

Centenary of Lenin's Birth



GRIGORENKO: "Obviously, if the only 'normal' Soviet citizen is one who bows his head to every bureaucrat who exceeds his power, then I am certainly 'abnormal.'" See page 345.

Ernest Mandel:

Lenin's Heritage

Trotsky's 'Young Lenin'
Published in Germany

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Inside Israel Today

It's All a 'Trotskyite' Plot:

Hijacked Ships and Planes
and Protest Against the War

Livio Maitan:

Cuba, Military Reformism, and Armed Struggle in Latin America

Hugo Blanco Hailed

Some 2,500 participants in the Chicano Youth Liberation Conference in Denver, Colorado, unanimously approved a resolution March 29 calling for solidarity with political prisoners in Mexico and demanding the immediate release of imprisoned Peruvian revolutionaries Hugo Blanco, Héctor Béjar, and Ricardo Gadea.

The resolution was presented by Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales, president of the Crusade for Justice, which sponsored the conference, the largest and most representative yet held by the Chicano movement.

Participants included spokesmen for virtually all Spanish-speaking minorities in the United States: Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and other "Latinos." The conference adopted a call for the reestablishment of the nation of Aztlan (the Chicano nation), the formation of an independent Chicano political party, and a national Chicano Moratorium against the war in Vietnam to be held August 29 in Los Angeles.

"Corky" Gonzales followed his reading of the resolution on political prisoners—submitted by the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners—with a fiery tirade against the system that imprisons fighters like Hugo Blanco in Peru and Reies Lopez Tijerina in the U.S., who fought for land for their people. His speech was greeted with lusty approval and with cries of solidarity by the assembly.

The resolution contained an indictment of the Diaz Ordaz government in Mexico:

"The regime of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz killed hundreds of its people in a cold-blooded massacre at the Plaza de Tlatelolco, Mexico City on Oct. 2, 1968. . . .

"That same regime arrested and imprisoned people who protested that vile act and people who supported the democratic liberties of the Mexican people; people like José Revueltas, the novelist, Elí de Gortari, professor, Cabeza de Vaca, student leader, Carlos Sevilla, teacher, to name just a few. . . .

"In order to keep its crimes silent the regime continues to imprison peo-

ple as it just imprisoned Menéndez Rodríguez, editor of *Por Qué?*, and attempts to frame them up. . . ."

The assembly voted to "bring the plight of our brothers and sisters in the prisons of Mexico before public attention in the U.S. and throughout the world" and urged "all supporters of justice and liberty to adopt resolutions, and any other actions they feel appropriate, to secure liberty for the political prisoners in Mexico, Brazil, Puerto Rico, Bolivia, Santo Domingo, Peru, and in all the prisons of Latin America."

On Peru the conference declared:

"The present government of Peru claims to have the interest of its people at heart and has promised to initiate an agrarian reform to give land to the campesinos. . . .

"The most outstanding fighter for the campesinos of Peru, Hugo Blanco, has served 7 years in El Frontón prison because he initiated the struggle for the land reform and organized the campesinos into unions that would defend them against the abuses of the landowners. . . ."

The conference voted to send a message to Peru's military ruler, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, requesting "the release of Hugo Blanco, Héctor Béjar, Ricardo Gadea, and of all other prisoners presently in jail because they fought on behalf of the campesinos. . . ." It was resolved:

"That this conference send Hugo Blanco and the other prisoners its fraternal greetings and express its solidarity with the struggles of our Indian brothers for the return of their land."

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Lenin's Heritage

By Ernest Mandel

Lenin's life work is a totality in which theory and practice cannot be separated from each other. Lenin himself stated: without revolutionary theory, no revolutionary practice. No serious person today could deny the historic significance of the socialist October revolution or the creation of the Soviet state: these events have indelibly marked the history of our century—and of the century to come.

But the theoretical insight which made these great events possible is as important, if not more important, from the long-term point of view than these events themselves. For that insight will in the long run make possible a worldwide extension of the October revolution, an endeavor which temporarily failed during the lifetime of Lenin and Trotsky themselves.

Seven main pillars constitute the body of Leninism, an extension of Marxism in the imperialist epoch. These seven main parts of Leninism continue to hold true today as they did forty-six years ago when Lenin died—nay, their full significance is only coming to be understood today by larger and larger masses of workers and poor peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and students, in several important parts of the world.

1. Imperialism:

Last Stage of Capitalism

The theory of *imperialism as the supreme phase of capitalism* in which free competition leads to the creation of great monopolies (trusts, holdings, cartels, combines; we would add today: multinational corporations), that is to say, the domination of a tiny handful of finance groups over the economy and society of the imperialist countries and their colonial and semi-colonial satellites.

Imperialism doesn't mean necessarily the end of economic growth, a final stop to the growth of the productive forces. But it means that capitalism has fulfilled its historically progressive task of the creation of the world market and of the introduction of an

international division of labor, and that an epoch of structural crisis of the capitalist world economy is opened.

This structural crisis, while coinciding sometimes with deep conjunctural crises of overproduction (as it did in 1929-33 and during the subsequent so-called "recessions"), is marked by two decisively reactionary traits: in the underdeveloped parts of the world it impedes those very processes of national liberation and unification, of agrarian emancipation and industrialization, which the great bourgeois revolutions of the past realized in the West.

In the imperialist countries themselves, it is marked by a growing and frightful parasitism (large-scale waste of material and human resources, not only through wars, unemployment, overcapacity, etc., but also through massive increases of the selling and distribution costs, systematic degrading of the quality of products, threats against the ecologic equilibrium, and threats against the very physical survival of mankind).

2. Revolutionary Character of Our Epoch

The theory of the *revolutionary character of our epoch*, of the "up-to-dateness" of socialist revolution, which flows directly from the structural crisis of world capitalism. While that crisis is permanent (although knowing ups and downs, periods of temporary stabilization and periods of great instability of capitalism in key countries and continents), there are from Lenin's point of view, no "permanent revolutionary situations": if the working class does not profit from a favorable combination of circumstances to conquer power, a defeat of the revolution creates preconditions for a temporary comeback of the capitalist class.

The socialist world revolution, which has been on the agenda since World War I, takes the form of a *process*. The chain of countries subjugated by imperialist capitalism breaks first in its weakest links (these can be under-

developed countries like Russia and China, but there is no law in Lenin's thought which says that they *have* to be such).

For Lenin, while the workers of each country where a favorable revolutionary situation occurs should by all means seize power, they should consider this as a means to strengthen the revolutionary forces in neighboring countries and on a world scale, and should consider themselves always a detachment of the world revolutionary communist movement.

3. The Party

The theory of the *revolutionary vanguard party*, which is based upon a correct, dialectic understanding of the interrelationship between objective mass struggles and subjective class consciousness under capitalism.

Defending and expanding Marx's and Engels's concepts of historical and dialectical materialism, Lenin rejected the mechanistic and naïve belief that class struggle in itself gives to the exploited class—cut off from all the main sources of science—the power to spontaneously reconstruct Marxist theory, the highest product of centuries of intellectual and scientific developments of mankind.

Marxist theory, socialist consciousness, must be introduced from the outside in the class struggle, by conscious efforts of a revolutionary vanguard. Without such a constant effort, the overwhelming majority of the working class remains subjected to the prevailing influence of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. But without a successful fusion with a large working-class vanguard, the revolutionary minority is not yet a party; it is only an attempt to build such a party.

Lenin rejected all ideas of self-proclaimed vanguards. For him the proof of the pudding was in the eating, i.e., in the capacity of the vanguard to actually lead large working-class struggles. And the supreme test of the party—the leadership in the struggle for power—presupposes the conquest

of the conscious support by the majority of the working class and the toiling masses.

4. Workers Councils

The theory of *workers councils* (soviets) as *power instruments of the dictatorship of the proletariat* and as higher forms of democracy than parliamentary bourgeois democracy. Lenin believed, as Marx did, that between capitalism and socialism there is a transition period called the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. No more than Marx did Lenin believe that you could overthrow capitalism along the road of gradual reforms, parliamentary elections, or legislation in the framework of bourgeois institutions. The victory of socialist revolution presupposes not only collective ownership of the means of production but also destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus—i.e., of the apparatus of repression directed against the great mass of the people.

The essence of a workers state, i.e., of a dictatorship of the proletariat, is for Lenin not any "totalitarian" nightmare of the 1984 type but, as described in *State and Revolution*, a democratically-centralized system of freely elected workers councils, which exercise simultaneously all legislative and executive functions as the Paris Commune had done.

For Lenin, dictatorship of the proletariat means *more* actual democratic freedoms for the workers and toiling masses than they enjoy under any bourgeois-democratic regime. It means full and unfettered enjoyment of freedom of the press, freedom of association and of demonstration for all and every group of toilers (and not only for a single party), as well as the material means to enjoy these freedoms.

Even for the bourgeois classes Lenin did not in principle rule out the right to enjoy democratic liberties under the dictatorship of the proletariat, but neither was he ready to guarantee this to them. In his opinion this was a matter of relationship of forces, i.e., of the strength and violence of counter-revolutionary opposition to the victorious working class.

As for the leading role of the party inside the Soviet institutions, this was for Lenin strictly a matter of political persuasion, of capacity to win the al-

legiance of the majority, and not at all a matter of systematic repression of all contending tendencies (Lenin admitted the necessity of such repression only under exceptional circumstances of civil war, when most of those tendencies were involved in open military violence against the revolutionary government).

5. The International

The theory of *internationalism*, the International being the only organizational form for the proletarian vanguard and for the workers states congruent with the needs of world economy and toiling mankind, produced by imperialism. That's why Lenin proclaims the need for a Third International the very day he recognizes the Second International is dead. That's why he remained till his end a passionate defender of the right of self-determination of all nations. That is why he proclaimed the necessity of the *independence* of the Communist International from the Soviet state: no maneuver of that state (e.g., concluding a truce with German imperialism; making an alliance with the Kemalist state in Turkey, etc.) should imply any change of orientation by the Communist International from its line of preparing, favoring, and assuring the best possible conditions for victory of proletarian revolutionary struggles everywhere.

For the same reason he opposed any attempt at Russification of the non-Russian Soviet republics and considered the attitude of communists in imperialist countries towards national liberation movements in the countries oppressed by their own bourgeoisie as a keystone of internationalism.

6. Role of the Party

The theory of the *political centralization*, through the revolutionary vanguard party, of all progressive democratic mass demands and mass movements into a single flow towards a socialist revolution. While Lenin developed that concept at a time when he did not yet accept the idea of the Russian revolution growing uninterruptedly over into a socialist revolution, he maintained it and extended it during the founding years of the Communist International when he based

all his thinking upon the strategy towards socialist revolution.

This concept flows from a dialectical understanding of the stratification of the working class and the toiling masses into layers with different levels of consciousness and with different immediate interests, which have all to be united (inasmuch as they don't stand for counterrevolutionary causes) in order to make a mass revolution possible.

It also flows from a deep understanding of the antidemocratic and reactionary nature of imperialism, which not only does deny the majority of mankind such elementary rights as those of national independence and dignity but which tends also to erode in the imperialist countries themselves the very conquests of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the past.

But contrary to opportunists of all kinds, Lenin's concept of uniting the struggle for democratic and the struggle for transitional demands did not mean in any way a dismissal or a subordination of the socialist goal to the wishes or prejudices of temporary "allies"; on the contrary, it was based on the firm belief that only the victorious socialist revolution could bring about a final and definite triumph of these democratic goals.

7. Democratic Centralism

The theory of the *inner-party regime based upon democratic centralism*, which does not only mean majority rule, the need of minorities to apply in practice majority decisions but also full democratic rights of discussion inside the party, the right to form tendencies, to submit collective platforms to party congresses, to have them discussed on equal footing with the leadership proposals before congresses, to full and impartial information of the membership about political differences which crop up in the organization, etc., etc.

This was the way the Bolshevik party and the Communist International functioned in Lenin's lifetime. It is indicative of the gulf which separates Leninism from the bureaucratic centralism applied today in the USSR and Eastern Europe that the hesitant attempt of the Czechoslovak CP leadership to return in 1968 to some of these Leninist norms in a new draft statute for the Fourteenth Congress

of the party was seized upon furiously as a sign of "rightist antisocialist tendencies" inside that party by Brezhnev and company.

Already before Lenin's death, many if not all of these basic tenets of Leninism were beginning to be challenged by the new Stalinist leadership inside the CPSU and the Communist International. Lenin's last struggle was a desperate attempt to stop this perversion of his doctrine. This revisionism was, obviously, not a purely ideological phenomenon. It reflected a deep-going social shift inside Russian postrevolutionary society and inside the CPSU.

On the basis of the growing passivity

of the Russian working class — resulting from the backwardness of the country and from the temporary retreat of world revolution — a privileged bureaucratic layer monopolized the exercise of power and the administration of the state and the economy. It ruthlessly subordinated the party into an apparatus defending its own particular interests, if necessary against the historic and immediate interests of the world revolution and of the Russian working class itself.

Stalinism was only the ideological expression of the rise of that parasitic caste. It is the very antithesis of Leninism, the proletarian doctrine of socialist revolution.

Lenin's Heritage

The Left Opposition around Trotsky, and later the Fourth International, maintained and enriched the heritage of Leninism in the years of reaction and of receding world revolution. These are now superseded again by a new epoch of rising world revolution.

A growing number of workers, revolutionary students and intellectuals, and poor peasants understand the validity of Leninism and participate in the building of new revolutionary parties on a worldwide basis. The future belongs to Leninism. That's why it belongs to the Fourth International.

