

# Bolivia Shifts to Left as Army Splits



**More Eyewitness Accounts  
of Massacre in Jordan**

**Nixon's New 'Peace Offer'  
Offers Nothing New**

JUAN JOSE TORRES, Bolivia's new ruler. Was 'leftist' general moved forward in effort to save military regime from popular revolution? See page 867.

## ***Ernest Mandel Answers Victor Perlo***

## May Student Strikes

"No episode or series of episodes had a higher impact in all of our history than the events of last April and May," Dr. Clark Kerr told an October 2 news conference in Boulder, Colorado. He was reporting the results of a study of the campus rebellion that swept the United States after Nixon's invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent killing of students by Ohio national guardsmen and Mississippi police.

Dr. Kerr, former president of the University of California, was speaking as chairman of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education which ordered the "Survey of University Presidents." Presidents of all 2,551 U.S. colleges and universities were sent questionnaires concerning the reactions on their campuses. The answers showed some form of protest on 57% of all campuses, with much higher figures for the larger independent and public universities.

(There were demonstrations at 89% of all independent universities, and 41% of these institutions were on strike one day or longer. Figures for public universities were 76% and 28%.)

The October 3 *New York Times* summarized Dr. Kerr's conclusions:

"Those responses, Dr. Kerr said, indicated to him that reaction on campuses was greater than the impact of the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, women's suffrage or the Depression of the nineteen-thirties.

"Normal academic activities were shut down at 21 per cent of the universities, he said, adding. 'We have had nothing like that ever before.'"

Kerr seemed most disturbed at the implications of the takeover of many universities by students and faculty last May for use as antiwar and revolutionary centers:

"In some universities, instructors reconstituted their courses last spring, feeling their academic lectures were irrelevant in view of the war. They switched to talking about the war and politics, Dr. Kerr said.

"Such a switch raises serious questions of whether normal academic subjects can be revived this fall, he said."

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Intercontinental Press, Post Office Box 635, Madison Square Station, N. Y. 10010.

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, and black liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion,

unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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TO SUBSCRIBE: For one year send \$15 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010. Write for rates on first class and airmail. Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to: Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York 10010. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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## Bolivia Shifts to the Left as Army Splits

By Gerry Foley

The big student and worker demonstrations that began September 21 in protest against the deportation of five radical clerics confronted the Ovando regime with an acute crisis (see October 12 issue of *Intercontinental Press*).

To redress the situation, the right-wing chief of the armed forces, General Rogelio Miranda, attempted a military coup. This in turn touched off a popular mobilization that threatened to sweep aside the entire military ruling caste and that was temporarily stemmed only by a new "leftist" general seizing power.

The dramatic turn began on October 4 when the official army radio station in a predawn broadcast issued an ultimatum calling for the resignation of President Alfredo Ovando Candia. The ultimatum came from a group of officers headed by General Miranda, who succeeded Ovando as commander of the armed forces after the latter seized the presidency in a military coup exactly one year and seven days before.

General Miranda and his associates, Colonel Juan Ayoroa, the minister of the interior, and General Valencia, the minister of the economy, had become the recognized leaders of the right-wing faction of the military caste. This group gained dominance in the Ovando regime after the most prominent advocate of "military reformism," air force general Juan José Torres, was ousted from the cabinet July 7.

In an attempt to halt the increasing political isolation of the ruling classes, Ovando upon seizing power had pledged to follow a "left nationalist course." He did nationalize the holdings of the imperialist Gulf Oil combine and concede some democratic and trade-union freedoms. But, under pressure from U.S. imperialism and the ultrareactionary pro-American wing of the armed forces, his regime shortly began backsliding toward a traditional rightist position.

The rise of the right-wing faction to a position of dominance in the military regime was considered a personal triumph for U.S. Ambassador Sira-

cosa, according to the knowledgeable Latin-American expert Marcel Niedergang. In the September 29 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*, Niedergang described the U.S. representative as "a soft-spoken but efficient man" who was "on his way to building up a formidable reputation as a diplomatic 'troubleshooter.'"

When the rightist officers issued their ultimatum on October 4, Ovando was in the southwestern Bolivian city of Santa Cruz, dedicating a new railway line. "For months, Ovando had hardly ever visited the provinces without taking along the few officers he thought capable of plotting against him. Last Sunday [October 4] he neglected to request the presence of General Miranda," Niedergang wrote in *Le Monde* October 8.

Ovando refused to step aside meekly, as his predecessor Siles Salinas had done. First he assured himself of the loyalty of the garrison in Cochabamba, Bolivia's second largest city, which lies midway on the route from Santa Cruz to La Paz. Then he landed in the capital and resumed possession of the presidential palace.

The 600-man elite presidential guard, considered the best equipped and trained military unit in the country (perhaps because it is the one most likely to see action against an armed opponent), pledged its loyalty to the incumbent dictator.

Ovando's minister of defense, David Lafuente, went on the radio appealing to the Bolivian people to "take to the streets in defense of the revolution led by General Ovando Candia." Lafuente also called on the "'principal organizations'—presumably labor unions and student groups—to fight the revolt," according to an Associated Press dispatch from La Paz October 4.

The second day of the revolt, the Papal Nuncio Msgr. Giovanni Gravelli arranged a meeting between the two contenders for power. Gravelli, "it was understood, tried to get both sides to agree to concessions to avert fighting," Reuters reported. The nuncio failed, however, to restore har-

mony in the military establishment.

*Le Monde* gave this account October 7 of the meeting: "Long negotiations took place Monday between General Ovando and General Miranda at the seat of the apostolic nunciature. The two adversaries stuck to their positions. The chief of state relieved General Miranda of his post as commander of the army and Miranda continued to hold that General Ovando is no longer the president of the republic."

When it became apparent that the negotiations in the offices of the Vatican legation were deadlocked, the Bolivian officer corps met Monday evening at the La Paz garrison headquarters. By a vote of 317 to 40, they decided to call for the resignations of both contenders for power as "politically compromised" persons.

### Alarmed Over Clique Fight

Since it is primarily a repressive force, the Bolivian military machine did not want to risk an open conflict between different sections of the armed forces. Such a clash could render it incapable of withstanding the revolutionary pressure of the masses.

At the officers' meeting, General Juan Lechín Suarez, the Bolivian ambassador in London; and General Hugo Banzer, the head of the war college, were suggested as possible successors to Ovando, according to the October 8 issue of *Le Monde*.

Ovando held out briefly against the pressure of the military commanders. Late Monday evening he declared: "A meeting of officers cannot take the place of the people, who are the sole source of authority."

This commendable sentiment would, perhaps, have been more appreciated by the people had Ovando observed this principle in his own career. In any case, he did not go to the people. Tuesday morning, October 6, the military dictator resigned.

"At the last moment General Ovando chose to maintain the unity of the armed forces rather than appeal to

the popular and trade-union forces," Niedergang wrote in *Le Monde* of October 8. "It must be recalled that the student and worker leaders had just denounced the 'fascist coup d'etat of General Miranda.' Perhaps they would even have responded to an appeal from Ovando to avert the worst.

"But he did not dare take such a gamble. After offering his resignation, which was read over the radio by the minister of information, General Ovando followed the very classical procedure of taking refuge in the Argentinian embassy.

"This was a symbolic place of retreat. General Miranda, who brought about his fall, is a personal friend of General Alejandro Lanusse, commander in chief of the Argentinian armed forces. General Ovando not only abdicated power, he went to Canossa."

Miranda, however, refused to yield. He withdrew formally but set up a military triumvirate through which he could rule from behind the scenes.

The three figureheads were General Efrain Guachalla, the chairman of the military tribunal that tried Régis Debray and Ciro Bustos; General Fernando Sattori of the air force; and Rear Admiral Alberto Albarracin of the "navy" (Lake Titicaca on Bolivia's northern boundary is the highest large navigable lake in the world).

General Torres declared his opposition to the new junta. Apparently he retained his influence in the air force despite being formally retired in July.

Workers and students poured into the streets to block a take-over by the rightist officers. It is not clear from the press reports whether this popular mobilization came before or after Torres came out against the triumvirate.

It cannot yet be excluded that a section of the military decided to push Torres forward because they saw the masses getting out of hand. As a result of his ouster from the government, Torres was perhaps the only top officer who retained some credibility as a "leftist." It is strange to find him emerging suddenly from retirement at the head of a large section of the armed forces.

The American papers implied that the unions, the students, and armed detachments of peasants were being led by the dissident retired general. But *Le Monde* reported October 8 that "the Bolivian Workers Federation and some student leaders have given 'con-

ditional' support to General Torres."

In the evening of October 6 the newly activated general met at the El Alto air base with Juan Lechin, the executive secretary of the tin-miners union; and Siles Suazo, former president of the country and one of the main leaders of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, the party that rose to power in the wake of the 1952 revolution]. After this meeting, according to *Le Monde* of October 8, Lechin and Siles "went immediately to the University of San Andres in La Paz to prepare a plan of common action with the students."

"Students began to build barricades in the streets of the capital in order to block any movements by forces favorable to General Rogelio Miranda," the Paris daily continued. "In Catavi the powerful tin-miners unions denounced the 'fascist coup d'etat of the right-wing officers' and decided to offer 'conditional support' to General Juan José Torres.

"The miners' federation called for arms 'to defend our social gains' and posed as conditions for their support 'the establishment of democratic liberties and release of the political prisoners, repeal of the antistrike decrees, nationalization of the foreign banks and all American interests, expulsion of all imperialist bodies, and the establishment of a people's government.' The COB [Central Obrero Boliviano—Bolivian Workers Federation] has already issued a call for a general strike throughout the country."

The *Washington Post* reported October 7: "The 30,000-member Bolivian Workers Central [COB] also announced opposition to Miranda's junta and ordered its members to block streets and prevent troop movements within the city [La Paz].

"Army troops supporting the right-wing junta were ordered off the streets of La Paz and back to their barracks, apparently to avoid confrontation with civilians. Public order in the capital was left in the hands of the national police, armed only with nightsticks and tear-gas grenades."

Miranda appealed to Torres to turn back before it was too late: "Those who proclaim themselves chiefs of state should stop or face the consequences of their suicidal attitude."

The forces supporting Torres announced that they had taken the coun-

try's second largest city. "Thousands of armed peasants organized by the Cochabamba garrison are said to be on their way to La Paz to back up General Torres," *Le Monde* reported October 8.

Elements of the air force loyal to Torres bombed and strafed the Miraflores garrison in La Paz, the headquarters of the right wing.

Early Wednesday morning, October 7, General Sattori withdrew from the junta. Shortly afterward, the remaining two members visited General Torres at El Alto.

"Torres said he showed them army units and armed peasants and told them: 'You see that I am not alone,'" the *Washington Post* reported October 8. "Torres said they capitulated when he threatened to stage a massive attack on their headquarters."

The victorious military leader promised large crowds in La Paz that he had made "the revolution of the people." His government, he said, would rest on four pillars—the peasant farmers, the workers, the students, and the armed forces.

Some contingents of the popular forces apparently did not wait for Torres' permission to begin making some changes. "Armed civilians freed several leftist prisoners from jail, among them Julio Dagnino Pacheco, a member of the guerrilla band led by Ernesto Che Guevara," the *Washington Post* of October 8 said.

"Ebullient Torres supporters, including students and workers, raced through the streets of the capital, sacking the homes of military men and civilians suspected of rightist sympathies, and occupied the buildings of three leading newspapers," according to the October 8 issue of the *New York Times*. "They vowed to convert the three into 'cooperative newspapers in defense of popular aspirations.'"

"In Cochabamba, Torres supporters attacked the offices of the United States Information Center and destroyed or carried away most of its contents. . . .

"Reports from the provinces also said jubilant tin miners had seized police stations and announced they would ask the new Government for quick wage increases. Some reports said they had expelled Bolivian and foreign technicians of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia."

The October 9 *New York Times* reported: "With the urging of student

organizers, workers at two daily newspapers in La Paz, *El Diario* and *Hoy* have now seized the publications. *El Diario* appeared today, evincing a new leftist position.

### Students Destroy Police Files

"At sunset today [October 8], armed students took over the headquarters of the criminal division of the national police [presumably the Dirección de Investigaciones Criminales — Criminal Investigation Bureau, the political police]. Apparently unopposed, they were reportedly looting the offices and destroying the files. . . .

