

# Intercontinental Press

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**Clashes in Jordan:**

## **King Tries to Finish Off Fedayeen**



J. Edgar Hoover and  
the Clerical 'Kidnappers'

Blanco, Bejar, Gadea Demand:

**Free Eduardo Creus!**

ALLENDE: Thinks peasant land seizures are "improper." Favors taking only abandoned land. See page 62.

# Nerve Gas Lost

Two hundred cylinders of nerve gas, so deadly that a single drop of it on the skin is fatal, were lost at the bottom of an Alaskan lake for more than three years. This disclosure was made by the U.S. army, which was responsible for the gas, only after articles hinting at the incident had appeared in Alaskan newspapers, and inquiries had been made by Mike Gravel, a senator from Alaska.

Michael Getler reported in the January 6 *Washington Post*:

"According to the Army Test and Evaluation Command's investigative summary supplied to Gravel late last month, the lost munitions were among excess stocks that the Army had begun destroying at its Arctic Test Center in 1964. Because of the large amount to be destroyed, the project was expected to take a long time.

"As part of this effort, the Army moved 'approximately 200 rounds of toxic munitions' to the frozen lake in January-February 1966. Gravel's office says the munitions contained nerve gas."

For reasons "unable to be determined," no order to destroy the gas was given. When the lake thawed in May 1966, the deadly cylinders slipped to the bottom. The army responded to the loss of the gas—by forgetting about it.

Nobody said or did anything about the missing poison gas until August 1968, when a new commander arrived at Fort Greely, where the lake is located. Acting on the basis of rumors he had heard, the new commander asked for and received permission to drain the lake.

The draining was completed the following August and all the gas was destroyed, according to the army, by September 18, 1969. The army also claimed that there had been no leakage from the cylinders.

There was no admission of the incident until June 5, 1970, when the army distributed a mimeographed statement to members of congress. This was shortly after Alaskan newspapers had spoken of "mysterious goings-on" at Fort Greely. □

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## Hussein Tries to Finish Off the Fedayeen

The January 8 offensive by the Jordanian army against the last strongholds of the Palestinian guerrillas showed King Hussein's determination to complete the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance organizations, which he failed to accomplish in the bloody massacre of September. The January 14 "cease-fire," like all those that preceded it, will prove to be only a brief interlude in the king's extermination campaign.

The Palestinians have steadily lost ground since the September standoff. The latest "agreement" gives Hussein a key concession in providing for the disarming of the thousands of Palestinian militia fighters, who far outnumber the regular full-time commandos.

The Hashemite monarchy has pursued a policy of attrition against the Palestinians since the day the Cairo accord "concluded" the September civil war. Hussein is determined to have a separate peace with the Zionist rulers of Israel—who have explicitly demanded that the Arab governments curb the guerrilla movement as the price for such a "peace."

Several factors strengthened Hussein's hand over the last few months. The death of Nasser involved the new Egyptian leadership in their own internal problems. Nasser, of course, shared Hussein's aim of concluding a peace treaty with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, but for tactical reasons he was opposed to the destruction of the guerrilla organizations before that had been accomplished.

The overthrow of the al-Attassi government in Syria November 13 was also a boon to Hussein. Syria was the only Arab state to provide even halfhearted aid to the commandos in September. This source of supply was effectively cut off after the coup.

The most important advantage for the Amman regime has been the vast flow of American money and arms that has poured into the country. There are reports of a secret pact between Hussein and Nixon aimed at the extermination of the guerrilla organizations. Edouard Saab, writing from Beirut, gave this account in the

January 14 Paris daily *Le Monde*:

"There are reports of a secret accord concluded between King Hussein and the Americans, which is said to propose a separate peace with Israel. Strengthened by his victory over the fedayeen on the battlefield in September and by the practically unlimited aid which he is said to have received since then from the Americans, the Hashemite sovereign is said to have decided now to carry through the 'normalization' to the end. The Americans have reportedly furnished Jordan with twice the amount of arms and munitions lost during the civil war."

Thrusts against the Palestinian camps by the Jordanian army have intensified since November. Ten persons were reported killed in Amman November 3. Troops and fedayeen battled for hours in the capital November 18. Three days of fighting in north Jordan ended in a truce December 7—the Palestinians said the army had staged a surprise attack.

On Christmas Eve the Jordanian army mounted an artillery and tank assault on Palestinian bases specifically protected under the Cairo agreement.

The tempo and scale of the attacks stepped up with the reopening of United Nations talks between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt on January 5. With the Jarring mission reactivated, prospects for a "settlement" improved and the pressure increased for Hussein to finish off the fedayeen quickly.

As in September, the January 8 government offensive included indiscriminate shelling of the populous refugee camps. Clashes took place at Jarash and Salt, northwest of Amman. Fateh, the largest commando organization, issued a statement January 8 accusing the army of shelling a hospital at El Rumman and bombing the al-Baqaa refugee camp a few miles west of Amman. There were heavy civilian casualties but no exact figures were available.

Sporadic firing was reported in Amman from the eighth until after the formal cease-fire January 14.

The inter-Arab truce team in Jordan confirmed the guilt of the Hashe-

mite regime. The January 10 *New York Times* reported that Brigadier General Ahmed Hilmi "put the onus on the Jordanian Army, and charged that the authorities in Amman had mounted an offensive against commando bases."

Hilmi also accused Jordanian officials of barring his observers from the scene of the fighting.

King Hussein, undergoing treatment in a London hospital for a heart murmur, sent a message to his brother, Prince Hassan, on January 11 expressing his "unqualified support" for the army's bloodbath. Palestinian civilians had an entirely different reaction. The January 13 *Le Monde* reported that hundreds of refugees were arriving in Beirut, declaring that they had left Jordan "to escape a wholesale massacre and that they would prefer to live under the oppression of the Israeli enemy rather than remain in Jordan under the oppression of their Jordanian brother." □

## Habash Demands: Overthrow Hussein!

Dr. George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], was reported January 18 to have called for the overthrow of King Hussein. Eric Pace wrote in the *New York Times* that Habash's statement had been printed in an independent Lebanese newspaper, *Al Nahar*.

Habash said that the Palestinian guerrilla movement had been mistaken "in the illusion that it was capable of waging the fighting against the Israeli enemy within the framework of peaceful coexistence with the reactionary regime in Jordan."

"The Popular Front," Pace reported, "has objected to the truce provision stipulating that part-time commandos, or militia, should give up their arms and let them be stored under lock and key in commando arsenals."

Habash charged that "the Jordanian regime is determined to crush the Palestinian resistance movement." The PFLP objected to the truce agreed to by the Palestine Liberation Organization and said that its militia would not surrender their arms.

### Poverty in Turkey

Average per capita income in Turkey is \$350 a year.

## J. Edgar Hoover and the Clerical 'Kidnappers'

Six persons, including three priests and a nun, were indicted January 12 on charges of plotting to kidnap an adviser to President Nixon and to blow up the heating system of government buildings in Washington.

The bizarre accusations appeared to derive directly from charges made by J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], before a Senate subcommittee in November.

The six indicted were: the Rev. Phillip F. Berrigan, a pacifist priest serving a three-and-a-half-year sentence for destroying draft records in 1968; Eqbal Ahmad, a fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute for International Affairs at the University of Chicago; the Rev. Neil R. McLaughlin, a Baltimore priest; the Rev. Joseph R. Wenderoth, a Baltimore priest; Sister Elizabeth McAlister, a nun living in a New York City convent; and Anthony Scoblick, a former priest and the son of a former congressman.

Seven persons were listed as coconspirators but were not indicted. They included the Rev. Daniel Berrigan (Phillip Berrigan's brother, a Jesuit priest also in prison for destroying draft records), two nuns, a former priest, and a pacifist professor at a college affiliated with the Quakers.

The January 13 *New York Times* reported the charges as follows:

"The six defendants were accused of conspiring to commit the crime of maliciously destroying United States property by means of explosives; possessing dynamite, plastic explosives and detonating cord that had not been registered under Federal laws; transporting explosives in interstate commerce for the purpose of destroying property, and kidnapping and transporting in interstate commerce a person for ransom, reward or otherwise."

The indictment charged that the group planned to obtain maps of underground tunnels in Washington that contain heating pipes for government buildings. On February 22, the anniversary of George Washington's birth, it said, they intended to destroy the pipes with dynamite.

On the next day, the accusation con-



KISSINGER: . . . and also blow up my heating plant . . .

tinued, the group intended to kidnap Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, and hold him until Nixon had reduced the level of fighting in Vietnam.

Such wild accusations against a group of pacifists met almost universal skepticism, not to say amazement. Even the *New York Times*, which likes to maintain a pretense of suspending judgment on charges awaiting trial, commented editorially that "this is one of those events which would not be credible in the pages of a novel." The editorial added: "The indictment . . . is itself almost a conspiracy against sober reason."

The charges were immediately denied by the six defendants and their seven "coconspirators."

In a statement from their cells in Danbury, Connecticut, released by their attorney, the Berrigans stated:

"The objective [of the indictment] is a simple but deadly one—to destroy the peace movement by creating caricatures of those who oppose the war in Southeast Asia.

"Knowing that most Americans are against the war, the Government has embarked on a tragic and outrageous course—to stigmatize millions of mor-

ally dedicated opponents of our military involvement in Indochina as violent and deranged people."

They compared the accusations to Hitler's burning of the Reichstag in 1933.

Sister Elizabeth McAlister said: "We have all stood for nonviolence, and such acts as those described to me would be violent."

Wenderoth, McLaughlin, and Scoblick released a statement through their attorney. The January 14 *New York Times* reported:

"In their statement the three defendants declared that 'to attribute kidnapping and bombing to priests who have neither the philosophy nor the resources to support such activity' showed 'the desperation of men who have decided to stop at nothing' to destroy the peace movement. . . .

"Two men named as co-conspirators rejected the charges in separate statements. Mr. Mayer said the indictment was an attempt to 'stifle the voices of dissent.' Mr. Davidson called it an example of Mr. Hoover's 'wild determination to discredit those who have been struggling by non-violent means to produce fundamental changes in our society.'"

William Kunstler, the Berrigans' lawyer, predicted:

"They'll present evidence about the comings and goings of priests and nuns. Informers and F. B. I. infiltrators will make all sorts of allegations putting a sinister cast on their movements. How can you refute that? That's the insidious part of a conspiracy charge."

The *New York Times* added:

"He [Kunstler] said that the Berrigans viewed the charges as 'a colossal blunder into which the Government was stampeded after J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, concocted them to justify an appropriation for an additional thousand agents.'"

The reference was to Hoover's testimony November 27 before a Senate appropriations subcommittee. Hoover was asking the senators for \$14,150,000 to hire 1,000 agents and 702 clerks. He apparently felt that tales of

a "conspiracy" or two would be persuasive justification of the expenditure. He testified in a closed session—which may have caused him to be a bit incautious—but the subcommittee later released the record.

Hoover told the senators that the Berrigans were the leaders of a plot to kidnap "a White House aide or other public official," in the words of Fred P. Graham, writing in the November 28 *New York Times*.

The subcommittee appeared not to take the FBI's top snooper very seriously. Certainly they displayed surprisingly little interest in Hoover's charge. Graham reported:

"Neither Mr. Hoover nor any other Government official would give any hint as to the identity of the White House aide or any other persons allegedly marked for possible kidnapping.

"Senator Byrd [the subcommittee chairman] told reporters later that he had not asked. He did disclose that the Justice Department was asking for an additional appropriation of \$7.29-million to hire more Federal marshals to protect Federal judges." (Emphasis added.)

The imprecision seemed to indicate that the FBI had not bothered to make its tale complete by deciding on a victim of the "kidnapping." Hoover himself, Graham wrote, "Later . . . told a reporter that other high Government officials and several foreign diplomats were on the list of potential kidnapping victims."

The plotters, Hoover said, were organized in "an anarchist group on the East Coast, the so-called East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives."

Unfortunately for his credibility, the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives was no longer in existence, and the Berrigans had never been members of it. The November 29 *New York Times* reported that the organization, while it was active, had eleven members, mostly priests and nuns. The only member of the group named in the January 12 indictment is Joseph Wenderoth.

