

## Sensational Documents:

# Deeper U.S. Involvement in Thailand

A Shift in Kremlin Team?



BREZHNEV: New top dog or scapegoat? See p. 321.

*'Trotsky in Exile' as Documentary Theater*

Interview with Malachy McGurran:

For a Revolution in the Whole of Ireland

*Correspondence Between Hugo Blanco and Jose Maria Arguedas*

### Manila Students Help

Following a series of student demonstrations and workers' strikes in Manila, the mass-circulation *Sunday Times Magazine* (March 15) called attention to an outstanding example of militancy among working women.

In an article entitled "Women Workers Waking Up," Lydia C. Gutierrez wrote: "In the wake of labor unrest in the country, the women are often all but forgotten.

"But not the 90% women factory workers at the USTC (U. S. Tobacco Corporation) who have had a long story of continuous struggle with management until youthful leaders came to their rescue and helped to form a labor union (the U. S. Tobacco Corporation Labor Union)."

Some of the women activists described what conditions were like before the union: "We were treated very unfairly," one said. "At that time, when we would come in late by one minute they would remove 25 centavos from our daily wage; if we came in 10 minutes late, they would not even let us enter the factory premises. If your workcap fell off your head accidentally, you'd get suspended. If you filed for a 5-day vacation they would approve only two days. On top of this, we never got paid during legal holidays."

Another woman said: "Before we were required to finish packing 16 trays per day (a tray means packing 2,000 sticks of cigarets). . . . Do you know that we used to get suspended if we accidentally creased the edges of the pack of cigarets?"

The union has had to wage a bitter struggle against intimidation by the company and the government, Renato Casipe, the twenty-one-year-old president of the organization, explained: ". . . they try to stop our demonstrations with American trained riot squads and special forces. Our own vice-president Manuel Alabado was kidnapped in Tarlac by, we believe, government men. I cannot even go home to change my clothes. Recently two Task Force Lawin trucks raided my house looking for me. All this boils

down to the fact that they want to suppress the alliance of the students with the workers in the current demonstrations."

Another member of the union board described attacks by labor gangsters: "Goons come into the factory juggling hand grenades from one hand to another. Sometimes the goons would just come in, draw guns, and pick fights to frighten the women. And sad to say, because of these riots, some women

on the family way had threatened abortions."

Braving this intimidation, the overwhelming majority of the women have held firm behind their union and won victories. "Now fines are no longer charged for tardiness," a union leader said. "The women, too, have better maternity and vacation leave benefits. After all, it is the working man who controls management. Without us, the capitalists cannot move."

#### In This Issue

		PHILIPPINES
	314	Women Win Job Rights
		THAILAND
	315	Planning of Deeper U. S. Involvement Exposed
		IRAN
	317	Story of Hugo Blanco Featured in Tehran Journal
		SOVIET UNION
	318	Latest Works of Samizdat
	320	Help Save Pyotr Grigorenko!
	321	A Shift in Kremlin Team?
Jean Ravel	319	FRANCE Behind the Battle at Nanterre
		IRELAND
	324	Interview with Malachy McGurran
		DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
	327	Balaguer Doomed, Say Freed Prisoners
		REVIEWS
	317	"Trotzki im Exil" as Documentary Theater
		DOCUMENTS
	322	Correspondence Between Hugo Blanco and the Novelist Jose Maria Arguedas
	328	The Ovando Government and the Bolivian Situation
		DRAWINGS
Copain	313	Leonid Brezhnev

Intercontinental Press, Post Office Box 635, Madison Square Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, and black liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion,

unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York 10010. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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## Planning of Deeper U.S. Involvement in Thailand

Sensational documents revealing the extent of U. S. involvement in fighting in Thailand have come into the possession of the American antiwar movement.

Among the items is proof that academic figures at a dozen major universities are under contract at high salaries to the U. S. Defense Department or its subsidiary agencies to collect intelligence in Northern Thailand to aid in crushing insurgent forces.

The documents, consisting of government reports, correspondence, and the minutes of meetings of various agencies, were made public in the April 2 issue of the *Student Mobilizer*, the newspaper of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam [SMC].\* In its introduction the *Student Mobilizer* wrote:

"These documents lift a corner of the curtain behind which is hidden a widespread abuse of the American academic community under the general counterrevolutionary policy of the government. And it is not only foreign policy, for these documents show the agencies involved consider the findings to be applicable within the U. S. . . .

"The documents also show that far from attempting to disengage from military involvements the U. S. government has been making and continues to make elaborate preparations for expanded U. S. involvements in Southeast Asia up to and including agreements for the use of massive numbers of U. S. combat troops in Thailand should that be 'necessary' to maintain a Thai regime compliant with U. S. 'interests.'"

The American "counterinsurgency" operation in Thailand is run largely under the American "aid" program, administered through AID [Agency for International Development]. Robert H. Nooter, acting assistant AID administrator for East Asia, explained how the Nixon administration "aids" Thailand. His testimony on June 16, 1969, before the Committee on Government

Operations, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, was cited by the *Student Mobilizer* as follows:

"Except for a modest amount of technical assistance projects, most of which we are gradually phasing out, our assistance in Thailand is concentrated on counter-insurgency activities; approximately 75 percent of our total effort is in this field. . . .

"Our largest single project in Thailand consists of assistance to various elements of the Thai National Police Department. In FY-1968 obligations for this Civil Police Administration project totaled \$13.4 million. The primary objective of this project is to help the Thai government increase the capacity of its police forces . . . The primary emphasis in this program has been placed on bringing the regular presence of the police closer to the village."

Allen Myers, editor of the SMC's *GI Press Service*, summarized the material on academic involvement in this "aid" program.

"On September 6, 1966," he wrote, "a contract was signed between the United States government, 'as represented by the Agency for International Development,' and the Regents of the University of California. We have not been able to obtain a copy of this agreement, but we do have in our possession Amendment No. 3 to the contract, dated September 1, 1968 . . . Paragraph B-1 of the Amendment states that the 'Contractor' (the University of California) will 'identify research that is being, has been, or will be conducted in universities, foundations and other institutions that may relate to the developmental and counterinsurgency activities in Thailand; evaluate, index and make such research available to AID; suggest and solicit research proposals relevant to AID activity in Thailand for consideration by AID/W' (the W stands for Washington) 'and USOM/Thailand.' (USOM is United States Operations Mission, a subdivision of AID.)"

The amendment required the university to "provide support to facilitate the effective functioning of the Aca-

demical Advisory Committee for Thailand (AACT)," another AID subsidiary. The first AACT meeting following the signing of the amendment was held at the State Department. The minutes of the meeting, summarized by Allen Myers, show that in addition to government officials, professors attended from the University of California at Los Angeles, Cornell University, Rice University, the University of Michigan, and Indiana University. The minutes report:

"In discussing topics for conferences to be organized under AACT auspices, it was agreed that the subject of local authority in Thailand, *including the implications for village security, should be first priority . . .*" (Emphasis in *Student Mobilizer*.) A conference on this subject was held at UCLA July 24-27, 1969. A number of Thai government officials attended, including the undersecretary of state and the Thai minister of the interior, to learn from the American social scientists how to suppress their unruly subjects.

At a July 23-24 meeting of AACT just preceding the UCLA conference, plans were made to intervene at a meeting of the Association of Asian Studies April 3-6 of this year in San Francisco to try to pick the brains of scholars who would have no idea their researches were being appropriated by these academic "government agents."

There is no indication in the minutes whether it is patriotism or some other motive that inspires professors to help the Pentagon to kill Thai peasants. The minutes for a January 24-25, 1969, meeting of AACT do indicate that participants are paid "travel, per diem, and consulting fees."

"We have no figures on the consultation fees which AACT members receive," Allen Myers writes, "but the American Institutes for Research [a private agency under contract to the government for a similar study of counterinsurgency in Thailand] paid Michael Moerman [a professor of anthropology at UCLA and a member of AACT] \$150 per day plus \$18 a day for expenses — aside from travel — for five days consultation in Bang-

\* The April 2 issue of the *Student Mobilizer* is available from the SMC, 1029 Vermont, N. W., Suite 907, Washington, D. C. The price is 15 cents.

kok from June 30 to July 4, 1969 . . ." (Myers cites as proof a voucher dated July 5, 1969, which is in the possession of the SMC.)

Government penetration of the academic community for counterinsurgency research is not limited to the AID-UCLA contract and AACT. The Institute for Defense Analysis [IDA], run by the Department of Defense [DOD], maintains a similar network of academic stringers under the code name Project Jason. This operation conducted a three-week seminar from June 19 to July 6, 1967, at Falmouth Intermediate School in Falmouth, Massachusetts. The SMC has obtained the minutes of the meetings of the "Thailand Study Group" of this Project Jason conference.

In addition to a number of the professors who are members of AACT, participants at the conference included Nobel Prize winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann of the California Institute of Technology; Louis Lomax, a well-known "moderate" black writer who had recently returned from a trip to Thailand; and General Maxwell Taylor, former American commander in Vietnam.

The assembled social scientists were briefed by a Pentagon official on how to "sell" their product to the government. "Why do you break it [research] by geographic areas rather than [sic] by problems, e.g., counterinsurgency? This would have customer appeal . . . There are lots of people in government who are interested in violence and development. . . . ARPA [a DOD agency] is buying background for policy makers."

The minutes summarized Louis Lomax's report on U. S. intervention in Thailand:

"Lomax: We are committed to take over counterinsurgency where the Thai can't do it. I put it to Graham Martin [the U. S. ambassador in Bangkok] if any group is to threaten the Thai government would he defend it. He said yes. . . . The commitment is one which puts us on the same road as in VN [Vietnam]. . . .

"I oppose American policy in V. N. — the whole thing. What we are doing in Thailand is worse. It will be more disastrous. . . .

"If we pulled out of V. N., Martin said some of our GIs would be sent to Thailand. He is convinced that the Thai army will not be able to handle insurgency. Also, giving us bases has

compromised the Thai government's ability to live with its neighbors Cambodia and Laos."

Other participants expressed cynical contempt for "their" government in Thailand, voicing their readiness to manipulate it as a mere instrument of American policy. "The present leaders are not well known," said H. Moskowitz, "or if well-known are not liked. How does one choose or develop a charismatic leader? It is frustrating for the U. S. to work with this situation."

Herbert Phillips, a Berkeley anthropologist, indicated that Washington had alternatives to a "charismatic" leader if one could not be found:

"Herbert Phillips: Lomax says that the agreement [a secret compact with the Thai government that Washington has not published to this day] will permit one hundred thousand U. S. military personnel to be sent in to sweep the N. E. to defend the current military junta."

On July 6 General Maxwell Taylor addressed the Project Jason conference. He told the social scientists how they could help in making future American military involvement abroad more efficient than has been the case in Vietnam. The following is from the minutes of July 6, 1967:

"Taylor: Looking back at my VN experience the most serious problem was getting basic data soon enough. Their data and our graphs in Washington were not worth a damn. Our people were staying in Saigon. To correct this situation in Thailand would be a major contribution. You need people who are students of Thailand, ethnology, etc. We don't get enough people in our government who have that kind of background. . . .

"We would like methodical surveys, frequently repeated to get trend data. We also should do this with developing nations to see how they are doing."

"It is important," the general added, "to identify the problems that our government should be doing. Some countries should achieve a certain level of turbulence and development before we spend time on them, e.g., Africa."

"*Selectivity in future involvement militarily will be important.*" (Emphasis added.)