Stalinists Fulminate

Trotsky's 'Young Lenin' Published in Germany

["The card played against Lenin in this, Lenin centenary, year is called Trotsky," two West German Stalinists, Friedrich Hitzer and Oscar Neumann, wrote in the January issue of the *World Marxist Review*, the international bulletin of the pro-Moscow parties.

[The occasion for this new blast at Trotsky was the advertising of his book *Der Junge Lenin*¹ (The Young Lenin) at the Frankfurt book fair early last October. Apparently, these two Stalinists feared that Trotsky's portrayal of the development of the young revolutionist who was to lead the October revolution contrasted a bit too strikingly with the scores of dreary hagiographical works the Communist parties have turned out for Lenin's one hundredth birthday this April 22.

[Hitzer and Neumann began their article by laying the groundwork for an all-inclusive amalgam: "The Springer combine, cashing in on the demand for progressive literature, is putting out an edition of Marx's *Capital*, at a profit, of course. Big capital is certainly riding the 'Left wave,' without

forgetting, for all its lust for profit, to weigh carefully the various ideological and political problems. Much of the literature turned out consists of books by 'Marxologists' and 'Kremlinastrologers,' and of excavations ranging from Proudhon to Bakunin and Kropotkin, to Bucharin and Trotsky. The purpose, evidently, is a reversion from socialism as a science to utopia, and from the latter to an attitude of serving the Establishment."

[The growing interest in revolutionary ideas among broad sectors of youth in the capitalist countries was certainly what provoked this article.

[The publishing industry, like all cultural institutions under capitalism, has the general function of defending the system, and has always played this role. What is new in the present situation is that a powerful radicalization, starting among the intellectual youth, has created a market for revolutionary books which even the capitalist publishers cannot bring themselves to pass up. That is why, as Hitzer and Neumann admit, a bourgeois publisher like Suhrkamp is publishing a new edition of *Capital*.

[Despite ferocious censorship, the revolutionary ferment among the youth in the capitalist world must inevitably penetrate into the Stalinized countries. The bureaucracy, which has made

Marxism into an ossified dogma designed to justify its privileges and the status quo on which they are based, has a deadly fear of young people learning how Marxist ideas were developed and used as weapons of revolutionary change.

[Hitzer and Neumann's fulminations over the appearance of Trotsky's work at the fair were increased by the fact that the preface to the book was published in the September-October 1969 issue of *Wiener Tagebuch*, a magazine edited by dissident Communists in Austria. This group, of which the philosopher Ernst Fischer is the most prominent representative, broke with the Kremlin over its invasion of Czechoslovakia. The two German Stalinists devoted the major part of their article to an attack on this preface. The following extracts give the main points.

["This book contains a preface by Walter Fischer which the Ernst Fischer group found important enough to reprint in *Wiener Tagebuch*.

["To begin with Trotsky is referred to as the man behind the allegation that Lenin 'Russified' Marxism instead of developing it in the spirit of its founders. The result is said to be a 'Russian Marxism with its nationally conditioned peculiarities of revolutionary theory and with the corresponding forms of organization and revolu-

1. Leo Trotzki: *Der Junge Lenin*, Verlag Fritz Molden, Vienna-Munich-Zurich. 269 pages. The only previous edition of this book is a long-out-of-print French translation published in the thirties. An English translation is expected to come out shortly. — IP

tionary action.' For Walter Fischer 'the universal validity of the doctrine called Leninism' is an absurdity. The purpose is clear. The revolutionary theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism alone show how the chains of capitalism can be smashed anywhere in the world. This being so, the monopoly bourgeoisie today sees its task in keeping the younger generation, which is turning more and more against capitalism, away from Marxism-Leninism. Nor is that all: if Leninism is not a universally valid revolutionary theory and practice, neither can the Soviet Union be a model country building socialism and communism. Walter Fischer claims that where this model is recognized there is, on the contrary, 'a delay in adjusting social relations to the exigencies of the time.' Young intellectuals in the East and West alike protest and revolt against this, he says. ["Here too the purpose is plain: slander socialism — a developing reality — and thus deprive the youth searching for solutions of any perspective. A harassed monopoly power is trying to conceal from its opponents the reality of latter-day capitalism which is doomed by history, by claiming that socialism cannot be adjusted to the needs of the scientific and technological revolution. The calculation is that potential revolutionary forces will be kept away from their national task in the class struggle and isolated from their international basis, the socialist world system.

["Invoking Trotsky's ghost has yet another object. 'At a time of complete passivity on the part of the masses of working people' — this is Walter Fischer's interpretation of Trotsky's account — young intellectuals, first of all students, become keenly aware that the existing order is intolerable.' This 'complete passivity' of the masses and the 'failure of all attempts to overcome the people's lethargy' is projected into the present. The workers in most of the developed capitalist countries are alleged to be largely integrated with the Establishment. 'The explosions of student revolt are not the least important manifestation of despair over the fact that hardly anywhere has it been possible to bring the masses of working people into revolutionary motion.'

["We West German Communists can least of all view the state of workers' class consciousness without concern. One of our tasks is to foster class con-

sciousness. . . . Molden, the publisher, and Walter Fischer, his preface writer, want the exact opposite. They suggest to the workers and students that the Establishment and its power are here to stay. Young intellectuals are expected to think that the revolutionary energy of the working class has been spent. Their withdrawal into their 'inner world' and their addiction to LSD and sex are construed as ultimate solutions."

[So that our readers can draw their own conclusion we are offering below the full text of Walter Fischer's preface. The original German is cited where the meaning of the quotes used by Hitzer and Neumann was distorted in the *World Marxist Review*.]

* * *

In the twenties we young socialists waited for every part of the illustrated history of the Russian revolution with feverish impatience. It was published in a serialized form with Lenin and Trotsky on the title page. One day the current issue appeared in an unusual dress. At first glance it was not clear what was different. But then we discovered that Trotsky's picture was no longer on the title page. It had disappeared not just for this once, but forever.

Yesterday still side by side with Lenin, the great leader of the revolution, Trotsky had suddenly vanished. Gradually he was to reappear in a changed and distorted form — as the vile enemy and traitor. A good Communist was supposed to pronounce his name only with revulsion, as a devout Christian crosses himself when he speaks of the master of the demonic hosts.

In his great novel *The Joke*, the Czech writer Milan Kundera described how far this hobgoblinization of Trotsky went during Stalin's lifetime in the Communist-ruled countries. The fact that Ludvik, the hero of this novel, sent a postcard to a young comrade which, in a playful provocation, ended with the words "Long Live Trotsky" was enough to ruin his life forever.

Since then Stalin has died and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU [Communist party of the Soviet Union] has dealt a blow to the Stalin myth from which it is recovering only slowly and not without opposition. But now as before Trotsky remains the arch foe for orthodox Com-

munists, a detestable unperson who should not be discussed but only damned.

To convince yourself of that, you need only read the entry under Trotsky in the last volume of *Meyers Neues Lexikon* published in the DDR [Deutsche Demokratische Republik — German Democratic Republic, East Germany] in 1964 (thus eight years after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU). While every third-rate Soviet writer was considered worthy of almost a whole column, the following few lines were enough for Trotsky:

"Trotzki (Trotckij), Lew Dawidowitsch, born November 7, 1879, in Ivanovska near Elisavetgrad (in the Kherson Oblast'), murdered August 21, 1940, in Mexico City; waged a furious struggle against the Bolsheviks since 1903, an embittered enemy of Leninism. In the first world war he took a centrist position. At the Seventh Party Congress in 1917, he was taken into the party. After the October revolution, T. again opposed Lenin's policy, later pushed his anti-Soviet activity. In 1927 he was expelled from the party and in 1929 banished from the Soviet Union."

An embittered enemy of Leninism — expelled — banished — murdered. Enough. That is the picture of Trotsky that Stalin painted and which is still considered authoritative in the DDR and elsewhere even today.

It is not uninteresting in this connection to consult what Lenin wrote December 24, 1922, in his letter to the Central Committee. This letter, which was kept secret in the Soviet Union until 1956, has become known throughout the world as Lenin's "Testament." There we read:

"Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the C. C. on the question of the People's Commissariat for Communications has already proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C. C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work."

In order to avert the danger of a split resulting from the relations be-

tween Stalin and Trotsky, Lenin suggested increasing the membership of the Central Committee from fifty to one hundred. In order to assure a democratic check on the party leadership, the new CC members were to be elected from the ranks of workers who had not become part of the apparatus as a result of long exercise of party functions. Further, in an addendum to his letter to the CC written January 4, 1923, Lenin suggested that "the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post . . ."

The outcome was neither the removal of Stalin nor a democratic check by workers not belonging to the apparatus. The upshot was an embittered struggle between Stalin and Trotsky in which Stalin was able to base himself on the apparatus and eliminate his rival. Because of his legendary fame, it was utterly impossible both at home and abroad to simply erase Trotsky from world history and the minds of men. Therefore, he was declared public enemy No. 1 in the Soviet Union. And at the same time, in the "West," many people who had not the slightest affinity with the passionate Marxist revolutionist Trotsky misused his name for the purposes of vulgar anti-Communist propaganda.

This short introduction cannot take up the task of critically analyzing the theories of Trotsky and the practice of those who call themselves Trotskyists today. But I consider it necessary to make a brief comparison of all the rumors and slanders that have been circulated about this convinced revolutionist, whom Lenin designated in 1922 as the most capable man in the CC, with the facts. Already as a student Trotsky joined revolutionary circles in Kiev. In 1899 he was arrested and banished to Siberia. In 1902 he escaped to London. There he became acquainted with Lenin, with whom he had differences over the structure of the Russian Social Democracy. These differences led to his adhering to the Mensheviks in the party split. In the revolutionary year of 1905, we find Trotsky as an agitator in Petersburg, where in 1906 he was again arrested and deported. Once more he succeeded in escaping abroad. From 1907 to 1917 he lived in Vienna, Zurich, Paris, and the USA. In this period his relationship with Lenin did not change. In 1917 he returned to Russia and became Lenin's most im-

portant collaborator in preparing and carrying through the October revolution. In the first Soviet government, he served as people's commissar for foreign affairs, later as commissar of war and as the commander of the Red Army, which he created, during the civil war. Trotsky was not one of the type who subordinate themselves without question to others and do not assert their own opinions. To the contrary, he was, as Lenin said, a man of "excessive self-assurance," a trait which often led to sharp arguments between the two leaders but never to a break. Lenin knew the great value of his strong-willed collaborator. But Lenin died in January 1924, and Stalin, who had already firmly established himself in the picture, quickly disposed of his dangerous rival.

Among the many books Trotsky wrote in exile, *Revolution Betrayed*, his biography *My Life*, and the *History of the Russian Revolution* are best known. It was only quite recently that the project was begun of making his biographical work on Lenin available to a German-speaking public. Lenin's childhood and youth are the theme of the following work, which appears for the first time in German.

What Trotsky gives us in this biographical study is more than merely a factual account, more than a critical analysis of the legends of the memorialists and official biographers. For the latter often felt compelled to portray Lenin's development as if he came from his mother's womb as a fully armed revolutionist—like Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus. We learn to know not only the narrower surroundings in which Lenin grew up but experience the painful process of social change in the gigantic empire of the czars, which was pregnant with revolution. We see how Volodya Ulyanov, the son of an ennobled elementary school inspector in the Simbirsk guberniia, is formed by this process in which he will later intervene decisively as Lenin. And we learn to understand how the individual development of a genius is fused with the development of his country.

Especially interesting and highly timely is the portrayal of the origins of Russian Marxism. Already the later Narodniki, including Lenin's brother Alexander, were familiar with Marx's *Capital*. But the economic lessons of Marxism remained foreign to them, could not fundamentally change their

political views, because they did not know how to apply Marxism to the problems of peasant Russia. It was only when the Marxist method developed in the progressive West was united with an analysis of specifically Russian conditions—which was first attempted by Plekhanov and later fully developed by Lenin—that "Russian" Marxism emerged with its nationally conditioned special characteristics in revolutionary theory and corresponding forms of organization and revolutionary action. However little the author may have intended it, this observation reduces to absurdity an axiom preached by Moscow today—the principle of the universal and unconditional applicability of the doctrine which is designated as Leninism⁶ and which Stalin and his heirs have simplified to the extreme. If Trotsky shows that Marxism could only become the driving force of the Russian revolution after it had become "Russian" Marxism, then this principle doubtless holds for every country pregnant with social revolution.

No less interesting is the investigation of the regular developmental cycles of the succeeding generations of Narodniki. In a period of complete passivity on the part of the masses of the working people (which at first was largely synonymous with the peasants, the Muzhiks), the intellectual youth, primarily the students, became acutely aware of the unbearable oppressiveness of the prevailing order. The failure of all attempts to overcome the lethargy of the people always led back to the desperate solution of individual terror.

Even if all historical analogies have their faults, certain analogies with the present period are striking. In most of the developed industrial countries the workers are deeply "integrated" into the prevailing system and averse to revolutionary movements. But at the same time the intellectual youth, above all the students, are becoming aware of the unbearable oppressiveness of the dominant order, of the contradiction between the enormous possibilities for advancing mankind

2. ". . . das Axiom von der bedingungslosen Allgemeingültigkeit dieser als Leninismus bezeichneten und von Stalin und seinen Erben aufs äusserste simplifizierten Lehre." Hitzer and Neumann make this simply "the universal validity of the doctrine called Leninism." — IP

through the scientific and technical revolution and the way humanity is crippled and perverted by a narrow-minded establishment. The explosions of the student revolt are largely an expression of desperation³ over the fact that almost nowhere has a revolutionary mobilization of the working people been achieved.

