

**Pakistan:**  
**Worst Catastrophe**  
**— and Worst**  
**Callousness—**  
**of the Century**



**JOSE REVUELTAS:** One of Mexico's top literary figures, now one of Mexico's top political prisoners. For his speech in court on being condemned, see page 1029.

## **Hussein, Allon Unite Against Palestinians**

## Needed for Napalm

Almost \$3,000,000 worth of soap, 50,000 decks of pinochle playing cards, \$5,000 worth of billiard cue chalk, \$500,000 worth of paper bags, \$400,000 worth of cleaning cloths, \$400,000 worth of electrical insulation tape—what these items have in common is that they showed up as excess supply for the United States forces in Vietnam. The House Government Operations Committee ferreted out these errors in going over the Pentagon's books.

In October 1968, for example, the records showed that the U.S. forces had no toilet paper. In fact, an entire shipload was available, but had been misplaced. Similarly, a shortage of mattresses was reported when 69,000 of them were stockpiled.

"As the shipping backlog grew," the study said, "matériel was moved directly from ship and port areas to any available storage area and stacked at random.

"Documentation was lost or became illegible; locator systems were ineffective; needed supplies were inaccessible; packaging became weathered and damaged, and markings became illegible."

Unable to obtain the misplaced supplies, units requisitioned them again, which only added to the confusion. Because of delays, some units put high priorities on everything they ordered. The study said that "the highest possible priorities were assigned to items such as paper clips, davenports for quarters and offices, dictionaries, liquor glasses and similar items."

Big oversupplies were found in other areas: picture frames, dressers, bedsteads, tables, electric coffee pots, and dog food.

The committee's indignation at the scandalous waste did not, however, extend to the point of condemning the astronomical quantities of napalm, fragmentation bombs, and high explosives ordered for use on the Vietnamese people. To the good Christian bookkeepers in Congress, the Pentagon's record in that is irrefutable.

## In This Issue

		FEATURES
	1027	Children's Growth Stunted by Dirty Air
	1034	This Is Your Pilot, Napoleon, Speaking VIETNAM WAR
	1026	Pinch Those Pennies
	1031	Raids Near Hanoi and Haiphong PAKISTAN
	1027	The Worst Catastrophe—and Worst Callous- ness—of the Century MEXICO
	1028	Revueltas, 67 Other Prisoners Sentenced
	1029	Revueltas' Speech to the Court SOVIET UNION
	1030	Rostropovich Defends Solzhenitsyn
	1030	Scientists Found Human Rights Group
	1035	Amalrik Sentenced to Three Years PHILIPPINES
Francisco G. Blandino	1031	Capitalists to Run Convention CANADA
Allen Myers	1032	Labor Leader, Lawyer Charged with "Sedition" SUDAN
	1033	Nimeiry Kicks CP Ministers Out of Cabinet BOLIVIA
	1034	Chato Peredo Deported to Chile U. S. A.
	1035	Laird Ups the Bill for War Spending
	1048	Big Brother Listens to Governors MIDDLE EAST
	1036	Hussein, Allon Join Forces VENEZUELA
Gerry Foley	1038	The Kremlin Intervenes in CP Dispute CUBA
Livio Maitan	1041	A Crucial Stage for the Cuban Revolution CEYLON
	1048	More of That Same Old "Austerity" REVIEWS
Allen Myers	1046	Trotsky's Writings the First Year in Mexico
Jan Garrett	1047	A Play by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn PHOTOS
Joseph Hansen	1037	Peng Shu-tse and Peng Pi-lan DRAWINGS
Copain	1025	Jose Revueltas; 1028, Luis Echeverria Alva- rez; 1032, Michel Chartrand; 1035, Melvin Laird; 1036, Yigal Allon; 1048, N. M. Perera

Intercontinental Press, Post Office Box 635, Madison Square Station, N.Y. 10010.

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen.  
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.  
MANAGING EDITOR: Les Evans.  
EDITORIAL STAFF: Gerry Foley, Allen Myers, George Saunders.

BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen.  
TECHNICAL STAFF: H. Massey, James M. Morgan, Ruth Schein, Steven Warshell, Jack Wood.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July, not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, and Black liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors,

which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 95 rue du Faubourg Saint-Martin, Paris 10, France.

TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York 10010. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible an address label from a recent issue.

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## The Worst Catastrophe—and Worst Callousness—of the Century

The *New York Times* called it the "worst catastrophe of the century." Upwards of 500,000 people are dead. One million are homeless. But the catastrophe is not over. For hundreds of thousands of persons in the flooded delta region of East Pakistan, the disaster will continue until help arrives or they die.

Yet in face of the measureless suffering, nothing is being done. The hurricane that swept in from the Bay of Bengal November 12 could not be prevented. But the thousands who have died needlessly and the unknown thousands who still face death are the victims of human inaction, indifference, and callousness.

Sydney H. Schanberg described what he saw on Bhola Island in the Ganges River delta, in a dispatch in the November 22 *New York Times*:

"If relief supplies are not air-dropped soon to the coastal areas of East Pakistan cut off by last week's cyclone and tidal wave, many of the survivors probably will die of starvation, disease and exposure.

"In a two-day tour of accessible parts of this large island, where officials say at least 200,000 persons died, this correspondent found that survivors even in some areas that are not isolated are frenzied for food and other supplies.

"We need helicopter airdrops every half hour of dry food and blankets and clothes and medicine," said Lieut. Col. S. A. Hi of the Army Medical Corps, who is in charge of medical relief on Bhola Island, at the mouth of the Ganges River. "If we don't get them, people will simply die and die and die."

Yet *ten days* after the hurricane, there was only one helicopter in operation in all of East Pakistan. Because of the flooding, vast areas have become a great swamp, inaccessible even by boat. Airdrops by fixed-wing planes are not accurate enough to reach the groups of people clustered on islands of dry ground above the water.

Only the advanced industrial coun-

tries can provide the machines necessary to get aid to the desperate refugees in time. The United States should shoulder the greatest responsibility in this because of its wealth and its giant air force.

Nixon likes to boast about the military power of the United States—how many men can be airlifted to any spot in the world in a matter of hours if America's "security" is threatened.

It took Nixon nine days to get *six* helicopters to East Pakistan! According to Schanberg, these were not in operation a day after they arrived. In face of the plight of a million human beings in danger of imminent death, Nixon did not care to use the thousands of helicopters and immense supplies stockpiled only a few hours away in Vietnam and Thailand.

The greatest catastrophe of the century moved Nixon only enough to order six helicopters from the great U. S. arsenal. Of these, four were sent all the way from the distant United States, not from nearby Vietnam and Thailand.

In comparison to the resources Washington allocates for killing and the speed with which the packages of death are sent to their human recip-

ients, what can the world think of Nixon's decision to send six helicopters to Pakistan?

And what must the world think of the fact that precisely the same day these helicopters arrived in Dacca, hundreds of American planes renewed the bombing of North Vietnam!

The Pakistani government is not blameless in this crime, although it does not have the resources needed to meet a catastrophe of this magnitude. The Yahya Khan regime—for some unfathomable reasons of "face"—was reluctant to appeal to the world for help.

Yahya refused to even ask India for permission to refuel Pakistani helicopters on Indian territory—permission which the Indian government has belatedly granted without being asked. The small Pakistani air force stayed away from East Pakistan.

Little effort was made to distribute even the pitiful supplies on hand.

Such monstrous indifference is an indication of the ruling class's real attitude toward ordinary human beings. In Rawalpindi and in Washington, the rulers think alike. "The greatest catastrophe of the century? So what. Let them die. Saves bombing the gooks."

## Children's Growth Stunted by Dirty Air

Air pollution is a cause of growth retardation, respiratory diseases, asthma, dizziness, fatigue, loss of appetite, and impairment of vision in children, a leading pediatrician has reported.

Dr. Paul Wehrle is chairman of the Committee on Environmental Hazards of the American Academy of Pediatrics. His committee has completed a review of more than 100 scientific papers on the effects of air pollution on children.

According to the November 15 *New York Times*, Wehrle said that it is easier to study air pollution results in children than in adults. This is

because children normally stay within a limited geographical area, do not smoke, and are not exposed to occupational dangers.

Wehrle said that the effects of air pollution can be seen in the performance of athletic teams. In a study of high-school cross-country runners over a period of six years, Wehrle showed that their performances had a direct correlation to the level of air pollution.

Almost 40,000 persons were sentenced to whipping in South Africa in 1969, according to government figures.

## Savage Sentences for Mexico's Political Prisoners

Mexico City

The first batch of sentences was handed down November 12 against a group of 68 political prisoners jailed in the roughly two-month period from the start of the 1968 student movement July 26 to its suppression in the massacre of Tlatelolco October 2 of that year.

Federal Judge Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor chose to announce his decision only two weeks before December 1 when Luis Echeverría is scheduled to be sworn in to replace Gustavo Díaz Ordaz as head of the repressive Mexican regime.

The sentences were savage. The respected scholar Eli de Gortari was given 16 years in prison; the internationally famous novelist José Revueltas, 16 years; Raúl Alvarez, 17 years; José Luis González de Alba, 16 years; Gilberto Guevara, 16 years; Carlos Martín del Campo, 17 years; Fausto Trejo, 16 years; Salvador Ruiz Villegas, 16 years; Ana Ignacia Rodríguez Márquez, 16 years; Roberta Avendaño Martínez, 16 years; Luis Tomás Cervantes Cabeza de Vaca, 16 years; Carlos Sevilla González, 10 years; Armando Castillejos, 10 years; César Nicolás Molina Flores, 10 years; Arturo Zama Escalante, 8 years; Gerardo Unzueta, 8 years; Fernando Granados Cortés, 8 years.

Only a few of the prisoners received sentences under 5 years, which permit parole. All those now out on bail must return to prison since all got terms of more than 5 years.

In addition, Judge Ferrer MacGregor imposed fines on 47 of the defendants to "compensate" for the losses supposedly caused by the student agitation. If the prisoners are unable to pay these "damages," their terms will be lengthened.

One group was fined 1,987,832 pesos (12.49 pesos equal US\$1). This group included Bernard Phillip Ames, Marcos Antonio Avila Cadena, José Revueltas, Pablo Gómez Alvarez, Florencio López Osuna, José Carlos Andrade Ruiz, Carlos Martín del Campo Ponce de León, Servando Dávila Jiménez, José Piñero, Sócrates Amado Campos Lemus, Gilberto Ramón



ECHEVERRIA: Mexico's new president takes office with "clean slate"—the dirty work was done by outgoing regime.

Guevara Niebla, Luis Oscar González de Alba, José Tayde Aburto, Antonio Pérez Sánchez, Rodolfo Echeverría Martínez, José Fausto Trejo Fuentes, José Natividad, Francisco Colmenares César, Jesús González Guardado, Salvador Ruiz Villegas, Ana Ignacia Rodríguez Márquez, and Roberta Avendaño Martínez.

A second group was fined 970,368 pesos. In this group, the judge listed Adela Salazar Carbajal, Eli de Gortari de Gortari, César Nicolás Molina Flores, Armando Castillejos, Carlos Sevilla González, Martín Dosal Jotar, Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, Luis Tomás Cabeza de Vaca, Romeo González Medrano, Miguel Eduardo del Valle Espinosa Félix, Lucio Hernández Gamundi, and Raúl Alvarez Garin.

A third group composed of Mario Hernández, Fernando Granados Cortés, Gilberto Rincón Gallardo Meltis, and Jessai Díaz Cabrera was fined 969,748 pesos.

A fourth group—Arturo Zama Escalante, Félix Goded Andrew, Rubén

Valdéspino García, Arturo Ortiz Marbán, Gerardo Unzueta Loenzana, Roberto Miñón Corro, Agustín Montiel Montiel, and Arturo Martínez Nateras—was fined 69,153 pesos.

Two defendants, César Romero González and Juan Ferrara Rico, were fined 27,000 pesos.

All the fines were collective and must be paid by each of the groups as a whole.

Furthermore, the penalties imposed in the first batch of sentences apply only to the federal offense charged against the prisoners. The sentences for alleged common-law crimes are yet to come.

After sentence had been pronounced, one defendant, Eduardo del Valle Espinosa, who had been given 10 years, was called back before the court. He was told that an error had been made in his case, that his real sentence was . . . 16 years.