There are some indications that "counterinsurgency" operations may not be limited to Southeast Asia or Africa. The *Student Mobilizer* also provided some excerpts from a Decem-

ber 1967 report from the American Institutes for Research to the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency [ARPA]. Entitled "Counter-Insurgency in Thailand: The Impact of Economic, Social, and Political Action Programs," the reported stated:

"The potential applicability of the findings in the United States will also receive special attention. In many of our key domestic programs, especially those directed at disadvantaged subcultures, the methodological problems are highly similar to those described in this proposal; and the application of the Thai findings at home constitutes a potentially most significant project contribution."

The Student Mobilization Committee has called for a campaign to drive this kind of "research" off the university campus. "Our intention," wrote Don Gurewitz in the *Student Mobilizer*, "is not to simply 'purify' the ivory tower by forcing these programs off the campus and into the community. Rather, our intention is to contribute to the total abolition of such programs and strike a blow at the war effort in the best way we can, by conducting the struggle on 'our territory', where we have the strength to win. By organizing and winning these struggles on the campuses we hope to not only win a material victory for the antiwar movement, but also to set an example for the rest of the population of how the war machine can be taken on and beaten."

Some of the demands the SMC has proposed are: ending war research on campus immediately; firing of professors on the government payroll; soliciting public declarations from university officials that such research will not be tolerated; and opening all university files and records.

These exposures are further evidence of what lies behind Nixon's escalation of the war in Vietnam to encompass the whole of what was once French Indochina. The use of Thai troops to prop up the Souvanna Phouma regime in Laos and the use of Saigon's forces to bolster the new American puppets in Cambodia belie Nixon's phony troop "withdrawals."

The SMC and other antiwar organizations have called mass demonstrations in cities throughout the United States for April 15. Similar protests will be held throughout the world on that day to demand that the U. S. get out of Southeast Asia now.

## Story of Hugo Blanco Featured in Tehran Journal

The Iranian magazine *Andishe va Honar* carried an article in its winter issue about the Latin-American revolutionist Hugo Blanco.

*Andishe va Honar* [Thought and Art] is published legally in Tehran, and ordinarily it concentrates on art and literary criticism. However, it occasionally includes articles on radical world politics and Marxist thought. In the same issue, for example, there is a translation of Isaac Deutscher's "Discovering Das Kapital."

The article tells about the report that the Peruvian government had decided to transfer Hugo Blanco from the prison island of El Frontón to a far worse prison camp in the El Sepa region. This is because "the prisoners in El Frontón can draw national and international attention to the barbarous way they are treated and the miserable conditions in the prison." The journal adds that protests have poured in to the consulates and embassies of the Peruvian government.

The article continues: "Hugo Blanco

started his eighth year of imprisonment in May 1969. The thirty-seven-year-old\* Trotskyist peasant leader is a man of outstanding character with an unshakeable will. This was shown by his strong support of the struggles of the oppressed—struggles that converted his name into a fearsome symbol in the eyes of the Peruvian rulers at the time he led the peasants in recovering their lands in La Convención from the landowners."

The story is told of Hugo Blanco's university days, his work in an American meat-packing plant in Argentina, his role in organizing anti-Nixon demonstrations in Peru in 1958, his return to his hometown of Cuzco and his work of organizing the peasant unions.

"The unions that started their work by fighting against illiteracy and by establishing hospitals soon were confronted by the main problem: a minority of capitalist rulers owned large

\* This is an overestimation of Blanco's age by about two years.

segments of land. The peasants started retaking the land that had been confiscated by the landowners. Three hundred such actions took place between 1961 and 1963. The rulers sent police and private armed bands against the peasants; and the peasants in turn started organizing self-defense units.

"Hugo Blanco was captured on May 30, 1963, after an intensive manhunt.

"Che Guevara declared on July 23, 1964, when he was visiting Algeria:

"'Hugo Blanco set an example, a good example, and he struggled as much as he could.'"

The article describes the scope of the international defense campaign that saved the lives of Hugo Blanco and his comrades, and concludes:

"The recent threat of the Peruvian junta to silence this outstanding fighter forever will again evoke far-reaching outcries of protest from his friends and supporters."

It is unusual to find an article of this kind in the heavily censored press of Iran. A magazine risks suspension by publishing such accounts.

## REVIEWS

### 'Trotzki im Exil' as Documentary Theater

A careful study of Peter Weiss's new play *Trotzki im Exil* appeared in the March 13 issue of the Uruguayan weekly *Marcha*, which is widely circulated in Latin America.

The reviewer, Walter Acosta, is a student of the theory of the theater. He analyzed Weiss's recent theoretical work *Fourteen Theses on Documentary Theater* in the February 20 issue of *Marcha*, as the first of two articles. In the second article he deals with *Trotzki im Exil* as an expression of Weiss's theories.

A quotation from *Fourteen Theses*, cited by Acosta, indicates Weiss's approach: "The power of documentary theater lies in its capacity to construct, on the basis of fragments of reality,

a useful example, a model of the actual events . . . it assumes the attitude of an observer and utilizes analytical observation. . . . It uses real material which it projects from the stage without changing its content but shaping its form."

By "shaping," Weiss means "removing everything accidental, every dubious speculation, for the sake of a strict representation of the essential problem."

In Weiss's conception, Acosta explains, "documentary theater" is not an expression of subjective feelings but involves rigorous scientific analysis of the events portrayed. This kind of theater, according to Weiss, maintains that the reality, "no matter be-

hind what absurdity it is concealed, can be explained in its most minute detail." The purpose is "to oppose the tendency of the mass communications media to keep the people in a desert of brutalization and cretinization."

The dramatist specifies that his form of theatrical creation is possible only "with a stable work group which has political and sociological training and is capable of devoting itself to scholarly research based on abundant documentation."

Weiss's definition of the attitude of "documentary theater" also suggests a different approach to the personality of Trotsky from previous literary or dramatic treatments. Before Weiss, many writers had tended to view Trot-

sky's fate in terms of their own pessimism and cynicism. The fact that a man who played a leading role in the crucial event of the century, the October revolution, died in exile and in relative isolation has been taken by some writers as confirmation of their feelings about the futility of trying to change history.

Weiss writes: ". . . documentary theater opposes the kind of dramatic production which takes as its central theme the writer's own desperation and his own anger and refusal to give up the notion of an absurd world without hope."

After the staging of the play in Düsseldorf, Weiss explained his objective in *Trotsky in Exile*. He said, according to Acosta: "What interested me most was finding or analyzing Trotsky's place in the history of socialism and in the history of the revolution. I wanted to give a very broad and epic view of the evolution from the first years of our century to Trotsky's death—the different stages of the Russian revolution in 1905 and 1917; his expulsion from the Soviet Union and his life in exile. I was also interested in his development as a revolutionist and his points of view on world revolution. Besides this I want this work to open up discussion with the socialist countries so that a very important matter will be analyzed—the need for discussing not only Trotsky but all that he represented and still represents today."

Weiss continued: "Trotsky is still the scapegoat in the socialist countries, blamed for everything that goes against the party line. He is still considered the greatest enemy of Lenin. This is owing to the lack of analysis of the Stalin epoch."

Weiss first offered to stage *Trotsky* in Moscow, Acosta relates. His offer, apparently, was rejected. The play was also turned down by the director of a Stuttgart theater who considered it too obscure. The version that finally opened at the new Düsseldorf theater was cut roughly in half. The critic of the liberal *Frankfurter Rundschau* complained that a scene in which Trotsky discusses the problems of the colonial revolution was cut out.

Some drama critics writing for the German capitalist papers did not know how to respond to a play of the political nature of *Trotsky in Exile*, Acosta reports. "Two German dailies end-

ed their reviews . . . in open contradiction to each other. One said: 'There were no disturbances at the showing—only scattered applause.' The other

said: 'The heavy applause from the public showed that bourgeois society felt secure and could absorb anything thrown against it.'

## Latest Works of Samizdat

# 'The Transformation of Bolshevism'

[To what extent do the current expressions of opposition in the Soviet Union link up with the revolutionary traditions of Marxism, Bolshevism, and the Left Opposition? An article in the *New York Times* Sunday magazine of March 15 ("Samizdat Is Russia's Underground Press") acknowledged that "some dissidents" may hark back "to the era of pure 'Lenin-Trotsky' thought and action."

[But, for the author of the article, this is of doubtful importance: ". . . naval officers arrested in Tallinn had a program that was a non-Lenin, non-Trotsky 'Communism with a human heart,' an echo of the Czech Spring, if you will. And groups of Leningraders, also now in prison, appear to have issued appeals for a kind of Christian Socialism."

[In fact, there is no contradiction between the positions of Lenin and Trotsky and the demand for "socialism with a human face." The Stalinist degeneration, the coming to power of a privileged bureaucratic layer, was the opposite of Bolshevism. And the revival of struggle against Stalinist bureaucratism logically includes a revival of the traditional Marxist and Bolshevik position on socialist democracy.

[There have been a number of indications that such a linkup was being made in the Soviet Union, just as Kuron and Modzelewski had done in Poland and groups like the Revolutionary Socialist party in Czechoslovakia. But no programmatic documents have come from the Soviet Union, thus far, that deal with this question as fully as the Poles and Czechs, and even the Yugoslavs and Hungarians have.

[This may be as much a lag in the movement of clandestine documents as a political lag. For a report that recently appeared in the Soviet underground newsletter, the *Chronicle of*

*Current Events*, indicates a rather fully developed discussion among Soviet oppositionists of socialist democracy in the light of Marxism.

[In each issue, the *Chronicle* carries a separate section called "Latest Works of Samizdat," in which relatively brief reviews are given of the varied and constantly growing clandestine material in circulation. Issue No. 8, for June 30, 1969, ran a rather detailed description of a new Samizdat book. We reprint this review in full below. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.

[Until the full text of this book becomes available outside Soviet borders for a full evaluation, we can only stress that it deals with some very interesting points: an echo of Trotsky's position on a territorial militia; a concept of "state monopolism," rather than, say, "state capitalism"; and the analysis of the historical reasons for the "transformation" (degeneration) of the Bolshevik party.]

\* \* \*

*The Transformation of Bolshevism*. This book, which consists of five chapters, gives a critique of the present line of the party from the position of the Bolshevism of the October period and before. As its foundation it takes authentic passages from the classics of Marxism and resolutions and decisions by party congresses during the first five years after the revolution.

The first chapter is devoted to the views of earlier socialists on the state as an obvious but necessary evil, which remains such even after the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat. And it deals with the way these views were altered at the hands of those who compiled the new program of the Soviet Communist party.

In the second chapter an analysis

is made of the electoral system now in effect in our country, and the statutes of today's Soviets are contrasted with those of the Soviets in the first five years after the revolution.

The third chapter sets forth the program of Bolshevism in relation to the building of a militia and the arming of the population as a whole. What was under discussion was the abolition of the official police and regular army and the spreading of responsibility for military security among the entire able-bodied, adult population. The author tries to show that the guidelines of a territorial militia system could promote a significant democratization in the existing social structure.

The fourth chapter, the central one, is devoted to problems of economics and management. In the author's opinion, the Soviet Union's successes in the area of industrialization may be

fully explained by the advantages and benefits flowing from the monopolization of the means of production and the centralization of all leadership functions affecting the national economy into the hands of the appropriate government agencies. Consequently, one may speak of state monopolism but not necessarily of socialism at all. For socialism presupposes as an indispensable precondition not only state ownership but also the widest possible self-management.

The last chapter explores the historical laws and causes behind the Bolshevik party's abandonment of its original positions. In the author's opinion this was inevitable in the light of the historical situation that had developed (social backwardness, the low cultural level of the country, the unrealized hopes for socialist revolution in Western Europe, etc.).

and thus without assured employment opportunities.

And to accomplish all this, the bourgeoisie has also to keep up a *repression*. That is a virtually indispensable precondition for "Operation Profitability." It has to exclude "leftist" high-school students, "suspend" professors, and take other such measures. It has not been easy, moreover, after May 1968 to "restore order" at Nanterre. The representatives of the bourgeoisie on campus, right-wing teachers belonging to the "independent" unions and neofascist students, have remained a tiny minority and have just suffered a stinging defeat.

