

What the Hijackers Hoped to Achieve



**Who Are
the Tupamaros?**

DR. GEORGE HABASH, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: "We force people to ask what is going on, and so they get to know our tragic situation." See page 763.

LEON TROTSKY—First Time in English:

The German Puzzle

Uninvited Guest?

After a week of conflicting reports, the vice-president of the Saigon regime, Nguyen Cao Ky, on September 9 announced that he intended to go through with plans to speak at a pro-war rally in Washington on October 3.

The rally is being organized by Carl McIntire, a right-wing fundamentalist preacher who organized a similar rally of about 10,000 people last April. McIntire has a regular radio program which, according to the September 4 *Washington Post*, regularly includes "charges of widespread communism in government, education, labor and churches and cries against forced racial integration, permissiveness toward American youth, sex education and 'modernism' in theology."

The announcement of Ky's impending visit was greeted, publicly at least, with something less than enthusiasm by the Nixon administration. The tinpot general may boost Nixon with the hawks, but he has often shown an ability to put his foot in his mouth. Nixon stressed to reporters that the visit was "unofficial" and strictly a private matter between McIntire and Ky. The *Washington Post* on September 9 said that officials at the American embassy in Saigon "had privately expressed horror when the trip was announced."

Most officials of the Saigon regime likewise opposed the trip, including Ky's chief deputy in Washington, who cabled that it "would have an unfavorable effect on the Republican Party" in the November congressional elections.

In the face of this opposition, Ky first announced that he was "reconsidering." But on September 9 he told a Saigon paper: "They insist that I not go. But I will go. No one invited Vice President Agnew here. . . ."

The reason behind Ky's determination to go through with the trip was suggested by an observer quoted in the September 9 *Washington Post*: "For someone who wants to run for president next year, he's been suffering badly from underexposure."

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What the Hijackers Hoped to Achieve

By Les Evans

Why did the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine choose the first week of September to carry out its four successful hijackings of commercial airliners? What did it hope to accomplish?

The carefully coordinated actions were clearly timed as a response to acceptance by Israel and the key Arab states of the so-called Rogers Plan for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East. Although the conditions raised by the Popular Front for the freeing of captive airline passengers dealt only with the release of Palestinian political prisoners in Europe and Israel, leaders of the guerrilla organization were candid in stating their broader motives. The September 13 *New York Times*, for example, reported:

"The American planes were hijacked, a Popular Front spokesman explained in Amman, as a protest against the 'American peace plan' for the Middle East, and Cairo airport was chosen for the dynamiting of the jumbo jet in protest against Egyptian acceptance of the plan."

The essence of the Rogers Plan is a settlement of the Middle East crisis that would deny the Palestinian refugees any claim to exist as a national entity. When the Soviet Union agreed to the plan and succeeded in pressuring the Nasser regime into accepting the August 7 cease-fire, it became plain that unless the negotiations were scuttled the big powers would enforce a "solution" at the expense of the Palestinian people.

Washington's "peace plan," which to date has been accepted in principle by the Soviet Union, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, the Sudan, Lebanon, and Israel, calls for implementation of the November 1967 United Nations resolution on the Middle East. This calls for an Israeli pullback to the borders existing before the June war. In exchange, the Arab governments are to recognize the right of the Zionist regime to hold the land it seized from the Palestinian people prior to 1967.

For the Palestinians there is nothing in this agreement but defeat. They are to be paid a lump sum for land confiscated by the Israeli regime or be allowed to return to settle in Israel.

Tel Aviv has made it plain that it will never permit the 2,000,000 Palestinians to return. Those who did return would become second-class citizens of the Zionist state.

The Arab governments know that such a settlement can never be imposed as long as the Palestinian masses are armed and have organizations through which they can fight for their rights.

Although Israel has temporarily interrupted the negotiations by taking an unyielding stand, Nasser and Hussein have not abandoned their objective of destroying the guerrillas. This is the meaning of the continuing clashes between the guerrillas and the Jordanian army.

Of all the Arab governments, only Algeria, Syria, and Iraq have rejected the "Rogers Plan."

The Popular Front's answer to the negotiations was carefully planned, and executed with precision. The first hijacking attempt on September 6 was the only failure. Shortly after its departure from Amsterdam en route to New York, El Al Flight 219 was interrupted by two armed commandos. An Israeli guard killed one of the hijackers. The other, Lelia Khaled, was captured and later detained in a British prison.

Three other flights the same day were successfully rerouted by the Popular Front guerrillas. One of these was the American plane later blown up in Cairo after the passengers had disembarked.

The targets were chosen with care. The September 13 *New York Times* reported the Popular Front's explanation:

"The Swiss plane was hijacked to put pressure on Switzerland to release three commandos jailed after an attack on an Israeli airliner at Zurich's airport last year. The Frankfurt stop-

over was chosen so there would be West German hostages to pressure Bonn into releasing three guerrillas jailed after an attack last February on Israelis at an airport lounge in Munich."

The fourth successful hijacking, on Wednesday, September 9, was of a British Overseas Airways Corporation VC-10 en route from Bombay to London. This was taken to give the Palestinians a better position in bargaining for the freedom of Lelia Khaled.

In an interview that appeared in *Life* magazine, Dr. George Habash, the main leader of the Popular Front, was asked why his organization deliberately sought to involve the European powers in its struggle.

"We have to stand against whoever supports Israel economically, militarily, politically, ideologically," Habash answered. "This means . . . the U.S. and almost every country in Europe.

"Our struggle has barely begun, the worst is yet to come. And it is right for Europe and America to be warned now that there will be no peace for them until there is justice for Palestine."

At one time there were some 400 hostages and three of the giant airliners at "Revolution Airport" (also translated as "Liberation Airfield") in the desert twenty-five miles north of Amman. On September 12 the passengers were evacuated to Amman by the guerrillas, where all but forty were released. In face of the stalling tactics initiated by Washington, the planes were blown up to convince the imperialist powers that the Palestinians were serious about their demands.

Washington has used the hijackings as a pretext to prepare for a possible military intervention in the Middle East.

The September 12 *New York Times* suggested the possibility of unilateral military intervention in Jordan by the United States or some other "affected" nation if the Hussein regime failed "to bring the criminals to heel." The

Times proposed as an alternative that the "international community" organize a multinational military force "designed to extirpate pirates from territories whose governments are unable to cope with them."

In his September 11 statement, Nixon treated the question as one of mere law enforcement—"Piracy is not a new challenge for the community of nations"—requiring solutions of a purely technical nature such as sophisticated "electronic surveillance equipment," armed guards on airplanes, and a good strong dose of the CIA.

The governments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, and Israel have issued a statement that no direct military intervention is planned.

"Nevertheless," the *New York Times* reported September 12, "other Government sources indicated that the use of some military forces in a possible evacuation movement could not be ruled out." The *Times* added that there had been reports "that a number of ships in the Sixth Fleet had recently left their normal ports in the area for undisclosed destinations."

On September 10 Nixon sent six C-130 troop-transport planes to Incirlik, Turkey, to stand by for possible use in evacuating the detained passengers. Four more of the planes, which can be used to carry paratroopers, were sent to Incirlik the following day, along with twenty-five U.S. air force Phantom jet fighters.

Eugene V. Rostow, U.S. under secretary of state in the Johnson administration from 1966 to 1969, took a grim view of the situation in an article in the September 12 *New York Times*. "American and Allied policy," he said, "now faces a crisis which can only be compared to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962." Rostow was referring primarily to the military aid that the Soviet Union has provided for the Nasser regime, but he expressed the belief that if the guerrilla organizations could be curbed, there were signs that Nasser and the Kremlin would not be such a problem.

It is clear that Nixon's efforts to isolate the fedayeen have had some measure of success, largely because of the complicity of the Soviet bureaucrats and the Nasser and Hussein governments.

The Soviet press as of September 8

had not even reported the hijackings. The pro-Moscow Communist parties in other countries have been less restrained, hurling epithets at the Popular Front hardly distinguishable from those in the bourgeois press. The September 11 *Daily World*, the newspaper of the American CP, said:

"At the time when the Popular Front's thugs were 'heroically' brandishing their guns and grenades in front of unarmed pilots, stewardesses and passengers, the real Palestinian resistance was fighting Israeli tanks in southern Lebanon. . . ."

"The so-called Popular Front's operations have never had the slightest effect on imperialism and have not contributed in any way to Arab liberation."

This "Communist" newspaper even went further than the capitalist police by claiming that the Popular Front "blew up an airliner in Switzerland, killing the crew and passengers." As the *Daily World* must know, the Popular Front along with all the other Palestinian organizations, disclaimed any responsibility for the Swiss air disaster.

Such slanders give credence to the Zionist and imperialist propaganda and will be used to justify repressive measures against the entire Palestinian movement.

The *Daily World* itself called on the bourgeois Arab states "to take drastic action against the self styled Popular Front before it does greater injury to the Arab cause."

It should be said that while the hijackings were carried out by the Popular Front alone and are a tactic that may not be approved by the other liberation organizations, all of the Palestinian groups have cooperated in common defense against the attacks by Hussein's troops. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the umbrella organization to which all the major guerrilla groups belong, has taken responsibility for the negotiations over the fate of the detained passengers, and the outcome now is not a purely Popular Front affair.

Within the framework of unconditional support for the Palestinians' fight, by any means they deem necessary, it is possible to raise certain criticisms of the choice of tactics. Unquestionably the hijackings have boosted morale in the refugee camps. But by their nature these are acts that

can only be carried out by a small, highly disciplined body of men and women. There is no way the Palestinian masses can participate directly. Yet the real strength of the guerrilla groups rests ultimately on their ability to mobilize masses in struggle.

Furthermore, choosing objectives that involve civilians who are not a party to the struggle cannot be understood or condoned by those who are not already deeply convinced partisans of the Palestinian cause. It diverts attention from the just demands of the Palestinian people, focusing comment instead on other issues such as the safety of international air travel or the rights of noncombatant civilians from other countries.

In acting as it does, the Popular Front implicitly expresses the view that international opinion can have no influence on the outcome of their struggle, or that it cannot be won to their side.

By taking the position that individual citizens of imperialist countries should be held as hostages for the crimes of their governments, the Popular Front jeopardizes its ability to win widespread support, particularly among the radicalizing youth around the world—including Jewish youth.

But if the choice of tactics had serious deleterious side effects and must be questioned as a long-range strategy, it appears that some ground has been won in rolling back the immediate threat of an imposed "solution" at the Palestinians' expense. As Anthony Austin commented in the September 13 *New York Times*:

"Officials [in Washington] could not remember when a diplomatic initiative as promising as the American Middle East peace move of a month ago had soured so quickly."

No Real Danger

The Thai forces in Vietnam have had their name changed from "Panther Division" to "Leopard Division" because of fear of identification with the Black Panther party in the U.S.

Silent Majority in South Vietnam

Columnists Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden reported September 1 that "a recent poll in Vietnam, commissioned by the U.S. military command, showed that only 5 percent of those questioned wanted Americans to remain."

Niedergang Interviews Allende

"There will be no Marxist government in Chile. There will only be a government supported by the six political formations of Unidad Popular [People's Unity, the Popular Front coalition including Communists; Radicals, that is, bourgeois liberals; and Socialists, as well as small split-offs from the Socialist party]. This government will have a program that will be neither Socialist, Communist, nor Radical, but the result of common agreement. In the period since 1964 when the Christian Democrats have been in power, the left opposition has very frequently voted with the government of Eduardo Frei, in support of the agrarian reform, for example. I hope that when we are in power the Christian Democrat representatives in parliament will support our economic and social reform bills . . ."

Le Monde's Latin-American expert Marcel Niedergang interviewed Salvador Allende shortly after Allende won a plurality in the September 4 presidential elections in Chile. Niedergang's report of this interview was published in the September 8 issue of the Paris daily. The above quotation from Allende headed the article.

Allende also seemed to discount the threat of physical force from the right to prevent his installation as the next president of Chile: "In Cuba, everyone knows, Fidel Castro had to fight arms in hand against a corrupt dictatorship and an army serving this dictatorship. There is none of this in Chile. We are coming to power legally after long years of political struggle and by means of a perfectly regular electoral process. Quite simply, we are gathering the fruits today of what we have sown over a very long period."

It was clear immediately after the elections, Niedergang wrote, that the ruling Christian Democrats were not alarmed by Allende's victory. The candidate of this party, Radomiro Tomic, congratulated the Chilean people for having "chosen democracy." The day after the election, he paid a friendly call on the victor. The Christian Democrat youth leaders visited Allende the following day.

Since Allende did not get an absolute majority, the next president will be chosen by a joint session of the Chilean congress October 24. It is only tradition that congress pick the candidate with the highest vote, and Christian Democrat votes will be needed in order for Allende to win.

"It is already claimed in well-informed circles," Niedergang wrote, that Christian Democratic personalities may participate in the future Unidad Popular government."

Allende has called for "an exchange of information between the members of the present government and the leaders of Unidad Popular in order to facilitate the transition."