These monstrous sentences imposed by the Mexican government and its subservient court system demonstrate the depths of the repression in our country, which became evident to the world in the massacre of Tlatelolco October 2, 1968, when hundreds of persons attending a peaceful meeting were deliberately trapped and gunned down by the army.

The defendants refused to sign the documents the judge put before them. José Revueltas made a brief speech, turning the court, which had been held in a room in Lecumberri jail, into a political rally. After this, the prisoners returned to their wards singing the "Internationale." As they reached their cells, the remaining prisoners joined them in the battle hymn of workers throughout the world.

Immediately after the announcement of the sentences, the rector of the National University of Mexico, Doctor Pablo González Casanova, made a statement calling on the new president to issue an amnesty to "strengthen the faith and confidence of the citizens in the present legal system in Mexico."

"The National University," González said, "must out of duty make known the unrest this trial against their con-

pañeros has produced among the professors and students; and declare that the situation would be graver still if this unrest did not exist. Because if there were no such anger, it would indicate a lack of elementary human solidarity and a lack of academic and civic responsibility on our part.

"Therefore, the university considers it necessary to make a brief consideration of the principles involved. National security is one of the objects of a state based on laws. Unrest, anxiety, and mistrust of the law are signs of insecurity—at least a feeling of insecurity which does nothing to promote the healthy development of the nation.

"As a basis for more vigorous and conscious national unity, the country requires increasing confidence in a system of laws. In the academic world we are responsible for strengthening the confidence of the professors and students in reason and law, their confidence that individual and social conflicts can be solved by recourse to the courts.

"It is certainly our responsibility and our concern as members of the academic community to seek the release of the imprisoned professors and students. But as citizens we are also vitally interested in seeing that the courts . . . fulfill their role of assuring the security and stability of the Mexican nation. Therefore, we consider it highly desirable that a just, democratic, and fair review of these sentences—soon to take place in the appeal courts—will bring the release of these students and professors."

The rector's appeal was seconded by some of the most distinguished members of the bar, the Mexico City daily *El Día* reported in its November 15 issue. For example, the jurist Raúl Cervantes Ahumada said: "Naturally the present university community and the graduates of our country's highest institution of learning are disturbed by the situation of the students and professors who we believe have been unjustly imprisoned."

Cervantes explained that an amnesty would have the advantage of promoting national "harmony," as well as "benefiting the persons who are now the victims of an unjust situation. They have been sentenced by courts that are not independent but an appen-

dage of the executive power. We all know that today the courts are really an organ of repression."

Now, more than ever, worldwide protests are necessary to force the new regime to annul the murderous sentences against many of Mexico's lead-

ing intellectuals and student leaders. These long jail terms could prove to be death sentences in the corrupt Mexican penal system.

Protests can be sent to President Luis Echeverría, Palacio Nacional, Mexico 1, D. F., Mexico.

## 'What We Represent Cannot Be Killed'

# Revueltas' Speech to the Court

[In addition to being one of the foremost writers of his generation, José Revueltas is a longtime revolutionary militant. In the early 1930s he was sent to the penal colony on the Islas Mariás for being a member of the Young Communist League. He was fourteen years old at the time.

[Revueltas broke with Stalinism over the issue of artistic freedom and responsibility. In studying the causes of the worldwide youth revolt, he came to revolutionary positions approximating those of the world Trotskyist movement. Owing to his cultural prominence and revolutionary principles, he was singled out by the Díaz Ordaz government as the "intellectual leader" of the 1968 student rebellion.

[Since the repression of this movement October 2, 1968, Revueltas has been imprisoned in Lecumberri penitentiary, despite appeals on his behalf by many Mexican writers and by the world-famous Chilean poet Pablo Neruda. Revueltas was condemned November 12 to sixteen years in prison, plus joint responsibility with other political prisoners in paying a fine of 1,987,832 pesos. The following is his speech to the court after sentence was pronounced.]

\* \* \*

I do not want to address myself to the injustice of this sentence. It constitutes a true monument to the cynicism of a court system that sooner or later will itself be judged by public opinion and a citizenry less cowardly and degraded than we see at present under the dictatorship suffered by our country. I wish to address myself only to the inconsistency of the sentence that has been pronounced here.

In reality, the judge should have sentenced us to death. It is to be supposed that this did not come about for

any lack of will either on the part of the president of the republic or the judge, his lackey and political hatchet man. For what is the *object of the law* on which this *false subject of the law*, the judge, has passed sentence? This juridical object is only a person with a first and last name to which the sentence is assigned. On this person falls a certain number of years, which I suppose he will have to spend in jail. But you, your honor, your honors, who pose as judges in this country, are sentencing this juridical object, this legal person, not his spirit or his thought. Against this spirit and this thought, your honors can do nothing. Nor can you, Mr. President, ever do anything.

Who can prevent us from continuing the struggle in prison with the weapons of criticism and thought?

Here lies the inconsistency of those who have condemned us. They could not sentence us to death—not because this penalty is not included in the Code, not because they are incapable of murdering us, as the criminal assault we suffered January 1 demonstrated, but because what we represent cannot be killed. You cannot kill our brains; nor dim our minds by all the years of imprisonment you heap upon us.

Of course, our brains are not important, nor are the works they have borne and will continue to bear in the coming years. But as long as our brains live and our minds work, you cannot stop us from thinking. While our intelligence lives on, while our thoughts remain active, you, judges, functionaries, dictatorial presidents, police agents, informers, hangmen, and the rest of you garbage of history, you and your sons and your sons' sons and their sons will not live in peace.

That is all I have to say.

### Rostropovich Defends Solzhenitsyn

Mstislav Rostropovich, the Soviet cellist, has come to the defense of dissident writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in an open letter to the Soviet press.

Rostropovich, a world-renowned musician, has often served the Soviet government as a "cultural ambassador" on foreign tours. He was awarded Stalin prizes in 1951 and 1953, and at least forty works by Soviet composers have been dedicated to him. He has not previously been involved in political controversy.

Rostropovich's letter was addressed to the editors of *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and *Sovetskaya Kultura*. It has not been printed in the Soviet Union, but a copy was obtained by the *New York Times* and printed in its November 16 issue.

The letter criticizes the Soviet press for its selective quotation of world reaction to Solzhenitsyn's Nobel prize:

"Why does *Literaturnaya Gazeta* select from numerous Western newspapers only the opinion of American and Swedish newspapers, avoiding the incomparably more popular and important Communist newspapers like *L'Humanité*, *Lettre Française* and *L'Unità*, to say nothing of the numerous non-Communist ones?

"If we trust a certain critic Bonosky [Philip Bonosky, a writer for the *Daily World*, which reflects the views of the American Communist party], then how should we consider the opinion of such important writers as Böll, Aragon and François Mauriac."

Rostropovich points out the inconsistency of hailing the Nobel prize awarded to Mikhail Sholokhov in 1965 while attacking the award when granted to Solzhenitsyn or, earlier, to Boris Pasternak.

In regard to Pasternak, who was pressured into refusing the Nobel prize in 1958, Rostropovich offers an illuminating example of how literary criticism is practiced in the Soviet Union:

"I recall with pride that I did not go to the meeting of cultural figures in the Central House of Cultural Workers where B. Pasternak was abused and where I was expected to deliver a speech which I had been 'commis-

sioned' to deliver, criticizing 'Doctor Zhivago,' which at that time I had not read."

He goes on to cite such composers as Shostakovich, Prokofiev, and Khachaturian, some or all of whose works were banned twenty years ago but are now considered acceptable. "I recall the past not in order to grumble but in order that in the future, let's say in twenty years, we won't have to bury today's newspapers in shame."

Rostropovich's letter would seem to create a difficult dilemma for the So-

### Soviet Union

### Scientists Found Human Rights Group

Three Soviet physicists announced November 15 the formation of a Committee for Human Rights to seek to protect personal freedoms in the Soviet Union. The three are Andrei D. Sakharov, Andrei N. Tverdokhlebov, and Valery N. Chalidze.

The most prominent of the three is Sakharov, who is a member of the Academy of Sciences. Regarded as the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, he has been barred from work on security projects, according to the November 16 *New York Times*. He is employed at the Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow, which was recently criticized by the Communist party Central Committee for insufficient "staunchness in the struggle against unscientific, idealistic conceptions of bourgeois scientists."

The three physicists made available to newsmen a signed statement of the principles of the new committee. Anthony Astrachan reported in the November 16 *Washington Post* that the statement listed three purposes for the organization:

"To help the organs of state power create and apply guarantees of human rights . . ."

"Creative assistance to persons who want to conduct constructive research into the theoretical aspects of the problem of human rights and the study

viet bureaucrats. On the one hand, they can hardly be pleased by the criticism of their rule of the arts. On the other, it would be very embarrassing to take public measures against such a prominent figure.

While the bureaucrats are attempting to solve this problem, some of the Soviet people may be thinking over a question in Rostropovich's letter:

"I do not speak about political or economic questions in our country. There are people who know these better than I. But explain to me please, why in our literature and art so often people absolutely incompetent in this field have the final word? Why are they given the right to discredit our art in the eyes of our people?"

of the specifics of the problem in a socialist society."

"Legal instruction, specifically propaganda for the documents of international and Soviet law on the problem of human rights."

In its apparent willingness to work with Soviet government organs, the Committee for Human Rights differs from a similar group formed in May 1969, the Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights.

The statement of the committee indicated that its founders hoped to keep it apart from political disputes. Membership was restricted to those who "are not members of a political party." Another passage excluded anyone who is a member of a group "whose principles allow participation in orthodox or opposition political activity."

The latter restriction could conceivably exclude many well-known opponents of bureaucratic authoritarianism.

### Unemployment Still Rising in U. S.

Unemployment in the United States rose to 5.6 percent of the work force in October, the Labor Department announced November 6. This means that 4,300,000 workers are looking for jobs.

The October unemployment was the highest for any month since January, 1964.

## Raids Near Hanoi and Haiphong

# Nixon Again Escalates Vietnam War

The Nixon administration again escalated its aggression in Indochina November 21 with heavy bombing raids against six provinces of North Vietnam.

The raids, lasting twenty-four hours, hit Hatay, Quangninh, Haiphong, Hoabinh, Hatinh, and Quangbinh provinces. Hatay is adjacent to the capital, Hanoi. The port of Haiphong is near the border between Quangninh and Haiphong provinces.

U. S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird denied that planes had struck as far north as Hanoi and Haiphong. He claimed that the bombing was confined to the area below the nineteenth parallel.

Laird was contradicted by Agence France-Presse, which reported in a dispatch from Hanoi:

"Hanoi shook today from the blast of bombs only 25 miles away as United States aircraft carried out raids. . .

"Reports told of dead and wounded from the raids, which hit several towns around Hanoi. . ."

Laird also attempted to picture the new escalation as "defensive." The raids, he said, were "protective reaction air strikes against missiles and anti-aircraft gun sites" in retaliation for the shooting down of a U. S. reconnaissance plane nine days earlier.

The U. S. imperialists have no right to "protect" planes violating North Vietnamese air space. The real reason for the raids was quite different from that offered by Laird. In the November 22 *New York Times*, William Beecher quoted a "high-ranking official" who admitted that the U. S. bombs were directed against weapon and fuel supplies.

"Heavy rains and B-52 strikes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in Laos have prevented the North Vietnamese from moving much of these supplies south," the official said. "They have been piling up for weeks. If this strike is successful, and I have every confidence it will be, it will present quite a setback to the enemy."

Agence France-Presse said that Observers in Hanoi considered the bombing "the start of a United States operation aimed at dissuading Hanoi

from keeping up its aid to the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

"The observers say they are convinced that Washington doubts the success of its 'Vietnamization' policy . . . and is now seeking by all means possible to give it some breathing space."

In escalating his attempts to defeat the Vietnamese revolution, Nixon even bombed some of the American prisoners of war for whom he professes so much concern. Nguyen Thanh Le, a North Vietnamese spokesman at the Paris talks, reported that the planes

## Supported by Stalinists

# Philippine Capitalists to Run Convention

By Francisco G. Blandino

Manila

On November 17, Filipinos elected delegates to the constitutional convention, which will meet in June 1971. The convention represents an attempt by the ruling classes to appear more "nationalistic" by getting rid of the 1935 constitution, which was passed by the U. S. Congress in 1935 and amended in 1946 and 1954 to give additional economic concessions and military bases to the U. S.