At the time of Hoover's original accusation, the Berrigans issued a statement that said: "At Danbury [prison] we have neither the facilities nor personnel to conduct such an enterprise." They demanded that Hoover

either prosecute them or retract his charges.

Hoover, in short, had been put on the spot by the publication of his testi-

mony. Having never been known to retract *any* statement, the FBI chief chose the first of the two alternatives open to him. □

## In Letter to 'Intercontinental Press'

# Hugo Blanco Voices Thanks to All Who Helped Free Him

[*Intercontinental Press* received the following letter, dated January 7, from Hugo Blanco, the Peruvian revolutionary leader, who was released from the prison island of El Frontón December 22 after being held behind bars for seven years and seven months as a political prisoner.]

\* \* \*

Compañeros:

I express my profound gratitude for your perseverance in the struggle for the release of the political and social prisoners in Peru.

Thanks to the campaign you waged, along with compañeros in other parts of the world, we have won a general amnesty and pardon law for all those accused of political, social, and related crimes.

In accordance with this law, I and the majority of the political prisoners have been released. However, this measure has inexplicably not been ap-

plied to Eduardo Creus Gonzáles, a revolutionary fighter active for twenty years in his native Argentina, who later continued his work in Peru, following the trail of San Martín.

Also still in prison are eight peasant leaders in Cuzco, five political prisoners in Lurigancho prison, and still others.

I am confident that you will continue as energetically as always to support our struggle for the release of Creus and the other political and social prisoners.

We believe that this is the proper time to make the maximum effort, since all we are asking for is *enforcement of a law that has been put on the books*. Moreover, now is the time when the public's attention is centered on this question.

I repeat my most profound thanks for your help in winning the freedom I now enjoy.

Signed: *Hugo Blanco Galdos*.

## Peruvians Open New Campaign

# Blanco, Bejar, Gadea in Joint Appeal for Other Political Prisoners

[On January 6 the Peruvian Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (Comité de Derechos Humanos — CODDEH) appealed to its friends and supporters throughout the world to mount an emergency campaign for the release of the Peruvian political and social prisoners still being held despite the December 21 general amnesty. The statement stressed the importance of sending the largest possible number of letters and telegrams to the Lima government de-

manding that it observe its own law providing for the release of all those imprisoned for political, social, and related offenses.

[Messages can be addressed to Presidente de la República del Perú, Gral. Juan Velasco Alvarado, Palacio de Gobierno, Lima, Perú.

[The committee also gave international distribution to a statement, jointly signed by a number of prisoners who were released December 22, appealing for the release of all those still

held in the jails of Peru because of their political views. The signers included Hugo Blanco, Héctor Béjar, and Ricardo Gadea.

[Our translation of this statement, which is dated December 23, 1970, follows.]

\* \* \*

On this date the undersigned went to the office of the Minister of the Interior—who refused to see us—to demand that the Decreto-Ley de Amnistía e Indulto [Amnesty and Pardon Decree-Law] be carried out in full.

Our comrades Eduardo Creus Gonzáles, Eduardo Espinoza Flores, Mario Cossi Pasache, César Ramos Vicente, Ernesto Alvarez Bautista, Juan Suárez Moncado, and Pedro Durand have still not been released. Besides this, other political prisoners are still suffering imprisonment in provincial jails.

We recognize that the Decreto-Ley de Amnistía e Indulto—to which we are indebted for our freedom—is a just measure and in harmony with the government's declaration. We point out, however, that the law will not

accomplish what it set out to do—and what has been repeatedly called for by professional, trade-union, and student organizations—unless it is extended to all political and social prisoners without any discrimination whatever.

December 23, 1970.

Signed: Hugo Blanco, José Fonken, Gerardo Benavides, Omar Benavides, Ricardo Gadea, Cirilo Mendoza, Héctor Béjar, Antonio Meza, José Galindo, Abelardo Collantes, Miguel Tauro, and Mario Calle.

## General and Colonel Witnessed Assault

# Mylai Trial Points to War Criminals Higher Up

Sergeant Charles Hutto was acquitted by a court-martial at Fort McPherson, Georgia, January 14. He had been charged with assault with intent to commit murder during the Mylai massacre in March 1968. [See the January 18 *Intercontinental Press*, page 30.]

In freeing Hutto, the court accepted the defense contention that Hutto, who admitted firing on unarmed civilians, acted properly in obeying orders to shoot. In his summation, the defense attorney declared:

"The Government didn't bring one officer or noncommissioned officer who could say that Charley Hutto did anything wrong except that he followed orders."

During the trial, the defense had presented testimony to show that the troops of C Company had been ordered by Captain Ernest Medina to kill everybody in Mylai. The January 12 *Washington Post* quoted one witness:

"Roger Lewis Alaux Jr., a student at Arizona State University who served, as a lieutenant, in the capacity of forward observer during the 1968 attack on Mylai, said the order came from Capt. Ernest Medina . . .

"The orders were to destroy the village and everything in the village," Alaux said. . . .

"Did the troops do what they had been told to do?" asked Edward McGill, Hutto's civilian attorney.

"I believe, as the order stood, that

was what they were ordered to do,' he said."

Other testimony implicated at least one officer higher than Medina—Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, who was in overall command of the task force that assaulted the village complex. He was killed in a helicopter crash several months after the massacre.

Sergeant Dennis Vasquez, who was Barker's artillery adviser at the time, told the court that the colonel had observed the entire operation from the air. He quoted Barker as saying: "Things are going fine, smooth, according to plan."

The January 13 *Washington Post* reported:

"Defense attorney . . . asked Vasquez:

"Did I understand you to say, as far as all the higher ranking officers were concerned, the mission was a complete success?"

"That's right, sir," Vasquez responded."

Similar testimony was also presented at the trial of Lieutenant William Calley, which reopened January 11 after a three-week recess.

The testimony of Paul Meadlo attracted the most attention from the press. When news of the Mylai massacre became public in November 1969, Meadlo was interviewed on nationwide television and admitted shooting down unarmed men, women, and children.

After being granted immunity from prosecution, Meadlo told the Calley court that he and the lieutenant had together killed perhaps as many as 140 persons. Meadlo's testimony also implicated Medina:

"Captain Medina was there before [one group of prisoners was executed] . . . and I assumed everything was okay because, if it wasn't, he would have put a stop to it, if he wanted to—the killings. With all the bodies laying around, why didn't he put a stop to all the killing?"

Two other witnesses, the *New York Times* reported January 15, swore that Medina had ordered the extermination of Mylai's inhabitants. Louis B. Martin said the captain had ordered his troops to "kill all inhabitants and livestock, contaminate the water and destroy food and anything that could be useful to the enemy."

James H. Flynn . . . said that when a soldier had asked at a prebattle briefing if 'we were supposed to shoot women and children,' Captain Medina replied, 'Kill everything that moves.'"

As in the Hutto trial, evidence pointed to responsibility of higher officers than Medina. On January 13 the court was given a hitherto secret report on the Mylai operation written by Lieutenant Colonel Barker twelve days after the event.

Barker's report claimed that 128 "enemy" had been killed and eleven captured. "Friendly casualties were light and the enemy suffered heavily,"



The Pigeon

MacPherson in the Toronto Star

he wrote. In regard to civilians, he added: ". . . the infantry unit on the ground and mobicopters were able to assist civilians in leaving the area and in caring for and evacuating the wounded."

That Barker's fictional account of the events was not based on ignorance was indicated by his pilot and copilot. The January 14 *New York Times* described their testimony:

"One of the pilots, Dean Lind . . . said Colonel Barker had visited the scene after a conference back in the staging area with another officer. The pilot said he thought the other man was either Col. Oran K. Henderson, commander of the 11th Brigade, or Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster, commander of the parent Americal Division. . . .

"From what I'd seen and what I heard made me realize he [Barker] knew what was going on,' Mr. Lind said."

"Colonel Barker and General Koster," the paper added almost in passing, "observed part of the Mylai operation from helicopters."

Both Henderson and Koster have been accused of concealing evidence about the massacre, although the army has not yet decided whether they will be brought to trial. Koster, however, had a legal obligation not merely to report the slaughter, but to prevent it, particularly if he was on the scene. As for Henderson, testimony at the Calley trial indicated that his orders played a direct part in the assault.

Dennis Vasquez, who earlier appeared at the Hutto trial, told the court he had attended a briefing conducted by Henderson before the massacre at which the colonel had ordered his company commanders to "rush in aggressively, close with the enemy and wipe them out for good."

The January 15 *New York Times* reported:

"He [Vasquez] indicated that the colonel regarded the assault as the 'final solution' to the problem of the 48th Vietcong Battalion, which was reported to be in the Mylai area."

The army's cynical attitude toward civilian casualties shows up not only in the refusal to prosecute the officers ultimately responsible for the Mylai massacre, but perhaps even more in a directive introduced as evidence at the Calley trial.

William Greider wrote in the January 14 *Washington Post*:

"Another document . . . describes why the Americal Division — just one month after Mylai — decided to stop using the term 'search and destroy' to describe such combat missions.

"Col. Nels A. Parsons, the division's chief of staff, issued the directive because, he wrote, 'unfortunately the term has been taken out of context and the emphasis placed on the word "destroy." It is then used to describe hamlets and villages in an area in which heavy fighting has occurred. Further, "search and destroy" has occasionally been used to foster the impression that military operations wantonly create, without regard to human suffering, large numbers of refugees.'"

Parsons went on to suggest several substitute terms that would "give the reader no basis for assuming a lack of compassion on the part of members of this command." □

## MEMO to:

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## Bolivian Colonels Fumble Coup

By Gerry Foley

"All night long the radio broadcast appeals to the students, to the workers, and to state personnel, calling on them to come to the aid of the government. At dawn, chief of state General Torres made an address to the nation in which he described the rebels who had tried to take power as a 'little fascist group.'"

Torres issued a stern warning to his rightist opponents: "'If the subversion continues, I will call on the Bolivian people to join in the struggle to completely crush the traitors.' Later he ordered the workers to assemble at their job sites, which he said were 'trenches in the battle.'"

These first dispatches from La Paz after the latest unsuccessful coup by rightist officers January 10-11, published in the January 12 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, indicate that in order to curb reactionary elements in the armed forces the shaky Bolivian military regime had to appeal for a new popular mobilization.

Before the masses could go into action, the plotters ended their mutiny. It lasted only seven hours. But a report in the *Washington Post* of January 12 revealed that some vanguard elements had moved very quickly and boldly in response to the rightist threat: "Groups of left-wing university students occupied the studios of a radio station and began broadcasting patriotic music."

*Le Monde's* correspondent Philippe Labreux described the mutiny as a "desperate enterprise which had been preceded the week before by an equally feeble campaign to create a climate of terror. At the head of a commando group, Captain Fernandez, former minister of the interior under the Barrientos government, attempted to blow up the thermoelectrical power plant supplying current to La Paz. The bomb failed to explode and the terrorists, who fled in one of La Paz's worn-out taxis, were quickly captured."

Like the abortive coup of October 4, 1970—which resulted in the formation of the weak, demagogic Torres government—this second rightist ad-

venture seems to have been a disaster for the Bolivian military establishment as a whole. "In the face of a new attempted rebellion by the right," Labreux wrote, "popular unity has been restored. Students, trade unionists, and left political leaders have once again stood shoulder to shoulder."

The ill-fated coup was led by Colonel Hugo Banzer. The week before, Banzer had been removed from his position as commander of the military academy and assigned to a post in a remote and desolate region. This reassignment came after he attacked the "direction" of the Torres government in a speech to the graduating class of cadets.

The putschist force was reportedly composed mainly of Banzer's cadets and elements of the Ingavi regiment, which was the backbone of the October 4 coup and which has remained hostile to Torres.

At the outset of the mutiny, the rightist forces seized General Luis Roque Terán, commander in chief of the armed forces; General Samuel Gallardo, armed forces chief of staff; and Admiral Rodolfo Castedo. Gallardo, working together with his brother Jorge, the minister of the interior, is supposed to have been mainly responsible for foiling previous attempted right-wing uprisings against the Torres government.

