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
Vol. 9, No. 5

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February 8, 1971

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# Like Vietnam in 1965



## Escalation

## in Laos,

## Cambodia

ROGERS: Protective reaction . . . bombing anywhere needed . . . to protect withdrawal next year . . . just like Nixon said. See page 99.

## Hugo Blanco on Tupamaros, Peru, Sino-Soviet Rift

# Hong Kong's 'Rudi Dutschke Case'

The decision of British Home Secretary to expel German socialist Rudi Dutschke has already found its echo in Britain's colonial administration. The weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review*, published in Hong Kong, reported in its January 16 issue that that colony now had "its own Rudi Dutschke case."

The victim this time was Dietmar Albrecht, a German student and a former worker for the Freie Demokratische Partei [Free Democratic party], the liberal junior partner in West Germany's governing coalition. Albrecht and his wife were expelled from Hong Kong, apparently because he had signed a petition protesting the government's failure to extend another student's visa.

The colonial administration of Hong Kong has been more consistent in launching a witch-hunt than Maudling has yet dared to be. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* noted:

"... Albrecht's ouster was preceded by the refusal of visa extensions to several other foreign academics. Out have gone German lecturer Klaus Schleusner, Swedish language student Lars Ellstrom, and American student Mitchell Meisner. All three were marked men after they took part in an anti-Vietnam war demonstration outside Pan-Am's local office last March.

"Others who have been involved in peaceful anti-Vietnam protests outside the US consulate or have been indiscreet enough to lend their names to petitions to the government do not feel safe. A young American missionary active in the labour field—and outspokenly critical of working conditions here—has been warned unofficially that his time is nearly up." □

## Please Note

### Our New Address

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July, not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors,

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Post Office Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Because of continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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# Nixon Escalates War in Laos, Cambodia

After hearing Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee January 27, Senator Stuart Symington told reporters: "I can shut my eyes and look back five years. It's the same optimistic briefing I got in Saigon in 1965."

Symington himself was probably being too optimistic. In some ways, Nixon's escalation of the war in Cambodia and Laos already had gone beyond conditions in South Vietnam in 1965.

On January 29, Secretary of State William Rogers hinted strongly that the administration was preparing to launch an invasion of Laos with troops of the puppet regime in Saigon. Such an assault was expected to be backed with close combat support by U. S. planes, in the manner of the nine-day battle for Highway 4 in Cambodia. [See the February 1 *Intercontinental Press*, page 75.] Terence Smith described Rogers' remarks in the January 30 *New York Times*:

"He specifically expressed concern about a large build-up of North Vietnamese forces and supplies in the panhandle area of southern Laos, just across the border from northwestern South Vietnam.

"Asked whether he would rule out a South Vietnamese strike backed up by American aircraft in that area soon, Mr. Rogers paused and replied:

"We do not rule out the use of air power to support Asians in any effort they make to fight the common enemy. There is one enemy: it is North Vietnam."

Craig R. Whitney reported in the same issue that U. S. planes were already conducting "one of the most intense aerial campaigns of the Indochina war." This campaign included "direct combat-support missions in Laos for the Laotian forces."

Whitney also quoted South Vietnamese sources as saying that "small-unit operations involving South Vietnamese forces have been conducted on the ground against the trail network in Laos, with ground troops being lifted in and out of key points along it."

The January 31 *New York Times* gave further evidence that an invasion of Laos was being prepared — or already under way:

"... regularly available seats on military aircraft going to the northern regions of South Vietnam could not be booked from Saigon. Military sources in Saigon said normally scheduled troop and cargo flights had been pre-empted by what was described as 'higher priority traffic.'

"In London, The Observer said allied authorities had imposed a news blackout on military activities in South Vietnam's northern area. . . The newspaper said in an article written by its diplomatic staff that the embargo on news from the area was linked to speculation 'that South Vietnamese ground troops had invaded Laos.'"

The same article reported that the Nixon administration was willing to rule out an invasion—for a period of one day:

"... sources at the State Department and the Pentagon said there was no unusual activity this weekend and suggested that if there was a major new operation in Indochina it would not come today and possibly [!] not tomorrow either."



"Oh, the cartridge-belt look is the latest thing among us civilians."

In Laos, one day after Rogers spoke, Souvanna Phouma, premier of the pro-American regime, obediently attempted to provide a pretext for whatever actions Nixon had planned. Tillman Durdin reported from Vientiane in the January 31 *New York Times*:

"Premier Souvanna Phouma said today [January 30] that he was convinced that the North Vietnamese were beginning a general offensive against Laotian Government positions.

"The Prince said in an interview that it was quite possible that North Vietnam's strategy was to attempt the conquest of Cambodia and Laos now and leave South Vietnam to be dealt with later."

Durdin also reported that "some observers" in Vientiane expected Thai troops to join a U. S.-South Vietnamese invasion of the Laotian panhandle.

The U. S. aggression in Indochina has already spilled over beyond that region's borders, giving an indication of Nixon's ultimate goals. Michael Morrow revealed in the January 26 *Washington Post* that Laotian mercenaries hired by the Central Intelligence Agency are regularly sent into China:

"United States intelligence operations include the sending of armed Laotian reconnaissance teams into China from northern Laos, sources here [Vientiane] say. Teams are reported to have gone as far as 200 miles into China, dispatched from a secret CIA outpost 15 minutes' flying time north of the Laotian opium center at Houei Sai.

"According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weapons, a three-pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," sources close to the CIA said."

These operations, which are directed from the U. S. Udorn air base in Thailand, have even involved the capture

of Chinese officials. Morrow said that in 1968 five functionaries "defected" to one of the guerrilla groups. The "defectors" were executed in Laos.

The escalation in Laos was accompanied by attempts to justify the increased air war in Cambodia and to prepare the American public for more of the same—or even worse.

Following Laird's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Stennis, the committee chairman, emerged to tell reporters that it might be necessary to revise the Cooper-Church amendment, which prohibits the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops or "advisers" into Cambodia. Stennis said that "we may have to re-examine our policy and restrictions" if the military situation in Cambodia becomes "substantially worse."

It was generally believed that Stennis' remarks were a deliberate trial balloon sent up at the request of Laird. John W. Finney wrote in the January 28 *New York Times*:

"One question raised on Capitol Hill was whether the Defense Department was using Senator Stennis, a past defender of the Vietnam war, to prepare his colleagues and the nation for a deeper military involvement in Cambodia."

In fact, there was no question at all. The deeper involvement was increasing almost daily.

U.S. planes were involved in battles around Saang, Lovea Sar Kandal, and Prey Khiev, towns surrounding the capital of Pnompenh, over a period of several days. On January 28, the U.S. command in Saigon revealed that U.S. planes, including giant B-52 bombers, had flown up to forty sorties per day during the fight for Highway 4.

On January 25, fifteen to twenty troops from the U.S. 520th Transportation Battalion landed at the Pnompenh airport to "rescue" helicopters damaged during the liberation forces' January 22 attack. The troops, under the command of a colonel described as "very upset" by the presence of newsmen, were dressed in civilian clothes, apparently in the hope that this would somehow make them invisible to reporters.

The same day, the Defense Department admitted that it was training Cambodian troops outside the coun-

try. The January 26 *Washington Post* reported:

"Defense Department officials yesterday confirmed reports that U.S. Special Forces were being used to help train Cambodian cadres at bases in Thailand and South Vietnam.

"Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said he was 'not aware of any plans' for a similar U.S. military training program to be carried on inside Cambodia. *But he said such a move was not prohibited*, in the Pentagon's view, by Congressional legislation barring American ground combat troops or advisers from Cambodia." (Emphasis added.)

The Nixon administration thus announced that it felt free to send troops into Cambodia after first baptizing them "trainers" or "instructors" instead of the now-discredited term "advisers."

American officials in Pnompenh in fact announced that U.S. troops would be deployed in Cambodia under the name "military equipment delivery team." These teams, the January 25 statement said, would check up on the use Lon Nol's troops made of military equipment supplied by Nixon. Alvin Shuster wrote in the January 29 *New York Times*:

"The United States military teams that are to move through Cambodia to check on the use of American military aid are to travel in civilian clothes with instructions to remain out of combat areas, official sources said. . ."

The sources, however, did not explain why Lon Nol would want to keep his U.S.-supplied weaponry outside of combat areas. Shuster continued:

"But the sources could not rule out the possibility that these military equipment delivery teams would provide some advice to Cambodian soldiers. They stressed, however, that the men would be unarmed and would be directed to 'avoid slipping into an advisory role.'

"Given the nature of the war here, the sources said it was possible that the members of the teams would find themselves in battle. They added, however, that the purpose of civilian clothes would be to show that they were not in a combat advisory role."

Aggression, under the "Nixon doctrine," is not aggression if performed in civilian clothes. There remained the

possibility, however, that the liberation forces might fail to distinguish between bullets fired at them by "adviser" troops in uniform and bullets fired at them by "instructor" troops in civilian clothes. In that case, of course, the U.S. forces would have the "right of self-defense" that is regularly invoked to justify missile attacks on North Vietnam. Murrey Marder reported in the January 27 *Washington Post*:

"McCloskey [state department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey], when asked if the military teams would have authority in Cambodia to shoot if fired upon, said he was unfamiliar with that but 'nobody, soldier or not, is going to sit like a trans-fixed rabbit if somebody is taking dead aim at him.'"

McCloskey apparently forgot that the "teams" were supposed to be "unarmed."

"History is repeating itself in Southeast Asia," the *New York Times* commented in a January 29 editorial. "The insidious insertion of American military power into Cambodia in support of a faltering regime ominously parallels the events of early 1965 which entrapped the United States in a major war in neighboring Vietnam."

There was another parallel with Vietnam, Tom Wicker wrote in the January 31 *New York Times*:

"The first and most terrible fact of this policy is that it will perpetrate a thousand Mylais throughout the region. Air warfare is indiscriminate; villages are burned, children and women killed, the countryside blasted."

Nixon, in short, has already gone a long way toward completely "Vietnamizing" Cambodia and Laos. It will take massive public protests around the world—such as those scheduled for April 24—to force him to reverse his course. □

### **Kidnapping Item on Menu**

Restaurants in Brazil have found a way to profit from kidnappings of foreign diplomats, the *New York Times* reported January 25.

To protect diplomats and foreign businessmen, guards have been placed in restaurants where these dignitaries dine frequently.

"And some not-so-good restaurants have capitalized on the situation by hiring guards in the hope that patrons will think foreigners usually favor them."

## Hugo Blanco's Views on Key Current Struggles

[The Peruvian revolutionary leader Hugo Blanco gave the following interview January 1 to the monthly magazine *Libertad*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

*Question. Did the political and social prisoners expect the general amnesty decreed by the military government?*

*Answer.* It was always expected because of the national and international campaign on behalf of the prisoners. The measure was a result fundamentally of this campaign.

*Q. Did the government pose any conditions?*

A. None whatever.

*Q. Could you give us a résumé of your life as a guerrilla in the armed struggle waged in the valley of La Convención?*

A. The term "guerrilla" is only partially applicable in my case. Although I was a guerrilla, that was only one of my functions as a revolutionist, which I consider a more comprehensive and appropriate term.

As a revolutionary activist, I knew that there was no peaceful solution to the problems of the peasantry. But despite this, starting off from minimum demands, working by peaceful means through the peasant union movement to mobilize the masses, I went through the peasants' experience with them for several years.

It was inevitable that the peasants would become convinced of the need for physical force when their attempts to achieve a peaceful solution to their problems were blocked.

I realized that the peasants had to learn by their own experience because "liberation of the workers will be the act of the workers themselves."

I was convinced that the peasants must not be just a base of support

but the material and intellectual agent of their liberation. Therefore, I went through the peasants' experience with them, from the lowest level to the point where they came to understand *the need for armed struggle, as the only possible means not only for achieving their liberation but just to hold back repression.* [Emphasis in the original.]