The prevalent belief in liberal and moderate circles that the nation's problems can be solved by legal reforms has helped produce a "national" demand for a new constitution.

The Constitutional Convention Election Act passed by the present Congress made it illegal for political or civic groups to run or back candidates. It also set a minimum age of twenty-five for candidates. Thus student and youth militants were excluded from running.

Some radicals, especially the Maoists, claimed that running in the election would "foster bourgeois illusions among the people." But while justifying their abstention by radical rhetoric, the Maoists at the same time

had hit a prisoner-of-war camp containing American pilots.

Le indicated that the North Vietnamese delegation might boycott the talks in protest against the raids. He also said that five of the attacking planes and a helicopter had been shot down.

The only immediate response to the escalation from the Soviet Union and China was an editorial in *Renmin Ribao*, the newspaper of the Chinese Communist party.

Nixon's new escalation was one more clear proof that American imperialism will feel free to attack revolutions anywhere in the world so long as the two most powerful workers states continue their policy of substituting lip service and token aid for the serious efforts required to defend them.

worked for the election of "progressive" lawyers and editors. This was part of their concept of a multiclass front they call "National Democracy."

The pro-Moscow Communists supported the various "progressives" in the major urban centers while running two token candidates in the rural areas of Southern and Northern Luzon.

A recently formed radical socialist group, Samahan Ng Kabataan Sosyalis [SKS], ran two candidates. Their program was: an end to foreign imperialism; creation of a "Union Congress"; public ownership and workers control of basic industry; public ownership of the land.

Some radicals and "progressive" nationalists criticized the SKS's socialist program because "bourgeois conditions must first exist before there can be socialism." SKS replied that "what was necessary was full political power for the workers to build the base to build socialism."

The big bourgeois Nationalist and Liberal parties ignored the election law and put their machines to work. The lead article in the November 12 Manila *Daily Mirror* reported that

the results tended to show that the triumphs of the so-called 'independents' were an exception rather than the rule . . . known administration candidates were swamping the independent opponents."

The "unofficial" entry of the big party political machines became so glaring that the moderate president of the National Union of Students of the Philippines wrote a letter to the *Manila Times* pointing out that fifty candidates were either relatives or in-laws of leading governors, congressmen, senators, and administration heads. A later survey showed that two-thirds of the candidates mentioned in the letter were elected.

Big politicians themselves got into the act, with Senator Liwag and former presidents Garcia and Macapagal among the elected. On a television election report, the Liberal party presidential candidate in the 1969 elections joyfully admitted: "All my candidates were elected in Cebu." On the same program, the mayor of Manila admitted that his political machine backed all but one of the city's elected delegates.

The "progressive" nationalists were in the minority and divided as well. These nationalists never advocate workers control, and for them nationalization means Filipinization. This Filipinization is quite ambiguous and can mean government ownership,

capitalist ownership, or a mixed economy.

With its conservative majority, it is unlikely that the convention will end "parity" rights for American businesses. One of the administration-backed delegates said on television that while he opposed some effects of U.S.-Philippine relations, such as the bars and brothels outside Clark Air Force Base, parity rights are not that simple since they "are also a question of property rights."

Thus it is obvious that the constitution drawn up by the convention will maintain imperialist relations because, like all bourgeois constitutions, it will defend bourgeois property.

## Trudeau Retains Emergency Powers

# Labor Leader, Lawyer Charged with 'Sedition'

By Allen Myers

More than five weeks after the imposition of the War Measures Act, the Trudeau government has yet to produce a single piece of evidence supporting its claim of an "apprehended insurrection" in Québec.

Neither have the Draconian measures been directed primarily at the Front de Libération du Québec [FLQ], as statistics on arrests clearly indicate. Of the 429 persons arrested without warrant, 372 were later released without any charges being filed. Under the proclamation outlawing the FLQ, even aiding the organization in any way would have been sufficient grounds to hold them for trial.

Of the remaining 57 prisoners, 43 have been reported arraigned, often on charges that have no connection with the FLQ. So far, Québec Premier Robert Bourassa's police have come up with two proven FLQ members: one music teacher, who pleaded guilty, and Bernard Lortie, who admitted being one of the four men who kidnapped Québec Labor Minister Pierre Laporte.

The most serious charge filed against the political prisoners is "seditious conspiracy," which can bring a sentence of fourteen years.

Ten men were arraigned on this



MICHEL CHARTRAND

charge November 5, including Michel Chartrand, the head of the Montréal branch of the Confederation of National Trade Unions [CNTU]; Robert Lemieux, the lawyer who represented the FLQ in negotiations with the government; author Pierre Vallières;

Charles Gagnon, a former sociology professor at the University of Montréal; and Jacques Larue Langlois, a former producer in the French-language service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's television network. Three other persons, including a woman who had worked as a receptionist in Bourassa's office until October 8 of this year, were arraigned on the same charge November 14.

The accusation of "seditious conspiracy" is an apparent attempt to lend credence to the government's claim of "apprehended insurrection." Sedition is defined in Canadian law as advocating "the use, without authority of law, of force as a means of accomplishing a governmental change within Canada."

Many of the prisoners used the arraignment as their first opportunity to speak out against their confinement.

According to the November 6 *Toronto Daily Star*, Chartrand told the court that Québec Justice Minister Jérôme Chôquette "knows damn well I'm not a member [of the FLQ]. I've never been a member and I can't be a member."

"I've always used democratic methods."

Chartrand also objected to the un-



usual procedure of conducting the arraignments in police headquarters:

"Is this a regular court? Ordinarily, an accused appears at the court house on Notre Dame St. We appear in a police headquarters. Is this done to entertain a psychosis of terror?"

Pierre Vallieres pointed out that he was in prison during part of the time he is supposed to have "conspired."

Lemieux refused to enter a plea against the conspiracy charge. "Conspiracy?" he said. "What conspiracy? I want to know if I have conspired because I quoted Judge Turgeon of the Appeal Court as saying that my client, Vallieres, should have been condemned more for his ideas than his act . . . I want to know if I have conspired because I secured the acquittal of my client, Charles Gagnon . . . I want to know if I have conspired because I rose against the fact that in Matagami, the 25 percent of English-speaking people there are receiving 50 percent of the funds allocated to schools. I want to know if I have conspired when I said that Bourassa was a liar when he promised to create 100,000 new jobs if he got elected to power."

If any additional evidence were needed that the War Measures Act was aimed at suppressing the nationalist sentiments of the entire Québécois population, it was provided November 11 by Justice Minister Chôquette. He urged that all residents of Québec be required to carry identification cards bearing their photograph and fingerprints.

The November 12 *New York Times* reported that Chôquette "also wants the police to retain some of the more important search and seizure powers granted them under the Emergency War Measures Act . . ."

Chôquette warned a television audience: "The people had better get used to the idea that police must have more adequate methods of controlling crime."

The Federal Minister of Justice, John Turner, suggested that Chôquette's suggestions "might" be unconstitutional. But constitutionality was the least of Turner's concerns when he introduced into parliament November 2 the Trudeau government's "substitute" for the War Measures Act.

This substitute, entitled "Public Order Temporary Measures Act," specifically states that it "shall operate notwith-

standing the Canadian Bill of Rights."

Under the new bill, which has been approved in principle by the House of Commons but will not become law until all proposed amendments have been acted upon, persons can still be imprisoned for five years for having belonged to the FLQ *before the law was passed*. Police will still be able to hold prisoners seven days without charges and to conduct searches without warrants.

In the November 3 issue of the *Toronto Daily Star*, the paper's Ottawa editor, Anthony Westell, wrote that the new measure "is in essence a public relations bill, designed to meet the government's commitment to introduce some legislation to take the curse off the War Measures Act, and to placate Parliament and the people."

It is unlikely that Trudeau will be able to "placate" many people with a

law that preserves the worst features of the War Measures Act, even though the Public Order Temporary Measures Act will apply almost exclusively to Québec. Suspicions about Trudeau's intentions can only be reinforced by the knowledge that the War Measures Act remains on the books and can be invoked again at any time.

The credibility gap that Trudeau has created for himself is indicated by Westell at the conclusion of the article quoted above:

"The government justified the use of the War Measures Act by saying it had evidence of an apprehended insurrection, but it has never produced convincing proof.

"It is now seeking approval of use of the same emergency powers in a new form, and it should still be made to prove its case before one civil liberty is suspended."

## Sudan

### Nimeiry Kicks CP Ministers Out of Cabinet

The military regime of General Gafaar Muhammed al-Nimeiry in the Sudan has begun a witch-hunt against the Sudanese Communist party, ousting its representatives from the government and arresting its leaders.

The government radio station in Omdurman announced November 16 that three cabinet ministers, believed to be members of the Communist party, were relieved of their functions.

The November 19 Paris daily *Le Monde* reported that thirty officers in the Sudanese army, who were thought to be sympathetic to the CP, were removed from command. The CP's general secretary, Abdel Khalik Mahjoub, was arrested.

Mahjoub was exiled by Nimeiry last April but he was allowed to return to the country in June. He had been under close government surveillance until the purge began.

The Communist party was instrumental in bringing the Nasserite Nimeiry regime to power in the coup of May 25, 1969. Nimeiry's Revolutionary Command Council depended on the Communist-led unions in the initial period of its rule. The junta adopted a "left" stance, calling for "Sudanese socialism" and aligning itself

with the more radical of the Arab bourgeois states.

Earlier this year, on the first anniversary of the coup, Nimeiry announced a series of sweeping nationalizations, including all foreign-owned banks and four British companies that control the bulk of Sudan's foreign trade.

Like Libya, the new regime moved toward a close alliance with Nasser's United Arab Republic, with a concomitant shift toward opposition to the aims of the Palestinian resistance movement after the Middle East cease-fire began this summer.

The present crisis was triggered by the November 9 agreement between Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan to work toward a single federation of the three nations. The Communist party reportedly opposed "immediate" institution of the federation, calling for it to be set up "gradually."

From the beginning, the CP subordinated itself to the bourgeois regime, even remaining in the government after its leader had been sent into exile. More than a year ago, Nathan Weinstock predicted the outcome of this policy:

"It is to be feared that the Commu-

nist party will rapidly become a hostage in the hands of the nationalist officers, who will then get rid of it when they have consolidated a regime of the Nasser type. . . . The bourgeoisie know how to rid themselves of their proletarian allies after the chestnuts have been raked from the fire." [See "The Sudan—Between Nasserism and Socialism," *Intercontinental Press*, June 30, 1969, page 653.]

The three Communist ministers who have been ousted are Colonel Babikr El Nour, vice-president of the Revolutionary Command Council in charge of the economy and planning; Farouk Osman Hamadallah, minister of the interior; and Hachem El Atta, deputy prime minister in charge of agriculture and animal resources. *Le*

*Monde* commented November 18 that Hamadallah especially had played a central role in the revolt that brought Nimeiry to power "and was considered to be the real mastermind of the coup."

Nimeiry on November 17 accused the deposed ministers of having fallen under the influence of elements who, "while claiming to be progressives, were opposed to the revolution."

"These elements," *Le Monde* quoted the general as saying, "began carrying on subversive activities in the armed forces and the unions. They succeeded in influencing certain members of the Revolutionary Command Council and obtained certain secret information from them which they transmitted abroad, thus distorting the image of the revolution."

in the November 10 Paris daily *Le Monde*:

"One of the victims, the medical student Nestor Paz Zamora, twenty-four, died of starvation and fever. His companions in the struggle carried his body for three days, but, too weakened themselves, they did not have the strength to bury him. This example is a perfect illustration of the setting in which this new, unhappy guerrilla experience in Bolivia unfolded."

Chato Peredo and Mario Suárez were among six guerrillas whose lives were saved by the gold miners of Tipuani. According to *Le Monde*, however, the miners said they acted for "strictly humanitarian reasons," and not because they sympathized with the ELN.

During the four months the Teoponte guerrillas were in the field, *Le Monde* said, they were unable to recruit a single peasant.

In the opinion of the *Le Monde* correspondent, Peredo's band had ties with student organizations but lacked organized support among workers or peasants. "Last October 7," Soliz wrote, "the general strike called by the union organizations provided success for General Juan José Torres and assured the stopping of the right-wing militarists. But the echos of the shots in Teoponte were not heard in La Paz."