Also many movements of the intellectual youth and acts of desperation by individuals in the "Eastern"

3. "... sind nicht zuletzt Ausdruck der Verzweiflung darüber, da es bisher fast nirgends gelungen ist, die breiten Massen der arbeitenden Menschen in revolutionäre Bewegung zu bringen." Hitzer and Neumann, or their editor, apparently shifted the meaning here to associate the youth rebellion with drugs and sex.
— IP

It's All a 'Trotskyite' Plot

Hijacked Ships and Planes and Protest Against the War

By Les Evans

"A North Korean broadcast said the Japan Air Lines Boeing 727 landed in North Korea 'without prior notice and our consent'—and . . . accused the Japanese of a subtle plot 'to create the impression that we want to take in the so-called Trotskyites or criminals' . . ."—April 4 *Los Angeles Times*.

"WASHINGTON — A House subcommittee begins hearings today on alleged Communist influence in the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (New Mobe) one week before a renewal of last fall's nationwide anti-war protests. . . .

"Committee Chairman Ichord (D-Mo.) charged in a lengthy House speech just before last November's protests that New Mobe 'remains under tight control of the Young Socialist Alliance,' the youth arm of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party."—April 7 *New York Post*.

* * *

A virtually universal characteristic of the bureaucratic mentality is the disposition to see every symptom of revolt as the result of a conspiracy.

states are an expression of protest against social conditions lagging behind the demands of the time.

Over and over again the desperate and heroic rebellion of the Russian Narodniki led to bloody sacrifices and hopeless disaster. But, nevertheless, they did not sow their seed in vain. And Lenin was to stand at the head of those who reaped the harvest that they had sown.

In his work on the young Lenin and his time, Trotsky gives us a better and more profound understanding of a decisive segment of Russian history—and more than this, he teaches us much that is important not only for Russian history. Of course, one need not agree with him on everything. But even where he provokes disagreement, we are indebted to the author.

As the examples above indicate, this reaction is not restricted to a single class or social system. It is of no small significance that officials in the heartland of world imperialism stand on common ground with those in the bureaucratized workers states in condemning acts of protest as "Trotskyite."

In the case of the nine Japanese youths who hijacked an airliner March 31, seeking to divert it to North Korea, there is no actual connection with the world Trotskyist movement. Their organization, the "Red Army," is not associated with the Fourth International and Trotskyists have never advocated hijacking planes as a means of making political points.

At the same time there is no indication from the testimony of the passengers on board, who finally returned to Tokyo April 3, or from any other source that the hijackers' motives were not genuine or their act anything but a sincere attempt to promote "revolutionary consciousness" among the people of Japan.

The North Korean label of "Trotskyite" is misplaced and the linking

of that label to the word "criminals" is a slander of the old Stalinist variety in no way justified by Pyongyang's understandable desire to disclaim responsibility for the action.

The Japan Communist party took the same stance at a press conference April 4. According to an Associated Press report, the CP spokesman read a dispatch from the Pyongyang correspondent of the party's paper *Akahata* [Red Flag] calling the students "utterly arrogant."

This was picked up by the American Stalinists in the April 8 issue of the *Daily World*, voice of the American Communist party: "The Communist Party of Japan has denounced the March 31 hijacking of a Japan Air Lines plane as a 'provocative intrigue of the Trotskyites.'"

Soviet officials had a similar reaction to the seizure of a U. S. merchant ship by two American youths off the coast of South Vietnam March 15.

The ship was diverted to Cambodia, where the two who reputedly sympathized with the U. S. Students for a Democratic Society [SDS] were given political asylum. Rather than view the action as a sincere, if ill-considered, protest against the Vietnam war, Soviet newsmen have discerned yet another plot.

An April 8 dispatch to the *New York Times* described the return of the ship, the *Columbia Eagle*, to the Americans:

"A small group of newsmen was then taken down into one of the vessel's five holds in a move to demonstrate that none of the munitions ship's cargo had been unloaded in Cambodia.

"This was to dispel suspicions, assiduously nurtured by Communist diplomats here and Communist propaganda throughout the world, that the *Columbia Eagle* had been involved in an American plot to furnish arms for the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Chief of State."

As for the witch-hunters in the United States, the March 7 *New York Post* reported: "Two former undercover agents with the Chicago police are scheduled to testify about the influence of the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance in New York, and Chicago groups allied to the New Mobe.

"The timing of the three-day hear-

ings," the *Post* added, "just before anti-war protests April 13-15 was 'purely accidental,' said Glenn Davis, staff director of the subcommittee."

The New Mobilization Committee denounced the government's attempt to red-bait the antiwar movement.

The revolutionary-socialist weekly *The Militant* pointed out in its April 17 issue that Trotskyist participation in the antiwar movement was public knowledge: "For a smaller amount of taxpayers' money, they [the House subcommittee] could have learned the

same thing by reading any of a number of newspapers, including this one, or by attending any of dozens of meetings around the country."

Fred Halstead, presidential candidate of the SWP in 1968 and a member of the New Mobe steering committee, told *The Militant*:

"It's precisely because the antiwar movement was built on the basis of nonexclusion that it is so powerful. We're proud of our role as socialists in building the antiwar movement and we're not stopping now."

'A Lunatic Cannot Be Amnestied'

Excerpts from Grigorenko's Diary

The most extensive account so far of the diary of the imprisoned Soviet dissident Pyotr Grigorenko was published in the April 3 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*.

Reports of this diary, together with an appeal by Grigorenko's wife Zinaida, began appearing in the international press at the end of March. According to *Le Monde* the documents were smuggled to the West by a Scandinavian student group called SMOG, which supports the struggle for democratic rights in the Soviet bloc. Excerpts were published in the April 6 issue of the U. S. magazine *Time*. [See *Intercontinental Press*, April 13, page 320.]

The version of Grigorenko's diary in *Le Monde* gives new details on the former general's imprisonment.

According to the *Le Monde* account Grigorenko wrote that he was arrested in Tashkent May 7, 1969, after coming to the Soviet Central Asian city in response to an appeal to represent imprisoned Crimean Tatar protesters. The Tatars were being prosecuted for demanding the right to return to their ancestral homeland, from which their nation had been expelled by Stalin at the end of World War II.

Once he arrived in Tashkent, Grigorenko writes, he discovered the appeal was a police provocation, and he decided to return to Moscow. However, his departure was held up by an attack of fever. Before he could get out of the city, he was arrested by a police agent who had already been trailing him in Moscow and who had searched his home the year before.

To protest his arbitrary confinement Grigorenko went on a hunger strike. His jailers force-fed him brutally. But he decided to end his fast, he writes, only when he realized that his death would not cause any serious problems for the bureaucracy.

One of his jailers told him: "Don't expect any noisy funeral like Kosterin. We won't return your body to your family. They won't even know when you died or where you're buried. They'll be given the news maybe three days or maybe three to six months after you're dead."

On July 3 Grigorenko wrote to Premier Kosygin protesting his imprisonment. He got no response. But he was informed that he would be given a psychiatric examination. This took place August 18. His examiners ruled him legally responsible.

Between August 18 and the end of October 1969 Grigorenko was questioned eight times by the judge assigned to prepare his case. The judge showed clearly that he did not take the matter seriously, Grigorenko writes.

Late in October Grigorenko was flown to Moscow. After spending a night in the Lefortovo prison, he was transferred to the Serbskii Institute of Criminal Psychiatry. The "sole reason for the existence" of this institute, according to Grigorenko, is to "convert the innocent and sane who are unfortunate enough to displease the KGB [secret police] into mentally incompetent persons dangerous to the society." He was held there eight days in solitary confinement while being subjected to absurd and exhausting tests.

On November 19 Grigorenko was

examined by a committee headed by the director of the institute, Morozov.

Among other things Grigorenko was asked why he had behaved normally for a year or two after he was first locked up in a mental institution in 1964. He answered: "The psychiatrists had nothing to do with my so-called 'normal' behavior. I didn't write anything for distribution in 1965 and 1966, first because I had no time. I worked as a loader for twelve hours a day with no days off to feed my family. . . . When I came home I had only enough strength to get into bed.

"Secondly, I thought I would start writing a history of World War II. But experience showed me that cases of repression are increasing all the time, rather than diminishing. The time had not yet come when I could climb into an ivory tower and engage in 'pure scholarship.' Until a real stop is put to the abuse of power in our country, every honest person must take part in the fight against it, no matter what the danger . . .

"In 1964 I had made a typically Bolshevik decision—to create a highly secret organization and distribute illegal tracts. None of this now. I am making public declarations against acts of hypocrisy, against lies and hypocrisy . . . an appeal to eliminate the obvious blemishes from our society, for strict respect for the laws and the constitutional rights of the people . . . a public struggle within the framework of what is authorized by the law for a democratization of our social life. . . . Obviously, if the only 'normal' Soviet citizen is one who bows his head to every bureaucrat who exceeds his power, then I am certainly 'abnormal.'"

After his examination at the Serbskii Institute, Grigorenko was shipped to the Kazan asylum for the criminally insane, where he is reportedly still being held. This punishment is worse than a criminal sentence. The maximum penalty for the charge against Grigorenko is three years in prison. He has already spent one year in confinement. There is no limit to the time he can be kept "under treatment."

Furthermore, Grigorenko is not eligible for the amnesty expected for the Lenin centenary, since, as he put it: "a lunatic cannot be amnestied from his illness." Perhaps it was such considerations that recommended this type of political imprisonment to the czars, who were the first to use it.

Pentagon's Growing Power in U.S. Politics

Billions of dollars worth of American military matériel are secretly handed over by the Pentagon to foreign dictators without the knowledge, still less the permission, of even the U. S. Congress. A secret computerized data bank is set up in which the U. S. army compiles dossiers on more than 18,000,000 American political "dissenters." Science fiction? Not at all. Merely examples of the growing reliance of the U.S. ruling class on the military to implement aspects of domestic and foreign policy that are too politically embarrassing to conduct in a more open way.

As far as the public record is concerned, military "assistance" to other governments—with the exception of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand—has been sharply cut back in recent years. In the fiscal year 1969, for example, the total military aid to U. S. client states was \$350,000,000, down from an all-time high of \$6,000,000,000 in 1952. What was not revealed until the end of March of this year was that an additional \$470,000,000—more than the original appropriation—was secretly given to foreign dictatorships in 1969 through the ruse of declaring weapons "surplus" and "disposing" of them administratively through the Pentagon without seeking congressional approval or making any announcement of the gifts.

Although some twenty-four countries were recipients of the instruments of war, some 75 percent of the weapons went to the military dictatorship in Greece (against which there is a supposed U. S. arms embargo), the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan, the Chung Hee Park dictatorship in South Korea, and Turkey.

The gifts were discovered by accident during a closed-door hearing of a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on aid to the Taiwan government. The testimony was summarized in the March 29 *New York Times*:

"The United States secretly presented Nationalist China last year with fighter planes, cargo planes, destroyers,

anti-aircraft missiles, tanks and rifles reportedly worth \$157-million."

The State Department admitted on March 31 that some \$3,400,000,000 worth of military equipment had been surreptitiously given to "allied" governments during the last nineteen years. All of the equipment was declared "surplus" and entered in the Defense Department's records at one-third of its original cost. A study by the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports that as much as \$10,000,000,000 worth of weapons, bought for the war in Vietnam and still in serviceable condition, will be declared "surplus" in the near future.

What this "surplus" disposal amounts to is the use of the military to make American foreign policy. Military "aid" to Taiwan, for example, was cut by Congress from \$117,000,000 in 1968 to \$25,000,000 in 1969, a big decrease—until the \$157,000,000 secretly supplied by the Pentagon is added in.

But manipulating foreign policy is not the only function of the Pentagon in the political sphere. In January former Army Intelligence Captain Christopher H. Pyle, writing in the *Washington Monthly*, revealed that the army maintains a staff of nearly 1,000 plainclothes investigators to spy on civilian political activities inside the United States.

"To assure prompt communication of these reports," Pyle said, "the Army distributes them over a nationwide wire service. Completed in the fall of 1967, this Teletype network gives every major troop command in the United States daily and weekly reports on virtually all political protests occurring anywhere in the nation."

"Today," Pyle added, "the Army maintains files on the membership, ideology, programs and practices of virtually every activist political group in the country."

These files were consolidated in a computerized data bank at Fort Holabird, Baltimore, where they are available to other political police agencies of the government, such as the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In addition the army has periodically published a list of "subversives" for the information of its commanders.

After the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] filed suit demanding discontinuance of this secret police operation, the Pentagon brass made a tactical retreat. On February 26 the chairman of the House Invasion of Privacy Subcommittee released a letter from the army's general counsel saying that all copies of the "subversive" list "have been ordered withdrawn and destroyed."

The army also said it was discontinuing its computer data bank, which the House subcommittee chairman said contained files on 18,500,000 people!

But "discontinued" apparently does not mean abandoned. An editorial in the April 1 *New York Times* said that while the computer had been scrapped, "it appears that the Army retains complete microfilm files of virtually the same information."

The *Times*, which speaks for the liberal wing of the capitalist establishment, expressed its foreboding at the direction being taken by Nixon and the Pentagon:

"The danger represented by a domestic military secret service is, in fact, more serious than is indicated by the legal language of the A. C. L. U.'s charge. In contrast to such civilian agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an Army intelligence system operating under the cover of military secrecy could skirt all supervision and restraint by Congress, the executive branch and the courts. Neither the scope of its activities, nor the competence and discretion of its personnel would be subject to civilian regulation. . . . Monitoring of ideologies smacks more of thought control than of national security. If allowed to go unchecked, it could open the door to politico-military control over civilian government."