"Students have also begun attacks on United States property. They entered the Bolivian-American Binational Center yesterday, hauling down an American flag and announcing that they were annexing the building to the university."

It was apparently the increase in worker and student militancy that precipitated the clash between the various factions in the military. This open split, in turn, touched off a popular mobilization that threatened to overwhelm the officer caste as a whole.

Marcel Niedergang described the situation leading up to Miranda's abortive coup in the October 7 issue of *Le Monde* (the article was obviously written before the coup): "The 'liberal' general Juan José Torres was ousted and numerous officers suspected of 'leftist' sympathies have been gotten out of the way thanks to the SIFA, the armed forces intelligence agency. But there is no doubt that the army remains deeply divided and that a not inconsiderable number of left officers see no other solution for the Bolivian political crisis but the 'socialist road.'

"These left officers could not fail to be impressed by the increasingly strong stands of the workers organizations, the student federations, and a very large section of the Catholic church.

"The congress of the Siglo Veinte miners and the Fourth Congress of the COB in May showed that the Trotskyists of the Revolutionary Workers party [Partido Obrero Revolucionario — POR] remain very influential in the tin mines. . . .

"The hostility of the student organizations to the government is no less great."

Ovando's indecisiveness in confronting the students would bring about his downfall, Niedergang predicted: "Out of weakness or hesitation, the Ovando government at first adopted a laissez-faire policy toward the students but it is clear that in recent weeks it has been trying to regain lost



GENERAL ALFREDO OVANDO CANDIA

ground in this key sector of Bolivian political life. Army cadets and rightist Phalangist militants forcibly occupied the fourteen floors of the University of San Andres in the heart of La Paz for a week. It seems that this spectacular operation, carried out with the help of machine guns and dynamite charges, enjoyed the complicity of certain army chiefs. A threat by the unions to intervene on the side of the students, made it possible to oust the extreme right commandos . . . but everything indicates that the army officers are eager to restore the status quo ante and destroy the 'revolutionary' organization the students have developed."

Far from restoring the "status quo ante," the rightist officers seem to have succeeded only in weakening the foundations of the capitalist order. For the present no return to the "status quo ante" seems to be in the cards. Two questions are posed now: (1)

How far left is General Torres prepared to go? (2) Can he save the bourgeois state from going down in face of the popular mobilization?

### New Vintage 'Leftist'

All the press accounts note that Torres's "leftist" convictions are of recent vintage. "It was General Torres who planned the United States-supported operation against the Cuban guerrilla that resulted in Guevara's death in 1967," the *New York Times* wrote October 8. "With General Ovando, General Torres had been one of the senior group of army commanders who approved of the order that Guevara was to be killed if captured."

Nothing in Torres's background indicates strong individuality, great intelligence, or daring. "His solid, if not brilliant army career, included field commands, service as a teacher at the Bolivian military academy, and staff duty," the *New York Times* noted October 8.

Torres was named chief of the armed forces, considered the number two position in the regime, when Ovando took power last September.

The new chief of state appointed his cabinet October 9, giving the first concrete indication of the course he intends to follow. "The Cabinet, while leftist, appeared much more moderate in composition than some observers had thought. Conspicuously absent were the names of two ultraleftist Cabinet ministers in the defunct Government of Gen. Alfredo Ovando Candia," *New York Times* correspondent Malcolm Browne wrote.

Four members of the new cabinet were military officers. The remaining four were civilians, "for the most part leftists but now known as extremists or Marxists," according to Browne.

As for the jet-age strongman's chances of keeping the situation under control, the *Times* correspondent was hopeful: "General Torres has shown himself as a powerful speaker and quick moving politician in the face of potential disaster."

It remains to be seen if a fifty-year-old general with a long "solid, if not brilliant," career behind him can generate sufficient charisma to awe the Bolivian masses. Over the past two decades they have seen a succession of demagogic strongmen who have betrayed their promises to the people.

# Nixon's New 'Peace Offer' Offers Nothing New

By Allen Myers

In a nationwide television and radio broadcast October 7, Nixon announced what he called "a major new initiative for peace" in the Indochina war.

Nixon's "initiative" contained five proposals. These were:

1. A "cease-fire in place" supervised by unspecified "international" forces.
2. An expanded "Indochina peace conference."
3. A readiness to "negotiate . . . to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight."
4. A "political settlement" that "reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people" and which "should reflect the existing relationship of political forces in South Vietnam."
5. The "immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides."

Nixon's "major new initiative" contained virtually nothing that was new, even in a formal sense. The *New York Times*, which gave his performance a rave review on the editorial page, had to admit in its October 8 report on the speech that "The only really new elements . . . were the standstill cease-fire and the proposal for expanded peace talks."

Even the cease-fire proposal was not really new, as the *Times* acknowledged elsewhere in the same issue. The alleged "change" in Nixon's view of a cease-fire was summarized by the *Times* as follows:

"NIXON TODAY — Immediate negotiations for cease-fire in place throughout Indochina to be internationally supervised. . . .

"NIXON 1969 — International body acceptable to both sides to supervise cease-fires (presumably local), plus a cessation of combat after a year of troop withdrawals."

Thus the *Times* saw progress in "Nixon 1969" moving from an international body supervising a cease-fire to "Nixon today" favoring a cease-fire internationally supervised.

Distinctions of this sort, formerly the specialty of theologians who had mastered the question of how many angels can dance on the point of a needle, are now capable of swaying not only the *New York Times*, but also the U.S. Congress. The *Times* reported October 9:

"In Washington, reaction to the President's new plan was almost entirely favorable. Democrats and Republicans, hawks and doves all applauded the proposal and called on the Communist side to give it serious consideration.

"The Senate adopted a resolution tonight expressing support for Mr. Nixon's peace initiative. It said the proposal was 'fair and equitable and lays the basis for ending the fighting and moving toward a just settlement of the Indochina war.'"

This resolution was introduced by "dove" Senator Charles Percy of Illinois. Cosponsors included a host of senators who have tried to advance their careers through verbal criticism of the war: Mike Mansfield of Montana, Frank Church of Idaho, John Cooper of Kentucky, Mark Hatfield of Oregon, Harold Hughes of Iowa, George McGovern of South Dakota.

The strongest criticism from a congressional "dove" came from 1972 presidential hopeful Edmund Muskie, who said that Nixon's proposals were "overdue."

It goes without saying that none of the capitalist politicians went to the essence of the matter to point out that even if Nixon's "initiative" had contained something new, it would still be based on the assumption that the ability to intervene militarily gives the U. S. government the right to a voice in the future of Indochina.

Nixon's proposals, like all the past "peace" proposals of the American government, were intended to win Vietnamese acquiescence in the U.S. rights of conquest. In an article on the Pentagon's attitude toward a possible cease-fire, William Beecher said in the October 9 *New York Times*:

"If North Vietnam accepted the President's proposal for an internationally supervised truce and sincerely lived up to it, the military planners say, the South Vietnamese Government could solidify its increasing control of villages, improve the training and quality of its 1.2-million-man armed forces and devote increased attention to post-war economic and political problems."

Beecher's evaluation did not prevent the *Times* from editorially castigating the Vietnamese for their "automatic negativism" in refusing Nixon's request that they refrain from trying to drive out his puppet regime in Saigon.

It is of course always possible that at some point the military might of the U.S. may force the Vietnamese to agree to terms similar to those Nixon presented October 7. Nixon's speech, however, was directed much more to the American people than it was to the Vietnamese.

An October 8 article in the *Times* noted that the proposals Nixon advanced, even if not formally introduced at the Paris talks, "have been around for a long time. Although they raise dozens of questions as outlined . . . the critical question is, Why now?"

The article went on to give a partial answer to its own question:

"Not only Hanoi but some observers in the United States and elsewhere will be tempted to explain the timing by the schedule of American Congressional elections."

It requires no great insight on Nixon's part to recognize that the American public is sick of the war and that the appearance of an attempt to end it would help the Republicans in the November elections.

Nixon's propaganda effort may also be aimed at soothing the war-weariness of the U.S. troops in Vietnam. On October 9 the *Times* carried an article by James Sterba reporting that the GIs are carrying out their own cease-fire whenever possible:

"Nine out of 10 American infantry riflemen now fighting in the moun-

tains and jungles are draftees . . .

"As a sequence [sic], one top-ranking general said recently, there is a growing tendency to try to avoid fighting, to avoid seeking out the enemy. . . .

"The foot soldiers, or grunts as they call themselves, are the first to acknowledge their flagging spirits and aggressiveness. They have a word for it: flakey."

But the *Times* managed to overlook a third, and perhaps the most important, of the considerations behind Nixon's speech: the desire to counteract the efforts of the antiwar movement to mobilize Americans by the thousands in independent actions in the streets.

The National Peace Action Coalition [NPAC], a nationwide antiwar alliance, has planned major demonstrations in more than thirty cities October 31. The timing of Nixon's latest "major new initiative" was not unrelated to this, just as in the days preceding the October 15, 1969, Vietnam Moratorium the press was regularly fed rumors of upcoming "peace" moves.

This latest attempt to defuse the antiwar movement will be no more successful than past attempts. The Student Mobilization Committee, the mass student antiwar organization and a major constituent of NPAC, answered Nixon's speech with a release stating among other things:

"Nixon's statement is aimed at undercutting the pressure of mass antiwar actions demanding 'Bring All the GIs Home Now!' On October 31, hundreds of thousands of Americans will answer Nixon by demonstrating in the streets . . . to restate the demand of the majority of the American people for the *immediate withdrawal* of all U. S. troops from Indochina. . . .

"We are tired of speeches and empty promises and grandiose-sounding plans for peace. We demand that Nixon and his government stop the double-talk and do the only thing that will really end the war — BRING ALL THE GIs HOME NOW!"

## 'Fedayeen Counterattacked like Madmen'

# More Eyewitness Accounts of Massacre in Jordan

"I had the impression that the army was no longer aiming its guns at any definite place. It was just firing blindly. An officer told me: 'We have to finish them off this time for good!' I answered: 'But it is the people who are dying.' 'The people,' he answered, 'they're all fedayeen.' I remembered the French army in Algeria. It used to say that the people were all 'fella-ghas' [bandits, the French government's name for the Algerian freedom fighters]." Ania Francos, an eyewitness to the fighting in Amman September 17-23, wrote the above lines in the October 6 issue of the weekly *Jeune Afrique* [Young Africa] published in Paris.

During the fighting, Ania Francos was not in the Intercontinental Hotel like the other correspondents but in the Algerian embassy, which was fired on directly by royalist troops. She left Amman September 23. "At 9:00 a.m. the International Red Cross plane charged with evacuating women, children, and foreign journalists rose slowly over a ruined Amman. The stewardess crossed herself. 'If only they don't shoot at us,' she said. The firing stopped suddenly as we were leaving Amman but it resumed immediately beneath us with still more intensity.

"Through a window I saw the smoke



HUSSEIN: "Hashemite Nero"

of explosions over djebel \* Tej, djebel Hashrafia, djebel Hadra, and toward the Wahdat refugee camp which had been burning for eight days. It was the headquarters from which Abu Amar was leading the resistance.

"Permission had to be asked from the Jordanian government but *also*

\* "Djebel" is the Arabic word for "hill."

from the Central Committee of the resistance for the airplane loaded with medical supplies to land and take off. On September 23 the people were still resisting in Amman. The day before, the military governor, the terrible Marshal Abes Majali, was forced to lift the curfew for a few hours to permit the rescue of thousands of wounded people groaning under the ruins, as well as the removal of all the rotting corpses. The streets were swarming with rats and an epidemic of bubonic plague and cholera was feared.

"But the curfew was immediately re-established in some neighborhoods — because as soon as Jordanian soldiers, their faces smeared with soot so that they wouldn't be recognized, left their tanks they were attacked by snipers hidden on the roofs. The snipers were fedayeen or militiamen, like the little twelve-year-old boy who kept several soldiers pinned down all afternoon from the top of a building in the old city."

On the way to the airport, Ania Francos passed through the djebel Hussein area where the guerrilla headquarters were located: "It looks like the place was bombed by planes. Nothing is left but charred walls and yawning craters. There is not a single human being. Dogs are howling as if mourning for the dead.