After capturing the top military leaders, the mutineers reportedly moved on the El Alto air force base outside La Paz, Torres' stronghold. The attackers were blocked by the presidential guard regiment, according to the *Washington Post* of January 12, and the air force strafed the buildings occupied by the mutineers: "La Paz reverberated throughout the night to the sound of machineguns as the World War II vintage planes attacked the headquarters where the rebels were holding two pro-government generals hostage.

"Flares were dropped over the city

to stop any attempt at troop movements.

"While the air force attacked, the 47-year-old president met his cabinet and talked by phone with the insurgents. . . ."

The mutineers seem to have surrendered after only a token show of force. Nighttime strafing by ancient aircraft cannot have been very effective from the strictly military point of view. There is no report that the putschists harmed their hostages. Some time during the night, the rightist leaders simply fled, taking refuge in foreign embassies.

Most reports speculated that the mutineers were hopelessly outgunned and had no chance against progovernment forces. It seems doubtful, however, that Torres would have issued appeals to the masses if his position were secure. The mobilization touched off by the October 4 coup only three months previously had threatened to shatter the military caste and all possibilities for maintaining the capitalist system short of full-scale U. S. intervention.

Given the relationship of forces that has existed in Bolivia since the mass mobilization of October 4-9, once Torres refused to give up without a fight and appealed to the people, the rightists were undoubtedly put in a very difficult position, no matter what military advantages they might have had. They may have decided to surrender rather than risk a head-on clash that could open the way for revolution. This, for example, was the choice the rightist leaders of the October 4 coup made when they found themselves in this situation.

Forced to accept an extension of reformist experiments by the October mass mobilization, elements of the armed forces have remained fearful that Torres would be driven to make concessions fatal to the entire repressive system. The mutineers apparently thought the new government had gone beyond the point of no return in yielding to popular pressure. As a result,



they may have thought that they could quickly rally the military establishment in an attempt to halt the collapse.

One of the main motivations of the failed coup, according to Colonel Edmundo Valencia, economics minister under the previous government and reputed second in command of the putschists, was opposition to the release December 22 of Régis Debray and Ciro Bustos.

In an interview with *Prensa Latina* three days after his liberation, Debray said that it had taken a long fight in the military and a virtual commando operation to get him out of the country. Intelligence officers trained by the CIA had been particularly opposed to letting him go, he said.

Debray was portrayed in a show trial as the mastermind of an international "Castro-Communist" conspiracy. To militarists like Banzer and officers especially heavily indoctrinated with the anti-Communism of the intel-

ligence services, freeing this young intellectual must have seemed like surrendering the last rampart of "order."

According to Torres, the Brazilian government was the ultimate backer of the attempted coup. If the accusation is true, it would indicate that the fanatical military strongmen in Rio de Janeiro are ready to engage in desperate adventures in an attempt to reverse the liberalization in Bolivia and probably also in Chile. Such an attitude would introduce a new factor into the very delicate political situation in southern Latin America created by the popular mobilizations in these countries.

Thus the January 10-11 putsch raises important questions about the capacity of the Latin-American military establishments to carry through the reformist operations now apparently favored by Washington. But there seems to be little doubt that in Bolivia the rightist mutiny has further weakened an already seriously threatened ruling class. □

between the bureaucracy and the Gdansk workers were of a rather tense nature. "The latest reports from Gdansk indicate that a delegation of shipyard workers was detained a few days ago when the men sought to continue their discussion with party officials," Feron reported January 15 from Warsaw. "The unrest in the shipyards is now said to be more apparent.

"Reporters who visited the city yesterday and today said that all appeared normal but that city officials reported an unusual number of meetings of worker groups."

The same day as this report, January 15, the bureaucracy granted one of the workers' principal demands. The head of the official trade unions, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, was ousted. "The trade unions led by Mr. Loga-Sowinski were among the first targets of worker fury when the demonstrations of mid-December erupted into violence," Feron wrote. "Union headquarters in several cities were attacked and in some cases badly damaged."

In the wake of the December rebellions, Loga-Sowinski made a humiliating self-criticism, admitting that his organization had been unable to defend the workers' rights. Later, state television reported that he said he understood the "necessity to make basic changes in the activity of the trade unions." The discredited bureaucrat's belated confessions and promises could not save his career. He was also expected to resign his seat on the party Political Bureau, according to Feron.

Other heads fell before Loga-Sowinski's, and more were expected to follow. Anton Walaszek, head of the Szczecin provincial Communist party, was dismissed, along with his deputy Henryk Huber. The new vice-chairman of the provincial party is Wieslaw Rogowski, editor of the local paper *Glos Szczecinski*. During the "Szczecin commune," his paper declared itself on the side of the workers who seized control of the city.

All high party officials implicated in the repression of striking and demonstrating workers were to be reassigned or removed from their positions, according to a January 11 dispatch from Feron. But the political face-lifting went further than that.

An Agence France-Presse dispatch quoted in the January 13 issue of *Le Monde* reported a decree that the

## Poland

### Gdansk Workers Threaten New Strike

Despite reluctant concessions by the Polish bureaucracy, the possibility of a new full-scale confrontation with the mobilized workers looms larger.

Several thousand workers of the Lenin shipyards walked off their jobs for two hours January 15, threatening a general strike, according to a correspondent of the American National Broadcasting Company.

"Gdansk is alive with rumors on the eve of the threatened strike, according to interviews conducted tonight," *New York Times* correspondent James Feron cabled from the Baltic port city January 17. "One man said it was widely believed that Warsaw workers would strike next week."

The Gdansk workers were demanding the end of reprisals against participants in the December strikes; ouster from the government of General Mieczyslaw Moczar, head of the secret police at the time of the upheavals; and the firing of economics minister Stanislaw Kociolek.

"Warsaw officials, including Mr. Kociolek have come here," Feron report-

ed from Gdansk, "but only to speak to party chiefs, according to one worker. He said that Mr. Kociolek was now so heartily disliked that 'it was probably safer for him not to go into the yards.'"

Hundreds of workers arrested in the December insurrection are reportedly still being held by the state repressive forces in Gdansk. In addition, Feron reported, the authorities in the shipyards refused to issue other hundreds of militant workers new identity cards after the rebellion, effectively barring them from returning to their jobs.

The hatred aroused by the bureaucracy's attacks on the workers in December is still running high. "Many women are said to be wearing black armbands for those who died," Feron wrote.

Warsaw radio admitted January 8 that numerous meetings were taking place in the Gdansk shipyards. It claimed that Kociolek had presided over some of them.

Signs appeared that the discussions

pictures of party leaders were no longer to hang in the schools and other public buildings. Henceforth the only symbol of state authority was to be the traditional white eagle of Poland.

The concession with the most far-reaching implications has been the first official recognition of the workers councils since 1958. On January 10, the government took the step of informing these bodies about the social problems facing the country, thus im-

plicitly according them a role in resolving the present crisis.

The workers councils arose spontaneously at the height of the 1956 anti-Stalinist upheaval as potential organs of workers power. In the first period of de-Stalinization, the Gomulka regime granted them modest participation in economic administration. For the last twelve years, however, these bodies had been totally ignored and held to be nonexistent.

Even if the Warsaw government's action in regard to the workers councils is intended only as a gesture, it still represents the Gierek regime's first concession of any kind to antibureaucratic demands.

It now seems clear, however, that Gierek's concessions have been too small to win the support of the decisive sections of the Polish working class for his government. In fact, the regime's political position may be eroding very rapidly. □

## 'A Poison in the Veins of the U.S. Army'

# Deepening Radicalization Among U.S. Troops

By Allen Myers

On January 8, two white U.S. army majors entered a hut in a Quangtri base camp and ordered five Black enlisted men to turn down the volume of their phonograph. A few moments later, one of the officers was dead and the other was seriously wounded.

The next night, an enlisted men's club at Tuyhoa was the scene of fighting between Black and white GIs. During the battle, a grenade exploded, wounding twenty-seven soldiers.

"How can you fight for America when every morning you read about Black people being killed?" a Black sergeant stationed in Germany asked a *New York Times* reporter last November. "You see pictures of them holding guns on Black kids. The kids stripped naked on the streets. You read about killings at Kent State, in Augusta, at Jackson State—my sister was in the dormitory at Jackson State when it was shot up."

"About two years ago," a Defense Department official told *Newsweek* magazine, "only some 30 per cent of the troops [in Vietnam] used drugs or pot. A year ago, it was up to 40 per cent. Now it's 50 to 60 per cent."

Incidents like these, which could be multiplied indefinitely, are a clear indication that the current radicalization has not skipped over the U.S. armed forces. In fact, under the pressures of combat and military life, manifestations of the radicalization frequently take more extreme forms than among civilians.

The process has already gone far enough to cause serious concern in U.S. ruling circles. A lengthy article in the January 11 issue of *Newsweek* summed up the situation:

"Since the end of the Cambodian operation last June, the United States Army in Vietnam has fought no major actions, launched no significant operations, captured no territory and added no battle honors to its regimental flags. In this same period, the Army has abandoned at least one base under enemy fire and suffered most of its losses from accidents and booby traps. It has seen the time-honored medal-award system badly tarnished, witnessed large numbers of its troops take to drugs that are prohibited back home and experienced a measurable decline in discipline and morale."

This decline in discipline is most startlingly exemplified in a custom known as "fraggings"—killing unpopular officers with a fragmentation grenade. Iver Peterson reported in the January 11 *New York Times*:

"The United States command in Vietnam says it does not have statistics on the number of fraggings, but informed sources disclosed recently that in the 101st Airborne Division near Hue, there were 42 'serious incidents' against officers and sergeants that resulted in at least nine deaths last year."

More widespread than such extreme forms of rebellion are simple refusals to obey orders. In the November 21 *New York Times*, Fred Gardner quot-

ed from a letter written by a GI at Cu Chi:

"They have set up separate companies for men who have refused to go out to the field. It is no big thing here anymore to refuse to go. If a man is ordered to go such and such place he no longer goes through the hassle of refusing; he just packs his shirt and goes visit some buddies at another base camp."

Even before Nixon ordered an end to "search and destroy" missions, they had become known to the infantry as "search and evade." *Newsweek* cited the example of a squad leader ordered to take his men up a hill that he knew to be mined with booby traps. Instead, he deliberately led them up another hill, where they waited to be evacuated by helicopter.

"If a platoon or company commander wants to avoid blemishing his record with a combat refusal," the article continued, "he does not issue an order unless he is sure that his men will respond to it."

The magazine's Saigon bureau chief Kevin Buckley spent Christmas day with soldiers at an outpost called Firebase Dragonhead. He talked about the war with a group of GIs, most of whom were smoking marijuana:

"Everyone—pot smoker and non-pot smoker alike—agreed when one stoned soldier remarked: 'You know what this war is like? It sucks. . . . There's nothing good about us being

here. There it is. All we want to do is get out of here alive. Morale is bad, man."

Said another GI: "They ought to send over some of those people who are for the war. Send some of those brave politicians and hard hats and let them see if they like it so much. I'll change places with any one of them."

One "top-ranking American officer" told *Newsweek*: "Vietnam has become a poison in the veins of the U. S. Army." There are other poisons as well.

One of the most prevalent is the discrimination experienced by Black soldiers. Unlike older career soldiers, young draftees have been strongly affected by the nationalist sentiment in the Black communities, and they are organizing nationalist groups inside the army.

Thomas A. Johnson reported in the November 23 *New York Times* that Black GIs stationed in Germany have established some *fifteen* such organizations, with names like Unsatisfied Black Soldiers and Black Action Group.

Last July 4, in a united front meeting at Heidelberg, 1,000 Black GIs met and resolved to work for immediate U. S. withdrawal from Indochina, for an enlisted review board to rule on pretrial confinement of Black soldiers, a civilian inspector of army procedures, an end to discrimination in assignments, and the hiring of more Blacks in civilian jobs.

Superficial reforms such as the elimination of reveille are obviously not going to reverse the process of radicalization in the armed forces. *Newsweek* expressed the concern that must be occupying many persons in the White House and the Pentagon:

"The central question . . . is whether an army that has begun to wilt can manage to wilt just a little. If the enemy should launch another major offensive, the GI's would no doubt fight hard. But should they be called upon to take the offensive themselves, there seems to be serious reason to question whether all of them would respond."