News about the activities of the ELN guerrillas in Bolivia has been so sparse in the U. S. and European capitalist press that it is difficult to check one report against another. As yet, *Intercontinental Press* has not received direct confirmation from Bolivia of the disaster to the ELN reported by *Le Monde* and the *New York Times*.

## Report Defeat for Bolivian Guerrillas

# Chato Peredo Deported to Chile

The Teoponte guerrilla front in Bolivia led by Osvaldo "Chato" Peredo and Mario Suárez Moreno appears to have suffered a most severe defeat in the last days of the Ovando regime. "Leftist" General Juan José Torres has announced that survivors of the campaign will be allowed to go into exile if they choose to surrender. Peredo and Suárez, who were captured by the army October 12, were deported to Chile along with six other guerrillas at the end of the first week in November.

A "pacification commission" composed of representatives of San Andrés University and of the Central Obrera Boliviana [COB—Bolivian Workers Confederation] have gone to the Teoponte area of Beni, northeast of La Paz, in hopes of finding some seventeen survivors of Chato Peredo's guerrilla band and persuading them to go into exile. According to the November 17 *New York Times*, the high command of the Bolivian army has promised the guerrillas safe conduct.

The army claims to have decimated the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Army, the guerrilla force led by Che Guevara in 1967] group in Teoponte, which began operations in July. The Torres government has published a list of

fifty-five guerrillas who have been killed. The November 17 *New York Times* estimated that the group numbered just over seventy members. Five soldiers were reported killed in encounters with the guerrillas.

The guerrillas included Chileans and Peruvians as well as Bolivians. Many were university students from La Paz.

The difficult terrain of the Teoponte area took its toll in lives, in addition to that taken by government bullets. Andrés Soliz reported from La Paz

## This Is Your Pilot, Napoleon, Speaking

If your next airplane flight stops unexpectedly in Havana, it might not mean you've been hijacked. Another possibility would be that your pilot was insane.

The United States government, which inspects military, private, and commercial airline pilots for all sorts of physical ailments, has virtually no checks at all to detect mental illness, David Hoffman reported in the November 11 *Washington Post*. He went on to cite a number of cases of irrational behavior by licensed pilots. Among them:

The air force lieutenant colonel who showers three to five times a day, scrubbing himself so vigorously that the skin peels from his fingers, and his hands become too sensitive to touch the control wheel.

The commercial pilot from Los Angeles who landed his plane in Utah and left his passengers sitting while he took a bus to his home 300 miles away.

The pilot who delays takeoffs by ten minutes for each Black passenger aboard as a protest against the fact that facilities are not segregated.

The Federal Aviation Administration pilot, whose job it was to examine commercial pilots, who suddenly put his plane into a steep, climbing turn over Oklahoma while announcing: "Damn Japs put a lot of flak down there. Guadalcanal's always a tough target."

The pilot of a light plane who, along with his only passenger, was completely nude when the plane crashed.

### Amalrik Sentenced to Three Years

Soviet historian Andrei Amalrik was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in a labor camp November 12. A codefendant, Lev Ubozhko, was also sentenced to three years.

Amalrik is the author of *Can the U. S. S. R. Survive Until 1984?* and *Involuntary Journey to Siberia*. The former envisions the fall of the Soviet government in a war with China. The latter describes the author's experiences on a collective farm in Siberia, where he was exiled as a "parasite."

Amalrik was arrested May 21. Although his home is in Moscow, he was tried 900 miles away in Sverdlovsk, a city closed to foreign newsmen. The official reason for holding the trial in Sverdlovsk was that Ubozhko had been captured there, carrying an open letter written by Amalrik. The two defendants had never met before the trial.

The evidence against Amalrik was reported to consist of his two books, two interviews given to an American television correspondent, and an open letter to Soviet writer Anatoly Kuznetsov, who defected to England in 1969. Amalrik's letter criticized Kuznetsov for his action.

All the witnesses, except one, testified only about Ubozhko. The one exception was Amalrik's wife, who was called as a prosecution witness even though she supports her husband's activities.

Newspaper accounts of the trial differed in some details. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* reported November 12 that Amalrik had pleaded not guilty, but the *Times* said in its November 15 issue that he had refused to enter any plea on the grounds that the court had no right to try him for his ideas.

Both papers agreed that Amalrik had refused to answer any questions during the trial, although he did make a statement to the court.

The statement condemned authorities who oppose dissident ideas with "the threat of criminal prosecution."

"Recognizing their ideological hopelessness," Amalrik said, these officials "... cling in fear to criminal codes,

prisons, camps and psychiatric hospitals."

Amalrik and Ubozhko were tried under Article 190 (1), which makes it a crime to "spread deliberate fabrications or to defame the Soviet state and social system." Amalrik denied that his writings were directed against either the Soviet state or people:

"It seems to me that now the main task for my country is to unburden itself of the heavy weight of the past, and for this criticism is necessary above all and not glorification.

"I think that I am a better patriot

than those who, loudly declaring their love for the motherland, mean love for their own privileges.

"Neither the witch-hunt carried out by the regime, nor this particular example—this trial—arouses in me the slightest respect nor any fear. I understand, however, that such trials are counted on to frighten many, and many will be frightened. But all the same, I think, the development of ideological emancipation, having begun, is irresistible."

The prosecutor asked a sentence of three years under general regime—the least rigorous in the labor camps—for both defendants. This was the sentence given Ubozhko, but Amalrik was ordered to spend his three years under restrictive regime, the next most severe classification.

### Laird Ups the Bill for U.S. War Spending

The Nixon administration's spending for war purposes will go up for the first time in three years in the next budget, Secretary of Defense Mel-


military spending, but this "tight rein" is not likely to cause any cries of anguish from American war industries. Although Laird named no precise figure in his speech, "informed Pentagon officials" quoted in the November 18 *New York Times* said the secretary was planning to spend between \$74,500,000,000 and \$77,000,000,000.

Military spending approved by Congress for this fiscal year, ending June 30, 1971, is \$73,600,000,000, some \$2,000,000,000 less than the Nixon administration had requested.

Laird told the Economic Club that unless Congress reconsidered and granted the \$2,000,000,000 extra it would be necessary to close some military bases and lay off personnel.

He estimated that reductions in military spending in the last two years had resulted in the loss of 2,000,000 jobs in war industries. In other words, under capitalism in the U. S. today, peace is incompatible with employment for millions of workers.

With the unemployment rate having risen to 5.6 percent in October, the Nixon government clearly feels it necessary to "prime the pump" of the economy by wasting a few billion dollars more than usual on napalm and similar goodies demanded by the Pentagon.



LAIRD: Waited until after election to break the news to U.S. taxpayers.

vin Laird told the Economic Club of New York on November 17.

Laird tried to ease the blow by promising to "hold a tight rein" on

## Hussein, Allon Join Forces Against Palestinians

The revelation that Jordan's King Hussein has been secretly meeting with high Israeli officials touched off controversy in both countries. Despite official denials from Amman and Jerusalem, reports continue to appear confirming that the meetings did indeed take place and that the main subject discussed was an agreement on joint efforts to suppress the Palestinian resistance movement.

The story was first made public when Uri Avnery, an opposition member of the Knesset, demanded to know why the parliament had not been briefed on the meetings. His question was stricken from the Knesset records and censors deleted any reference to the matter from the Israeli press.

*Time* magazine broke the story in its November 23 issue, giving details of a meeting between Hussein and Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon in Israel, north of Elath. The meeting which lasted ninety minutes, took place in an air-conditioned car guarded by Israeli security men. *Time* reported:

"The meeting was the latest of two or so that have been held since September 1968, when Hussein met Allon and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in London."

Even Golda Meir was said to have had a secret rendezvous with Hussein, as she once had with his grandfather King Abdullah, whom she visited dressed as an Arab peasant woman.

*Time* gave this account of the substance of the most recent Allon-Hussein discussion, which took place after the September Jordanian civil war:

"Allon asked the King whether Jordan might be interested in carrying on peace talks with Israel, either through Jarring or directly. Hussein acknowledged that conditions have changed since the death of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and that his throne is stronger as a result of Jordan's civil war. But he held that the time was not ripe for unilateral discussions. . . .

"Turning to the question of the guerrillas, the two leaders agreed that the fedayeen were a nuisance to both countries and that coordination was neces-



ALLON: Pledges Israeli "help" to King Hussein in putting down guerrillas.

sary to neutralize them. The King received promises of Israeli help."

Hussein reportedly said that he opposed the creation of a separate Palestinian state.

Both governments quickly denied the *Time* account, but even the censored Israeli press gave credence to the story. Jonathan C. Randal reported from Jerusalem in the November 18 *Washington Post*:

"The Israeli press today [November 17] blossomed forth with its own James Bondish version of alleged meetings between Jordan's King Hussein and Israeli ministers now that foreign publications have breached Israeli censors' efforts to hush up the reports.

"Readers of the afternoon newspaper *Yediot Aharonot* were treated to descriptions of Vice Premier Yigal Allon, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and the king trying to avoid being recognized by donning sunglasses and outlandish hats.

"All but the most recent meeting, which took place early this month in the Arava, a desert area in southern Israel, occurred during the late Premier Levi Eshkol's administration be-

tween July, 1968, and his death in February, 1969, the newspaper said.

"The earlier meetings took place, it said, in London, Switzerland and on the high seas."

The November 18 Paris daily *Le Monde* said that the "best informed Israeli sources" confirmed that the meetings had indeed taken place.

In the Jerusalem daily *Haolam Hazeh* of the same date, Uri Avnery criticized his government for dealing with Hussein, who would sooner or later be overthrown. "The peace, in the final analysis, depends on" the Palestinian people, Avnery wrote, and it would be a great error, he said, to rely on a regime that is regarded as the executioner of the Palestinians.

But it was a desire to conclude a deal at the expense of the Palestinian people that brought Allon and Hussein together in the first place. It was the only question on which they had no difficulty reaching an agreement.

*Le Monde* on November 19 gave its estimate of the results of the Allon-Hussein meeting. They were unable to agree—at that time—on a separate peace. There was no agreement on Allon's demand for "secure frontiers." The king did not accept the Israeli minister's proposals on the disposition of Jerusalem. *Le Monde* concluded:

"The only points on which agreement seems to have been reached was on the struggle against the Palestinian organizations."

### Opposite Page

Peng Shu-tse and Peng Pi-lan photographed in their modest home in Western Europe a few years ago. The two revolutionists were founders of the Chinese Trotskyist movement. Shu-tse celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday on November 24. Pi-lan will celebrate her sixty-ninth birthday next May 5. For a short account of Shu-tse's contributions in the struggle for world socialism, see Pi-lan's account "Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse" which appeared in four weekly installments in *Intercontinental Press*, beginning in our November 2, 1970, issue.



## The Kremlin Intervenes in Venezuelan CP Dispute

By Gerry Foley

"An article published in the official Soviet Communist party organ *Pravda*, analyzing the situation in the Venezuelan Communist party, has given a violent turn to the discussion going on in this party (which is getting ready to hold its Fourth Congress in December) over the ideas of Teodoro Petkoff. The views expressed in Petkoff's last two books have brought about a crisis heightening the tensions the party has been undergoing." This is how the November 2 issue of the mass-circulation Caracas weekly *Vea y Lea* introduced its report of an article in the October 20 *Pravda* that was sent out over the TASS wire.

The *Pravda* article, signed by A. Mosinev and entitled "On the Eve of the Fourth Congress of the Venezuelan Communists," made news in Caracas for several reasons.

Teodoro Petkoff has been in the leadership of the PCV (Partido Comunista Venezolano—Venezuelan Communist party) for a decade and still sits on the Central Committee. In his criticism of Stalinist concepts and methods in the Venezuelan CP and the world Communist movement, he apparently has the support of the PCV youth and reportedly a large section of the party rank and file. The fact that he has not been peremptorily expelled, like previous dissidents, testifies to the extent of his following.

Most of the draft resolutions prepared for the Fourth Congress, the first in ten years, seemed designed to block Petkoff's challenge. (See "Crisis in Venezuelan CP Over Czechoslovakia," in *Intercontinental Press*, May 18, 1970, page 469; and "Venezuelan Stalinists in Crisis Over Petkoff Book," September 7, 1970, page 733.)

In these circumstances, coming only a few weeks before the PCV congress, a major attack in the Soviet press on the dissidents represented obvious intervention by the Kremlin in the internal affairs of the Venezuelan party.