"When the road leading to the air-

port cut through the city, the convoy was stopped. In front of us, tanks were firing full force at a group of ruined houses. We were told that snipers were hiding behind these houses and that they had fired on soldiers . . . an hour ago."

The Algerian embassy, located near a police station, was caught in a cross-fire between the proimperialist army and the fedayeen. "We were never hit by the guerrillas. On the other hand, the army fired eight 80mm shells at us, which exploded and set fire to the floor. An army 155mm shell exploded in front of the building, breaking every window in the neighborhood. Up till 4:00 in the afternoon this first day [September 17] it was like the end of the world. You could not even peek outside. The women pressed their babies under their bodies and waited in terror for death. . . .

"Around 4:00 p. m. I climbed up to take a look outside. Centurion tanks, 105mm self-propelled cannon, recoilless artillery mounted on jeeps moved along the road that runs through the djebel Amman area. They moved back and forth, shelling the djebel Hussein on the one side and the djebel Hadia on the other. Everything was in flames. Immense clouds of smoke rose above the Wahdat camp, which was being bombarded with 155mm cannon and phosphorous bombs. It was impossible to talk there was so much noise."

The following day, September 18, the fighting intensified, according to the *Jeune Afrique* correspondent. "The city seems to be under bombardment from the air. At 5:00 a. m. the soldiers stationed on the roof of the police station fired point-blank at our building. They had seen a curtain move. They said later that they had seen a rifle. The army is unwilling to do any real fighting. That would involve going in to flush the fedayeen and militiamen out of each house. It avoids hand-to-hand fighting, limiting itself to destroying every house where it thinks it sees gunfire.

"If a shadow moves in a room, the house is machine-gunned. When they fire on solid houses like those on the djebel Amman, some rooms are damaged. When they shoot at refugee camps such as those on the djebel Hussein, djebel Hareh, and the Wahdat camp, it means immediate fires and death for thousands of people."

In the October 4 issue of *Le Nouvel Observateur*, correspondent Jean-Francis Held wrote: "The royal infantry, composed in large part of Palestinians, has no enthusiasm for systematic extermination house to house of the diehard commandos."

The Palestinian resistance fighters tried to win the regular army soldiers over to their side, Ania Francos reported; "*Saut el-Assifa*, the voice of the resistance, has been making appeals to the Jordanian troops to join the revolution."

Held could hardly believe what he saw with his own eyes: "Only a week ago, I was in the Wahdat, Barkha, and Suf camps. I can imagine the effect of high-caliber shells and phosphorous bombs on those overflowing shanty towns, where there is no obstacle to the sweep of flames and explosions. It seems that the Wahdat camp, which housed 20,000 refugees, has been destroyed. It is difficult to accept."

On September 19, Ania Francos wrote in her notebook: "The situation is increasingly tragic. The streets are strewn with corpses. The stench hanging over the city is unbearable. The army announces that it controls some neighborhoods, but the situation is very unclear. The fedayeen have left their ruined bases and adopted a new tactic. They are hiding on the roofs. As soon as the army retreats they attack. They shift their bases constantly."

\* \* \*

Some foreign correspondents in Amman were overwhelmed by the scope of the massacre perpetrated by the proimperialist troops. "The Swedish photographer who came back with a bullet in his leg said, his hands still trembling: 'I've been in Vietnam and Biafra, here it is much worse.' Five thousand, ten thousand victims, the numbers mean nothing in an affair like this," Held wrote.

The royal authorities wanted no witnesses to the mass murder. They issued orders that no pictures were to be taken and that no one was even to look out the window. A Soviet cameraman who tried to break this ban was shot dead. His body was left lying on the street.

Held and Francos tried to portray the horror of the massacre in a few vignettes: "The wounded dying in the streets, the shelling of hospitals, you know all that by heart," Held wrote. "But the four fourteen-year-old militia-

men captured and shot by the soldiers of a 'mop-up squad' . . . I may have known them. The wounded man dispatched in front of the Hotel Jordan under the nose of a colleague of mine from the ORTF [Organisation de la Radiodiffusion et Télévision Française—French Radio and Television Broadcasting Organization], he might have been my taxi driver."

Francos described the atmosphere of the first hours of the cease-fire: "Everyone seems dazed. Women embrace each other, asking if relatives and friends in other areas are still alive. A woman passes by singing, a baby in tow. She has lost her mind."

Held, pessimistic about the guerrillas' chances for victory, was amazed at their fortitude. "The hills and big refugee camps were held for a long time by the fedayeen, who counterattacked like madmen. This fierce determination that I saw on the eve of the battle but only half believed in has been verified by the ultimate test. The commandos are infiltrating everywhere, stopping tanks by bazooka fire and letting the less well-armed militiamen finish off the job with machine guns."

Held found an equally fierce resolve in the civilian population: "A young Palestinian girl of good family expressed the same determination in gentle tones. The fact that the family in question was lying somewhere under the ruins of Amman strengthened her resolution still more: 'Pardon me if it seems a bit grandiloquent. We have nothing left to lose but our lives.'"

The *Nouvel Observateur* correspondent concluded: "Jordan—or what is left of it—is infected. Not just by some diehard desperados. Nor even by the bodies rotting in Amman behind the walls, on the terraces of the houses, or in the gutters. Nor by the wounded, the gangrenous, the lost children; people dying from hunger, from thirst, from sicknesses. Nor by the polluted water, the filth, the ruined masonry and scrap iron, the rats, and the flies. Hashemite Jordan is politically contaminated and the machine guns of the bedouins can do nothing to cauterize this infection, quite the contrary . . .

"Hussein and his staff are marked as bearers of the plague."

A moderate Palestinian told Held: "A localized revolutionary abcess has been broken and the infection is going to spread to the entire Arab people."



# The Rogers Plan and the Palestinian Resistance

By A. Yoldachs and Yann Freder

[The following article, written before the outbreak of the civil war in Jordan, appeared in the August 31 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International. We have translated it as part of our effort to provide our readers with a selection of background material on the broad developments that led up to the counterrevolutionary offensive in Jordan undertaken by King Hussein, the "Nero of Amman."]

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The Arab revolutionary movement stands at a historic turning point — its enemies having joined in a common plan to liquidate the Palestinian resistance. It is the duty of revolutionary militants to rally stronger than ever in support of the Palestinian resistance against imperialism, Zionism, the Arab regimes and the Stalinists. The latter are being shown up ever more clearly for what they have been for the past forty years — gravediggers of the revolution.

But in order to rally support to the Palestinians it is necessary to understand the causes, both internationally and in the Arab world, of the grave situation they face. This is the subject we propose to deal with here.

Owing to the emergence of the Palestinian resistance, the Arab revolution reached a new level in the past three years. Now all the enemies of this resistance have set up a plan to liquidate it. To grasp the extreme seriousness of the situation created by the Rogers plan, it is necessary to briefly recall past events and to locate the different forces in movement on the international scene.

## I. The Zionist Aggression of June 1967

Because of the radicalization of the revolutionary nationalist Arab regimes and the appearance of the first Palestinian commandos, the Zionist

state resorted to war in order to demoralize the masses and block the revolutionary upsurge that was affecting the Arab nation. The essential role assigned to Israel, this advance post of imperialism, is to crush any revolutionary development in the Middle East in the egg.

But the June 1967 aggression likewise grew out of Zionism's own difficulties — an economic and ideological crisis in Israel, a drop in international aid, termination of the war indemnities paid by the Federal Republic of Germany, wildcat strikes, etc.

## II. Emergence of the Palestinian Resistance

It was a directly political, counter-revolutionary war that Israel engaged in with the support of imperialism and not at all a small country's struggle for survival against threats from all sides. The war enabled Zionism to overcome certain difficulties for a time — the Zionist leadership reconquered its social base and surmounted various economic problems. But today the same problems have reappeared.

Through the 1967 aggression, imperialism and Zionism succeeded in politically crushing the petty-bourgeois regimes and demoralizing the masses who still placed confidence in Nasser. But this led in particular to the upsurge of the Palestinian people, armed with a national consciousness that found expression in the various components of the national liberation movement.

As soon as the Palestinian resistance turned in practice to armed struggle of the people, a *line of cleavage* was at once established between the revolutionary Arab movement and the disoriented petty-bourgeois regimes.

Despite the diversity of organizations and the political weakness of the leadership, the impact of the Palestinian resistance, out of its own dynamics, deepened this line of cleavage.

## III. Impact of the Palestinian Resistance

In this three-year period, all the previous petty-bourgeois movements were superseded by the resistance. Nasser lost out as the leader of the Arab world. From 1967 on, everything revolved around the Palestinian resistance and its development. This period — from the June 1967 war to the launching of the Rogers plan — was marked, as we said above, by the practice of popular armed struggle and an unprecedented rise in consciousness among the Arab masses. But these also paved the way — and this was not the least important of the consequences — to the consolidation of an Arab Marxist vanguard. Whatever its weaknesses, this vanguard exists today, organized in revolutionary groups in various Arab countries.

The success of the Arab socialist revolution depends on the capacity of this vanguard to construct the revolutionary party needed by the Arab masses to liberate themselves from imperialism, Zionism, and all the existing Arab regimes.

To these two consequences of the emergence of the Palestinian resistance — mobilization of the masses and appearance of an Arab vanguard — must be added the politicalization of the new revolutionary far left which has invigorated support to anti-imperialist struggles (notably in the imperialist centers), particularly support for the Palestinian struggle. At a time when the Stalinists are backing Nasser instead of the resistance, the new generation of revolutionists is renewing the internationalist principles and practices of the Bolsheviks.

## IV. Position of Imperialism

American imperialism, profoundly shaken by the blows administered by the Vietnamese people, by the appearance of revolutionary hot spots elsewhere in the world, urgently requires a solution to the cauldron of the Mid-

dle East. It encouraged Israel in June 1967 in order to block the development of the revolutionary Arab movement. But very quickly its top strategists came to the conclusion, in face of the reversal of the situation, that it would have to find a way of guaranteeing maintenance of the status quo.

They decided that Israel could no longer engage in colonialist occupation of new territories, that it was time to establish good relations between Israel and the Arab regimes. The enemy was no longer Nasserism or the Baath party, but the Palestinian resistance, the spearhead of the Arab socialist revolution. To gain its way, American imperialism had to put pressure on the Zionist government, within which the "hawks," up to now, have been very powerful.

## V. Inherent Contradictions of Zionism

The aim of the Zionist movement is to solve the Jewish question by creating an oasis of peace and prosperity for all the Jews of the Diaspora. Today it is clear that Israel is no such oasis. Just the opposite — the endless war is affecting the lives of the Israelis in many ways which they are less and less inclined to accept (taxes, three years of military service, insecurity . . .). All this led to a crisis, particularly visible in the at times violent opposition of a part of the population to the bellicose policies of the Israeli government (the Goldmann affair, for instance). In face of this pressure, Golda Meir had to seek a solution to the conflict through a settlement with the Arab regimes.

But the crisis was not the sole or even essential reason for Zionist acceptance of the Rogers plan. The pressure of imperialism was the main factor. Washington compelled the Zionists to grasp the fact that the most urgent problem was to halt the revolutionary process taking place in the Middle East by liquidating the Palestinian resistance through a "peace" plan. The Zionists had to accept such a plan because their ultraprovocative attitude reinforced the resistance and thus aggravated the situation.

## VI. Position of the Stalinist Bureaucracy

In accordance with the Stalinist "strategy" of revolution by stages and

peaceful coexistence, the Stalinist bureaucracy came to the aid of the counterrevolutionary Nasser, sending him specialists, technicians, arms, planes, and pilots . . .

In face of the revolutionary upsurge, the Stalinist bureaucracy has been intensifying its peace efforts. In the Middle East it is working shoulder to shoulder with Zionism and imperialism in the plan to liquidate the revolution. The true nature of Stalinism is clearly emerging, becoming apparent to revolutionists who have long clung to illusions concerning this, and who would prefer, like us, to see the arms and planes sent to Vietnam and the Palestinian resistance instead of to the Arab regimes! (See in this regard the recent very interesting polemic between *Pravda* and the journal *Fateh*, reported by *El Moudjahid*.)