What is not clear is whether the right is prepared to accept a continuation

of reformist experiments under the aegis of a government apparently to the left of its predecessor. The establishment of a regime including nominally Marxist parties and professed admirers of the Cuban revolution might prove a dangerous encouragement to the masses struggling to better their lives. It could touch off mobilizations which would be difficult to control.

The rightists have indicated that they do not consider the election results to be final. On September 6 Enrique Ortuzar, the national spokesman of the grouping supporting Jorge Alessandri, the conservative candidate, issued a statement referring to the election results as "tentative." Ortuzar appealed to "all those opposed to Marxism, to free men and women, to unite and defend their rights."

It is yet to be seen whether any guarantees by Allende can reassure the right. But it is not difficult to imagine what sort of pledges will be demanded.

Peru

Ask Amnesty for Political Prisoners

The Peruvian Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Committee for the Defense of Human Rights) made an appeal for a general amnesty of all social and political prisoners in the July issue of its monthly bulletin.

The appeal noted that the Declaration of Human Rights says: "Every person has the right of a social and international order in which the rights and liberties proclaimed in this declaration are fully applied."

"We know that men have shouldered the responsibility for defending this right . . ." the appeal said. "These men, social fighters (workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals) raised the banners of agrarian reform, nationalizing the oil industry, and many other demands. Today no one doubts the justice of this struggle; even the present government [the "reformist" junta] recognizes it."

The appeal protested the fact that many persons who fought for the aims proclaimed by the present government remain in prison. It cited the cases of the following peasants from the central region of Peru: Guillermo Loardo Avendano, age twenty-seven, native of Pucara, sentenced to ten years in prison; Cirilo Campos Alanaya, age forty-two, from Andamarca, sentenced to ten years in prison; Pablo Torres

Cordova, age twenty-four, from Pariahuanca, ten years; Jose Miranda Balvin, age thirty-one, from Sapallanga, two years; Simeon Flores Martinez, age thirty, from Pucacocha, has spent five years in prison without trial; Pablo Flores Martinez, age twenty, from Pucacocha, five years in prison without a trial; Nicolas de la Cruz, age thirty-one, from Pucacocha, three years in prison without trial; Donato Hinojosa Gomez, age thirty-one, two years in prison; Santiago Cristobal Leon, age forty, from Huasuicha, in El Sexto without trial; Celestino Surichacqui Gutierrez, age twenty-nine, from Churay, no trial, now in El Sexto; Leonardo Ortiz Morales, age forty-six, from Andamarca, three years without trial; Antonio Meza Bravo, age thirty, from Andamarca, four years without trial.

Correction

In our story "Ovando Regime Survives New Crisis" [September 7 *Intercontinental Press*, page 721], the name of Oscar Edgar Busch was inadvertently omitted from the list of ten political prisoners released by the Bolivian government in exchange for two hostages taken by the guerrillas of the National Liberation Army.

Trotskyist Runs Against French Premier

A Trotskyist candidate, Gérard Barthélémy, was certified August 30 to run in the second parliamentary district of Bordeaux against French premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, former editor of the mass-circulation liberal weekly *l'Express*.

Servan-Schreiber has been given a big publicity buildup as a wonder-working exponent of a "modernist" and "non-Communist left" alternative to the "Gaullism without de Gaulle" represented by Chaban-Delmas. Therefore, the Bordeaux by-election September 27 is regarded as a test of efforts by bourgeois politicians to develop an effective political formula to fill the void left by the departure of the providential general.

The Ligue Communiste (Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International) and the *Lutte Ouvrière* (Workers Struggle) group have joined forces to present a clear revolutionary position in the nationally publicized debate taking place in Bordeaux. Both groups appealed to the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party, a left-centrist formation) to support a single revolutionary candidate but were rebuffed.

The Trotskyist candidate launched his campaign with a news conference August 30. He gave the following reasons for his candidacy, as quoted in the September 2 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*: "We are seeing a particularly dazzling example of the electoral farce. We do not have any rabbits in our hats. Our action is totally removed from all such trickery. Without falling into electoralism, we had to raise a voice in defense of the workers' interests."

Alain Krivine, the candidate of the Ligue Communiste in the 1968 presidential elections, shared the platform with Barthélémy. Krivine explained the importance of the contest in Bordeaux this way: "Since May 1968 and the departure of General de Gaulle, the bourgeoisie has been suffering an ideological and structural crisis . . . If an adventurer like Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber can amuse the gallery

with his acrobatics in an election such as the one in Bordeaux, that is a sign of an enormous social, political, and structural crisis of the system. J.-J. S.-S.'s future does not interest us. He may be a star, but he is a shooting star that will soon vanish from the electoral scene."

On Saturday, September 5, Barthélémy confronted Chaban-Delmas on the streets of Bordeaux, in an area that has long been the Gaullist premier's political fief. *Le Monde* gave this description of the encounter September 8:

"For two hours Saturday afternoon Chaban-Delmas walked the streets of the second district.

"'It was not barnstorming,' he declared. 'I only went out to talk to my fellow citizens of Bordeaux ['mes Bordelais'] as I have always done, as I did more often before becoming premier. But I must say that in all the commotion I was able to visit with them less than I would have wanted. But I will go again when things are quieter to discuss calmly their individual problems, which enables me to understand their problems as a whole.'

"Chatting and shaking hands, the premier went from store to shop. From a flower seller he bought some roses for Mme Valade, the wife of his alternate, who accompanied him. Coming out of a big store, he was confronted by Barthélémy, the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière* and the Ligue Communiste:

"'I have a question to ask you . . .'

"'We are not in a debate,' Chaban-Delmas replied, carried away by the crowd.

"Extreme left newspaper salesmen not far away chanted as the premier went by: 'It's only the beginning; continue the fight [one of the slogans from the May-June 1968 student-worker revolt]. Down with Tweedle-Dum and Tweedle-Dee!'

"Chaban-Delmas' cortege then returned to the Rohan Palace, where refreshments were served in the salons. Then the premier returned to his office, excusing himself: 'I am going to work now.'"

Barthélémy found it considerably

harder to campaign in the Bordeaux streets than the Gaullist "local notable." At 10:00 a.m. the day Chaban-Delmas made his handshaking tour of the district, police roughly dispersed a street meeting addressed by the Trotskyist candidate. Some of those selling campaign literature were arrested.

"The intervention of the forces of order, about thirty policemen, provoked a rather long and heated discussion," *Le Monde* reported September 6. "A banner with the inscription 'Lutte Ouvrière' was confiscated by the police. An officer told Barthélémy's supporters that they could not conduct business on a public street."

The Trotskyist candidate pointed out that "J.-J. Servan-Schreiber and Chaban-Delmas regularly hold street meetings." In a press release, Barthélémy protested against "brutal interference by the police," stressing that "this attitude by the police contrasts with the solicitude surrounding the campaigns of the bourgeois candidates, Chaban-Delmas and Servan-Schreiber. They can walk all day through the streets of Bordeaux and have their posters pasted up even in front of military posts."

Re-Stalinization

The murder in 1934 of Sergei M. Kirov, attributed by Stalin to the Trotskyist opposition, was used as an excuse for the purge that culminated in the infamous Moscow trials. In Khrushchev's 1956 "secret" speech he virtually accused Stalin of ordering Kirov's assassination himself. Khrushchev said:

"After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD [secret police] were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing."

By 1962, in that year's edition of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, the responsibility for Kirov's murder once more receded into obscurity, although Stalin's use of the act was fairly openly stated:

"Stalin used the murder as a pretext for organizing the punishment of all people who were inconvenient to him. A great number of arrests followed. It was the beginning of massive repressions and most flagrant violations of socialist legality."

In the 1969 edition of the *History* this became:

"The murder . . . served as another reminder of the need to enhance revolutionary vigilance. The party had to be protected from alien elements so as to forestall actions hostile to socialism and the interests of the Soviet state, no matter how they were camouflaged."

Australian Government Denies Visa

Dick Gregory Barred from War Protest

The Australian government has refused to grant a visa to American entertainer and antiwar figure Dick Gregory, Minister of Immigration Phillip Lynch announced in parliament September 2.

Gregory had applied for a two-week visa beginning September 13. He had timed his proposed visit to coincide with antiwar demonstrations scheduled September 18-20 by the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign.

Gough Whitlam, leader of the Labour party in parliament, had called on Lynch to explain the exclusion of Gregory in view of the "damaging speculation" which would be occasioned by the denial of a visa "to an American Negro of Mr. Gregory's celebrity."

"This Government," Lynch responded, "is not prepared to allow the entry to Australia of persons whose activities are stated to be contrary to that national interest . . ."

"In the Government's view this applies where the intentions are related to a one-sided, distorted antiwar Mor-

atorium campaign inimical to the objects to which [sic] Australian troops are fighting in Vietnam."

Lynch went on to claim that permitting Gregory to attend the antiwar demonstrations would be a "betrayal" of Australian servicemen, would damage their morale, and would "promote the rule of the streets and the power of the mob."

Criticizing the government's decision, the Melbourne newspaper *The Age* wrote in an editorial September 3 that Gregory ". . . declared that 'sightseeing' was the purpose of the trip. It is not so funny: there are extraordinary sights to see. A Commonwealth Minister and his Government, for example, rising in the Parliament to tell the world that Australian democracy would be threatened by a short visit from one of America's vocal, but nonviolent, rebels. . . ."

"The Government could salvage a shred of respect by reversing its extraordinary decision to bar Mr. Gregory. But only a shred."

(The decision is not really so "ex-

traordinary," as the Australian government's refusal to grant a visa to Belgian Marxist economist Ernest Mandel has shown.)

The demands of the Moratorium campaign are for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Australian, American, and U.S.-allied troops from Indochina and for an immediate end to military conscription.

Australia

N.Y. Women's March Gets Wide Coverage

The massive women's liberation demonstration in New York August 26 [see the September 7 *Intercontinental Press*, page 719] received a good deal of attention in the Australian press.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* carried a front-page picture of the marchers overflowing Fifth Avenue, and a report by its New York correspondent, Lillian Roxon, who participated in the demonstration.

"This is the hardest piece I have ever had to write in my life," Roxon said.

"I am supposed to be telling what happened when 25,000 women marched down Fifth Avenue last night on the 50th anniversary of the day women won the right to vote. As is customary in my business I am supposed to be telling it briskly and factually and without bias.

"Fat chance. I'm so biased I can hardly think straight."

Among other things, Roxon condemned the communications media which continue to treat the women's liberation movement as some sort of joke:

"Someone just phoned me long distance to interview me live for Australian radio. He treated the whole thing as a delightful lark . . ."

"He could laugh at the demand for free abortion but anyone who saw the tragic condition of ghetto women seeking help at hospitals wouldn't laugh quite so much."

Vietnamese Vote with Feet

"The big concern in Saigon at the moment is not the Viet Cong, but the morale of the army . . . The monthly toll of deserters has risen from 8,000 in 1969 to 12,000 in the summer of 1970—a full division."—*Der Spiegel*, August 31, 1970.

Cause for Sorrow?

"It is, at first, a startling, sorrowful thing to see an Army with so many soldiers wearing peace symbols they do not hide, even as they go into combat."—Gloria Emerson in the August 28 *New York Times*.

In Australian CP Paper

A Trotskyist View of American CP

The *Tribune*, newspaper of the Australian Communist party, published an interview with American Trotskyist Andrew Pulley in its July 22 issue. Pulley, the Socialist Workers party [SWP] candidate for U.S. Congress from San Francisco, was in Australia as part of his recent Far East speaking tour.

After Pulley had described the SWP's activities in building the antiwar and Black liberation movements, the interviewer asked him about relations between the SWP and the American Communist party. Pulley replied:

"We were both in the 'Mobe' [New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam] . . . in November,

but the CP boycotted the Peace Action Coalition.

"The CPUSA role has zigzagged. It has consistently supported the Democrats in elections. It proclaimed LBJ's win initially as a 'victory for the working class.' This support for the Democrats alienates the youth. Those who want to support Stalinism go to the Maoists—the CP is not 'stalinist' enough for them! The average age of the CPUSA is 49—in the SWP it's 24.

"The CPUSA was divided over Czechoslovakia. But generally, even among those in the CPUSA opposing the invasion, nothing much has changed in their line in the anti-war movement, or in their support for the Democrats as the 'lesser of two evils.'"

Who Are the Tupamaros?

[We have translated the following article from the August 31 issue of *La Verdad*, a workers and students weekly published and distributed clandestinely in Buenos Aires.]

* * *

Two weeks ago [August 8], not long after the Tupamaros carried off one of the most spectacular actions of their career in kidnapping the Brazilian consul and a CIA agent, their already almost legendary leader Raúl Sendic, along with other leaders and activists, fell into the hands of the Uruguayan police.

At the same time Pacheco kept on refusing to release the 150 Tupamaros locked up in his jails in exchange for the guerrillas' hostages. Threats to execute the hostages, and the kidnapping of another American employed by the Uruguayan government the same day as Sendic's capture, failed to move the head of the Montevideo regime.

In view of this stubbornness on Pacheco's part, the Brazilian authorities stepped up the pressure on the Uruguayan government to accept the exchange.


