chance to develop completely, by overthrowing the semifeudal *ancien régime*, before socialism is put on the agenda.

The chief error of this classical Social Democratic idea lies in its underestimation of the decisive turn in the history of capitalism represented by the era of imperialism. Before this era, it was more or less correct to apply the model of capitalist development in Great Britain or Belgium to "the next countries to industrialize," such as France, Germany, Italy, the USA, etc.

With the rise of the imperialist epoch, the situation changed decisively. From that point on, the development of capitalism in the imperialist countries no longer provided an example or stimulus, but became an *insurmountable barrier* to capitalist industrialization of the underdeveloped countries. The reasons for this are:

- The inability of the young industry of the third world to compete with the assembly-line mass production of the imperialist countries.

- The domination of international investment funds by western capital, which has striven to achieve an international division of labor in which the third world develops types of production that complement rather than compete with the Western economy.

- Domination of the economies of third world countries by international trusts that extract in one form or another the most important part of these countries' surplus value—either directly, by such means as repatriating dividends, interest, and personal income



of management personnel, or indirectly as the result of unequal exchange.

The conclusion to be drawn from this situation was epoch-making. It was that in the era of imperialism no country of the third world will succeed in industrializing by the capitalist road and within the framework of the capitalist world market.

The historical balance sheet of the last sixty years confirms the validity of this conclusion. With the exception of Japan, no other country has succeeded in becoming a fully industrialized state without overthrowing capitalism. If you compare the fate of Brazil, Turkey, or Egypt—not to mention India—with that of Russia in the half century since the first world war, you can see precisely the striking difference between these two paths of development.

The second error in the classical Social Democratic view of the destinies of the underdeveloped countries is a mechanical and unrealistic evaluation of the decisive class forces *within* these societies. The Mensheviks, Kautsky, and Otto Bauer mechanically took the lessons of the great English and French revolutions—and in part the lessons of the German revolution of 1848—as applicable to the conditions of the third world.

Since extensive development of *capitalist* industry was thought necessary there in order to make the socialist revolution possible, the industrial bourgeoisie had to be helped to power. It was true, they argued, that, as Marx said, the bourgeoisie became more cowardly the farther east you went. But this meant only that the young proletariat in these countries had to *force* the capitalists to seize power by driving the revolution forward to the overthrow of absolutism, the semifeudal landlords, or foreign rule. The proletariat would be able to accomplish this overthrow by itself, but then it would have to hand the power to the bourgeoisie, because history offered no other solution.

This mechanistic view overlooked a decisive difference between the social and economic situation of France in 1789, or Germany in 1848, and the situation of Brazil or India today. At that time, the young industrial bourgeoisie still had literally a world

to conquer, that is, a capitalist world market to create. Today the national bourgeoisies of the third world find a world market already ruled and filled by big capital. This world market even severely restricts their "internal market." Consequently, they have no pressing reason, no pressing interest, in establishing industry.

The bourgeoisies of the third world countries know that they will get a far bigger return from capital invested in land and real estate, in the leasing of ground to small peasants, and even in speculating on international stock exchanges, than from capital expended in sickly industrial enterprises. Therefore most "native" capital flows toward those fields, where it converges with the greater part of the surplus product accumulated by the semifeudal landlords—when it is not squandered in pure luxury or deposited in Swiss banks.

For this reason the bourgeoisie of the third world is also opposed to any agrarian revolution. An occupation of the land by the peasants would expropriate not only foreign plantation owners and native oligarchs, but also a mass of manufacturers, merchants, banks, doctors, and rich peasants, who see precisely the purchase of land as their most important capital investment.

Often the so-called national bourgeoisie is prepared to accept measures against, and even partial expropriation of, plantation owners, as at present in Peru, for example. Often this same national bourgeoisie wants also to limit the property of the native aristocracy and large landlords, as happened with the so-called agrarian reform of the Indian Congress party in the 1950s.

*But all these internal quarrels within the ruling class are characterized by the fact that in the best of cases they permit only partial reforms proclaimed from above, never a general occupation of the land by the peasants, organized from below.*

We are now in position to understand the theoretical error of the Mensheviks, of Kautsky, and Otto Bauer: They attempted to apply to the countries of the third world in the imperialist epoch the outline of preimperialist Western economic, social, and

governmental development. In the age of imperialism it is simply *impossible* for countries like Brazil, Turkey, or Egypt to become a new Great Britain, a new Germany, or a new North America.

The choice for these countries is not: capitalist industrialization or "premature" socialist revolution. The choice is: continued stagnation in a state of underdevelopment determined by the world market and the domestic social structure—or a radical modernization and industrialization of the country by a socialist revolution.

Trotsky, in 1906, was the first to understand this dilemma. Around the idea, he constructed his theory of permanent revolution. This states that in the epoch of imperialism the classical tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the underdeveloped countries of the third world can be carried out only if the proletariat seizes power in alliance with the poor peasants and the political forces resting on them.

But while this underdevelopment, which cannot be overcome along the capitalist road in the age of imperialism, offered a great historic opportunity during the first half of this century, at the same time the opportunity had fateful results for socialism.

Because although the countries of the third world are riper for socialist revolution than the nations of the West, they are incomparably less ready for a socialist transformation of society. For Lenin as for Trotsky, the Russian revolution represented only the overture to a worldwide process of socialist revolution. But what if this international expansion of the revolution proceeds much more slowly than expected, and spreads primarily to other underdeveloped countries instead of to the highly industrialized lands? Then a historical and social dynamic arises that inevitably gives a contradictory, two-sided character to the transformation of the economies and societies in the countries where the revolution has triumphed. As a result, the classical model of socialism is profoundly distorted.