*Q. What do you think about the junta's revolutionary measures?*

A. Imperialism, which was formerly distinguished by its attempt to keep the colonial and semicolonial countries as producers of raw materials and importers of manufactured goods, has changed in this respect, owing to numerous factors. Among these I could point to the big worldwide industrial expansion, intensified, for example, by the uninterrupted technological development generated by the arms race.

This technological development has been decisive in making industrial installations obsolete almost as soon as they are built.

But let's take time out here. Stop writing and let me think how to put this. That way you'll see more clearly what the real picture is and what the reason was for the junta's reformist measures.

(Several minutes passed, and then Hugo Blanco said, "Now, compadre, let's go on.")

Imperialism has an urgent need for more extensive markets for its manufactured goods and machinery. The purpose of this neocapitalist policy is suited by an agrarian reform that would create an extensive layer of small agricultural proprietors capable of absorbing the consumer goods exports of the imperialist countries.

Industrialization of our countries also suits the purposes of this policy. In this way they can absorb the imperialists' machinery exports. This is true even if the industrial concerns that carry out this development in our country are not imperialist but

national or even state-owned companies.

The reforms instituted by the Junta Militar [military junta] fit into the context of this general policy of imperialist neocapitalism. This is true not only of the specifically economic measures like the agrarian reform, which is aimed at creating layers of consumers of industrial products; or the industrial development law, which is aimed at promoting this development for the benefit of the bosses. It is also true of the educational reform. The purpose of this measure is to provide skilled workers, such as lathe operators for example, that is, industrial slaves instead of illiterate Indian serfs of the landlords.

Besides these fundamental economic reasons for the government's reformist measures, there are political reasons. Not just the desarrrollista [pro-development] sectors but the most astute elements of all the exploiting sectors understand that the previous situation in our country could not be maintained, that the danger of a *genuine popular revolution* was imminent.

*Q. What is your opinion on the Freedom of the Press law? \**

A. It protects the interests represented by the government.

*Q. Now that we are talking a lot about freedom, what do you think real freedom is?*

A. There can be no freedom without economic abundance. Only if there is an abundance of goods can we achieve a communist society, even though the objective technological and

\* A censorship and political libel law apparently aimed primarily at curbing the power of the big press controlled by the old landed oligarchy antagonistic to the junta and the developmentalist bourgeois sectors that support it. See Hugo Blanco, "The Government Is Not Nationalist," *Intercontinental Press*, March 30, 1970, page 278.

scientific conditions (computers) already exist for it.

It is the inner contradictions of the capitalist system that prevent us from achieving abundance in a relatively short time. This shows that it is essential to destroy capitalism in order to put technology and science completely in the service of man.

*Q. What is your opinion on the "Basque case," about the victims of Francoism?*

A. It is one more brutal act by the regime that has afflicted the Spanish people since the 1930s.

The crushing of the Spanish revolution was the most painful episode in the retreat of the world revolution during the 1930s. The cause of this retreat was not just the offensive of the classes inimical to the workers but the betrayal by the reformist leaderships of the working class, like the Social Democratic parties of the Second International and the Communist parties that had fallen into the grip of Stalinism.

The Spanish people and the international fighters who came to help them offered their blood for a socialist revolution, for a workers government. Unfortunately, the reformist leaderships, the Stalinists in particular, sold out the revolution to the Republican bourgeoisie, which of course was incapable of defending even the bourgeois-democratic conquests associated with the historic role of this class in other countries.

The impotence of the Spanish Republican government can be compared with that of the Russian bourgeois regime from February to October 1917. Under Lenin the Communist party led the working class to power in Russia. Under Stalin the Spanish Communist party led the working class to surrender power to the Republican bourgeoisie. The Spanish capitalist class was incapable of resisting the fascists, who installed Franco as a monstrous example for the "gorillas" of successive generations throughout the world.

Fortunately, if Spain is the painful reminder of a period of ebb in the world revolution, Vietnam is the mighty symbol of our era of permanent revolution which is shaking

Spain itself, raising it from its ashes through the struggles of the workers in Asturias and all over Spain, of the students, the intellectuals, and now the Basque nationalists fighting for self-determination.

When Vallejo\* died in Spain, he charged the youth of that time: "If Spain falls, go forth, youth of the world, go forth in search of it." Now the time has come to carry out the task conferred on us by this Indian who loved Spain so much.

*Q. How can you carry a radical bourgeois-democratic process to a higher stage?*

A. By giving impetus to the immediate struggles of the working class and other popular strata for their most deeply felt demands. Even struggles arising out of the regime's reformist promises can serve as a spur to consciousness, as in the Huando case.

*Q. Has any law instituted by the military government gone beyond the bounds of the capitalist system?*

A. Not one.

*Q. What is your opinion on the Sino-Soviet conflict?*

A. China is to the left of the Soviet Union. But I think that since it upholds the Stalinist doctrine of socialism in one country, Peking cannot give leadership or guidance to the world socialist revolution. This is shown by its selling out the Indonesian revolution to Sukarno, a betrayal that resulted in mass murder, mass murder of the Communists themselves, of the cream of the Indonesian revolutionary movement.

The capitulation of the pro-Peking party in Pakistan, although less striking, is further evidence of the perniciousness of the theory of socialism in one country and the policy of peaceful coexistence, which in practice puts the diplomatic interests of the Peking government above those of the world socialist revolution. The attitude of Cuba toward the Mexican and Peruvian governments is also related to the influence of this anti-international

\* The poet Cesar Vallejo died in 1939.

alist and anti-Leninist theory.

*Q. What do you think about the policy of the Cuban government toward the development in Peru?*

A. That it represents an unfortunate capitulation to the pressure of the Soviet bureaucracy.

*Q. What do you think of the Tupamaros?*

A. I admire their valor but I disagree with their methods. Their actions are isolated from the immediate struggle of the masses. The courage, discipline, and other qualities of these comrades would make them valuable leaders of the mass movement and they would find their effectiveness infinitely increased.

*Q. This said, can we consider their activity an advance in revolutionary strategy?*

A. As far as tactics go, they are making many valuable contributions but in strategy they fall below the level of revolutionary science reached by Leninism.

*Q. What chance do you think the Tupamaros have of winning?*

A. I place my trust in the Uruguayan people, fundamentally in its working class. It is they who will win. The Tupamaros are only one more factor, a contradictory one, in this struggle.

*Q. What historical significance does the Peruvian process have in the context of the Latin-American revolutionary ferment?*

A. It is one of the last desperate efforts of a condemned system to divert the people from making their real revolution.

*Q. What are your immediate and long-range plans?*

A. Over the long term I intend to continue fighting for the world socialist revolution in the ranks of the Fourth International. Right now I am going to fight without letup until they apply the general amnesty law and release my teacher and comrade

Eduardo Creus and the eight peasant leaders still imprisoned in the Cuzco jail, as well as the rest of the political and social prisoners who remain behind bars.

*Q. How do you feel about the life you have chosen, devoting your life to the revolution?*

A. I am doing my duty as a man in this epoch.

*Q. Would you prefer not to have been born in this stage of history?*

A. This is the best age to be born in.

*Q. Would you like to have been born in the age of socialism or communism?*

A. I think that it is best to have been

born in the age of permanent revolution.

*Q. Compañero Blanco, is there anything else you'd like to say?*

A. I offer my revolutionary greetings to the readers of your magazine *Libertad*. I've enjoyed this discussion. I don't feel the same interest when I give interviews to the bourgeois press.

## Extend Demands for Proletarian Democracy

# Polish Workers Revolt Gathers Fresh Momentum

By Gerry Foley

With working-class militancy building rapidly toward an explosive point, the Polish bureaucracy made a further tactical retreat in the third week of January. Apparently incapable of making substantial economic or political concessions, however, the regime seems to have won but a short truce by its maneuvers.

In return for the Gierek leadership's agreement to drop the major plank of the bureaucracy's antilabor economic reform program—for the time being—and to discuss their grievances with them directly, most workers apparently decided to await the results of the Eighth Central Committee Plenum at the end of January.

The latest crisis of the shaky new regime in Warsaw indicated that the development of independent class consciousness and organization among the workers is moving ahead at a rapid rate.

The new confrontation began January 18, when thousands of workers assembled in a mass meeting at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk to voice their demands. They called for advanced antibureaucratic measures—freezing the highest wages and progressively raising all the rest, improving the supply of consumer goods by a better allocation of investment, increasing the role of the workers councils, and democratizing the trade unions.

The Gdansk workers also demanded that economics chief Stanislaw Kociol and security chief General

Mieczyslaw Moczar be ousted from the Political Bureau. They called on Gierek to come and negotiate with them in the yards, on their own territory.

The Gdansk regional party executive, Stanislaw Celichowski, admitted that "about 3,000 workers" had attended the ninety-minute mass meeting, according to an Associated Press dispatch January 18 from the Polish port. A total of 16,000 men work in the yards. Therefore, according to the bureaucrats themselves, a very substantial percentage of the morning shift must have attended the meeting, which began at 9:00 a.m.

After the assembly, thousands of workers walked off their jobs in a six-hour strike and threatened to continue the work stoppages the next day. Several hundred workers gathered outside the shipyard manager's office, shouting demands, the editor of the local newspaper *Glos Wybrzeza* told a Reuters correspondent.

The workers agreed to return, AP cabled January 18, only "after being promised that management directors and workers' delegates would go to Warsaw to present their demands, including a call for removal of two Politburo members." However, no sooner had the shipyard workers gone back to their jobs than the Gdansk transportation workers began protest strikes.

On January 19, Gierek gave the elected workers' delegates an effusive reception in Warsaw: "It was a shock

for me, this meeting," delegate Leon Stobiecki told an AP correspondent. "Gierek kissed us when we walked into the room. We felt he was deeply touched by our presence. Although kissing is the Slavonic way of greeting a person, we didn't expect it from the first secretary."

Another delegate, Jan Ostrowski, said that Gierek pledged that "there will be changes after the eighth plenum." "He promised us that the shooting [of strikers] by militia[men] will also be explained after the plenum." The same day, Gierek received workers' delegations from Szczecin and Gdynia.

Gierek's meetings with workers' representatives were given a big play in the bureaucratically controlled media: "The Warsaw press announced the news Wednesday [January 20] with big headlines and a picture on the front page of Gierek shaking hands with one of the workers from the Gdansk shipyards in an apparently quite chummy atmosphere," correspondent Bernard Marguerite wrote in the January 21 issue of *Le Monde*.

But while the former provincial boss was giving the workers' representatives the glad hand in front of newspaper and television cameras, he took a tough line in asserting bureaucratic authority. He warned the workers that their demands could only be examined in "an atmosphere of calm, order, and serious work." He refused to talk to the workers on their own ground until all agitation had been stopped

and complete "order," that is, the unchallenged authority of the plant management, was restored.

Western correspondents thought Gierek had managed to bring the situation under control with his Nixon-style combination of demagoguery and threats. "Worker unrest in Poland's northern coastal cities declined today in the aftermath of yesterday's meeting between Edward Gierek, the Communist party leader, and a delegation of shipyard workers," *New York Times* correspondent James Feron wrote January 20. "The only indication of industrial unrest came from Gdynia, near Gdansk, where a delegation of street-car workers met for two hours with city officials."

Only two days later, however, on Friday, January 22, a new outbreak occurred in another area, Szczecin, Poland's largest port. Shipyard and transportation workers went out on strike in support of demands for higher wages and democratization of the party and unions. Fighting was reported. The government showed signs of fear. Gierek abruptly stopped insisting that "order" be restored before he would talk to the workers directly in the plants and yards.

"It was nearly 6 P.M. [January 24] when the yard workers [in Szczecin] were stunned to find Mr. Gierek, Mr. Jaroszewicz, Defense Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, and acting Interior Minister Franciszek Szlachcic among them at the gates," James Feron cabled from Warsaw January 25.

"The leaders met with about 500 persons, sources said, all of them delegated by fellow workers. The meeting had been expected to last two or three hours but it ended well after midnight."

In these talks, in contrast to the "chummy" exchanges in the official reception rooms in Warsaw, Gierek announced concrete concessions. "Polish sources in Warsaw said Mr. Gierek had promised to meet a number of demands, including a modification of a new incentive system and a pledge that wages would not fall below previous levels," according to Feron.