Furthermore, the *Pravda* article resorted to anathematizing the leader of the critical current in terms reminis-

cent of the days when an ukase handed down by Stalin had the authority of a medieval papal bull in the international Communist movement. Petkoff was denounced, among other things, as a "renegade," an "anti-Sovieteer," and a hater of the "first socialist state and the party of Lenin."

The intent of the Kremlin's diatribe was transparent to everyone. It was immediately translated and published in *Tribuna Popular*, the official organ of the PCV. This indicated that the Stalinist right wing, hard pressed by the challenge of the dissident youth and party activists led by Petkoff, were relying heavily on Kremlin support. The PCV organ even took the liberty of altering the text of the *Pravda* article to adapt it more closely to the needs of the right wing's factional war against the critics of Stalinism. It eliminated a reference to "Petkoff and his group," in order to make it appear that the dissident leader was isolated in the party.

As if to emphasize its collusion with the ultra-Stalinist right wing in the PCV, *Pravda* coupled its denunciations of Petkoff with well-larded praise for its own local bullyboys:

"Petkoff goes to the point of making monstrous statements that the strength of the socialist countries lies not in unity, but in fragmentation, in self-isolation. According to his assertion, the fragmentation of the socialist camp would 'create new bases for the development of the revolutionary movement' (?). In his hatred for the socialist countries, the slanderer goes to the extremity of demanding a change of regime in these countries. In all this, Petkoff tries to present himself as a Communist, as a 'friend' of the socialist countries. The General Secretary of the PCV, Jesús Faria, correctly answered the attacks of one of Petkoff's supporters, saying: 'If these are our friends, who are our enemies?'

"Petkoff's writings are filled with frank hatred of the world's first socialist state—the Soviet Union—and

of the party of Lenin. How correctly the prominent Venezuelan CP activists Ortega Díaz and García Ponce answered the renegade in their pamphlet 'The Antisocialist Views of T. Petkoff,' writing that 'anti-Sovietism is the thread that runs through Petkoff's book from the first page to the last.' It can be said in all justice, these authors wrote, that the theme of Czechoslovakia was only a pretext for anti-Sovieteering."

The *Pravda* article began by noting with approval that the Venezuelan CP firmly supported the schema of a two-stage revolution, the first stage involving an alliance with the "progressive bourgeoisie": "The tasks which emerge as its main objectives [the PCV's] in the present stage are the following—ending American domination, liquidating the economic and political power the American imperialists use to support the big bourgeoisie, overcoming the social and economic backwardness of the country, and creating an independent national economy. Only a democratic, patriotic people's government formed in the process of a victorious revolution can achieve these tasks."

Moreover, much to the satisfaction of the Kremlin organ, the superloyal Venezuelan CP, condemned by the Cuban leaders for its craven conservatism and betrayal of revolutionists, had backed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. "As is well known, the Venezuelan CP, by a resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee meeting in August 1968, approved the action of the socialist commonwealth countries aimed at defending socialism in Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Venezuelan CP confirmed its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism."

However, in *Pravda's* view, the generally gratifying picture in the PCV was marred by the appearance of a "grouplet" seeking to "sow the seeds of dissolution":

"Now, a month and a half before the Fourth Congress, the discussion

in the Venezuelan Communist party has assumed a sharp character. Within the party a little group has become active, advocating anti-Leninist positions on a series of major problems of the Venezuelan revolutionary movement and the international Communist movement. On the pretext of demanding 'renewal' of the party, this grouplet, headed by a member of the Central Committee, Teodoro Petkoff, is trying to revise Marxism, distort its most important positions, discredit the most devoted and tested leaders of the party, and sow disruption by rejecting the Leninist organization principles."

*Pravda* indicated, rather indirectly, that Petkoff opposed the perspective of collaborating with the "progressive bourgeoisie": "Petkoff criticizes the resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on the creation of antifascist popular fronts. He categorically declares that the establishment of popular fronts gave capitalism the opportunity to 'catch its breath' (!). He covers up the fact that in many countries, already long before the war with Hitler Germany, the policy of popular fronts helped to strengthen the working class and all democratic forces. Why does Petkoff have to make such a statement? His purpose is to argue against the necessity of the Venezuelan Communist party struggling in the present stage for a broad anti-imperialist popular front. There is no need to ask who benefits from this."

Thus, *Pravda* hinted that Petkoff was at least objectively an imperialist agent.

*Pravda* directed its heaviest fire, however, against Petkoff's criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: "In his book *Czechoslovakia—As a Problem*, Petkoff fully solidarizes himself with imperialist circles in evaluating the events in that country. He comes out in defense of the antisocialist counterrevolutionary forces who tried to pull Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. He apologizes for the authors of the counterrevolutionary 2,000-Word Manifesto."

Petkoff's positions on the need for democracy in the workers states, the international Communist movement, and the CPs—conclusions that flow naturally from his defense of the de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia—came under similar fire:

"Setting forth his renegade credo in articles published in the bourgeois

press and in his two books, Petkoff attacks the Soviet Union, the international Communist movement, the CPs of Latin America and of the Socialist countries of Europe. He writes about the Soviet Union with unconcealed hatred, viciously distorting the picture of communist construction in the USSR. . . .

"Petkoff needs such fabrications to propose his own 'model' of socialism. Petkoff tells in his book *Socialism for Venezuela?* what kind of socialism this is. It is socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the leading role of the Communist party, with full freedom for the dissemination of bourgeois ideas—that is, everything the counterrevolutionary forces aimed for in Czechoslovakia."

*Pravda* regarded Petkoff's views on the need for free discussion in the party and the right of minorities to defend their opinions as particularly scandalous:

"Petkoff raises his hand against the Leninist principles of party building. In this he does not shrink from falsifying the historical documents of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. He claims that the resolution passed at the Tenth Congress of the RKP (b) [Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia (bol'shevikov)—Russian Communist party (Bolsheviks)], which strictly prohibited factions and groupings within the party, was a temporary measure and that Lenin was an advocate of 'pluralism' both in the party and in relation to building socialism, and in his approach to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Obviously this represents the grossest distortion of Lenin's teaching on party unity. . . .

"As noted in the declaration of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCV, Petkoff dares even to put forward as a condition for maintaining the unity of the party that it renounce Leninist organizational principles, the principle of democratic centralism as the rule of the party's internal life, permit the existence of factions, renounce unity based on the program and statutes."

*Pravda*, of course, completely distorts the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. A public attack on a leading member of a "sister party," a few weeks before that party's supreme decision-making body has discussed his views, is hardly conducive to "unity"—unless unity means a

graveyard peace where all dissidents are expelled forthwith at the Kremlin's command.

As for *Pravda's* rehash of the Stalinist falsifications of Lenin's work and of party history, this is simply grotesque beyond words to anyone with free access to the documents of the Russian revolution and a willingness to examine the facts.

The natural corollary of *Pravda's* method here is to condemn Petkoff for turning to forbidden sources: "Not having the facts to support his slanderous assertions, Petkoff relies on the accounts of the most egregious troubadours of anti-Sovietism from Trotsky to Deutscher, Garaudy, and Sik."

The Kremlin mouthpiece *Mosinev* left no doubt about what he expected the Venezuelan party to do with Petkoff: "The pretensions of the renegade are meeting resistance from the leaders as well as from the rank-and-file organizations of the party. In a declaration of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, it is said that Petkoff's machinations have met with general condemnation. Pointing to the essential meaning of Petkoff's tendencies, the leadership of the Venezuelan CP has called on all party and young Communist organizations to energetically defend the unity and integrity of the party. . . . The provocative activity of Petkoff and his group cannot help but create certain difficulties for the revolutionary movement in Venezuela. However, the international experience of the Communist movements shows that wherever a resolute struggle is waged against opportunism on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and whenever all the healthy forces of the party rally around the leadership, all attempts to divert the party from the correct Leninist path will fail."

Although *Vea y Lea* faithfully reported the spirit and substance of the Kremlin organ's polemic, this won them no thanks from the superloyal pro-Moscow elements in Venezuela. *Tribuna Popular* denounced the Caracas magazine's article as "garbage."

In its November 16 issue, *Vea y Lea* replied: "We must acknowledge that what is involved is 'garbage,' but *TP's* apprentice sorcerer and poor student of journalism erred in putting the garbage on the doorstep of this publication. In journalism, no matter what its content or orientation, the responsibility for information lies with

the source. And it happens that the source of the information published in *Vea y Lea* was no less than the TASS news agency, which, as the *Tribuna Popular* apprentice sorcerer may know, is a Soviet agency that sends cables daily to many publications, including *Vea y Lea*. We received this transmission of 'garbage,' to use the expression of the *TP* hack sorcerer. In agreement with the TASS reporters both here and in the Soviet Union, we considered that Comrade A. Mosinev's article in *Pravda* attacking Teodoro Petkoff was of journalistic interest. Therefore we reported it, even though we do not agree with its method of analyzing the problems of the PCV nor with its view of the root of the question. That is, the article contained judgments that could serve to clarify the questions being debated by the PCV. So we ran a discussion of the TASS cable, instead of merely reprinting it. We assumed the responsible journalistic task of analyzing it, within our limitations of time and space.

"And, lo and behold, this cable from a Soviet news agency was transformed by the art of necromancy into 'garbage.' We asked ourselves self-critically, after reading the incoherent attack on this magazine, where our fault lay. And the weekly which made the attack [*TP*] explained the reason for its annoyance. It was our title "Inadmissible Russian Interference in the Problems of the PCV," which, as we saw it, was what the TASS material represented in essence. But it seems that what on our part is 'garbage' does not have the same character when it comes from people like Alexis Adams, Germán Lairé, and others who wrote in *Tribuna Popular* rejecting Comrade Mosinev's aggressive intervention against Teodoro Petkoff. Others like Larrazábal and Gustavo Machado expressed different views. But none of these opinions was changed into 'garbage' by the wand of the *TP* witch-hunter. Is an independent publication with a clear [leftist] stand to be disqualified from analyzing a TASS cable or an article in *Pravda* by the simple fact that it disagrees with the material TASS diligently provides?

"It is lamentable that our friends at *TP* will not join with us in the struggle we are waging as free men to win real and effective *freedom of speech*, which we have fought for so much.

For our part we will never abandon this fight. Perhaps that distinguishes us unmistakably from the other type of publications in our dishonored medium."

*Vea y Lea* also noted that its article on the *Pravda* polemic had evidently inspired the PCV spokesman Ramadés Larrazábal to write a piece on "proletarian internationalism." The Caracas weekly agreed that this question was an important one for revolutionists and offered to help advance the discussion. In accordance with its policy of providing a free forum for all tendencies on the left, it printed a contribution on the subject by Alfonso Ramírez.

Ramírez wrote: "What is the highest expression of proletarian internationalism? An international workers party such as Lenin sought to build in the Third International. It is a party, composed of national sections, that discusses and adopts a worldwide strategy, assigns its forces around the globe according to the appearance of revolutionary opportunities. Such a party, moreover, requires world congresses at least every two years to compare experiences and adjust its tactics.

"The Fifth Congress of the Third International, the first dominated by the concept of 'socialism in one country,' was held in 1924. The sixth took place in 1928, and the seventh and last in 1935. The Third International's degeneration reached such depth that Chiang Kai-shek was elected to the Executive Committee of the Communist International as an honorary member!

"At the time of the Sixth Congress, Trotsky observed: 'The new doctrine proclaims that socialism can be built within the limits of a national state—just so long as there is no intervention. From this principle flows a policy of collaborating with the foreign bourgeoisie in the attempt to avert intervention. This is supposed to guarantee that socialism will be built, that is, solve the main historical question. The task of the Comintern parties is, thus, of an auxiliary nature. Their mission is to protect the USSR from intervention and not to struggle for the conquest of power.' Already in 1943 Stalin no longer needed to keep up the pretense, and ordered the dissolution of the Comintern.

"If those now discussing the article

published in *Pravda* against the Petkoff group in the Communist party of Venezuela are not part of any International, on what basis are they talking about proletarian internationalism? If the Soviet Union supports the whole disjointed array of Communist parties for the purpose of applying its policy of 'peaceful coexistence,' how can it be said that the Soviet bureaucracy's condemning Petkoff's position, through the intermediary of the journalist Mosinev, rests on the principle of proletarian internationalism? The government of the USSR has not practiced proletarian internationalism since 1924. When it invokes this principle in name, it is to give orders to the parties of other countries but never to accept criticism from them.