This in turn gives socialism, by world standards, a mask that is repellent to the developed industrial proletariat of the West: the mask of



a socialism of poverty, which prolongs the revolutionary process instead of hastening it.

Lenin recognized this situation in 1921 when he characterized Russia not as a workers state, but as a workers state with bureaucratic deformations. The last battle of his life was against this spreading hydra-like bureaucracy, which found its politically most consistent—even if for a long time unconscious—representative in the party fraction grouped around Stalin. The monopoly of power in the hands of this privileged bureaucracy naturally meant that the process of industrialization and growth was largely subordinated to its interests.

Even though the objective results of economic growth favor building a really socialist society in the long run, we are still a long way from this goal.

It is therefore correct to define these societies as Lenin did in the 1920s: *not* as socialist societies or systems—to say nothing of communist—but also of course not as capitalist. *Rather they are societies still in the historical transition period between capitalism and socialism.*

Are the conclusions that one must draw from this historical experience pessimistic from the standpoint of the immediate and objective opportunities for socialist revolutions in the countries of the third world? By no means. These conclusions can be summarized in four points:

● First: The spread of the process of permanent revolution to new underdeveloped countries and regions is inevitable. The ultimate impetus for this expansion comes neither from the Russian nor the Chinese nor the Cuban models—although these examples definitely play a role, at least in Asia and Latin America.

Still less can this impetus be attributed to so-called foreign agitators. On the contrary, it reflects the deep hopelessness of the poverty-stricken popular masses of these countries, the lack of any prospect of liberation from their terrible misery in the foreseeable future. That is, it reflects the deep structural crisis of the old societies of these countries.

So-called economic aid—which in the best of cases means fragmentary

industrialization and modernization of agriculture—far from relieving the misery of the masses, only increases it, because the inherent tendency of capitalism is to place the costs of development on the shoulders of the workers and poor peasants just as it does the costs of underdevelopment. The, in part, devastating social consequences of the Indian agrarian reform are a clear example of this. (Irrigation works where the peasants have to pay for the water.)

● Second: After a victorious socialist revolution, an underdeveloped country is faced with the problem of primitive accumulation of the means of production. This is solved most easily within the framework of a socialist world economy or an international economy based on victorious socialist revolutions in the more industrially advanced countries.

In the medium and long run, therefore, a socialist transformation of Western Europe is the most effective economic aid we can provide the peoples of the third world. Such a transformation would make it possible for these peoples to receive—as a gift from the proletariat of the West—the most important part of the equipment needed for primitive accumulation in modern industry, transport, infrastructure, and agriculture. And this would allow a rapid rise of the living standard in the developing countries.

The possibility of such disinterested aid would exist on the broadest scale. There is already today a huge potential accumulation fund that would be available to a socialist world—the \$120,000,000,000 to \$150,000,000,000 now wasted every year in military spending throughout the world. If the economic resources devoted to this sector produced tractors instead of tanks, machine tools instead of airplanes, automatic rolling mills instead of nuclear submarines, doctors and engineers instead of generals and admirals, the living standard of the West would not decline one bit. Only the use values of the goods produced with these resources would be changed.

● Third: When little or no foreign help is available, a victorious socialist revolution in an underdeveloped

country has the capacity to finance on its own an accelerated process of cumulative growth in the economy. Of course this process will be much slower and much less harmonious than it would be with generous foreign assistance.

● Fourth: Both the accumulation of the social surplus product and the so-called labor investment have limits that can be passed only at the cost of the deepest social disturbances—such as those in Russia at the beginning of the 1930s or in China in the final phase of the "great leap forward."

If these limits are not respected, then there is danger that investment will produce much less than expected; labor productivity may decline relatively, if not absolutely; and voluntary mobilization of labor can be transformed into forced labor, which is economically unproductive and incredibly costly in a political and social sense.

*In other words, the poorer a given country is, the greater the danger that the whole misery of Stalinism will be repeated.*

This risk can and must be avoided by the political leadership remaining closely tied to the liberated masses, as is still the case, for example, in Cuba today. If this is done, bureaucratization can be kept to a minimum until a link-up with successful revolution in the West provides the material basis for its complete disappearance.

*These four conclusions mean that it is possible for the peoples of the third world to prepare the way for socialist revolutions today. And even if this did not seem theoretically permissible to some of us, they would do it anyway. They have simply had enough of waiting for "favorable objective conditions" while their misery and stagnation continue.* □

#### Less Oil, Fewer Jobs in Trinidad

One-third of the Trinidad labor force under thirty-five years of age is unemployed.

The country's economic situation was hurt by a 14 percent decline in oil production in 1970. Some 80 percent of Trinidad's income derives from the petroleum industry.

# Polish Fascism and the Mistakes of the CP

By Leon Trotsky

[In July, 1926, Leon Trotsky was permitted by the Stalinist majority in the top leadership of the Communist International to speak for ten minutes at a special commission that had been set up to consider mistakes made by the Polish Communist party that facilitated Marshal Josef Pilsudski's seizure of power on May 12 of that year.

[The speech was not published at the time. However, Trotsky found a copy of the stenogram six years later and decided to publish it in the *Bulletin* of the Russian Left Opposition, where it appeared in No. 29 and No. 30.

[Trotsky, then living in exile in Prinkipo, wrote an introduction, explaining the circumstances in which the speech was made and adding some further considerations in the light of later events.

[The speech and the introduction are of special interest to revolutionists concerned about the danger of fascism and aware of the necessity to understand its real nature, the better to combat it. Particularly notable is Trotsky's evaluation of fascism in general, in distinction to particular varieties of it. His observations on Polish fascism should be considered in relation to his much more detailed study of the fascism that came to full flower in Germany.

[The translation from the Russian is by George Saunders.]