"This promise was said to have brought cheers in the Szczecin shipyards, where a sit-in strike had led to violence. Ten to 20 workers were said to have been injured."

It was not reported whether Gierek made any concessions to the workers'

political demands. But the presence of the minister of defense and the new minister of the interior, appointed just the day before he went to Szczecin, indicates that the role of the police and army in the mid-December strikes was discussed.

The next day, January 25, Gierek went to the other center of the working-



KOCIOLEK: "Get rid of him!" say Polish workers.

class movement, Gdansk, where he met with workers "well into the night," according to Feron.

The day Gierek returned to Warsaw, January 26, the government announced it was suspending its plans to introduce its "incentive-pay" scheme, a central feature of the planned economic reform. This system would tie wages to plant "profitability," resulting in fact in a speedup and increased exploitation of labor.

At the meeting where this decision was made, Deputy Premier Jozef Kulesza indicated that the bureaucracy had been convinced that the existing situation ruled out imposing a "Market Socialist" wage reform: "On the basis of analysis and evaluation of the new incentive system, it should not be introduced in its present form this year."

It seemed that party boss Gierek had been alarmed by the working-class mobilization he had seen in the coastal cities, which appear to be only the hottest spots in an agitation that

covers the entire country. Once the workers had won de facto recognition in the mid-December battles of their right to organize independently, an uncontrollable process was initiated. All the reports in the international press show an independent workers movement developing by leaps and bounds, and moving toward a bid for political power.

Even Western Communist party journalists testified to the scope of the movement for proletarian democracy. The Warsaw correspondent of the Italian CP organ *l'Unità* wrote that the country "seems in these days to resemble one vast Hyde Park."

In the *New York Times* of January 24 James Feron wrote that to talk to the Polish workers "is to feel that they retain a sense of quieter strength." They had, he noted, restored "frank discussion" in the trade unions, "turning some sessions into turbulent affairs."

"One observer," Feron continued, "said that the meetings had moved beyond the economic sphere—although Gdansk party officials say they have heard 2,000 demands so far—to the political arena, where the cry is 'Get rid of him—and him—and him.'"

"Another change is that the workers in Gdansk and perhaps in Szczecin feel better able to speak out. They shake their fists at what they consider to be ineffective trade union representatives, they march to directors' offices and they negotiate directly with local party people.

"They are putting their names on petitions, and they are standing up in public to address groups of workers as negotiations with local authorities ebb and flow. . . ."

"The demands similarly have extended beyond the economic sphere. In Gdansk, they have called for greater freedom of the press and, in one instance last week, they called for publication of the case at hand as a condition of continued work."

In the January 26 issue of the *Christian Science Monitor*, Charlotte Salkowski wrote: "Now the workers are using their own ad hoc committees rather than ordinary union machinery to maintain pressure over their grievances."

"These include not only the predictable demands on wages and working



conditions but also insistence on full exposure and punishment of those authorities or individual officials responsible for the excessive force and bloodshed inflicted on the December demonstrators."

The bureaucracy's own press revealed that Gierek had confronted a politically conscious force in his trip to the coast cities. In Szczecin, the local daily *Glos Szczecinski* reported that one worker told the party boss: "In 1956 we gave full confidence to Gomulka and it proved in vain. We want that no such disappointment occurs again."

If Gierek's tour showed that the bureaucracy faces an increasingly powerful and self-confident workers movement, it also showed how narrow a margin for maneuver the regime has in its attempts to stave off new explosions. The new government has admitted that not only can it not offer any improvement in the workers' living standard but it cannot even forestall a decline in real wages.

"The Szczecin workers are demanding essentially an across-the-board wage increase to compensate for the price increases decided on in mid-December," Bernard Margueritte wrote in the January 26 issue of *Le Monde*. "But the new leaders say that it is very hard to do more than has already been done—raising the wages of the lowest-paid workers—without aggravating an already delicate enough economic situation."

Margueritte claimed that the workers like the Gierek team's "realistic language" in explaining the economic impasse. But after winning the right to organize independently in violent confrontations with the repressive forces and at the cost of hundreds of dead and wounded, the workers are unlikely to accept further sacrifices willingly unless they get the decisive say on how the economy is to be run. But the parasitic bureaucracy can grant this even less than economic concessions. Workers control and democracy are incompatible with the survival of the parasitic totalitarian bureaucracy.

As a result of this dilemma, the bureaucracy's response to pressure from the workers has been shot through with contradictions. For example, the day before he went to

Szczecin, Gierek removed Kazimierz Switala from the post of minister of the interior. Switala had been in command of the police during the December fighting and his ouster could be viewed as a concession to the strikers. But the new minister, Szlachcic, is reputed to be "more of an advocate of firm internal security than his predecessor," according to *New York Times* correspondent Feron. Szlachcic is also said to be associated with the national Stalinist Partisan faction headed by General Moczar, a particular target of the workers' hatred.

After Gierek's return from his tour, it was evident that he was unwilling to take repressive actions that could arouse the workers: "Militant Polish shipyard workers who led [last] weekend's strike in Szczecin will suffer no state reprisals by order of new party leader Edward Gierek, it was learned here today," the *Washington Post* reported January 27, summarizing news dispatches from Warsaw.

But the very day before Gierek suddenly turned up in front of the shipyard gate in Szczecin, the government published a letter from Premier Jaroszewicz exhorting plant managers to resist "unreasonable" demands by workers. Jaroszewicz denounced administrators who, as he put it, "take a passive attitude toward applying important government decisions and directives, tolerating a slackening in work discipline and violation of the regulations in force."

Gierek's subsequent actions, however, showed that the government itself did not dare take the hard line it was urging on individual plant managers.

Moreover, the same day the Polish party boss started his lengthy talks with the workers, the Communist organ *Trybuna Ludu* published an editorial denouncing elements in the country that, it claimed, were trying to "create an atmosphere of anarchy and demagoguery." After the press's Stalinist slanders of the December strikers, such language could only reinforce the workers' suspicions of the new regime.

Even when the bureaucratic press printed criticisms of the system and comments favoring the workers movement, this material was at times mixed with ultra-Stalinist concepts. For ex-

ample, the editor of *Zycie Literackie*, Machejek, wrote: "The dialogue of the deaf is ending. Many events and facts testify to a change in the morality of our political life, of a return to the good socialist traditions of the Polish October."

At the same time, he lamented that the purges following the March 1968 student movement had not been "completed" and complained that there had been "an unfavorable attitude toward comrades who played an active role in the March events in defense of the patriotic and socialist principles of our communist future."

The obscurantist and anti-Semitic terror to which the bureaucracy resorted to crush the student protests in March 1968 was only relaxed when it seemed to be bringing intolerable disgrace on the Warsaw regime. There is considerable evidence, moreover, that a linkup between the student and workers movements has developed. In this context, it is hard to see what political sense there is in Machejek's line. He may have lost his footing in trying to balance between the pressures facing the bureaucracy.

Caught in insoluble contradictions, a social grouping as narrow-minded and as shallowly rooted in society as the Stalinist bureaucracy can be expected to behave in very peculiar ways. It is natural, moreover, to the bureaucratic mentality to think that all difficulties can be solved by maneuvers.

If the Kremlin has not yet intervened, despite the fact that the movement for proletarian democracy has already reached a higher stage in Poland in some ways than it did in Czechoslovakia, it may be that it thinks the Gierek regime can still restore the situation by demagoguery and minor concessions, in short by maneuvers.

The American Communist party paper the *Daily World*, for example, which faithfully mirrors the attitudes of the Kremlin, highly approved the Warsaw regime's latest retreat. In its January 28 issue, it wrote: "The withdrawal of an incentive wage plan by the new leadership of the Polish United Workers Party is typical of the flexibility and responsiveness it has shown to the demands of the workers." □

## The Mishima Affair

By Wataru Yakushiji

[On November 25, Yukio Mishima, one of Japan's best-known novelists, led an armed attack on the Eastern Army Headquarters of the Japan Self-Defense Force in the heart of Tokyo. The writer and his companions—members of the right wing Tate No Kai (Shield Society) founded and led by Mishima—held Lieutenant General Kanetoshi Masuda hostage. Mishima addressed an assembly of more than 1,000 soldiers from a balcony of the army headquarters, calling on them to return to the samurai tradition. When his appeal brought no response from the troops, he cried "Long Live the Emperor!" and withdrew into the building, where he and a young follower took their own lives in ritual *harakiri* fashion. Mishima was forty-five years old.

[The writer's death under such dramatic circumstances stirred world interest. Mishima had won a reputation as Japan's "Renaissance Man" through his versatility as a novelist, playwright, essayist, actor, swordsman, and right-wing organizer. Many observers were of the opinion that his act reflected a new rise of militarism in Japan.]

\* \* \*

Osaka

In the months since the November 25 suicide of Yukio Mishima and Hissho Morita, a controversy has arisen as to whether their deaths were inspired by political or literary motives. Aside from the naïve view expressed in some quarters that human death somehow transcends political or literary questions, such a debate was inevitable because the deaths touched a fundamental nerve.

The reason for the great public interest cannot be attributed to the controversial manner in which Mishima and Morita died—*harakiri*—which appears to have titillated the curious in Europe and America. In Japan, attention was drawn by Mishima's stature as one of the country's most popular and admired literary figures, while his cosuicide was a youth, one of the generation that is going through a process of worldwide radicalization.

The debate since November has hinged on whether or not Mishima's act can be regarded as rational. Those who say the suicides were a serious political act argue that they will bring in their wake important social repercussions. Others say Mishima and his fellows were political fools and that his death will have little or no impact on Japanese society.

An extreme example of the latter view is provided by Premier Eisaku Sato and his colleagues, who suggest that the dissident writer may have gone insane. When Mishima was on good terms with the government and the Self-Defense Forces, the bourgeoisie regarded him as an outstanding citizen. Characteristic of this response is

an apologetic tone, excusing Mishima's momentary aberration the better to defend Japan's alleged "constitutional democratic" system from suspicion. We could hardly expect anything different from the political managers of the new capitalist-imperialist regime.

A diametrically opposite view has been seriously voiced by quite a number of intellectuals of various political persuasions, as well as by the country's ultrarightists. On the left, some of the Zenkyoto spontanéist students at Tokyo University are said to have "sincerely mourned" the late novelist. Rightists have done likewise. But even among those who regard Mishima's end as an act of heroism, explanations of its significance vary widely.

Some compare his death to that of Hemingway—a literary finale. Others talk about "Mishima aesthetics," and relate this concept to his political views. There is debate over whether the militarism advocated by Mishima and his private army has in fact been developing in Japan.

Almost all of the critics and intellectuals as well as literary figures failed to see the essential character of the so-called Mishima aesthetics. His views were a reflection of the objective conditions that have given rise to the worldwide youth radicalization. Young Hissho Morita's death pact can only be understood in this light, which has been ignored by the commentators or reduced to a matter of a homosexual relationship.

*Asahi Shimbun* on December 26 published the results of an opinion poll, taken among university students, that showed something of the reactions among young people in the country. Only 6 percent indicated they were politically inspired in a right-wing direction by Mishima's act. Some 30 percent were indifferent or hostile, 30 percent shocked and uneasy, and 30 percent expressed personal sympathy with Mishima while disagreeing with his rightist ideology.

We should not be complacent about the small number of rightist-oriented responses. More significant is the fact that a majority experienced something sympathetic or felt uneasy—were in some way moved by the two rightists' deaths.

The worldwide radicalization of youth has as its fundamental characteristic a total denial of traditional value standards. This orientation has been produced, above all, by the industrial development that has taken place in the world under the new imperialist regimes that emerged from World War II.

In Japan, the development since the middle fifties has been characterized by technical innovation and the reestablishment of imperialist domination of the Far East under the leadership of the Japanese bourgeoisie. The latter, in turn, is deeply integrated in the U.S. world empire.