## VII. Nasser's Policy

Nasser played his opening card by officially accepting the November 22, 1967, United Nations resolution. Since then his entire policy (foreign and Arab) has consisted of bargaining with the imperialists behind the back of the Palestinian resistance in order to block the new rise of the Arab revolution and to win back leadership of the Arab world. On May 1, 1970, he clearly stated his desire for a peaceful solution to the conflict. By that he indicated his hope of once again becoming the bandmaster of the Arab world, which means today leader of the counterrevolutionary Arab forces.

In order to regain this role, Nasser built up his military forces, thanks to aid furnished by the USSR. He was able, likewise with the support of the Stalinists, to follow a strategy of neutralizing Baathism (both Syrian and Iraqi), particularly after the military coups d'etat in Libya and the Sudan. Thus he was able to follow up his "strategy of the eastern front" designed to neutralize Syria and Iraq.

But this struggle among the Arab regimes for influence was secondary to the struggle of *all* of these regimes against the resistance. Their common objectives have been expressed most clearly by Quathafi, an apprentice of Nasserism, in his junkets in the Middle East. Nasser, not being able to voice such crass sentiments himself,

had the new Libyan leader explain that "the left has sold out to the East, the right to the West; thus there is no longer any room among us for the right or for the left (sic!)." He also said that "the slogan of people's war has no meaning, only the regular armies can reestablish the honor of the Arab nation (sic!)." For our part, we prefer people's war and Arab revolutionary unity!

To achieve his desire for peace, Nasser had to have Palestinian neutrality. This was an impossibility in view of the existence of a radicalized left among the Palestinians capable of upholding a certain level of political consciousness and of engaging in intense struggles (as shown in particular in February and June 1970). An additional factor was the level of mobilization of the Arab masses in supporting the Palestinian resistance.

In line with this, upon announcement of the Rogers plan, Nasser sought to make a false distinction between this plan and the November 22, 1967, resolution, picturing it as a difference between tactics and strategy. He made an additional concession in not demanding the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories occupied in 1967. The success or failure of Nasser's policy depends in large measure on the Palestinian resistance.

## VIII. Limitations of the Palestinian Resistance

In the columns of *Rouge*, we have often stressed the political weakness of the leadership of the Palestinian struggle. Unfortunately, in view of the gravity of the situation faced by the Arab revolutionary movement as a whole, in which the Palestinian resistance is of historic significance, this weakness stands out glaringly. The moves of the reactionaries must be met in good time if the revolutionary gains conquered in struggle in the past period are to be safeguarded. During these three years, the resistance has had many an occasion to mobilize the Arab masses in a class struggle against the existing regimes.

Today in face of the pending direct threat, the resistance has no choice but to mobilize the Jordanian-Palestinian masses in order to hold their ground. Tactics must be worked out toward the Syrian, Iraqi, and Alge-

rian regimes without forgetting their responsibility in the June 1967 debacle, and without forgetting that their prisons are filled with revolutionary militants, and that they follow social and economic policies to the detriment of the masses.

## IX. Syria, Algeria, and Iraq

The rejection of the Rogers plan by Syria, Algeria, and Iraq flows from considerations altogether different from those of the Palestinian resistance. Syria rejected the November 22 resolution and the Rogers plan under pressure from the Syrian masses, which remain vigilant despite the repression.

For Algeria, the rejection came out of the need to refurbish its anti-imperialist image, and particularly to distract the Algerian masses from their own problems.

As for Iraq, it has an old score to settle with Nasserism, inasmuch as the Nasserites participated along with the Stalinists and the petty bourgeoisie (under Kassem) in suppressing the Baathists who now hold power. Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers plan provided the Iraqi Baathist regime with an opportunity to attack Nasser, and, through the attack, to appear as a more radical current with respect to the question of Palestine.

In reality, the Baathist ideology is based on rejuvenating the Arab "personality" by way of national chauvinism, and it is not very different from Nasserism in the political alternatives and perspectives it offers the Arab masses.

This defection in the petty-bourgeois camp provoked great consternation in the Stalinist press. One might well ask why, since presumably the USSR stands in opposition to the United Nations resolution and the Rogers plan.

In addition, it should be noted that the USSR has said nothing about the repression bearing down on the Communists in Iraq today (between June and August, 1970, about 500 Communists, belonging either to the pro-Moscow or left-wing CPs, were arrested in Iraq). Likewise Palestinian militants have been deported from the country. On this, too, the Stalinist press has remained silent. The Stalinists prefer to tell those who will listen that Iraq has taken an astonishing at-

titude, since it does not contribute to the anti-imperialist struggle!

## X. Immediate Perspectives

The consequence of the liquidation plan will be very serious, not only for the Palestinian resistance but also for the Arab revolutionary movement as a whole, since the petty bourgeoisie is more and more flagrantly demonstrating its determination to crush the movement of the Arab masses and their vanguard. The relationship of forces in the region as a whole now favors the Arab counterrevolution, not because Nasser has refurbished his image but because he is backed by imperialism, the Stalinists, and Zionism.

The relationship of forces has changed in the area of political initiative. This is very grave. Nevertheless, curious as it may seem, in Jordan

the relationship of forces has shifted in favor of the Palestinian resistance. Thus everything hinges on the revolutionary response which the resistance is able to mobilize among the Jordanian-Palestinian masses.

## XI. Our Support

As in the past—and now more than ever—we must demonstrate our solidarity with the revolutionary anti-imperialist movement as a whole. Throughout the world, revolutionists must organize propagandistic and agitational campaigns on the threat posed by the Rogers plan to the Arab socialist revolution. Appeals should be made to all the forces claiming adherence to socialism to establish an anti-imperialist front, uniting all revolutionists on a nonexclusionary basis in a struggle to halt the imperialist offensive.

## REVIEWS

### Leon Trotsky on the Jewish Question

*On the Jewish Question* by Leon Trotsky. Pathfinder Press, New York, N. Y. 31 pp. \$.50. 1970.

The selections in this pamphlet were written during the decade 1930-40, a period in which the rise of fascism and the defeats suffered by the revolutionary movement were producing a rebirth of faith in Zionism as a solution to anti-Semitism.

Trotsky held that establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine was a utopia that, if actually tried, would signify setting up "a bloody trap" for the Jews.

The triumph of Hitler in Germany, Trotsky wrote, did not, as some maintained, give new validity to Zionism. On the contrary, it proved that "the Jewish question cannot be solved within the framework of capitalism. . . . The blind alley in which German Jewry finds itself as well as the blind alley in which Zionism finds itself is inseparably bound up with the blind alley of world capitalism, as a whole."

The oppression of Jews, as of any other nationality, will be ended only by the socialist revolution, not by an alliance with British imperialism at the

expense of another nation. In letters to revolutionary Yiddish-language papers in France and the United States, Trotsky outlined their task as one of spreading the ideas of revolutionary socialism among Jewish workers.

In other selections, Trotsky discusses the extent and meaning of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and the attempts by the bureaucracy to establish a Jewish settlement in Birobidzhan.

An introduction by Peter Buch gives a valuable historical outline of the development of Zionism and the attitude of the socialist movement toward it.

— Allen Myers

#### Zionist Gangs in Hyde Park

Three hecklers were beaten by gangs of Zionists in London's traditional free-speech area of Hyde Park September 20. According to the September 27 London *Sunday Times*, "All three men complain that although the police were present in strength, no arrests were made."

Norman Temple, a Jew known for his support of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, was unconscious for two hours after being kicked in the head. Two other men were beaten when they asked questions of a Zionist speaker.

## Unemployment a Bigger Problem than Famine?

"It has been estimated that it would take thirty years, under the most favourable conditions, before the normal rate of increase of income [in India], that is, 3 percent per year would assure the minimum dietary requirements of only a third of the population." *Le Monde's* English-language *Weekly Selection* for September 23 thus indicates the magnitude of the problem facing the underdeveloped nations in trying merely to feed their populations.

The *Le Monde* article, although it is entitled "Expansion Has Not Solved Malnutrition," does not offer evidence of any significant expansion in the economies of the underdeveloped countries. In fact, the ratio of economic growth to population growth is declining.

According to the figures offered by *Le Monde*, population increase in the underdeveloped countries between 1950 and 1960 averaged 2 percent per year. During the same decade, economic growth averaged 5 percent, that is, 2.5 times the population growth. For the period 1965-1969, this ratio had declined slightly to about 2.25 rather than increasing. Population growth was 2.6 percent, economic growth 5.8 percent.

At the same time, "aid" from the developed countries has been declining slightly, both in terms of value and in terms of goods:

"The total value of aid to developing nations remained

constant—\$13,300 million in 1969 compared with \$13,200 million in 1968—which in fact means that *the real value slipped if monetary depreciation is taken into account.*

"The proportion of the gross national product of the industrial nations devoted to aid fell from 0.79 percent in 1968 to 0.72 percent in 1969." (Emphasis added.)

These figures require another qualification. Most governmental aid—80 percent of it according to *Le Monde*—is granted on condition that it be spent in the donor country. This means that the recipient country may have the value of the aid it receives significantly reduced by being denied the opportunity to purchase the products it needs at world market prices. In spite of predictions that the developed capitalist countries would remove this string from their aid, the meeting of the Development Aid Committee (set up by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in mid-September failed to agree to do this.

*Le Monde* also indicates that the development of so-called "miracle rice" is not doing much to solve the problem of malnutrition: "Newly developed high-yielding varieties of rice and wheat are still not widely enough used to have had an impact on most producers. . . . The cre-



ation of 'model farms' to be used as teaching centres for the poorest farmers is still limited to a few pilot projects. So long as this goal is not reached, the agricultural revolution threatens to aggravate the inequalities in farm income . . ."

There are as well additional difficulties with "miracle rice" that are not discussed in the *Le Monde* article. The new varieties require far more intensive irrigation, use of fertilizer and insect control, all of which are difficult to introduce in an underdeveloped country.

Even if one assumes that the so-called "green revolution" will nevertheless be able to increase significantly agricultural production in the countries attempting to develop within a capitalist economy, other equally pressing problems will remain to be solved.

The *Christian Science Monitor's* business and financial correspondent David R. Francis, writing in the September 28 issue of that paper, says:

"A combination of unemployment and urbanization are much more explosive for this decade [than the danger of famine]."

According to Francis, the normal unemployment rate in many underdeveloped countries is comparable to that in the United States during the depression of the 1930s.

"In Ceylon, for instance, there is an open unemployment rate of some 15 percent. These people say they are looking for jobs. In addition, many others are underemployed.

"Among the Ceylonese in the 15 to 24 age bracket, declared unemployment amounts to 39 percent.

"In Colombia the comparative percentages are 14 to 23 percent."

These unemployment rates are more likely to increase than to decline. During the 1960s unemployment rose even though the economic growth rate in the underdeveloped world was 5 percent. During the 1970s the increase in the number of persons looking for jobs is expected to be 50 percent greater than during the previous decade.

The problems of overcoming underdevelopment today are not comparable to the problems of earlier times that led to industrialization in the West in the nineteenth century. Francis writes:

"When Europe was becoming industrialized in the last century, the work force grew by less than 1 percent a year. The less sophisticated technology of the time required large numbers of employees. Any surplus could migrate to the new lands of the Americas or Africa.


"Today the developing countries face increases in their labor forces of some 3 percent annually. The new technology they inherit is less labor intensive. And there are no new lands to populate."

James Grant, the president of the Overseas Development Council, believes, according to Francis, that "The poor countries must aim to establish more labor-intensive production, rather than highly automated plants. They must take advantage of their low-cost labor."

*Le Monde* attributes the same view to Edward Martin, president of the Development Aid Committee:

"His recommendation is to find solutions permitting the maximum use of manpower and minimum use of capital in all sectors without at the same time pricing products out of the market."

What this means in effect is that capitalists in the un-



derdeveloped world must limit the application of modern technology, yet successfully compete with the very latest developments in the world's most advanced capitalist cen-

ters. This would be possible, if at all, only if wages were continually forced even lower than their present level. Every new technical development in the advanced countries would require a corresponding wage reduction in the underdeveloped countries.

The subordination of the economies of the underdeveloped nations to the capitalist world market thus means that industrial "development" is equivalent to a worsening of the situation of the poor, a greater deformation of the economy, or both. In Mexico, to take but one example, the three major United States automobile manufacturers—General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler—have all built large plants. According to the theories of people like Grant and Martin, the lower labor costs in Mexico should mean that these plants produce automobiles more cheaply than the same firms do in the United States.