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## Introduction

In May 1926 Pilsudski carried out his coup in Poland. The nature of this rescue operation seemed so enigmatic to the leadership of the Communist party that, in the person of Warski and others, it called the proletariat out into the streets to support the marshal's uprising. Today this fact seems quite incredible. But it went to the very root of Comintern policy at that time. The struggle for the peasantry had been converted by the epigones into the policy of dissolving the proletariat into the petty bourgeoisie. In China the Communist party entered the Kuomintang and humbly submitted to its discipline. For all the countries of the East, Stalin put up the slogan "the worker-peasant party." In the Soviet Union the struggle against the "superindustrializers" (the left opposition) was being waged in the name of preserving good relations with the kulak. In the leading circles of the Russian party, there was rather open discussion on the question whether the time had not come to return from the proletarian dictatorship to the formula of 1905: "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Condemned

by the whole course of development and discarded once for all by Lenin in 1917, this formula was converted by the epigones into the highest criterion. From the angle of the "democratic dictatorship," Kostrzewa reevaluated the legacy of Rosa Luxemburg. Warski, after a certain period of vacillation, began to step to the tune of Manuilski's commands with redoubled diligence. It was in such circumstances that Pilsudski's coup broke out. The Central Committee of the Polish party had a deadly fear of showing any "underestimation of the peasantry." They had learned the lessons of the struggle against "Trotskyism" well, Lord knows! The Marxists of the Central Committee summoned the workers to support the almost "democratic dictatorship" of the reactionary martinet.

Pilsudski's practice very quickly brought corrections into the theory of the epigones. As early as the beginning of July the Comintern had to concern itself, in Moscow, with a review of the "mistake" of the Polish party. Warski gave the report in the special commission, under the point on information and "self-criticism": he had already been promised complete exoneration—on condition that he voluntarily assume the full responsibility for what had been done, thus shielding the Moscow chiefs! Warski did what he could. However, while confessing his "error" and promising to correct himself, he proved completely incapable of bringing out the matters of principle at the root of his misfortunes. The debate as a whole had an extremely chaotic, confused, and to a certain degree, dishonest character. The whole purpose after all was to wash the coat without getting the cloth wet.

Within the limits of the ten minutes allowed me, I tried to give an evaluation of the Pilsudski coup in connection with the historical function of fascism, and thereby reveal the roots of the "error" of the Polish party leadership. The proceedings of the commission were not published. This did not, of course, prevent a polemic being developed in all languages against my unpublished speech. The reverberations of this polemic have not died down to this day. Having found the stenogram of my speech in the archives, I came to the conclusion that its publication—especially in the light of the current events in Germany—might prove to be of some political interest even today. Political tendencies should be tested at various stages of historical development—only in that way can their real content and the degree of their internal consistency be properly evaluated.

Naturally, in the case of a speech given six years ago in a special commission, within a ten-minute time limit, you cannot expect of it more than it contains. If these lines reach the Polish comrades, for whom they are indeed intended, they, as more fully informed readers, will

be able themselves to fill out whatever I have stated incompletely and to correct whatever is not accurate.

Pilsudski's coup is appraised in my speech as a "preventive" (precautionary) one. This characterization may be supported in a certain sense even today. Precisely because the revolutionary situation in Poland did not reach the same maturity as those in Italy in 1920 and, later, in Germany in 1923 and 1931-32, fascist reaction in Poland did not attain such depth and intensity. This explains why Pilsudski, over a period of six years, has still not carried his work to completion.

In connection with the "preventive" character of the coup, the speech expressed the hope that Pilsudski's reign would not be as protracted as that of Mussolini's. Unfortunately, both have been more protracted than any of us hoped in 1926. The cause of this lies not only in the objective circumstances but also in the policies of the Comintern. The basic defects in those policies, as the reader will see, are indicated in the speech—to be sure, in a very cautious manner: it must be recalled that I had to speak as a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party, under discipline.

One cannot deny that the initial role of the PPS [Polish Socialist party] in regard to Pilsudskism rendered rather spectacular support to the theory of "social fascism." Later years, however, brought the necessary corrections here, too, bringing out the contradiction between the democratic and the fascist agencies of the bourgeoisie. Whoever regards this contradiction as absolute will inevitably turn onto the path of opportunism. Whoever ignores this contradiction will be doomed to ultraleft capriciousness and revolutionary impotence. Whoever still requires proof of this, need only cast his gaze toward Germany.

L. Trotsky  
Prinkipo  
Aug. 4, 1932.

## On the Polish Question

I wish to take up just two questions of general significance, which have been raised repeatedly in the discussion, both at yesterday's session and today's.

The first question is, What is Pilsudskism and how is it connected with fascism?

The second question is, What are the roots of the mistake made by the Central Committee of the Polish Communist party? By "roots" I have in mind not matters relating to individuals or groups, but objective ones, built into the conditions of the epoch; but I do not thereby minimize the responsibility of individuals in any way.

The first question: Pilsudskism and fascism.

These two currents undoubtedly have features in common: their shock troops are recruited, above all, among the petty bourgeoisie; both Pilsudski and Mussolini operated by extraparliamentary, nakedly violent means, by the methods of civil war; both of them aimed not at overthrowing bourgeois society, but at saving it. Having raised the petty bourgeois masses to their feet, they both clashed openly with the big bourgeoisie after coming to

power. Here a historical generalization involuntarily comes to mind: one is forced to recall Marx's definition of Jacobinism as a plebeian means of dealing with the feudal enemies of the bourgeoisie. That was in the epoch of the *rise* of the bourgeoisie. It must be said that now, in the epoch of the *decline* of bourgeois society, the bourgeoisie once again has need of a "plebeian" means of solving its problems—which are no longer progressive but, rather, thoroughly reactionary. In this sense, then, fascism contains a reactionary caricature of Jacobinism.