By calling the police onto the campus, which they patrolled like a conquered city, "poor Dean Ricoeur" achieved essentially the following results:

1. He pushed the "moderate" students into fighting against the "forces of order" and thus postponed for a long time the achievement of Edgar Faure's<sup>1</sup> objective — isolating the revolutionists.

2. He demonstrated in striking fashion *the total bankruptcy of the policy of "participation" in the universities*. This Christian humanist showed that without the cops he was incapable of getting the Conseil de Gestion [Management Council] to function, and thus of putting into practice the "Guidelines Law" skillfully drawn up by Faure to soothe agitated spirits in the summer of 1968.

The Communist party alone continues to play it up as a victory when some representatives of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France pour son Renouveau [UNEF-Renouveau — the Renewal Caucus of the National Union of Students of France — led by the CP youth] and the members of the present majority in SNESup [Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur — National Union of University Teachers] win a few extra hours or a few crumbs by way of added appropriations which the regime had provided for any way as a cushion in case of tension.

Its reformist and class-collaboration-

1. Edgar Faure was appointed minister of education by de Gaulle following the May explosion. Faure attempted to carry out a university reform appearing to give students a say in the running of the university, under the general Gaullist slogan of "participation" (sharing decision-making power, or codetermination). The French Trotskyists boycotted the elections to the "participation" bodies. — *IP*

## France

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# Behind the Battle at Nanterre

By Jean Ravel

### Paris

The suburban trains slowed down on the afternoon of March 3 as they passed in front of "Nanterre la Folie" [Crazy Nanterre]. A few feet from the fence surrounding the campus, several dozen curious spectators watched an unusual spectacle that lasted for some hours. Were they shooting a war film, with tear-gas grenades, stones being thrown from the top of the besieged buildings, and an assault that left no door, window, or piece of furniture whole?

For several days the papers and TV played up the financial aspect of this "funny war." The taxpayers would have to pay 52,000,000 old francs [approximately 500 old francs equal US\$1] extra because of those little snout-nose students who have nothing better to do!

I must make clear that while the revolutionary barricades of May 1968 were built with the help of automobiles set on fire, at Nanterre in March 1970 it was the vicious CRS [Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité — Republican Security Companies — elite riot troops]

who deliberately smashed up dozens of cars parked in the lots and caused most of the damage in the two schools (law and letters) and the dormitories, to say nothing of what happened in the cafeteria. Many students eating there, who had nothing at all to do with the "events," both men and girls, were savagely clubbed and then taken to the hospital.

Why Nanterre? Why in March?

Everyone is talking about a "crisis," if not the "death" of the universities. The fact is no one is satisfied any more with the liberal values which the bourgeoisie, dominant since 1789, continued as a class to inculcate into its children.

The bourgeoisie of today has no more use for the old humanism. It needs to make the universities *financially profitable*, raise matriculation fees, cafeteria prices, bring in private capital, and so forth. In the human sphere, the bourgeoisie has to carry out a weeding-out process by means of examinations and competition which throws an excessive percentage of youth on the job market without skills

ist policy having lamentably failed, the PCF [Parti Communiste Français — French Communist party] is consoling itself as best it can. It is stepping up its publication of communiqués and tracts lumping together "leftists" and "fascists," and just heaping on abuse.

*In the wake of an aborted revolution* (the third in thirty years, after 1936 and 1945-47), a sag was inevitable. This setback, as much as the lack of a mass revolutionary party, has promoted a loss of patience, and an increase in exasperation among some of those active in the May 1968 flareup.

This frustration explains the painfully feeble "analyses" of the GP [Gauche Prolétarienne — Proletarian Left], which considers itself Maoist and hopes to build a revolutionary party based on concentrations of immigrant workers, or the reformatories!

The Ligue Communiste [Communist League — the French section of the Fourth International] is resolutely combating the "vicious circle of provocation-repression-solidarity" which serves as a "line" for the GP, as well as this organization's terrorist methods (including within the revolutionary movement). We are still more resolutely combating the repression of the bourgeoisie and the deceitful amalgams of the PCF, whose moral level has been inherited by the GP.

This is why we reject the so-called opposition of two lines that occurred at Nanterre before March 3 between those who were for fighting the cops and those who were against it.

Demagogy is not dead. The real political division was over two different conceptions of political action. One side favored confrontationist tactics by small groups aimed at arousing "mass solidarity," that is, the anarchist logic of individual exemplary acts, which has been bankrupt for years. The other side wanted to make confrontation not a miraculous detonator but a stage in a mass mobilization.

The March 6 mass meeting at Nanterre called by most of the revolutionary organizations<sup>2</sup> on the ini-

2. As in every revival of the mass movement, the "people" mystique of the "pro-Chinese" is reappearing. They forget the self-criticism condemning the "superproletarianism" of those who in May 1968 considered the student movement "100 percent reactionary."

tiative of the Ligue Communiste and the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié — United Socialist party] had no other purpose but to confirm the withdrawal of the police from the campus, which the government had to agree to under pressure, and the spread of the Nanterre struggle to other campuses in Paris.

This meeting, fortunately, has been followed up by several attempts to "popularize" the struggle outside the university ghetto—especially in the train stations in the western suburbs of Paris.

Since the March 6 meeting,<sup>3</sup> a United Front against the "police university"

and the government's general offensive has been formed. It includes all but the PCF and various Maoist groupings; in other words, all but the Stalinists. The pro-Moscow Stalinists want allies on the right but not on the left, and the Maoists are unable to operate in any but the most sectarian and factional framework.

Even without them, the struggle continues!

3. The meeting was also sponsored by the AJS [Alliance de Jeunes pour le Socialisme—Alliance of Youth for Socialism], the youth organization of the Pierre Lambert group, which is allied with the Socialist Labour League in England. —IP

## An Appeal from His Wife

# Help Save Pyotr Grigorenko!

[A letter by General Pyotr Grigorenko describing how Soviet authorities have treated him since his arrest in Tashkent in May 1969 is reported to be circulating in the USSR. Grigorenko has been arbitrarily locked up in a mental institution. Copies of Grigorenko's letter, together with an appeal by his wife, have reached the West. The following excerpts appeared in the April 6 issue of the U. S. magazine *Time*.]

\* \* \*

June 15: [After Grigorenko had begun a hunger strike] they started to force-feed me. They put me in a strait-jacket, beat me and choked me. Then they began the painful procedure by putting a clamp in my mouth to keep it open.

June 16-19: Force-fed every day. I resisted as much as I could. They twisted my arms, hit my crippled leg [wounded in the war]. On June 19 the bullies increased in number from five to twelve. After each struggle I suffered pains in my heart. I continued to resist but I felt my heart would stop. I wanted to die because I thought my death would expose their abuses of power.

June 24: Received a letter saying that my family would no longer receive a pension. I understood this to be moral torture. My elderly, sick wife and my son, who has been an invalid

since childhood, were deprived of any means of support.

Oct. 16: On this, our birthday (they come on the same day), my wife managed to cover 1,900 miles to see me and was refused even a five-minute meeting with me. It's only now that I really understand the dreadful feelings of those who were jailed under Stalin. It was not the physical torture. One can stand that. But to be deprived of any hope whatever—this cannot be endured.

\* \* \*

[Zinaida Grigorenko wrote:]

It was from behind bars that a letter from my husband finally reached me. It is a chronology of what happened to him during ten months of solitary confinement in Tashkent and a cell of the Criminal Psychiatry Institute. All those who know my husband and who have read his writings know his lucidity and his common sense, combined with a rare ability to think logically and consistently, with absolute honesty. It is for these abilities that my husband was pronounced insane and has been doomed to a life that might drive anyone mad. People! Pyotr Grigorenko is threatened with death. I appeal to all democratic organizations that defend the rights of man, and to all free citizens of the world. Help save my husband. The freedom of one man is the freedom of every man."



## A Shift in Kremlin Team?

Is a shuffle taking place in the Kremlin's top leadership?

Alain Jacob, *Le Monde's* Moscow correspondent, answers in the affirmative in the March 18 English-language edition of the Paris daily. In fact, he asserts, it may have "already taken place."

Jacob is not certain whether Brezhnev is emerging from the "collective leadership" as the new dictator, or whether Brezhnev has simply managed to inch himself out on a limb which his associates are now busily sawing off. But whichever it is, "a number of fairly positive signs indicate that a new situation has arisen in the Politburo; its effects could become apparent in the near future."

Jacob notes several unusual items recently featured in the news.

First of all, last December Brezhnev "appeared to have assigned himself the task of drawing attention to the state of the Soviet Union's economy by presenting a detailed analysis of the situation to the plenary meeting of the Central Committee. The debates which were organized across the Soviet Union on the contents of the analysis turned the 'Brezhnev Report' into one of the country's major political events, thus distinguishing its author from the other members of the Politburo, if not from the rest of the 'troika' which in theory holds the reins of power."

Secondly, the March 5 *Pravda* gave front-page prominence to consultations undertaken by Brezhnev "with a group of 'technical' ministers responsible for Soviet agriculture."

This is "almost unprecedented, at least since Nikita Khrushchev was ousted from office."

As Jacob interprets it, "Mr. Brezhnev seemed to be moving to take over responsibilities which devolved, in theory, on Premier Alexei Kosygin."

Finally, the Moscow press and television have recently played up a trip Brezhnev took to Minsk where he participated in watching the end of a military exercise "as the only 'civilian' from Moscow in the midst of a glittering array of military chiefs."

The immediate cause of the commo-

tion in the Kremlin is the economic situation.

The rate of growth in industry for 1969 was 7 percent, compared with 8.1 percent in 1968 and 10 percent in 1967. The Soviet grain crop in 1969 was 160,500,000 tons, compared with the 1968 crop of 169,200,000 tons.

Various sources indicate that the economic situation is much worse than officially admitted and that this was rather frankly outlined by Brezhnev last December in his speech to the Central Committee. This speech, which has still not been published, is the document being used for the current discussion in the bureaucracy.

*Le Monde's* Moscow correspondent is not the only one who has been speculating on possible shifts in the top leadership of the Kremlin.

"Because economy and politics are so intertwined in Soviet society," Bernard Gwertzman noted in a March 25 dispatch from Moscow to the *New York Times*, "Western diplomats have scrutinized the record to see whether the campaign [of massive "self-criticism"] is related to any imminent change in the power structure." While some nuances can be observed, "Western experts here see no evidence at this time that Mr. Brezhnev lacks the full support of his Politburo colleagues."

On March 11 Reuters carried a report from Vienna by Vincent Buist claiming that in both Belgrade and Prague reports were circulating that Brezhnev and Kosygin were under fire for failures in key economic sectors.

"Three members of the ruling Soviet Politburo—Mikhail Suslov, Alexander Shelepin and Kirill Mazurov—have signed a document attacking the two leaders for serious shortcomings in party work affecting the economy, the reports claimed."

The reports were officially denounced by the Soviet government March 13. A government spokesman said that the rumors about three members of the Politburo having written a letter criticizing Brezhnev were a "fabrication from beginning to end."

The spokesman, Leonid M. Zam-

yatin, did not, however, comment specifically on the possibility that differences of opinion might have been expressed in other ways than in a letter.

Peking appears to have its own sources of information. Hsinhua, the official press agency, said March 25 that serious economic difficulties in the Soviet Union have led to "fierce strife" in the Kremlin. A number of officials in the lower ranks have been replaced, according to Hsinhua. They were made "scapegoats for the Soviet revisionist chieftains."