The Peruvian government, along with many others, carefully kept hands off. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, went to the extreme of publicly supporting Pacheco against the Tupamaros and opposing the exchange. Once again the Soviet bureaucracy brutally betrayed the cause of the world revolution.

Confronted with the government's refusal Sunday, August 9, the Tupamaros executed Mitrión.

In response, Pacheco Areco got the parliament to vote a suspension of constitutional guarantees for twenty days and threw all of the police and armed forces into a gigantic manhunt, raiding 500 homes a day, searching cars and pedestrians, and arresting hundreds upon hundreds of "suspects."

So far these means have not been sufficient to find the two remaining hostages.

In view of this situation, Sendic got



JORGE PACHECO ARECO

permission to go to the Punta Carretas prison and meet there with another three imprisoned Tupamaro leaders. Well-informed sources indicate that the question was discussed of what to do with the hostages and of the possibilities for negotiation with the government.

Every one is asking what the four Tupamaro leaders meeting in Punta Carreta could have decided.

This meeting raises more basic questions than we will try to resolve here.

The fact is that the meeting almost directly confirmed what had been suspected since Sendic's capture. The leader of the organization is in the hands of the authorities. What is the present situation of the Tupamaro movement? Is it by chance that Sendic has been captured now?

These questions in turn require answering a more general question. What are the Tupamaros? What social phenomenon, what social process

does their emergence, growth, and present situation reflect?

Saying that they are part of the revolutionary movement, that they are the vanguard of the urban guerrillas in Latin America is important. But if we stopped there, we would not get very far.

Jorge Batlle, leader of the most important faction of the Colorado party, which represents fundamentally the industrial and financial bourgeoisie of Uruguay, has shown that he has quite a clear view of the matter, as is often true of capitalist leaders. He said:

"The violence is the result of both local and general causes . . . As a result of the economic setback suffered in Uruguay in the decade 1957-67, the standard of living of the urban middle classes, essentially concentrated in Montevideo, declined. Their previous standard of living was not what the country could offer them but a product of a favorable world conjuncture. When the crisis came affecting the market for meat and wool, the prices of domestic and imported goods rose. The country found itself faced with a crisis which could not be avoided . . . Anxiety and frustration developed, especially among those who reached the age of consciousness in this period and are now between the ages of twenty and thirty. Their standard of living is lower than their parents' and they see no opportunities lying ahead of them."

In fact, in the stage prior to the decline beginning in 1957 to which Batlle refers, the Uruguayan economy enjoyed great prosperity, based essentially on the sheep industry. The commercial bourgeoisie located in Montevideo held political power in its hands. But in order to maintain it, they had to compete with the big ranchers and agriculturalists from whose stepped-up enrichment they also benefited.

The commercial bourgeoisie encouraged the development of a strong urban middle class, whose standard of living reached very high levels, as a social base for maintaining polit-

ical power. This was possible thanks to the situation of general prosperity.

In 1957, when the advance of synthetic fibers began to cut into the demand for wool on the world market, a crisis appeared in the Uruguayan economy and rebounded on the situation of certain sectors of the bourgeoisie, and above all the petty bourgeoisie that Batlle described.

It is from these middle layers, exasperated by the economic situation which worsens every year, that the Tupamaro movement drew the majority of its members. This is the essential source of its most progressive characteristics but also of its great weaknesses.

It is on the basis of this experience of depression that many sectors of the petty bourgeoisie see an urgent need for struggling against imperialism and its national agents who are strangling the country.

The rotten reformism of the Communist party, which ends all demonstrations with petitions at the doors of the ministries and acts as the left hand of the regime, together with the lack of a consistently revolutionary leadership rooted in the mass movement, led these radicalized elements to form the MLN [Movimiento de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Movement]. Against the conciliatory methods of the CP, this or-

ganization posed the necessity of armed struggle.

Along with this, however, because they come from these desperate middle layers, the young radicals have no knowledge of the working class, its experiences, needs, and enormous potential for struggle. They do not understand that organizing and mobilizing the working class offers the only real possibility in Uruguay for eliminating imperialism and all forms of exploitation. Therefore, they act in isolation from the masses. Incapable of defeating the whole capitalist repressive apparatus by themselves, they end up becoming its victims.

Only such a method of analysis, one which examines the class roots of phenomena, can enable us to explain not just the Tupamaros's general orientation but also the separate phases of their development.

Thus, we think that the growing power of their organization in the years 1967, 1968, and 1969 was a product of the rise of the Uruguayan masses—above all, of the student movement which exploded into the colossal mobilization of 1968 and the workers movements which dovetailed with this process in the big strikes in the meat and banking industries.

It was this radicalization of enormous masses of youth which enabled

the Tupamaros to win influence and expand it.

Using the same method of class analysis, we have to conclude that the Tupamaros have also reflected the ebb of this mobilization, which began with the defeat of the meat and banking workers (betrayed by the CP-led Central Obrera [Labor Federation]) and spread to the student movement this year.

Is it an accident, then, that Sendic, the leader and symbol of the Tupamaros, fell into the hands of the police at this time? Is it an accident that the bulk of the Tupamaro leadership is in jail now that the workers and student movement is on the ebb? We do not think so. The ups and downs of the mass movement have a profound affect on the Tupamaros's position, even though they are not directly linked to the masses and even though they do not understand it.

The fate of the Tupamaros has an enormous importance not only for the masses and the Uruguayan vanguard but for the masses and the vanguards of all Latin America. Let us hope that their experiences will teach them and the vanguard as a whole to understand the necessity of turning their revolutionary activity toward the mass struggle.

Uruguay

Tupamaros: the Moral of the Story

By Michel Lequenne

[The following article is translated from the August 31 issue of *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste, the French section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

For more than a month the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan revolutionists who are carrying out large-scale urban guerrilla warfare, have held prisoner two hostages—a Brazilian diplomat and an American agronomist. In exchange for their release they have demanded freedom for all

their imprisoned comrades in the country, which must now amount to more than 200 persons.

Never have the stakes been so high. The resistance by the Pacheco Areco dictatorship has a precedent: that of Guatemala, where the refusal to negotiate resulted in the revolutionists executing their hostage, a West German diplomat. But the Tupamaros have several hostages; they have executed only one of them, the American cop Dan Mitrione, who came to Uruguay to lead the antiguerrilla struggle.

The state power in Uruguay has

made gigantic efforts to screen Montevideo and the surrounding area. They have arrested Tupamaros, or supposed Tupamaros, but such measures have not enabled them to recover the hostages. To the contrary, the revolutionary organization has shown by its weekly holdups that it maintains its strength and its freedom of action.

However, a question arises. Are such actions losing their effectiveness? This is not very likely. For the South American dictatorships there are at least as many disadvantages in holding out as in giving in. In any case, we

have come to a turning point in the use of such methods, marked by the emergence of controversy on an international scale, and the question must be examined in all its implications.

On several occasions, Trotsky explained that the bourgeoisie demands that its adversaries in the working-class movement fight stripped to the waist and according to the Marquis of Queensberry rules, while itself reserving the right to go into battle arrayed in full armor and equipped with the most modern weapons.

The Vatican and the Kremlin, both of which have just condemned revolutionists kidnapping diplomats, police, and other servants of the bourgeois state to exchange for their imprisoned comrades, observe the same code.

L'Osservatore romano [Roman Observer—the Vatican newspaper] formulates the rules of the game this way: "No motive, no desire to protest or confront political and social structures, even those considered to be oppressive and unjust (oh! such elegant phrases . . .) can morally or juridically excuse illegal detention of ambassadors and diplomats."

It escapes the worthy "Observer" that in this particular case what is involved is not "protesting" or "confronting," but very simply *trading* life for life, saving a certain number of the victims of dictatorial regimes from torture and death and setting the hostages free afterwards.

We would have expected approval all the more from the earthly representatives of the God of charity, since at the modest price of a few kidnappings whole groups of prisoners have been set free.

As for calling such kidnappings a crime, that is a sick joke coming at a time when wholesale genocide is being carried out in Indochina with the papal blessing.

The truth is that revolutionists have invented a tactic which has made it possible for them to free more than eight dozen prisoners in a few months. Before this these captives had been left to the sadistic whims of the Brazilian, Bolivian, and Guatemalan torturers.

On the other hand, what harm have these kidnappings done? Two people

were killed,* and these were less victims of the revolutionists than of the pigheadedness of the dictators who refused to play the game according to their own rules, the rules of force. What objection could there be to that?

L'Osservatore romano had another argument. These kidnappings violate basic human rights. That fact is undeniable. But if there are guerrillas in these countries, it is *precisely* because *prior* to their appearance the people's rights were blithely trampled underfoot.

The Bolivian military, which was recently forced to release ten of its victims (in exchange for two German technicians who contributed to the pillage of the country by Yankee imperialism), not so long ago captured Che Guevara alive. They murdered him with the aid, the counsel, and the supervision of United States advisers, without our hearing that this elicited any protest from the Vatican. Is that how they respect the fundamental rights of man?

Very legalistic, *L'Osservatore romano* makes reference to international law and declares that the kidnappings amount to aggression against the sovereignty of the states represented by the kidnapped diplomatic agents. It even cites as evidence ancient Greece. That's what it's like to live in the realm of the eternal!

But in our time we see an irresistible tendency toward international solidarity. The innocence of a member of the political personnel of a particular country with regard to the politics of some other country is always very relative. No one is obliged to serve the government of his country, and serving it signifies accepting responsibility for it. The Brazilian diplomat kidnapped by the Tupamaros did not resign on learning that torture was the rule in his country's prisons. Moreover, the terror system in Brazil is not without influence on the one in Uruguay.

Thus the system of hostages, as old as war itself, is "morally" elevated into something perhaps more "responsible" than anything ever seen before.

It seems, indeed, that the Tupamaros's internationalism has given the Brazilian diplomat they are holding a chance to save his skin. They will

release him if his government proves more reasonable than that of Pacheco Areco.

As for Dan Mitrione, whom the Tupamaros had to execute in order to prove that they meant what they said, he was a member of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], on loan to the Uruguayan police. That is to say, he was a professional killer who, on that count alone, deserved his execution ten times over.

The United States, it might be said, chose to let him die by not putting pressure on the Uruguayan government to accede to the Tupamaros's conditions, as it had done in previous kidnappings. Quite to the contrary, it strongly urged firmness, and *Le Monde* itself was able to write:

"The United States has, then, taken the responsibility in this affair for allowing Dan Mitrione to be executed."

The Tupamaros should also receive credit for the effect this demonstration should have in discouraging other mercenaries from putting themselves at the service of such ungrateful masters.

Finally, in regard to aggressions against the sovereignty of states, the Vatican has evidently forgotten that the presence of American killers in all corners of the globe constitutes aggression against the right of the peoples to control their own destiny and that the right of legitimate defense requires exterminating these people like the vermin they are.

The USSR's raising the same principle as the Vatican is probably less a result of fear of seeing its diplomats kidnapped in reprisals by ultrarightist organizations such as the White Hand or the Death Squad than of its desire to woo the Latin-American dictatorships. The Russian bureaucracy is continuing steadily to establish commercial ties with these dictatorships, such as the accord signed this month with Bolivia.

But precisely, a second objective of the kidnappings is, if the exchange is refused, to force the states that are "injured" through their diplomatic intermediaries to break relations with dictatorships which would rather maintain their regime of terror than their political and trade relations. Such a development would be favorable to revolutionary strategy throughout the world. But the Russian bureaucrats

* A third person was killed attempting to escape.

have no interest in revolutionary strategy.

For the hypocritical saints of Rome, we should note that the guerrillas by their activity give governments an excellent moral lesson. They force the states to assume their responsibilities instead of closing their eyes and refusing to "aid people in danger." There can be no neutrals. The pope and his imitators cannot claim such status, and we will not believe that they can.

Not only has the kidnapping tactic probably made possible the saving of lives but it helps to raise the morale of the revolutionary fighters. It also lifts the veil covering the repressive policy of terrorist regimes. Even more than this, the tactic has

some chance of staying the hand of these governments.

Is there no connection between the kidnapping campaign and the fact that suddenly we have seen a denunciation in Brazil of the Death Squad, an organization whose purpose is to murder leftists and which is made up mostly of policemen and operates under police protection (just like the White Hand in Guatemala)? *L'Observatore romano* hasn't dedicated any editorials to the victims of this organization, by the way.

Lastly, the kidnappings have a still more profound effect. They tend to establish a new legality, a legality of those outside bourgeois law. This legality is based on universal responsibility, the legality of revolution.

UNP nor the intellectual discomfiture of its counsellors—local and foreign—can relieve the anxieties of the new finance minister, Dr. N.M. Perera, who has inherited a bankrupt treasury.

"For Mrs. Bandaranaike, there is one rare source of satisfaction: her victory was so complete that she does not have to woo the Tamil parties (as Senanayake [the UNP prime minister] did in 1965, to his great embarrassment) nor does she have to please her leftist allies. On her own, she can now safely command 100 members in a House of 157. Her SLFP's leftist partners number twenty-five MPs: nineteen members of the LSSP . . . and six from the Communist Party (Moscow). To call the LSSP Trotskyist, as the Western press persists in doing, is no more than a terminological inexactitude. It gave up Trotskyism more than a decade ago; it is vaguely Titoist."