U. S. Offers Top Pay for Mercenaries

The April 13 *Newsweek* reports that "CIA agents in Saigon are actively recruiting both American and non-American civilians there . . . to lead raiding parties of Meo tribesmen against the North Vietnamese in Laos. One such offer last week included a salary of \$1,000 a week and a week's vacation in Taiwan for every four weeks in the field."

Inside Israel Today

[The following interview with Arie Bober of the Israeli Socialist Organization (ISO) was obtained by Les Evans of *Intercontinental Press* and Robert Langston of *The Militant* in New York April 6. Bober, who is 29 years old, was born in Haifa. He served three and a half years in the Israeli navy and is at present a research assistant in the Berwald School of Social Work of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He is in the United States on a speaking tour for the Committee on New Alternatives in the Middle East.]

* * *

Question. What is the status of the anti-Zionist left in Israel today? Would you describe the organizations it comprises, particularly the Israeli Socialist Organization.

Answer. The anti-Zionist left is comprised of only two organizations: the ISO and the Communist party led by Wilner, the group that most closely follows the traditional line of Moscow. There is no other organization in Israel today, left or otherwise, that is anti-Zionist. There are some organizations that pretend to be non-Zionist, but when probed on the basic questions like their stand on the Law of Return, or other basic assumptions of Zionism, they are very quickly shown to be Zionist.

There are two Communist parties. The one led by Moshe Sneh, which is called Maki—it split from Rakah, the Wilner group—has been not only implicitly but explicitly stating that it is "returning home," returning to Zionism. Maki defends the national right of the Jews, which is equated with Zionism. But, of course, it is more liberal than the Zionists. It is important to note that Sneh, its leader and its sole member of parliament, has never, since the June war, supported the demand for complete withdrawal of the Israeli armies from the occupied territories. He is using the Eban formula of agreed and secure borders.

We can sum up the position of this Communist split—if you can still call

it Communist—by saying that on issues of world affairs it is thoroughly Stalinist, adheres to the policy of peaceful coexistence, and takes its line from the Soviet CP. But concerning the Israeli conflict it has a dispute with the stand taken by the Soviet Union on the Middle East.

Therefore today its stand is similar to that of Mapam in the early fifties, when Mapam was a very Stalinist-type party. At that time Mapam did not have to split with the Soviet Union because the Kremlin supported the formation of the State of Israel.

The Rakah group is comprised mostly of Arabs and is much stronger than the Maki group. It won most of the votes of the younger radicalized Arabs in the last election. It has three members of parliament and has a very strong hold on the Arab sector in Israel.

It has a traditional pro-Moscow position. It so happens that the Soviet Union is for the November 22, 1967, United Nations resolution and they adhere to it.

The ISO certainly does not support the stand proclaimed by Maki. It does not support the Rakah position either, because we don't agree with their concept of world policies or their particular stand on the Middle Eastern question. Inherent in the November 22 resolution is the assumption, which is not stated explicitly but is a certain outcome of this solution, that all the guerrilla movements in the Middle East will be exterminated. Otherwise it would solve nothing.

This resolution takes as its starting point the status quo, the existing regimes, including a Zionist Israel. It regards the Palestinians and the Palestinian problem as a humanitarian problem that can be solved by letting the refugees return if they please or get reparations if they remain in the Arab states.

On this question we cannot agree and we are fighting this proposal, but because of the special conditions in Israel we work together with the Rakah CP as far as possible because the objective facts are that the Stalin-

ist Rakah CP is fighting—and sometimes under heavy attack—for the rights of the Arab population in Israel.

We oppose and criticize them on all the international questions, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and world revolution in general, and, of course, on the internal structure of the revolutionary party which for them is very Stalinistic and bureaucratic.

I am afraid that there are no other organizations that are anti-Zionist. Nevertheless, there are individuals who have shown great personal courage in fighting against the regime. I am referring to people like Dr. Israel Shakhack, a Ph. D. and a lecturer at the university. He is working all the time and taking tremendous risks to expose and to publish facts about tortures, about mistreatment. He is an acknowledged anti-Zionist, and he has been elected chairman of the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Israel. He gave me a partial list of Arabs who have been mistreated or tortured, with names, places, and dates. This of course was confiscated when I left Israel.

Another person who is very outspoken and brave in this concern is Uri Davis, a pacifist. He also works with us as Shakhack does in the various activities against administrative abuse, in the general fight for democratic rights for Jews and for Arabs in Israel.

The ISO was established at the end of 1962. It has a Hebrew paper, *Matzpen* [Compass]. It has Arabs and Jews in its ranks, but it has no Arabic publication because under the Emergency Regulations we are forbidden to print an Arabic newspaper.

The ISO has grown very rapidly since the June war. It was the only organization with the exception of the most chauvinistic Zionists that was not broken up or confused by the war. Most of the groups such as Mapam, Avneri's group, different leftists, liberals, etc., saw the June war as either a miracle or a catastrophe—or both. For them Zionism was dead before the June war. Whenever we tried to argue with them and point out that Zionism

was still a live ideology and policy they would laugh at us.

Suddenly it arose in front of their faces and it confused most of these organizations, including the Communist party.

The ISO is comprised of proportional parts, students and young intellectuals, a smaller part of workers, and a still smaller number of Arabs. There are many more Jews than Arabs. The reason is that our Arab members are much more heavily persecuted than Jewish members. An Arab member is much more easily accused of being with Fateh, a terrorist, or a spy—there have been such cases. As a matter of fact all our Arab members are either in prison, in exile, under house arrest, or under restriction of movement. We do not have one Arab member who is allowed to move freely in the country.

We have distributed propaganda to Arab students in Jerusalem and in Haifa. Any time an Arab comes more than once to our meetings he has a visit from the security forces advising him—very benevolently, like a good father—that for his own sake he should leave us alone, if he doesn't want to have trouble.

Sometimes people are arrested. The latest case was Nabil Sa'ad who was arrested during the last election campaign. He was held for six weeks. He was questioned for two and a half hours with the "question" consisting only of "For your own good, leave *Matzpen*." He was released two days after the election.

Some 800 activists of the Rakah Communist party were arrested or restricted to their homes during the election campaign, including members of their Politbureau, their Central Committee, etc.

The ISO is working on three levels. First is the student body, where our main propaganda emphasis is criticizing Zionist policy and fighting against the persecution of Arab students or Arab citizens of Israel. And of course we are trying to expose the atrocities against Arabs in the occupied territories, like shooting, throwing grenades, torturing, blowing up houses, all those things.

The second level of our work is in the factories. We publish a special leaflet for workers, and the main point of our propaganda is trying to show that you cannot be a chauvinist and adhere to the "Greater Israel" and then

demand higher wages or a rising standard of living or be astounded by the profits that people make while they demand from you that your wages should go down.

The third level of work is directed at the Jewish community, especially recent immigrants, mostly young people. A great part of them came as leftists, as radicals, as revolutionaries—but with a Jewish entity, which is very understandable. We have told them, if you accept a Zionist outlook then you cannot be a socialist, and if you are a socialist you cannot be a Zionist. This has been very embarrassing to the government. In their symposiums and in the Ulpan, the schools that teach the students Hebrew, etc., the main discussion, if there is a political discussion, is *Matzpen* versus the others.

These three fields of action are interwoven. One of the most important areas where we cannot work freely is in the Arab sector. Right after the war, when every Jew was going to the "liberated" territories and meeting with Arabs and buying up everything, we also joined the march and tried to meet various known radicals, some of whom had been members of the Jordanian Communist party, which was outlawed under Hussein, or other leftist groups.

While we were not harmed, the people we met were later either expelled or put into jail.

In the Arab villages it is the same. It is not illegal to go to an Arab village, but it is not legal either. When we go there we are promptly arrested and held for anywhere from a few hours to a couple of days. Our literature is confiscated and the people we meet are put in serious danger.

In this area we are very limited in our effort to build a base, to establish chapters in Arab villages. On one hand the government is very hard on us, and on the other hand the CP, which has a base there, works against us. Rakah needs us in the Jewish sector but is very afraid of us in the Arab sector.

Q. What is the state of repression by the Zionist regime?

A. If you have a certain portion of the population that you have to oppress and some part of the oppressor nation shows sympathy for them,

then you have to repress a sector of your own kind as well. That is what is happening in Israel.

Democratic freedom is curtailed in ways that were not manifested before the June war; censorship is strict and it encompasses not only questions of military security but also purely political opinions; there is harassment by police.

Harassment against us mainly takes the form of declaring us moral outcasts in the press, thus giving a green light to various fascist groups or just small-time punks to attack us physically. We've been attacked trying to sell our newspapers, and whenever we go to the university to sell our literature we have to defend ourselves actively against Israeli chauvinists. Our people have trouble getting jobs; they receive threatening letters.

When I left Israel for this visit I was stopped at the airport. I had a visa and my passport. When I passed the police checkpoint I was taken to a special room where I was thoroughly searched. All of my papers were taken from me: addresses here in America, letters from the Committee on New Alternatives, my books, newspaper clippings, even the lectures I had written for my speaking tour. They told me they would return these things after they check them—maybe they will, maybe not.

We have a member named Ruth Milow. She was born in Germany. She was in love with a Jew—who was also a Communist. In the thirties she was persecuted in Germany as a Jew-lover. Finally they had to leave the country.

Today she is persecuted by the Jews as an Arab-lover. Her neighbors went to the secret police saying that there were "underground" meetings in her house. The police visited her and confiscated all her personal papers—they were finally returned.

Now they are putting her on trial for violating a small technicality by running a kindergarten in her home, which is not zoned for conducting a business. Her neighbors are conducting a campaign against her and against the people who send their children to her school.

It is very illuminating to see how easily a persecuted people like the Jews can turn into persecutors themselves.

Of course, the repression of Jewish dissidents is nothing compared to the

persecution of the Arabs. Dr. Israel Shakhack is compiling a specific list of cases of people who disappeared in prison, who died under torture.

Q. What was the impact in Israel of the Amnesty International revelations on the torture of Arab prisoners?

A. I was in London when this report was published. But it is significant because Amnesty International was used by the Israeli government only a couple of months ago, when a representative of that organization went on a conducted tour of Israeli jails. Amnesty International published at that time a preliminary report saying that what they had seen was satisfactory; they didn't see any torture. This was widely publicized on the radio and in the newspapers.

The problem is that whenever the question is raised—not only by *Matzpen*—of the torture of Arabs, it is quickly hushed up.

Uri Avneri raised in the Knesset [parliament] a specific case of an Arab who was arrested and afterwards his family was called to the Jerusalem jail and his body was handed to them. The family was told to bury it immediately, otherwise they would suffer. The sheet in which he was wrapped was covered with blood, and they didn't know what to do.

They asked to see a doctor but the police refused, threatening to bury him themselves if the family would not do as they said. So they buried him and went to Uri Avneri but his protest was ignored. According to Israeli law there should have been a court of inquiry and an autopsy to determine the cause of death.

People just take it in stride. I don't think they consider it important. Generally these things are known. Most Israelis are serving in the reserve army, and when they do their active turn of duty a big part of them are in the occupied territories. They see how the Arabs are treated. "We have to protect our security" is the answer to everything.

Q. Is there a youth radicalization in Israel as in other parts of the world; and in particular has the endorsement of the war in Vietnam by Golda Meir alienated young people from the regime?

A. The war in Vietnam has had a very small effect among the Israeli public, including the youth. We have had antiwar demonstrations of a couple of hundred young people, but a great deal of work went into even that turnout. The Zionists do not see the American intervention in Vietnam as a bad thing.

In the press it is stressed repeatedly that America should not "give in to the Vietcong because this is the same enemy." It is argued that if the United States extracts itself from Vietnam then maybe she will extract herself from the Middle East.

I have been told personally by some people that if they were in power they would send Israeli troops to South Vietnam and it is in "our" interests to support the Saigon regime.

As a matter of fact the criticism that Golda's telegram to Nixon did receive in Israel was mostly of a tactical nature: This would alienate the Jewish left from Israel. It was not a criticism of the basic political assumptions.

There has been some radicalization of Israeli youth, especially among high-school students. This is a result certainly of the radicalization of youth all over the world, as well as of the perspective of serving in the army in a very active role for three years or more, and the constantly growing oppressiveness of all aspects of Israeli society.

This has led to the formation of circles for free thought and democracy. There has been the growth of "underground" newspapers. These developments have been met with opposition from school authorities, etc.

In response many students have made contact with *Matzpen* and we work together.

The youth radicalization stems in part from the revolt against the old who wield authority, but because of the Israeli situation it has a particular aspect: to revolt you have to be against Zionism, or at least try to form a Zionism that would be liberal and humanistic—which, of course, in reality is a contradiction in terms—and against the war with the Arabs.

One experience that radicalized a number of high-school students occurred when they were distributing leaflets as people were coming out of the film "Z." The people turned and beat them up, calling them "Communists" and "dirty traitors."

Q. Has the repudiation by a number of the Palestinian liberation organizations of the call to "drive the Jews into the sea" had any effect in winning sections of the Jewish working class away from the Zionist government?

A. There was nothing more effective than Shukeiry's propaganda before the June war in solidifying all the Israelis. After the war the Israeli mass media put two simple alternatives before the country: "Either you are a Zionist, and in spite of any humanitarian or liberal outlook you may have you must support what the government does, or you have only one other choice, buy a boat and go to sea." The only alternatives, they said, are Fateh or us.