This report deserves serious attention since it comes from a regime not unacquainted with the technique of utilizing scapegoats to escape blame for disastrous policies. Liu Shao-chi, if he were permitted to speak freely, might offer solid testimony on this.

The singling out of scapegoats was standard practice under Stalin. His handpicked heirs in the Soviet Union have, of course, continued in the ways taught by the master.

Stalin himself managed to evade falling victim to this neat way of handling crises until after his death. Then Khrushchev, at the Twentieth Congress, blamed the monstrous repression of the preceding period on Stalin's "paranoiac" personality.

Khrushchev in turn was made the scapegoat for the bad economic situation, particularly in agriculture, that developed under his rule.

The economic situation in the Soviet Union today would seem to call for a propitiatory offering of comparable magnitude.

An additional incentive for such a move, from the standpoint of the parasitic ruling caste in the Soviet Union, is the growing mood of popular opposition. Doubt that the present team can contain the rising insistence on restoration of proletarian democracy must be very high in the top circles of the bureaucracy. Many of them must have reached the conclusion that it is high time to find a new scapegoat—while at the same time rehabilitating Stalin and tightening up the maintenance of "law and order."

The sound of fast shuffling inside the walls of the Kremlin, detected by observers as acute as the correspondent of *Le Monde*, may come from either those trying to escape the knife or those trying to throw it in first. It seems too early as yet to say which is which.

## Correspondence Between Hugo Blanco and the Novelist Jose Maria Arguedas

[The following exchange of letters between the imprisoned Peruvian Trotskyist Hugo Blanco and the novelist and ethnologist José María Arguedas, who shot himself November 28 and died in the morning of December 2, was published in part as a special feature in the March 14 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*. The correspondence occurred on the eve of Arguedas's suicide and was in Quechua, the language of the Incas and the most widely spoken language of the Peruvian Indians. Our translation is based on a Spanish version by Blanco circulated by the Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Committee for the Defense of Human Rights) in Lima. Blanco's final note is translated from *Le Monde*.

[These letters were also published in the January 16 issue of the Uruguayan weekly *Marcha*.

[Arguedas is famous throughout Latin America and in Europe for his powerful novels describing the condition and mentality of the oppressed Peruvian Indian population, especially *Los Ríos Profundos* (1959) and *Todas las Sangres* (1965). Some of his works have been translated into foreign languages. He published, moreover, several ethnological studies of the Peruvian Indians, notably *The Evolution of the Native Communal Villages* (1956).]

\* \* \*

Taytáy [Father] José María,

You almost made me weep today, when I learned what your wife told me. She said: "As he was getting ready to send this to you (*Todas las sangres*), he wrote a long note in Quechua. Later he changed his mind, 'Hugo might be embarrassed.' And he put down only these plain words."

When she told me that, I was very sad. I almost wept. How can there be any embarrassment among us, *taytáy*, when we can speak to each other in our warm language? When we ask each other's help, we never do it in plain words. Have we ever heard any-

one say: "Come help me with the planting tomorrow; I helped you yesterday"? How repellent! Who could do that! Only the *gamonales* [landlords] talk to us that way. Among ourselves, among our people, do we use that kind of language? We use a very kind tone: "Señor mio,\* I came to ask you to help me. Do not refuse. Tomorrow we have to plant the lower ravine. So, give me a hand, then, *caballerito\* paloma mia* [my dove], *corazón* [friend of my heart]." This is how we go about asking for help.

And also when we meet on the paths of the *punas* [high plateaus], even when we are strangers, we greet each other. We offer each other a drink, a little coca. We ask where the other is going. We chat a little.

And, this being so, how could you think I could be offended by anything you might have written in our affectionate language, by anything you might have written for me? Hasn't my heart warmed on reading how you translated our speech into Spanish so that all could come to know it and learn some small part of all that our language can express? When I also translate something of what we say in our language, don't I think of you? "Write like him," I say to myself. "The *mistis* [whites] are going to talk about me." I repeat to myself alone, when I try to translate from Quechua. "They have to get it right. They have to tell it like it is. I cannot use any other kind of language. I say exactly what comes from my heart, what comes to my lips." Saying that to myself, I think.

I cannot tell you what comes into my mind when I read your work. I do not read your work like any ordinary writing nor as constantly. My heart might break.

My *punas* begin to come to me with all their silence, with their mute sorrow, clutching my heart. Or when you

\* It is impossible to capture in English the respect and affection that is combined in these Spanish honorifics which are used with diminutive endings.

remind me of the little ravines, I begin to see the hummingbirds. I hear how the little springs sing. How many times I have thought of you when I have been moved by these memories.

What joy you would have felt seeing us come down from all the *punas* into Cuzco,\*\* without bowing our heads, without humbling ourselves, shouting in every street: "Death to All the *Gamonales!*" "Long Live the Working People!" Hearing our shouts, the "whiteys" fled into their holes like mice, as if the demons of hell were after them. At the gate of the cathedral itself, with a loudspeaker we told the people all the facts, the whole truth. What they had never heard in Spanish, we told them in Quechua. We told even the *maqtas*, who do not know how to read or write but do know how to struggle and work. They almost brought the Plaza de Armas down, these *maqtas* in their ponchos.

That day must come again, *taytáy*, not just like the one I told you about, but a greater day. Greater days are coming. You must see them. They are very clearly foreshadowed.

Here, without more, *taytáy*, I end. Or I would never finish writing. I will be angry if you do not send me the note you wrote for me. Until we meet again, *taytáy*. Do not forget me then.

Hugo Blanco  
El Frontón Prison  
November 11, 1969.

\* \* \*

*Hermano* [Brother] Hugo, Heart of Stone, Heart of a Dove,

Perhaps you have read my novel *Los Ríos Profundos* [Deep Rivers]. Remember it, brother, my most powerful novel. In that book I tell not only how I wept burning tears. With more tears and greater passion, I tell about the *pongos* [serfs], about the *colonos* [sharecroppers] of the *haciendas*, about their immense hidden power, about the rage, the undying fire that burns deep in their hearts. In this novel these flea-ridden people, beaten daily, forced to eat dirt, despised even by the *comunidades* [Indian communal villages] invade the city of Abancay, heedless of machine guns and bullets, over-

\*\* This refers to a temporary occupation of Cuzco in 1962 during the land agitation and peasant unionization campaign led by Hugo Blanco.

powering machine guns and bullets. In this way, braving a hail of lead, these serfs force the great preacher in the city, a priest who regards them as dirty insects, to say a mass, to sing in the church. They make him respect their might.

I had a premonition when I imagined this invasion of the city of Abancay by the poor and degraded. The men who study the signs of the times that are coming, who understand social and political struggles, who understand the meaning of the upheaval and occupation of Cuzco that you mention will comprehend the meaning of the uprising and seizure of a city that I imagined. With how much greater passion—the day they conquer the fear and terror that holds them fast—will these people rise up, when they are seeking not the death of the father of plagues, typhus, but of the *gamonales*! "Who can bring them to conquer the fear formed and deepened over centuries, who? Does the man exist anywhere in the world who will enlighten them and save them? Does he exist or not, Goddamn it?" I said to myself, like you, weeping hot tears, waiting, alone.

The critics, the very illustrious students of literature, could not at first perceive the ultimate intent of my novel, the idea that I instilled into its marrow, into the very center of its development. Fortunately one, only one, saw it and proclaimed it very clearly.

And later, brother? Were not you that man, you yourself, who led these "pulguientos" [flea-bitten ones], these Indians of the *haciendas*, the most downtrodden of the downtrodden, more whipped than pack animals or dogs, suffering the foulest defilement? Didn't you make these degraded peons into the bravest of the brave, fortify them, touch their hearts? Inspiring hearts, the hearts of stone and of doves that were hidden deep within these people like seeds, didn't you take Cuzco as you told me in your letter, thundering in Quechua from the very gate of the cathedral? Didn't you terrify the *gamonales*, who hid in their holes like trembling mice? You sent them running, these sons and protégés of the old Christ, the Christ of lead. Brother, dear brother, like me your face is a little white, but you have the most intense Indian heart—tears, song, dance, hatred.

I, brother, know only how to weep tears of fire. But with this fire I have purified a little the head and heart of Lima, the great city that denied, that hardly knew, its father and mother. I opened the eyes of the people a little. I cleaned the scales out of the eyes of the men of our people a little so that we could see each other more clearly. To the so-called foreign peo-



Drawing by Soanne in Marcha.

#### JOSE MARIA ARGUEDAS

ples, I think I showed our true image, its value, its great real value, and I raised it high enough and showed it clearly enough for them to esteem us, to know our strength and expect our future comradeship, so that they would not pity us as the most outcast of orphans, so that no one would be ashamed of us.

These things, brother, I and you, the man for whom the most reviled of our people have been waiting, we have done together. You and I have done these things, brother Hugo, man of iron, you who weep without tears. You are like, so very much like a *comunero* [member of an Indian communal village], a man of sorrow and of steel. When I saw your picture in a bookstore in the Quartier Latin in Paris, next to Camilo Cienfuegos and "Che" Guevara, I jumped for joy.

Listen, in the name of our new personal friendship, I am going to confess something to you. Listen, brother, just reading your letter, I felt, I knew that your heart is tender, is a flower, like the hearts of the Puquio *comuneros* who are closest to me. I received your letter yesterday, I spent the whole

night, walking first and then becoming agitated by joy and revelation.

I am not well; my strength is waning. But if I die now, I will die happier. That beautiful future day about which I spoke, when our peoples will be reborn, is coming. In my innermost eye, I sense its radiance. In the glow of that day your burning sorrow drips endlessly drop by drop. I am afraid that that dawn will cost blood, so much blood. You know that and that is why you speak from prison, give guidance, believe.

As in the hearts of the *runas* [Indians] who took care of me when I was a child, who raised me, there is hatred and fire in you against the *gamonales* of every stripe. For the suffering, the homeless, the *wakchas*, you have the heart of a lark. And like the water of some very pure springs, you have a love that refreshes until it makes the heavens ring with joy. Every drop of blood in your body has known how to weep, brother. A man who does not know how to weep, and this is even more true in our time, knows nothing of love, has never experienced it.

Your blood has already mingled with mine, like the blood of Don Victor Pusa and Don Felipe Maywa. Day and night, Don Victor and Don Felipe speak to me, weep unceasingly in my soul, accuse me in their language, with their great wisdom, with their cry that carries over incalculable distances, that reaches further than the light of the sun.

They loved me, Hugo, loving me because they saw that I, who was the son of a white man, was being treated with contempt, like an Indian. In their name, remembering them in my most innermost being, I wrote what I have written, learned all that I have learned and done everything that I have done, overcoming obstacles that at times seemed insuperable. I learned to know the world. And you also, I think that in the name of *runas* similar to the two I spoke of you know how to be a brother to those who know how to be brothers, to those like you, to those who know how to love.

How long have I to write to you? Already you cannot forget me, even if death takes me, listen Peruvian, strong as our mountains where the snow never melts, strengthened by prison like a stone, like a dove.

Here then is what I wrote you, happy, in the midst of the great dark-

ness of my mortal illness. The sadness of the *mistis*, of the egoists, does not reach us. We are touched by the mighty sorrow of the people, of the world, of those who know and feel the dawn. So, knowing death and sorrow, we neither perish nor suffer. Is it not so, my brother?

From the bottom of my heart,

José María

Lima

November 27, 1969.

\* \* \*

José María Arguedas left a note explaining why he was taking his own life. The following is a translation of a section of that letter:

"I think that I have fulfilled my obligations with a certain sense of responsibility, as a worker, an official,

and a scholar, and as a writer. I retire now because I feel, I have proved, that I no longer have the energy and the illumination to continue working, that is, to justify my life. With increasing age and prestige, my responsibilities and their importance have been growing. And when my spirit no longer retains its fire and lucidity, and instead begins to weaken, I personally think that the only road I can honestly take is that of retirement. Many, I hope all my colleagues and students, will understand that for some, retirement to one's home is worse than death."