The technical innovation has shattered the traditional

paternal, authoritarian relationships in the sphere of production to such an extent that the state itself has lost its content as a focus for people's loyalties (thus depleting an important part of the bourgeoisie's political capital).

In fact, the bourgeoisie has contributed to this process, selling parts of the national territory when this proved profitable to their regime.

At the same time, technical innovation has created a so-called "affluent society." But for students and workers (especially of the younger generations), the "affluent society" has meant a complete alienation in their daily lives. What they actually have is a monotonous repetition of controlled and regulated work, both in the factory and on the university campus (and in the high schools as well). They face a gloomy future under a hypocritical regime founded on collusion with foreign interests.

The youth can no longer regard "material progress" as something worthy of obtaining. They have come to know the real meaning of "peace" and "democracy," long insisted upon as the highest aims of the nation. They totally refuse to accept the existing value system. It is perfectly understandable, for example, that the bureaucratic leadership of the traditional trade unions has lost its control over the younger workers, because the material aspirations the bureaucracy advocates no longer correspond to the hopes of the workers.

Radicalizing students and workers see barbarities and contradictions all around them. The brutality of the Vietnam war is a fact of their daily lives.

The "Mishima aesthetics" fits in beautifully with the youth radicalization. The novelist's work, in this sense, has quite an up-to-date character, reflecting the nature of advanced capitalist-imperialist society. This is the very source of his popularity.

As Ernest Hemingway did after World War I, and John Osborne in post-World War II England, Yukio Mishima sought his own "chance for life."<sup>1</sup> Mishima found the model for his chance in the *Nihon-Roman-ha* tendency in Japanese literature. This movement in literature and aesthetics, which flourished in the years 1935-44, was led by Yojuro Yasuda, Katsuchiro Kamei, and others. It sought to give firm spiritual moorings to the cultural chaos among intellectuals who had become disoriented by the then developing nationalist, militarist, and isolationist fanaticism.

The *Nihon-Roman-ha* tried to unite Japanese medieval values and the aesthetic philosophy of the German Romantic school around Friedrich Hölderlin, finally transforming itself into an extreme species of ultranationalism and Shintoism.

Mishima's very Westernized style, his bourgeois idealist agony, and yet his firm footing in the realities of the world he had to live in—these elements were adopted

1. This quest was central to the life of the "I" in *Kinkakuji* ("The Temple of the Golden Pavilion"). This novel, written in 1956, tells about a man who lost his reason for being when there is no longer any danger that the beautiful Golden Pavilion might be destroyed. His expectation of death in the pavilion under an air bombardment evaporated with the close of the war. At the end of the novel he concludes that he himself must burn down the pavilion in order that he may live on.

under the influence of the *Nihon-Roman-ha*. His well-known works such as *Hanazakari-no-Mori* ("Forest in Full Bloom"), *Kamen-no-Kokuhaku* ("Confessions of a Mask"), and *Ai-no-Kawaki* ("Thirst for Love"), are all idealist dramas based on contradictions between "consciousness" and "existence" in personalities deeply involved in the realities of the world.

Then Mishima wrote *Kinkakuji*, one of his masterpieces, and expressed in it his complete denial of the postwar popular philosophical values—the admiration of peace, democracy, and material progress. He challenged these values with his own weapon, the "Mishima aesthetics," which he first enunciated in his book *Kyoko-no-Ie* ("Kyoko's House").

The "Mishima aesthetics" were, in short, an attempt to achieve a basis for escaping from the idealist contradiction between consciousness and existence, words and deeds, intelligence and flesh.<sup>2</sup> Later, as a natural development of this bourgeois idealist philosophy, the writer moved further in the direction of mysticism, as seen in *Kinu-to-Meisatsu* ("Silk and Insight"), *Yorokobi-no-Koto* ("Harp of Joy"), *Yukoku* ("Patriotism"), *Hojo-no-Umi* ("Sea of Fertility"), and his other recent works.

The younger generation looked on the "Mishima aesthetics" as a doctrine of confrontation and challenge to the existing social order. This credo seemed to promise a new standard of value to be established in place of the traditional one. When the dissident writer named his concept "*Tenno*" (emperor),<sup>3</sup> however, radicalizing youth unambiguously rejected it, as was clearly seen in the dialogues between Mishima and struggling students at Tokyo University during the campus occupation in 1968. Two years later, more than a thousand soldiers who heard his final appeal at an army headquarters only showed hostility at the writer's insistent advocacy of a return to the past. This was not because they were against nationalism, but because they knew that an advanced, industrialized capitalist society was incapable of establishing the kind of paternalistic authoritarianism Mishima advocated.

Nevertheless we must take seriously the fact that part—albeit a very small part—of the young generation has gone over to Mishima's illusory "aesthetics." They are looking for any tenable alternative to the present imperialist regime. They cannot accept the regime's professions of peace when this means the Vietnam war, or of democracy

2. In his confessional essay *Taiyo-to-Tetsu* ("Sun and Steel"), Yukio Mishima clearly states: "In the first stage I had put myself on the side of words. And realities, flesh, and deeds on the other side. . . ." In another place in the same book he defines his aesthetics as "representing mute flesh in beautiful language which imitates the beauty of physical form, thus bridging the gap between word and flesh."

Blocked by insuperable difficulties in his search for deeds that would not be "buried in a retroactive chain of numerous responsibilities," the writer contrived to substitute a "sense of satisfaction in physical existence" for actual deeds. He sidestepped confrontation with his own fundamental idealist contradiction by dissolving all "spiritual" activities into physical existence, just as Osamu of *Kyoko's House* does.

3. Mishima's "*Tenno*" does not necessarily mean the real existence of an autocratic emperor, but rather an aesthetic concept or ideal as the highest value in life.

which in practice amounts to a totalitarian dictatorship on the university campus, in the streets, and in every workshop.

The death of Yukio Mishima and Hissho Morita was only an episode as far as its impact on society is concerned. Death was the logical conclusion of Mishima's bourgeois idealist philosophy. There is nothing in this "philosophy" that provides a way out of the impasse for

today's radicalizing youth.

We should draw the lessons of these events in any case. If the rebel youth created by the world imperialist system are not to founder in the politics of despair, they must have a perspective worthy of their commitment. That perspective is socialist revolution and the movement committed to achieving it is Trotskyism.

January 15, 1971.

## Hoped-for Riches Greasing Nixon's War Machine?

# The Mad Scramble for Oil in Asia

By Allen Myers

"The South Vietnamese Government offered its continental shelf to the world petroleum market last week," reported a short article in the December 21 *New York Times*, "when President Nguyen Van Thieu approved a law giving offshore oil exploration rights to foreign petroleum companies.

"The bill, which was approved by the Vietnamese National Assembly, came in response to a seismic survey sponsored last year by ten American oil companies that found the shallow virgin continental shelf surrounding Southern Vietnam a 'good oil risk.'"

"Good oil risk" is putting it rather mildly to judge by the current scramble for oil going on all over Southeast Asia. As we reported earlier (*Intercontinental Press*, September 7, 1970, page 723), some geologists believe the coastal areas bordering the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea will produce 400,000,000 barrels of oil daily within five years—an output far surpassing that of the entire capitalist world today.

The only known producing wells so far are in the Indonesian archipelago—off the eastern coast of Borneo, Brunei, Malaysian Borneo, and Sumatra. But the oil companies are convinced that more can be found throughout the region, and they are willing to spend millions to back their belief, according to the March 1970 issue of the U.S. business monthly *Fortune* magazine:

"The potential undersea reserves, oilmen believe, may stretch clear across the Far East—from the shores of Burma and Thailand, down the Malay



THIEU: Big-time real-estate salesman.

peninsula, and along the Indonesian archipelago. The reserves may also extend to waters off South Korea and Taiwan, new surveys indicate. On that theory, reinforced by seismic tests, companies from the U.S., Australia, Canada, Europe, and Japan are planning to spend a conservatively estimated total of \$500 million on exploration over the next four years."

*Fortune* noted that nine vessels were already wildcatting in the area and predicted that the number would in-

crease to fifteen by the end of 1970 and thirty by 1972. The reality exceeded the prediction. William D. Hartley reported in the September 22 *Wall Street Journal*:

"About 15 exploration rigs are working offshore—at something like \$25,000 a day for each—in such places as the Java Sea, South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. . . . By the end of this year, Singapore officials estimate, there will be about 25 rigs drilling."

Hartley also noted that *Fortune's* prediction of a \$500,000,000 eventual investment fell short of the probability:

"Chase Manhattan Bank estimates that \$6 billion will be spent in the Asian area on exploration and production between now and 1980, if oil is found."

The area in which the oil companies are carving out their giant undersea empires—just one of Gulf Oil's concessions is larger than the state of Oklahoma—covers an estimated 600,000 to 900,000 square miles of what Hartley called "probably the largest contiguous continental shelf in the world."

The exploration for the new fields comes at a time when the governments of the major oil-producing countries—Venezuela and the Middle East—are attempting to increase their share of the profits extracted by the oil companies. This of course emphasizes for the imperialists the need to assure eventual alternate sources of supply. The Asian oil would offer several additional advantages.

One is the low sulfur content. Sulfur

in oil is a major source of air pollution, and oil from the Middle East averages 4 to 5 percent sulfur. All the oil so far discovered in Southeast Asia contains virtually no sulfur.

Another advantage is the proximity to Japan, a major market for oil that now obtains 90 percent of its supplies from the Middle East. The October 25, 1969, issue of *Business Week* magazine reported:

"As the only major industrial country without indigenous energy supplies, Japan imports more oil than anyone else. By 1985, the government has declared, at least 30% of it should be bought from Japanese-owned sources. Japanese companies are now looking for petroleum in the Persian Gulf, in Indonesia, and off Japan's own continental shelf. If they hit, they are guaranteed a market."

For the U.S. government, oil from Asia constitutes a potential reserve for the future. Philip H. Trezise, assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, told a convention of the Pacific Coast Gas Association last September 24:

"We have had a conscious national policy toward petroleum for more than a decade. Its basic premise is that the United States should not become overly dependent on insecure sources of oil."

He went on to note that in 1970, U.S. oil consumption had increased 5 percent. (And 1970 was a year in which the real gross national product declined!) At that rate of increase, Trezise continued, by 1980 the U.S. would require 24,000,000 barrels per day. Its present production is only 10,000,000 barrels daily.

Although U.S. domestic production can be increased, even the addition of the 2,000,000 barrels per day expected from the Alaskan North Slope fields would not meet the 24,000,000-barrel requirement, Trezise said, unless the country used less economical sources such as shale:

". . . although it is quite possible to elaborate a position in which the United States could be self-sufficient, or achieve some approximation of self-sufficiency, our present knowledge tells us that this would require substantially higher oil prices than today."

With political conditions in the Middle East likely to remain "insecure"

indefinitely, the Asian oil supplies take on added importance.

Asian oil, however, comes with its own political problems attached.

In his *Wall Street Journal* report, Hartley wrote:

"One persistent rumor is that Jersey Standard has struck oil in its 28,000-square-mile area off the east coast of Malaysia. Jersey Standard won't talk about it and other oil executives speculate that one reason, if the report is true, is that the company's block abuts the last area of the South China Sea still not handed out as concessions.

"The area is South Vietnam's continental waters. The Vietnamese have divided the area into 18 blocks, which are expected to be parceled out soon, mostly to Americans."

Hartley's article was written in September. Thieu's action in December, referred to above, certainly strengthens the "persistent rumor."

The difficulty for the oil companies involved is that their concessions are of value only as long as there is a government in Saigon that recognizes them. The same holds true for concessions off Cambodia. These considerations led Jacques Decornoy to write in the January 8 Paris daily *Le Monde*:

"Have the oil combines received firm assurances from Washington on the United States' will to 'hold' Indochina, and in particular, South Vietnam? One is tempted to believe it in the face of all this scurrying. The companies have now begun to invest despite President Nixon's launching the slogan 'Vietnamization.' Moreover, Vietnam is not the only country involved in this business. Six months after the rightist putsch in Pnompenh, four months after the intervention of American troops in Cambodia, the Khmer-Thai negotiations on the growth of economic relations between the two neighbors have been taking place in Bangkok. The negotiators have examined the possibilities of establishing a joint prospecting plan. The oil fields appear to run the length of the South Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Thailand coasts. In any case, the foreign companies are not sparing any effort in trying to locate the black gold."