For a long time there was no differentiation between the Arab groups. Everything was Fateh. Only lately has the press begun to discuss the differentiation between the different groups.

Our main propaganda work is aimed at breaking this equation. I think the declarations of the Palestinian groups have had some impact; they are good. They have forced Golda Meir to address herself to those elements in Israel who want to see some sort of settlement.

In our opinion there are still important questions to be resolved beyond the rejection of the slogan "All the Jews into the sea," although that is a vital step.

Fateh looks at the Jews in the Middle East as they were in the Arab countries before Zionism began, that is, as a religious community. Therefore what they propose is the usual liberal formula of the separation of religion from the state and equal rights for all citizens.

There are other groups which go further than this and recognize the national rights of the Jewish community without specifying concrete slogans or concrete transitional formations.

There is one thing for sure, the more the propaganda from the Arab organizations recognizes the character of the Jewish community and grants it some sort of self-expression, either political, cultural, or ethnical, the harder it is for the government to pose for the Jews the question as "either adhere to us or commit suicide."

There is no visible impact among the workers, however, of Fateh's propaganda. The more educated and

the European-oriented workers are the most integrated into the Zionist machine, both the machinery of the state and the machinery of Histadrut [the General Federation of Labor in Israel].

For the Oriental Jews the situation is more complicated. Their position is very similar to that of the poor white in the American South. From their recent past in the Arab countries and their position in Israel they need to be much more Zionist than the Zionists.

The most reactionary Israeli party, Gahal, a coalition of Herut and the Liberal party, the party of the "big capitalists" of Israel, has the biggest following among the Oriental Jews. This is in spite of the fact that Gahal opposes all the immediate interests of those Jews in terms of wages, the right to strike, trade-union rights, etc.

The more revolutionary attitude of various Arab groups outside of Fateh regarding the Israeli community as a national community requiring a national right of expression of some sort has certainly had an impact on the youth and some radical intellectuals.

The government has seen this as a danger and has censored our attempts to publish these views in our paper. The press retaliated against us for expressing these views by a campaign accusing us of being traitors, Fateh agents, self-haters. We were even accused of wanting to build ovens in Israel to burn the Israelis.

This forced Mordehai Bar-On, the former chief education officer of the Israel Defense Forces who is now head of the Jewish Agency's youth department, to announce in an interview that it is imperative that *Matzpen* not be outlawed as this would make them martyrs, but to expose them to the Israeli public, especially to the youth, as traitors. He said the government is planning to open a wide educational operation in the high schools concerning this point.

Q. Has the grip of the Zionist organizations on the general population been strengthened since the June war?

A. Yes. The June war revived Zionism. Before the war there was a great emigration out of the country, especially of skilled people, intellectuals, university graduates. Today this has been reversed.

Before the June war, in part because

of the economic recession in 1965-1966, there was a general sentiment that something had to be done, that major changes were needed. Today there is virtually a complete unification on basic issues, not only by individuals but by parties which before the war presented themselves as being so opposite each other. Today almost everybody agrees and everybody assumes that there is no fundamental argument between them. There is only a dispute on marginal issues.

This unity is manifested in the Knesset where the ruling coalition comprises 108 seats out of 120. There is virtually no opposition.

The liberals argue that first we are Zionists, and while we want to be moral, liberal, democratic, we cannot afford to.

The chauvinists say, "What the hell anyway." There is a popular song in Israel, "All the world is against us, what do we care?" This is their attitude.

The Zionist community does not tolerate any dissenting view. There is no political discussion. There is no basic public debate about what we are going to do. The question, if it arises, touches only marginal points. If someone says something against the tribal taboo he is not discussed with, not debated—he is expelled out of the tribe. He is a self-hater, a traitor, or a Fateh agent, and there is nothing to discuss with him. The only thing to be done is to silence him as easily and as efficiently as possible.

Certainly you can say that Zionism, as a colonization movement, was one of a very particular kind, because of its attempt to solve the Jewish question by creating a whole nation; it was different from the usual colonization pattern. But today even from this point of view it is beginning to turn towards the pattern of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Among the whites, the settlers, there is no difference of view because they are united by a basic tie. That the same process is beginning to happen to Zionism as expressed by Israeli society is shown by the revival of the Jewish Agency.

It can be shown in the characteristic way that the Israeli youth revolt has taken the form of youth conquering the Zionist meetings. They demanded representation. They got it, but so what? The *aim* of the Zionist move-

ment was to enlist the young Jews, and they were only too happy to see the youth break down the doors to get in.

The Zionists pointed to the recent turnout of 7,000 Arab citizens to vote for Teddy Kollek in Jerusalem as proof that Zionism could provide democracy for all the citizens of Israel and break down Arab chauvinism by winning votes for a Zionist candidate. But exactly the opposite was proved. I was working in the Jerusalem election and there were hundreds of Arabs pressing, begging the police, "Please let us vote."

So I asked them why. They answered, if we do not have the imprint showing that we voted we will not have jobs tomorrow.

This was publicized by the "opposition" a few days later because they were beaten by it; with those 7,000 votes Teddy Kollek won a majority in the Jerusalem council.

For one day all the opposition papers complained. The *Ha-arets* newspaper even said, "we were used in the fifties, the Yemenite Jews were driven like herds to the elections to assure Mapai's victory. But today, in the sixties, we are a democracy, how can this happen?"

But afterwards there was silence. It was characterized by the editorial of Hertzl Rosenblum, who is the editor of *Yedioth Aharonoth*, one of the biggest dailies in Israel. He said, "How the election in Jerusalem was won, we all know. But for patriotic reasons I cannot go into it."

Let us take another aspect: education. For a long time there was a rejection of Jewishness. In my time the Israelis were looking down on Jews in the Diaspora. This was part of the Zionist propaganda aim in Israel. We are the new Jews, the ones who stood up, the bold ones. It was not dissimilar to the anti-Semitic propaganda, but we took it. The Jews in the Diaspora are the perverted Jews, the abnormal Jews, the degraded Jews.

In the fifties there was a switch, and they began to stress the continuousness of the Jews. All the Jews were always Zionists; almost all the gentiles were always anti-Semites. There was no differentiation. From Titus the Greek who destroyed the first temple up to Nasser today they were always coming at us and wanting to destroy us.

There was published lately a study

by Professor Adahr, the head of the education department of the Hebrew University, pointing out that the Israeli system of education is not an educational system but an indoctrination system. The youth are not supplied with the tools to analyze or think freely, but they are indoctrinated. This is a Zionist speaking, from the viewpoint of efficient education and the efficient production of good fighters and Jews who can, with small numbers, maintain their force against overwhelming numbers of Arabs.

Furthermore, Adahr says, in the teaching of "universal" values as compared to "particularist" values, the system leans overwhelmingly to the particularist values. There is almost no stress on such elementary bourgeois-democratic ideals as justice, equality, democracy.

As a matter of fact there are papers and articles in Israel's press saying that all the trouble we have is due to the damned emancipation which was a product of the damned French revolution. This is not only published but accepted by part of the population.

There are articles and editorials by "writers," by "liberals," by "radical artists," which in the United States, I'm afraid, apart from the John Birch Society and Barry Goldwater, *nobody* would even publish.

These are all indications that the Zionist regime not only is strengthened but is consciously employing more and more means to solidify itself.

On the other hand something must be stressed. All this is not a strengthening of the structure because the regime is solving the basic needs or contradictions of the population; on the contrary. The basic contradictions and interests are only subdued. And we see here and there militant explosions of workers and other sectors, spontaneous things that break out.

At best the Zionists prolong the crisis. They put it forward in time but they don't solve anything. The key is to convince the Israeli public that there is a viable alternative. Nobody in his right mind would accept higher taxes, killings, no democratic rights, etc., unless they were sure there were no other alternatives.

Q. What perspective do you see for resolving the crisis in the Middle East?

A. In our opinion, Zionism as a self-liberation movement of the Jews

is a contradiction. Zionism tried to solve the Jewish problem; it didn't succeed. Instead, it created a revival of the Jewish problem and added the Israeli problem.

Any attempt to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict must take into account one very important factor. This is not simply a dispute that started between two nations, normal nations, like the Germans and the French, over some marginal land or some past grievances.

On the other hand it is also not simply a dispute between a settlers' community versus the indigenous society.

It is both. This stems from the history and practice of the Zionist enterprise.

Therefore this Israeli-Arab conflict is impossible to solve as long as the Jewish community remains a settlers' community engaged in a colonialist undertaking. The necessary first condition, which is not enough by itself, should be to abolish, in certain ways, this settlers' characteristic. In our slogans this is called the de-Zionization of Israel. This means the abolishing of all laws that give privileges to the Jews.

But this is not enough. You cannot have the illusion that you can solve such a problem purely on a national basis, which means any sort of isolation, either of the Israelis or of the Palestinians from the entire region of the Arab East.

Any such isolation first of all would not abolish this basic contradiction between settlers and the indigenous population and would create two new small states which could not be by themselves anything but stooges of the imperialists.

Any such "solution" would not challenge the imperialist status quo. It would involve a compromise with imperialism—both with the Zionist ally of imperialism and with the imperialist stooges still in power in some Arab countries. Zionism cannot be defeated without defeating imperialism; any compromise with the status quo anywhere in the Middle East is thus in reality also a compromise with Zionism. Thus, such a proposal is fundamentally reformist, not revolutionary.

To put it in slogan form, we propose a solution by de-Zionization of Israel and by integrating a de-Zionized, socialist Israel into a socialist Middle East. Then the question of the

national self-determination of the Jews or the Palestinians would become secondary because the basic thing is the class struggle and the anti-imperialist struggle in the whole Middle East.

Putting it negatively, we have a disagreement with the Fateh group, for instance, over their assumption that this conflict can be resolved on the basis of Palestine alone; because in reality, the conditions of a settlement involve the entire region.

After a revolution, or in the process of the revolution, the question of national minorities like the Israelis or the Kurds can be dealt with. But to try to pose the question as one between an Israeli majority and a Palestinian minority—or vice versa—is the wrong way and leads to wrong conclusions.

We advocate a revolutionary struggle by Jews and Arabs. We think that the major factor should be a joint revolutionary organization of Arabs, Jews, and other minorities in the whole Middle East and the creation of a socialist revolutionary Middle East. Within this framework, the problem of non-Arab minorities could be dealt with in the socialist tradition, by the acknowledgment of the principle of self-determination.

Guatemala

Von Spreti Case

Diplomatic circles blame the Guatemalan government for the death of the West German ambassador, Count Karl von Spreti. Guatemalan army officers are said to have prevented President Julio Mendez Montenegro from dealing with the guerrilla forces who kidnapped the ambassador and demanded a ransom of \$700,000 and the release of twenty-two political prisoners. When the terms were not met, the guerrillas, said to be members of the FAR [Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes], killed the ambassador on April 5.

The West German government, which was willing to pay the ransom, took diplomatic reprisals against Guatemala.

The Mendez regime responded with a new witch-hunt. On April 8 the secret terrorist organization MANO [Movimiento Anticomunista Nacionalista Organizado] assassinated Cesar Montenegro Paniagua, a former Communist deputy.

It was reported that on the same day, a guerrilla, David Guerra Guzman, arrested last January 8, was killed in police headquarters "while attempting to flee." Hundreds of arrests were being made, particularly in university circles.

Cuba, Military Reformism, and Armed Struggle in Latin America

By Livio Maitan

[The following article has been scheduled for publication in a coming issue of *Quatrième Internationale* (Fourth International) to which the author refers from time to time in the text. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The Latin-American revolutionary movement is once again being shaken by polemics and stormy conflicts. The old debates over the nature of the Latin-American revolution and on the attitude to be taken toward the so-called national bourgeoisie have been resuscitated by the spectacular measures adopted by Velasco in Peru and Ovando in Bolivia. Tensions are increasing even among the forces that opted for armed struggle and OLAS. The Cuban leadership itself is becoming the object of public denunciations by the guerrilla leaders which it had enthusiastically supported. The strategy followed by revolutionary groups and movements in many countries is being subjected to close critical analysis, often on the initiative of participants in heroic struggles.

What Do the Velasco and Ovando Regimes Signify?

The Peruvian and Bolivian events and the orientation adopted by Velasco Alvarado and Ovando Candia—who are trying to give the impression that they are the initiators of a revolutionary-democratic renewal and a struggle against the imperialist grip on their countries—deserve attention not only for their intrinsic importance but also because they express a tendency which might materialize in other countries as well. In fact "Peruvian" currents are taking form increasingly in other places and it is symptomatic that in the ranks of the revolutionary movement itself some are predicting and even hoping that these currents will come to power.

In general the three fundamental questions posed are the following: (1) What is the significance of the new course of the military regime in Peru and the turn attempted by Ovando in Bolivia? (2) What is the real portent of the international orientation Cuba has adopted and especially of the change in the relations between Cuba and the USSR? (3) What is the situation of the Latin-American revolutionary movement? What lessons must it draw from the experience of the last years and on what principles must its strategy be based in the future?

It is impossible to make an exhaustive examination of all these problems in the context of a single article. So I will have to compress and simplify as much as possible, referring my readers for a whole series of questions both to the [Latin-American] document adopted by the world congress of the Fourth International in April 1969 and to the more detailed analyses that our magazine has already published or is publishing in this same issue.

In order to understand the origins and nature of the new "military reformism" (I will use this general term in order to simplify the discussion), the question must first be answered whether new economic and social tendencies have emerged in the recent period in Latin America as a whole. In other words, is a new "reformism" possible owing to the existence of objective margins for concessions to the masses and important changes occurring in the stratification of social classes and in the relationship of forces between them?