\* \* \*

After Arguedas's death, Hugo Blanco wrote the following note:

"*Taytay* José María, you have found what you were seeking in tears, what awaited you in suffering. You have attained your goal. The awakening of your Indian brothers has come, the uprising of your children has arrived. As you said, now they are rising not only to demand a high mass against typhus. Now it is for land that they are rising. Now it is to seize what belongs to them from the hands of the usurpers. As you said, they are rising to assume their human dignity. Now the quiescence of your people is no longer a dreaming torpor. It is the pause of a condor before soaring to a greater height. As you said, the dawn is already near; already its light can be seen on the horizon. And as you said, seeing this dawn, suffering is no longer suffering and death is no longer death."

## Interview with Malachy McGurran

# For a Revolution in the Whole of Ireland

[The following interview with Northern Irish civil-rights leader Malachy McGurran was obtained by Gerry Foley of *Intercontinental Press* and Susan Lamont of the Young Socialist Alliance in New York March 18. Malachy McGurran is a representative of the Irish Republican movement, an all-Ireland anti-imperialist organization, and has been active in the leadership of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association.]

\* \* \*

*Question: Mr. McGurran, does the nationalist population of the Six Counties feel that they won a victory in the August fighting?*

*Answer:* No. No one won any victory. All that arose out of the August troubles was probably to help reestablish more strongly British imperialist control and influence in Northern Ireland. It gives the Wilson administration—the Labour party in London—an opportunity to reestablish itself as a kind of protector of the "warring Irish."

*Q: What alternative to direct British rule do you propose to protect the*

*rights of the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland from the Orange machine?*

*A:* The British government claims the ultimate authority under Article 47 of the Government of Ireland Act for all that happens in the North of Ireland. Therefore they can and must legislate directly from Westminster on the demands of the civil-rights movement. Aside from the question of democratic rights, however, we basically believe that direct rule can in no way help the situation.

Our alternative both for the mass of the Catholic or nationalist population, and for the Unionist or Protestant population is not to ask them to come into the present political setup in the Twenty-six Counties, which we are as much opposed to as the setup in the Six Counties. We are asking them, in fact, to disestablish the whole of the Establishment in Ireland, to reestablish the Irish people in the ownership of Ireland. This can only be done through a direct conflict with both British imperialist and native capitalist interests—which are predominant in the Twenty-six Counties.

*Q: Does that mean that you consider*

*the Republican movement a socialist movement?*

*A:* Yes, very much so. Going back ten years ago, the Republican movement—particularly the Irish Republican Army\*—was only concerned with the national question. Basically, it was a paramilitary organization which concerned itself with attacks on the established British armed forces in the North of Ireland.

But in the last four years it has come to a very radical standpoint. We realize that what is needed in Ireland is not just a military campaign against British occupation forces in the Six Counties, but a revolution in the whole of Ireland.

We in the Republican movement believe that a revolution must eventually come about by the establishment of some organization, particularly on military lines, but also on social, political, and economic lines, with all of the radical and left-wing organiza-

\* The Irish Republican Army [IRA] is a clandestine military group within the Republican movement. Sinn Fein is its political organization. Sinn Fein is legal in Eire and banned in Northern Ireland. —IP

tions in Ireland merging in the fight to disestablish the capitalist overlords.

We hope within a short number of years to see the establishment of a form of national liberation movement that will encompass the whole of the revolutionary groups that now exist in Ireland into one united mass organization.

We have plans afoot to bring this about and we hope that it can be accomplished within the next twelve to eighteen months.

*Q: Can you give us some idea of what you understand by socialism; do you want to establish a socialist system with central planning; would there be any role for, say, small capitalists within the socialist system that you propose for Ireland?*

*A:* We believe that at least in the beginning we would have to be able to take these people some way along the road with us. To a large extent they make up the backbone of the population in the rural parts of Ireland, and eventually they must be brought to a point of seeing that their interests as individuals lie in the establishment of workers and cooperative control of both industry and agriculture. This would be in a context of a cooperative form of state structure, all the way from what we term a rural or county level right up to provincial and national level.

*Q: Who do the people in the nationalist ghettos in the North look to for leadership?*

*A:* The organization that had the most contact with the people prior to this was probably the Civil Rights Association itself, but it was recognized by the mass of the people that the backbone of the association was the Republican movement.

We were able to give some form of lead and guidance, particularly in the areas where up to 100,000 people were barricaded in after the August troubles, in relation to the setting up of defense committees which to a large extent the Republican movement controls.

The Catholic Church attempted to use their influence to win back the leadership and control of the people, in their attempt to remove the barricades at a time when Republicans were

being searched for and hunted for by the police to be arrested under the Special Powers Act. We had to, at that stage, have a head-on collision in public with the Catholic Church which for hundreds of years has had the strongest influence over the mass of the Irish people.

Various other organizations attempted to lead the movement. The members of the People's Democracy are an example. But what they had, probably, in theory, they lacked in the question of the practicalities of being able to give guidance and deal with the people, because a lot of them were students who had little or no connection with the masses of the working class in areas like Belfast, and Bogside in Derry.

These people have traditionally looked to the IRA anyway in the stand against authority and particularly the stand against the police. We were unfortunately in a position where a lot of our leadership both on a local and national level during the August period had been imprisoned.

*Q: Do the Citizens Defense Councils still exist and if they do, how are they selected?*

*A:* The Citizens Defense Committee is still very much in existence because we are expecting a lot of trouble in the coming five or six months. There is a definite right-wing move within the Unionist party for control of the Unionist Association which, in fact, would be the group to decide what form of government we would have in Northern Ireland.

The committees are elected on a parish system where the local people get together at public meetings. They elect a chairman, a vice-chairman, and a guard-duty officer whose job is to get members of the defense committee out on guard duty.

The whole system aims at controlling and defending the area, not even so much against extremist Unionists who come in burning and shooting, but against infiltration by members of the Special Branch, of the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary], and particularly more so now, members of the Special Branch of the British army who are trying to integrate themselves into and with the people by holding functions and dances and all this type of thing.

The Citizens Defense Committee has been able to prove to the people that the British army are not there in their interests, that they can only depend on themselves and their own structure.

*Q: Have there been arrests of civil-rights activists in the recent period?*

*A:* There have. I myself was arrested and spent four and a half months in prison under the Special Powers Act without charge or trial. This is probably one of the most obnoxious pieces of legislation in operation in any part of the world today.

They have a maximum law in relation to the Special Powers Act which can cover detention for an unlimited period at the discretion of the minister of home affairs of the Unionist government. Thousands of people have spent some ten, fifteen, twenty years in prison without charge or trial at various times in the history of the state of Northern Ireland.

There is another piece of oppressive legislation which is to my mind even more oppressive, and that is the Offenses Against the State Act operated by the Twenty-six County government. I have also spent three and a half years in prison in Dublin under this act without charge or trial for Irish Republican activities.

*Q: How would you compare the Republican movement and People's Democracy in the North in regard to their respective strength and their approach to the civil-rights movement?*

*A:* Well, the People's Democracy started about two years ago out of a purely students' demonstration that was held in support of the civil-rights demands and as a reaction against the repressive activities of the police on the streets in Derry City on October 5, 1968.

Within six or seven months they grew to around 600 or 700—at least this was how many came to their meetings, and anyone could come. There was no real organization, no committee was elected, and no one was responsible, really, for anything. They believed that this was the best system and that the Civil Rights Association should adopt this attitude. They looked on the association with disdain because of its "bureaucratic" insistence on elections and an execu-

tive to coordinate and plan activities of the civil-rights movement.

We differed with them because we felt that there must be central coordination within the Civil Rights Association because it was made up of a large number of organizations, some very much on the left, some in the center, and some on a kind of quasi-chauvinist nationalist stand very near the right.

People's Democracy are confined mainly to the city of Belfast. Outside of that, even in the North of Ireland, they have no real organizational form, whereas the Republican movement is a national organization, covering every area in the whole of Ireland.

We have been able in the Republican movement to maintain our own political existence with our own political objectives outside of the civil-rights movement. The members of the People's Democracy, I feel, got so involved in the civil-rights struggle that they lost their own identity.

They have tried in the last six and half months to form themselves into an organization with card-carrying membership and a central executive. To a large extent I believe they have failed in this because they have had no roots or contacts with the mass of the ordinary people.

*Q: Are there specific political differences of analysis and approach between the Republican movement and People's Democracy?*

A: Basically we accept and believe in the same objectives: the establishment of an Irish socialist republic, a workers and small farmers republic. There is little or no difference in political analysis from that standpoint.

People's Democracy disagrees with our whole attitude of abstentionism from parliamentary representation in either the Westminster parliament, the Stormont parliament, or the Twenty-six County parliament.

They believe that you should be able to use the whole parliamentary system to disestablish the Establishment. We believe that from a revolutionary standpoint if you tell people you want to destroy the Establishment which is represented by these parliaments, then you can't ask the people to elect you into them. Some members within our own movement feel that

you can destroy these things from inside. This is a contentious question within the Republican movement itself.

But our main difference is over our approach and our tactics in involving the people in all forms of agitation. They believe that it is a question of just standing up and saying it at public meetings and in handing out leaflets. We believe that you must show it in a practical sense and be working with the people and giving them lead and guidance, and proving to them by example that they are a power and that their interests require an Irish revolution and an Irish revolutionary organization.

*Q: Are there other socialist forces involved in the civil-rights struggle in the North besides the Republican movement and People's Democracy? And if there are, would you describe them?*

A: The only other influential left-wing organization in the struggle in the civil-rights movement is the Communist party of Northern Ireland. This is a very small organization that would not number any more than, I suppose, 150 to 200 active people. They are based mainly and solely in the Belfast city area.

What can be said for them is that they have large influence in the trade-union movement. They have been able to avoid sectarian clashes and pogroms in areas like the Belfast docks.

They originally were purely a branch of the Communist party of Great Britain. They have since attempted to come to grips with the national question of Ireland. They are attempting to amalgamate with the Irish Workers party, which is their Twenty-six County equivalent, to form themselves into the Irish Communist party, which will cover the whole of Ireland. They are reasonably active in the civil-rights struggle and have been one of the cofounder organizations, if you like, of the civil-rights movement in the North of Ireland.

But a lot of them and much of their leadership are rather conservative in relation to the possibility of a national revolution in Ireland as a whole.

*Q: What is the attitude of the Republican movement to the labor parties in Northern Ireland; both the*

*Northern Ireland Labour party and the Republican Labour party?*

A: Well, the Republican Labour party is basically led and controlled by one individual, Mr. Gerry Fitt. It is even smaller in a numerical sense than either the People's Democracy or the Communist party of Northern Ireland. It hasn't really a social program or political program either. Its membership is made up to some extent of ex-Republicans and ex-political prisoners who got together after they came out of prison after the last war and who felt that the Republican view on parliamentary participation was wrong. They have two MPs at the moment. Basically they have little or no support among the youth in the greater Belfast area, and outside of that they don't exist.

The Northern Ireland Labour party really has looked upon itself as a branch of the British Labour party and attempted, in fact, at their annual conference this year to merge directly with the British Labour party. Again, they have two representatives in parliament.

*Q: What kind of activities does the Republican movement carry on on a day-to-day basis in an attempt to involve the nationalist masses in Northern Ireland?*

A: We work through the Republican clubs, which you must remember are banned in the North of Ireland under the Special Powers Act. It is punishable by a five- to fourteen-year term of imprisonment to be a member of a Republican Club.

Rather than knuckle down under the ban, our attitude has been to operate in public.