One tactic that the Nixon administration has used against civilian political activity will clearly not work in the army. As a GI said at a rally

Germany: "What can they do? Call out the National Guard? How can they call out the National Guard on the army?" □

## Bourgeois Parties and Reformists Declining

# Shift to the Left in Okinawa

By Wataru Yakushiji

Osaka

An important change has taken place in the structure of the struggle for an end to the U. S. occupation of Okinawa since the five-day strike of Zengunro [All-Okinawa Military Workers Union] in January, 1970.\*

The movement received a setback when Zengunro was forced to conclude an unfavorable "armistice" agreement with the American military authorities April 7, after Fukkikyo [Okinawa Conference for Return to the Homeland] and Kenrokyo [Okinawa Prefectural Council of Labor Unions] failed to produce on a promised general strike in support of Zengunro strikers.\*\*

Differences in the Okinawan workers movement were brought out in the open at Fukkikyo's April 20 congress. A right wing pressed for adaptation to the liberal rhetoric of the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué of November 1969. This tendency finally precipitated a walkout from the congress.

Fukkikyo is an umbrella organization uniting some fifty diverse groups ranging from the Socialist, People's, and Socialist Mass parties, to Parents-Teachers Associations, women's associations, and trade unions. The congress majority voted to continue the fight against the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty and the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué and against the continued presence of American military bases in Okinawa. This went under the slogan of an "antiwar return" of Okinawa to the mainland, that is, with no strings attached.

\* See *Intercontinental Press*, February 16, 1970, page 128.

\*\* Zengunro was fighting for the reinstatement of or payment of compensation to 1,738 Okinawan workers at American bases who were summarily dismissed February 6. When the threatened general strike failed to materialize, the Zengunro leadership agreed not to strike again before June 30, 1970, if there were no further dismissals and if there were no reprisals for the earlier strikes. Four hundred of the fired workers were temporarily reinstated.

The minority, represented by the Okinawa chapters of the Sailors Union and the Zensen-domei [All-Japan Textile Workers Union], both affiliated to Domei [Confederation of Japan Labor Unions, a class-collaborationist organization which supports the Democratic—Socialist party], split from Fukkikyo in the course of the congress.

Although the groups that walked out were relatively small, the reformist tendencies that remained, such as the Socialist Mass party, used the incident to create a furor that led to demoralization and paralysis within the ten-year-old coalition. The results were clearly reflected in the turnout for "Okinawa Day," April 28: 15,000 persons in comparison to the 50,000 who participated in 1969.

Militancy remained quite high, however, among rank-and-file workers, as shown by the September 10-11 Zengunro strike against the dismissal of 518 base workers and arbitrary cuts in the workweek accompanied by loss of pay. About 1,500 workers from Kenrokyo, Kyoshokuin-kai [Okinawa Teachers Association], and Masukokirokyo [Okinawa Council of Press and Broadcasting Workers Unions] joined picket lines of 2,500 Zengunro workers at gates of U. S. bases. The American authorities were finally forced to withdraw about half of the dismissals.

## The November Elections

It was under these circumstances that the November 15 elections to the mainland parliament were held in Okinawa.

There were two questions at stake in the elections: First, whether to accept the "unification" plan proposed by the imperialist leaders of the U. S. and Japan. Second, for those who rejected the Nixon-Sato proposal, what course of action to choose.

On the first point there was no ambiguity. The proimperialist parties were given a smashing defeat. The margin of victory for the left parties

was especially marked considering the fact that many advanced workers rejected participation in the mainland parliament and hence abstained from the election.

For the mass, however, the turnout of 83.5 percent at the polls showed that rejection of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party did not mean a break with parliamentary politics.

For the lower house (House of Representatives), the Liberal-Democrats won 43.56% of the vote; the right-wing Komeito party, 10.16%; while the rest went to three left parties: People's party, 17.44%; Socialists 16.61%; and Socialist Mass party, 12.23%.

For the upper house (House of Councilors), the three left parties fielded a common slate under the name Left Cooperation. This slate won 49.78% of the vote compared to 45.41% for the Liberal-Democrats, with the remainder going to a conservative independent.

The decline of the Socialist Mass party and the big growth in the Socialist and People's party vote were indicative that Okinawan workers had chosen the most radical parties on the ballot. This meant also, in regard to the second issue in the election, that the electorate was moving toward the most radical solution proposed by any of the mass parties to the problem of how Okinawa was to be returned to the mainland.

The decline of the Socialist Mass party was particularly important, as this formation has dominated the Okinawan reunification movement for many years.

Among the more advanced workers there are reservations about participating in a mainland parliament overwhelmingly dominated by the Liberal-Democrats. In this layer the election inspired no great enthusiasm. One local chapter of Kyoshokuin-kai even decided to boycott the election.

The decision to boycott the elections without proposing any alternative is ultraleftist. At the same time, it is clear that the boycotters represent the revolutionary vanguard in Okinawa in opposition to the parliamentary cretinism of the traditional workers parties.

The Japan section of the Fourth International, opposing the reformist

parties, has also criticized the ultra-leftism that has appeared spontaneously in the Okinawan movement. In

the process the Japanese Trotskyists have registered considerable gains in Okinawa as well as on the mainland. □

## Quebec Prisoners on Hunger Strike

### Chartrand Sentenced for 'Contempt'

By Robert Dumont

[The following article is reprinted from the January 18 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

\* \* \*

The legal frameup of radical Québec nationalists took a new turn January 8 when Michel Chartrand, leading Montréal trade unionist, was sentenced to a year in prison for contempt of court.

Chartrand, one of the five leading defendants accused of seditious conspiracy as well as membership in the outlawed Front de Libération du Québec [FLQ—Québec Liberation Front], had appeared before Mr. Justice Ouimet to submit a motion for quashing the charges. When Chartrand urged the judge to disqualify himself from the trials on the grounds of prejudicial statements he has made about the persons accused, the judge quickly slapped four convictions of contempt on Chartrand.

In a court appearance the previous day, the labor leader had protested the repeated postponements of his trial. With his trial date now set for February 1, he said, he will have spent almost four months in jail simply awaiting a show trial on illegal and unconstitutional charges.

"How would you like to spend (a further) three weeks in jail, without your wife, without the sun?" he asked. "Who will give me back all this time lost? Somebody will pay me back, I guarantee you that. And they wonder why some people want to blow everything up." (This last sentence was mistranslated in the English newspapers as "The sooner things will blow up, the better.")

Appearing after Chartrand, codefendant Robert Lemieux, the radical lawyer, sought to withdraw a bail application for himself, Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon and instead present

it to another judge. Lemieux said Mr. Justice Ouimet had threatened him by telling him in private to think twice before defending some of the people accused under the "public order" act.

The trials of those accused of FLQ membership began January 11 and are expected to drag on for several months. The seditious conspiracy trials begin February 1, and the trials of those accused of murdering Pierre Laporte begin February 8. However, the judges are openly threatening to hold over many of the accused to the fall assizes on the grounds there are too many prisoners to deal with this spring. The government, anxious to sustain the atmosphere of crisis and insecurity provided by these serious charges, is clearly in no hurry to dispose of the trials. And as the vicious sentence against Chartrand indicates, it is prepared to throw the book at the political prisoners.

By keeping the repressive Public Order Act on the books, the Ottawa and Québec governments aim to keep their hands free to continue their arrests and harassment of the Québec nationalist movement. Just before his departure for Singapore and the Commonwealth conference, Trudeau said he would not revoke the Act until the police give him "ironclad guarantees" of no further terrorism in Québec. And, for the first time, he clearly committed his government to introduce during this session permanent repressive legislation along the lines of the present "temporary" measures.

All of the leading prisoners have complained of prison conditions. Chartrand says he is detained "in a five-by-seven cell with no lights, no nothing." Charles Gagnon is reported to be very sick, complaining of stomach pains and eating very little. Some of the political prisoners are on a hunger strike to protest failure to obtain bail. □

## U.S. to Relocate Millions of Peasants

American and South Vietnamese officials in Saigon have revealed plans to move hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of peasants from the country's northern regions to what the *New York Times* called "more sparsely populated provinces" in the south.

Despite official denials, it was apparent that the aim of the massive transfer would be to scatter peasant supporters of the Vietnamese freedom fighters. The January 11 *New York Times* reported:

"Some Vietnamese, sharply critical of the movement, say that the plan is a political move by the Government against the Vietnamese of the northernmost provinces, who have consistently resisted control by the Saigon Government.


"The area has been traditionally sympathetic to the Communists and remains the poorest economic region in South Vietnam. By moving the peasants, these critics say, the Government would attempt to disperse its opposition at the cost of still more suffering."

Official justification for the project is the plight of the one million refugees in the northernmost provinces, who in the last four years have been driven by American bombing from the countryside into urban slums. But Tran Nguon Phieu, the Saigon regime's minister of social welfare, told the *New York Times* that the plan had been under consideration for several years, i.e., since before the refugee problem assumed its present proportions.

The scale of the proposed project, which has been "approved in principle by the highest South Vietnamese and American officials," may involve as many as three million people over a period of three years. This would represent more than one-sixth of South Vietnam's total population.

"The project," said the *New York Times*, "will be financed by the United States, according to Franklin Stewart, the director of the War Victims Program in Vietnam.

"We expect that this year's allotted refugee fund will be exhausted during



the first two months of the program,' Mr. Stewart said. 'After that we hope to get additional money from the U. S. government.'

Even some American advisers have objected to the plan. One of them told the *New York Times*:

"I am afraid that if they try to settle refugees in our province the peasants will eventually move to Saigon to join the urban slums. I am opposed to the movement. I know other American advisers are opposed. In the long run, it will only add another tragedy to our already tragic involvement here."

Stewart claimed that the migration would be "voluntary," an assurance that brings to mind the "voluntary" concentration camps called "strategic hamlets," which were used to control the population in an earlier phase of the war.

Saigon's minister of state, Phan Quang Dan, who is expected to head the project, may have inadvertently revealed what awaits the peasants of the northern provinces when he said: "We know from the Cambodian experience that the peasants will jump at the opportunity to have new land."

Dan was referring to last year's mi-

gration of 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia to South Vietnam. He neglected to point out that these peasants left their homes only after the Lon Nol regime had slaughtered hundreds of defenseless villagers.

Similarly, peasants were "persuaded" to move into the strategic hamlets by having their villages burned to the ground. Presumably the Thieu government has been assured of American assistance if any examples are needed to persuade peasants to migrate "voluntarily" to the south. □

### Mercury in the Air

Scientists in Chicago, Illinois, have reported that the burning of coal and oil in industrial plants is a source of mercury pollution of the environment. They reached the conclusion after using a helicopter to obtain air samples from smokestacks.

According to the December 31 *Chicago Sun-Times*, the investigators found that even larger amounts of mercury were thrown into the atmosphere by municipal incinerators, which burn mercury-treated paper, mercury batteries, and electrical instruments containing mercury.

The scientists said that such airborne mercury was probably a source of the contamination that has been found in tuna.

## The Real Perspective Facing the Chilean Masses

[We have translated the following article from the January 8 issue of the Belgian revolutionary socialist weekly *La Gauche*.]

\* \* \*

The Popular Unity [Unidad Popular] victory in the Chilean elections, with 36 percent of the vote, and the installation of a popular front government, presided over by the Social Democrat Salvador Allende and including three Communist ministers, has inspired hosannas from the Belgian Communist newspaper. Bursting with joy and pride, the comrades of *Le Drapeau Rouge* are congratulating themselves on being in the center of things. After so much fratricidal warfare, they are overcome with a feeling of renewed brotherhood among the CPs of the world.

Under the direction of their traditional leaders, the Communists of *Le Drapeau Rouge* would like to celebrate a victory reconsolidating the old Stalinist complicity and confirming the validity of a line they have stubbornly defended since 1935. But this is a bit premature.

They are already raising the shout of victory. But whose victory? The victory of an alliance of Social Democrats, Communists . . . and bourgeois liberals—an alliance that exercises power only within the framework of a bourgeois government and only on the condition that it maintain bourgeois order and respect both "personal human rights," that is, essentially, private property, and the honor of the army.