Once the terms of the question are posed, the answer follows automatically. No one can claim that the new

course in Peru and the turn in Bolivia are the result of an economic boom, even of the most modest dimensions, which would permit concessions to the popular strata; or of any substantial change in the composition and dynamic of the ruling classes. In Peru Velasco's coup d'état occurred in the midst of an extremely serious political and economic situation, emerging as an extreme solution for heading off a rapidly ripening major crisis of the system as such. In Bolivia the situation—from the standpoint of the defenders of the system—was still more alarming. Despite the blows suffered by the revolutionary movement and the long wave of repressions, the hostility of the masses toward the regime was mounting steadily.¹ The defeats suffered by the revolutionary movement had left the ruling classes a respite, but every attempt at achieving a reorganization and some kind of stabilization of the government had failed miserably. The groups in power were without any popular base. The imperialist vise was tightening unbearably. In this situation the logic of both experiments was an attempt to find a "new" solution—in fact, a daring, and in the Bolivian case almost desperate, attempt.

In Bolivia, with the fall of Paz Estenssoro, it became clear that the army was now operating as the only party able with the least effectiveness to guarantee the survival and mini-

1. For a more detailed analysis on Peru see the article "Une année de reformisme militaire au Pérou," *Quatrième Internationale*, November 1969 (an English translation appeared in *Intercontinental Press*, November 24, 1969, page 1044, under the title "A Year of Military Reformism"). For Bolivia see the analysis in the document voted by the November 1969 conference of the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario—Revolutionary Workers party, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International] in *Intercontinental Press*, April 13, page 328. (See also the text of Adolfo Siles's report of August 7, 1969.)

mum functioning of the system. After the coup of late September 1969 the group around Ovando made an attempt to utilize this instrument not only for repressive or strictly defensive objectives but also for a more ambitious policy. The aims of this policy were, on the one hand, to enable the native possessing classes to appropriate a less ridiculously small share of the pie; and, on the other, to establish relations with the masses, primarily the petty-bourgeois masses, by means of a campaign of nationalistic and socialist-sounding demagoguery. In Peru the new military team could link up with the traditions of currents that had already appeared in the army in the past. Such currents had manifested themselves especially in the first period of Pérez Godoy's government. There was the difference, however, that Pérez Godoy only promoted the rise to power of a political current which he considered more representative of the national bourgeoisie (Belaúnde). But as Velasco saw it the "civilista" [civilian] political apparatus was totally incapable of acting to achieve a renewal and the only viable instrument was the army. Only the army could impose discipline on the different sectors of the ruling class and at the same time bring pressure to bear on imperialism, as well as contain or repress the mass movements. To complete the picture, American imperialism — burnt by its Cuban experience, preoccupied with events in Asia, and conscious of the reality of the relationship of forces in Latin America — adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the Peruvian regime and, in spite of everything, toward Ovando as well. The outline of a more flexible line for Latin America was, moreover, presented in the Rockefeller report. Its conclusion was, better this new breed of military officers than guerrillas!

The two experiments in military reformism, and most of all the "cleaner" one by the Peruvian team, were to produce reactions very rapidly in all circles and stimulate hopes. As for the ruling classes themselves, there were fears that people like Velasco and Ovando would play the role of apprentice sorcerers, and there was reluctance to pay the price necessary for such operations. However, these feelings were counterbalanced, at least in the more clear-sighted sectors, by an understanding that it was impos-

sible to base relationships with the masses on repression and terror alone; as well as by a desire to win concessions from imperialism and eliminate or limit particularly scandalous forms of exploitation and alienation of national sovereignty. After the crushing of the guerrilla nuclei in several countries and after it became evident that it was difficult if not impossible for mass movements by themselves to lead to substantial changes, it was inevitable that illusions would arise in the popular strata and that an expectant attitude or even hope would take form. In political circles a whole sector of the traditional left influenced by the Communist parties and by centrist currents could only rejoice. Their old schemes of revolution by stages and their strategy of an anti-imperialist and antioligarchical alliance with the so-called national bourgeoisie regained ground and their policy seemed to recover an objective basis. Even in revolutionary sectors the moves of Velasco and Ovando were sometimes followed with a sympathetic eye.²

Moreover, Fidel Castro himself gave the green light for such positions by his estimations of the new Peruvian regime. In his speeches of July 14 and November 4 he expressed a positive evaluation of the confiscation of the IPC and of the agrarian reform. But he went on from this basis to accepting the idea of a Peruvian exceptionalism, explaining flatly that in Peru the army was playing a revolutionary role. As of this writing the Cubans are keeping their distance from the Bolivian officers; the political reasons for this inconsistent attitude are

2. See, for example, the articles and interviews published by the Montevideo weekly *Marcha*, which it would be wrong to think represent the views of only their authors; the pro-Velasco attitude of the Peruvian group inspired by I. Frias; the attitude expressed in Rico Galan's letter to the Mexican students. As for the Posadista groups, which broke from the Fourth International on the pretext that it was opportunist, they are shamelessly supporting both Velasco and Ovando. It is true that in this whole Posadas game, besides political delirium there are some very suspicious elements. How can it be explained, for example, that at a time when revolutionists are still outlawed and many POR and ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional — National Liberation Army] activists are in prison or being hunted that the reactionary daily *Jornada* serialized in several issues one of the interminable documents of Juan Posadas?

no secret to anybody. However, if the Cubans applied the same criteria to Bolivia as to Peru, they could not in good logic reach qualitatively different conclusions.

All of this confirms the fact that there are important forces, and forces of a different nature, which have a stake in a positive development of the experiments in progress in Peru and in Bolivia. This implies also that in certain conditions similar experiments might be undertaken in other countries. Once again it is necessary to avoid a careless and impressionistic application of abstract schemata. In countries where the army does not yet have an important influence (e.g., Uruguay), where "Nasserite" tendencies have not existed for some time, or where "civilista" traditions are still firm, an attempt at military reformism — at least at this stage — would pose insoluble problems. Similar considerations hold for countries where the image of the army as a whole has long been that of ultrareactionary "gorillas." There are, however, countries, including some decisive ones, where neither the most farsighted groups in the ruling class nor the most influential imperialist circles can allow an indefinite protraction of situations that might lead to explosions seriously threatening the survival and functioning of the system (e.g., Brazil, and, *mutatis mutandis*, Mexico). In these cases we cannot rule out deepgoing differentiation in the army itself — indeed such differentiation often already exists. And here we cannot exclude, finally, the possibility that the "Peruvian" path will be chosen as the only even slightly viable solution. Let me repeat, I am considering potential tendencies which may or may not crystallize. However, the important thing is that these tendencies exist, are operating, and already constitute one of the elements in the political interaction in Latin America.

In this sense the analysis which I made at the congress of the Fourth International on the tendency toward a universalization of military regimes retains its essential validity.³ However, more attention must be drawn to the fact that there are different variants of a military regime. Moreover, to the extent that the army tends to

3. See *Quatrième Internationale*, May 1969, pages 58-59; and *Intercontinental Press*, July 14, pages 717-18.

become a political party and to function as the instrument of leadership in societies where all sorts of conflicts and contradictions are developing, political differentiations arise or are reflected within the armed forces. However, this does not put the army's primordial role in question. In its reactionary variant, a military regime appears as the only kind of government capable of suppressing mass movements and blocking their rise, arising because more or less classical fascist dictatorships—that is, enjoying a certain popular base—prove impossible or extremely problematical. In the "progressive variant," as a result of the failure of "democratic" experiments in the style of Frei and Belaúnde, it is military reformism that is prescribed as the only real way out.

What then is the nature of the regimes that exist now in Peru and Bolivia?

We do not minimize the importance of some measures such as the expropriation of imperialist companies or the agrarian reform. Revolutionists have no fear of declaring themselves in favor of these measures. But this does not necessarily imply that they consider the regimes that adopt them revolutionary. Over and above the intrinsic importance of such measures, we must consider the general framework they fit into and the objective dynamic of the process initiated. Unfortunately, Fidel Castro did not do this in his speeches. If the expropriation of a few foreign companies were a first step toward complete expropriation of imperialist property, which would be followed up by the expropriation of native-owned property (at least the decisive sectors)—as was the case in Cuba—then this measure would in fact mark the commencement of a revolutionary regime. The same thing would hold in the case of an agrarian reform capable of developing in accordance with an anti-imperialist and anticapitalist logic and actively mobilizing the great masses of the peasantry. But, as all the Peruvian revolutionists say and as we have shown in the analyses in our magazine, there is nothing to support the postulation of such a variant.⁴ To

the contrary, everything indicates that Velasco wants to eliminate certain forms of imperialist exploitation and intervene in some very limited sectors, but not to eliminate imperialist ownership entirely—American, European, or any other kind. Still less does he want to strike a blow at national capitalism, which in reality he is trying to promote, including through the mechanism of the agrarian reform. As for the masses, Velasco assigns them at most an auxiliary role and he is ready to brutally strangle any attempt to organize and mobilize the masses independently and on a class basis.

How then could Fidel Castro make the suppositions he did, speaking flatly of a "revolutionary role"? Was he, at bottom, making an implicit analogy with the course of the Cuban revolution, which made its radical, anticapitalist choice empirically, under the pressure of events, and on the initiative of a leadership which at first was neither proletarian nor Marxist? Such an analogy would be entirely without foundation. The individual subjective factors are obviously quite different. No one could seriously compare men like Fidel and Guevara—who had prior connections with mass movements and revolutionary experiences, political and even Marxist training, and an acute awareness of the role played by different social forces in the revolutionary process—with Velasco's team of brass hats. But even leaving aside this question, the Cuban leadership was the direct expression of the masses, which had already waged a revolutionary strug-

vian section of the Fourth International]. (Unfortunately some Cuban journals published documents by Hugo Blanco with cuts that changed the meaning.) See also my article already cited. The analyses which have appeared in certain bourgeois journals, including those by Marcel Niedergang in *Le Monde* of February 20, 21, and 22, 1969, confirm the fact that these estimations do not arise from a sectarian or schematic attitude. It is also worth noting that on the occasion of the first anniversary of his rise to power Velasco said among other things: "The government offers confidence and support for investment that stimulates economic development within the bounds of respect for the legitimate expectations of capital and the legitimate rights of labor. . . . From the beginning, the government has stated that it was supporting and encouraging private investment, including foreign investment which accepts the laws of the country."

gle arms in hand. The Peruvian officers, to the contrary, advocate a "revolution" from above, under the strict control of an army that retains all its traditional structures and conceptions.

In regard to Bolivia, the terms of the problem should be still clearer since the measures adopted so far have been much more limited and the objective margin for maneuver is markedly narrower. To the extent that a revolutionary-democratic program could be carried out within the framework of the capitalist bourgeois system, this was done in the first years of the Paz Estenssoro regime. This regime nationalized the mines—the country's crucial industry—and adopted a quite radical agrarian reform with respect to the general run of such measures in other countries. This situation requires that any government that wanted to undertake a revolutionary policy would have to move, from the beginning, onto the ground of anticapitalist and socialist achievements. For my part, I leave to others the privilege of devoting themselves to variations on the theme of a so-called socialist option by Ovando and a military team which remains bound by a thousand ties to the imperialism that trained it and which has to its credit the massacre of thousands of workers and the murder of Che.⁵

It is not possible here to analyze the objective possibilities for reformist operations in the different countries of Latin America. I can say, in any case, that in most of these countries, the adoption of substantial anticapitalist measures would threaten to quickly generate a dynamic that would challenge the framework of the system as a whole. This is why even the least conservative strata of the ruling classes will hesitate to attempt any spectacular turns. But most of all the following question must be answered: What so-

5. On the subject of Bolivia see the article "De Siles a Ovando," *Quatrieme Internationale*, January 1970 (an English translation of this article appeared in *Intercontinental Press*, December 8, page 1100, under the title "The Replacement of Siles") and the document voted by the November conference of the POR. Regarding General Ovando's views very lively polemics occurred in the Bolivian press in January 1970 following the statements which Ovando made to the Uruguayan journalist Carlos Maria Gutierrez. These statements were later denied or rectified.

4. See especially several statements by Hugo Blanco, Hector Bejar, Ricardo Gadea, and some documents of the FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario—Front of the Revolutionary Left, the Peru-

cial strata would be the beneficiaries of a reformist course? Clearly—the Peruvian model shows it unmistakably—the ones to profit would be the national bourgeoisie of the most dynamic, most "modern" industrial sectors. This does not imply that the national bourgeoisie could touch off a radical, anti-imperialist movement, in which the working class and the poor peasantry could ally themselves with it. This bourgeoisie is intimately linked to imperialism, often associated with mixed companies in the last analysis controlled by big international concerns or trusts. It is absolutely impossible to envisage any ruptures between this section of the national bourgeoisie and imperialism, which would inevitably mean disaster for the native capitalists themselves. Moreover, from a broader standpoint, in a time of feverish capital concentration and the emergence of ever more powerful capitalist combinations, the hypothesis of the development on a large scale of a national industrial economy seems simply utopian. Any possible reform would, therefore, not go beyond an internal restructuring of the ruling classes, a change in the relationship of forces between these classes, and a more extensive association of the na-

The International Context and the Policy of the Cuban Leadership

I have already mentioned the attitude of American imperialism toward the Bolivian and Peruvian events. The Soviet Union also has a word to say, and it has already entered into a game where it clearly holds some important cards.