We have in the rural areas become involved in the land question. Native and foreign capitalists are involved in land speculation, coming in and buying up landed estates. The movement's activity at the local level is to get the small farmers involved in defense. We have formed Defense Associations, agitating for the control of these estates to be given to local cooperative organizations to be distributed among the people.

In some cases we are forced to take direct action. This means the destruction of some of the large estate houses by one means or another to make it as awkward as possible for these peo-

ple who own large tracts of land to exist within the community. We have also organized boycotts, getting even the local small business firms who supply these people with food or farming equipment to join in.

In the urban areas we have carried on housing agitation, to get the people formed into tenants organizations to refuse to pay rents as a form of civil disobedience until the whole question of rent rises and proper amenities in large building sites are gone into by the government, particularly in Belfast.

The Republican movement has been very active with the Bombay Street Tenants Association in Belfast in getting the people to build their own houses through cooperative activity and voluntary labor. We hope to have finished sixty-odd houses by the end of this year. We have had to put members of the Republican army under arms to protect these houses because the British army, the city council fathers, and the big building companies have attempted to stop them being built.

*Q: What do you see coming in Northern Ireland in the next six months or a year?*

A: Well, I think the struggle will be on two levels.

Within the Unionist county associations there has been a definite move to the right. The right wing has been very active; to a great extent, they have already picked most of the candidates for the next national elections to Stormont and to Westminster.

We believe that the next election will see a direct attempt to take over the control of the government and the whole state structure in Northern Ireland by these people.

They are people who are opposed not only to the basic reform demands of the civil-rights movement but to granting even the reforms that are on the statute books, like one man, one vote, and the end to business votes. Since votes are in proportion to your property, some business concerns have up to thirty or forty votes.

In addition to confrontations with the right-wing Unionists, we can see a strong possibility that the mass of the people will come into direct physical conflict with the 12,500 British troops who are representing British imperialist interests in the North of

Ireland. This is one of the reasons we hope to get support not only from Irishmen's organizations but from any of the radical, progressive organizations in America for the struggle which is coming soon.

It is significant that in the highly Protestant areas of Belfast where they fly the Union Jack in every home and practically worship the queen, people had a seven-hour fight with the British troops. I would say, having met some of these people in prison, that in those Protestant working-class areas of Belfast there is more hate for the British government and the British armed forces than there is even in the nationalist Catholic areas.

This creates an important opening for the Republican movement, and unless we are able to get through to the mass of the Protestant working class, then the revolution in Ireland cannot be a success.

*Q: Do you feel that the Vietnam war and the worldwide resistance to it has had an effect on the struggle in Ireland?*

A: The Republican movement has not been really all that actively involved in forms of antiwar demonstrations. We have pushed a pro-Vietcong line directly through our newspaper, the *United Irishman*. There is an antiwar organization in the Dublin area, but there is none in the Belfast area.

We believe that probably the best way that we can support the struggle in Vietnam is by bringing about a realization in the minds of the Irish people that there is an equation between the struggle in Vietnam and the struggle for the liberation of Ireland. We have had some success in this.

Probably our greatest opponents have been a lot of Irish so-called American Republicans who could not see that the situation in Vietnam is related in any way to what has been going on in Ireland. We have lost some people over this but our feeling is that we're as well off without these people.

*Q: Do you feel that the August explosions in Northern Ireland produced a comparable radicalization in the South?*

A: The Southern government is not stable in relation to the August trouble. It's ironical in a sense, but a lot of

the rank-and-file members of the Fianna Fáil party in Dublin are so right wing in the national sense toward the removal of British troops that they exerted a strong pressure on the Dublin government to march directly with the Irish army across the border in one last gallant drive to disestablish the British occupation forces.

Needless to say, the Irish government came to terms very quickly with the British government. They did not want to be put in the situation of having to shoot down their own people in the streets of Dublin for demanding weapons for the defense of the people of the Six Counties.

That situation still exists. It is not in the interests of the Dublin government to see it continue, because as long as it does, they are threatened with overthrow by the people's anger at their inactivity.

There is also the danger, for them, that the civil-rights movement might spread into the South. This is another reason why they would dearly love to see an end to the struggle in the North.

## Dominican Republic

### Balaguer Doomed, Say Freed Prisoners

Upon arriving in Mexico along with nineteen other political prisoners March 26, after being exchanged for Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, a U. S. air attache kidnapped by the "Unified Anti-re-election Command," Maximiliano Gomez, the twenty-six-year-old general secretary of the Movimiento Popular Dominicano [Dominican Popular Movement], declared that "conditions are now at a favorable conjuncture for the Dominican people to take power." The opposition to Balaguer's campaign for reelection "is of such scope that a confrontation between the ruling team and the democratic forces is now inevitable."

Another member of the group, Juan Pablo Gomez of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano [Revolutionary Dominican party], said that "the current president of the republic has established a dictatorship even more ferocious than that of Trujillo. In the last three years, 450 persons have been murdered by the Balaguer government, and 500 others, most of them workers and peasant leaders, or student leaders, are in prison right now."

Maximiliano Gomez charged Balaguer with having "ordered the assassination of four political leaders last week guilty of having participated in a meeting organized against the reelection of the current president of the republic."

# The Ovando Government and the Bolivian Situation

[The following resolution was approved unanimously at a special national meeting of the POR (Partido Obrero Revolucionario — Revolutionary Workers party, the Bolivian sec-

tion of the Fourth International). The meeting was held last November under clandestine conditions owing to government persecution.]

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## 1. The Development of the World Revolution and Imperialism's Defensive Measures

In order to correctly understand the events that have occurred in Bolivia since September 26, 1969, it is essential to place them in their context as part of the general situation in Latin America and the world. These developments must be seen as an expression of the relationship of forces between the advancing revolution and the counterrevolution which is defending itself by every available means — from war and terrorism to even staging "revolutions" itself in some colonies and semicolonies in order to stave off bigger revolutions.

The imperialists' great offensive, which escalated in the early 1960s, especially in the Vietnam war, could not halt the slow disintegration of their domination of the colonial and semi-colonial world. In Cuba and Vietnam, their extraordinary military and economic power was defeated. The colonial revolution suffered a number of setbacks which were at times severe blows — the partial defeats of the anti-imperialist forces in Latin America represented by the advent of military dictatorships and a damming up of the workers movement; the ouster of Nkrumah in Ghana; the counterrevolution in Indonesia; the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel; the elimination of Odinga Odinga in Kenya; and the defeat of the guerrillas in Bolivia in 1967 with the murder of Che. However, such blows could not alter the relationship of forces favoring the revolution. After these setbacks, the colonial revolution resumed its advances, beginning in Cuba and Vietnam. And this time it is coupled with a ripening revolution in the imperialist centers themselves.

The defeat of imperialism in Vietnam is already an accomplished fact, a fact with far-reaching repercussions

on a world scale. The imperialists who tried to intimidate the revolutionists through military terror in Asia now have to retreat before the indomitable determination of the Vietnamese masses, suffering a loss of prestige not only in the eyes of the Asian peoples but of the entire colonial world. Moreover, this war and the Yankee defeat are producing economic and political repercussions in the United States — such as inflation, the dollar crisis, and a radicalization of the black and student masses that is stimulating the emergence of a new revolutionary vanguard — all of which constitute a kind of time bomb in the very heart of the most powerful imperialism.

It is also an obvious fact that the imperialist offensive in Latin America, which has been carried on primarily through military regimes, is being defeated. It has proved impossible to crush the guerrillas in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. After a downturn, owing primarily to internal crises provoked by the capitulation of the Communist parties, the guerrilla movements in these countries are now picking up new momentum. In other countries like Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Ecuador, guerrilla movements are emerging, dealing spectacular blows to the imperialist oppressors and their national lackeys. Moreover, in Argentina and Mexico a mass movement, combined with insurrectionary-type direct-action methods, is shaking the foundations of capitalism.

Defeated militarily in Asia, severely challenged in the Near East, and shaken and outflanked in Latin America, Yankee imperialism is faced with an urgent need to readjust its policy toward the southern continent. In the

ranks of the Yankee plutocrats themselves voices of alarm are being raised in the face of the advancing revolution which cannot be contained or still less crushed by essentially military means. These voices are recommending prudent changes designed both to appease the discontent of the Latin-American masses and to improve the image of the bourgeois governments so that they can gain some credibility among their own masses.

Rockefeller's junket through Latin America as Nixon's emissary alarmed the Yankee governmental circles because it showed the precariousness of the bourgeois governments and military dictatorships. In many areas these governments could not guarantee his safety and in others they received him only in airports or in isolated places surrounded by bayonets and with an impressive array of security forces. Nixon's envoy was greeted by the peoples not as a friend but as public enemy No. 1. The report Rockefeller made upon concluding his tour reflects this alarm. It is a warning of the dangers existing in this part of the world to the capital invested by the imperialist companies and to the "Western way of life." Inspired by a fear of losing imperialist positions, his recommendations call for improving U.S. relations and strengthening the alliance with the Latin-American bourgeoisies. They call for correcting the deficiencies of the Alliance for Progress, which is to become "Action for Progress."

Behind the Rockefeller report and Nixon's speech on Latin America, there is an apprehensive tendency at work. Prompted by the imperialist defeats, this tendency wants to maintain U.S. domination on a dual basis — social and economic concessions as well as military power. It is true that the idea of combining armed and social counterinsurgency was already present in the Alliance for Progress. However, a clearly greater emphasis was placed on a military offensive, the social and economic aspect being quite weak.

Rockefeller made a number of spe-



cific recommendations in both the political and economic areas which reflect the more flexible attitude developing in the imperialist center under the impact of the blows dealt by the revolution. They show an attempt to sugarcoat colonial exploitation with some beneficial programs. On the political side, Rockefeller's recommendations were to create a Latin-American Security Council; rearm the national armies; and drop the Hickenlooper, Symington, and Reuss amendments. His economic recommendations were the following: tariff preferences for developing countries; higher import quotas for the Latin-American countries; stabilizing raw-materials prices at levels reflecting fair wages; supporting regional common markets and banks; revision of regulations requiring use of American shipping; new coffee agreements; longer-term loans; replacing projects with complete financial programs; financing of superstructural improvements; lowering interest rates, eliminating the additionality clauses which require aid recipients to spend equivalent amounts in the U.S., restructuring of interest payments on the foreign debt, and other such measures. The new right [as opposed to the "new left"], the modern right, has learned from the failure of McNamara's policy of trying to maintain the stability and internal peace of every country solely through security measures (the army, the police, and special security forces). This new right proposes bold changes, including "revolutions" in order to head off greater explosions which would sweep away imperialist domination. That is, they favor giving concessions rather than losing everything.

This Yankee right is tied to, or we might say associated with, the Latin-American bourgeois reformist movements. It is the force orienting those currents and governments that talk about opposing communism by attacking social ills, that maintain that continental defense and the inter-American system must include not only military means but measures of economic and social development. What all these currents are seeking in reality is to preserve the capitalist system, to gain better conditions for defending it. The changes they propose vary according to the peculiarities of each country—the depth of the crisis in each country and the level of revolutionary ma-

turity. However, all these changes are always within the framework of the system of imperialist oppression. One thing is clear: the advance of the revolution is forcing imperialism and its native lackeys to use new tactics, to use more refined or subtle methods of colonial exploitation. But this shift in tactics cannot deceive the masses and the revolutionary vanguard of Latin America. Imperialism is still imperialism and many of the advocated reform measures have been blunted in the bureaucratic and administrative machinery, frustrating the hopes even of the bourgeois sectors. Moreover, as long as the relationship of forces favorable to the revolution is maintained, minute concessions and a few crumbs will not pacify the masses but will feed the revolutionary flames in Latin America. Every gain gives the masses an awareness of their own power. The inexorable march toward socialism will continue. Confronted with this fact, imperialism will soon present its old face once again—its true nature as the policeman of colonial exploitation relying unequivocally on military force. It is already preparing to do this by planning the

## 2. The Guerrilla Movement and the Rise of Workers' Struggles Are Forcing the Generals to Take Defensive Measures

The estimation of the preventive causes of the emergence of the Ovando government is confirmed by the introduction to the "Mandato Revolucionario" [Revolutionary Mandate] of the armed forces and by the initial and repeated statements of the new ministers and military chiefs.