But the electoral successes of the Unidad Popular (UP) and the CP's achievement in finally getting accepted into a bourgeois government cannot be mistaken for a victory of the Chilean revolution. A revolutionary victory would take something more than the sort of promises of profound refashioning of the existing structures contained in the UP program to which Salvador Allende is committed!

But for traditional Communists, victory is nothing more than the UP and the CP getting the upper hand in dominating the Chilean masses.



CORVALAN: Don't "distrust . . . the army."

"There is nothing more revolutionary than to contribute to the success of the people's government presided over by Comrade Allende; there is nothing more revolutionary than carrying out his program, widening the support of the people's government, and . . . consolidating the influence of the Communist party."

On this subject, you have to read the interview with Luis Corvalán, the general secretary of the Chilean CP, in the January 1 issue of *Drapeau Rouge*. Here the confusion of the electoral victory with a victory of the revolution stands out clearly. It is deliberate. The objective of advancing and developing the UP is substituted for developing and advancing the Chilean revolution.

Of course, Luis Corvalán does not claim that the revolution has already come to pass. Nor has he yet forgotten about it. He begins in fact by noting that the steps that have been taken in this direction are still far from irreversible. He points out that the UP enjoys only a plurality in the govern-

ment, that the administrative personnel remain bourgeois, and that the imperialists and the oligarchy still control the centers of economic power.

But, Corvalán says, the UP program is not reformist because it includes measures of a really fundamental character. And, in moving without delay to carry it out—if unity, the Allende government, and the "Party" are defended—the decisive stage will be passed in the next three months.

"Our strategy of unity has not always been understood by everybody," Luis Corvalán dares to say. And he repeats the explanation aimed at justifying the unprincipled alliance with the petty-bourgeois parties. But the need of winning over the petty bourgeoisie as an auxiliary force has long been understood. However, the dangers are also known that flow inevitably from a counterrevolutionary alliance with bourgeois parties. It is easy to become the hostage of such parties if you are not careful.

Above all, we know the vital necessity in cases of alliances with bourgeois parties of bolstering the activity of all the working-class organizations through united action in a proletarian united front. Only such a workers' alliance can confront the bourgeois united front which coalesces unflinchingly when the bourgeoisie feels threatened.

The difference between a workers' united front and a popular front (which includes the bourgeoisie) has been understood by everyone who has any clear idea of what happened in France and Spain in 1936, in China in 1927, or more recently in Indonesia. It would be understood all too well by those who perished as a result of this criminal policy promoted by Stalin, which the CPs that identify with Moscow or Peking continue obstinately to defend today. This is the policy that tends to disarm the workers and peasants and finally gets them to lay down their arms before the bourgeoisie when the counterrevolutionaries ultimately turn their weapons against the revolutionists.

Who has not understood the limits

and dangers of the popular front strategy? Who but our good Stalinist comrades. Closing their eyes even to the glaring evidence of the massacres in Indonesia, they are starting again with their arguments, their accusations of sectarianism and ultraleftism, to drown out all discussion by sending up a chorus of cries for "unity"!

Unity with whom? With the proletarian forces or with the bourgeoisie? Are you familiar with the cartoon that appeared in a bourgeois daily at the time of the popular front in France? Trying to puff up a red scare to denounce the popular front government, it showed the liberal Daladier being pushed out by the Social Democrat Léon Blum, who in turn was being pushed out of the picture by an enormous Maurice Thorez [the CP leader].

What in fact happened? It was Thorez and Blum who were pushed out by Daladier. And later, by capitulating at Munich he prepared the way for the second world war. This, moreover, was after he had gotten Blum to agree not to intervene in the Spanish civil war.

Isn't concrete proof enough for the Stalinists? No, because this strategy enabled the CP in France after 1936 to win hegemony over the masses of French workers. And this position enabled it, through the war and the liberation, the Algerian war, Gaullism, and May 1968, to protect the gains of the workers, which they themselves had won by their struggle—collective bargaining and paid vacations.

We are far from denying the need for tactical and temporary alliances with bourgeois forces. But such alliances must not lead to letting yourself be tied up by these forces and then smothered or massacred. It is equally obvious that the primary task of any Communist party worthy of the name is to help the workers to organize independently and to move toward arming them. Parallel to this, it must work for the practical realization of a program including nationalization of the essential sectors of the economy and of foreign trade, as well as a radical agrarian reform.

Isn't this precisely what Allende is doing? No! It would be precisely the worst deception to claim this.

Of course, the promised 66 percent increase in the minimum wage, free hospital and clinic care, rescinding price-rise decrees, a free half-liter of

milk for children, and dissolving the mobile police (a special antiworking-class brigade) would represent extraordinary gains. We would never deny this. But this is not enough. This could simply be the ransom the bourgeoisie had to pay to curb the powerful mass mobilization which assured the UP success in the elections and which has since broadened further.

The creation of a national economic council including representatives of the unions and the social organizations along with representatives of the state and the employers (it goes without saying that representatives of the capitalists and their government will be included but Luis Corvalán neglects to mention this) is simply an institutionalization of the situation where the unions are integrated into the capitalist state. We do not see any means here for assuring the working masses real control over the administration of public affairs and the economy . . .

Establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, China, and North Korea? That is unquestionably positive. But there is still nothing here absolutely unacceptable for imperialism. It tolerates a lot of other countries. These are minor concessions that can easily be taken back when the flood of mass mobilization has receded to safe channels, or resumed an obscure course through the subterranean depths.

Finally we come to the difficult stage: passing the point of no return. Isn't President Allende quickening the advance of the revolution by nationalizing the copper mines, coal mines, and private banks, as well as by undertaking an extensive and deepgoing agrarian reform?

The Brazilian masses are waiting for this and applauding Allende; certainly the Latin-American masses are, too. And this is true as well of the masses of the entire world, who, while apprehensive about the reaction of American and international imperialism (five of the nationalized, or rather, statized, banks were owned not only by American but also French, Italian, English, and Brazilian capitalists), hope for a revolution in Latin America.

But nothing in these measures is yet of a nature fundamentally inimical to the interests of imperialism or the Chilean oligarchy.

Nationalizing the copper mines has been the most spectacular of all these measures. But this sort of action is

no longer an affront to the imperialists. In view of the continually mounting dangers of revolution on the Latin-American continent, which threaten to definitively undermine their interests, the imperialists have decided—after Nelson Rockefeller's reconnaissance in South America—to modernize the forms of their penetration in the area.

Now imperialism is withdrawing on its own from extracting and exporting raw materials, which was the chief form of pillaging the third world, and the crudest. Today it seems more inclined to resort to other, less obvious forms of pillage, involving especially processing plants. Such a shift also permits an apparent liberalization of the economy and social life, in limited sectors of course. This is why the atmosphere seems to be easing in Latin America. Imperialism has new perspectives. The "left" nationalist military regimes have the wind in their sails. And with this in prospect, Allende could very well offer a democratic variant fitting in perfectly with the development projects of neoimperialism in Latin America.

This is true, so long as he doesn't go too far. In that case the bourgeois army, which still constitutes the capitalists' best guarantee, is always ready to intervene. But so far no fires have been lighted!

The state intervention in the steel industry and the Lota-Schnager coal mines, notoriously in the red, should not arouse very lively criticism. Salvador Allende himself told the miners that the company and the state had reached an agreement to transfer ownership without any cash payment. The state assumed the liabilities of the company, whose production was dropping and which "lacked financial resources to develop."

Nationalizing deficits is something that we have experienced even under the capitalist system and even under a coalition of the PSC [Parti Social Chrétien—Social Christian party] and the PSB [Parti Socialiste de Belgique—Belgian Socialist party]. We have also experienced growing state intervention in the affairs of the private sector to cover the risks of the private capitalists and increase the drains on the public coffers for their benefit. There is nothing heretical, from the capitalist standpoint, about this procedure.

Under state control the banks will

continue to function according to their charters. The measure is in fact a statization and not a nationalization. This is all the more true because it is announced that foreign banks will be accorded special conditions and the stock will be repurchased by the state at an advantageous rate for the holders.

It was Luis Corvalán, in his interview in *Drapeau Rouge*, who listed among the government's achievements the expropriation of the important Bellavista-Tome textile concern. Its principal stockholder left the country taking 2,000,000,000 pesos [8.57 Chilean pesos equal US\$1] with him. Ironically Corvalán says: "This is the first decree of this type and President Allende has said that it will not be the last."

Here also there is nothing very dangerous in the government's projects! But the regime has announced the nationalization of foreign trade, of the monopolies in production and distribution, and a deepgoing agrarian reform. On these points the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition is aroused. Does Allende intend to go ahead? Why not, after all? It is not too late and giving him a push might be enough. But for that you must not rely on the Chilean CP.

The real challenge is to make a genuine start on agrarian reform, that is, speed the movement of land occupations by the most underprivileged peasants. This must be done not so as to form a layer of favored peasants all devoted to the regime, but to satisfy the most poverty-stricken class in the country and genuinely transform Chile's economic and social structures.

Where are we now in this regard? The agrarian reform corporation (CORA) has announced that sixty-two holdings have been expropriated, but the decision to do this was made by the preceding regime. The Unidad Popular program calls for eliminating the class of 4,500 big landowners existing today in Chile, "with the most complete respect for personal human rights." What heavy burdens in compensation will this mean for the national treasury? Already the opposition is up in arms against granting the additional credits that were supposed to be accorded to the office of the president and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Allende would like to remain faithful to his program and, also, insofar as

possible, avoid clashes with forces inside and outside the country. Nonetheless, the time is coming when he will have to choose between being faithful to the bourgeoisie or to the working class whose votes brought him to power.

Sit-in strikes have occurred in factories in Santiago, in various provinces, and in various industries—in the postal and telegraph system, municipal services, and education. The workers are demanding that the promises made to them be kept, and first of all the wage increase that the still thoroughly bourgeois government set "for next year." And we are now in 1971!

On several large agricultural estates in Chile, the farm workers have occupied the land to press their demands for better wages and working conditions.

In answer to the chairmen of the farmers' associations, who, alarmed by this wave of land occupations, asked him to set the rules of the game, the president said that he considered these actions "improper." Some occupations were understandable, however, he said, in cases where the owners abandoned their land.

That, alas, is how Allende seems to think he is going to carry out the fundamental structural transformations he promises. He seems to think that he can do this by taking advantage of the indifference, default, and complacency of those who own the country.

It has already come to light that big landowners have formed private armed forces. Where is the revolutionary party that will be capable of organizing the popular masses for the confrontation that is building up? Will it be the CP?

Let's go back to *Drapeau Rouge* and Luis Corvalán, general secretary of the Chilean CP:

"The eventuality of an armed confrontation cannot be entirely excluded. Our task is to do everything to prevent this, to put a straitjacket, not on the opposition but on the imperialists and oligarchs, that will render them incapable of unleashing a civil war."

But what is the oligarchy concretely, if not the opposition? The opposition and the army?

Is an armed clash inevitable? "Some ultrarevolutionary circles," Corvalán said, "consider it inevitable [the traditional logic of the Stalinists is well known!]. There is no basis for such a categorical judgment.

"In the meantime, the position that an armed confrontation is unavoidable — as some suggest — would require the formation of armed popular militias."

In the face of the danger inexorably looming up, the CP leaders know what they must do. But they shirk their responsibility. Why?

"In the present situation that would be equivalent to showing distrust in the army. But the army is not invulnerable to the new winds blowing in Latin America and penetrating everywhere. It is not a body alien to the nation, in the service of antinational interests. It must be won for the cause of progress in Chile and not pushed to the other side of the barricades."

But where has anyone ever seen a bourgeois army so transform itself as to go over to the service of the workers intact? What has, alas, been seen are Communist parties degenerated to the point where they renounce their class positions and, for all practical purposes, play the game of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists. This is what threatens to happen when the barricades go up in the near future in Chile.

The real character of the "ultraleftists" of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria — Movement of the Revolutionary Left] remains in question. Corvalán mentions their positions only for the purpose of refuting them. But he nonetheless concedes the MIR a place in the mass movement. Could he do otherwise when it is solidly implanted there?