In February the Moscow correspondent of the organ of the Italian CP wrote an article commenting on the visit of Carlos Raphael Rodriguez. It might be interesting to quote a few passages since this author has certainly drawn on Soviet sources. After noting that, according to a statement of Raúl Castro, "relations today between Cuba and the USSR are good," the correspondent wrote: "There is no doubt that the basis for improving relations is not solely the accords achieved in the economic sphere. Between the two parties and the two countries there is certainly a greater unity of views today also on the problems—which for a long period were

tive bourgeoisie with imperialist concerns. The mass movement would be no more than an auxiliary force, with the workers and peasants regimented in unions or official political organizations under the strict and direct control of the elements in power.

As our Bolivian and Peruvian comrades have already explained, this analysis does not imply an attitude of indifference or hostility a priori toward the new course of military reformism. Even limited measures striking at imperialist property or the power of the oligarchy will have the support of revolutionists. Such support will, however, be critical support. On the one hand, revolutionists will never cover up the class nature and the real objectives of the regime. On the other, they will struggle to involve the masses, demanding, for example, workers control over expropriated enterprises and the creation of peasant committees to enforce the agrarian reform. Fundamentally, revolutionists will defend the class independence of the mass movement and fight intransigently in defense of the essential democratic rights, first of all for the freedom of workers and peasants to organize politically and in trade unions.⁶

the object of polemics, and even harsh polemics—of foreign policy and the attitude to be taken toward the situation which is ripening in disregard of all schemata in Latin America. Cuba and the USSR have begun to draw closer on these questions, in fact, since the anti-American coup d'etat in Peru—since this development the repercussions the Peruvian events have had throughout Latin America forced the Communist movement to reexamine the situation and sort out its positions

6. I will not take up in this article the problem of the real possibilities of a prolongation and success—in the limits indicated—of the new reformist course. In my article on Peru I stressed all the grave difficulties the Peruvian government must confront. These difficulties are still more considerable in the case of Bolivia. But what I was interested in here was to indicate the objective import of military reformism in the most favorable variant, that is, if it were actually implemented.

regarding the deepening conflict between the traditional forces, including a part of the South American armies themselves, and the United States. Since then the situation has evolved, although in a contradictory form. It has raised the problem for the socialist countries of developing a policy adequate for the new circumstances and which would take account of the objective need of any political force in South America that wants to struggle against the U.S. enslavement policy of having a base of support in the socialist countries. Thus, reality has quickly outmoded the Cuban polemic against the Soviet policy of economic accords with the South American countries and at the same time certain academic responses to the theories of the 'Tricontinental.' Reality has demanded moreover a bold initiative; for example, an answer to the appeals for collaboration from countries which for years did not even have ambassadors in the socialist countries. . . . From the beginning the Soviet Union, responding positively to moves to normalize relations, openly raised the question of Cuba, explaining that the touchstone for judging the new South American regimes was their attitude toward the Cuban revolution. In this way the conditions arose for a Soviet-Cuban initiative of a new type toward South America, the aim of which was to bring about the definitive failure of the economic and political blockade that the Americans chose to mount against Cuba." (*L'Unità*, February 11, 1970.)

Let us disregard everything that stems from the impressionism of the journalist and the centrism of the Italian CP. The quotation is nevertheless useful because it brings out clearly the convergence of interests and pressures favoring and prompting a major political operation. Certain sectors of the Latin-American bourgeoisie want to loosen the stifling hold of American imperialism both by collaboration with other imperialisms and by an opening toward the USSR, and at the same time they envision a détente with Cuba which could have favorable repercussions domestically and might prompt a less intransigent attitude on the part of the Cubans. The USSR has an obvious interest in strengthening its presence in Latin America and in softening up the Cuban leaders as much as possible. As for the Cuban state, it could be interested in having

the regimes that confront it, if only for temporary demagogic aims, change their language and rectify their attitude, thereby offering Cuba a larger margin for maneuver and loosening the encirclement imposed by Washington. Finally, the United States itself might regard a temporarily increased involvement of the USSR in the Latin-American game as positive, since in the last analysis it would serve to brake and canalize revolutionary upsurges as well as the Cuban initiative.

It would be all too easy to point out the weak sides and contradictory elements in such design. For example, you need only think of the almost insurmountable difficulties the USSR would have in responding positively to all the demands for substantial trade and economic aid, if such demands came simultaneously from a whole series of Latin-American countries. It would be enough, moreover, to take into account the fact that if the United States might temporarily tolerate increased Soviet intervention, it could not help but react strongly to any spread of Soviet influence even partially challenging its domination in this part of the world. However, what interests us most here is the problem that is ultimately crucial for revolutionists, the attitude of Cuba.

It is unquestionable that a turn has occurred in Cuban policy. The expressions of this turn are, notably, the evolution of Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union, its attitude toward the Peruvian military regime, and the deterioration of its relationships with a series of revolutionary movements in Latin America. Some of these movements have openly accused the Cuban leadership of capitulating to Soviet pressures and ceasing to aid the development of the revolution.⁷ The essential factors contributing to this turn cannot be forgotten or minimized. On the one hand, Cuba remains a besieged fortress for which the economic and military collaboration of the Soviet Union is an elementary necessity. On the other hand, the setbacks suffered by the revolutionary movement in several countries over the past years impel the Cuban leadership, in this

7. The rupture between the Cubans and Douglas Bravo was made public a few months ago, but serious tensions also exist with other movements including those with strictly Fidelista origins.

stage, to rely primarily on domestic gains, notably the achievement of spectacular economic objectives—that is, to give priority to strengthening the foundations of the workers state, even by an international policy of a *détente* with some Latin-American countries.

But the question is whether Fidel Castro and his collaborators have already accepted or are getting ready to accept a new strategy involving the following: abandonment of stimulating and aiding the Latin-American revolutionary processes; acceptance in general of the international policy framework of the Soviet bureaucracy; normalization of relations with sectors of the Latin-American bourgeoisie; and even at the outermost limit, a *modus vivendi* with the United States. American imperialism could swallow the Cuban affront, if the infection were limited to that island alone. It was not, perhaps, altogether coincidental that a few weeks ago bourgeois sources drew attention to some little-known events that occurred at the time of the first Punta del Este meeting, more precisely to the relations between Ernesto Guevara and representatives of the Kennedy team, in which members of the Argentinian government participated. On this occasion the possibility was supposed to have been sounded out of an agreement based on a *de facto* elimination of the imperialist blockade and an abandonment on the Cuban side of "exporting revolution." This attempt fell flat. However, it may be that even in Washington someone considers that the time has come to make another push in this direction.⁸

But such an extensive deterioration of Cuban policy would only be possible if the leadership of the Cuban state had undergone a qualitative change. In other words, such a shift would be a corollary of a bureaucratic degeneration similar to that which has distinguished the Soviet Union and the other workers states born since the second world war. In the last analysis, this is the frame of the debate.

8. The answer that Guevara is supposed to have given on "exporting revolution," according to the version broadcast by Italian television, was absolutely correct. This concept itself was critically analyzed and there was no commitment to abandon solidarity with the Latin-American revolutionists.

I will not repeat here the arguments that I have advanced elsewhere on the exceptional subjective qualities of the Fidelista team, whose historical role no one can underestimate. These qualities have not ceased to constitute a favorable factor. However, in the long run the question will inevitably be decided by the processes governed by social forces and economic and political structures.

In the first place, economic development is playing and will play a role. If the growth rate is inadequate and difficulties persist for a prolonged period, especially in the area of food supply and consumption in general; if objectives considered essential such as harvesting ten million tons of sugar are not attained, or are attained at the cost of an exertion too great to be repeated, or at the expense of other vital branches of the economy—then bad consequences will result. Relations with the masses will deteriorate. The grip of the Soviet bureaucracy will tighten. And income distribution will still be conditioned for a long time by a situation of scarcity. But even in the case of the most positive variant, the dangers of bureaucratization will not necessarily be eliminated.

Up until now bureaucratic tendencies have been held in check. There is no privileged bureaucratic layer separated from the masses. The methods of political leadership remain qualitatively different from those adopted in the degenerated workers states (a symptomatic feature is that the circulation of ideas is incomparably freer in Cuba than anywhere else). Revolution in Latin America is still considered a necessary condition for the survival and development of the Cuban state itself. There is indisputably a turning inward on domestic problems and a pause for reflection. It is also probable that no initiative similar to Che's Bolivian campaign nor even like those previously in Venezuela will be attempted in the present stage. But there is nothing to support the assumption that in the event of the outbreak of a new wave of revolutionary struggle and armed struggle in a Latin-American country the Cuban leadership would adopt a reserved attitude or try to cool things down. Once again its active solidarity would be assured.

However, there are some facts which cannot be ignored. Since I cannot develop a detailed analysis in this article,

I will limit myself to raising two questions. The first concerns the differentiation that already exists, or is even growing, between the living standards of the professional strata and the mass of the workers and the people in general. This is a matter of still relatively modest privileges which are most often seen as a kind of compensation for very devoted people who are doing a killing job and playing a vital role. Nonetheless, this could mark the beginning of the crystallization of a social stratum which in the long run would inevitably and even unconsciously be impelled to consider these conditions as normal and thus to defend them and consolidate them by means of political and administrative power. The second problem—to which the first is obviously linked—is that of the lack of political structures and the growing role of the army.

From the beginning of the "growing over" of the Cuban revolution into a socialist revolution, we have stressed the absence in Cuba of political organs of the soviet type which would make possible an organized and interlocking expression from below of the will of the masses as well as real mass participation in the administration of the state at the different levels.⁹ This lack is made more serious by the fact that eleven years after the seizure of power and eight years since the attack against Escalante, the construction of the party itself has not been completed and it has yet to hold its first congress. Moreover, the unions—which were under the control of a Stalinist team for long years—have not experienced a real revival, having only a very limited function. The leadership has endeavored to fill this vacuum by a direct relationship between Fidel and his small nucleus and the masses, as well as by periodic mass mobilizations. It has used and is using the army more and more. The armed forces are being assigned increasing tasks in all areas. Fidel's speech of November 4, 1969, represented an attempt to give a theoretical justification of this practice.

I do not underestimate the subjective role of Fidel Castro and his nucleus; they are indisputably inspired by anti-bureaucratic feelings and have proved

it on several occasions. Nor do I forget the class nature and the historical origin of the Cuban army. However, an approach based on these two elements of direct contact between the leadership and the masses and using the army as an organizational instrument are more likely in the long run to promote than to counteract tendencies toward bureaucratization. In the last analysis it will be the broad social processes that will be decisive. And in this area the framework for a victorious struggle against the bureaucracy can only be provided by the creation of actually functioning, interlocking, and stable democratic workers' structures. Only such organization can make possible direct participation by the masses in running the state at all levels. The danger of bureaucratization is all the greater because the USSR is using and will use to the fullest every means at its disposal to

integrate Cuba into an international system in which the Kremlin holds leadership and which is governed fundamentally by the interests of bureaucratic self-preservation.

Here then in a sketchy way are the terms of the questions. It goes without saying that the revolutionary movement cannot limit itself to discerning the tendencies that are taking form or to drawing attention to mounting dangers. Its task is to act, utilizing all its potential to bring about conditions favorable for the defense and development of the Cuban workers state. Concretely, this means giving a positive response to the problems which are posed in this stage in Latin America as a whole by promoting a strategy capable of producing a favorable outcome of the struggles that are developing and the revolutionary explosions that are building up.

Orientation and Methods of Revolutionary Struggle

It is precisely in this area where polemics and differentiations are taking form in the Latin-American movements. The movements are debating continental strategy and the means used to apply it, the balance sheet of the past, and the orientations to be adopted in the period opening up.

First of all, it must be noted that not only has the OLAS, as an organization, failed lamentably but also that the role of the Cuban leadership in the Latin-American revolution is being increasingly disputed. I already mentioned the public attack on the Cuban leadership by Douglas Bravo's movement. But others are also expressing criticisms that follow more or less the same lines. In fact, most of the groups linked to Castroism are increasingly taking their distance from Havana, accentuating their independence. They now have a tendency to consider the relations they establish among themselves more important than their relations with the Cubans and what remains of OLAS—more properly speaking, of the preliminary moves to establish this organization.

This evolution may have been favored by errors of method or inadequacies in orientation on the part of the Cubans (who, however, on their side were doubtless disappointed by the instability and adventuristic dilet-

tantism rampant in sectors of the far left in Latin America also). However, the development of this critical attitude will have positive results only if it facilitates the formulation and application of a more effective strategy and the formation of a broader revolutionary united front.

Independently of the present positions, the problem arises whether the partial turn of the Cubans and the relative cooling of the relationships between them and a series of revolutionary tendencies might not create a more favorable situation for a strengthening of Chinese influence. The Chinese might, in fact, try to fill a certain vacuum that exists. In this they would naturally be favored by the need for material aid that most of the organizations feel cruelly. However, there are two major obstacles to such a development. The first is that China will have many hesitations about making moves in Latin America similar to those it is making in the Asian countries. American imperialism would unquestionably respond to the fullest extent of its energies and on every level to any active Chinese intervention in the game in its vital rampart south of the Rio Grande. The second obstacle lies in the conceptions and methods of Maoism. Most of the movements that take a position in

9. See especially the document on the Cuban revolution adopted by the World Congress of the Fourth International that took place late in 1960.

favor of revolutionary struggle are in nowise inclined to accept the theses that the Chinese continue to advance on the nature of the Latin-American revolution or the strict bureaucratic control Peking imposes on its faithful.