Decornoy concluded:

"The signing of contracts and the

offshore soundings are never mentioned by Washington in its declarations of principle on the subject of Asia. Nevertheless, when it comes to countries like South Vietnam and Cambodia, one can ask some questions. 'Vietnamization' and 'Khmerization' are expensive items in today's American budget. Who knows but that they will be profitable in the long run and pay big dividends, in the form of oil in particular? Provided, of course, that the 'friendly regimes' aren't swept away."

Thus in addition to its original, essentially political aims in Vietnam, the U.S. government has acquired powerful economic motives for continuing the war.

But the problems of the oil companies are not confined to maintaining "friendly" regimes in Saigon and Pnompenh. There is already in the region one "unfriendly" government that will have to be taken into account.

*Fortune* wrote last March:

"Ultimately, the oil search may spread northward from the present areas of activity. Under an agreement with the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), technicians from the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have been conducting physical surveys in the East China and Yellow seas. The results, according to an ECAFE report, 'indicated that the shallow sea floor between Japan and Taiwan might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world, possibly comparing favorably with the Persian Gulf area.'"

What *Fortune* neglected to point out is that the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea make up part of the continental shelf of China.

If that fact somehow escaped the attention of *Fortune's* editors, it has not gone unnoticed by either the Chinese or Japanese governments.

In Tokyo, Premier Eisaku Sato appears to have decided that China's legal rights can be negotiated away by Chiang Kai-shek. In July, representatives of Sato, Chiang, and South Korean president Chung Hee Park established a "liaison committee" in Tokyo. This committee agreed to set up a joint-stock company among the three governments to prospect for oil

in the East China and Yellow Seas.

Peking, not surprisingly, has vigorously protested these projected activities in China's coastal waters. A December 3 commentary by Hsinhua, the government news agency, said:

"There are indeed rich oil, natural gas and other mineral resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas around China's Taiwan Province and the islands appertaining thereto and of the shallow seas adjacent to other parts of China and to Korea. . . . In recent years, U. S. imperialism and the Japanese reactionaries have conducted large-scale surveys of the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of China's shallow seas. . . . The scope of their surveys included the vast water areas of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea adjacent to China and the Taiwan Strait. . . .

"The reactionary Sato government, together with the U.S. armed forces in Okinawa and the U.S. imperialist-controlled U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, has jointly surveyed the sea-bed and subsoil in the shallow seas adjacent to China and around China's Taiwan Province. At present, it is plotting hand in glove with the Chiang Kai-shek clique to prospect for petroleum of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas in China's Taiwan Strait area. Supported by U.S. imperialism, the reactionary Sato government is also seeking various pretexts to include into Japan's territory the Tiaoyu, Huangwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, Peihshiao and other islands and water areas which belong to China."

From a legal standpoint, China's claims are quite valid, according to John Gittings, writing in the December 18 issue of the British daily *Guardian*. Both Hsinhua and *Renmin Ribao*, the official Communist party newspaper, took the unusual step of quoting lengthy excerpts from this eminently bourgeois source.

"The Geneva agreement of 1958 on the continental shelf," Gittings wrote, "provides that the coastal state exercises sovereign rights over the shelf 'to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit to where the depth of the waters admits of the exploitation of natural resources.' Most of the East China Sea falls within the 200 metre

mark, and in any case the agreement goes beyond that mark. . . ."

What this means is that Sato, Park, and Chiang are selling property that doesn't belong to them:

"The governments of Japan, south Korea, and Taiwan are busy handing out concessions for deep-sea drilling rights, some of which are of disputed legality. China, on whose continental shelf these operations are being conducted, has not been consulted. . . .

"The Chinese cannot lay claim to

## Soviet Union

# Human Rights Group States Its Principles

[In an attempt to wage an open, public campaign in the Soviet Union against the bureaucrats' arbitrary abuses of power and violations of the guarantees written into the Soviet constitution and legal system, three leading nuclear physicists—Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Tverdokhlebov, and Valerii Chalidze—formed the Committee for Human Rights November 4, 1970. The following is our translation of the committee's statement of principles, which has now reached the West.]

\* \* \*

Proceeding from the conviction that safeguarding human rights is an important part of creating salutary conditions in which people can live, and that strengthening peace and promoting mutual understanding is an integral component of present-day culture;

Striving to assist international efforts to propagate the concept of human rights and to cooperate in the search for constructive ways of safeguarding these rights;

Noting the increased interest in this area of culture among the citizens of the USSR in the past few years;

Expressing satisfaction with the achievements in the field of human rights in the USSR since 1953 and striving in a consultative manner to promote further efforts by the state in creating guarantees for the defense of these rights, in accordance with the specific character of the socialist

the entire continental shelf in areas contiguous to Japan and south Korea, which also enjoy similar rights as coastal states. But in this kind of situation the rights should in theory be apportioned by mutual agreement—as has been done in the North Sea. Besides, there are vast areas away from Japan and Korea where only China can be legitimately regarded as the coastal state."

But legitimate rights are seldom paid even lip service when money is involved, and in this case the oil monopolies smell billions. □

system and the specific features of Soviet tradition in this field;

A.D. Sakharov, A.N. Tverdokhlebov, and V.N. Chalidze have decided to work together to continue their activity to promote constructive study of this problem by forming the Committee for Human Rights, which is based on the following principles:

1. The Committee for Human Rights is a creative association, acting in accordance with the laws of the state and the principles and regulations of the committee here set forth.

2. Conditions for membership are as follows: Members, when acting in the name of the organization, must abide by the principles and regulations of the committee. They must be recognized as members by the committee in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the regulations.

3. The aims of the committee are the following:

To cooperate in a consultative way with the organs of state power in developing and applying guarantees of human rights, acting either on its own initiative or following the lead of the interested governmental bodies.

To offer creative assistance to individuals interested in constructive investigation of the theoretical aspects of the human-rights question and in studying the specific character of this question in socialist society.

To conduct civic education on legal questions, in particular to make known to the public, international

and Soviet legal documents dealing with the question of human rights.

4. In theoretically investigating and constructively criticizing the present status of the body of individual rights guaranteed by Soviet law, the committee will be guided by the humanist principles of the Universal Declara-

tion of Human Rights, proceed from the specific features of Soviet law, and take into account the established traditions and real difficulties of the state in this field.

5. The committee is prepared for creative contacts with social and scholarly organizations and with in-

ternational nongovernmental organizations, if they follow the principles of the United Nations in their activities and do not have an aim of attacking the Soviet Union.

Moscow, November 4, 1970

Academician A.D. Sakharov, A.N. Tverdokhlebov, V.N. Chalidze.

## Under Kennedy Administration

# Report Six CIA Attempts to Assassinate Castro

The United States Central Intelligence Agency has made six separate attempts to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, columnist Jack Anderson wrote in the January 18 and 19 issues of the *Washington Post*.

Anderson said his information came "from sources whose credentials are beyond question." The first assassination attempt "began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. . . .

"After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba."

Anderson was able to furnish details, including the names of some of the CIA agents involved:

"To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. . . .

"Maheu recruited John Roselli, a . . . gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. . . . The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams."

Anderson charged that the CIA supplied Roselli with a poison to be used against Castro. He also suggested that one attempt nearly succeeded in killing the Cuban premier:

"On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel." The contact was supposed to be related to Castro's cook.

"A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been

carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961."

Anderson gave details of only one other of the six attempts. At the end of February or beginning of March 1963, he wrote: "The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended."

The columnist took the trouble to interview John McCone, who was head of the CIA at that time. McCone of course denied that any assassination attempt had been made, but he did acknowledge that the matter had been discussed.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was—it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

In considering any action, McCone would have us believe, the CIA always gives the most weight to the effect the action will have on the organization's popularity.

Since the recollections of former Florida senator George Smathers were partially printed last August, it has been public knowledge that President John F. Kennedy discussed the possibility of murdering Castro on several different occasions. [See *Intercontinental Press*, September 7, 1970, page 718.] Smathers, like McCone, claimed the idea was rejected.

Anderson suggested that the attempts to assassinate the Cuban leader were carried out by the CIA without

Kennedy's approval. In this, he was assisted by Smathers, who was happy to spout the liberal fiction that the CIA is an independent kingdom rather than a tool of the foreign policy set by the White House:

"Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed 'horrified' at the idea of political assassinations. 'I remember him saying,' recalled Smathers, 'that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous.

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing.'"

Smathers' account, however, was contradicted by McCone, who claimed that in a conference with John and Robert Kennedy, he had argued *against* assassinating Diem.

Even if one accepts McCone's statements at face value (his reliability may be judged from the fact that he told Anderson the CIA had never tried to kill *anyone*), it is clear that high U.S. officials regularly discuss with the CIA the possibility of assassinating heads of foreign governments, and that the sole criterion for approving or disapproving such a murder is whether it will advance the aims of American foreign policy.

Unfortunately, Anderson appears not to have asked Smathers or McCone if similar discussions are held concerning domestic opponents of the regime. If he had, might not McCone have treated us to some interesting information concerning never-acted-upon plans for such figures as the murdered Malcolm X? □

## Agnew Backs Hoover in Berrigan Case

Vice-president Spiro Agnew on January 25 joined the campaign against six persons accused of plotting to kidnap Nixon's adviser Henry A. Kissinger. [See *Intercontinental Press*, January 25, page 52.]

Agnew issued a statement describing as "self-serving claptrap" a speech in which William R. Anderson, a congressman from Tennessee, had said that Philip and Daniel Berrigan were "peace mongers, waging a peace campaign as their nation wages war." (Philip Berrigan is one of the six defendants in the case. His brother was named as a coconspirator but was not indicted.)

When FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover first announced the "plot" last November, Anderson publicly criticized him for making the charges without putting any evidence before a court. Agnew's attack on Anderson could thus be taken as an indication that the Nixon administration intends to do its part in smearing the six "conspirators" and defending Hoover and his methods in the case in face of growing public support for the defendants.

On January 26, Sister Jogues Egan was jailed for refusing to testify be-

fore the grand jury that handed down the original indictments. One of the reasons for her refusal, she said, was that the court wanted to question her about information obtained by tap-

### Problem for Nixon

## Balancing Claims of Client Dictators

The Nixon administration, in attempting to bolster two allies, has run afoul of a third. The Thai government is vigorously protesting plans to ship 200,000 metric tons of rice to South Korea and 110,000 metric tons to Indonesia under U. S. Public Law 480 [PL480], the so-called "Food for Peace" law.

Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn's objections stem from the fact that South Korea and Indonesia would normally be prime markets for Thailand's rice.

Under PL480, recipient countries pay for surplus food from the U. S. with their own currency. The U. S. then loans the money back, to be used for such economic development purposes as the purchase of arms.

This latter fact was recently greeted with astonishment by members of the U. S. Senate, but it is no surprise to the Thai government. The January 23 issue of *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported:

"... Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman . . . claimed that 'these sales were not made for humanitarian reasons as claimed by the PL480' but for allowing these countries to acquire credits for the sale of arms. 'Thailand is in the developing process,' Thanat declared, 'and we need funds to use for this reason. This unfair competition could reduce our income thus hindering our development.'"

With the mounting domestic opposition to his military ventures around the world, Nixon needs subterfuges such as "Food for Peace" in order to continue arming his client dictators.

ping the telephones of the Catholic church.

The Justice Department made no attempt to deny her charges, confining itself to a revealing "no comment."

The nun was released without bail January 29 while the contempt citation against her is appealed.

The six defendants are to be arraigned in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on February 8. □



AGNEW: "Self-serving claptrap" if you don't go to bat for J. Edgar Hoover.