"Clearly there is now only one movement that defends and practices proletarian internationalism as it was known in the first four congresses of the Third International—the Fourth International founded by Leon Trotsky."

#### Came Closer the First Time

The November 16 *Christian Science Monitor* carried the following notice:

"Due to a typographical error, a story from Saigon in our Nov. 14 papers quoted South Vietnam's Information Minister Ngo Khac Tinh incorrectly as saying: 'We now control 29 percent of the population.' The correct quotation is: 'We now control 99 percent of the population.'"

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# A Crucial Stage for the Cuban Revolution

By Livio Maitan

## Failures and Economic Contradictions

The year 1970 was the completion date of a major target of the Cuban revolution—the achievement of a 10,000,000-ton sugar harvest. For twelve months everything, in both the political and economic spheres, was subordinated to accomplishing this prime objective.

The goal was not set arbitrarily, or simply to score an important feat; it corresponded to very definite political and economic necessities. In the context of the new orientation worked out after 1963, the Cuban leaders estimated that in the immediate and near future only sugar production could create the exports necessary to finance the importation of the raw materials, foodstuffs, and industrial equipment needed before the construction of a socialist economy could really get off the ground.

Precisely because one is persuaded that the decision to set this goal was unavoidable, one cannot now minimize the importance of the failure to achieve it. This setback will result in a serious slowdown of economic growth while prolonging a dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union.

The situation is all the graver because the failure is not limited to the sector of sugar production alone. Let us recall the following facts particularly. Milk production in the period January-May 1970 dropped 25% below the 1969 level. Meat production has stagnated or declined, and there is no perspective for advances in the immediate future. Despite increases in absolute terms, the levels achieved in the production of rice are "far from satisfactory, both in quality and quantity." The plan for the fishing industry has been only 78% achieved. While surpassing the level of 1969, cement supplies are 23% lower than 1968.

The production of steel ingots has dropped 38%. A decline of 32% has been registered in fertilizer production. The plan for agricultural machinery has been realized only to a pathetically small extent. While showing a rise of 11%, electric power generated has fallen 17% below the increase in demand. Very serious lags have occurred in the manufacture of such essential consumer goods as shoes and textile products.<sup>1</sup>

What are the causes of such a balance sheet?

First of all, the bottleneck in sugar production did not develop where the Cuban leaders feared it would. According to their expectations, the maximum efforts would have to be made in cutting cane. The major difficulty in the past was most often underutilization of the sugar mill machinery because of an insufficient flow of raw material

from the fields. In fact, the cane was cut more or less as expected (the amounts counted on did not prove to be overestimated). But at the milling point, there was a failure (output was greatly below what had been expected).<sup>2</sup>

This failure must be attributed to both a hardly rational utilization of investments and inadequate maintenance of certain milling centers, as well as to the poor operation of these centers in general. According to Fidel Castro, the last factor was the most damaging.

The stagnation and decline in the other sectors mentioned above are attributable, primarily, to imbalances created by the concentration of all efforts on sugar production. Among these dislocations was the hardly rational employment of manpower, often indicated as the principal cause of the failure (for instance, the massive mobilization in sugar helped to aggravate the situation in transport).

But, more generally, the Cuban economy is suffering from a failure to apply the economic criteria that are indispensable to any system of planning. This, moreover, is related to a shortage of trained personnel which is both qualitative and quantitative.

In this context, bureaucratic disorganization wreaks havoc, like that denounced at the trade-union plenum held at the beginning of September in Havana. To cite only a few examples, 400 tons of raw material for plastic, unloaded in January, were still on the docks in September. Thousands of bags of jute suffered the same fate, with a loss that stevedore Raimundo Pérez estimated at \$70,000. Even the priority given to achieving the 10,000,000 tons did not prevent 45,000 metric tons of material for the maintenance of the sugar industry from being held up.

In the last analysis, these cases are an expression of the more general phenomenon of underutilization, or irrational utilization of existing resources. This has resulted, among other things, in a failure in certain cases to exploit the potentialities of special sectors in time which could have helped bring in the foreign exchange needed to finance imports.<sup>3</sup>

Another grave problem is labor output. The productivity of labor, in the context outlined, remains generally rather low, despite the enthusiasm which often marked the mobilization for the giant *zafra*. This tendency is particularly acute in the services (Castro mentioned the example of Cuban ports, which operate with manpower equal to half that of the British ports handling forty to fifty times the traffic). It has become evident at the same time that volunteer labor, which was strongly pushed during the *zafra*, has often produced quite modest results, involving absurd

1. The figures are taken from Fidel Castro's July 26 speech. The other references, which are not specified so as to avoid encumbering the texts, are from the following speeches: May 20, August 23, and September 3.

2. Output fell below the optimum output of the prerevolutionary period (10.85 as against 12.25, according to official calculations up to May).

3. See the cases cited by R. Dumont in his book *Cuba, est-il socialiste?*

waste and sacrifices that in the final accounting are fruitless.<sup>4</sup>

The problem of low labor productivity has become acute as a result of a further increase of the phenomenon of absenteeism. This is holding back the productive effort of the country, creating serious disorganization, and infusing elements of demoralization into the masses. The Cuban leaders are rightly worried over it and are encouraging discussions aiming at pinpointing its causes and envisaging methods for countering this dangerous tendency.

From the Havana trade-union plenum already mentioned, it appears that poor working conditions, problems of supply and of transportation, and bureaucratic methods of management help to provoke absenteeism. It also appears that the solution is now being sought both in the areas of improving working conditions, transportation, and political propaganda, and the adoption of repressive legislation.

This negative balance sheet and the need to indicate the causes at all levels must not make us lose sight—as the impressionists of all stripes seem to—of two considerations which while elementary are no less fundamental. The first is that the tensions and contradictions in Cuba at this stage are related in large measure to the achievements of the revolution. Fidel Castro was basically correct in saying that while "the revolution is passing through a period of crisis, this crisis is not one of retreat but of advancement." ("Perhaps," he added, "we have advanced too much.")

The problems that exist, for example, in food and housing arise not because consumption has been restricted, but for exactly opposite reasons. Likewise the difficulties in labor productivity as well as phenomena like absenteeism are explained, at least in part, by the radical change in the condition of the worker, who is no longer threatened by unemployment, enjoys rather generous social security, need not pay for a certain amount of recreation, and often has excess cash (because of the relative scarcity of consumer goods).

Even the rationing, which does seriously burden the daily lives of the Cubans, is in the last analysis greatly preferable to the much more barbaric rationing that existed under the capitalist system because of the feeble or non-existent buying power of the overwhelming majority of the people.

The second consideration is that Cuba must build socialism starting from a backward base. The Cuban leaders probably only now appreciate all the negative implications of this. This situation results in the use of methods that are still only those of craft production, while both the professionals and the workers have not been freed

4. Fidel Castro himself indicated, moreover, that the participation of the students in the *zafra* had negative consequences for their education and will bring a delay in the training of the technicians who are so necessary. This is an element which should give cause for reflection to all those who approach the question of the link between the schools and productive labor in a too utopian or offhand manner. With regard to his own participation in the *zafra*, Castro explained that it was impossible for him to go out every day, as he would have wished. "We had the illusion," he said, "of being able to cut cane four hours a day during the entire *zafra*, of living the utopia of a day divided between manual and intellectual labor."

from all the deformations characteristic of an underdeveloped society.

The international context substantially aggravates this situation. Cuba is still being subjected to an economic blockade by its powerful neighbor to the north. In order to comprehend the consequences of this, you need only to note the bottlenecks and paralysis suffered by the Cuban industrial sectors antedating the revolution because of the difficulty, or impossibility, of solving the crucial problem of spare parts.

## Bureaucratic Deformations

In sketching a brief analysis of the situation in Cuba a few months ago, I raised the question of a tendency toward social differentiation, toward the crystallization of a privileged layer. This problem is in the last analysis the major one facing the revolution at the present stage.

While there is a void as regards the structures of political power in Cuba, it has been partially filled by the intervention of an apparatus composed of immediate or higher-level cadres. These have either been furnished directly by the army (whose weight has steadily increased in the last years)<sup>5</sup> or were part of the state administration and the party. It is these cadres who exercise the real functions of leadership at all levels, using, more and more, administrative methods that are essentially paternalistic or authoritarian.

Behind the screen of unconditional support to the leadership of Fidel Castro and to the directives from the center, this layer is tending to consolidate itself in positions of power, which inevitably involve social privileges. In absolute terms and in comparison with what exists in the degenerated workers states in other parts of the world, these privileges are quite modest. But the essential thing is that members of this layer enjoy living conditions that differ perceptibly from the average conditions of the masses.

In this relative sense, privileges in the area of food, housing and means of transport (plus the manifold advantages linked to the position of leadership, such as trips abroad, parties, etc.) have a significance that goes beyond their intrinsic value. Therefore, they are resented by the masses as an injustice.

If, in addition to the limitations mentioned above, you consider the relative fluidity of the political structure and the still only relative crystallization of the apparatus, the orientations and attitudes of the leading nucleus around Castro and its persistent links with the masses, you must unquestionably conclude that no qualitative leap has occurred and that Cuba cannot be considered as a degenerated workers state in the same category as the other collectivist states.

Nevertheless, bureaucratic deformations have grown dangerously and the relationship of forces has evolved in favor of more or less consciously bureaucratic forces. This explains the note of alarm sounded by Fidel Castro, who, in several speeches, has just revived the themes of the 1962 polemic against Escalante, and the antibureaucratic offensive of 1967. In comparison with the Esca-

5. The practice of increasing use of the army in all spheres, and in particular in production, was given theoretical justification by Castro in his November 4, 1969, speech.

lante period, the social situation now seems objectively more difficult.

I have already mentioned the causes of the economic failures. The Cuban leaders must be given credit for not seeking excuses or scapegoats. Not only have they recognized the magnitude of the defeat—without resorting to manipulating the statistics—but they did not hesitate to declare, through Fidel himself, that "the battle of the 10,000,000 tons was not lost by the people, it was we, we who lost it. The battle was lost by the administrative apparatus and by us, the leaders of the revolution."

The Cuban leaders have admitted, more specifically, that administrative methods dominated over more properly political methods of leadership and that the participation of the masses in economic management had been absolutely insufficient. "The mass organizations are lacking," Castro said, "and they are fundamental."

Here, then, is the nub of the question. We are not idealists; we are Marxists, materialists. We by no means idealize the masses. We know whatever the specific solutions adopted, above all starting off from the level of a country condemned to backwardness by imperialist exploitation, that difficult problems will remain. It is hard to develop all the necessary trained personnel in a short period of time, and the cultural limitations of the masses constitute a major obstacle to their participating in a real way in administering the economy and the broader society.

But to break out of this vicious circle, there is no other way than to strive by every means right from the start to tap the creative potential of the masses. Only by experience can the masses acquire the necessary capacities and concepts, and produce the cadres essential for the overwhelming tasks of real socialist construction.

It is precisely for this reason—and not out of fetishistic attachment to any scriptures or experiences of the past—that we have always held that a revolution in Cuba, as elsewhere, must find expression in the creation of political structures arising from below, which alone can assure maximum democracy for the workers and peasants.

The absence of such structures, let us repeat once again, has been the Achilles' heel of the Cuban revolution. Now the consequences of this lack should be evident to everyone. If these structures had been built; if instead of relying primarily on their instinct and their direct experiences the Cuban leaders had learned more from the fundamental lessons of the past half century of struggles by the workers movement in the countries where capitalism has been overthrown, it would have been less difficult to achieve coherent planning and avoid the ravages of bureaucratic disorder. It would have been easier to achieve a much more substantial increase in production, to assure a more rational allocation of resources.

What is more, the creation of such structures would have erected much more substantial barriers than the mere combative spirit of a leading nucleus to the tendencies towards bureaucratization which, in a context such as the one in Cuba, is inherent in the phase of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Among the causes of the economic failures and dangerous social developments, the absence of a revolutionary-democratic organization of the state must, then, be assigned first place. The subjective responsibilities for this failure are all the more real because at certain stages—

for example, at the time of the fight against the Escalante group—the problem could have been taken up in relatively favorable conditions.