In short, the "United Front" has promised a new dance, but the World Bank and other imperialist agencies retain the right to call the tune.

"The man whose views will be decisive in most of these matters is Finance Minister Perera. 'We are in the soup' he told this correspondent.

"Perera painted a bleak picture of the financial situation. There has been a shortfall of Rs 150,000,000 [Rs 5.952 equal \$1] in anticipated borrowings from non-bank sources. The unfinanced budget deficit is now much larger than his predecessor bargained for. Worse, Perera's hands are tied by an IMF ceiling on borrowings.

"The limit was reached three months ago and all I have got is a bare cupboard" said the rueful finance minister. And external situation is even more embarrassing to a government committed to restore subsidies and to reduce prices and unemployment."

Ramotse, 19 Others on Trial

Twenty Africans charged with plotting the overthrow of the South African government were placed on trial August 24. Nineteen have been under arrest since May 1969 even though they were acquitted in an earlier trial. The twentieth, Benjamin Ramotse, has been held incommunicado for more than two years.

According to the August 25 *Washington Post*, Ramotse told the court he had been arrested in Botswana by Rhodesian police and had been tortured by both Rhodesian and South African police.

'We Are in the Soup'

Ceylon's Treasury Empty, Perera Declares

Writing in the July 23 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mervyn de Silva attempts to explain the recent defeat of the United National party [UNP] government in Ceylon by the reformist "United Front" composed of the Sri Lanka Freedom party [SLFP] headed by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the Lanka Sama Samaja party [LSSP], and the Communist party.

The culprit, says de Silva, was the World Bank. His analysis points out part of the reason why it is impossible for the underdeveloped countries to develop under capitalism.

"The fate of the pro-West right-wing UNP, which had dutifully followed the prescriptions of the World Bank in the 'development' of Ceylon . . . holds significance which extends far beyond this country. Is 'development' enough? Can economic criteria such as national growth rates be elevated to incontestable absolutes? The failure of the UNP at the polls demonstrated damningly that production alone is meaningless: in poverty-stricken countries, rapid increases in production can, in fact, widen the disparities in income, aggravating social and political tensions.

The kind of development the World Bank intended for Ceylon was of course nothing but the development of imperialist profits at the expense of the

Ceylonese masses: "Ceylon must become 'stable'. To become stable it needed the steady support of international financing agencies, Western aid-givers and foreign investors. But these must be 'won' by creating a climate of confidence. How would this climate be created? By slashing all things extravagant—social welfare expenditure, education, health. Remove all subsidies. Let 'cost' be the determining factor. Give local private capital every 'incentive'—tax holidays, superprofits—and make it the main instrument of development in both agriculture and industry. Concentrate, however, on agriculture. If the local capital resources are too weak, bring in the foreign investor and make him a partner—with tempting concessions, of course."

The dependence of the country on imperialist capital will not of course be changed by the election of the "United Front" government, as de Silva points out. Furthermore, the "left" parties in the coalition are junior partners whom Prime Minister Bandaranaike can ignore if she so chooses, even in the matter of minor reforms, although she will undoubtedly try to maintain a left cover as long as possible:

". . . neither the humiliation of the

Three Coalitions Contest Kerala Election

By Kailas Chandra

Bombay

The midterm elections in Kerala scheduled for September 17 are expected to decide whether the "problem state" of the South will have a stable government under the capitalist constitutional framework for a while or be plunged into yet another period of president's rule.

Political observers are inclined to believe that Kerala might even set the pattern for a new national alignment of political parties on the eve of the 1972 general elections. C. Achutha Menon, chief minister in the CPI-led [Communist party of India—the pro-Moscow CP] "Mini-Front" ministry, which dissolved the outgoing legislature, has said that the midterm poll would be a "dress rehearsal for 1972." (*Mainstream*, New Delhi, August 15, 1970.)

The two main political formations contending for the confidence of more than 10,000,000 voters are the CPI-led "United Front" [UF] supported by the Congress party (Ruling) [Congress (R), also called the "Indicate"] led by Indira Gandhi, and the "Peoples Democratic Front" [PDF] led by the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India (Marxist)—the erstwhile pro-Peking CP].

A third group known as the "Democratic Front" comprising the Opposition (Syndicate) Congress and the Kerala Congress— allied with smaller rightist parties like the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh—has also emerged in recent weeks. But in the context of Kerala politics, the third front may not have a decisive impact on the outcome of the election.

Among the revolutionary groups that have entered the contest outside the multiclass fronts are the Revolutionary Communist party [RCP], a group of Maoists opposed to the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(M-L)—the main Maoist grouping] led by K. P. R. Gopalan, which has fielded nineteen candidates; and the Socialist Workers party [SWP—Indian section of the Fourth International], which has put up a candidate

from Chalakudi, an industrial town in central Kerala.

The elections to the State Legislative Assembly—the fifth since Kerala came into existence as a unilingual state on November 1, 1957—are taking place as a sequel to the resignation of the UF "Mini-Front" ministry headed by C. Achutha Menon.

The constituents of the UF, in addition to the CPI, now are the Muslim League [ML], the Praja Socialist party [PSP], and the Revolutionary Socialist party [RSP]. The Kerala Congress, which was originally in the UF, has left it because of differences over allocation of seats among the constituents. The Congress (R) party has sought adjustments of seats with the UF without "any commitment to its ideology."

Among the allies of the CPI(M) in the PDF are the SSP [Samyukta Socialist party—United Socialist party] and smaller groups like the KTP [Karsshaka Thozilali party—Kerala Workers party] and KSP [Kerala Socialist party]. The PDF has sought electoral adjustments with the Indian Socialist party [ISP], a group of dissidents from the SSP, which was a part of the "Mini-Front."

As many as 970 candidates belonging to sixteen parties and groups have filed their nominations to fill 133 seats in the State Assembly. Although some of them have withdrawn from the contest, the picture is still very confusing, with threatened defections from the three major fronts and some political parties as well.

In that sense the midterm poll will only reflect the unstable political conditions prevailing in the state. Significantly enough, none of the national bourgeois parties, including the Congress (R), has any standing with the electorate in Kerala. All of them are compelled to seek an alliance with the left parties to ensure their electoral chances.

In the first elections, held in 1957, the united CPI emerged as the largest single party with 65 members, includ-

ing 5 Communist-supported independents, in a house of 127. The Congress party won only 43 seats. The strength of the other parties in the assembly was PSP, 9; Muslim League, 8; Independents, 1; and nominated, 1.

E. M. S. Namboodiripad, as the leader of the CPI, formed the first "Communist" ministry in Kerala. Soon, however, the Namboodiripad ministry had to face a "liberation struggle" launched by the Christian church and the Nair Service Society with the support of non-Communist parties including the PSP and RSP. As a result the ministry was dismissed by the central government headed by Nehru, and president's rule was imposed on the state at the end of 1959.

On February 1, 1960, new elections for the state legislature were held in which a Congress-led coalition with the PSP and the Muslim League emerged victorious. A coalition ministry, with the late Pattom Thanu Pillai of the PSP as chief minister, assumed office.

The party position in the new assembly was as follows: Congress, 63; PSP, 20; Muslim League, 11; CPI, 29; RSP, 1; and Independents (who later joined the Congress), 2.

Political differences between the Congress and its partners led to the withdrawal of the PSP and the Muslim League from the Cabinet and the Congress formed its own government led by R. Shanker. But the government was later thrown out of office when fifteen rebel Congress members supported a no-confidence motion against the Shanker ministry.

The rebels from the Congress formed the Kerala Congress under the leadership of K. M. George. Chief Minister Shanker was forced to resign on September 6, 1964. On the completion of president's rule, fresh elections were held March 4, 1965.

There was a complete realignment of political parties in the intervening period. The PSP had become the Samyukta Socialist party after it had merged with the erstwhile Socialist

party led by the late Dr. Lohia. The CPI had been split in two. The Kerala Congress had an understanding with the Muslim League, which in turn had its own adjustments with the CPI(M), SSP, and Independents.

The Congress was not prepared to coalesce with any other party. Most of the CPI(M) leaders elected to the assembly were still in prison. The relative strength of parties in the 133-seat legislature was: Congress, 36; Kerala Congress, 23; CPI(M), 41; CPI, 3; SSP, 13; Muslim League, 6; Swatantra, 1; KTP, 1; and Independents, 9.

On March 24, 1965, the Kerala assembly was dissolved by a decree of the central government and president's rule was again imposed on the state. Until February 1967, Kerala had no constitutionally elected government.

In February 1967, along with the rest of the country, elections were held in Kerala. Seven opposition parties had meanwhile formed a front to oppose the Congress. They included the CPI(M), CPI, SSP, Muslim League, RSP, KSP, and KTP. The Kerala Congress, Swatantra party, Republican party, PSP (which had seceded from the SSP), and Jan Sangh also put up their candidates.

The representation of the parties in the new assembly was: CPI(M), 52; CPI, 19; SSP, 19; ML, 15; KSP, 1; RSP, 6; KTP, 2; Communist independents, 3; Kerala Congress, 5; Congress, 9; and Independents, 3.

It was significant that the Congress party, which secured 35.4 percent of the votes, received only 9 seats while the CPI(M), which secured only 23.5 percent of the votes, received 52 seats.

A seven-party UF ministry with Namboodiripad as chief minister was formed and assumed office. But interparty and intraparty squabbles dogged the UF partners right from the beginning, undermining its prestige and efficiency. The CPI(M) was accused by its partners of a "hegemonist" attitude toward the other parties. As a multiclass coalition running a capitalist state, the UF ministry became more and more discredited in the face of growing mass discontent and its failure to solve any basic problems of the masses of workers, urban petty bourgeoisie, and rural poor.

The SSP was split, with a majority of its members calling themselves the ISP. Even the two-member KTP was

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broken in two. The crisis led to the resignation of Namboodiripad. A "non-Marxist" UF ministry led by C. Achutha Menon assumed office on November 1, 1969. Meanwhile the Congress party itself had been split on a national scale. Both the Congress factions in Kerala, however, supported the Menon ministry against the CPI(M).

The Menon ministry also had to face its problems. In the midst of talks of large-scale defections from the front, Chief Minister Menon won a confidence motion tabled by himself in the legislature as recently as March 29, 1970.

But he found it unsafe to continue in office with doubtful supporters. On August 1 he tendered the resignation of his team of ministers. President's rule was again imposed on Kerala.

The present indications are that none of the major parties or combinations

sponsored by them will gain an absolute majority in the new legislature. But the Congress (R) party is making an all-out bid to ensure the victory of its combination with the CPI-led UF, hoping that it would help the central government to try a similar experiment in West Bengal, where the state legislature also stands dissolved after repeated attempts to form a government excluding the CPI(M) had failed. Whereas the central government hurriedly ordered a midterm election in Kerala, it has refused to hold elections in West Bengal on the plea that elections cannot be held because of the disturbed atmosphere in that state.

Although the CPI(M) in Kerala has been accused of having entered into a secret understanding with the Syndicate Congress party, the central government fears the CPI(M) the most because of its mass base in both Kerala and West Bengal.

September 5, 1970.

Report from Chalakudi

SWP Candidate Challenges Reformists

By M. Rashid

Chalakudi, Kerala

The Socialist Workers party [SWP], the Indian section of the Fourth International, has announced that Comrade M. A. Rappai, a former sawmill worker and now a full-time unionist, will fight the election here in the constituency of Chalakudi, an industrial town in Trichur district.

Virtually all of the other working-class parties have joined electoral blocs that include bourgeois parties, in many cases open reactionaries from the most backward section of the Indian political spectrum. The fall of the CPI(M) "United Front" has produced a series of even more outlandish political combinations that none of the Stalinist parties would have admitted were possible only a few years ago.

During and after the 1967 general elections in Kerala, the seven-party, multiclass United Front led by the CPI(M) used to proclaim that whatever happened, it would rule the state as a team until the next general elections in 1972. But only twenty months after it assumed office, internal squab-

bles developed and Chief Minister Namboodiripad had to resign. The UF broke in two: a "Mini-Front" with the Muslim League, RSP, etc., under the leadership of the CPI, and the People's Democratic Front led by the CPI(M).

A new ministry was formed by a CPI-led coalition which included the ML, RSP, Kerala Congress, and ISP, with C. Achutha Menon as its chief minister. After eight months Menon advised the governor to dissolve the State Legislative Assembly, and the Menon ministry itself resigned a month later.

Now a midterm poll has been ordered in Kerala on September 17. Neither the Namboodiripad ministry nor the Menon ministry differed qualitatively from the previous Congress ministries in Kerala, as all of them were committed to defending the capitalist system. The Namboodiripad ministry did not care to implement even the declared programme of "reforms" enunciated by the UF, which was so harmless from the point of

view of the capitalist class that even a right-wing communal party like the Muslim League accepted it.

Instances of personal corruption were the order of the day in every constituent of the UF. Though the UF election manifesto proclaimed that the police would not be allowed to interfere in trade-union disputes, striking workers were beaten and shot under both the Namboodiripad and Menon ministries.