It is therefore unlikely that he will give in to the requests of the Thai government, even though the latter does hold one trump:

"... the United States intends to maintain an 'air umbrella' in the area at least until 1975, and the sprawling Utapao Airbase near Bangkok is regarded as a likely successor to the soon-to-be vacated Okinawa fortress. The Thais are on record as favouring such a move. . . . But recent statements by Thai officials indicate that they have raised the ante for their cooperation."

It remains possible that the dispute will be compromised in the same manner it was last year, although Nixon has so far rejected that solution. In 1970, when the Thai government protested plans to ship surplus American rice to South Vietnam, the U. S. bought the rice in Thailand and sold it to Saigon. □

### Only Stars Are Bulls

A man in Toronto recently announced that the nearly two-year-old decline in the Canadian stock market will reverse itself around the middle of this year. He arrived at his prediction by correlating the Dow-Jones average with astrological tables.

The market has been going down steadily since May 1969. The value of stocks traded in 1970 was one-third less than in 1969. On the Vancouver exchange, the decline was more than 50 percent. There has been a slight rise in recent months, but no one appears confident that it will continue. Brokerage houses are still refusing to rehire brokers laid off by the slump.



# Uncle Sam Is Watching You!

The Pentagon, the *New York Times* observed editorially, had once again been "caught in the constitutional cookie jar."

The paper was referring to charges made December 16 by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina. Ervin revealed, on the basis of information from a former army intelligence agent, that the army had spied on at least 800 civilians in the state of Illinois alone. The list of those kept under surveillance included Senator Adlai Stevenson 3d, former Governor Otto Kerner, and Congressman Abner Mikva.

"The Army," Ervin said, "investigated these men during their campaigns for office and while they were in office." He went on to describe the army's criteria for deciding who was suspicious enough to be watched:

"It was enough that they opposed or did not actively support the Government's policy in Vietnam or that they disagreed with domestic policies of the Administration, or that they were in contact or sympathetic to people with such views."

If it applied those criteria consistently, the army would have a file on Vice-president Spiro Agnew, whose daughter expressed a desire to join an antiwar demonstration in 1969. In any event, the army had no trouble finding 800 suspicious persons in Illinois who merited its attention. Those under observation included state and city government officials, contributors to political parties, church figures, reporters, lawyers, and at least one millionaire businessman.

Stevenson said he had noticed persons spying on him during the election campaign, but had assumed they were hired by his opponent.

The day after Ervin made his charges, the army issued a denial so carefully qualified that it amounted to a virtual confession. The December 18 *New York Times* quoted Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor:

"On the basis of information I have received, I can state that neither Senator Stevenson, Representative Mikva, nor former Governor Kerner are or ever have been the subject of military

intelligence activities or investigation related to political activities."

Resor said nothing at all about the other 800 persons. And the careful wording of his statement on Stevenson, Mikva, and Kerner, the December 28 issue of *Newsweek* pointed out, left open "the possibility that they had indeed been scrutinized under another rubric."

Ervin's disclosure came while a suit was in the courts, initiated by the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], that sought an injunction to prevent the army from spying on civilians. Court testimony by former agents gave additional insight into the army's methods. One witness quoted in the January 5 *New York Times* said:

"We might be asked for the names of the 10 most active radical groups in an area. If there were only four active groups, we'd have to come up with the names of six others."

Judge Richard B. Austin dismissed the suit January 5 on the rather peculiar grounds that the army's spying hadn't been very efficient. "It is clear from the testimony," Austin declared, "that if this country must rely on Army intelligence, there will be no *Seven Days in May*." (The novel and motion picture of that name describe an attempted coup by U.S. military officers.)

It appears that the judge seriously underestimated the military's talent for snooping. In the January 18 *New York Times*, Richard Halloran reported that in a two-year period ending in the fall of 1969 the army had compiled dossiers on some 18,000 civilians. This number, according to later disclosures, was far below the real figure.

The files were based on the efforts of 1,000 agents who spared no personal sacrifice in their work:

". . . a black agent registered at New York University in 1968 to report on students taking a course in black studies. Another agent joined the Youth International party, or Yippies, and slept alongside its candidate, a pig named 'Pigasus,' during the

counter-inaugural demonstration . . . in January, 1969."

"Conus Intel," as the army's spy operation is known (for Continental United States Intelligence), does not, of course, exhaust the government's sources of information about its citizens:

"Conus Intel was but one part of a vast, interlocking intelligence exchange that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and probably [sic] President Nixon, knew was in operation, although they may not have been aware of all of its details."

Ben A. Franklin indicated the magnitude of this "intelligence exchange" in the December 27 *New York Times*:

"Counting other kinds [in addition to computerized files] of semi-automated records—mechanical card indexes and information on microfilm, for example—the Government, alone, already has various kinds of sensitive information on about 50 million people. The number and variety grows daily."

These files, covering one out of every four Americans, were useful in different ways to different agencies. The chief concern of Conus Intel, according to Halloran, was preparing the army to make war in the United States:

"At meetings in the Pentagon on April 12 and in the White House on April 15, 1968, Mr. McGiffert [David E. McGiffert, former undersecretary of the army] proposed that Army intelligence concentrate on civil disturbance warnings.

"Out of those meetings also came a requirement that the Army be prepared to send 10,000 troops on short notice to any one of 25 cities. That number was later reduced to about 10 cities where the National Guard and the local police were considered unable to handle things on their own."

These plans resulted in the creation of a special office in the Pentagon:

"The Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations was set up in June, 1968, in what came to be known as the 'domestic war room' in the basement of the Pentagon. This

group was responsible for ordering airlifts, troop deployment and logistics in a civil disorder and became a major consumer of Army intelligence data."

The data fed into the "domestic war room," Halloran wrote, included not only information on real or alleged "militants," but also on such varied items as details about persons "who might be willing to help calm a crowd."

Another consumer of Conus Intel data was the Justice Department. Halloran reported that a new director of the army's intelligence operations proposed in August 1968 to cut back on civilian spying because it was diverting too much manpower from other intelligence work. The general was overruled by the "domestic war room" and other agencies, "particularly the Justice Department." In preparing its case for the Chicago "Conspiracy" trial, the Justice Department was able to make use of an interview with one of the defendants obtained by Mid-West Video News. Mid-West Video News, it turned out, was really the 113th Military Intelligence Group.

Ervin's disclosures were particularly embarrassing to the Nixon administration because it had promised to end military spying on civilians after similar revelations had created a scandal. Ben A. Franklin explained in the December 27 *New York Times*:

"The Army has said that its intelligence branch had formerly conducted surveillance of civilian political activity believed to have a bearing on the Army's assignment to suppress any possible civil disorders in as many as 100 cities. Since last June 9, however, the official policy of the Army has been, officials have said, that the service no longer conducts any such surveillance."

The army had also announced in June that existing files on civilians would be destroyed. Testimony during hearings on the ACLU suit revealed that the "destruction" was pure sleight of hand. The December 30 *Washington Post* reported:

"Another witness, Jared Stout, a reporter for the Newhouse National News Service in Washington, said the Army general counsel told him the Army maintained four computer data banks of information on civilians.

"Stout said he interviewed Robert E. Jordan earlier this month and that

Jordan said data banks were situated at Ft. Monroe, Va.; Ft. Hood, Tex., and Ft. Holabird, Md.

"Stout quoted Jordan as saying the computer banks were ordered destroyed but that copies of the information on the two banks at Ft. Holabird were forwarded to the Justice Department."

Another witness, a civilian supervisor in the 113th Military Intelligence Group, admitted that the unit was still maintaining files on two Chicago aldermen, among others.

The Nixon administration reacted to Ervin's charges—by ordering military spying reorganized. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced that henceforth military snooping would be under his control, as if anyone would find that reassuring.

In a December 26 editorial, the *New York Times* called Laird's move "another unconvincing chapter in a by-now familiar script."

"The pattern," the paper continued, "usually starts with Congressional or press disclosures of spying by military investigators on a wide range of civilian and political activities. These are followed by instantaneous official denials. Then, as evidence piles up, a high-ranking Administration spokesman pledges that there will positively be no recurrence of what only the day before was said never to have happened."

The issue, as even the *New York Times* pointed out, was not who controlled the snooping, but why it was being done at all.

On January 22, John S. Lang of the Associated Press reported an interview with four former agents in the 113th. The intelligence unit, the four said, kept files on 5,000 to 8,000 persons in the Minneapolis area alone, and engaged in spying on such activities as public speeches by Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota and economist John Kenneth Galbraith. Army spies also had "ready access" to student records at the University of Minnesota.

The ex-spies said that dossiers were sometimes destroyed, but not in the manner explained by officials. Lang wrote:

". . . several report the Minneapolis office of the 113th has not destroyed some files on groups and individuals despite orders to do so.

"One agent said he did destroy between 5,000 and 8,000 index cards

on personalities and groups.

"Three waste baskets full were burned," he said. "But this was not because of disclosures on snooping. We needed more storage space for other files."

The Senate subcommittee on constitutional rights, of which Ervin is chairman, has scheduled hearings on the army's spy activities to begin February 23. The senators of course will not object to surveillance of radicals, but their indignation at finding themselves under army observation can be expected to result in further public disclosures. In the meantime, the capitalist politicians can console themselves with the fact that in the "land of the free," they have an equal opportunity to be removed from the army blacklist by bureaucratic needs for more storage space. □

## Philippines

# Marcos-Lopez Feud Reveals Some Truth

Under President Ferdinand Marcos, the *Manila Chronicle* declared recently, the Philippines has developed a system that allows "rich and poor to seek their livelihood from garbage piles." Marcos responded by accusing the family of Vice-president Fernando Lopez (which owns the *Manila Chronicle*) of using "the most despicable means, including crime and anarchy."

The split between the president and vice-president, the January 23 issue of the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review* commented, has more to do with conflicting business interests than any real political differences. The accusations they have been hurling back and forth are for the most part true.

Marcos says, accurately, that the Lopez family riches dominate the political life of the country, but ". . . Marcos has a reputation for wealth and involvement in business which vies with the men he is attacking. A campaign on moral grounds would arouse some ribald comment." On the other side:

"The Lopez charge . . . that the general penury is due to 'the insatiable appetite of gangs of high officials who have been rendered sleepless by their greed', cuts both ways."

Such a dispute may well go beyond mere verbal exchanges. There are some forty-seven Filipino senators and congressmen who maintain private armies. It is unlikely that either Marcos or Lopez will choose unilateral disarmament. □

## In Leros Prison: Stalinists Play the Colonels' Game

[The following report on conditions in the Greek prison camp on the island of Leros has been translated from the November 1970 issue of *Ergatike Pale*, the clandestine organ of the KDKE (Kommounistiko Diethnistiko Komma tes Ellados—the International Communist party of Greece, the Greek section of the Fourth International).

[This report describes not only the inhuman treatment the ruling military junta metes out to its political opponents, but also the shameful role of the Greek Communist party among the political prisoners themselves in victimizing those with whom it disagrees.]

[The Greek Stalinists have seen severe erosion of their once-preminent position in the mass movement following the colonels' 1967 coup, which the CP met almost without resistance. In its degeneration, the CP has split into a number of warring factions, the two largest of which are led by Partsalidis and by Koligiannis, who are supported respectively by the Italian and Soviet CPs.]

\* \* \*

### Leros Prison Camp

Leros is a camp for imprisoned popular fighters and "democrats." The junta's press calls it a place of exile. But exile is not what is involved. Leros is a prison without bars on the windows and doors. In other respects it does not differ from other such institutions. The only thing is that those imprisoned in Leros have even less rights than the other prisoners.

Prisoners in penitentiaries get more visits, more nearly tolerable room for sleep and for exercise in the yard, and some health facilities, as insufficient and miserable as they are. Here we are deprived of all rights and there are no limits on the arbitrary power of the administration. Most characteristic of our situation is our complete isolation from the rest of the world.

The only information we get comes from the junta's radio (especially the armed forces' radio station), books approved by the guards, and the



KOLIGIANNIS: Safe in Moscow—best spot to play the colonels' game.

gagged press. We have no communication with the city or any inhabitant of it, except the mental patients we happen to meet when we go to their asylum here.