The crucial importance of this problem is all the more evident if you consider that in the framework of solving it, valid answers can be given to some very controversial questions, such as that of material incentives. The Cuban leaders did not wait for Mao's cultural revolution to criticize incentives of this type with arguments that were unquestionably well founded. Recently Castro has returned in more general terms to this problem: "If we use capitalist instruments to solve our problems, how can we create a communist man, a man endowed with a higher mentality, culture, and consciousness? We cannot be socialists with capitalists' methods."

In principle Castro is correct. But it must never be forgotten—as the Cubans seem to do sometimes—that one of the essential features of a transitional society, which is contradictory par excellence, lies in the fact that bourgeois norms continue to exist within the framework of a society that is no longer capitalist. It is only now, after all the tragic experiences of the past decades, that this theoretical influence, which was already known to Marx and Lenin before October, can be grasped in all its richness and concrete significance.<sup>6</sup>

If you ponder over the analysis of certain phenomena such as absenteeism, irresponsibility, and other such problems that have been advanced in Castro's last speeches and in the recent discussion, you could legitimately conclude that these manifestations are caused among other things by the inability or incapacity to satisfy the elementary needs of the masses. (This difficulty appears in such areas as working conditions in the plants, consumption, transportation, and similar spheres.)

Moreover, some of the measures envisaged to overcome a situation pregnant with dangerous tensions fall in the last analysis in the category of material incentives. In my opinion, this is absolutely correct. No one disputes the value of ideological education—of appeals to the spirit of sacrifice and to revolutionary enthusiasm, which at critical moments are irreplaceable. No one questions, either, that the cadres and the vanguard layers of the proletariat and poor peasantry must operate primarily on the basis of their consciousness of the historic tasks they are accomplishing.

But in a society that has just emerged from the barbarism of capitalism and that is a long way from the capacity to satisfy all wants on an equalitarian basis, incentives that are valid for the vanguard must not be confused with those capable of determining the attitudes of whole social layers.

It is easy to "denounce" the dangers implicit in the adoption of certain norms. But the following point must be understood. The adoption, for example, of material incentives assumes an entirely different significance and

6. "Perhaps," Castro said September 3, "our greatest idealism was to believe that a society which has just come out of its shell—in a world which has lived by the law of the knife and the law of the strongest, the law of everyone for himself, the law of the lie, and the law of exploitation for thousands of years—that it would be possible to move in one leap to a society where everyone would behave in a moral way." Is this a veiled self-criticism?

implications depending on whether this is done in a bureaucratic system, which promotes a depoliticalization of the masses and the development of a petty-bourgeois consumer mentality; or in a society organized on a revolutionary-democratic model, where the masses take an increasing part in economic and political administration.

From this standpoint, then, solving the problem of political structures is a precondition for a more correct solution of other problems. If the masses really hold power and can, first of all, determine the fundamental economic choices through the intermediary of democratic organs, then orientations based on priorities contrary to the interests of the masses and tendencies based on creating increasing privileges can be not only "denounced" or stigmatized but combated and counteracted in reality.

### **A Sharp Confrontation and the New Antibureaucratic Campaign**

Cuba has unquestionably entered a difficult phase. In the economic sphere it would be absurd to expect substantial changes in the immediate future. The bottlenecks cannot be eliminated without a long-drawn-out reorganization. Problems such as those in textile production or housing are "terrible," to use Castro's expression. (Regarding housing, he spoke more specifically of a "hypercritical" situation.)<sup>7</sup> For two to four years nothing can be offered in these areas but "palliatives."

As for food products, the Cubans must resign themselves to a continuation of the present scarcity. In such a context, the danger of tensions between the regime and the masses is far from imaginary. In fact, discontent is much stronger than ever in the past.<sup>8</sup>

This situation had to be reflected in the party, especially in its leadership. Very sharp discussions have been in progress for some months. Having no special sources of information and being obliged to take only the meager indications of the official press, one can nevertheless gather that two solutions, in principle, are being contemplated and that the debate revolves around these two approaches (or a combination of them).

The first solution is of a technocratic and authoritarian type. According to this view, in order to rectify things, in order to reorganize the economy, you have to rely primarily on the technicians, the specialists, the leaders who are supposed to be the most competent, and at the same time impose a much stricter discipline on the workers, including by means of administrative measures.

The second solution, on the other hand, would rely on mobilizing the masses, on their participating in a much more real way than in the past in economic and political administration. While not excluding disciplinary measures and tightening work discipline, this approach would eliminate the plague of absenteeism primarily by raising the consciousness of the masses.

The stakes in this confrontation, which seems likely to

prove extremely sharp, are in the last analysis crucial for the future of the Cuban revolution. Will Cuba be condemned to growing bureaucratization, or will it be possible to open a new chapter in the history of mass struggle against bureaucratism? The answer depends very largely on the outcome of the present confrontation.

Thus far, positive developments must be chalked up on two fronts, first of all in the orientation of Fidel Castro and the group around him. The speeches made by the revolutionary leader in the recent months and his contribution to the discussion at important meetings indicate that he is not inclined to accept the technocratic solution and that he is orienting toward the opposite approach. He wants, in reality, to stand up once more as the spokesman of the masses, as the first to denounce all bureaucratic abuses and chicanery the masses are suffering from, as the first to demand on their behalf their right to assert their will and their needs.

This is why he launched a new antibureaucratic campaign, picking up the themes of the preceding campaigns (in 1962 and 1967 especially) and pillorying the new "exploiters," who enjoy privileged living standards in comparison with those of the masses. He has even indicated solutions pointing in the direction of forming collective leadership bodies in the plants or direct intervention by the workers to solve the problem of allotting available housing.

This is why Castro explained more broadly that it was necessary to develop "a new society based on truly democratic principles—truly democratic principles!—replacing the purely administrative methods of the early years of the revolution. We must substitute democratic procedures for administrative ones which threaten to become bureaucratic." (August 23.)

Secondly, there have been very favorable reactions from the masses. Not only do they support Castro in his campaign but they often get ahead of him, taking the initiative in direct actions against the bureaucrats. Demonstrations occurred during the carnival at Santiago, and in some villages comfortably housed officials have simply been driven out.<sup>9</sup>

The discussion at the trade-union assembly in Havana, which I have mentioned several times, was an eloquent expression of the spirit existing at least in certain strata of the masses.

We cannot, however, neglect other important elements. I have already discussed certain phenomena like absenteeism, which in the last analysis reflect a depoliticalization and demoralization not confined to a few asocial individuals. If changes are not introduced in the near future in the political structures, and thus in the relationship between the state and the masses, negative reactions may grow instead of diminishing.

The main question to be answered is the extent of the changes envisaged by Castro. The enunciation of the

7. The situation has deteriorated with respect to the period immediately following the seizure of power, because the population has increased much faster than the construction of new housing.

8. Fidel Castro has spoken of this several times, correctly pointing out that there must be no confusion between the discontent of the counterrevolutionists and the discontent "within the revolution."

9. According to certain reports, some of the participants in the Santiago demonstration were arrested, but later released thanks to Castro's intervention. At the Havana assembly a woman worker related an episode which says a great deal about the relationship between the ranks, the small and middle bureaucrats, and Fidel. A bureaucrat ordered her to be quiet when she pointed out an absurd waste. She replied: "Some day I will get a chance to talk to Fidel!"

principle of electing committees to supervise the allocation of food and housing is obviously important, as well as the affirmation of the principle of recall ("at any hour of the day or night"). It is important also that a clear separation be established between the party and the state apparatus, and that real democratization of the trade unions be envisaged. Despite the changes introduced at the 1966 congress, the unions in general have remained ossified and passive.

But the Cubans seem to be still far from having a clear idea of new structures capable of mobilizing the masses and assuring their participation in running the economy. On the basis of what has been said from May to September, we must conclude that they envisage reemphasizing and expanding the mass organizations to which a fundamental role has been assigned.

Castro went so far as to set as a goal in organizing the workers movement, the slowness of which he continually denounces, that it attain the level of the Federation of Women or the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. But the effectiveness of these organizations in recent years is at least open to question and they play no real leadership role.

To remove any misunderstanding, I am not disputing the role of the mass organizations, especially the unions (provided, however, that they are freed from the present bureaucratic straitjacket, a heritage of control exercised by the old Stalinists of the PSP [Partido Socialista Popular — People's Socialist Party]).

But what Cuba needs is an all-embracing revolutionary democratic structure based on committees at all levels. These committees must be real organs of power, elected directly by the masses, and subject to recall at any time. In other words, what is needed is reorganization of the state and the government on the basis of *soviets*.

At the same time, this democratization must extend to the instrument of the organized political vanguard, the party. Promising beginnings were made in this area after the Escalante affair. But since then the Cubans have proceeded very empirically and inconsistently, dragging their feet. (It is symptomatic that the party has yet to hold its first congress.)

If the Cuban leaders want to remain faithful to Leninism, as they claim, they must take into account that one of the pillars of Leninism is precisely the conception of the party — an organized, effective party disciplined in action but profoundly democratic in the formulation and verification of its line. This involves the broadest freedom of criticism, and the rejection of all privileges for the leaders, including rights to information.<sup>10</sup>

The Leninist conception of the party requires, moreover, when there are opposing positions, the right to organize tendencies. The old objection, of Stalinist origin, that this right would threaten the effectiveness of the party has been proved false in advance by the experience of the Bolshevik party in Lenin's time. This party debated its problems openly and permitted tendencies in the most difficult years of the revolution and civil war.

Finally, it must be taken into account that there are

10. The lamentable poverty of the main Cuban press prevents the masses from having all the data necessary to come to correct conclusions. The leaders have available special bulletins and the foreign press.

forces in Cuba itself and the world that have an interest in promoting a process of bureaucratization. The whole apparatus spoken of above, composed of a large number of middle and higher cadres who have up till now practically run the state, are not ready to surrender their position in the name of principles. To the contrary, they will endeavor to consolidate their power, to defend and enlarge the privileges they enjoy.

If structural changes are not introduced in a relatively short time and there is a more substantial depoliticalization of the masses, the bureaucratic-authoritarian tendency could even win the support of some strata of the working class — those apt to react against absenteeism, lack of enthusiasm and work discipline — by appealing for administrative measures. The partisans of authoritarian methods might be considered by some workers as intransigent revolutionists.

At the international level, moreover, support will also be forthcoming for the bureaucratic-authoritarian tendency. The influence of the Soviet and East European bureaucracies has increased in Cuba for well-known reasons. These bureaucracies will inevitably offer substantial backing — camouflaged or open — to the forces representing interests similar to their own and seeking solutions in conformity with these interests.

## The Fourth International and the Cuban Revolution

The Fourth International has never subordinated its analysis of the workers states and their evolution to any tactical considerations. This is why today we are attempting a criticism of the tendencies operative in Cuba, and pointing out — along with positive aspects — a series of alarming elements. But at the same time we do not forget for a single moment that for Trotskyists, this question must always be posed from the standpoint of a revolutionary organization that understands how much its fate is linked to that of revolutions in every country in the world and how great its responsibility is to make a practical contribution, to the extent of its capacities, to promote certain outcomes.

For some time in intellectual circles and even in the ranks of the European far left, Cuba has no longer aroused any enthusiasm or even interest. It is simply no longer the fashion. In this context, the recent difficulties and failures will serve as a useful pretext for people to move farther away and to justify all sorts of more or less impressionistic or fanciful criticism. Those who bow before the myth of the cultural revolution and of Maoism will be among the happiest to devote themselves to this work. They already have some "serious" writings to quote from in their polemics.<sup>11</sup>

Such attitudes are foreign to the Fourth International. Moreover, the Trotskyist movement considers just as erro-

11. I am referring especially to Dumont's book, which, however, contains interesting information and assessments on specific points; and still more, Karol's book. After discovering Cuba only in 1961 (page 13 of the French edition), he has now moved away from it, seduced by the sirens of the cultural revolution, as spiced up by the Mao-spontaneists. Karol's conclusions that Cuba has adopted the Stalinist conceptions of the 1930s is simply aberrant and borders on bad faith. What can you say,

neous the judgments of those who extrapolate a bit too quickly on the tendencies I have indicated and who carry the implications of some attitudes too far, coming to the conclusion that Cuba has abandoned its policy of support for revolutionary movements in Latin America and accepted an egoistic and conservative outlook.