The MIR claimed that armed struggle was the only road likely in Chile, which was false, in part, because all legal channels there had not yet been completely closed. Some elements in the MIR understood this and have participated in the mass movement building up under the impetus of the elections. Today, knowing that an armed confrontation is inevitable, they are preparing for it and training the masses. It is these comrades who have taken the correct position; they are the real revolutionists. Because of the MIR, Allende, the CP, and Unidad Popular may be saved from ruin and dishonor.

You tremble indeed for the honor of the Communists when you see Corvalán say in *Drapeau Rouge*: "Resistance by our adversaries may lead to an armed clash. We will do everything to prevent it." □



# The Soviet Bureaucracy as a Source of Zionism

By Nathan Weinstock

[We have translated the following article from the December 31 issue of *Rood*, a Flemish revolutionary socialist biweekly.]

\* \* \*

With its marks of police provocation, the Leningrad case takes us back to the Stalin period and its sinister trials. Secret proceedings, violations of judicial norms, the seemingly coincidental arrest of "accomplices" in several Soviet cities immediately after the unsuccessful attempt to seize the airplane, the foiled "blow," the spectacular press campaign—everything points to a painstakingly set up police provocation.

The most notable thing about the affair is the severe penalties imposed, which are completely out of proportion to the alleged offenses. There must have been powerful reasons for the Kremlin to defy world opinion in this way, particularly the opinion of the Western Communist parties. Moscow does not deliberately court unpopularity.

Only one explanation is possible for such a move—the *Russian bureaucracy is afraid*. It is frightened by the memory of the Czechoslovak "spring"; frightened by the revolt growing within the Soviet Union itself. The sentence in Leningrad was prompted by panic. The foundations of the Stalinist edifice are shaking.

The basis of this case is simple. Despite the fact that Jews in the USSR are recognized as a nationality and the fact that this nationality is even recorded on their identity cards, they are deprived of their rights as a national minority, deprived of a paper in Yiddish (the mother tongue of hundreds of thousands of them), and deprived of any cultural life of their own. They encounter a vague but still virulent anti-Semitism (which is in fact promoted by the state leadership, since anti-Semitic writings are passed by the official censors). As a result of all this, the *Jews in the USSR have become nationalistic out of desperation*.

Humiliations, frustration, and oppression naturally arouse a strong national consciousness. The impossibility of giving expression to this legally in the USSR promotes Zionism among the Jewish masses, since a revolutionary rallying point is absent. (The large number of Jews in the new left opposition in the USSR is, of course, no coincidence.) In these conditions, a culture medium for Zionism can be distilled from the Stalinist society in the USSR.

Added to this is the ambiguity of the USSR's foreign policy—unconditionally pro-Israel in 1948, hysterically anti-Israel afterwards. And all this is topped off with an abundant anti-Semitic sauce disguised as anti-Zionism. This had to give rise to the development of Jewish nationalism, just as Great Russian domination has once again aroused the nationalism of many smaller nations in the USSR.

In Lenin and Trotsky's time the Jewish masses were encouraged to develop their national life in the Soviet framework. As a result, an extraordinarily rich Jewish working-class culture arose, which enabled the Jewish youth in the Soviet Union to identify fully with the workers struggle. Stalinism on the other hand meant (as for all other national minorities) the most brutal kind of national oppression, and exploitation of the most shameful prejudices. During the extermination of the Left Opposition and conflicts within the bureaucracy, Jews were very often singled out as victims. Fortunately, they have not yet suffered the fate of the Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Chechens, and other peoples who were subjected to actual genocide.

There is, therefore, no separate Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. There is simply *the problem—the problem of a workers state distorted and poisoned by a bureaucratic caste*, by a social group that will use any means to cling to power. Gomulka and Moczar also went through the Moscow "school." Great Russian chauvinism (against which Lenin fought so hard

at the end of his life) is nothing more than an ideological consequence of "socialism in one country," which was meant to take the place of internationalism. With this mentality, the second world war (the Great Patriotic War) was waged not against Nazism and the German imperialist bourgeoisie but against the German people as a whole, including the working class.

The "anti-Zionism" of the USSR (propagated by such reprehensible figures as the ill-famed Trofim Kichko, a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences!) has a strong odor of anti-Semitism. The tone, the arguments, the reasoning used against the "Zionists" is similar to that of the sinister Prague trials in 1950, which also employed the pretext of anti-Zionism. Leningrad is now experiencing a new edition of the so-called "Doctors' Plot" in 1953, the case aimed at a group of Soviet Jewish doctors. This attitude of the Soviet bureaucracy is a crime—a crime against the Jewish community, against the cause of socialism, and against the Palestinians (who, in fact, are also being sacrificed by the Soviet leadership on the altar of "peaceful coexistence").

Thus, objectively, the Soviet policy is Zionism's best ally. *National oppression of the Jews always triggers the Zionist reflex*. Anti-Zionism transformed into anti-Semitism therefore promotes Zionist colonization in actuality, the colonization carried out by the ruling class of the Israeli state (Tel-Aviv is waiting impatiently for *colons* to settle the occupied areas).

The Leningrad trial is giving Zionism an un hoped for opportunity to brighten up their escutcheon with the colors of a "national liberation struggle" in the USSR. The way the Israelis are exploiting this sinister masquerade in the Soviet Union is sufficient testimony to this. The Leningrad trial is giving the leaders of the Jewish state a chance to wipe out the revolutionary vanguard's long and patient work of explaining the Palestinian question.

For us revolutionists, Trotskyist

militants in the workers movement, continuers of the revolutionary traditions of the Russian revolution and the Left Opposition slaughtered by Stalin, the "air piracy" question is only incidental to the Leningrad trial. The real question on the agenda is the *class nature of the Soviet state* and the deeper causes of a degeneration, of which anti-Semitism (as well as the problem of the Tatars and the persecution of the intellectuals) is only one of the more striking manifestations. The Leningrad trial symbolizes

## South Africa

### Ex-Prisoner Describes Robben Island

[In the January 18 issue of *Intercontinental Press* (page 44), we reported a letter that had been smuggled out of South Africa's notorious Robben Island prison by Namibian freedom fighters confined there.

[Excerpts from another letter, written by a former prisoner, giving additional details about conditions in Robben Island, were published in the December 1970-January 1971 issue of *Anti-Apartheid News*, published in London. We reprint these excerpts below. Parenthetical comments are by *Anti-Apartheid News*.]

\* \* \*

About February last year, the delegates from the International Red Cross visited Robben Island Prison and all prisoners were not satisfied in the manner in which they investigated our complaints and there has been no change since they left.

They go to the extreme and censor even the prescribed books for study. . . . The kitchens are awful! Around and inside the kitchen there are millions of flies roaming around all over our food up to the cells where we sleep. Particularly in winter they are a pest.

We eat a very poor diet; mealie meal is our breakfast and supper and mealies at lunchtime. In the morning we have tasteless soup and black, sugarless, tasteless and useless coffee. All that from January to January and to some men for 20 years to life, eating that cows' feed, useless to a human body.

the debasement of a regime heading into crisis and therefore trying to find scapegoats and to hold up intimidating examples in order to protect its underpinnings. The collapse of Stalinism is quickening; the Russian workers will finish it off.

It was in the USSR that the first section of the Fourth International arose, and this country remains the key to the victory of the world socialist revolution. As a result, our revolutionary organization bears a still heavier responsibility. □

They have an old Nazi type of doctor who has been there for some time and he is just as good as been not there. I, for instance, was taken to Cape Town last year for gum operation and was left with one tooth on the upper gum on the right-hand side and four on the left; and immediately after I left hospital I had to eat boiled meal-

### Message from Greek Political Prisoners

#### Denounce 'Reign of Terror'

[The following message to the "free people of the whole world," was drafted by thirty-three political prisoners at the prison of Egine and smuggled out of Greece. These excerpts are taken from the January 10-11 Paris daily *Le Monde*.]

\* \* \*

The dictatorship established April 21, 1967, is seeking to deceive international public opinion by claiming that it is evolving toward a restoration of democracy. Four years after the coup d'etat, the Greek people continue to live under the implacable menace of martial law and of the special tribunals. . . .

An absolutely arbitrary system — which we have had the bitter privilege of knowing from firsthand experience — is enforced from one end of our

country to the other without even a pretense at observance of the law. This is shown in many ways: seizures and arrests without warrants, detention without any control for an unlimited time, bad treatment, torture, all ending in show trials and in sentences decided in advance. . . .

There are similar cases. The majority of prisoners are complaining about their eyes and many other ailments and he refused them to see a specialist. Zola Qini went insane four months after his release. Others die within a year of their release, because of lack of medical attention by Dr Van den Bergen.

The place is on the extremes in winter and summer and brings about so many ailments to prisoners. I am an example; my itching rash got better when I got to Leeuwkop Prison near Johannesburg . . . (he refers earlier to a rash "all over my arms and legs for a long time".)

That is the kind of treatment meted out to political prisoners in the island. When we speak, they say we want to take over the administration of the island.

Work—we just sit all day round and crash stones into concrete and as a result others develop piles and other sicknesses. In fact we are not producing anything at all. □

The detainees are deported or interned in primitive jails. Some of them are held in solitary confinement for a year at a time. . . .

The latest is that the political prisoners have been deprived of the guarantee that delegates of the International Red Cross could visit them. . . .

Despite the efforts of the junta and its few partisans, no one has any illusion as to the nature of the April 21 dictatorship. Not so long ago someone in the American Senate said tersely: "This is an arbitrary and

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shameful regime!" We, political prisoners, affirm again from our prisons the correctness of this judgment. The free peoples must be fully conscious of the impossibility of the present regime transforming itself into a democracy. Its policy is to eliminate all its op-

ponents in order to stay in power. Under this reign of terror the only crime we are guilty of is to have maintained our faith in the principles of liberty and democracy, of popular sovereignty and respect for the rights of man. □

question. The Defense Commission is scheduled to present its report and proposals on how to meet future invasions at the seventeenth session of the heads of states, to be held early this year.

Speaking at the closing session, December 11, the leader of the Liberian delegation declared: "Africa is determined to be free and independent. We will suffer and die rather than surrender to the treachery of imperialism."

Victor Muhammed Mera, representing the PAIGCV [Parti Africain de l'Indépendance de la Guinée dite Portugaise et des Iles du Cap-Vert—African party for the independence of so-called Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands], said the conference had helped his party's struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

Immediately after the Portuguese invasion of Conakry, there were massive demonstrations in Lagos organized by students from Ibadan and Lagos universities and members of the Nigeria Solidarity Youth Council. □

## Nigeria

# OAU Condemns Portugal, Israel

By Armona Woka

Lagos

The Israeli ambassador in Nigeria was put in an embarrassing situation December 9 by being excluded from the opening session of the Emergency Ministerial Council of the Organization of African Unity [OAU]. The decision had been taken at the previous OAU meeting at Addis Ababa not to tolerate the seating of any representative of the government of Israel at any future meeting of the organization.

The incident exposed a contradiction in Nigeria's foreign policy. On the one hand, Nigeria voices a strongly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist foreign policy while at the same time the government fraternizes with regimes like the one in Israel that constitute an affront to African independence and freedom.

The conference had three points on its agenda: (1) immediate aid as well as longer term assistance for Guinea; (2) the role of Africa in future imperialist aggression; and (3) increased support to the national liberation movements in Africa.

The conference was addressed by Nigerian head of state Major General Yakubu Gowon. He said the Portuguese invasion of Guinea was a test case in the struggle between the peoples of Africa and imperialism. "I believe in action," not pious speeches, he declared.

On the second day of the conference, Ismail Touré, head of the Guinean delegation, gave a detailed account of the November 22 Portuguese invasion. He displayed evidence of Portugal's guilt, including captured documents, uniforms, and weapons, as well as tape-recorded interviews with Por-

tuguese prisoners taken during the fighting. Touré expressed the hope that the OAU would adopt an amendment to its charter permitting an immediate military response to attacks anywhere on the continent.

There was widespread private discussion among the delegates of the need for a unified military force. The conference took no decision on this

## Gave Leaflets to Inductees

# Farinas Faces Prison on Draft Charges

A demonstration will be held in New York City January 29 in support of Juan Farinas, a socialist youth who faces a possible fifteen-year term in prison following his conviction December 10 on charges of interfering with the military draft.