The camp consists of the following installations: two buildings built in the shape of the letter pi; one, two stories high, the other three stories. Some 130-150 "exiles" are packed into their rooms in military-style double-decker cots, two persons to a bed (four prisoners in the space for two beds).

The yards of the buildings are so small that if we all went out to stretch our legs, we couldn't move. In the second year, there was a relative reduction in crowding, thanks to the efforts and pressures of the International Red Cross. The exercise yards were enlarged somewhat; some prisoners were transferred to the Oropos camp.

The camp site is still completely unfit even for robust individuals. The climate is damp, the buildings inadequate and unhealthy. The dictatorship's long confinement here of "exiles" suffering from numerous illnesses, many of them chronic—and whose

average age is fifty-five—is equivalent to slow but systematic and certain extermination.

As for the regime among the prisoners, it would be naïve of anyone to think that the fighters for "democracy" are living democratically together in the camps the dictatorship has thrown them into. This situation is one of the greatest tragedies the imprisoned fighters are subjected to, and perhaps the worst.

The political bureaucracy responsible for the defeats and catastrophes suffered by the workers and people's movement has an interest also in suppressing all censure, every critical view, all discussion, and all thirst for truth. And so it has created an atmosphere of oppression.

Both the pro-Koligiannis and anti-Koligiannis bureaucrats are equally guilty for the conditions the mass movement is subjected to in Greece. But while the Koligiannis faction in the camp amounts to no more than 25 percent of the prisoners, the most repulsive bureaucratic element is concentrated in it. It is trying to maintain control by coercion and force, suppressing all dissent and stamping out every trace of democratic activity.

The aim of the Koligiannis faction is to maintain and perpetuate its worm-eaten, decrepit, and dilapidated party "establishment." One of its main weapons is the use of physical force against those who think differently. The Koligiannis group is exclusively responsible for at least fifty acts of violence against prisoners in this camp. Its attitude toward the camp administration is slimy; it is trying to give proof of its good behavior.

When two non-Koligiannis activists, Kolonias and Sophias, escaped from the camp not long ago, the "representative" of the prisoners (a pro-Koligiannis lawyer) went to the administration, as if he were responsible to it. He reported that two prisoners had escaped and declared that the rest of the prisoners disapproved of their action. The warden thanked him and told him that the guards had already captured the two men in question. Then this disreputable "representative"

asked the warden not to put the escapees back into his camp.

When the camp administrator doubted that the rest of the prisoners agreed with this, the Koligiannis faction wanted to demonstrate that the whole camp shared their shameful and reactionary position. They suggested that the prisoners ask to meet with the administration. Here the real extent of their influence was revealed. Out of 1,200 prisoners, only 320 followed them.

This same faction is responsible for the death of the prisoner Galates. This is how it happened. The doctors in the camp were not Koligiannis people and had no inclination to take orders from this group. The doctors treated all the sick without discrimination. As a result, the Koligiannis faction decided not to go to them, even for first aid. As they saw it, they were isolating the doctors. In fact, they were isolating themselves from medical help.

When Comrade Galates fell ill, the Koligiannis supporters did not even ask the doctors to offer him first aid. They called them only ten days later, when his condition had deteriorated. But then it was too late. Comrade Galates's illness proved to be lung cancer, and he died.

Irresponsible, hyperbureaucratically organized, and holding fast to the views of Greek and international neo-Stalinism, the Koligiannis group constitutes the most ossified bureaucratic formation in the camp.

A second group is represented by the anti-Koligiannis people (the pro-Partsalidis faction). Although it upholds the same programmatic principles as the Koligiannis faction (essentially neoreformist), the Partsalidis group differs from the former on some important questions. It condemns the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and opposes the interference of the Soviet CP in the internal affairs of other parties.

A third group is represented by the followers of the Grapheion tou Eso-terikou [Bureau of the Interior]. Although these also have not rejected the old [Stalinist] tactics and methods, they constitute a more promising current which is examining itself and accepting its responsibilities. In its political positions, this tendency resembles the second group [the Partsalidis faction].

A fourth grouping is the "Chaos"

formation. It has an oppositionist attitude but no concrete orientation. It rejects the entire past and defends the cause of democracy. But it has such amorphous and undefined views that they fully justify the title "Chaos" which the group has given itself.

The fifth group is the "Anagenetes" [Resurrectionists] (named from the title of the pro-Peking periodical *Anagenesis* [Resurrection]). Despite all their abstract verbiage about "struggle," the members of this current are bound to the old Stalinist tactics, uninterested in studying and discussing new developments, and faithful to the new Mecca represented by Peking.

The sixth group is made up of independents who tend to make a radical criticism of their political past, try to illuminate all questions, want to maintain democracy in the workers and revolutionary movement, and condemn all attempts to distort the truth for any party's political convenience.

These, in a few words, are the conditions and problems of the activists imprisoned in Leros. The fundamental solution is release of the prisoners, a *general amnesty* for all the imprisoned and exiled activists, who are the greatest victims of the military dictatorship. Demanding a general am-

nesty is one of the basic forms of solidarity which the European and world proletariat must extend to the imprisoned Greek fighters; freeing the prisoners is one of the main political demands of the Greek people who today are bound hand and foot and gagged by the junta of the colonels.

The following minimum demands can be raised: closing the Leros camp as unhealthy and transferring the prisoners to islands where there are healthy conditions; guaranteeing bearable conditions in the prisons; complete medical and hospital care; completely free access to the books, periodicals, and daily papers the prisoners prefer; uncensored free communication (letters, visits) with friends and relatives; doubling the wage paid by the state; and unimpeded self-government by the prisoners themselves.

The prisoners have an obligation to themselves and to the movement to organize their own affairs and dealings with each other on a democratic and comradely basis, and to isolate every species of bureaucratic clique. This course would give a strong boost to regrouping and rebuilding the revolutionary workers movement on the democratic bases that are so necessary to it. □

## Canada

### Marches to Confront Trudeau on Abortion

Demonstrations for free abortion on demand will be held in Ottawa and Victoria February 13-14.

Particularly in Ottawa, where demonstrators will march on Parliament Hill, the protests have won growing support from figures in the New Democratic party [NDP—Canada's labor party].

Canadian women have been especially angered by the hypocrisy of the Trudeau government's response to the report of its own Royal Commission on the Status of Women, which supported the right to abortion.

Trudeau scheduled a two-day debate in parliament, but announced in advance that no reform would be introduced unless all the parties agreed. (When it was a question of destroying the civil liberties of Canadians by implementing the War Measures

Act, Trudeau felt no such need for unanimity from the parliamentary parties.) Since the small right-wing Social Credit party is opposed to abortion, this ruled out any opportunity to repeal the restrictions on abortion.

Trudeau has said that lack of public support prevents reform of the abortion laws, but a recent poll, reported in the February 1 issue of the revolutionary-socialist biweekly, *Labor Challenge*, showed that 44 percent of the population favor the right of abortion on demand. □

#### Cambodian Exports Fall

Prior to last April, Cambodia exported goods valued at \$70,000,000 a year. In 1971, the January 18 *New York Times* reported, "The Government's experts—and their advisers from the United States Embassy—are hoping to export about \$25 million worth of goods . . ."

## Healyites in Solidarity with 'Militant Policemen'

By Allen Myers

Since the strike of 200,000 postal employees in March 1970, there has been a rising level of unrest among American workers, with those on state and city government payrolls in the forefront. Many factors are involved in this increased militancy: spiraling inflation, growing unemployment, the war in Vietnam, and the influence of the deepgoing youth radicalization that has already affected the campuses of the United States so profoundly.

The youth radicalization has influenced the working class. Hundreds of thousands of young Black and Chicano militants, antiwar activists, and participants in the women's liberation movement, who have joined the labor force in the last five years, have brought a new mood into the unions contrasting with the conservatism of the middle-aged workers who dominated the labor movement in the 1950s.

At the same time, the new labor militancy has been expressed almost exclusively in strike struggles over wage demands and has not yet taken a political form—there are still no mass workers parties in the United States, nor even large-scale participation of the union movement as such in the mass struggles that are being waged around the war and other questions.

This lack of political differentiation has induced serious errors among sectors of the left toward actions taken by government employees. They overlook the fact that "government employees" covers a very heterogeneous group, from workers whose employer happens to be the state—such as firemen, clerks, postal employees, etc.—to components of the repressive apparatus—such as cops. Left groups that fail to see this can misjudge an internal dispute between the ruling class and its watchdogs.

A series of actions in New York City in December and January included walkouts by telephone workers, taxi drivers, longshoremen, and teamsters;

a firemen's slowdown; and threats of strikes by sanitation men and social-service workers.

Another category of persons paid by the city government also staged a work stoppage in New York for six days in mid-January: the police. The bourgeois press was quick to include the cops as just dissatisfied proletarians. Unfortunately, a sector of the left, eager to demonstrate its solidarity with the "workers," accepted this judgment and backed the cops in their action.

The chief demand made by the cops was more pay for their foul occupation—specifically a contract that would give them \$16,000 a year after three years.

There were additional issues not officially part of the dispute. These concerned the officers' dissatisfaction with what they considered interference with their normal duties of protecting private property, breaking strikes, attacking demonstrations, keeping oppressed minorities "in their place," and lining their own pockets. Murray Schumach reported in the January 20 *New York Times*:

"Interviews with policemen produced the following complaints:

● Other unions of city employees . . . went out on strike and, far from being punished, won fat contracts.

● Despite years of insults such as 'pig' from radicals at campus outbreaks and other demonstrations, policemen who tried to maintain law and order won little support. . . .

● Lenient court decisions and the behavior of some judges undermined the police and sometimes humiliated them.

● The mass media has been unfair, distorting the corruption of a small number of policemen and ignoring the good work of the vast majority."

In short, the cops demanded that the city government step up countermeasures against the present radicalization and, failing that, pay them more for trying to contain it.

The February 1 issue of *Newsweek* noted that "more than half" of New York's 31,700 police do not even live in the city but commute from comfortable suburban homes. "And when he comes into the city to earn his pay," the magazine commented, "his attitude perforce approaches that of the Hessian soldiers sent to quiet the colonists."

Despite frequent—and remarkably unsuccessful—campaigns to recruit cops from minority groups, the New York police force remains 92.5 percent white.

No demand raised during the work stoppage, no spokesman for the cops—official or unofficial—suggested that the walkout in any way implied dissatisfaction with their role as armed—and very often sadistic—defenders of the ruling class.

Among the most uncritical applauders of this prouling-class "strike" were the members of the Workers League, the American cothinkers of the ultraleft Socialist Labour League led by Gerry Healy in England. Their rationale is worth examining to see how the most simon-pure sectarians can talk themselves into ending up on the same side of the fence as the most reactionary defenders of the status quo.

The *Bulletin*, the "Weekly Organ of the Workers League," which has long denounced the attempt to build a united front against the Vietnam war as a "sellout," in its January 25 issue endorsed the walkout of New York's police force as a legitimate proletarian struggle.

Under a banner headline, "New York Labor Begins Showdown," the *Bulletin* featured a photograph of striking cops. As a caption for the stirring photograph, the editors declared: "Militant policemen march for parity during strike which was supported by 85%."

The author of the article, editor of the *Bulletin* Lucy St. John, wrote:

"While [Mayor John] Lindsay, [Governor Nelson] Rockefeller and city officials were preparing to mobilize the

National Guard yesterday, striking patrolmen reluctantly returned to work.

"The situation facing the city—*which can only be described as on the verge of civil war*—was sharply posed by a leader of the dissident cops the night before. Speaking to NBC-TV, in relation to the troop threat, he said that the cops did not want 'another Kent State' but that they would fight to stay out until their demands were met." (Emphasis added.)

Lucy St. John, it is clear, has been entranced by "New York's finest." She places them in the vanguard of the class struggle. These "dissident" proletarians have brought New York City to "the verge of civil war"!