When it was on the rise, the bourgeoisie could not establish a basis for its growth and predominance within the confines of the feudal-bureaucratic state. There was need for the Jacobin way of dealing with the old society, in order to ensure the flowering of the new, bourgeois society. The bourgeoisie in decline is incapable of maintaining itself in power with the methods and means of its own creation—the parliamentary state. It needs fascism as a weapon of self-defense, at least at the most critical moments. The bourgeoisie does not like the "plebeian" means of solving its problems. It had an extremely hostile attitude toward Jacobinism, which cleared a path in blood for the development of bourgeois society. The fascists are immeasurably closer to the bourgeoisie in decline than the Jacobins were to the bourgeoisie on the rise. But the established bourgeoisie does not like the fascist means of solving its problems either, for the shocks and disturbances, although in the interests of bourgeois society, involve dangers for it as well. This is the source of the antagonism between fascism and the traditional parties of the bourgeoisie.

It is beyond dispute that Pilsudskism, in its roots, in its impulses, and in the slogans it raises, is a petty-bourgeois movement. That Pilsudski knew beforehand what path he would follow may well be doubted. It is not as though he were particularly brainy. His actions bear the stamp of mediocrity. (Walecki: You're mistaken!) But my aim is not to characterize Pilsudski in any way; I don't know, perhaps he did see somewhat farther ahead than others. At any rate, even if he did not know what he wanted to do, he certainly—to all appearances—knew rather well what he wanted to avoid, which was, above all, a revolutionary movement of the working masses. Whatever he did not understand, others thought through for him, perhaps even the English ambassador. At any rate, Pilsudski quickly found common ground with big capital, despite the fact that in its roots, impulses, and slogans the movement he headed was petty bourgeois, a "plebeian" means of solving the pressing problems of capitalist society in process of decline and destruction. Here there is a direct parallel with Italian fascism.

It was said here (by Warski) that parliamentary democracy is the arena upon which the petty bourgeoisie performs most brilliantly. Not always, however, and not under all conditions. It may also lose its brilliance, fade, and show its weakness more and more. And since the big bourgeoisie itself is at a dead end, the parliamentary arena becomes a mirror of the situation of impasse and decline of bourgeois society as a whole. The petty bourgeoisie, which attributed such importance to parliamen-

tarism, itself begins to feel it as a burden and to seek a way out upon extraparliamentary paths. In its basic impulse Pilsudskism is an attempt at an extraparliamentary solution of the problems of the petty bourgeoisie. But in this very fact lies the inevitability of capitulation to the big bourgeoisie. For if in parliament the petty bourgeoisie shows its impotence before landlord, capitalist, and banker in one instance after another; on a "retail" basis, then, in the attempt at an extraparliamentary solution of its problems, at the moment when it snatches up power, its social impotence is revealed wholesale and altogether. At first one gets the impression that the petty bourgeoisie with sword in hand is turning upon the bourgeois regime, but its revolt ends with it handing over to the big bourgeoisie, through its own chiefs, the power it had seized by traveling the road of bloodshed. That is precisely what happened in Poland. And that the Central Committee did not understand.

The big bourgeoisie dislikes this method, much as a man with a swollen jaw dislikes having his teeth pulled. The respectable circles of bourgeois society viewed with hatred the services of the dentist Pilsudski, but in the end they gave in to the inevitable, to be sure, with threats of resistance and much haggling and wrangling over the price. And lo, the petty bourgeoisie's idol of yesterday has been transformed into the gendarme of capital! The cinematic tempo of the course of events is surprising, the appallingly rapid transition from outwardly "revolutionary" slogans and techniques to a counterrevolutionary policy of protecting the property holders from the onslaught of the workers and peasants. But the evolution of Pilsudskism is wholly according to law. As for the tempo, that is the result of a civil war that has skipped stages and thus reduced the time requirements.

Is Pilsudskism "left fascism" or is it "nonleft"? I do not think this distinction has anything to offer. The "leftism" in fascism flows from the necessity to arouse and nourish the illusions of the enraged petty proprietor. In various countries, under various conditions, this is done in different ways, with the use of different doses of "leftism." But in essence Pilsudskism, like fascism in general, performs a counterrevolutionary role. This is an antiparliamentary and, above all, antiproletarian counterrevolution, with whose help the declining bourgeoisie attempts—and not without success, at least for a time—to protect and preserve its fundamental positions.

I have called fascism a caricature of Jacobinism. Fascism is related to Jacobinism in the same way that modern capitalism, which is destroying the productive forces and lowering the cultural level of society, relates to youthful capitalism which increased the power of mankind in all spheres. Of course, the comparison of fascism and Jacobinism, like any broad historical analogy in general, is legitimate only within certain limits and from a certain point of view. The attempt to stretch this analogy beyond its justified limits would carry the danger of false conclusions. But within limits it does explain something. The summits of bourgeois society were not able to clear society of feudalism. For this it was necessary to mobilize the interests, passions, and illusions of the petty

bourgeoisie. The latter carried out this work in struggle against the summits of bourgeois society, although in the last analysis it served none other than them. Likewise, the fascists mobilize petty-bourgeois public opinion and their own armed units in struggle or partial struggle with the ruling circles and the official state apparatus. The more threatening the immediate revolutionary danger is to bourgeois society, or the sharper the disillusionment of the petty bourgeoisie, temporarily hoping for revolution, the easier it is for fascism to carry out its mobilization.