Internal dissensions in the seven-party UF were not based on any principled ideological and political difference. They were mostly personal squabbles emanating from narrow sectarian party claims to the spoils of office. It must, however, be said that the Menon ministry at least tried to implement the Land Act (conferring tenure rights on a certain section of tillers cultivating land without legal title to ownership), whereas the Namboodiripad ministry failed to enforce it even though it was initiated under its stewardship. In fact, the CPI(M) deliberately postponed the implementation of the legislation, hoping that if brought into force on the eve of the 1972 general elections it could be used as a vote-catching device.

The Menon ministry also implemented the Gratuity Act which gave certain retirement benefits to some categories of industrial workers in the state.

The police repression directed against mass movements continued unabated under both ministries. In some cases the police behaviour resembled the atrocities which occurred in 1948 after the CPI adopted the Calcutta theses favouring insurrectionary tactics against the Congress rule. The difference was that at that time the Congress ministries were hounding Communists, while this time Communist-led ministries were hounding the so-called "Naxalites" [Maoists] and "extremists."

Now, on the eve of the midterm election, the CPI-led "Mini-Front" (with the Muslim League, PSP, RSP) has made an open alliance with the Indicate wing of the capitalist Congress party. The RSP in Kerala had proclaimed that it would not join any front which would have anything to do with the bourgeois Congress, but it is very much there in the UF.

The RSP had also proclaimed on the eve of the 1967 election that it would not join any front which allied with the Muslim League; but the Mus-

lim League was dictating terms to the seven-party coalition in which the RSP remained an obedient junior partner. Now joint committees of UF constituents, including the Indicate Congress, have been formed in almost all districts, among them the RSP "stronghold" Quilon.

The other Communist party, which puts Marxism in brackets, led by Namboodiripad has formed a Peoples Democratic Front with the anticommunist front, now called the Karshaka Thozilali party, led by the notorious anticommunist Catholic priest, Father Vadakkan.

The SSP is also in the PDF, while at the same time entering into an open alliance with the Syndicate wing of the Congress party. The CPI(M) has also made back-door deals with the Syndicate. Here are some concrete instances:

In Ponani, a CPI(M) lawyer had filed a nomination for an assembly seat on his party ticket, but he has withdrawn in favour of a Syndicate Congress member. This arrangement was worked out between Imbichi Bava of the CPI(M)—a former minister—and Moidu Moulvi, a Syndicate Congress leader, at the latter's residence. Ponani is a stronghold of the CPI(M).

In Mattancheri, also a Communist stronghold mainly inhabited by dock workers and factory workers, CPI(M) is supporting a Syndicate leader. Here the CPI-led UF's candidate is an arch-

communist belonging to the Muslim League.

In the Mukundapuram Lok Sabha by-election, the SSP leader Janardhanan, chairman of his party's state parliamentary board, filed a nomination. But CPI(M) has decided to support a reactionary candidate who is jointly sponsored by the Syndicate and the Kerala Congress.

The joke of it all is that the general secretary of Janardhanan's own party has asked him to withdraw. But he has refused. This is going to lead to another split in the SSP. The CPI and RSP are openly supporting the official candidate of the Indicate Congress from the constituency.

The Socialist Workers party candidate in Chalakudi, Comrade M. A. Rappai, is opposed by an Indicate Congress candidate supported by the CPI and the RSP. The CPI(M) is supporting an independent who is a new face in the political field.

Chalakudi is predominantly a Catholic area. Here all leftist party workers belonging to the Catholic community (including Naxalites) are regular church-goers, except perhaps our candidate, Comrade Rappai. The Christian masses know Rappai as an ardent materialist and uncompromising atheist. This will influence the voting, but the SWP is waging a 100 percent political battle in the midterm election, using the occasion to popularize its anticapitalist revolutionary programme.

September 3, 1970.

New Zealand

Trotskyists Hold National Conference

By James Farrelly

Wellington

Some thirty-five delegates and observers from four cities attended the first national conference of the Socialist Action League [SAL] here in Wellington August 22-24. The SAL, the first Trotskyist organization ever built in New Zealand, has established branches in the three main cities in the one year of its existence.

After a full day's discussion, the conference voted to adopt the main document of the 1969 World Congress

of the Fourth International, "The New Rise of the World Revolution," along with a report by Harry North, which brought it up to date.

The political report, presented by Keith Locke, outlined the way in which the new radicalization is awakening many sectors of New Zealand society. Strikes have reached the highest level in twenty years, and new layers such as teachers, public servants, and postal workers are moving towards strike action for the first time

in their history. Both workers and farmers have seen inflation eat away at their real incomes, and thousands of workers have taken part in recent marches against rising prices.

A women's liberation movement is beginning to develop, and there is a new awakening in the struggle of the urban and rural Maori people.

The radicalization is deepest among students, who have been the core of the mass actions this year against the Indochina war and against South Africa's racist rugby tour.

The report pointed to the opportunities for the expansion of the Trotskyist movement as the radicalization deepens. Stalinist forces in New Zealand are very weak. The Communist party, which is the only CP in an advanced country to support Peking, recently dissolved its entire Wellington section, and now has only tiny forces in cities outside Auckland. Its members continue to fall away as it becomes more ultraleft and sectarian.

Spontanéist groups like the Progressive Youth Movement [PYM], though growing, are racked by internal crises as various Maoist, anarchist, and yip-pie tendencies attempt to thrust their program on the whole movement.

Of the left tendencies, only the SAL has a clear orientation towards the Labour party. Uncompromising in its opposition to the wretched right-wing leadership and program, the SAL supports the party because it is based on the union movement and retains the support of the overwhelming majority of the working class. Any significant working-class radicalization will inevitably be expressed within this party.

In the organizational report, Russell Johnson traced the development of the SAL from a handful of people in Wellington one year ago. He noted the expansion of the league's fortnightly paper, *Socialist Action*, from a small circulation, duplicated publication to a printed paper with a national circulation. He outlined how work in building actions against the South African rugby tour and particularly the July 17 mass action against the Vietnam war had strengthened the SAL and led to the formation of the Auckland branch.

The conference also adopted a constitution and a statement of organizational principles. The incoming National Committee elected George Fy-

son as national secretary and Hugh Fyson as editor of *Socialist Action*.

With the rapid growth of the SAL, the Stalinists have suddenly discovered the Trotskyist "threat." The CP has just come out with a pamphlet entitled *Trotskyism—a Tool to Split the New Zealand Revolution*. In a few pages this pamphlet manages to link Trotskyism with imperialism, Menshevism, Khrushchevism, New Leftism, putschism, terrorism, Che Guevara, Cohn-Bendit, the petty bourgeoisie, syndicalism, an opponent Maoist grouplet, and the CIA. When all else fails, writes our Maoist "theorist," "the bourgeoisie still possesses one last card to divert the workers from the path of revolutionary struggle—Trotskyism."

Not to be left behind, the Wellington district of the CP, recently dissolved by the national leadership, came out with a long, error-ridden document on "Trotskyism and the Chinese Revolution." This is the only thing the Wellington CP has published since its expulsion.

Even the pro-Moscow remnants, organized in the Socialist Unity party, have gotten into the act. The August 24 issue of their monthly paper, *New Zealand Tribune*, contains a standard Stalinist article attacking Trotskyism as "anti-Communist," etc. The article describes Trotsky as a Menshevik and does not even admit that he was ever a member of the Bolshevik party.

Much of the discussion at the second Radical Activist Congress, held in Wellington during August, centered around the positions of the SAL. This congress was attended by all the top figures in the country's radical youth movement and by every tendency on the left. There were sessions on Maori liberation, women's liberation, the working-class and antiwar movements, the war in Indochina, and revolutionary strategy.

Throughout the congress the main conflict was between the Trotskyists, who put forward transitional demands for labour and other struggles, and the Maoists, who did little more than talk in generalities about working-class struggle and socialism.

About 350 persons attended the major debate on "Which Way for the Revolution in New Zealand." The featured speakers were Keith Locke of the SAL and Ray Nunes of the CP. Others, such as George Jackson, leader of the pro-

Moscow Socialist Unity party, acted as commentators. The audience was more favourable to Trotskyism than Maoism, although the spontanéists and their "program" of undefined "action," love, laughter, and revolution now received substantial support from the less political section of the audience.

Of the tendencies represented at the congress, only the SAL supported the Labour party. Sol Salby, an Australian Trotskyist, explained to the gathering how, under the leadership of the Victorian Labour party, 75,000 people marched in the Melbourne Moratorium of May 1970.

Salby, who lived in Israel for thirteen years and is now a member of the Sydney Arab-Hebrew Joint Action Committee, was in New Zealand on a speaking tour for the SAL. He spoke in Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch on the topic "Zionism and the Arab Revolution."

The Salby tour followed a very successful tour by Andrew Pulley, a former GI antiwar leader who is presently Socialist Workers party congressional candidate in California. Pulley spoke to 3,600 people at eight meetings during his week's stay in New Zealand.

The past few months of intense activity have established the SAL as a major force on the left, with little serious opposition from other tendencies claiming to be socialist. If its present rate of growth continues, it will soon be clearly the dominant force to the left of the Labour party reformists.

Seize Indonesian Embassy

A group of twenty-five natives of Amboina, an island in Indonesia, stormed and held the Indonesian embassy in the Netherlands for several hours on August 31. A Dutch policeman guarding the building was killed and a group of people, including the wife and two children of the Indonesian ambassador, was held hostage.

The invaders, who were persuaded to surrender, demanded that Indonesian President Suharto in effect acknowledge a "Republic of the South Moluccas" whose independence was unsuccessfully declared in 1950.

Most of the Amboinese in the Netherlands are former members, or descendants of members, of the Netherlands East Indies Army.

Now You Understand It

According to columnist John Roche, the massive U.S. student strike of last May was caused by the students' desire to avoid final examinations.

What the Parti Québécois Really Stands For

By Dick Fidler

[The following article is reprinted from the July 27 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary socialist biweekly published in Toronto.]

* * *

The success of the Parti Québécois [PQ] in the April 29 Quebec election—it won close to 25 percent of the total vote, and the support of almost one in three French-speaking voters—has encouraged all Quebec nationalists and provoked some uneasy rethinking in the federal government.

Already, the executive of the powerful Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society, which boasts well over 100,000 members, mainly middle class, has declared itself in favor of the formation of an independentist party to contest the next federal election, expected in 1972.

Certainly the strong support among broad sectors of the Québécois electorate, including the working class areas in Montreal's east end which elected six of the PQ's seven deputies, for a party whose main appeal was its call for an independent state of Quebec, shows that the thrust of Quebec politics is towards separation from the rest of Canada. Since this independentist sentiment has been expressed through the PQ, we are bound to ask what sort of independence this party proposes for the Quebec nation.

The answer is clearly indicated in two books published by the PQ during the election campaign. *La Solution*, the party's 125-page official program, was an overnight best seller, with sales of over 60,000 (one for every 10 PQ voters). The other book, originally produced by the PQ's documentation committee for limited distribution to party militants, is entitled *La Souveraineté et l'Economie* (Sovereignty and the Economy).

These books are a rude shock to anyone in the left inclined to believe the current line in the daily press that the PQ is a nationalist, Québécois equivalent of the New Democratic party [NDP—the Canadian labor party].

To be sure, some modest reforms familiar to every NDPer are proposed—a capital gains tax, higher minimum wage, free university education, universal compulsory medicare, etc.

But on housing, for instance, the PQ calls only for more "social housing," without explaining whether this means public or private.

The PQ's labor program is truly ominous. Envisaging a greatly expanded intervention of the capitalist state in the trade unions, designed to avoid what it terms the "excessive scope of labor conflicts," it has overtones of the corporatist dream of labor-management "unity"—with the provision for compulsory trade union membership for all workers, a complex apparatus of "tripartite participation" by bosses, government and unions in preventive conciliation commissions, and legal recognition of only those unions originating in Quebec and staffed by Quebec citizens.

Labor councils and federations will be recognized by the state provided they have a "Quebec character" and show "evidence of good faith." Significantly, even the Montreal Council of the Confederation of National Trade Unions felt obliged to dissociate itself from the PQ's labor program when it voted to endorse the party during the election.

Even the PQ's promise to make French the sole official language is seriously undercut by its pledge to "recognize the school rights of the English minority . . . from elementary school to university," that is, to preserve the English school system, a symbol and instrument of English-speaking capital's domination of Quebec, and to continue to oppose the mass movement for a French unilingual school system.

As for the political forms of "sovereignty," the PQ proposes a presidential republic associated with Canada through a negotiated "monetary community and the essential elements of a common market." Quebec would withdraw from the military alliances

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and NORAD [North American Air Defense Command], and would take its seat in the United Nations.

But the key aspect of the PQ program—what it calls the "essential economic content" of independence—most clearly reveals the utter inadequacy of the PQ's "solution."

La Souveraineté et l'Economie vividly and eloquently details the shocking facts of Quebec's inequality as a nation within the Canadian confederation—its lower standard of living, higher unemployment, the serious income disparities between different regions within Quebec, etc.