The charges arose from incidents that occurred August 13, 1968, when Farinas, at that time a supporter of the Maoist Progressive Labor party, reported for induction at the Whitehall draft center in New York.

Farinas attempted to distribute anti-war leaflets to the other inductees and talk to them about the war. He was interrupted several times by a captain and a sergeant, who, finally, in Farinas' words, "brought me down to the first floor and tossed me out of the building, saying, 'Go to hell.'"

At the trial, even prosecution witnesses admitted that the induction process had not been disrupted by Farinas' actions. He testified that he had several times expressed his willingness to be inducted, and defense witnesses

said that Farinas had arranged his affairs on the assumption that he would be drafted.

Farinas was convicted on three counts, each of which carries a possible sentence of five years in prison and a \$10,000 fine. They were: refusal to stop speaking, distributing leaflets, and engaging in boisterous and unruly behavior in an induction center; interfering with the administration of the Selective Service Act; and refusal to report and submit for induction.

Farinas is presently a supporter of the Workers League, the American cothinkers of the Socialist Labour League of Britain. His attorney charges that the conviction was "based upon the defendant's antiwar and socialist views, not any illegal conduct." The decision is being appealed.

Contributions to defray legal expenses in the case can be sent to: Juan Farinas Defense Committee, 134 West Fourteenth St., New York, N. Y. 10011. □

## The Radicalization Continues

[The following editorial summing up the experiences of the Italian radicalization last year was published in the first issue in 1971 of *Bandiera Rossa*, the newspaper of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups—the Italian section of the Fourth International). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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As 1970 began, the ruling class was engaged in an attempt to exploit the tragic events of December 12.<sup>1</sup> Its objectives were to isolate the most advanced sectors of the movement, put an end to the wave of strikes, regain the initiative and authority for the center-left formula, and restore "normality." Twelve months later, how can the results of this attempt be summed up?

We can say without fear of contradiction that this bourgeois counterattack has not achieved its objectives. Despite partial successes for the ruling coalition in the June elections, the persistent conflicts in the bloc have prevented the government, first of all, from decisively regaining the initiative and advancing its declared reformist plan with the least consistency or effectiveness. The two governmental crises and the paralysis of parliament for two months in the fall have been the most obvious signs of a situation produced in the last analysis by sharpening structural conflicts, heightening tensions, and a shift in the relationship of forces among the fundamental social classes. Another manifestation of the regime's profound instability is represented, moreover, by the spread of centrifugal tendencies to the periphery (from the continual crises of the Sicilian regional government to the explosion in Reggio Calabria).<sup>2</sup>

1. On December 12, 1969, a bomb exploded in the Banca dell'Agricoltura in Milan, causing terrible loss of life and casualties.

2. Violent demonstrations under the influence of the extreme right have developed

In this context, the effect of establishing regional authorities is destined inevitably to increase such tendencies, much more than provide the opportunity for new experiments (as the Communist party hopes).<sup>3</sup>

A central objective for the class enemy is to reestablish "order" and "authority" in the factories. At this level also, his failure has been almost complete. The bosses have not had the slightest success in forcing a return to the methods prevailing before the great upsurge of recent years. The workers have been able to successfully defend the new relationship of forces—with the consequences for the system which are daily deplored by the bourgeois press and which were recently summed up by the chief of Confindustria.<sup>4</sup> So, as regards more large-scale political repression, we need not go back over the failure of the bourgeois operation following the slaughter in Milan (a failure decently hidden behind the veil of a "generously" accorded amnesty). [After the Milan bombing there were numerous arrests of left and trade-union activists.—*IP*] It is true that the police and the courts periodically attempt new counterattacks, striking at revolutionary-left activists, vanguard workers, and even trade-union officials. But the episodes following the death of the student Saltarelli offer sufficient demonstration of how difficult it is for the government and the reactionary forces to implement such plans, no matter how ardently they might wish to.<sup>5</sup>

At the root of all this is the decisive fact that the working-class movement has shown no sign of faltering; to the contrary, it has continued to expand in a highly combative and in-

on several occasions in Reggio Calabria starting in July 1970.

3. Regional authorities are provided for in the constitution but elections to these bodies took place for the first time only in June 1970. The PCI is trying to make alliances with the Socialists and Christian Democrats in the regional assemblies.

4. The Italian manufacturers' association.  
5. Saltarelli was killed by the police in Milan on December 12, 1970.

cisive way. In 1970 there was not, and there could not have been, a mobilization as extensive and concentrated in time as in the fall of 1969. But the struggles have never ceased—not only because new categories of workers have moved but also because, after a few brief weeks' pause, the protagonists of the previous battles have resumed the attack, striving to win nondiscriminatory contracts at the factory and industry level. It is worth noting once again the most significant elements in these struggles. On the one hand, the workers' tendency to abandon the more traditional methods of struggle (above all, passive strikes that were no more than taking time off the job) has been fully confirmed. They have tended to adopt much more trenchant and decisive forms as the norm, forms with an inherent capability to bring out the political significance of the conflict (militant marches drawing the attention of an entire city, blocking streets, militant pickets, marches in the factories themselves, and so forth). On the other hand, demands for equal benefits for all workers have tended in turn to challenge the present organization of capitalist factories, running counter especially to piecework rates and various pay incentives. Hence the broad importance of battles conducted only at the plant and industry level.

The last months of the year, finally, witnessed a revival of the student movement as a mass political movement, with an extensive mobilization of the high-school students. We never doubted that such a resurgence would occur—for the simple reason that the structural contradictions at the root of the great explosions starting in 1968 have not been in the least resolved and are even tending to sharpen. (It is precisely in this area that the insubstantiality of the government's reformism—which is proclaimed louder and louder and which is, at least in theory, partially realizable—becomes most striking.) The important thing is that this movement has assumed still greater dimensions than in the second half of 1968, and, by a combination of factors, has ac-

quired a more directly political thrust, with the emergence of hundreds, if not thousands of new very young cadres. The reactionary and demagogic maneuvers which have accompanied the spread of demonstrations in some cities have been able to do nothing to alter the general significance of the movement.

All these estimations of the relationship of forces have been confirmed or reinforced in the light of the mobilizations in commemoration of December 12, which were particularly imposing in Milan and reached very high peaks in other cities as well.<sup>6</sup> These most recent developments have, moreover, another more immediate significance. They point to a clear shift in the relationship of forces in the mass movement in favor of the revolutionary-left organizations and groups. The importance of the fact that in cities like Milan, Rome, and Naples, thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands of people, came into the streets without any propulsion from the traditional organizations (or in direct opposition to their instructions) needs no comment. The consternation of the most astute bourgeois papers is in itself an eloquent indicator of this. Of course, this shift has not yet occurred in the working class. But even at that level there is no lack of symptoms. (It is sufficient to note, for example, that several thousand workers took part in the demonstration on the afternoon of December 15 in Milan.)

In such a situation, the ruling class does not have any effective short-term solutions. The authoritarian solution of the right—which might seem a possible way out—is not practicable, given the present relationship of forces. It is true that in Reggio Calabria, for the first time since the end of the war, fascist, or semifascist, reactionaries have found a mass base. It is true also that certain of their maneuvers have found openings in the student movement. But these tendencies are still marginal. At most they can be exploited as a complementary element. Nor is the time ripe for the large-scale reformist operation which some want, others fear, and which is

too often considered from the standpoint of abstract criteria, even though based on an analysis of concrete relationships and conflicts. In the first place, this is true, because, we repeat again, there is no margin for consistent reformism (which alone would have some chance of temporarily canalizing or blocking the mass movement). In the second place, the majority of the bourgeoisie is still opposed to such an operation. In the third place, the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party] cannot help worrying about its relations with the masses that constitute its power base. And these would be put in question if the party entered the government or even the sphere of government. (If one was needed, the high price the PCI and the unions have had to pay since December 12 for their shameful passivity has demonstrated the acuteness of this problem.)

For all these reasons, the short-term perspective remains one of continuation of a conjuncture fraught with conflict and persistence of a situation of profound instability in which the system tends increasingly to break down. For its part, rather than complete integration into a reformist operation,

## Turkey

### Threat of Military Coup

Turkey's President Cevdet Sunay has initiated consultations with leaders of the parliamentary political parties in an attempt to solve a political crisis in which the army chief of staff has threatened a military coup.

In a New Year's message, General Memduh Tagmac warned that the army is concerned about "acts threatening the basis of the state" and would intervene "when the country's highest interests would require it."

The "acts" to which the general referred are student demonstrations that have plagued the government. Last June, demonstrations by students and workers resulted in the imposition of martial law in Istanbul.

Even before the June demonstrations, the parliament had begun debating bills to restrict the political rights of the students. But Premier Suleyman Demirel, who has a majority of only three votes, has been frustrated in his demands for stronger weapons against the students. The opposition parties either fear the public reac-

tion to such legislation or wish to use the opportunity to replace the Demirel government.

Demirel now has bills before parliament that would put the security forces at the disposal of universities, ban unauthorized meetings and boycotts of classes, and punish students who engage in "violence."

Former Premier Ismet Inonu, now leader of the parliamentary opposition, argues that no new legislation is needed, but that what is required is the resignation of Demirel.

Tagmac's warning can be seen as a reminder to the quarreling bourgeois politicians that the army is not prepared to accept an indefinite stalemate. Under this pressure from the military, Sunay is now trying to break the deadlock. The fact that the president, who is supposed to be largely a figurehead, has stepped in is already a defeat for Demirel.

For his part, the premier has countered by announcing that the government will begin legal action to ban two opposition parties—which he has refused to name.

the PCI is threatened with perpetuation of its essential paralysis. Incapable, because of its opportunist degeneration, of exploiting a situation bursting with revolutionary tensions, the PCI also finds itself unable to carry its policy to its logical conclusions and to get real results in the field that it finds congenial. This is its contradiction; this is the source of the crises that will not fail to rack it in the future.

If no positive outcome for the working class seems possible in the near future, in the last analysis this is owing to one reason alone—the lack of a revolutionary party capable of taking advantage of an objectively favorable situation by mobilizing the masses with the perspective of seizing power. The urgent task, therefore, is more than ever to build the party. But we can only accomplish this task insofar as we are able to intervene correctly, with an adequate methodology and objectives corresponding to the needs of the masses, by projecting goals able to stimulate mass mobilization and to raise mass consciousness in the continuing battles of this great upsurge, which after three years is still far from waning. □

6. In the same period there were combined demonstrations of high-school students—demonstrations against Franco Spain were combined with protests over the killing of the student Saltarelli.

## J. Edgar Hoover and Threat of Infantile Regression

"J. Edgar Hoover — Time to Retire" is the title of an article in the December 30, 1970, *New York Times* by Judge Lawrence G. Brooks.

It is hard to decide whether Judge Brooks writes with great authority—he celebrates his ninetieth birthday February 21; or with very little authority—he retired from the Massachusetts bench only last October 31.

Nonetheless, one of his arguments is: "Mr. Hoover is 75 years old. Granted that there is no impairment of faculties, there is an enormous change in the world since he started his career with the Department of Justice in 1917. It is hard for most elderly people to adjust to present conditions. There is accumulating evidence that Mr. Hoover has not adjusted."

Judge Brooks' assertion is questionable. One of J. Edgar Hoover's most recent articles proves that he is keeping tabs on the American campus and is completely up to date. Referring to the Young Socialist Alliance, Hoover said: "The Trotskyists . . . have shown a vast membership growth and resurgence in the last 24 months until YSA is today the largest and best organized youth group in left-wing radicalism. Trotskyist influence is especially strong in the youth field, particularly on the college campus." [See *Intercontinental Press*, October 12, 1970, page 340.]

Judge Brooks suspects J. Edgar Hoover because of his role as special assistant to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919. In June of that year, someone set a bomb in the vestibule of Palmer's home. The bomb did not go off as planned, but if it had, Palmer "would have been killed." Instead, the bomb exploded outside, "and its bearer was literally blown to pieces. He was never identified."