In reality, however, a "made in Mexico" car costs approximately twice as much as the same car produced in the U. S.

Because of the limited Mexican market, the three corporations built "modern" plants in Mexico which produce at a rate which is only one-twelfth of the average in the U. S. [See *Intercontinental Press*, July 28, 1969,

page 753.] They are able to maintain high profits in spite of this low productivity because of a 100 percent duty on imported cars—a tax which was imposed by the government for the purpose of cutting down the outflow of capital!

The overall result is big profits for the imperialist firms, low wages for Mexican workers, and the draining of the limited supply of domestic capital into fields which are profitable but unable to compete on the world market and which have little or no capacity for the expansion necessary to create more jobs.

Speaking at the World Bank meeting in Copenhagen September 21, Robert McNamara said:

"The 'marginal' men, the wretched strugglers for survival on the fringes of farm and city, may already number more than half a billion. By 1980 they will surpass a billion, by 1990 two billion. Can you imagine any human order surviving with so gross a mass of misery piling up at its base?"

What McNamara did not say was that in spite of all the talk of development and "aid" from the industrialized nations, the world capitalist economy has no other alternative to offer.

## REVIEWS

# Soviet Historians Probe Stalin's True War Record

By George Saunders

"June 22, 1941" by A. M. Nekrich. [Listed as "June 22, 1941"—*Soviet Historians and the German Invasion* by Vladimir Petrov. The translations, introduction, and notes are by Petrov but not the main body of the book.] University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, S. C. 322 pp. \$5.95. 1968.

That major political phenomenon in the Soviet Union today, *samizdat*—privately printed and circulated, uncensored material—has undergone a major shift in recent years. As the *Chronicle of Current Events* observed in its review of new *samizdat* works at the end of 1968, that year marked a turn from mainly literary to mainly political material.

In the late fifties and early sixties, unpublished poetry, stories, novels, and statements by literary figures were the main interest of the *samizdat*-reading and reproducing public. One of the first documents to reflect the shift to explicit political statements appeared in 1966. It was the minutes of a discussion held in February 1966 at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism concerning a book critical of Stalin's role in World War II. Both historians and members of the Red Army general staff took part.

The book was entitled *June 22, 1941*. It was by historian A. M. Nekrich and had been published in late 1965.

In descriptions of unparalleled sharpness, at least for officially published Soviet works, readers learned of Stalin's failure to prepare Soviet defenses for the possibility of Hitler's attack and of Stalin's refusal throughout the first day of the invasion to permit Soviet forces to fight back.

The discussion about the book was even sharper than the book itself. The minutes of the discussion circulated widely in *samizdat* and soon appeared outside the Soviet Union.

The appearance of these minutes caused considerable stir in the world press, for the discussion not only probed deeply into the question of Stalin's role in the war—much more deeply than Khrushchev's "secret" speech; it also went into the question of the Stalin-Hitler pact, the purges of foreign Communists and Soviet party and army leaders in the thirties, and even the question of Stalin's wrong policy in regard to Germany in 1930-33, when the Comintern's bureaucratic "leftism" permitted Hitler to move toward the seizure of power without effective resistance by a united working class.

The text of these minutes was printed in *La Sinistra* in Italy, in *Nouvel Observateur* in France, in *Der Spiegel* in Germany, and in *Survey* in England. *World Outlook* (former name of *Intercontinental Press*) printed a translation of the *La Sinistra* text in the November 11, 1966, issue.

Nekrich's book is now available in English, accompanied by the *Survey* version of the discussion on the book. Also included in the volume produced by the University of South Carolina Press is a translation of a favorable review of Nekrich's book from the liberal monthly *Novy Mir* (No. 1, 1966). This was the *only significant mention* of Nekrich's book in the official Soviet press for two years.

Likewise included is an official attack on *June 22, 1941*, from the September 1967 *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (*Problems*

of the History of the CPSU). The article was written by two of the panelists who took part in the Marxism-Leninism Institute discussion: Major General B. S. Telpukhovskiy and Professor G. A. Deborin. (Nekrich himself was the third panelist and Major-General E. A. Boltin presided.) The September 1967 article is a case study in the Stalinist method of falsifying both history itself and all versions of history other than the currently approved one. Deborin and Telpukhovskiy used the standard technique of equating any anti-Stalinist criticism (Nekrich's) with anti-Soviet and proimperialist sympathies.

In addition to the text of Nekrich's study and the Soviet materials relating to it, Vladimir Petrov (with whose record we are unfamiliar, but who seems to represent the views of the State Department, an obligatory inclusion in American-Sovietological academia) has included some extensive introductory material and notes, as well as an appendix consisting of an article by himself about the Stalin-Hitler pact period. Petrov's material is often useful as regards the factual information included. Not surprisingly, his interpretations are entirely useless, expressing the viewpoint of Washington diplomacy, whether in relation to the wartime policies of Roosevelt and Truman or to their postwar continuation.

Still the volume is a valuable one. Nekrich's book does not simply assert but, from Soviet sources, documents Stalin's disastrous failures (and thereby the failures of the whole bureaucratic layer).

The bureaucracy did not see how serious the danger was from fascist Germany and did not prepare adequately for war. The extremes to which this nonpreparation went, in the teeth of all necessary evidence that aggression was coming, are remarkable. The most striking is the lack of response at the top to the aggression itself.

(This is strongly reminiscent of the Kremlin's sluggishness about responding to U. S. imperialist aggression against the Vietnamese workers state and escalation of warfare near the border of China. Equal inertness is displayed, whether it be in defense of the "Soviet motherland" or of the "socialist commonwealth.")

In his section "The Day the War Started" Nekrich has the following grim vignette, one of many that illustrate the obtuseness of the upper echelons. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet in Sebastopol, Admiral F. S. Oktyabrskiy, is talking by phone to the high command in Moscow.

"Oktyabrskiy said in an unusually harsh voice:

"'Yes, yes, they are bombing us . . .'

"There was a strong explosion; the glass in the window rattled.

"'Just now a bomb landed somewhere not far from headquarters,' Oktyabrskiy continued in an excited voice.

"We exchanged glances.

"'In Moscow they don't believe that Sebastopol is being bombed,' said Kulakov in a choked voice."

\* \* \*

Why did the Kremlin hierarchy, following Stalin's lead, so blindly refuse to face the possibility of war—even after the actual attack?

Although Nekrich himself does not ask this question, his entire account of the views and behavior of the highest officials of the Soviet government raises it compellingly. His work does not indicate any answer. That omission is easy to understand. The roots of the paralysis lie in

the nature of the Soviet leadership as a privileged bureaucratic caste. And no "legal" historian dares, or desires, to state that.

The parasitic layer fears that any social upheaval may deprive it of its tenuous, usurped position of privilege. In the epoch of capitalism's death agony, of worldwide shocks and explosions, of wars, revolutions, and civil strife, this layer of well-stuffed officials clings blindly to the status quo, hoping danger will go away. Like Stalin before Hitler, the "peaceful coexistence" merchants of Brezhnev and Kosygin hope that the brutal imperialist aggression in Indochina will go away. They seek, not to defend the revolution against it, but to arrive at an "understanding" with the pirates of an imperialism still more rapacious than Germany's.

Brezhnev and Kosygin are as Stalin was—in Nekrich's words—"ready to do practically anything to avoid war."

Nekrich's book is actually rather mild criticism of the Stalin leadership. Its entire first half is a boring reconstruction of the international situation at the end of the thirties. It is full of generalizations about the Soviet Union's ability to win the kind of war imposed on it, and its achievement in so doing. These are so blandly stated that, while not wrong, they leave much unstated or understated and so lose any real significance.

Still, here is a book officially published in the Soviet Union, not a "bourgeois" document (for all that, it was later criticized and withdrawn), a booklet "confirmed for printing by the editorial collegium for scholarly-popular literature of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR," no less.

Kremlin theoreticians have recently taken to quoting, out of context, Trotsky's 1936 warning, in *Revolution Betrayed*, that the Soviet Union might be defeated in a war. What they do not like to recall is that as early as 1927, as leader of the Left Opposition, Trotsky declared total nonconfidence in the ability of the Stalinists to provide a revolutionary defense of the country in case of an attack. Trotsky held that Stalin's policies could lead to disaster. Nekrich's account of what actually happened confirms Trotsky's warnings in the grimest way.

Besides making Nekrich's book available in English, the University of South Carolina Press has done a useful service in providing English texts of key documents from the continuing Soviet debate about the war. A prime element in the drive to "rehabilitate" Stalin is to reestablish him as the "genius" who forged the great victory of 1945. That was the essential thrust of the *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* article by Deborin and Telpukhovskiy in September 1967.

Another collection of documents like this will soon be needed to encompass the growing scope of the debate on this question. It would include the unpublished *samizdat* letter by former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko, answering the article by Deborin and Telpukhovskiy. (The major part of Grigorenko's work appeared in *Intercontinental Press*, November 10, 1969.)

Grigorenko did more than just defend Nekrich (who incidentally had been expelled from the party in mid-1967). Grigorenko cited evidence even more damning than Nekrich's of the Stalinists' crimes and failures in disarming the country on the eve of the war and disarming the defense, especially in the early months.

The fight over Stalin's real role in the war is an important one. It is a crucial issue for those now attempting to restore Stalin to his pedestal.

The rehabilitation of Stalin is a necessity to the bu-

reaucracy in reestablishing its claims to legitimacy as the heirs of Lenin and of October. The effort to reassert that "legitimacy," in fact to pound it in and drown out any other possible idea, is also the meaning of the absurd lengths the bureaucrats have gone to in making a cult out of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Revolution and the Hundredth Anniversary of Lenin's birth.

Early in 1969 efforts were renewed in the official press to rehabilitate Stalin. This was the meaning of an article by Major General E. A. Boltin in the journal, *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1969. This was the same Boltin who chaired the 1966 Marxism-Leninism Institute discussion of Nekrich's book.

Boltin defended Stalin's military record against "falsifiers from abroad," indirectly attacking exactly those points about Stalin's war role made in Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Congress. This is the same Boltin who, in the 1966 discussion, asserted: "The Twentieth and Twenty-second Congress resolutions on the cult of personality are not exaggerations of the Khrushchev period but are of vital importance for every honest Communist." [*Intercontinental Press*, November 11, 1966, page 32.] So times change.

Having run Boltin's article in issue No. 2 for 1969, *Kommunist* carried the rehabilitation move still further in its third issue. A group of authors headed by V. Golikov (whether he is related to Stalin's former head of information services is not clear), and including one S. Shaumian—of whom more below—defended Stalin as "a fighter for the working-class cause."

Replies to the two articles in *Kommunist* soon appeared in *samizdat*, in March and April 1969, authored by Pyotr Yakir and Roy Medvedev.

For an English translation of Yakir's legal brief on the crimes of Stalin, including more information on his wartime failures, see *Intercontinental Press*, June 2, 1969, page 542.

Roy Medvedev's point-by-point refutation of the *Kommunist* articles, both on the war and on general political questions, is available in French under the title *Faut-il rehabiliter Staline?*<sup>1</sup>

In addition to Grigorenko's, Yakir's, and Medvedev's letters and the two *Kommunist* articles, there is a continuing expansion of materials on this issue, despite the intensified repression and growing reimposition of the Stalin cult.

Now a word about S. Shaumian, one of the *Kommunist* authors who praised Stalin as "a fighter for the working-class cause." This same Shaumian is, apparently, a leading contributor as well to the Kremlin's campaign against "modern Trotskyism." At any rate, one S. S. Shaumian is listed as the chief editor of the 1968 volume *The Struggle of the Bolshevik Party Against Trotskyism (1903-February 1917)*.

In that 250-page book the old lies about Trotsky's "incurable" struggle against Lenin in the pre-1917 years are rehashed for the present generation of pro-Kremlin Stalinists. (Shaumian brings these legends, vintage 1923, up to date in his prologue and epilogue, blasting away at "Trotskyist" theory in regard to revolution and im-

perialism, duly quoting his masters Brezhnev and Kosygin all the while.<sup>2</sup>

Shaumian's book is oriented not only to Russian readers; a copy of it has appeared in 1970 in at least one other major world language, Spanish.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps this was specially geared to the current debate on perspectives among Latin-American revolutionists.