Quebec's economy is increasingly oriented around light consumer goods industries and the export of raw materials and thus is highly vulnerable to unfavorable developments in the world capitalist market. The PQ economists make clear that the main problem lies in the fact that Quebec industry is not owned by Québécois, that is, that the Quebec economy has not developed as a national economy, but as a subordinate part of world imperialism, a source of raw materials, cheap labor, and a market for finished goods produced elsewhere. Of the fifty big corporations which account for 75 percent of Quebec's industrial production, only three are controlled by Québécois capitalists. (The largest is Bombardier, the motor toboggan manufacturer, which is eleventh on the list.)

Doesn't this analysis confirm in striking fashion what socialists have maintained all along, that the only "solution" to Quebec's national inequality lies in the Québécois taking their industries out of the hands of foreign capital, "nationalizing" them in the fullest sense of the word and operating them in a planned economy under workers control?

That's just what the Parti Québécois does *not* propose. You won't find imperialism as a word or concept mentioned in either of these books. Instead,

in *La Souveraineté et l'Economie*, we are told that if only the Quebec (bourgeois) state is given the power to "play the role of any normal government" Quebec will be able to overcome its underdevelopment.

Foreign investment will be positively welcomed. As *La Souveraineté* puts it, a "sovereign" state of Quebec will be financed in large part "from foreigners desirous of coming to do business in Quebec because here there is one of the most lucrative markets in the world. Foreigners who, moreover, would come in much greater numbers if we had, instead of a semi-State, a State fully responsible and endowed with the necessary powers to carry out a real development policy."

It doesn't require much imagination to picture that sort of "development." Quebec has experienced it rather extensively for about a hundred years.

In fact, the PQ takes great pains to assure us that what it is proposing is not radical at all. Most of the essential "tools" and "levers" for the "competent" administration of the state of Quebec have been created, particularly during the last ten years; they include the traditional instruments of postwar capitalist economies, such as government investment funds, heavy subsidization of private industry (to guarantee profits), the occasional "mixed" enterprises and considerable investment in "overhead social capital" like educational facilities.

"The organization and experimentation phase is now terminated," says *La Souveraineté*. "It permitted us among other things to initiate several thousands of individuals to a modern economic activity."

This is the voice of Quebec's new middle class, the well-paid "technocrats," the civil servants and managerial elements, the would-be bourgeoisie who comprise a large part of the PQ cadres and leadership. Not only do they almost all come from the more traditional bourgeois parties—the PQ is itself a combination of dissident Liberals (Lévesque), Socreds [Social Credit party] (Grégoire), as well as the petty-bourgeois nationalists of the old Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale, etc.—but they are all firmly wedded to the bourgeois outlook. Longstanding ideologists for the bourgeoisie, they want to use foreign capital, not expropriate it.

The last chapter of *La Souveraineté*,

a series of questions and answers, most clearly reveals the completely bourgeois, pro-imperialist character of the PQ's program.

Particularly instructive is the astute discussion of the possibility of economic reprisals by English Canadian and American capital against a sovereign Quebec. At present, we are told, it is "one of the rules of the game" that English Canadian capital strongly opposes Quebec's independence. But as the movement develops, the big capitalists will develop a "dual strategy."

"If it is clearly apparent that the Parti Québécois can take power, the corporations which will have pulled out all the stops to avoid the spread of the idea will exert just as strong pressures on both the federal and Quebec governments to see that if separation is to occur, it occurs in order, in moderation, in as rational a framework as possible. 'Don't upset the applecart.' (English in original.)

". . . In fact, once they have made this turn, the principal adversaries of independence will become its principal allies."

As for the American corporation, "it has above all learned to live and develop amidst an extraordinary variety of political regimes. It is obvious that violent extremism, continual disorder, very discordant laws, and excessive taxation, hinder its operations. But within reasonable limits, it knows how to operate and it does operate. Its competitive powers are so strong, so sustained, that it would not consider leaving any market or territory provided it can function normally there. . . ."

Thus the PQ blatantly appeals to the foreign capitalists and their governments for their support as the best defense against the rising mass movement for an independent Quebec. The final section of *La Souveraineté* is an extended polemic against "doctrinairism," the PQ's substitute word for socialism.

The PQ's electoral appeal, of course, is not its support for foreign capital, but its nationalist rhetoric and its offer of political "sovereignty."

Yet everything about this party—its origins, its leadership, its program, its commitment to parliamentarism and opposition to the mass extraparlimentary movements on issues like unilingualism—indicate its thoroughly bourgeois character.

It is even doubtful that a PQ government, borne to power on the crest of a powerful mass movement for independence, could maintain the social stability required by its bourgeois policies without resorting to the most repressive forms of rule—dispensing with parliament, measures to suppress the trade unions, etc. A PQ government would be a reactionary government.

The PQ program shows how utterly unable the party is to resolve the national oppression of Quebec, which is rooted precisely in the capitalist nature of its economy.

With over 90,000 members, most of them workers, the PQ, even as an electoral machine, is an extremely unstable phenomenon. It represents above all a transient stage in the developing mass movement, before the working class has been able to assert itself as the revolutionary leadership of the national struggle.

Balancing between the mass movement and an (at present) hostile Establishment in English Canada and Quebec, the PQ may be capable of taking what appear to be anti-imperialist stances on particular issues in the next period. But in the last analysis, it will remain an agency of imperialism.

For the workers, the PQ is a detour. Insofar as their nationalism leads them to anticapitalist conclusions, they will have to move beyond the PQ, along the road of independent class action, and in the process will have to smash this obstacle in their path.

Golden Lining to Black Market

"The official rate [of exchange between South Vietnamese piasters and U.S. dollars] is now set at 118 to the dollar. The black market rate . . . is over 700 to the dollar. . . . It . . . means that U.S. dollars go from the bars and bordellos of Saigon—largely owned by the wives of Saigon's generals—to the black market, where they yield more piasters, to be converted into gold leaf to be smuggled out . . ."—Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden in the September 1 *Washington Post*.

Canada Posts 'No Fishing' Sign

Mercury pollution, chiefly from industrial sources, has forced the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Manitoba to ban commercial fishing "in all or part of their principal rivers and lakes," according to the August 27 *New York Times*. Contamination has also been found in whales in Hudson Bay, 1,000 miles from the suspected source.

The German Puzzle

By Leon Trotsky

[The following article, written in August 1932, five months before Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as chancellor, was published in the November 8, 1932, issue of the radical German weekly *Die Weltbühne*.

"The German Puzzle" does not appear to have been published anywhere else, either in the Russian original or in any other translation. The English version below, by *Intercontinental Press*, is from *Die Weltbühne*.

[Pathfinder Press has announced that "The German Puzzle" is to be included in a forthcoming collection of all of Trotsky's major writings on the German situation in the 1930s. The book, *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*, will also include an introduction by Ernest Mandel.]

* * *

The political situation in Germany is not only difficult but instructive. Like a compound fracture, a rupture in the life of a nation cuts through all the tissues. Rarely has the interrelationship of classes and parties—of social anatomy and political physiology—been laid bare so starkly as in contemporary Germany. The social crisis is stripping away the conventions and exposing the reality.

Those in power today might have seemed phantoms not so long ago. Was not the rule of the monarchy and the aristocracy abolished in 1918? But apparently the November revolution did not do a thorough enough job. The German junkers do not at all feel like phantoms. To the contrary, the junkerdom is making a phantom out of the German republic.

The present rulers stand "above parties." No wonder; they represent a dwindling minority. Their inspiration and their direct support comes from the *Deutschnationale Partei* [DNP—German National party], a hierarchical association of property owners under their traditional leaders, the junkers, the only class accustomed to giving orders in Germany. The barons would like to erase the last eighteen years of European history in order to start all over again. These people have character.

The same could not be said for the leaders of the German bourgeoisie proper. The political history of the German Third Estate was uninspiring; its parliamentary collapse inglorious. The decline of British liberalism, today still able to garner millions of votes, can scarcely be compared with the annihilation of the traditional parties of the German bourgeoisie.

Of the *Demokraten* [Democrats] and the *Nationalliberalen* [National Liberals], who once had a majority of the people behind them, nothing remains but discredited staff officers—without an army and without a future.

Turning away from the old parties or awakening to political life for the first time, the motley masses of the petty bourgeoisie have rallied around the Swastika. For

the first time in their entire history, the middle classes—the artisans, shopkeepers, the "liberal professions," clerks, functionaries, peasants—all these strata, divided by tradition and interests, have united in a crusade, a stranger, more fantastic, more discordant one than the peasant crusades of the Middle Ages.

The French petty bourgeoisie continue to play a prominent role thanks to the economic conservatism of their country. This stratum, of course, is unable to carry out an independent policy. It does, however, force the official policy of the capitalist circles to adapt, if not to its interests, at least to its prejudices. The Radical party currently in power is a direct expression of this adaptation.

Because of the feverish development of German capitalism, which pitilessly drove the middle classes into the background, the German bourgeoisie was never able to assume a position in political life like that of their older French cousins. The era of shocks ushered in by the year 1914 brought immeasurably greater ruin for the German middle classes than for the French. The franc lost four-fifths of its value; the worth of the old mark fell to the vanishing point. The present agricultural and industrial crisis is nowhere near as extensive west of the Rhine as it is to the east. This time, also, the discontent of the French petty bourgeoisie has been contained in its old channels, bringing Herriot to power. In Germany it was a different matter. Here the despair of the petty bourgeoisie had to come to a white heat, raising Hitler and his party to dizzying heights.

In National Socialism everything is as contradictory and chaotic as in a feverish dream. Hitler's party calls itself socialist, yet it leads a terrorist struggle against all socialist organizations. It calls itself a workers party, yet its ranks include all classes except the proletariat. It hurls its lightning bolts at the heads of the capitalists, yet is supported by them. It bows before Germanic traditions, yet aspires to Caesarism, a completely Latin institution. With his eyes turned toward Frederick II, Hitler apes the gestures of Mussolini . . . with a Charlie Chaplin moustache. The whole world has collapsed inside the heads of the petty bourgeoisie, which has completely lost its equilibrium. This class is screaming so clamorously out of despair, fear, and bitterness that it itself is deafened and loses the sense of its words and gestures.

The overwhelming majority of the workers follow the Social Democrats and the Communists. The first party had its heroic age before the war; the second traces its origin directly to the October Revolution in Russia. The efforts of the National Socialists to break through the "Marxist front" have not yet achieved any tangible results. Roughly 14,000,000 petty-bourgeois votes are arrayed against the votes of approximately 13,000,000 hostile workers.

Only the *Zentrumspartei* [Center party, the ancestor of

the Christian Democrats] obscures the clear class outlines in the German political groupings. Within the confines of the Catholic camp, farmers, industrialists, petty-bourgeois elements, and workers are still amalgamated. We would have to go back through all of German history to explain why the confessional link has been able to resist the centrifugal forces of the new era. The example of the Center proves that political relations cannot at all be defined with mathematical precision. The past protrudes into the present and alters its configurations. The general tendency of the process, however, is not obscure. It is symbolic in its way that von Papen and his closest aide, Bracht, have left the right wing of the Center to carry out a political program whose development must lead to the breakup of this party. With a further intensification of the social crisis in Germany, the Center will not be able to withstand the pressure from within and without and the clerical shell will burst. The next to the last act of the German drama may be played out among the Center's component parts.

In the formal sense, today in the last days of August, Germany is still numbered among the parliamentary republics. But a few weeks ago Minister of the Interior von Gayl turned the commemoration of the Weimar constitution into a wake for parliamentarianism. Much more important than this formal status is the fact that the two extreme wings of the Reichstag, representing the majority of voters, regard democracy as definitively bankrupt. The National Socialists want to replace it with a fascist dictatorship on the Italian model. The Communists aspire to a dictatorship of soviets. The bourgeois parties, which have tried to administer the affairs of the capitalist class through parliamentary channels for the past fourteen years, have lost their entire electoral following. The Social Democracy, which forced the workers movement into the framework of the parliamentary game, has not only let the power conferred on it by the November Revolution slip from its hands, has not only lost millions of votes to the Communists, but is in danger even of losing its legal status as a party.

Isn't the conclusion self-evident that, faced with the difficulties and tasks too great for it, the democratic regime is losing control? In the relations between states also, when matters of secondary importance are involved, the rules and usages of protocol are more or less observed. But when vital interests collide, rifles and cannons come to the center of the stage, instead of treaty provisions. The internal and external difficulties of the German nation have heated up the class struggle to the point where no one can or wants to subordinate it to parliamentary conventions. Some may regret this, bitterly reproach the extremist parties for their inclination toward violence, hope for a better future. But facts are facts. The wires of democracy cannot take too high a social voltage. Such are, however, the voltages of our time.

The worthy Almanach de Gotha once had trouble in defining Russia's political system, which combined popular representation and an autocratic czar. Characterizing the present German system would probably be even more difficult, if you tried to base yourself on legal categories. By turning to history, however, we can offer assistance to the Almanachs de Gotha of all countries. Germany is currently being governed according to the Bonapartist system.