The editor of the *Bulletin* reached this conclusion on the basis, apparently, that the mayor and the governor were readying the national guard against squads of uniformed men who are armed themselves—and notoriously trigger-happy.

No doubt Lucy St. John is sufficiently aware of the teachings of Marxism to know that in a real class war of major scope, one of the central problems facing the working class is to disarm the cops, who can be counted on to act as the most inveterate and ruthless opponents of any militant mass struggle.

But St. John, in accordance with her training in the school of Healyism, appears to feel that exceptions can occur. A goodly sector of "New York's finest" seem to have engaged in a political revolt against their masters:

"Lindsay and the entire capitalist class must very well be asking themselves what they face if those they pay to break strikes are themselves striking, if those who advocate and defend 'law and order' now defy it."

In fact, however, there was nothing in the situation that was not perfectly comprehensible to Lindsay. His cops were not striking against capitalist "law and order." They were putting the squeeze on for more elbow room in defending "law and order." And like mercenaries in the Congo or Indochina, they wanted to be paid in accordance with the risks.

The editor of the *Bulletin* seems to have been taken in by the fact that the cops' walkout was illegal under New York's Taylor Law. But committing illegal actions is nothing new for New York's racist-minded cops.

Few days pass without run-of-the-

mill accounts of police graft, payoffs, bribery, not to mention innumerable violations of civil liberties, the brutalization and outright murder of members of oppressed minorities.

The Taylor Law is, of course, a reactionary piece of legislation. But Lindsay's cops were not concerned with that. They will enforce that reactionary law to the hilt in the future as in the past, if they are so ordered, while they continue to break laws involving the rights of workers and the minorities.

St. John, a top leader of the Healyite Workers League, has suddenly forgotten all this. To win a bigger allotment of dog food, New York's cops bared their teeth at their masters. That made them proletarians!

This is not the first time that appearances have led the American Healyites to cross class lines. In 1968 they supported the New York teachers' racist strike—it was a strike, wasn't it!—against the right of the Black community in New York to control its own schools.

The rationale used by the Workers League in 1968 was that the teachers were a legitimate part of the working class and were led in their action by a bona fide union organization. But revolutionists have never given uncritical support to any and all actions of the trade-union bureaucracy. Strikes by construction workers to prevent the hiring of Blacks, for example, are thoroughly reactionary and must be opposed as such.

In fitting the 1968 excuse to the 1971 police strike, the editor of the *Bulletin* found it necessary to stretch things a bit.

The semifascist Patrolmen's Benevolent Association that led the action is pictured by St. John as a genuine trade union.

"Any concessions made to the cops on the question of wages will only raise the fight *by the rest of the unions* whose contracts expired on December 31." (Emphasis added.)

So the fraternal organization of the cops, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association [PBA], becomes just one more labor organization among "the rest of the unions." But police "unions" in general and the PBA in particular are first and foremost right-wing *political* associations, not collective bargaining agents. The PBA is no more a union than is the American Legion, the West

Point Officers Club, or the Ku Klux Klan.

*Newsweek*, which supports cops if not cop strikes, gave this description of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association in its February 1 issue:

"Begun in 1894 as a paper organization, the PBA won rights as bargaining agent for the department in 1963 and since then has developed into a formidable empire unto itself—complete with an annual flow of at least \$10 million from dues and pension contributions. Until 1969 when a scandal broke involving misuse of union [sic] funds, the men had been hard put to find a financial statement in five years, and when all the figures came out, they found their officers living the life of Mafia capos."

The editor of the Healyite *Bulletin* took a stand to the right even of the *Daily World*, which reflects the views of the Stalinist U. S. Communist party. The *Daily World* wrote in a January 16 editorial:

"... municipal workers, like all other workers, need the support of the entire working class to defend and advance their living standards. That is obvious in the present struggles of New York's sanitationmen, policemen, social workers, and uniformed firemen."

But the Stalinists, who make no secret of their reformist perspective, tried to cover their right-wing position with a few qualifications:

"The racist currents in the police department, the brutality of many policemen, the anti-black and anti-Puerto Rican attitude of the officialdom of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association do not win allies, even for justified wage demands."

The Workers League expressed no reservations.

Having placed the cops in the vanguard of the class struggle and having devoted more than half her article on "New York labor" to them, St. John apparently felt the need to cite some "objective" results to justify her stand:

"Objectively this action [the police "strike"] supported by transit and housing authority police has triggered a whole fight on the part of the city labor movement against the attacks on wages, jobs, and working conditions."

Here St. John postulates something not yet seen in the objective world: a "cause" that comes *after* its effect.

The cops' walkout began on the

night of January 14-15. It is therefore impossible for it to have "triggered" the phone workers' strike, which began January 11; the firemen's slowdown, which began December 31; or the cab drivers' strike, which ended in December. The only strike to follow the cops' action was that of the Teamsters, and there is no reason to regard it as "triggered" by the police walkout.

The "militant policemen," discovered by a top leader of the Workers League, did not "trigger" anything in the labor movement. On the contrary, one day before their own walkout, "militant policemen" attacked a demonstration of striking telephone employees, and six persons — workers, not cops — were "militantly" arrested.

This is rather peculiar behavior on the part of forces alleged to be leading the working class to the "verge of civil war."

St. John's position on the cops' strike necessarily leads to further contradictions. An editorial in the same issue of the *Bulletin* declared:

"... the working class is moving forward in such a way that the government, for all its intentions to crush it, is forced into an extremely difficult position. In New York City the police strike continues despite every threat, pressure and the Taylor Law itself, while the phone men defy immense fines and produce truck drivers go out on strike."

Presumably the sentence that immediately followed was intended not to be a logical contradiction but a dialectical unity:

"What this means is that the repression of the courts and the police can be beaten back IF the defense of the victims is rooted in the movement of the class." (Emphasis added.)

All clear now? The working class, including the police, is "moving forward." But the working class is also under attack by the courts and the police—who, we have been informed, are part of the working class. This repression of the workers by the workers can be defeated if the class, including the cops, continues moving "in such a way that the government . . . is forced into an extremely difficult position."

The "difficult position" would seem to be greater for the editor of the *Bulletin* than the head of "New York's finest."

But then the Workers League might work its way out of its difficult posi-

tion through a recruiting drive in the newly discovered sector of the working class. (Police of course have been joining working-class organizations for more than a century, but until now it was done without mentioning who their employers were; and when they were discovered, they were called stool pigeons or provocateurs.)

Another possibility opens up. A dis-

inction between "militant policemen" who are city "workers" and their counterparts who are federal employees would be rather arbitrary. Does an FBI militant, disgruntled over less than \$16,000 a year, now meet the proletarian membership standards of the Workers League? Can he at least count on the editorial support of the *Bulletin*? □

## At White House Ball

# Rogers Puts on Clown Act for Juan Carlos



FRANCO'S HEIR: "Unemployed royalty."

Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, heir to the Spanish throne and to fascist dictator Francisco Franco, was received in Washington January 26 with all the pomp and circumstance due his royal station. The festivities in-

cluded a nineteen-gun salute and a white-tie dinner and ball at the White House.

"Even as unemployed royalty," Judith Martin wrote in the January 27 *Washington Post*, "in three previous visits, the prince and his Greek-born wife, Princess Sophia, were received by the highest American government officials and were curtsied and bowed to by Washington society — partly because the couple's prospects were good, and partly because titles go over big here. But now that the prince has been officially named as heir to the Spanish Head of State, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, they are getting the full-scale, official treatment."

Life of the party at the official dinner was Secretary of State William Rogers, who toasted the royal couple as representatives of the "future generation" of Spain. He forecast a continuation of the "excellent" diplomatic relations between Washington and Madrid, and cited an example:

"Your Foreign Minister has been here four times recently and has seen President Nixon three of those times." Quipped Rogers: "He ought to get a commuter ticket." □

## China Exporting Lamb

Some \$800,000 worth of Chinese lamb is being sold to Greece, according to a report in the January 23 *Far Eastern Economic Review*. In return, Peking will receive 20,000 tons of surplus tobacco valued at \$200,000 and the balance in cash.

The negotiations, the magazine said, were conducted by a consortium of Swiss banks. The shipping is to be handled by the firms belonging to Aristotle Onassis and Stavros Niarchos.

## A Lawyer's Brief on Torture in Greece



PAPADOPOULOS: "... the only duty left to me ... is to commit suicide."

*Barbarism in Greece* by James Becket. Walker and Company, New York, N. Y. 147 pp. \$5.95. 1970.

On August 22, 1969, Greek Prime Minister George Papadopoulos told a visiting U. S. congressman: "I therefore assure you, on my word of military honor, which I still hold although I have parted with the glorious uniform, that whatever has been stated as regards tortures is . . . infuriatingly and basely false . . . if he supplies evidence of even one such case as having taken place under the direction of the present regime, then the only duty left to me as a man under solemn military oath, is to commit suicide."

James Becket has done far more than provide the one case demanded by Papadopoulos. This book contains:

- The stories, in their own words,

of eleven political prisoners tortured by the dictatorship;

- The text of the report of the European Commission on Human Rights, which found that torture is an "administrative practice" in Greece today;

- An Amnesty International report that found evidence of widespread torture;

- The full text of the Red Cross report from which the junta selected excerpts in order to "disprove" the charges of torture;

- The names of police and military officers assigned to torturing political prisoners, and the locations where they carry out their sadistic work.

Becket is a lawyer who spent a large amount of time in Greece prior to the 1967 military coup. Between December 30, 1967, and January 26, 1968, he visited the country as a representative of Amnesty International. His case is presented with a lawyer's concern for proven facts. One suspects that when the Greek people gain control of their country, the public prosecutor will need to do nothing but introduce this book as evidence in order to convict Greece's present rulers.

In this sense, Becket only proves what was already common knowledge to nearly everyone, including some

capitalist politicians who choose to deny what they know to be true. He does, however, offer additional items of information in passing, such as the following description of the CIA's functions in Greece during the 1950s:

"Its activities directed outside the country ranged from the overt, such as monitoring radio broadcasts, to the covert, such as dropping over a hundred men into Albania to overthrow the regime."

Becket's introduction also provides an unfortunately brief account of the role American imperialism plays in maintaining the power of the colonels. This concludes:

"The torturers themselves not only use American equipment in their military and police work, but they rely on the fact that the U. S. supports them. Hundreds of prisoners have listened to the little speech given by Inspector Basil Lambrou, who sits behind his desk which displays the red, white, and blue clasped-hand symbol of American aid. He tries to show the prisoner the absolute futility of resistance: 'You make yourself ridiculous by thinking you can do anything. The world is divided in two. There are the communists on that side and on this side the free world. The Russians and the Americans, no one else. What are we? Americans. Behind me there is the government, behind the government is NATO, behind NATO is the U. S. You can't fight us, we are Americans.'"

— Douglas Jones

## Guns and Butter No Problem for Pentagon

President Nixon's budget says that the U. S. is providing \$625,000,000 in "military assistance" to various governments in fiscal 1970. The actual figure, according to testimony before a congressional subcommittee, may be more than ten times as large.

Elmer B. Staats, head of the General Accounting Office, told the Joint Economic Subcommittee that arms aid this year actually totals somewhere around \$5,000,000,000. Senator William Fulbright said his staff thought the figure closer to \$7,000,000,000. No one could be certain because the Pentagon doesn't keep records on many of the goodies it dispenses to friendly dictators.

The reason for the discrepancy between budget figures and reality is relatively simple. Both the White House and the Pentagon have long recognized that

phrases like "supporting assistance" sound much better to the American people than "guns for dictators." So armaments programs were classified under other headings. In some cases, "surplus" weapons were sent to Indochina and Thailand without any record of the gift being made.

One of the most charming subterfuges involved the "food for peace" program. John W. Finney described its operation in the January 10 *New York Times*:

"The Pentagon also found a way to tap the local currencies that dozens of countries have set aside in return for 'food-for-peace' shipments received from the United States. With the permission of the United States, these countries used food-for-peace funds for purchase of military equipment from local suppliers. . . . nearly \$700-million of food-for-peace funds have been used for military purchases in the past five years."