In the Russian version of this anti-Trotsky opus, "Professor" Shaumian is described not only as its chief editor and author of its prologue and epilogue, but also, apparently, as a member of the Department of Party History at the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee. And inscribed on the title page, apparently as the body authorizing production of this book, is the "Chief Editorial Board for Educational Literature of the Upper Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee." Presumably, Shaumian, this expert on how bad Trotsky was and how good Stalin was, is also a member of that high office for the ideological training of the bureaucracy.

Nekrich's book and the struggle over the truth about the war are an important part of the effort to revive Leninism and thoroughly expose the Stalinist deformation in the Soviet Union. It is material well worth studying. For this is an area where Stalin's apologists are exerting a special effort—but where they are also highly vulnerable!

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2. Kosygin is quoted in answer to a UPI reporter's question at a press conference in 1966. The question was: "Don't you think Trotsky deserves to be rehabilitated and cleared of the charges made against him in the Stalin epoch?"

Kosygin answered: "If the author of the note [on which the question was submitted] is so very interested in what Trotskyism is and what harm it has done to the Communist movement, a special lecture might be arranged on this question. Our party, which carried out a successful struggle against Trotskyism, condemned and still condemns Trotskyism. Such was the state of affairs in the past; so it remains today." (Quoted by Shaumian from *Pravda*, December 5, 1966.)

3. *La Lucha del Partido Bolchevique Contra El Trotskismo* (1903-Febrero de 1917). Editorial Progreso. Moscu. No date.

## Thieu Still Raking It In

General Thieu submitted his 1971 budget to the Saigon legislature October 1, calling for expenditures of \$22,000,000,000.

This is nearly 25 percent larger than his 1970 budget, and the October 2 *Washington Post* commented that even this figure "is expected to grow by at least 25 percent over the next 12 months." Washington pays half of the budget as a direct subsidy to its puppet regime.

The *Washington Post* noted that Thieu's budget "contains no funds for three much-publicized and expensive administration programs: land reform, higher pay for soldiers and increased benefits for disabled veterans."

Some \$11,000,000,000 of the total is earmarked for "defense." This is almost exclusively salaries inasmuch as the Nixon administration provides all the weapons, ammunition, and equipment at the expense of American taxpayers.

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1. *Is the Rehabilitation of Stalin Required?* The Russian title is *Vozmozhno Li Segodnia Reabilitirovat Stalina?* The French edition was published in 1969 by Editions du Seuil, 27 Rue Jacob, Paris.



## Nixon Increases Arms Aid to Greek Colonels

The Nixon administration announced September 22 that it was resuming the shipment of heavy arms to the Greek dictatorship. Suspension of such shipments had been declared by Lyndon Johnson after the April 1967 coup that placed the military regime in power.

In fact, however, the arms embargo was always extremely limited. As Terence Smith observed in the September 27 *New York Times*, ". . . the embargo denied Greece the planes, tanks and helicopters she ostensibly needed to fulfill her NATO role and, at the same time, provided the junta with the small arms, jeeps and trucks it needed to enforce rigid control at home."

Smith was mistaken only about the "denial" of planes, tanks, and other heavy weapons. As early as October 18, 1968, President Johnson approved the shipment of twenty-two F-102 jet fighter planes, ninety-two medium tanks, and an undisclosed number of howitzers.

In 1966, before the coup, Greece received \$90,000,000 in arms from the United States. The figure dropped to \$44,000,000—still not an insignificant amount—in 1967, but started rising again the following year. An article in the June 3, 1970, *Washington Post* reported that ". . . Greece received \$58.5 million in 1968 and a whopping \$170.0 million the next year. All but a small portion of both figures were *gifts rather than sales*." (Emphasis added.)

Thus in 1969 U.S. arms aid was nearly double what it was in the year before the military seized power in Greece.

According to the September 23 *New York Times*, the lifting of the limited embargo means ". . . Greece now will receive some \$56-million worth of aircraft, tanks, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, mortar, artillery and tank ammunition." The figure may actually be much higher since the Pentagon normally values weapons considered "surplus" at only one-fourth of their cost.

In announcing the new arms aid, State Department spokesman Robert

McCloskey claimed that the military junta had developed a "trend toward constitutional order." In a prepared statement, he said: "The Government of Greece has stated that it intends to establish parliamentary democracy."

The same day, Senator William Fulbright responded: "There is no sign of a restoration of parliamentary government."

Speaking on the floor of the Senate, Fulbright continued: "The colonels appear to have done just enough to pry loose the tens of millions of dollars of equipment that the Defense Department has been so anxious to give them."

The "just enough" to which Fulbright referred was apparently the dictatorship's release of 500 of its political prisoners in August. At the same time, the colonels removed the travel ban on all former members of parliament except "Communists."

The "liberalization" which these steps allegedly represented was intended to make it easier for Nixon to end the limited embargo, as he had been planning to do for some time. Last June 3 Bernard Nossiter reported in the *Washington Post*:

". . . the Nixon administration has decided in principle to scrap the embargo entirely. Knowledgeable sources disclosed that the ban has been reviewed by the National Security Council and that body has determined that the embargo has outlived its usefulness. A public announcement to this effect, however, *is being delayed until a more receptive climate at home and abroad is ensured*." (Emphasis added.)

The junta itself acknowledges holding another 596 political prisoners arrested in the days following the 1967 coup. This figure of course does not count the hundreds who have been tried and sentenced since then for opposing the dictatorship.

And although most former members of parliament are no longer forbidden to travel outside the country, hundreds of journalists, workers, lawyers, etc., remain under travel restrictions.

As for the professed intention to "es-

tablish parliamentary democracy," the colonels are no closer to that today than they were in 1967. In an August 12 editorial on the release of the 500 prisoners, the *New York Times* commented:

"As often happens, however, the junta spokesman used the occasion of this announcement to make a ludicrous claim that the 1968 Constitution [written by the colonels themselves] was now 'almost implemented' and that the martial law remaining in effect was 'only a shadow.' In truth, the articles of the Constitution guaranteeing civil liberties and free elections either have not been activated at all or have no effect because of the martial law."

Political opponents of the regime are still being tried by military courts, which do not hesitate even to jail the defendants' lawyer, as happened at a trial in July.

Interestingly enough, however, that trial may have indicated to Nixon that the international climate was now right for increased military aid to the Greek dictatorship.

One of the defendants, Trotskyist worker Theologos Psaradelles, who escaped from Greece, was denied political asylum in Bulgaria and handed over to the Greek police by the Stalinists.

Nixon clearly has less reason to fear criticism of his support for the military regime when the leaders of a workers state help the colonels keep revolutionary socialists in jail.

### Ramotse Convicted

The South African government's information service in New York announced October 2 that black nationalist Benjamin Ramotse had been convicted on six charges of "terrorist activities." He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

Ramotse was the last of twenty-two nationalist prisoners whose continued detention without trial had aroused protest around the world and even within South Africa. Charges against nineteen of the prisoners were dismissed by the South African Supreme Court on September 14.

## The Philippines—a Bottomless Sink of Corruption

Teodoro M. Locsin, the editor of the *Philippines Free Press*, wrote recently: "The government is generally considered by foreigners and Filipinos alike, one of the most corrupt, most terroristic, most disgusting in the world. . . . The currency was debauched, inflicting incalculable suffering on the people—and the debaucher remains in high office, together with the grafters and terrorists . . . The truth is that there is no law, only the selective application of government regulations, the mighty, fearsome and corrupt being exempt from the application, only you and me having to comply—or else."

Two articles by Frances Starner and Bruce Nussbaum in the September 19 issue of the weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review*, published in Hong Kong, paint a revealing picture of conditions in the Philippines—the government riddled by corruption and the economy destroyed by the demands of foreign imperialism.

Starner writes that the "specifics of what is wrong with the present system are testified to daily in the country's newspapers and journals." Examples include:

"In a local court in Ilocos Sur, a town mayor—whose mother is governor of the province and whose congressman father heads the justice committee of the commission on appointments—was freed from a murder charge last month when the eye-witnesses to the killing recanted their original testimony.

"He still faces charges, with numerous political supporters of his parents, of setting to the torch some 40 barrio houses, thereby leaving several hundred persons homeless and one dead."

The case of the mayor may be unusual only in that he was brought to trial. "In Tarlac province, at high noon on June 24, seven barrio officials and the driver were removed from a jeepney [a jeep equipped to hold eight to ten passengers, often operated as a public conveyance] and shot down alongside the highway just outside a military camp. By coincidence, one of the dozens of witnesses to this bloody massacre was the pro-



FERDINAND MARCOS

vincial governor who has said he could identify the killers. But thus far there have been no arrests in the case. To the charge of the secretary of national defence that the victims were gunned down by dissidents of the New People's Army, or Huks, Senator Benigno Aquino and others familiar with the Tarlac situation have retorted that they were, in fact, Huk sympathisers shot down by members of the Tarlac city police. (Witnesses noted that the killers escaped in a vehicle with government licence plates.)"

Starner also gives a brief description of the cases of non-Christian minorities in Mindanao who are being illegally driven from their tribal lands. The land thefts are carried out by an alliance of businessmen, police and politicians. When one congressman charged that the lands were being devoured by a "giant octopus," another legislator responded frankly, "We are all giant octopuses here."

President Ferdinand Marcos, who, in Nussbaum's words, "during his first term of office . . . became one of the nation's wealthiest men," won reelection in 1969 by a record margin.

"In his campaign," Nussbaum says,

"Marcos relied heavily on the organisation and funds of the national administration he controlled. Government spending, under his direction, rose nearly 25% in 1969 over 1968. Money supply shot up by over 13%. This flood of funds designed to generate votes not growth came from such official sources as the 'barrio fund', the 'calamity fund', the 'emergency fund', and the 'intelligence fund'."

Starner estimates that Marcos and his Nacionalista party spent between 800,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 pesos—at the rate of exchange at that time equivalent to \$200,000,000 to \$250,000,000—during the campaign. She quotes the chairman of the senate ways and means committee to indicate that the money supply increased even more rapidly than in Nussbaum's estimate—25.3 percent between July and December 1969.

As a result, from April 1969 to April 1970 consumer prices rose 14.2 percent.

In his successful campaign, Marcos pictured himself as a nationalist and called for land reform, industrialization, an end to special privileges for U.S. businesses and the revision of military and economic treaties. He denounced the International Monetary Fund [IMF] for attaching conditions to its loans and promised not to devalue the peso in spite of the inflationary pressures which existed even before campaign spending began.

Unfortunately for Marcos, such promises were easier to make than to keep. The Philippines, in a neo-colonial relationship to the U.S. and Japan, exports raw materials and imports manufactured and semimanufactured goods. Industries established since formal independence in 1947 are mostly foreign owned, and engaged in the production of consumer goods.

Inflation, or increased consumer demand—created by campaign spending, for example—requires hard currency to buy foreign goods necessary for increased consumer production. But this hard currency, Nussbaum writes, could not be obtained:

"Unfortunately, the balance of payments was very precarious at this pe-

riod (as it has been periodically since the end of the war). Imports heavily exceeded exports. Dollar revenues from American bases had declined. Remittances by US corporations to their head offices had risen while Filipino and Chinese were buying up dollars to salt away in safer, more profitable climes abroad."

Moreover, both the government and private businesses needed dollars to pay off debts to foreign banks, most of them American. In December 1969 the government bank had reserves of \$150,000,000 while debts stood at \$151,100,000.

Marcos imposed import quotas, Nussbaum continues, and "ceilings of dollars for foreign purchases were set at 55% of the previous year's level.

"Yet with the high money supply persisting and imports blocked, prices began to rise appreciably. In addition, manufacturers faced with tight credit and dollar restrictions began to lay off workers, and production declined. The election—which made reformist hopes soar—by Christmas had begun to pay unwanted and dangerous dividends."

Marcos asked his foreign creditors to convert short-term loans into long-term, and also began looking for additional credit. He was quickly informed, however, that "rescheduling of loan repayments and additional credit from American banks and other institutions would not be granted unless the Philippines agreed to borrow its third line of credit — 'tranche' — from the IMF under which the inter-

national money-lending body is able to dictate its own terms."