In Poland the conditions for this mobilization were unique and complex; they were created by the economic and political impasse, the dim prospects for revolution, and the "Muscovite" danger connected with this. One of the Polish comrades here—I think it was Leszczynski—expressed himself to the effect that the *real* fascists were hiding not in the camp of Pilsudski but in the camp of the National Democrats, i.e., the big capitalist party, which has at its disposal chauvinist bands that have carried out pogroms more than once. Is this the case? The auxiliary bands of the National Democrats would suffice, so to speak, only for everyday affairs. But to arouse the broad masses of the nation to strike a blow against parliamentarism, democracy, and above all the proletariat—and to weld the state power into a military fist—for that the party of the capitalists and landlords would not suffice. In order to mobilize the petty bourgeoisie of the city and countryside, as well as the backward section of the workers, it is necessary to have in one's hands such political resources as the traditions of petty-bourgeois socialism and the revolutionary national-liberation struggle. The National Democrats had not even a trace of this. That is why the mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie of Poland could only have been accomplished by Marshal Pilsudski—with the PPS in tow for a certain period. But having won power, the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of wielding it independently. It is forced either to let go of it under the pressure of the proletariat or, if the latter does not have the strength to seize it, to hand power over to the big bourgeoisie, but no longer in the previous dispersed, but in the new concentrated form. The deeper had been the illusions of petty-bourgeois socialism and patriotism in Poland and the more impetuously they had been mobilized in conditions of economic and parliamentary impasse, the more brazenly, cynically, and "suddenly" would the victorious chief of this movement fall down on his knees before the big bourgeoisie with the request that they "crown" him. This is the key to the cinematic tempo of the Polish events.

The big and lasting success of Mussolini turned out to be possible only because the revolution of September 1920, having shaken loose all the buttresses and braces of bourgeois society, was not carried through to the end. On the basis of the ebb of the revolution, the disappointment of the petty bourgeoisie, and the exhaustion of the workers, Mussolini drew up, and put into practice, his plan.

In Poland matters did not get that far. The impasse of the regime was at hand, but a direct revolutionary

situation, in the sense of the readiness of the masses to go into combat, did not yet exist. A revolutionary situation was only on the way. Pilsudski's coup, like all of his "fascism," appears then as a preventive, i.e., precautionary, counterrevolution. That is why it seems to me that Pilsudski's regime has less chance of a lengthy existence than does Italian fascism. Mussolini took advantage of a revolution already broken from within, with the inevitable decline in activity among the proletariat thereafter. Pilsudski, on the other hand, intercepted an oncoming revolution, raised himself to a certain degree with its fresh yeast, and cynically deceived the masses following him. This provides ground for hope that Pilsudskism will be an episode on the wave of revolutionary upsurge, not decline.

The second question that I would like to take up has to do with the objective roots of the error committed by the leaders of the Polish party. Undoubtedly the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie, with its hopes and illusions, was very strong in the days of the May coup. This explains why the party at that stage was unable to win the masses and guide the whole movement onto a truly revolutionary path. But this in no way excuses the leadership of the party, which meekly submitted to the petty-bourgeois chaos, floating upon it without rudder or sails. As for the basic causes of the mistake, they are rooted in the character of our epoch, which we call revolutionary but which we have not gotten to know by a long shot in all its sharp twists and turns—and without this knowledge it is impossible to master each particular concrete situation. Our period differs from the prewar period the way a crisis-filled, explosive period differs from one that is organic, developing in comparative regularity. In the prewar period, we had in Europe the growth of the productive forces, a sharpening class differentiation, the growth of imperialism at one pole and the growth of Social Democracy at the other. The conquest of power by the proletariat was pictured as the inevitable but distant crowning of this process. More precisely, for the opportunists and centrists of Social Democracy the social revolution was a phrase without content; for the left wing of European Social Democracy it was a distant goal for which it was necessary to prepare gradually and systematically. The war cut short this epoch, thoroughly revealing its contradictions; and with the war began a new epoch. One can no longer speak of the regular growth of the productive forces, the steady growth in numbers of the industrial proletariat, and so on. In the economy there is either stagnation or decline. Unemployment has become chronic. If we take the fluctuations in the economic cycle of the European countries, or the changes in the political situation, and put them on paper in the form of a graph, we get not a regularly rising curve with periodic fluctuations but a feverish curve with frantic zigzags up and down. The economic cycle changes abruptly within the framework of an essentially constant fixed capital. The political cycle changes abruptly in the grip of the economic impasse. The petty-bourgeois masses, involving wide circles of workers as well, charge now to the right, now to the left.

Here we can no longer speak of the organic process of development unceasingly strengthening the proletariat as a productive class and, thereby, its revolutionary party. The interrelations between party and class are subject, under current conditions, to much sharper fluctuations than before. The tactics of the party, while preserving their principled basis, are endowed—and should be endowed!—with a far more *maneuverable* and *creative* character, foreign to any routinism whatsoever. In these tactics sharp and daring turns are inevitable, depending above all on whether we are entering a zone of revolutionary upsurge or, on the contrary, a rapid downturn. The whole of our epoch consists of such distinctly marked off sections of the curve, some rising, some falling. These steep, sometimes sudden, changes must be caught in time. The difference between the role of the Central Committee of a Social Democratic party in prewar conditions and that of the Central Committee of a Communist party in current conditions is to a certain degree like the difference between a general staff, which organizes and trains military forces, and a field headquarters, which is called upon to lead those forces under battle conditions (although there may indeed be long pauses between battles).