Cuba remains a rampart of the world revolution. The existence of revolutionary Cuba represents an unceasing source of weakness for American imperialism and an element objectively assisting the Latin-American revolution as a whole. All indications are that the Cuban leaders will be on the side of any revolutionary movement that develops, because they have not forgotten that their revolution

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moreover, about the temerity of a writer who criticizes the excessive role of Fidel or the vexations to which intellectuals have often been subjected in Cuba and at the same time eulogizes Maoism, which, as we all know, does not at all practice the cult of personality and permits no restrictions on the freedom of expression of artists?

## REVIEWS

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# Trotsky's Writings the First Year in Mexico

By Allen Myers

*Writings of Leon Trotsky [1937-38]*, edited by George Breitman and Evelyn Reed. Pathfinder Press, New York, N. Y. 184 pp. \$2.95. 1970.

"These lines are being written aboard the Norwegian oil tanker *Ruth*, sailing from Oslo to Mexico, with the port of destination as yet unknown. Yesterday we passed the Azores. For the first few days the sea was agitated; it was difficult to write. I avidly read books about Mexico. Our planet is so tiny but we know so little about it! After the *Ruth* left the straits and turned to the southwest, the waters of the ocean became calmer and calmer and I could now busy myself with setting in order my notes on our stay in Norway and my deposition in (the Norwegian) court. Thus the first eight days were spent in intensive work and in speculations about mysterious Mexico."

This is the opening paragraph of the third volume in the Pathfinder project of reprinting articles by Trotsky that have become almost inaccessible. It was written December 28, 1936.

En route from Norwegian internment to asylum in Mexico, Trotsky was preoccupied with the first big Moscow frame-up trial of August 1936. The "socialist" government of Norway had prevented him from making any public statement in reply to the infamous charges leveled against him and his son Leon Sedov in that trial. Now, he was preparing to speak out. Memories aroused by the execution of Zinoviev and Kamenev, two of Lenin's closest collaborators, welled to the surface. Trotsky jotted them down.

The journal Trotsky kept while crossing the Atlantic

in the last analysis depends on that of the continental revolution.<sup>12</sup>

It is our duty, therefore, not only to explain the results of our analysis without any diplomatic or tactical evasiveness. It is our duty not only to indicate by what means dangerous contradictions can be overcome, taking account of the crucial experiences of the international workers movement and the struggle of revolutionists against bureaucracy. It is our responsibility also and above all to help in a practical way to reinforce those in Cuba who are struggling against the bureaucratization, and to help in the most effective way possible—that is, by giving impetus to revolutionary struggles and preparing revolutionary victories in the other countries of Latin America.

October 8, 1970.

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12. I examined the question of the Cuban leaders' present orientation toward Latin America in my article "Cuba, Military Reformism, and Armed Struggle," dated March 15, 1970. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 20, 1970, page 352.) I consider the conclusions drawn on this subject in the article to still be valid.

was included in his book, published in a French translation as *Les Crimes de Staline*. Now, in *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1937-38]*, some of the entries appear in English for the first time. The book also contains a number of articles translated into English for the first time from the Russian *Bulletin of the Opposition*.

The largest part of Trotsky's writing during this period is concerned with the Moscow trials: the trial of the sixteen (headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev), the trial of the seventeen (Pyatakov, Radek, etc., in January 1937), and the trial of the twenty-one (Bukharin, Rykov, Rakovsky, March 1938).

In responding to the trials, Trotsky went far beyond merely refuting the absurd and slanderous charges leveled against him and his followers. More important was analyzing and explaining the meaning of the extermination of the old Bolsheviks and the top leadership of the Red Army.

He had to defend the positions of revolutionary Marxism not only against Stalinist distortions, but also against the liberals, who saw in the Moscow frame-ups the "inevitable" consequence of Bolshevism, and against the "lefts," who regarded the trials as evidence of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union.

In an article for the newspaper *Socialist Appeal* (the name for a time of *The Militant*) written in June 1937, Trotsky analyzed the contradictions within the bureaucracy that led to the trials:

"The social and political meaning of the purge is clear: The ruling stratum is ejecting from its midst all those who remind it of its revolutionary past, the principles of social-

ism, liberty, equality, fraternity and the unsolved tasks of the world revolution."

Against the "liberal" opinion that condemned both Stalinism and Leninism on "moral" grounds, and even tried to identify the two on this basis, Trotsky was particularly scathing. Commenting on the position of the liberal American magazines the *Nation* and the *New Republic*, he wrote:

"Since the Thermidorean reaction came out of the revolution, the *Nation* and the *New Republic* have sought tirelessly to prove that revolution and reaction are one and the same thing. . . .

"The Moscow trials not only took this circle of people unawares but have destroyed the tranquility of their souls for a long time to come. . . . Theoretically, these Pharisees indignantly reject the principle: 'The end justifies the means,' failing to understand that a great historical goal automatically discards those means that are unworthy of it. But in order to bolster up traditional petty prejudices and especially their own authority in the eyes of simpletons, they are always ready to resort to artful dodges, and frame-ups of picayune scope."

More important, however, for the future of revolutionary Marxism, was the question of the class nature of the Soviet Union, for some persons in the Trotskyist movement allowed their revulsion over the Moscow trials to persuade them that the Soviet Union was no longer a workers state.

Some of the best illustrations of Trotsky's use of Marxist analysis are contained in his writings on this question, as in the following passages from an internal document of the Left Opposition:

"It is the substitution of a subjective 'normative' method

in place of an objective, dialectical approach to the question which renders it difficult for many comrades to arrive at a correct sociological appraisal of the USSR. Not without reason do . . . [these comrades] say that the Soviet Union cannot be considered a workers state 'in the traditional sense given to this term by Marxism.' . . . On this score there can be no disagreement. Our program has counted upon a progressive development of the workers state . . . But history which does not always act 'according to a program' has confronted us with the process of a degenerating workers state. But does this mean that a workers state, coming into conflict with the demands of our program, has ceased to be a workers state?

". . . such a counterposing of norm to fact, that is to say, of the *generalized* expression of the development to the *particular* manifestation of this same development . . . is absolutely lifeless and does not open any road for the intervention of the revolutionary party."

In addition to writings on the Moscow trials and the problems of the developing Fourth International, this volume contains sections covering both political and military aspects of the then approaching second world war, Trotsky's answer to raked-up accusations concerning the suppression of the 1921 Kronstadt rebellion, the murder of Ignace Reiss, and the evolution of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The editors' arrangement of the material by subject matter rather than chronology makes it easy to study Trotsky's opinion on each subject and to follow the development of his polemics with various opponents.

The other volumes that have already appeared in this valuable series are *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1938-1939]* and *Writings of Leon Trotsky [1939-40]*.

## A Play by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

By Jan Garrett

It is a unique thrill to be one of two revolutionists in the midst of an overwhelmingly upper middle-class audience at the Guthrie Theater in Minneapolis when the Internationale begins playing over the loudspeakers.

We joined in, singing, although we felt uncomfortable that nobody rose to their feet.

This ambivalence dominates one's reaction to the entire production, the first time in the world, of "A Play by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn" (originally *Olyen i Shalashovka*).

Certainly, the director and the actors have nothing but the best motives in putting it on. Director Michael Langham says in his notes on the play: "The action of this play occurs in a Soviet 'correctional' labor camp in 1945. As with many primitive and uncivilized prisons in the U.S.A., which modern convention dictates

should also be called 'correctional,' it would be more accurate to describe Solzhenitsyn's camp as 'penal.' Like its U.S. counterparts, it creates more criminals than it reforms."

Moreover, "it is not at all an anti-Communist play; but anti-Stalinist."

The actors and actresses are well distributed in their roles. Granya, a woman prisoner who was a well-decorated Communist military officer and had engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Germans "on the outside," is played by a black actress. During one confrontation with a camp bully, or "professional," she gets a quick hammerlock on him and threatens to squeeze him "like a green caterpillar."

The coincidence of antibureaucratic struggle, women's liberation, and black liberation was beautiful: this was the one instance of spontaneous

applause by the audience . . . "spontaneous" if you allow for the fact that the two revolutionists started clapping first.

As far as I can tell, the script was loyal to the position of Solzhenitsyn himself. Nemov, the political prisoner (he had referred to Stalin as "the man with the mustache"), is appointed production leader but is demoted because he refuses to become part of the camp's bureaucratic corruption. He represents Solzhenitsyn, an "idealist" who remains true to the aspirations for which the October revolution was fought.

Unfortunately, I cannot see how the average liberal that saw the play will avoid interpreting it with the typical homily: "Oh, yes, Communism is great as an ideal, but in practice . . ."

But for the socialist who gives complete support to the antibureaucratic

struggle in the worker states, this play means a lot. And even to many who are not socialists, the concentration camp and prison themes will have a universal significance that will sink home as the ruling classes in North America extend their clamor about "law and order" and people with "bleeding hearts" who defend civil liberties.

Solzhenitsyn, of course, was not asked if he wanted his play to be produced in the United States, just as he had not been asked if he approved of

the translations of his books by American publishing houses.

But, to echo one of the characters in his play, it is unthinkable that the culture that mankind has arduously built up over the centuries can be repressed forever, by any force, be it either Stalinist tyranny or the more subtle perniciousness of U.S. petty-bourgeois culture-dabbling.

Solzhenitsyn may well turn out to be one of the best Soviet allies the coming American revolution could wish for.

## 'Hot Line'

# Big Brother Listens to U.S. Governors

"Hotline" phones installed in the offices of forty-two of the fifty American state governors are a good deal hotter than the governors expected. The phones have turned out to be wired as microphones that pick up conversation in the offices.

An electronics expert testing the office of Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel discovered the listening device on October 27. According to the November 18 *Washington Post*, Mandel then sent the expert to check the phone of the governor of Delaware. It also proved to be bugged.

The red, hotline phones were installed in 1966. The *Washington Post* article reported:

"According to a Pentagon spokesman for the Civil Defense Administration, the phones of the 42 governors are connected to three points: An underground center within Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, which is headquarters for the North American Air Defense Command; a two-story underground building in Denton, Texas, and a classified location 'outside Washington.'"

The telephone company, which installed the phones, said it would be possible to tap the wire and thus listen to conversations in the governors' offices only within each building. Mandel and his electronics expert disputed this, saying more complex equipment would make it possible to tap the line at other points.

Nobody seems to have suggested the most obvious fact: A person at the other end of the line in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado; Denton, Texas; or "outside Washington" could eavesdrop on the governors just by picking up the phone, without bothering about a tap.

If the phones have a function other than keeping tabs on the governors, either no one knows what it is or they aren't saying.

"I haven't the slightest idea" where the phone goes, Mandel told the *Washington Post's* reporter. "All I know is that it goes to a terminal in the basement. After that it's classified."

## Ceylon

# More of That Same Old 'Austerity'

"Austerity," Ceylon's Finance Minister N.M. Perera announced November 1, "must be the keynote of our social thinking during the next few years."


In his budget speech to the House of Representatives, the Lanka Sama Samaja party's representative in the "United Front" government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike reported that the government faces short-term unfunded debts of Rs.772,000,000. [Rs.5.95 equal US\$1.] He predicted a trade deficit in 1970 of Rs.559,000,000.

Perera attempted to project a solution to the country's economic difficulties that, he said, constituted a "third way" between abject dependence on imperialist financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and repudiation of Ceylon's debts to foreign capitalists:

"We have to discipline ourselves to concentrate on productive effort. We must be prepared to do without present pleasures for future welfare."

Although Perera proposed compulsory savings for incomes over Rs.6,000 a year, and included measures for recovering funds illegally held by rich individuals, his program fell far short of the "socialism" promised by the United Front.

Increased taxes will fall mainly on consumer goods: kitchenware, radios, paints, confectionery, textiles, chocolate, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, biscuits, clothing, and canned fruits and



PERERA: "A small contribution by a large number is more valuable than a large contribution by a few . . ."

vegetables. Taxes on some luxury goods were also raised.

"Socialist" Perera "justified" his taxation of the poor in the following words:

"A small contribution by a large number is more valuable than a large contribution by a few because the large number is an earnest manifestation of all of us to be participants in this task."

Perera, apparently, believes that the Ceylon masses are clamoring for the chance to "participate" in the task of preserving capitalism at their own expense.