Nussbaum points out that previous Filipino governments had already had some experience with the terms imposed by the IMF:

"Such policies were instituted in the Philippines in 1962 after a similar foreign exchange crisis forced the government to turn to the IMF and other outside sources. They consisted of elimination of restrictions on currency convertibility; the end of import and export controls; free exchange rates; fiscal and monetary restraints by the government and private enterprise designed to curb inflation and import demand; devaluation, making imports more expensive and exports cheaper."

These policies only made it easier for foreign capital to pump profits out of the Philippines—between 1961 and 1964 profit remittances back home by foreign corporations increased from \$200,000,000 to \$700,000,000—and they did not solve the balance of payments problem, which by 1969 was worse than ever.

In February of this year, Marcos adopted the policies demanded by the IMF: devaluation of the peso, reduction of imports, and decreased public spending. The effects have been just what could have been predicted from the earlier experience:

"The consequences of these policies are similar to those of 1962. Less business credit has led to decreased production and less jobs. Devaluation has increased the peso cost of foreign

loans (before, about four pesos paid off each dollar, now six or more are needed). The government also has begun to lay off tens of thousands of workers to save money. . . .

"Devaluation has hurt consumers who have seen the cost of living soar with inflation. . . . The introduction of 'miracle rice' strains, by greatly increasing the benefits of mechanisation and large-scale agri-business farming, has tended to give the profit edge to larger, more efficient landowners. Higher production and consumer costs will enlarge this profit advantage, exacerbating the unrest in the countryside.

"Finally, acceptance of IMF restrictions . . . and total dependence on American dollar loans have ended for the time being hopes of Filipino reformists for basic economic and social change."

In this situation the government has scheduled a convention which is to draw up a new constitution in June 1971. Starner reports that there is "a reformist minded element here which frankly talks about constitutional change as the last hope of staving off revolution."

The reformist hope is not shared by the general population, however. In a recent public poll more than two-thirds of those expressing an opinion said that the constitutional convention would not be able to solve the country's difficulties because it would be controlled by the "rich and powerful."

## Second in Command of Huk Guerrillas

# Sumulong Captured by Philippine Police

[The following article is reprinted from the September 25 issue of *Laging Una*, "The Voice of the Filipino People," published in Los Angeles.]

\* \* \*

Commander Sumulong, rated second in command in the Huk leadership, surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Sept. 16 when trapped by a force of some 250 troop-

ers in a house in Angeles City, Panganga province.

Known in private life as Faustino del Mundo, the 55-year-old rebel leader had played an important role in the insurgent Huk movement for 24 years. As late as March of this year the Philippine government had raised the reward for his capture to 150,000 pesos.

Occupying the house where the capture took place was Sumulong's wife,

Maxima Gana, who is the owner, and their five daughters, ranging in age from one to five years. The house, of bungalow type, is located in a residential subdivision.

Acting on a tip, the troopers closed in during the evening of Sept. 15. Conflicting accounts were published in Manila newspapers regarding the exact circumstances of Sumulong's surrender next morning. One account said that the PC men persuaded his wife to

get him to surrender peacefully. Another said they entered and searched the house, finding the rebel leader hiding in a tunnel leading from the building and that Sumulong surrendered when ordered to come out.

Like some other Huk leaders who have fallen into the hands of their foes, Sumulong was alternately defiant and conciliatory in his references to the government. Meeting reporters, he declared that "for every Sumulong captured, there will always be ten other Sumulongs to replace him." But he also had kind words for the Marcos administration. He said he and his command had supported Marcos in last year's election "because he (Marcos) presented a program for Filipino nationalism."

In the same vein, the man believed until lately to be a fiery revolutionist said "the administration has changed (for the better) and the soldiers are not as bad as they used to be. This is why I feel happy about the manner of my treatment. It is time to help the administration. I conferred with President Marcos a while ago in Malacanang and he said he has made many reforms and I believe in his sincerity. We should all now live peacefully and help our government."

The last remarks followed a two-hour talk that Sumulong had with Marcos at the presidential palace, in which the captured man reportedly expressed the agreement of himself and his Moscow-oriented faction of the Huks with the reform policies of the president.

Sumulong also wrote an appeal for surrender to Commander Dante (in private life Bernabe Buscayno), who leads a supposedly Peking-oriented faction of the rebel movement in Tarlac province. This group is known as the New People's Army. In his remarks to the press, however, Sumulong also denounced Commander Dante, his one-time student, as "a traitor to the cause."

He accused the other leader of having violated an agreement to support Marcos in the last election by accepting weapons and vehicles from a rival candidate to the value of 100,000 pesos. He did not name the candidate. Sen. Sergio Osmena Jr. was Marcos' opponent in the 1969 election.

Sumulong denied that he was a

Communist. "I am a Socialist," he declared. "All we want are reforms, and unless these are given by the government, our organization will always find a popular following."

Periodic reports regarding the internal organization of the Huk movement have credited Sumulong with being the finance officer as well as second in command. His was the job of levying "taxes" on landowners and merchants to provide funds for purchasing arms and supplies for the guerrilla fighters.

Newsmen, interested in the source of the modern weapons used by Sumulong's command, were told by the captured leader that they had either been donated "by friends of the organization" or were purchased through Filipinos or Americans at Clark Air

Force Base, the huge U. S. military installation adjacent to Angeles City.

Outranking Sumulong in the Huk hierarchy is Supremo Pedro Taruc. The captive leader spoke of him with esteem. "Ka Boyong," as he referred to Taruc, has "a brilliant mind" and is in good health except for occasional attacks of asthma.

There was speculation in Manila as to what Taruc and the guerrilla fighters in the field will think of Sumulong's immoderate praise of President Marcos and the armed forces they must continue to confront as long as they remain in rebellion. Taruc has said he will never voluntarily surrender to the government.

Meanwhile, government lawyers were preparing charges of rebellion and murder against the captive leader.

## Britain

# Move to Set Up 'Irish Solidarity Campaign'

By Robin Mor

London

An important effect of the outbreak of the civil-rights struggle in Ireland has been the creation in Britain of a solidarity movement composed of Irish exiles and British people who sympathize with the Irish cause. Now this movement is taking an important step forward. A conference has been called for October 10-11 to unite the independent groups which have sprung up in a number of towns, Irish exile organizations, and British socialist groups.

The conference was initiated by the Birmingham Irish Solidarity Campaign and is being held in that city because of the very large number of Irish workers who live there. Amongst the organizations supporting the conference are the Irish Solidarity Campaigns in Birmingham, Oxford, Glasgow, Stafford, Coventry, Bristol, Manchester, and Essex; the London-based Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (ICRS); Clann na h-Eireann (the Irish republican organization for England, Scotland, and Wales); the International Socialists (IS); the International Marxist Group (IMG—the British section of the Fourth Interna-

tional); and the James Fintan Lalor Republican Club. The new organization will be called "The Irish Solidarity Campaign".

A Steering Committee composed of delegates from each of the Solidarity Campaigns has drawn up a programme for action and a list of demands to propose to the conference. These demands reflect the conviction that the struggle in Ireland is no longer restricted to the issue of civil rights in the North, but is becoming an all-Ireland struggle against British imperialism, which can only be completed by the creation of a workers republic.

The demands are: (1) Support the Irish people's right to self-determination. (2) Support for popular movements in Ireland, North and South, fighting political and economic domination by British imperialism. (3) Release all Irish political prisoners in British and Irish jails. (4) An end to British intervention in Ireland, and the immediate withdrawal of British armed forces. (5) Opposition to those fostering religious sectarianism in Ireland and preventing working class unity. (6) Support for the right of

Irish workers to arm and organize to defend their homes from attack by sectarian gangs, the military, and the police.

The main proposals for action are as follows: a national tour for Bernadette Devlin (who will be invited to become president of the Irish Solidarity Campaign after her release from

jail), a national demonstration to be held in the spring, a series of coordinated local actions, and a publicity campaign to be directed to the trade-union movement.

A rally is planned to conclude the conference. The speakers invited are Cathal Goulding, from the Irish republican movement; Vincent Mc-

Dowell, of the Irish Labour party left wing; Gerry Ruddy of People's Democracy; Bob Purdie of the ICRSC and a leading member of the IMG; and Padraig Yeats, secretary of the Birmingham ISC and secretary of Clann na h-Eireann. Séamus Collins, chairman of Clann na h-Eireann is scheduled to preside over the rally.

## Documents

# Sihanouk Appeals for End to Slaughter in Cambodia

[On September 29 the London office of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation released the text of a telegram it had received from Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia appealing for expressions of solidarity in the efforts of his government to end the intervention of the Nixon administration in Cambodian affairs.

[We call special attention to Prince Sihanouk's affirmation that the Prague authorities are diverting messages sent to his representative in Czechoslovakia to Lon Nol's "ambassador."

[The Lon Nol puppet regime owes its existence to the support given it by the Nixon administration, and the evidence indicates that the CIA played a key role in setting it up in the first place.

[The text of Prince Sihanouk's telegram is as follows.]

\* \* \*

I very warmly thank the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for everything it has kindly done for the Khmer people and its National United Front. Please excuse me for being unable to say whether your cable to our Prague Embassy has been received by our representative, because I do not know anything myself, since the Czechoslovak Government delivered the cables and messages to the Ambassador of Lon Nol instead of giving them to our representative, the true addressee. I beg the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to be kind enough to make known to the Press, the people and the Parliamentarians of America and England that Mr. Nixon's warplanes, with those of the Saigon Generals Thieu and Ky, of the Thai Government and of Lon Nol are daily con-

tinuing the decimation of the Khmer population outside of Phnompenh, whose only crime is the rejection of the bloody dictatorship of Lon Nol and American-Thai-Saigon neo-colonialism.

The four air forces have already killed or mutilated more than two hundred thousand men and women civilians including old women and children. Eight hundred thousand refugees have fled to Phnompenh to escape death or atrocious napalm burns. The population of Phnompenh which was, last June, seven hundred thousand, has now risen today to one million, five hundred thousand. The rice paddies, the fields, the pastures are deserted. Undeniable genocide of the Khmer people by the four air forces is presented in the propaganda of Nixon and Lon Nol as operations against the so-called Vietcong. I appeal to all the peace-loving people of

the world to insist upon the total cessation of the bombing and strafing by the four air forces, to demand that President Nixon immediately cease his import [support] for the regime of Lon Nol, not only because this regime does not represent the Khmer people, but because it is, indeed, against the Khmer people. I beg you to inform the American Parliament that my government is ready to accept direct negotiations with Mr. Nixon's government for the complete disengagement of United States from the Cambodian affair, which concerns only the Khmer people. With highest esteem, Norodom Sihanouk.

### World Leader

Nearly 50 percent of the world's environmental pollution is produced in the United States, according to a report in the October 5 issue of the German weekly *Der Spiegel*.

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## Ernest Mandel Answers Victor Perlo's Slander

We are reprinting below two articles from the *Daily World*, a newspaper published in New York that reflects the viewpoint of the Communist party of the United States. One of the articles is signed by Victor Perlo.

As the reader can judge for himself, these articles accuse Ernest Mandel, the Belgian economist, of participating in an alleged infringement of Perlo's right to freedom of speech at an important conference of economists in Holland.

The charges are especially vicious in view of the current campaign seeking to compel the State Department to revoke its ban on Mandel's visiting the United States to fill speaking engagements at various universities.

Following the two articles, we are publishing a reply by Ernest Mandel. This reply, we hope, will be widely circulated in order to help overcome some of the damage done by Perlo's slanderous attack.

## 'Daily World' Account of Economic Conference

[The following is the account of the four-day economic conference in Holland that appeared in the September 24 issue of the *Daily World*. The unsigned article carried the headline: "Perlo heard at Europe Catholic Institute meet."]

\* \* \*

TILBURG, The Netherlands, Sept. 13 (By airmail)—A four-day conference on "Capitalism in the '70s" at the Catholic Economics Institute here was almost broken up by disruptive tactics of a small group of Trotskyites. The aim of the conference was to clarify issues and unite left forces in the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist struggles ahead.

In a stormy session, the conference by a four to one margin voted to reject a resolution attacking the conference report of Victor Perlo, the U. S. economist. It also rejected the demand that the paper be omitted from the conference proceedings.