In the first statements formulated by General Ovando and in the introduction to the Mandato Revolucionario, the ouster of Siles Salinas was justified as follows:

a) The stand of the armed forces was precipitated by the danger threatening the national institutions as a result of the advance of the forces of the extreme left and the growing activity of the guerrillas.

b) By foreign intervention in the form of guerrillas.

c) By the Siles government's incapacity to combat the terrorist adventure.

d) To prevent the "Polandization" [national collapse] and Vietnamization of Bolivia.

organization of the Latin-American Security Council and rearmament of the local armies. But if the exclusively military offensive and later the combination of force with their so-called development plans have not succeeded in breaking up the revolution, another change of tactics will avail them nothing. Their historic destiny is marked out; it is to fall in order to make way for the new socialist society.

Now we must determine the place of the Bolivian military government in this process taking place in the world and in Latin America in which imperialism is defending itself by resorting to preventive measures.

The emergence of the Ovando government was an intelligent preventive response by the bourgeoisie to the unstable situation in Bolivia. It is the system's most serious attempt to contain the revolution rising and maturing from below by means of a "revolution" manipulated from above. It does not matter if this operation is carried out at the expense of some individual financial interests so long as it maintains the structure of imperialist domination.

e) Because of the need to confront the anarchy from a "revolutionary" standpoint and not by the mere use of violence, which is self-exhausting.

These pronouncements are quite clear and reveal the true aims of the new civilian-military government. The same thing is happening as in November 1964 when a popular insurrection also endangered the institutions of capitalist society. The generals have moved to confront, with the means they felt most appropriate, a new rise and mobilization of the people, of the worker, peasant, and student masses, whose most energetic and dynamic expression is the guerrilla movement.

Shortly before the ouster of Siles Salinas, the military chiefs announced that the guerrilla activity had not been eradicated despite the blows suffered by the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional—Army of National Liberation] and the murder of Inti Peredo. This amounted to a confession that the army's plans had failed. Repres-

sion could not break the revolutionists. So now after a military offensive to soften up the opposition, new methods will be tried. Underlying this can be seen the army's fundamental objective of preserving the system and isolating the guerrilla movement. In one of his speeches, the commander of the armed forces, General Tórrez, clarified the regime's character still more by saying that "the army has stolen the banners of the guerrillas."

It must be stressed that the army sees as its responsibility preservation of the capitalist system in Bolivia. However, in the conditions of the crisis of the bourgeoisie and its parties, and of the armed revolutionary advance of the ELN guerrillas, this result can no longer be expected from purely repressive means, which, moreover, have already failed. An economic development plan is necessary. This is the new philosophy of the military nucleus that inherited power from President Barrientos.

To understand the desperation of the military chiefs who see the capitalist state crumbling, you must recall the very grave crisis of the regime that appeared already during the Barrientos dictatorship, the profound crisis of the bourgeois state apparatus that threatened to sweep away all the so-called national institutions. This was expressed, among other things, in the action of the minister of the interior, Antonio Arguedas;\* the rebellion of then chief of staff of the army Vásquez Sempértegui; the tensions and frictions in the ruling circles themselves (the parliament, the judicial system, the executive); and the scandalous deal over the Matilde mine, building the gas pipeline to Argentina, and many other deals which enriched a sector of the rulers. And all this was against the backdrop of the country's endemic economic crisis — a chronic budget deficit; interest on the foreign debt absorbing 15 percent of annual income, as Rockefeller brought out in his report; a constantly declining per capita income (US\$150 in 1950 and US\$80 in 1968, according to Chancellor Medeiros's report to parliament). But the most serious thing was that this

objective situation was becoming a spur to the struggle of the masses, who were drawing behind them broad sectors of the church and the intellectuals. In this context, the guerrillas were no more than the extension of that revolutionary mass movement whose development had been cut off and whose spread had been limited by the massacres, the repression, and the jailings of the military. While Che's guerrilla movement had broad popular support in 1967, the reappearance of the guerrillas in 1969 under Inti Peredo occurred in a much riper situation. In these circumstances, the students, priests, workers, and radicalized sectors of the middle class lost their hesitations and accepted armed struggle as the road to national and social liberation. This popular attitude of accepting and supporting the guerrilla road is what sustains and fuels the guerrilla movement. The people have not been scared off; no terror gnaws at their vitals. For the people, the guerrillas seem like the first Christians, who were devoured by the beasts in the Roman circuses but whose places were taken by other fighters inspired by their faith and confidence in victory.

### 3. The Armed Forces Holding Power Have Become the Political Party of the Bourgeoisie

The armed forces seized power in Bolivia in November 1964. The traditional bourgeois parties had lost their historic validity. They showed themselves incapable of understanding the world and national situation, or the new relationship of forces in effect. Worn out, ossified, divided, and subdivided, these parties became useless for defending the order established by imperialism and native capitalism against a workers and popular revolution.

This political vacuum, as General Ovando once called it, was filled by the army, which began to act like a political party of the bourgeoisie.

The entire military establishment assumed characteristics belonging to a political organization. In the context of enjoying numerous privileges, well-paid administrative posts, and a 300 percent wage increase, all of the military, from generals to sergeants, received political instruction from Yankee technicians, in addition to their

Exclusively military repressive measures proved ineffective. In the conditions described, continuing this course would have led toward a catastrophic explosion and precipitated a majority of the masses to the side of the guerrillas. The military high command understood this. Instead of confronting the people directly, mounting armed guards around the mines, exercising unrelenting persecution and violence that exhausted itself without changing anything, it needed a new tactic. In order to prevent the catastrophe, it had to "make a revolution" from above, liberalize the regime and loosen the halter imposed by the imperialist concerns, which was strangling the country's economy. The military high command had to steal the banners to which the guerrillas were rallying the people, as General Tórrez confessed. The hangman's rope and the murderous machine guns the military had used against the miners had to be hidden behind a development program and behind the name of "revolution." Great and catastrophic sicknesses must be combated with drastic medicines. That was the choice the bourgeois system was confronted with in Bolivia.

antiguerrilla and urban counterinsurgency training. The general staff of the armed forces was converted into a political committee, or central committee, of the army-party. An important qualitative change took place in the armed forces; they are no longer the old armed forces or the old army. This peculiar development has consisted of a *politicalization of the officer corps and the institutionalization of its political character*. This in turn engendered a *militarization of political activity on a national scale*.

The party-army, or armed political party, has monopolized political power uninterruptedly since November 1964. It has governed the country in various forms — a military junta (Barrientos-Ovando); a constitutional government (Barrientos-Siles), and now a civilian-military junta (Ovando).

These various forms have been purely a matter of appearances and have been dictated by the tactical needs of the military's domestic and interna-

\* Arguedas sent a copy of Che's diary to the Cuban government and denounced CIA domination of the Bolivian state apparatus. See "How the CIA Runs Bolivia," *Intercontinental Press*, September 23, 1968, page 770.

tional relations. Whatever the form, the same military dictatorship propped by armed force was still behind it. Never has the capitalist state looked so much like a simple armed body than now. Having absorbed all powers, the military commanders can boast that "We are the state!"

This does not mean that differences have ceased to exist within the army-party, including cliques and exclusive fraternities, all of which want to grab the best positions, from the presidency of the republic on down. But these groupings act like factions of a political party; they have a common denominator—defense of the capitalist structure. Their differences are over how to approach this task.

At no point did the Siles Salinas government break the continuity of the military dictatorship. In practice Siles did not govern. He was a fictitious president lacking the power to

name even subordinate officials in the local administrations (e.g., Valenzuela in Cochabamba). His unusual talent for playing a front man's role led him to tolerate such a situation. The ruling force was always the army-party, which, with its regional divisions, its air and naval forces, controlled the country and carried out its decisions behind Siles's back.

Depending on its needs, the army-party has created and dissolved civilian political groups or hitched old mini-parties to its chariot, trying to give the impression that it had a base of support. Representing no organized political forces, the civilian personalities who have passed through the cabinets have never carried any weight; their function has been reduced to playing the role the party-army assigned them in accordance with its changing tactics.

#### 4. The History and Social Character of the Army-Party

By our works we shall be known, General Ovando said. That is gospel truth. To be sure, we already know them by their works and we know what the Bolivian armed forces are capable of.

The statements of the generals would be enough to reveal what is behind the reorganization of the government. In jurisprudence "the confession of the accused is full proof." But in politics this criterion is insufficient. What is decisive here in understanding the essence of a state, in measuring a revolutionary process and gauging the potential of its leaders, is determining its social or class nature. Such an analysis prevents errors of judgment in the face of at times contradictory and confused passing situations.

The armed forces are a component of the state. In our country they represent the ruling classes, which are tightly bound to imperialism. In this period of world war between socialism and imperialism, the Bolivian armed forces are actually part of the international army of imperialism, whose head is in the Pentagon. This truth is so elementary that even the children know it.

After it was routed by the armed people in 1952, the Bolivian army was rebuilt by imperialism. General Ovando admitted this when he said that the military received Yankee arms

behind the back of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, the ruling party from 1952 to 1964]. Its top military commanders as well as its middle-ranking officers have gone through special courses in Panama. In the Miraflores fortress, alongside the Bolivian general staff offices, the American military commission carries on its work. Yankee advisers train the special antiguerrilla and urban counterinsurgency units. The armed forces of Bolivia have been built up, trained militarily, technically, and armed by the Pentagon. And this so-called military assistance continues today after the nationalization of the Gulf Oil Co. and when General Ovando declares that he is at war with imperialism.

Because of its role as the lever of the system, its overbearing attitude deriving from its privileges, the Bolivian military caste has been conservative and a defender of the "established order." Bolivian military history is a history of massacres of the workers and peasants and of coups d'etat to block the advances of the masses. Just in the period since 1964 we have to note the two massacres in the Catavi-Siglo Veinte mine in 1965, the massacre in Milluni and Alto la Paz in the same year, the Saint John's Day massacre in the Siglo Veinte and Hua-

nuni, the occupations of the trade-union headquarters, the destruction of the labor-owned radio stations, as well as other such incidents. All of these actions were carried out under the command of General Ovando, who exercised the supreme authority over the army, and the present team of military rulers.

If this is the history of the army forces, which today are the ruling party-army, it would be strange that in the twinkling of an eye, without debates or serious internal crises, this entire institutionalized body changed its mind, cast off its past, and became progressive, revolutionary, and anti-imperialistic. What kind of a miracle is this?

We do not deny the possibility of a change in sectors of the army influenced by the technical, scientific, and military triumphs of the socialist camp and by the defeat of the imperialists at the hands of the advancing revolutionary masses. The class struggle does not spare any organization, however monolithic, and the army will not be an exception. But only revolution, revolutionary struggle, will disintegrate the oppressor army, freeing sectors that will go over to the people and join a new liberation army emerging from the ranks of the people. In the tradition of Lenin, we do not believe that the army and its commanders will make an about-face as a result of simple persuasion or any awakening of "their conscience." The force that will divide this army, demoralize it, and win for the people any progressive sector that might exist within it will be revolutionary struggle. That is the historic lesson of all revolutions.