The struggle for the masses remains, of course, the basic task, but the conditions of this struggle are different now. Any turn in the domestic or international situation may, at the very next step, transform the struggle for the masses into a direct struggle for power. Today you cannot measure strategy by decades. In the course of a year, or two, or three, the whole situation in a country changes radically. This we have seen especially clearly in the case of Germany. After the attempt to summon up a revolution in the absence of the necessary preconditions (March 1921), we observe in the German party a strong rightward deviation (Brandlerism), and this deviation is subsequently wrecked on the sharp leftward shift in the whole situation (1923). In place of the opportunist deviation comes an ultraleft one, whose ascendancy coincides, however, with the ebb of the revolution; out of this contradiction between conditions and policies grow mistakes that weaken the revolutionary movement still further. The result is a kind of division of labor between rightist and ultraleftist groupings according to which each one, at a sharp upward or downward turn of the political curve, suffers defeat and gives way to the rival grouping. At the same time, the method now in practice—of changing the leadership with every shift in the situation—gives the leading cadre no chance to acquire a broader experience that would include both rise and fall, both ebb and flow. And without this generalizing, synthesized understanding of the character of our epoch of rapid shifts and abrupt turns, a truly Bolshevik leadership cannot be educated. That is why, in spite of the profoundly revolutionary character of the epoch, the party and its leadership have not succeeded in rising to the heights of the demands that the situation has placed before them.

Pilsudski's regime in Poland will be a regime of fascist struggle for stabilization, which means an extreme sharpening of the class struggle. Stabilization is not a condition

granted to society from without, but a problem for bourgeois politics. This problem is no sooner partly settled than it erupts again. The fascist struggle for stabilization will arouse the resistance of the proletariat. On the soil of mass disillusionment in Pilsudski's coup a favorable situation for our party will be created, on the condition,

of course, that the leadership is not one-sidedly adapted to a temporary rise or temporary decline in the political curve, but embraces the basic line of development as a whole. To the fascist struggle for stabilization must be counterposed, above all, the internal stabilization of the Communist party. Then victory will be assured! □

## Yes, and Yes Again, Says Wohlforth

# Are New York's Cops 'Workers'?

By Allen Myers

The national secretary of the Workers League (the American cothinkers of the ultraleft Socialist Labour League led by Gerry Healy in England) has confirmed that, as far as the U. S. Healyites are concerned, cops are just one more group of exploited workers.

In the February 15 issue of the organization's newspaper the *Bulletin*, Tim Wohlforth defended the cops and attacked Black nationalism—an indication of the priorities of the Workers League. As though to emphasize his confusion, Wohlforth entitled his article "In Defense of the Working Class."

To be sure, Wohlforth proclaimed it a "slander" to suggest, as I did in the February 8 *Intercontinental Press*, that the Workers League sees cops as class "brothers." Unfortunately, Wohlforth devoted his article to contradicting his own assertion.

"Are we to see only the side of police as the repressive arm of the state but at the same time not understand that the police are also employees of that state?" Wohlforth asked.

Being an employee of the state, however, does not automatically convert a person into a "worker." The CIA agents in Laos are also employees of the state. If they were to demand more money for their dirty work, would Wohlforth thereupon proclaim them to be workers and offer them the *Bulletin's* editorial support?

It is necessary to look beyond the fact that cops are listed by the capitalist state as "employees" and see their role in class society. Wohlforth attempted to do this—and failed:

"No, they [police] are not the same as other workers because it is their job to repress other workers."

Very simple, you see: some work-



—Laura Gray

Employee of the state.

ers produce steel, some workers wait on tables or teach children, and some workers repress other workers. It's all just part of the social division of labor.

"But," he continued, "under certain conditions those whom the bourgeoisie relies upon to suppress the working class themselves go out in strike against the bourgeoisie. Such an act does not change their fundamental nature as the repressive arm of the state. However, it does definitely create problems for the bourgeoisie."

Wohlforth, who likes to boast of his appreciation of "dialectics," provides us here with reasoning that can only be rated as sophistry. Cops are workers because when they demand more money and greater latitude in suppressing workers, they "create

problems for the bourgeoisie"!

One wonders what Wohlforth's analysis of the recent oil-price negotiations must be. Is the shah of Iran a "worker" because his demand for a bigger share of the loot created "problems for the bourgeoisie"?

"If our stand is with the working class," Wohlforth went on, "then we can only be happy to see the repressive arm of our enemy in struggle against our enemy."

In the first place, Wohlforth here completely falsified the character of the New York cops' strike. These mercenaries were in no way rejecting their role as agents of repression against the working class. Their "struggle" was not "against our enemy" but against the working class: They were demanding greater freedom in carrying out their repressive assignment and more money for doing it.

Secondly, what makes Wohlforth "happy" is beside the point; the question is whether a demand by the cops for more money transforms them into part of the working-class movement. Wohlforth, unfortunately, answers yes:

"The significance of all this [a recapitulation of the 1919 strike by Boston cops] is the importance of placing the recent New York police strike within the framework of the general movement of the working class and at the same time seeking to understand what underlies this movement of the class."

The Healyite theoretician even defended in his own way the extravagant contention of an earlier *Bulletin* article that the action by the cops had brought New York City to "the verge of civil war":

"Yes, Mr. Myers, we have entered

## A New Aspect of Australia's History

By Myfanwy Tudor

*A New Britannia* by Humphrey McQueen. Penguin Books Australia Ltd., Ringwood, Victoria. 261 pp. \$A1.50. 1970.

Billed on the jacket as "a hard hitting manifesto for the New Left," Humphrey McQueen's *A New Britannia* is rather a series of healthy swipes at traditional concepts of the Australian character. McQueen, who has spent most of his political life within and beyond the left wing of the Australian Labor party [ALP], and who is now working as a tutor at the Australian National University in Canberra, musters all the evidence he can to show that the ALP has since its birth been imbued with racism, imperialism and similar elements of Australian bourgeois ideology. He concludes that the ALP is "the highest expression of a peculiarly Australian petit-bourgeoisie" and that it can never really challenge that society.

He looks outside the ALP for the real forces to make a revolution in Australia, but never specifies their actual identity, nor how they are to organize to accomplish this historic task. While it may be true that the leadership and ideology of the ALP are predominantly petty bourgeois, McQueen doesn't face up to the reality that the base of the party is proletarian.