The disrupters, using an advance text of the speech, had circulated a resolution attacking Perlo as "revisionist" and the Soviet Union as "counter-revolutionary."

In his report, Perlo pointed out that U. S. imperialism has lost ground in the 1960s and would lose ground more rapidly in the 70s if unity of anti-imperialist forces can be strengthened.

The main ideological weapons of U. S. imperialism, he said, is to prevent unity through anti-communism, in general and anti-Sovietism in particular. He described the key role of

the Communist parties and the USSR in this anti-imperialist struggle.

Perlo's answers to questions in the discussion period at an evening session were well received, but the disrupters, with fresh provocations, broke up the session.

The small Trotskyite group of disrupters was led by Andre Gorz of France, Ernest Mandel of Belgium and Elmar Altvater of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

At the final session, Gorz urged vio-

lent outbursts everywhere and "workers' revolutions" in socialist countries; Perlo urged unity and the use of varied tactics, including parliamentary, in the struggle for the immediate needs of the working people and for peace and socialism. Conference papers were presented by speakers from several West European countries, from Brazil and from the U. S.

About 1,000 took part in the conference. It was sponsored by faculty members and students of the Institute.

## Victor Perlo Tells His Story

[The following article, signed by Victor Perlo, appeared in the October 1 issue of the *Daily World* under the headline: "Anti-communist peddlers at work."]

A few months ago the Belgian Trotskyite Ernest Mandel was again refused a visa to speak in the United States. This time — as I recall — the State Department advocated granting the visa, but Attorney General Mitchell overruled it. A wide variety of organizations, including the U. S. Communist Party, is supporting the appeal now before the courts.

Mitchell and his loquacious wife are the political Neanderthals of the Nixon Administration, from whom the most outrageous and the most idiotic actions may be expected.

But a few weeks ago in Tilburg, Holland, Professor Mandel dropped his suave academic manner. He joined with his political sidekicks, Andre Gorz of France and Elmar Altvater of West

Germany, to organize a gang of political Neanderthals to try to suppress somebody else's freedom to speak.

I was the somebody else. And the attempt was made because I presented the viewpoint of the U. S. Communist Party and the world Communist movement on the perspective [sic] developments of the coming decade.

In essence, Mandel, Gorz and Altvater used the same arguments against me that Mitchell used against Mandel. And they were motivated by the same basic drives—a fierce hatred of the Soviet Union and the Communists.

They used the same tactics as I have seen used many times by Legionnaires and Birchites trying to break up peace meetings and prevent anti-war speakers from being heard.

Fortunately, the West European Trotskyites, et al., do not have state power in Holland. The essential power was exercised by the 1,000 partici-

# The Facts on What Happened at Tilburg

By Ernest Mandel

pants in the left-oriented economic conference—Capitalism in the 70s—held at Tilburg. Most of the participants were Dutch students. By overwhelming votes, and counteractions they rebuffed Mandel and his associates.

Some details were reported in a Daily World news story (9/24). To review briefly, the Trotzkyite clique tried:

1. To prevent my talk by calling a side meeting at the same time. Less than one percent walked out of the packed hall to attend it, however.

2. To break up my talk with organized whistling, interruptions, jeering. This was rebuffed by the audience.

3. To get passage of a slanderous resolution denouncing Perlo and the Soviet Union. This was voted down by a margin of at least 4 to 1, and perhaps as high as 8 to 1. There was only a show of hands, no teller vote.

4. To block publication of my talk in the book of conference proceedings—this was defeated by a similar margin.

The clique expected an easy victory. The conference was held at the Catholics [sic] Economic [sic] Institute, traditionally one of the most conservative in Holland. Following a militant student strike two years ago, the student body and part of the faculty were radicalized, and consider themselves Marxists. But their Marxist "authorities" have been exclusively people like Mandel and Sweezy. There wasn't a single item from any Communist Party author on the conference literature tables. And the speakers' list at the conference was overweighted by anti-Communist leftists.

So this was a confused body of young people, militant and anti-imperialist, but steeped in anti-Soviet, anti-Communist Party, anti-working class propaganda.

My talk, presenting a contrary view, not only in general, but on such specific questions as Czechoslovakia, was a first exposure to many. It couldn't change the views of the majority on such critical questions.

But they were turned off by the goon tactics of the Trotzkyites. They believed in the conference call for unity of anti-imperialist forces—a line stressed in my speech. And they acted accordingly. They saved the conference from being converted into a propaganda platform for U. S. imperialism.

In its September 24 and October 1 issues, the *Daily World* published comments on the conference of Marxist economists held September 10-13 at the University of Tilburg. These comments implied that I, or my political friends, tried to make it difficult or impossible for the American Communist party economist Victor Perlo to express his views at this conference. This allegation is untrue.

1. The professors of the department of political economy at the Catholic University of Tilburg initiated the first international conference of Marxist economists in the West. It was the result of one of the most radical student confrontations in the Netherlands, during which the students renamed the school "Karl Marx University."

About 1,000 professors and students from many European countries and some countries on other continents attended this meeting.

Far from being "anti-Communist" in any sense, the organizers of the conference invited three Communist party members (the British economists Maurice Dobb and Bob Rowthorn and the American economist Victor Perlo). These three CP spokesmen were included among eleven reporters. The organizers made a real effort to see that all tendencies claiming to be Marxist were represented among the speakers.

For this effort and the success of the conference they deserve the thanks and approval of all Marxists—above all, because this took place in a country where the defense of Marxism has been very weak in recent decades.

2. The literature sold in front of the conference hall was not sponsored by the organizers but by a great number of very diverse groups. These groups sold their literature, obviously, because they saw an opportunity for presenting their political views.

It was not the fault of the organizers, nor the Trotskyists, nor mine, that the Dutch Communist party chose to pass up the chance to have a literature table in the hall. It had full freedom to do so—and far greater material resources for this than the groups that took advantage of the occasion.

3. The subject of the conference was

"Capitalism in the Seventies." My report, like those of the other reporters—including the British CP members Maurice Dobb and Bob Rowthorn—was strictly limited to this topic. Although all the reports aroused not a little controversy, they were all listened to with great attentiveness by the participants. The papers that were presented evoked heated discussion, of course, but within the framework of strict respect for the right of all to express their ideas.

4. Victor Perlo had been invited to discuss the problem of American imperialism in the seventies. He felt it necessary to include in his report a defense of the Kremlin's intervention in Czechoslovakia.

This was, of course, his right. Equally it was the right of the majority of the participants in this conference to take the position that (1) this question was not on the agenda; and (2) that they did not agree with Perlo on this matter.

(It might be said in passing that neither the Communist party of Great Britain nor of the Netherlands approved the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries. Are they also "anti-Communist"?)

5. Neither I nor my friends tried to hinder Victor Perlo from expressing his opinions. The resolution that was proposed condemned his point of view on the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, not his right to express his point of view.

The conference did not vote down this resolution (the great majority of the participants were opposed to the invasion of Czechoslovakia). What the conference rejected was putting the resolution to a vote, that is, transforming a conference called to discuss the questions raised by the development of capitalism in the seventies into a deliberative body deciding political questions—above all, questions not on the agenda. It was a procedural and not a political vote.

6. After Perlo's speech, the majority of the reporters, with the approval, I am sure, of most of the participants in the conference, asked two things of the organizers. First of all they de-

manded the right to discuss the opinions expressed by Perlo at a full session.

Secondly, the reporters demanded the right to include a statement by all those who condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia as harmful to the interest of the international and Czechoslovak working class in the volume of conference papers scheduled to be printed.

The other reporters demanded this right in order to prevent the expression of only one view on the Czechoslovak question as a result of Perlo's including his opinion on this matter in his paper. The organizers of the conference accepted the dual demand. This closed the incident. In doing this, no injury whatsoever was done to Victor Perlo's freedom of speech. All we did was to forcefully reaffirm freedom of speech in the workers movement. This freedom applies to all tendencies and does not involve a monopoly for anyone.

7. It is true that one person, whom I do not know and with whom I have nothing to do, proposed that Perlo's speech be omitted from the conference proceedings. He was booed by the gathering and supported by no one—and rightly so. I continue and will continue to defend everywhere and always the right of freedom of speech for all tendencies in the workers movement, including the one represented by Victor Perlo.

There is only one difference between Perlo's position and mine on this point. For me, the right of freedom of speech is a universally valid principle, applicable in the Netherlands, in the United States, in Czechoslovakia, and in the USSR. Perlo, in contrast, claims this right for himself in the Netherlands and in the U.S.—I hope that he will continue to demand this right for me, too, in the U.S. (at Tilburg I thanked the Communist party of the USA in front of all the participants in the conference for its protest against the American government's excluding me from the country)—but Perlo denies this right of freedom of speech to Czechoslovak or Soviet Communists who disagree with the present rulers of the USSR and who are in prison (or, still worse, insane asylums) for the sole "crime" of publishing documents, which, for example, end with the words, "Leninism yes, Stalinism no!"

October 5, 1970.

## All Fields Feel the Pinch

### Tightening Controls on Czechoslovak Artists

Increasing government control of the press and mass media in Czechoslovakia since August 1968 is hampering the work of some of the country's most gifted artists, according to a report from Prague by Andrew Ritchie in the September 26 issue of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*.

"Writers, film-makers, critics, and painters are suffering from more and more isolation from the arena of public discussion, and Czech artists have always been intensely political people," Ritchie writes.

The government "spends precious Western currency buying Raquel Welch and incredibly dated westerns, while the home industry, encouraged and prodded, could be a very big dollar-earner for Czechoslovakia.

"The flowering of the Czech cinema in the 1960s was one of the most remarkable manifestations of the pervading process of liberalisation. Now Jiri Menzel's latest film is finished, with a screenplay by the author of 'Closely Observed Trains,' Hrabal, but is not going to be distributed yet. Also, apparently, two of Hrabal's new books are printed and waiting at the publishers, but are not allowed to appear yet."

Television and radio programming have become the victim of what Ritchie calls a "cultural imperialism." For example, a regular radio broadcast of Czech baroque music has been replaced by "heavy cosmopolitan Germanic brass-band music and dated 1950-type jazz, the sort of noncommitted music which was out of favour for a long time."

A "documentary" film shown on television in mid-August, which Ritchie cites as typical, attempted to show that the reform movement of 1968 had been originated by foreign imperialism:

"First there was a shot of a parcel addressed to Czech TV, inside which were some tapes. Why they came from Paris, or who sent them was not explained or discussed. The voices on the tapes were so hard to hear that a commentary was read simultaneously . . ."

The situation in the literary field is equally bleak. *Host do Domu*, a literary magazine, closed in May of this

year. *Universum*, which printed English translations of Czech works, "was starved to death through lack of funds."

Avant-garde poet Miroslav Holub has been attacked in *Rude Pravo*, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist party, for a travel book about New York, written several years ago, which was allegedly too "uncritical."

Holub now edits a small magazine called *Orientace* which "receives hardly any contributions in prose, because writers simply do not know what they can say."

The Slovak Writers' Union still continues to function and has even "won a little independence, but the Czech Writers' Union . . . no longer officially exists, and all its functions have been taken over by the Literary Fund, effectively an offshoot of the Ministry of Culture. It has no money of its own, and all of its financial dealings have to be certified by an official in the Ministry of Culture."

The situation has resulted in a rapid decline of public interest in the mass media. Ritchie cites figures on newspaper circulation which illustrate this decline:

"The trade union paper 'Svet Prace,' which was selling 170,000 at the end of 1969, now sells about 70,000; 'Tvorba,' the new weekly political and cultural paper, has fallen in circulation from 60,000 when it was first published to around 34,000 now; and 'Rude Pravo' . . . the most important medium in the country, was selling more than a million copies daily just before the invasion in 1968, but has now dropped to 730,000, a figure which includes an oversupply of 7 per cent."

#### Nixon's Crystal Ball on Blink

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30—The index of wholesale prices, which generally foreshadows retail price trends by a few months, rose sharply again in September, partly, but not entirely, because of increased food costs.

"The increase more than wiped out the decline in the index that had occurred in August, which [Nixon] Administration officials had hailed as strong evidence of the success of their anti-inflationary programs."—October 1 *New York Times*.