The main feature in German political physiognomy is produced by the fact that fascism has succeeded in mobilizing the middle classes against the workers. Two mighty camps are locked in irreconcilable conflict. Neither side can win by parliamentary means. Neither would willingly accept a decision unfavorable to it. Such a split in society foreshadows a civil war. The threat of civil war creates a need in the ruling class for an arbiter and commander, for a Caesar. That precisely is the function of Bonapartism.

Every regime claims to stand above classes, safeguarding the interests of the whole. But the effects of social forces cannot be so easily determined as those in the field of mechanics. The government itself is made of flesh and bone. It is bound up with certain classes and their interests. In peaceful times a democratic parliament seems to be the best instrument for reconciling conflicting forces. But when fundamental forces veer off at 180-degree angles, pulling in opposite directions, then the opening for a Bonapartist dictatorship appears.

Unlike a legitimate monarchy, where the person of the ruler represents only a link in a dynastic chain, the Bonapartist concept is bound up with a personality who makes his way to the top either through talent or through luck. Such a picture, however, corresponds poorly to the leaden figure of the East Elbian junker and Hohenzollern field marshal. Indeed, Hindenburg is no Napoleon, Posen no Corsica. But a merely personal, or even esthetic consideration of this question would be wholly inadequate and in fact likely to divert us. While, as the French say, a rabbit is required to make a rabbit stew, a Bonaparte is by no means indispensable for Bonapartism. The existence of two irreconcilable camps is enough. The role of the all-powerful arbiter can be filled by a clique instead of a person.

Let us recall that France has known not only Napoleon I, the real one, but also the fake Napoleon III. The uncle and the alleged nephew had in common the role of an arbiter who records his verdicts with the point of a sword. Napoleon I had his own sword and Europe still bears traces of its carving. The shadow alone of his alleged uncle's sword was enough to propel Napoleon III into the cockpit of power.

In Germany, Bonapartism takes a strictly German form. But we should not linger on the nuances of national differences. In translation many distinctive features of the original are lost. While in many areas of human creativity the Germans have provided the greatest models, in politics as in sculpture they have barely risen above the level of mediocre imitation. I will not, however, go into the historical reasons for this. Suffice it to say that it is so. Posen is no Corsica, Hindenburg no Napoleon.

There is no trace of adventurism in the conservative figure of the president. The eighty-year-old Hindenburg sought nothing in politics. Instead, others sought for and found Hindenburg. And they did not come on him by chance. These people are all from the same old Prussian, aristocratic-conservative, Potsdam-East Elbian background. Even if Hindenburg lends his name as a cover for the acts of others, he will not let himself be pushed off the track laid by the traditions of his caste. Hindenburg is not a personality but an institution. That is what he was during the war. "Hindenburg's strategy" was the strategy of people of quite different names. This procedure was carried over into politics. Ludendorff and his adju-

tants have been relieved by new men. But the method remains the same.

Conservatives, Nationalists, Monarchists, all the enemies of the November revolution, put Hindenburg in the post of Reichspräsident the first time in 1925. Not only the workers but also the parties of the bourgeoisie voted against the Hohenzollern marshal. But Hindenburg won. He was supported by the masses of the petty bourgeoisie moving toward Hitler. As Reichspräsident, Hindenburg has done nothing. But he has not undone anything either. His enemies developed the idea that Hindenburg's soldierly fidelity had made him into a defender of the Weimar constitution. Seven years later, driven back all along the line by reaction, the purely parliamentary parties decided to put their money on the marshal.

By giving their votes to the monarchist military commander, the Social Democracy and the Catholic Democrats freed him of all obligation to the now impotent republic. Elected in 1925 by the reactionaries, Hindenburg did not depart from the constitution. Elected in 1932 with the votes of the left, Hindenburg adopted the rightist viewpoint toward constitutional questions. Nothing mysterious lies behind this paradox. Alone before his "conscience" and the "will of the people"—two infallible courts—Hindenburg inevitably had to become the champion of the circles which he has served faithfully throughout his entire life. The Reichspräsident's policy is the policy of the landed aristocracy, of the industrial barons and banking princes of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and — last but not least — Hebrew faith.

By selecting von Papen—whom no one in the whole country had thought of the day before—to head the government, Hindenburg's political staff abruptly cut the

threads by which the election had bound the Reichspräsident to the democratic parties. German Bonapartism lacked the spice of adventurism in its first stage. By his career during the war and his magical rise to power, von Papen made up for this to a certain extent. As for his other gifts—aside from his knowledge of languages and his impeccable manners—the verdicts of different tendencies seem to agree that from now on the historians will no longer be able to describe Michaelis as the most colorful and insignificant chancellor of the German Reich.

But where is the sword of Bonapartism? Hindenburg retained only his marshal's baton, a toy for old men. After his not very inspiring experience in the war, Papen returned to civilian life. The sword, however, appeared in the person of General Schleicher. He precisely is the man who must now be regarded as the core of the Bonapartist combination. And this is no accident. In rising above parties and parliament, the government has shrunk to a bureaucratic apparatus. The most effective part of this apparatus unquestionably is the Reichswehr [the army]. It is not surprising, then, that Schleicher emerged behind Hindenburg and Papen. There is a lot of talk in the papers that from the seclusion of his headquarters the general carefully set the stage for the events. That may be. Much more important, however, is the fact that the general course of the events set the stage for a general.

The author is removed from the scene of events, by a considerable distance moreover. This makes it difficult to follow the day-to-day twists and turns. However, I would like to think that these unfavorable geographical conditions cannot hinder me from taking account of the fundamental relationship of forces, which in the last analysis determines the general course of events.

Stalinism and the Venezuelan CP

Thirty Years After the Assassination of Trotsky

By Alfonso Ramirez

[The popular, mass-circulation Venezuelan weekly *Vea y Lea* devoted the center pages of its August 31 issue to an article by Alfonso Ramirez on the significance of Leon Trotsky's life and ideas thirty years after the great revolutionist's assassination on August 21, 1940. Following is our translation of this article, preceded by the *Vea y Lea* editors' introduction.]

* * *

Thirty years ago Ramón Mercader del Río, a secret agent of the Russian political police, assassinated Leon Trotsky. The murder took place in a house in Mexico City where the revolutionary leader was living in exile.

Thousands of miles away, in the setting of the most spectacular episodes in the Russian revolution led by Trotsky, the man who had commanded his murder, Joseph Stalin, thought that he had won the last battle over his implacable critic. He thought that he had rid himself of the Left Opposition both inside and outside the USSR.

If Stalin could believe that Trotsky's thought was interred with him, it was because he was unable to comprehend the basic dialectics of world revolution, which were the principles that Trotsky developed, propagated, and in accordance with which—through the Fourth International—he oriented

revolutionary organizations in all latitudes.

Trotsky directed the October revolution and founded the Red Army, which he led to victory on fourteen fronts. He was a prolific revolutionary author. Contrary to the calculations of the man behind his murder, Trotsky's thought, the ideological framework built up by his incomparable work and his exemplary life of struggle, has an unwaning vitality. The work of this great strategist of world revolution illuminates the great ideological confrontations that have developed in the search for a dialectical synthesis of thought and action.

In our time, thirty years after his assassination, Trotsky's work is not

only an implacable critique of errors and deviations bordering on betrayal. His thought is becoming the guide of all the liberation struggles the peoples are fighting throughout the world.

In 1937, shortly before his death, the indomitable old man wrote the following in *Stalinism and Bolshevism*, an essay on the historical and theoretical roots of the Fourth International:

"Reactionary epochs like ours not only disintegrate and weaken the working class and its vanguard but also lower the general ideological level of the movement and throw political thinking back to stages long since passed through. In these conditions the task of the vanguard is above all not to let itself be carried along by the backward flow: it must swim against the current. If an unfavorable relation of forces prevents it from holding the positions that it has won, it must at least retain its ideological positions, because in them is expressed the dearly-paid experience of the past. Fools will consider this policy 'sectarian.' Actually it is the only means of preparing for a new tremendous surge forward with the coming historical tide."

The years that have intervened since Trotsky's death have seen his predictions borne out in many parts of the world. Swimming against the current, in Trotsky's words, the revolutionary forces have far from retreated (while Stalinism, in practice, by such abject positions as its capitulationist tactic of "peaceful coexistence," has abandoned the battlefield). The forces of the revolution have won significant victories in Asia, Africa, and Cuba. Moreover, Trotsky's brilliant analysis forewarned of the defeats of many movements unable to escape the influence of capitulationist revisionism.

On this thirtieth anniversary of Trotsky's murder, it is still important to review the circumstances of this treacherous crime by the hangman of the Russian revolution, Stalin. But we have preferred to offer an article by our collaborator Alfonso Ramírez giving a historical interpretation of some aspects of the controversy around the Stalinists' implacable persecution of the Left Opposition, whose banner, despite their abominable crimes, they could not strike down. In particular the article takes in the ideological dis-

pute which has developed and is steadily intensifying in Venezuela.

* * *

To judge from what we read in the publications that have brought out into the open the different views being debated in the Venezuelan Communist party, there are no Stalinists left in the country.

Petkoff and Caballero attack Stalinism up and down the line. On the other side, Ortega Díaz, García Ponce, Márquez, Faria, and the rest do not oppose the ideas put forward by Petkoff in the name of Stalin. Quite to the contrary, they slip more or less perceptible attacks on the late dictator of Russia into their replies. In any case, it is obvious that they are anxious to appear far removed from the Stalin school.

Recently one of this group, Rafael José Cortés, even went as far as to accuse Petkoff of being . . . a Stalinist, apparently hoping by this to save himself from the same imputation.

The general line of those who are trying to hold on to their positions against the winds of renewal blowing through the Communist party is to blame Stalin for grave errors, but with the qualification that these errors were balanced by positive achievements. In his conduct of the war, in running the economy, and in his books—these Communists explain—Stalin made innumerable mistakes, but he also said and did good things.

How different this estimation is from the eulogies of only sixteen years ago! During the thirties, the forties, and half of the fifties you could not skim through a Communist periodical, from *l'Humanité* to *Tribuna Popular*, without coming across the most extravagant praises for the "father of the peoples." First came the obligatory quotation from Stalin's thought, just as for some today it is Mao Tse-tung Thought, and then the exegesis trying to apply this thought to the concrete case. But Stalin's name could not be invoked unless it was flanked by litanies of sycophantic adjectives.

Let us not forget that in the middle of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, when the news of the Russian dictator's death became known, many members of the PCV [Partido Comunista Venezolano—Venezuelan Communist party] risked their liberty to

write "Glory to the Immortal Stalin!" on various walls in Caracas.

How in a few months' time did the Communists go from the most unqualified glorification of Stalin to their present estimation, treating him with a diffidence that may or may not conceal repentance. Khrushchev's "secret" speech does not explain it, nor the revulsion against the figure of Stalin among the peoples who suffered his tyranny. However, attempts by a fearful bureaucracy to rehabilitate Stalin, who it condemned shortly after his death, have completely failed to overcome this revulsion.

"As ye judge, so shall ye be judged," an old saying goes, and this should be written as an epitaph on Stalin's grave. His disregard for the merits of his enemies and friends alike also has its imitators. When the master died, the disciples had no scruples about turning praises into reproaches. What was important for them (as for Stalin) was to keep the reins of the government and the party in their hands.

Stalin is dead, we will be told. Is not this fact, plus the fact that no one calls himself a Stalinist, enough for us to forget his sins? But what concerns us here is not the individual but his impact on the present. If it were only a matter of his personality, denouncing of the Stalin cult—as Khrushchev did and his successors have done to some extent—would put an end to all the criticism, because politics should not be a place for venting personal likes and dislikes.

Those who say that they are no longer Stalinists remind us of what happens to the political police when the government changes. The new regime takes a different name but the police stay the same. They pulled Stalin down off the pedestal to which they had raised him. Why continue extolling him if nobody believed in him anymore? But although they have rejected him in appearance, they continue applying his policy. The Communist parties trained in the school of Stalinism are no longer capable of breaking from his heritage.

When the PCV was calling itself Stalinist, it was such a faithful supporter of General Medina's regime that it became virtually an appendage of the ruling PDV. The ouster of Pérez Jiménez came at a time when the PCV was already declaring its indepen-

dence from Stalinism. And together with Acción Democrática [Democratic Action—the party of Romulo Betancourt], COPEI [Comité Organizado por Elecciones Independientes—Committee for Independent Political Action, the Christian Democratic party], and the URD [Union Republicana Democrática — Democratic Republican Union], the PCV was calling in every paper and over every microphone in Venezuela for "national unity."

These parties were clamoring for "unity" so that the aroused masses would quiet down and allow the most conspicuous representatives of our bourgeoisie to finish the job of emptying out the public till, which they had begun to do through Pérez Jiménez, this being the principal reason for his fall.

When in Stalin's lifetime the PCV was giving such support to Medina, the armed forces of the United States and England had united with the Red Army in the war against the fascist Axis countries. For this reason the role of the Venezuelan Communists under General Medina's government was reduced to hymning the glories of allied arms, and the word imperialism was stricken out of its vocabulary.