In spite of these flaws, McQueen's book presents a whole new aspect of Australia's history. He stops at nothing in his debunking of the Australian legend of mateship and egalitarianism, toppling not only its heroes but also its purveyors, the historians. Of those historians claiming to be Marxists (most of them, incidentally, former adherents of Australian Stalinism) he says:

"In essence they picture radicalism, and with it socialism, as chances gone for ever. There is nothing to look forward to except king-making and wire-pulling the A. L. P."

Perhaps the theme that emerges most clearly from this book is the racism that pervaded nineteenth-century Aus-

tralia and that still exists today. He reveals the chauvinism generally overlooked in the literature and songs, as well as politics, of the time. The well-known poet Henry Lawson, who is generally considered to have been a socialist and whose birth centenary was recently celebrated by the Australian Communist party, is shown here in a somewhat different light.

McQueen holds that Lawson's verse reveals "fascist" characteristics — an organic concept of the nation, idealization of manly virtues, hostilities to finance capitalism, elitist notion of leadership, racism (including anti-Semitism), and militarism. McQueen concludes his chapter entitled "Poets" with the words: "But if these [characteristics] demand a reinterpretation of Lawson, how much more do they demand a reappraisal of the Australia that Lawson has so long epitomized?"

Fascism, however, is considerably more than a reactionary ideology, and McQueen's misuse of the term detracts from his evaluation.

Ned Kelly and the other bushrangers, commonly regarded as heroes who robbed from the rich and gave to the poor, do not escape McQueen's scalpel.

They are shown as ". . . no more, and often a good deal less, than louts of the contemporary bikie [motorcycle hoodlums] variety. They roamed the countryside terrorizing small farmers and stealing their poultry. As such they were thoroughly detested by ordinary people who had more immediate tasks to perform than writing ballads in praise of the hoodlums who added appreciably to the difficulties they experienced in an alien environment."

One of the most serious defects of *A New Britannia*, and one that McQueen acknowledges in his introduction, is that he leaves out of his account both women and the Aboriginal people. The admission does not alter the inadequacy!

This book, a pioneering effort, will have to be expanded by further re-

into a period when troops can face strikers, when a general strike could take place, when two arms of the repressive state itself could shoot it out."

Wohlforth's methodology is instructive. He carefully avoided the *Bulletin's* original claim that a cops' strike in New York City in January 1971 nearly touched off civil war. Instead, we are given two deliberately vague generalities: "troops can face strikers" (which strikers?) and "a general strike could take place" (called by the cops?).

These abstract strikers then become a springboard for a dive into civil war mounted by the cops against the ruling class. I expect Wohlforth will tell us that this is getting away from "impressionism" and engaging in "dialectical" leaps.

Wohlforth continued:

"The significance of the police strike is broader than the police itself, for like the growing insurrectionary situation in the army, it signifies that we are now entering on an international scale a period which Prime Minister Heath has characterized as 'one not of wars between nations but civil war.' And furthermore, that the United States will not be exempt from such struggle but the deepest, most violent battles of all can break out here, and soon."

It may come as a shock to Wohlforth, but the fact that the laws of the class struggle apply to the United States was discovered neither by the New York cops, by Edward Heath, nor by Tim Wohlforth. The contribution on the subject by the U. S. Healyite theoreticians is confined to the hypothesis that in the class struggle, which in an acute stage reaches the point of civil war, the cops can be allies of the working class, brothers in the labor movement, and even workers themselves.

Wohlforth neglected to answer directly the question whether the Workers League now plans to conduct a recruiting drive among police "proletarians" and similar "workers" such as FBI agents. But his one allusion to the question is far from reassuring:

"We for one [sic] . . . enjoyed thoroughly the strike of the police and wished only it had been 100% effective instead of 85% effective and was permanent rather than for a few days. In answer to Myers we would be even happier if the FBI went on strike."

It sounds as though Wohlforth is ready to roll out the welcome mat. □



search and analysis to unearth the reality from the myth that has been

accepted for so many years. But *A New Britannia* is a necessary begin-

ning for all who want to know anything of Australian society. □

## Documents

# Tupamaros State Why They Support Popular Front

[The following statement by the Tupamaros, declaring their attitude toward formation of a "broad front" in Uruguay, has been translated by *Intercontinental Press*. The statement was issued in December while the question was under discussion by leftist groupings and labor organizations throughout the country.

[As reported elsewhere in this issue of *IP*, the "Frente Amplio" held its first formal meeting on February 5.]

\* \* \*

1. During these last three years the dictatorship of the oligarchs has banned newspapers and political parties; cut the wages of the workers drastically; imprisoned thousands of Uruguayans in jails and stockades; beaten and murdered students and workers with impunity; established torture as a regular and normal procedure; censored publications, concerts, and quotations from Artigas.\* It has forbidden songs and the use of certain words.

The dictatorship has persecuted education and all forms of culture. It has overridden the parliament, the constitution, and individual and collective rights. It has sold the country to foreigners for a miserable price. It has closed down union headquarters and in practice banned trade-union activity.

All this it has done in the name of law and order, its law and order, the law and order that establishes privileges for the landlords, the banks, and big business. It is this "law and order" that is served by the repressive forces, the mercenaries of the oligarchy.

Every time a strike for modest social reforms or for higher wages has impinged on this "law and order" of

the privileged, the response of the oligarchy has been the same—repression. To the violence of the regime, the students and workers have responded with their own violence, in their mass mobilizations, street confrontations, and factory occupations—the violence of the armed apparatus of the MLN [Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (Tupamaros)]. And this radicalization of the class struggle came about when the workers were only demanding modest increases in their tiny incomes.