The danger is greater on the other hand, insofar as the power of the Cuban pole of attraction should diminish or vanish, that manifold centrifugal tendencies would develop among the groups or organizations linked up to now to Castroism, which a united front could not automatically counterbalance. In fact most of these organizations and groups are confronted with very difficult and serious problems of analysis and perspectives, which have their inevitable organizational reflections. If the leading nuclei are unable in a relatively short time to give clear answers to these questions and take effective initiatives, splits are inevitable; and the possibility of a further fragmentation of forces, accompanied also by manifestations of passivity and demoralization, could not be excluded. The line of the organizations of the Fourth International is still that of a united front with all the revolutionary movements that rallied around OLAS. A united front involves agreement on certain fundamental orientations and common action on a nonexclusionary basis. It means that every organization participates as it is, in full political and organizational independence. A united front also involves the concept that, far from being fuzed over, confrontations on all the major questions of the world revolution must be seen as a necessity for the growth of the movement as a whole.

As for the problems of analysis and perspective that arise in this stage, they are evident from many articles and discussions among the different revolutionary currents. In this same issue of our magazine there is an interview with Héctor Béjar, Ricardo Gadea, and Hugo Blanco, which gives a strikingly clear idea of the current disputes. Furthermore, this interview merits consideration all the more because these three activists played a role in crucial episodes of revolutionary struggle in their country. It is on four points primarily that polemics have sprung up again. Therefore, it is imperative for revolutionists to state

their positions on these questions with the maximum clarity.

The first point concerns once again the nature of the Latin-American revolution and more concretely relations with the national bourgeoisie or certain of its layers. After the evolution of the conceptions of the Cuban leaders, which culminated in Che's message of April 1967 and the OLAS documents, one would have supposed that debate among revolutionists on this question had been closed. Unfortunately certain positions taken toward the Peruvian military regime—including by Fidel Castro, as we have seen—and the resumption of some old themes by representatives of the traditional left in Bolivia require a directly opposite conclusion. Obviously some theoretical formulations were marked by empiricism. All that was needed was for somewhat sensational and unforeseen events to come along to reopen the question and inspire assumptions essentially impressionistic, lacking any analytical foundation. Above and beyond even the illusions that have developed in Peru and in Bolivia, the possibility of an alliance with currents in the national bourgeoisie is envisaged, for example, in some Brazilian revolutionary circles (I am leaving aside, here, the second wind the Peruvian and Bolivian events have given those who hold ideas about an antioligarchical and anti-imperialist revolution). I have already talked about what is happening in Peru and Bolivia in the first part of this article, pointing out the social content and the dynamics of the Velasco and Ovando regimes. Every analysis of the most recent structural tendencies in the Latin-American economy and society only confirms that the so-called national bourgeoisie including its most modern layers is strictly dependent on imperialism and cannot be regarded as a force capable of waging a real struggle against it and playing a leading role by itself or in collaboration with other forces in the Latin-American revolutionary process. It would be naïve, moreover, to think that an orientation leaving the way open to collaboration with bourgeois strata could be fruitful as a tactical ruse to gain their support during a whole stage of the struggle without in the last analysis preventing a settling of accounts with capitalism. The Latin-American bourgeoisie has a suf-

ficiently developed class consciousness and political sense not to forget the lesson of the Cuban revolution so quickly and fall into such "snares."

The second question to be clarified is the relationship between guerrilla warfare, as well as armed struggle more generally, and the mass movement. Already in the period of the first OLAS conference, attempts to apply the "foco" theory expressed most symptomatically in Régis Debray's famous book were beginning to result in setbacks. After painful experiences in a series of countries, these conceptions—which inspired actions as heroic as they were inexorably condemned to failure—have been abandoned by most of the revolutionary movements in Latin America.¹⁰ The idea is now very widely accepted that armed struggle cannot develop and be successful without real ties with the masses both in the countryside and in the cities. Likewise, it is widely accepted that viable connections with the masses cannot develop almost automatically as the consequence of courageous initiatives by small vanguard groups but can only be established by systematic organizational and political work. Therefore, a polemic centering on an opposition between partisans of guerrilla warfare on one side and of mass work on the other would be misplaced today. There would be the danger in such a polemic of rehashing arguments that are now largely superfluous and of failing to concentrate on the decisive points.¹¹

To the contrary, it is the question of the party that must be given more stress. This necessity is demonstrated once again, among other things, by the statements of Héctor Béjar who seems to be content for an indefinite period with a pathetic substitute both for a party and an international, thereby making concessions to spontanéism. Permit me to recall here a passage

10. The author of this article does not believe that any real "foco" theory exists in the contributions of Ernesto Guevara and Fidel Castro. In any case it would be wrong to claim that this theory inspired the practical work of the Cuban revolution and even that of the Bolivia campaign of 1966-67.

11. I am referring to the situation in this stage without excluding the possibility that in the future "foquista" tendencies may redevelop and force us to shift the axis of our argument.

from the document adopted by our last world congress:

"While it is necessary to reject the schematic and paralyzing conception according to which everything hinges on the preliminary existence of a genuine party with all its traditional structures . . . the two following fundamental facts must, however, never be lost sight of:

"(a) The existence and functioning of a revolutionary party, far from being an outworn schema of outmoded Marxists, corresponds to the concrete and ineluctable needs of the development of the armed struggle itself (this, among other things, is the lesson of Hugo Blanco's experience in Peru).

"(b) The revolutionists must struggle for the most favorable variant: acting in such a way that when the armed struggle begins, if there is not already a genuine party, completely structured, with a large mass influence (a very unrealistic perspective in almost all of the Latin-American countries) in existence, there be at least solid nuclei of a political organization, coordinated on a national scale."

If these necessities are not really understood and the practical conclusions are not drawn, in fact, the need for preliminary political and organizational work will be lost sight of. And without such preparation any attempt at armed struggle will be condemned to isolation and failure. There would also be the danger of forgetting that there are periods when an effort to develop mass work and to create the instruments for this must have absolute priority. For example, it would be absurd in Peru today to rely primarily on preparing a new wave of guerrilla warfare, failing to understand the need for a deepgoing activity of political clarification and to exploit all the possibilities which, despite everything, the new situation offers for stimulating mass movements and establishing links with them. This is also true on a different scale and probably for a markedly shorter period for Bolivia.

But it is above all on the question of the possible forms of armed struggle and especially the role of guerrilla warfare in the Latin-American revolution that clarification is once more necessary. Let us recall, first of all, the conceptions that were approved by a large majority of our International and by virtually all of our movement in Latin America:

"The fundamental perspective, the only realistic perspective for Latin America is that of an armed struggle which may last for long years. . . . Even in the case of countries where large mobilizations and class conflicts in the cities may occur first, civil war will take manifold forms of armed struggle, in which the principal axis for a whole period will be rural guerrilla warfare, the term having primarily a geographical-military meaning and not necessarily implying an exclusively peasant composition of the fighting detachments (or even necessarily preponderantly peasant composition). In this sense, armed struggle in Latin America means fundamentally guerrilla warfare."

The document tried immediately afterward to explain that it would be wrong to draw any one-sided generalizations from these premises, specifying as follows:

"The strict selection of this central axis must be complemented by a very precise understanding that there will inevitably be a whole gamut of variants and that the different factors at work will combine in different forms according to the different countries and conjunctural situations. The two extreme possibilities can be indicated almost symbolically by taking on the one hand the case of a country like Uruguay where the armed struggle will be essentially urban and where the regime could have already been overthrown on the basis of a powerful urban mass movement if it had been technically and politically armed with such a perspective, and on the other hand by taking the case of a country of overwhelmingly peasant composition, without large urban concentrations, where the guerrilla war will be almost exclusively rural and peasant until the very eve of the enemy's final defeat."

When Comrade Hugo Blanco reaffirms that the real opposition is between revolution and opportunism, he reminds us of an elementary truth that no one can dispute. However, what is vital for the Latin-American movement, once there has been a clarification of the relationship between armed struggle and the masses and the need for a party as the instrument of revolution, is to sketch the concrete forms armed struggle will take. As we have just seen, our congress foresaw manifold variants. But above and

beyond specific or conjunctural combinations, the general hypotheses can be defined rather clearly.

Armed struggle for the conquest of power might take the form it took in Russia in 1917, where it was the culmination of a powerful mass movement which threw up armed detachments from within itself. Even leaving aside the civil war which followed and in which there was a combination of manifold forms of armed struggle, it must not be forgotten for an instant that the emergence of armed units directly from the mass struggle was possible notably because of the breakup of the army resulting from its defeats in the world war. Secondly, armed struggle might take the form of an actual civil war, the most acute and dramatic form of class struggle, with the confrontation of two full-fledged armies and where dual power would be expressed even as a geographical partition of the country. There is, finally, a third variant which occurs when the class struggle has already reached the level of armed confrontation but not yet in the generalized form of a civil war—the guerrilla warfare variant. As we have seen, this variant may assume very different concrete forms. Guerrilla warfare has proved at the same time necessary and effective in all kinds of experiences over the past fifty years in Asia and Africa, as well as in Europe itself during the Nazi occupation (above all in Yugoslavia, in Italy, and in France).

If we consider the most probable perspective in most of the countries of Latin America in the stage where we are now—after the victory of a socialist revolution in Cuba and the ripening of a revolutionary situation continentwide—we must exclude the variant of: "a progressive rise and broadening of the mass movement and its structuring and reinforcement through traditional organizational forms before it reaches the armed struggle . . ." The native ruling classes and, if need be, imperialism will block this variant by the most determined and barbaric forms of repression. The experiences not only of Bolivia and Brazil but also of Mexico and Argentina are conclusive in this regard (to say nothing of Santo Domingo). Likewise, we consider that there are not sufficient reasons to count on the possibility of "an explosive crisis involving the breaking

up or paralysis of the state apparatus and a mass mobilization so impetuous that it could prevent or neutralize recourse to repression as a decisive measure."¹² In the last analysis, moreover, such a hypothesis would fall back on relying on the omnipotence of spontaneous mass movements. As for the perspective of a civil war or an anti-imperialist war in the strict sense, this will very probably be a necessary stage in most of the countries. However, most often it will mark only the final stage before the seizure of power.¹³

This is why we share the conclusion of the great majority of Latin-American revolutionists — that is, for a phase of the revolution whose length cannot be predicted a priori but which in general will probably be long, the armed struggle will be fundamentally a guerrilla struggle. It will take over the methods and means suggested by an international tradition now very rich and others which the circumstances might indicate to the ingenuity of the fighters. If you take account of the geographical facts, the demographical structures of the majority of the population, and the technical and military considerations stressed by Che himself, it follows that the variant of rural guerrilla warfare on a continentwide scale will be the most probable one.

It is, then, necessary and entirely possible to avoid confusing concepts that are quite clear and to eliminate false problems. A false alternative would be that of a choice between working in the mass movement and guerrilla warfare. Unless it is rooted in the masses, guerrilla warfare like any other form of armed struggle would be inexorably condemned to failure. And without guerrilla warfare the mass movement would be condemned to an indefinite succession of precarious attempts or fruitless spontaneous explosions and crushing repressions. Another false problem would be the question of whether guerrilla warfare is a strategy or a tactic. It might be, in fact, either one, and the conceptual or terminological quarrel could drag on in an absolutely

sterile way. The essential thing is to clarify whether—in its various forms —guerrilla warfare does or does not correspond to a stage of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. The essential thing is to analyze in detail, in the case of every country or group of countries, what forms should be preferred. We have already had occasion in the past to specify our movement's conceptions regarding Bolivia, and our Argentinian movement has made a valuable contribution to the strategy of armed struggle in its country. We consider also that revolutionists who do not belong to the Fourth International have developed very pertinent analyses which constitute essential points of departure (e.g., for Guatemala). Moreover, the events of

the last year in countries like Brazil and Uruguay provide valuable indications on the importance and methods of urban guerrilla warfare. In Peru, finally, the problems are more complex and they would merit, therefore, a separate and very detailed analysis.

I have tried by this article to recall and clarify certain conceptions of our movement. I hope that those who believe that we are wrong and that our projections of revolutionary strategy are incorrect will express their criticism in the most concrete way, by showing us with the maximum clarity and precision where our errors lie and what alternative they propose for a strategy of armed struggle.

March 15, 1970.

In Our Next Issue:

We have noted an increase in the recent period of works sponsored by the Kremlin on the subject of "Trotskyism," which apparently remains a burning topic in the Soviet Union. One of the best recent examples is "The Role of Trotskyism in the Modern World" by M. Basmanov.

A translation of this article has now been made available to the English-speaking world by *Political Affairs*, a publication of the Communist party U. S. A.

In our next issue we are reprinting this translation in full so as to help bring it to the attention of readers who do not generally follow the Stalinist press. For a better appreciation of Basmanov's production, we are also publishing "A Trotskyist Reply: The Role of Basmanov in the New School of Stalinist Falsification" by George Saunders.

In addition, George Saunders undertook checking the sources quoted by Basmanov from Lenin, Trotsky, and the Trotskyist publications of today, which are evidently carefully collected and studied by certain Moscow departments. The rich results of this research job provide notes more than three times the length of Basmanov's piece.

Here's a sampling of the headings: The "Second Front" and the Achievements of Earl Browder; Youth "Infected with Leftism"; What Is Meant by "World Socialism"?; "Deformed Workers States"; M. Basmanov and J. Posadas; The 1953-54 Split; Lenin on Guerrilla Struggle; The Outcome of a Nuclear War; Relative Importance of the Colonial Revolution; Guatemala and Fidel Castro's Speech; How a Revolutionary Situation Can Develop; "The Events in Peru".

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12. The quotations are from the world congress document.

13. This also emerges from the final part of Ernesto Guevara's essay *Guerra de guerrillas: un metodo*.