Then, after Stalin died and the PCV had taken the necessary distance from him, came the time of disputes between the great powers. The word "imperialism" reappeared and all the PCV's energies were thrown into the anti-imperialist struggle. But despite its disavowal of Stalin's paternity, the PCV continued to uphold his policy of relying on certain layers of the native bourgeoisie to fight against imperialism.

The arguments were the same as those used by the Stalinist Third International when it ordered the young Chinese Communist party to put its head on Chiang Kai-shek's chopping block. Don't make allies for the enemy, they said, without realizing that the enemy already had these allies. It is not the revolutionists but the Venezuelan bourgeoisie's class ties with imperialism that seal this alliance.

When Stalin was venerated in the PCV, the socialist revolution was considered a goal more remote than the stars. Today when nobody in this party calls himself a Stalinist, it is believed that the socialist revolution

will come after a prior anti-imperialist revolution in which the progressive sectors of our bourgeoisie will participate. This is just what Stalin advised. First we will liberate ourselves from imperialism with the help of the national bourgeoisie, and afterward we will liberate ourselves from the national bourgeoisie. So the PCV agrees with the repudiated Stalin that for the moment we cannot talk about an anticapitalist or socialist revolution, only an anti-imperialist one.

That the Cuban revolution has demonstrated in practice that the national bourgeoisie must be defeated before there can be any thought of a real revolution is unknown to these PCV members, who claim that they are no longer Stalinists. That this lesson is stated in the Second Declaration of Havana has also not shaken the PCV's Stalinist foundations.

The failures of this policy of seeking a united front with the bourgeoisie to fight imperialism in Iraq in 1958 and in Brazil in 1964 cost thousands of Communists their lives. Such examples speak eloquently against this master who, despite the fact that his followers have denied him as Peter did Jesus, continues to impose his dictates in the official strategy of the Venezuelan Communist movement.

Because of the alliance of imperialism with the bourgeoisie of a colonial country, half a million Communists died in Indonesia in 1965 in the most atrocious butchery ever unleashed against a Communist party. The fact that such a massacre could result from clinging to dogma originated by Stalin and followed with tragic results by the Chinese Communist party shows that it would be madness to want to repeat an experiment of such terrible consequences here in Venezuela.

Teodoro Petkoff has rebelled against the old Stalinism in the PCV that is rotting its vitals. And we see that the way the party responds to his arguments bears the stamp of Stalinism.

Lenin created a type of party steel-tipped for action like the point of an arrow. But it was a party and not a bourgeois army made just for carrying out orders.

The strength of this organization lay in the conviction which the members derived from discussion. First they studied questions thoroughly and decided what had to be done. Then

they acted under a centralized leadership elected democratically. The balance between centralism and democracy gave this party its momentum.

Precisely because the fullest democratic means were employed, this organization was likely to be guided by a correct strategy. Such a party is very difficult to defeat. In it you could debate with an absolute guaranty that there would be none of the dogmatic sanctions and epithets which pigeonhole individuals or groups and destroy their usefulness in the search for truth. Such a party allowed tendencies within it and offered minorities the means for reaching the majority.

Is there freedom of tendencies in the PCV? When we read the arguments which Pedro Ortega Diaz and Antonio García Ponce use on page thirty-one of their pamphlet to combat "the antisocialist ideas of Teodoro Petkoff," it seems as if you could hear Stalin's voice from beyond the tomb denying the right to dissent.

During Stalin's lifetime proletarian internationalism was understood as absolute submission to the interests of the bureaucracy enthroned in the Soviet Union, whose pope was Stalin.

Let us leave aside here the defeats organized by the Third International in China, in the period of the rise of fascism, during the Spanish civil war, and at the end of the second world war in France, Greece, and Italy. Let us note only what most interests us here in Venezuela.

During the war the PCV centered its international policy on glorifying the battles won by the Soviet armed forces. And once the war was over its internationalism was displayed in preaching the virtues of peace, just as those of peaceful coexistence between the United States and the USSR are being trumpeted now.

But proletarian internationalism is something more than intoning eulogies to the advances of Soviet science. First of all socialism cannot be consolidated in a single country, because capitalism is a worldwide system that defends itself with equal determination all around the globe. And as a corollary, capitalism's world strategy for maintaining itself must be countered by a proletarian world strategy.

What is needed is not national parties in solidarity with each other but a single international party, one par-

ty with a global view of the struggle (whether in the colonies or the imperialist centers) and which has human and material resources not limited by frontiers or decadent patriotism.

The errors attributed to Stalin by those who now deny him as their master are alluded to in a general and not a specific way. So we cannot know precisely what mistakes they have in mind. The saint had his defects, that is all. But what is grave is that Stalin's crimes do not figure in this whole series of mistakes that these renegades from Stalinism refer to in the abstract.

Of the twenty-one members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party during the October revolution, twelve were murdered by Stalin. Between 1918 and 1921 thirty-one Bolsheviks sat on the Central Committee. Of these, eighteen fell victim to Stalin's terror. In October 1917 a Political Bureau of the Central Committee was elected for the first time. It was composed of seven members—Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, and Stalin. Two of these seven died natural deaths (Lenin and Stalin). The other five died as a result of the Stalinist terror. In the period before 1923, ten persons belonged to the Political Bureau. Eight were murdered by Stalin.

The charge Stalin made against his victims was that they were counter-revolutionists. What then would we have to say about Lenin's political capacities? Could he have surrounded himself with a majority of counter-revolutionists at the most critical moment of the revolution and believed them to be his most faithful collaborators, as he often said?

Stalin did not wage his struggle against the Left Opposition in the party by confronting its arguments (that was the last thing he did). On the one hand he slandered all his opponents, and on the other he physically liquidated every man and woman who stood in the way of his march toward despotism. The purges of the Soviet Thermidor claimed a greater number of victims than the guillotine did during the French revolution.

The memoirs of a Bolshevik-Leninist have been published recently in Paris. The author fought in the civil war. In this book he tells about one

of the concentration camps where Stalin sent his comrades to die. Those who survived in the camp got used to hearing the daily gunfire of execution squads.

What do the Stalinists wearing an anti-Stalinist mask have to say about these crimes? They can no longer lie, saying that the victims were agents of the counterrevolution. Are those in the Venezuelan Communist party who know about these atrocities ready to condemn them? Or do they persevere in their Stalinism by condoning them?

So far the PCV has echoed the falsification of the history of the revolution and of the Soviet Union. There was one "Bible" which served as the model. It was the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* published in 1938. This famous compendium described "heroes" who were on Stalin's side, and "villains," or the opponents of the bureaucracy, who were invariably "traitors, spies, and agents in the pay of foreign powers." Several of the present leaders of the Communist movement in our country learned "history" from this collection of fairy tales.

After the Twentieth Party Congress a second version appeared in 1960 in which the hero was no longer Stalin but the Central Committee of the party. This must have been kind of a godhead. In order to avoid embarrassment, the authors did not name any of its members.

The Moscow trials which sent tens of thousands of Communists to the gallows and to concentration camps were not mentioned. Thus the necessity was avoided of repeating the Stalinist accusation that the deceased were agents of Germany and Japan.

I will not list the lies contained in the "history" that Khrushchev ordered written. I only want to allude to the omissions that can be noted in the version of history officially accepted by the Communist parties. Kamenev's contribution is forgotten; as well as the fact that Zinoviev was the first chairman of the Communist International and the theoretical and political role of Bukharin.

And why does this history fail to note that Trotsky was the first Bolshevik chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and as such led the Revolutionary Military Committee which prepared and executed the insurrection?

Why does it hide his work as People's Commissar for Foreign Relations in the first revolutionary government and as the founder and organizer of the Red Army which he led to victory? Can you continue covering up the truth without being a thoroughgoing Stalinist falsifier?

Youth throughout the world, and in Venezuela also, began to react, once they understood that they were being lied to and above all that the truth was being hidden from them. The morally admirable thing about Petkoff's books is that while being a member of the PCV he has refused to continue repeating slanders.

He is accused of believing Isaac Deutscher, who they call a Sovietologist. If there is anyone who cannot be called a Sovietologist, it is this honorable Polish historian, who told the true history of the revolution and the regime to which it gave birth. His biography of Trotsky is a monument to the historical truth. It is to be hoped that the youth of Russia will soon be able to read it. Deutscher was not a Sovietologist but a great Marxist, and the saddest thing about his death is that he did not leave a complete version of his projected biography of Lenin.

A revolutionary movement cannot be built on deceit. In order to expose the falsehood that masks the bourgeois system of exploitation, those who fight against this hypocritical system must first clarify their own past and present. Stalinism is above all a mask hiding the reality. It is so false that even the heirs of Stalinism deny being Stalinists. But although they deny Stalin, in their ideological acrobatics you can see the clothing they inherited from him peeking out. And Stalin has never been a master for the revolutionary youth.

Today it is thirty years since Trotsky was struck down by the murderous hand of Stalin. In 1970, a century after the birth of Lenin, two facts stand out in the turbulent world in which we live. Vladimir Ilyich, the father of the Russian revolution, had a great companion who side by side with him led dispossessed humanity to power for the first time. And what is more, when Lenin died, this comrade in arms kept the traditions of the revolution from being submerged in the dead sea of Stalinism. These

traditions were brilliantly carried on and extended by Trotsky.

If it had not been for Trotsky, for example, how difficult it would have been for later revolutionists to explain the contradictory regime in the Soviet Union. And the same is true for dozens of questions which it would have been difficult to solve over a long period unfavorable to world revolution.

But that period has now come to a close. Today, thirty years after his assassination, Trotsky's name is being mentioned increasingly in books, in periodicals, and by combat orga-

nizations everywhere that there are struggles to be waged against imperialism.

And the day is not far off when his banner, which for three decades has flown in a humble corner of Mexico City, will once again be carried on the broad avenues of Leningrad and Moscow, raised aloft by the hands of workers who will at last have freed themselves from the oppressive bureaucracy.

Trotskyists at least are not ashamed to proclaim themselves as such in public. Why, sixteen years after the death of Stalin, are the Stalinists afraid to declare their allegiance openly?

Netherlands

'Vrij Nederland' on Trotsky's Assassination

The mass-circulation Dutch weekly *Vrij Nederland* devoted the front page of its second section August 22 to the thirtieth anniversary of the assassination of Leon Trotsky. The space was given over to two articles by Igor Cornelissen, one describing the circumstances of Trotsky's exile and assassination; a second listing the writings available on and by Trotsky.

Cornelissen gave a thorough summary of the facts that led up to the murder of the Russian revolutionary leader, including the murder of his son Leon Sedov and a number of his followers by Stalin's secret police. The article concluded as follows:

"An attempt to bring Trotsky's body to the U. S. for burial was stopped by Washington. Even his corpse frightened them.

"About 300,000 Mexicans, primarily the poor, paid their final respects to the revolutionary leader.

"Ramon Mercader (Jacson) continued to deny that he murdered Trotsky on Stalin's orders. In *Mind of an Assassin*, Isaac Don Levine gave an extensive account of the relations between Jacson and his mother . . . and the GPU. As a reward for her son's silence, she got the Order of Lenin. . . .

"In his book General Salazar [Mexican police chief] estimated that organizing the murder and maintaining the GPU apparatus in Mexico cost about \$600,000."

In his second article, Cornelissen

noted: "Few of Trotsky's writings are available in the Netherlands. Last year, however, Politeia-Amsterdam brought out a new, well-annotated translation of *Their Morals and Ours*.

"Moreover, Van Gennepe (Nes 128, Amsterdam) will shortly publish a selection of his work edited by Ernest Mandel. The book will cost about 9.90 florins [4 florins equal US\$1]. The basis of selection is said to be relevance to contemporary problems."

"Van Gennepe is also the Dutch representative of Pathfinder Press, Inc. [873 Broadway, New York, New York 10003] which has published much of Trotsky's work."

Peru's Agrarian Reform

Latifundism Remains

"Latifundism remains characteristic of agriculture in Peru," Dr. Lanse Caller Iberico told the First World Congress on Agrarian Law meeting in Caracas at the end of July.

Dr. Caller is the chairman of the Comision de Derecho Agrario (Agrarian Law Commission) in Peru and has defended peasants victimized for fighting the landlord system.

The most positive development in the Peruvian countryside, Dr. Caller said, has been an awakening on the part of the peasants. The first expression of this new attitude, she continued, was the peasant union struggles of 1962 led by the Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco. These first stirrings of the peasant movement were crushed by savage repression, as a result of which Blanco is still being held in the infamous El Fronton penitentiary.

Dr. Caller attributed the successive land reforms under Perez Godoy, Belaunde Terry, and finally the junta headed by General Juan Velasco to the pressure exerted by an increasingly restive rural population.

"At present I can assure you that the mobilization of the peasant masses and their developing consciousness represent progressive phenomena of great importance for the future. The constant mobilizations permitted by the present law have made possible the winning of some goals."

One advance of the present law is that common-law wives now can inherit their husbands' property.

"But in general terms," she stressed, "we must say that the landlord system persists in the greater part of Peru and to break it a real agrarian revolution will be needed."

Prices of basic commodities in South Vietnamese cities have risen 700 percent in the last year.

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