What will happen when the people propose to change the structures of the country, seize the land from the landlords, destroy the monopoly capitalists in banking, industry, and commerce? What will happen when the people propose to eradicate this stratum and not just reduce their ill-gotten profits? What will happen when the people propose to replace the government of the oppressors with a government of the oppressed? What will happen when the people want to take power and not just pressure the government? Will this oligarchy which jails, tortures and kills anyone who threatens its profits give up its land and its banks without a fight? No. The oppressed can win power only through armed struggle.

2. Consequently, we do not honestly believe that we can achieve a revolution in Uruguay today by means of elections. It is incorrect to transpose the experiences of other countries.

In Uruguay today, radio, television, and 90 percent of the press are in the hands of the capitalists. All of the press, moreover, is censored. The government decides what can and cannot be reported.

The oligarchs have the gigantic economic means needed to finance costly election campaigns. From their powerful positions in the government, they can decide the fate of thousands of applicants for pensions and a myriad

of public jobs. With their law on slogans, they make a joke of the popular will. All this makes it impossible to talk about freedom of speech and the right to vote.

3. The present rulers have had no scruples about beating and killing men of the people. They have violated the constitution hundreds of times. They jailed more than 5,000 workers in a single year because these workers exercised their rights. Such rulers are not going to passively turn the government over to the same workers if they win an election.

The dictatorship is prepared to grant elections in order to revitalize a discredited regime. It will even accept a changing of the guard between alternating oligarchs. But we doubt that it will go to the point of turning the government over to those it recently jailed and tortured.

4. The Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (Tupamaros) considers the forging of a common front of such important forces to be positive. It regrets, however, that this closing of ranks came specifically for the elections and not before.

From the time struggles were repressed, fighters were fired from their jobs, imprisoned, and tortured; from the time our beloved comrades were murdered for seeking the same social justice, we should have joined in a common front against the common enemy.

All of these fighters were shot by the same police and suffered in the same jails. Today they suffer the same hunger. And their righteous rebellion against the regime was the same. But, although the struggle is more intense than ever, unfortunately there have been ideological differences and our ranks have been disunited in the face of the enemy.

Today, many left and progressive forces seem to have overcome these differences, or some of them, and they have joined together. Although this

\* Jose Gervasio Artigas (1764-1850), the hero of Uruguayan independence. —*IP*

front does not yet constitute total unity of the popular forces, it is already giving the reactionaries a new cause for worry.

5. We maintain our differences with the organizations composing the front over methods and over the tactical assessment of the front's immediate objective—the elections.

Nonetheless, we are willing to offer our support to the Frente Amplio [broad front].

The fact that the front's immediate objective is to participate in the elections does not cause us to forget that it represents an important attempt to unite the contingents struggling against the oligarchy and foreign capital.

In the coming months and after the elections, this front can constitute a force capable of mobilizing an important section of the workers. It can be a powerful instrument for mobilizing the people, for struggle for a national and popular program; for winning the release of political and trade-union prisoners, reinstatement of fired militants, and complete abrogation of the security measures and decrees issued under cover of them.

In offering our support to the Frente Amplio, then, we do so with the understanding that its principal task must be to mobilize the toiling masses and that its work in this regard will not begin and end with the elections.

6. To solve the problems of the country: The land must be in the service of society and not a handful of privileged individuals. It must produce the riches that it ought to produce and this wealth must go to serve the

needs of the people. The land must serve the most unfortunate, as Artigas wished more than 150 years ago.

Monopoly capital must be eliminated from banking, industry, and commerce, and these key sectors of the economy put in the service of the workers and the people. The shameful ties that bind us to foreign exploitation must be broken and we must develop a patriotic and truly independent foreign policy. The right of all to culture, to housing, to health, and work must be assured, as is possible if investment in these areas were made of all the wealth that now flows out of the country or into luxuries, speculation, and unproductive activities. All of the money swindled in the big political and economic conspiracies must be returned to the people and the conspirators punished. The workers must be able to play the role in

reality that belongs to them by law in determining their own destiny and that of the country.

The clandestine, armed struggle of the Tupamaros goes on. In the name of those who have fallen in the struggle, in the name of the imprisoned, of the tortured and humiliated, of the exploited, the underprivileged, the outcasts in their own land, those who build the country but do not own it, the landless, the unemployed, those who have nothing to lose and everything to win, we say:

*"Unless the country belongs to all, no one will have it."*

*Freedom or Death.*

Signed: Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (Tupamaros).

December, 1970.

## Iran

## Shah Makes Threat to 'Crush' Students

The shah of Iran, in a February 4 meeting with students and professors from Teheran University, threatened to "crush" all students who, in his words, "are trying to betray the cause of the fatherland." The shah has made it clear in the past that the "cause of the fatherland" as far as Iranian courts are concerned is synonymous with support for his own dictatorship.

An Agence France-Presse dispatch

from Teheran in the February 7-8 Paris daily *Le Monde* said the shah "warned the university youth . . . against 'those in your ranks who are serving foreign interests.'"

"The security services are doing their duty," the shah was quoted as saying, "but you also have to remain vigilant wherever the interests of the country are concerned."

He assured the students that he only intended to "crush" one percent of their number, inasmuch as he was "convinced that 99 percent of the students are true Iranians and patriots."

## Super Spies

"General J. N. Chaudhri, former chief of staff, and later Indian High Commissioner at Ottawa, had a dig at [military] intelligence the other day. Speaking in New Delhi he remarked that on the eve of the 1961 operations against Goa, the army inquired if the Portuguese had any tanks or armoured cars. Quickly came a packet of photographs, taken at considerable personal risk. The photographs were genuine and, sure enough, tanks were there—all on reinforced concrete pillars. Intelligence had spotted water tanks in Goa." — *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 23, 1971.

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