However, Palmer "was badly shaken by this experience." Judge Brooks offers this as the explanation for what happened next:

"Seven months later the Department of Justice staged the so-called Red Raids, in which on one night throughout the country some 3,000 persons 'suspected' of being 'dangerous aliens' were arrested and taken to the nearest lockup. It quickly turned out that many of the arrested were neither aliens nor dangerous. All this has been documented. These raids present perhaps the sorriest episode in the history of our country, not excepting the era of Senator Joseph McCarthy. The Red Raids were badly conceived, clumsily and brutally carried through, in brazen disregard of decency."

You've guessed it. Judge Brooks suspects J. Edgar Hoover. He "was at the time special assistant to the Attorney General and must have been quite aware of the whole business. . . .

"I have not heard that Hoover ever

expressed disapproval of the raids in whose planning he must have participated, or at least known about. Either he felt constrained not to disagree with his boss or he approved of his actions. I suspect the latter."

It's dangerous to have a character like that in a post as important as the one held by Hoover. "I would fear," states Judge Brooks, "that if a comparable period of hysteria should again afflict our people and Hoover were still in office, he would not be found with those who believe in government by law."

There is obviously a good deal of substance to the learned judge's reasoning. Perhaps it will prove persuasive enough to convince Hoover that he ought to heed the judge's advice to "voluntarily retire."

Would democracy, however, be any less in danger if a younger and more vigorous Hoover were to replace the old fossil?

And where would you find a candidate half his age who keeps up so well with what is going on among the youth of America, particularly on the university campus?

A more effective solution, it might be suggested, would be to abolish the political police, and the entire concept and practice of political witch-hunting that has been eating like a cancer into American democracy.

That, however, would take one little,



HOOVER: Case of infantile regression?

but good, socialist revolution—a development that might not meet with the approval of Judge Brooks and his kind, who think that a bit of patching here and there is sufficient to fix things up. □

### REVIEWS

## Who Is Responsible for Son My?

*Nuremberg and Vietnam: an American Tragedy* by Telford Taylor. Quadrangle Books, Chicago, Ill. 224 pp. \$5.95. 1970.

It is both the strength and weakness of this book that Taylor spends such a great deal of space arriving at so few conclusions.

Taylor is of course eminently qualified to write about the legal precedents created at Nuremberg, having served as the chief American prosecution counsel during the trials of Nazi war criminals. Now a professor of law at Columbia University in New York, he traces the development of the laws of war from the writings of St. Augustine until the present day

without lapsing into needless pedantry and with an eye always open for present-day applications.

When he finally arrives at the point of indicating the responsibility for the massacre at Son My—and, more generally, for American war crimes in Vietnam—his case is therefore all the more convincing.

Taylor leaves no doubt that the U. S. is committing war crimes, in a legal as well as a moral sense.

The air raids in South Vietnam, for example, "are a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention on Civilian Protection . . . and equally in violation of the rules of Land Warfare." Evacuation of peasants into "strategic

hamlets" is contrary to Article 49 of the Geneva Convention. The U.S. army's handling of prisoners violates its own regulations as well as the Geneva Convention.

Few would argue with Taylor's contention that courts-martial are unlikely to fix the ultimate responsibility for such crimes. In the Son My massacre, he points out, "proximity and immediate authority" place legal responsibility on a string of high-ranking officers from marine Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, through Generals Abrams and Westmoreland, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To put it another way:

"The ultimate question of 'guilt' in the trials of the Son My troops is how far what they did departed from general American military practice in Vietnam as they had witnessed it. . . . the defense of superior orders . . . is properly invoked by the low-ranking soldier in mitigation of punishment for conduct, even though unlawful, that is not too far removed from the behavior authorized or encouraged by his superiors . . .

"Now, the searching feature of the situation is that this defense cannot be put forward or tested without, in substance, putting American military practice in Vietnam on trial." (Emphasis in original.)

Unfortunately, Taylor never really develops his argument beyond this point. For all his erudition, he seems to have forgotten von Clausewitz's dictum on the relationship of war and politics. Describing "military practice" as the cause of war crimes is like blaming poverty on lack of money. Taylor spends his entire final chapter, not analyzing and explaining U.S. military practice in Vietnam, but finding other names for it. He fails entirely to take up the imperialist politics of which American military practice — war crimes — is the extension.

This failure seems to lie behind other defects in the book, such as Taylor's amazing conclusion that the bombing of North Vietnam is not a war crime. (He does acknowledge that perhaps it ought to be.)

It is interesting to note that Taylor himself has moved cautiously toward correcting some of the omissions in *Nuremberg and Vietnam*. In an in-

terview made January 7 for the "Dick Cavett Show," he indicated that he considered civilian officials legally responsible for American war crimes. Asked if men like Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, respectively secretary of state and secretary of defense under Johnson, should be brought to trial, Taylor replied:

"Well, I certainly suggest very strongly in the book, and would be quite prepared to say it a little more explicitly, that if you apply to the people you've mentioned . . . the same standards that were applied in

## In Spanish Translation

## Warm Review of Weiss's 'Trotsky in Exile'

After reading the Spanish translation\* of Peter Weiss's play *Trotsky in Exile*, Ernesto Ekaizer wrote a very favorable review which appeared in the December 29, 1970, issue of the Buenos Aires weekly magazine *Panorama*.

"Awaited perhaps obsessively, Peter Weiss's new play — to the good fortune of the reading public — was released from the claws of the Argentine censorship only ten days ago, after the authorities decided to legalize its sale. Today it is on display in the windows of the main bookstores in Buenos Aires — something unusual, in view of the fact that any title linked with the life of Leon Trotsky is returned to the country where it was printed or simply burned by the official bureaucracy."

Ekaizer gives some facts about the writing of the play and its production in Germany, as well as the place of the author as a playwright. He continues:

"In his latest work he seeks, above all, to reestablish Trotsky's place in the Russian revolution and to contrast it with his exile, persecution, and death at the hands of Stalin's machine.

"Weiss reconstructs the times and provides dialogues taken from an infinite number of the works of the October revolutionists. Thus, he has his characters speak, using their own

\* *Trotsky en el exilio*, por Peter Weiss. Grijalbo, Mexico. 1970. 189 pages.

the trial of General Yamashita,\* there would be very strong possibility that they would come to the same end as he did."

And Lyndon Johnson? Said Taylor: "I don't think I want to answer that directly at this time."

— Allen Myers

\* Yamashita, the Japanese commander in the Philippines, was executed for atrocities committed by his troops. The American court that convicted him held that even though he had not ordered the crimes, it was his obligation as commander to prevent them.

words. Obviously he has relied heavily on Isaac Deutscher's trilogy on Trotsky and also on Trotsky's autobiography, *My Life*, in which the outstanding protagonist of world revolution voices his personal view on all the causes he championed.

"The result is good theater. The technique is to juxtapose chronologically distinct epochs related to the central figure. Thus, in October, 1917, when Lenin and the old Bolshevik guard, together with the workers movement, proclaim victory over Kerensky, and sing the 'Internationale' on stage, a group of soldiers break through the assemblage, and, taking Trotsky by the arm, read a proclamation: 'The verdict is to expel the citizen Trotsky, Leon Davidovich, from the territory of the Soviet Republic. Decreed January 20, 1929.'"

In this way, Ekaizer explains, Weiss offers capital proof of the absurdity of the expulsion. "Along with Lenin, Trotsky directed the first socialist workers revolution . . ." And Weiss shows that he remained loyal to the ideals of October.

Ekaizer notes that the play undoubtedly raises knotty personal questions about the figures he portrays, "but his work is essentially documentary . . ."

Nevertheless, a major part of Trotsky's life is left aside, the hard years of exile in the thirties. It was the fate of the revolutionary writer and leader to suffer one of the most terrible fates

of the twentieth century. This part of Trotsky's life is not shown.

"The decade of the thirties was decisive for Trotsky," Ekaizer continues. "He was preparing to carry out a gigantic undertaking, on a world scale — reconstruct the revolutionary party that Stalin had disarmed and brought into the service of his own camarilla. In this objective he was quite isolated — he had only militant youths who did not possess great experience in the socialist struggle, but they did have the necessary theoretical-ideological clar-

ity to learn. Trotsky was assassinated at this transcendent point of his life.

"Weiss says little about this. He hardly indicates it. Nevertheless, his play re-creates a deeply moving happening — how the exile of the revolutionary leader formed part of the strangulation of a revolution; how Leon Trotsky's inner life and aims were dedicated up to his death to the service of a class: the proletariat. That the drama succeeds in transmitting this with rare force is proof of the artistry of the author." □

## Prensa Latina Interviews Prisoners

# Cuban Press Reports Peru Amnesty

Cuban publications have provided additional details on the December 21 amnesty that freed some of the political prisoners in Peru. Both the January 3 issue of *Granma*, the official organ of the Communist party Central Committee, and No. 30 of *Direct from Cuba* carried accounts of the amnesty.

Alongside pictures of Héctor Béjar, Hugo Blanco, and Ricardo Gadea, *Granma* reported that fourteen prisoners had been released December 22 and five more the next day. The paper continued:

"Hugo Blanco, the young student who directed the peasant movement in Convención Valley, was taken from the prison of Frontón, which is located on an island facing the port of Callao, to Lurigancho Prison, where the 13 other prisoners were waiting for their release.

"Scores of students and relatives and friends of the prisoners gave them a jubilant welcome on their release.

"The former prisoners were then invited to the School of Medicine, where the university students had prepared a ceremony in their honor. Hugo Blanco, however, went straight home to see his aged mother — he had spent the past seven years in prison."

*Granma* quoted Béjar's speech during the ceremony:

"On leaving prison, we remain revolutionaries and socialists, and now that we are free, we will continue fighting to free Peru from imperialism and to further the interests of the workers and farmers."

Béjar also paid tribute to Luis de la Puente Uceda and other fighters who died in the guerrilla struggle.

*Granma's* correspondent also obtained a statement from Blanco:

"At his home, Hugo Blanco stated, after a brief rest, 'I will continue the struggle for the release of all political prisoners.'"

The account in *Direct from Cuba* consisted primarily of interviews with several of the prisoners granted to Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency.

Héctor Béjar expressed his gratitude to all those who had worked for the release of the prisoners:

"We cannot forget the people who have fought for our freedom for many years. I especially want to mention Alberto Ruiz Eldredge, who was the first person to demand an amnesty, thus leaving himself open to attack by the reactionaries. It would take too long to list all the people and organizations who have asked for an amnesty for us. We feel that this measure is a vindication for them.

"I believe that the amnesty is a victory for the people and the sectors within or close to the government that have favored such a measure. We consider it a big popular triumph, above all because it was so broad.

"I want to stress the breadth of the amnesty decree, because we feel that the existence of a single political prisoner means there is no amnesty."

Béjar then spoke of the need for revolution in Peru:

"I believe there are changes, but they

are very limited to be able to speak of an authentic popular and revolutionary movement.

"For my part, I will continue to fight for a true popular revolution. I would like the changes to be deeper and with greater popular participation. I believe that there will only be deepgoing changes if the way is opened for the people to participate."

The same theme was taken up by another former prisoner:

"Helio Portocarrero is another young man who looks like an office worker. He was imprisoned in August 1968 after escaping the police for two years. A military tribunal sentenced him to a five-year prison term. . . .

"Regarding the government of the Peruvian armed forces, he said: 'We see this government as a reformist regime that has taken positive steps, but I believe that the people must not forget their ultimate goal: the taking of power.'

"The struggle for the application of the changes decreed by this government does not deny that ultimate objective. We believe that a close tie with the popular masses is an essential condition for a true revolutionary change."

Another speaker saw the amnesty as an attempt by the regime to win the confidence of the masses:

"Pedro Candela Santillan, Hugo Blanco's comrade in the Convención Department peasant movement, has been in prison since 1963. He was sentenced to 22 years imprisonment for his participation in the guerrilla [movement], to two years for 'invasion of lands', and five years for bank robbery.

"If we are released [the interview must have been made December 22 at Lurigancho, as the prisoners were awaiting their release — *IP*] — said Candela — it will be a victory of the entire Peruvian people. I feel that the decree shows a positive reaction in regard to the contradictions present in the regime, and tends to secure the support of the masses, who were beginning to lose confidence in the regime." □

### Concession to Intellectuals?

In a letter to the magazine *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the first deputy prosecutor general of the Soviet Union has acknowledged that it is legal for Soviet citizens to have long hair.