But it must be made very clear that an instrument like the army-party is not qualified to head a revolution leading to the national and social liberation of Bolivia. In the present period in world history of transition between two systems and modes of production, revolution means a direct struggle for socialism. The road of civilization and progress for the backward peoples leads through the overthrow of the capitalist classes holding power and the defeat of imperialism which is their underpinning.

Moreover, the military rulers themselves say that they are not trying to create a socialist society and that they do not propose to elevate the work-

ing class to power. We stress that the army-party has replaced the traditional bourgeois parties which are in crisis and has assumed the task of preserving the capitalist system within the structure of imperialist domination. But the present Bolivian political conditions and the catastrophic economic crisis require extreme measures. The country has been reduced to the status of an international beggar. It is being strangled by the control of the imperialist concerns and manifold American organizations. In this situation also the ruling army lacks the finances for maintaining, and still less for modernizing, itself. These difficulties can only be met with drastic medicine, by sacrificing a sector of the exploiting and oppressor classes themselves. The policy of the rope and massacre had failed, while the insurrection headed by the guerrilla movement threatened to destroy all

the underpinnings of the system. In these circumstances and in harmony with the American new right, the military had to steal some popular banners and "make a revolution" against imperialism. So, we are seeing military officers educated by the Pentagon and headed by Ovando, who only months before was in the USA as a special guest of the top American brass, taking on the coloration of "left nationalists."

This is nothing new. In certain circumstances, in order better to defend their interests, the oppressing classes find themselves forced to "move to the left" and make some concessions. But having retained power in their hands, thanks precisely to this maneuver, these oppressing classes quickly take back what they have given and even increase their profits once the moment of difficulty is past.

## 5. The Theoretical and Political Content of the 'Mandato Revolucionario'

The above conclusion is confirmed by the programmatic document released by the armed forces under the name of "Mandato Revolucionario." As a work of political theory, it barely reaches the level of a bourgeois reformist program, with the typical populist phrasemongering used to conceal such objectives.

The central and leading ideas of this program can be summed up in the following points:

1. A national model of state organization. A system neither "exclusively capitalist nor exclusively socialist." Coexistence of various types of ownership (state, cooperative, private).

2. National sovereignty over the sources of production; recovery of natural resources turned over to foreign companies on disadvantageous conditions, or a readjustment of the state share of the profits of the operations.

3. Heavy industry based on the mines and an industrial revolution in the countryside.

4. Protection of national capital and industry, and guarantees for private foreign investment.

5. A study of the possibility of raising wages and introducing profit sharing.

6. The right of self-determination and relations with the socialist countries.

7. National unity and an alliance of classes.

As can be seen, these planks are not new. They were popularized by the right wing of the MNR and, in a situation of a crisis endangering the system, they represent a bourgeois program.

The proposition of a state of undefined character, neither capitalist nor socialist, is an absurdity from the standpoint of political science. Everybody knows that the state is a repressive historical entity which arose to guarantee the privileges and interests of the ruling class. The capitalist state protects the bourgeoisie in its appropriation of the social surplus produced by the workers. A workers or socialist state protects the interests of the workers in power; it destroys the roots of capitalist exploitation and creates the conditions for building socialism. There can be no intermediate kind of state, neither capitalist nor socialist. This is the ABC of the theory of the state, which even the capitalist theoreticians admit. If this formulation is resorted to, it is out of a need to confuse the masses. Moreover, the coexistence of state, cooperative, and private ownership does not change the nature of the state because in essence the Bolivian regime is still based on wage-labor exploitation and the ap-

propriation of surplus value by capitalist enterprises. Both state and cooperative ownership operate within the laws of capitalism. And the entire country remains a part of the structure of imperialism.

As for the proposals to assure national sovereignty, the contradictions in the program of the army-party are evident and demonstrate its limitations and weaknesses. On the one hand, the program declares that the state will recover the natural resources turned over to foreign companies under disadvantageous conditions, or that it will enforce a fair sharing of the profits. Later it states that foreign investment coming in to develop the country will be protected. Here we are confronted with another demagogic absurdity. No foreign imperialist concern invests in backward countries to develop them. What the foreign investors are looking for is a high rate of profit and their policy is one of looting the country. Therefore, all the concessions for the exploitation of natural resources made by semicolonial countries are harmful to the national interest and none contains or recognizes a "fair share" for the state. The history of Bolivia, of Latin America, and the entire colonial and semicolonial world shows this in tragic dimensions. Protecting private foreign investment means ignoring this experience and, in practice, opening the gates of the country to imperialist colonization.

The formulations on industrialization, protecting national industry and capital are out of the bourgeois arsenal and assume a utopian independent capitalist development in Bolivia.

National sovereignty and underdevelopment are interdependent problems which can only be solved outside the framework of the imperialist-capitalist system. The underdevelopment and backwardness of the colonial and semicolonial countries have increased the development of the imperialist centers. We are a poor, underdeveloped country because the imperialist center takes the social surplus or the economic residue available for investment produced in the country. It does this not only through direct exploitation by foreign concerns but by means of the economic and social structure created by imperialism in which trading relationships play a very important role. A serious and

responsible policy, a revolutionary policy, that really tried to develop Bolivia would have to break this circle of dependence and exploitation. There can be no development as long as the economy is tied in with the imperialist system.

Bourgeois programs like the "Mandato Revolucionario" have already failed under the MNR in Bolivia, Frei in Chile, Betancourt in Venezuela, Belaúnde in Peru, and under other such regimes in backward countries. After failing in its terrorist military repression, the army is taking up the program of the government it ousted in 1964, now touting the same program dressed up in populist verbiage. The army-party, which has taken over the task of preserving the system by fulfilling the role of the bourgeoisie and its parties, will also fail. As long as the country stays within the framework of imperialism there will be no real development, national independence, or solution of its chronic crisis. Moreover, it is evident that the masses are not willing to sacrifice themselves for industrialization in the context of economic dependence and exploitation. The masses are not renouncing their class interests, and we already have conflicts which in their development will lead to a confrontation with the Ovando government. Once it has failed in its mission of saving the capitalist system by means of a feeble bourgeois program, the army will return to its repressive offensive, as in 1965.

Nationalizing the Gulf Oil Co., which the Ovando government found itself forced to do in view of the resistance of this imperialist concern to raising the state's royalties, was a bourgeois step. As an isolated measure, the nationalization will remain enmeshed in the structural webs of capitalism without benefiting the people in any real way, as was the case with the nationalization of the mines.

We must be conscious of the fact that nationalizing the Gulf Oil Co. was a drastic measure the army-party resorted to for the purpose of grappling with the debacle of the bourgeois system. It is true that this measure harms the particular interests of one imperialist consortium but it is also apparent that it has served momentarily to take some steam out of the revolutionary forces that were about to explode. Spokesmen for imperial-

ism have justified this step, although they do not like it. Rockefeller is among them. For him it is now a choice between the "new breed of progressive officers" who are appearing in Latin America and the *barbudos*, that is, the revolutionists.

From the theoretical standpoint, the "Mandato Revolucionario" does not go beyond the positions of bourgeois reformism and revision, which are based on the utopian idea of a progressive bourgeoisie and a division of the revolutionary process into two distinct and separate stages. These theories have already been condemned by history. In this period of imperialist domination, capitalism and the national bourgeoisie can never remedy backwardness and underdevelopment. There is no "revolutionary bourgeoisie." Therefore, the role of liberating the peoples and leading them to progress falls to the revolutionary socialist forces, to the working class.

The triumph of the Cuban revolution meant the burial of bourgeois reformism and revisionism. Fidel Castro's words in his speech concluding the first OLAS conference were very precise in this regard:

"There are times when political documents, called Marxist, give the impression that someone has gone to an archive and asked for a form: form 14, form 13, form 12; they are all alike, with the same empty words. . . . And in what way is this different from a catechism, and in what way is it different from a litany, from a rosary? . . . Because there are theses that are 40 years old; for example, the famous thesis concerning the role of the national bourgeoisies. How hard it has been to become convinced, finally, that this idea is an absurdity on this continent; how much paper, how many phrases, how much empty talk have been wasted while waiting for a liberal progressive, anti-imperialist bourgeoisie.

"And we ask ourselves if there is anybody who, at this time, can believe in the revolutionary role of a single bourgeoisie on this continent?"

Our position is clear. Bolivia's backwardness and underdevelopment will not be cured by the half-way measures of a bourgeois program. These evils can be cured only by a socialist revolution led by a revolutionary army of national and social liberation arising out of guerrilla warfare. They

can be cured only by a revolution with the objective of creating a new state and a new society in Bolivia following along the road opened up by socialist Cuba, a process that will culminate with the expulsion of imperialism from all of Latin America.

In order to support its postulates, as could be expected, the "Mandato Revolucionario" of the armed forces calls for the formation of a social alliance, or class front of the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the worker masses. The MNR governments also proclaimed themselves multiclass but all the workers know that their policy was bourgeois, antiworker, and ended up serving imperialist interests.

The Ovando government is appealing for the support of the worker masses. But its program does not mention a single concrete problem of the working class. It offers only to study the question of higher wages and profit sharing. While giving guarantees to national capital and protecting private foreign investment, the Ovando government has rushed to freeze wages. This is no more than a repetition of the economic policy in force from the time of the MNR, and continuing under Barrientos, of shifting the weight of the crisis onto the backs of the workers.

In the area of international policy, maintaining relations with the USSR has long since ceased, in its political effects, to be a revolutionary measure for a capitalist state. To the contrary, the presence of the USSR in countries where there are violent revolutionary crises represents support for moderate and conservative tendencies. The USSR proclaims and practices peaceful coexistence, is an opponent of guerrilla warfare and the masses seizing power by violent revolution, and it advocates the peaceful road. Over and above the economic accords, these positions of the USSR are politically convenient for the Ovando government. Faced with the spread of guerrilla warfare, the Colombian bourgeoisie also resorted to establishing relations with the USSR. As Fidel Castro said, relations and economic cooperation between the USSR and bourgeois governments shaken by revolutions do not help socialism.

The conclusion is unequivocal. The "Mandato Revolucionario" as a program and the measures taken by the Ovando government belong to the ar-

senal of a desperate bourgeoisie in a catastrophic crisis. The bourgeoisie finds itself forced to resort to certain reforms that appear bold and radical in order to contain and break up the overpowering revolutionary process headed by the guerrillas and in order to remedy its mortal financial crisis. Rather than be shattered by a revolution, it is trying to prolong its existence even if it means sacrificing some of its interests.

Shaken by the advance of the guerrillas and the radicalization of the masses, the army-party has adopted a leftist language. But its objectives go no further than wanting to modernize the bourgeois state, to rejuvenate it from above, to put a new coat of paint on its facade without, however, changing the real causes of the national backwardness. The eloquent speeches of the military commanders have not made a dent in the structure of national and imperialist ex-

ploitation. For example, Ovando declares that he is in a war to the death with imperialism. But what kind of a war is this when imperialism continues to maintain the Bolivian army and when the imperialist Peace Corps and military missions are still operating in Bolivia? This war is a fixed game, like the boxing matches that are decided in advance, where the winner is already known.

The struggle for Bolivian national independence is a much more serious question and it has not been solved with the nationalization of the Gulf Oil Co. National liberation is bound up indissolubly with social revolution and can only be achieved by defeating capitalism, defeating imperialism, and building socialism. This is the lesson of Cuba. The road that our country and Latin America must follow is that of the victorious Cuban revolution!

## 6. The New Lineup of the Parties Toward the Ovando Government

As we have said, the "save-the-capitalist-state" operation mounted by the army-party is aimed at politically disarming the masses and the opposition groupings that are called leftist.

The initial result has been the arousal of expectations among the people and the appearance of hopes in broad sectors. This has enabled the officers to relax the military encirclement of the mines without risk, giving the impression that we are returning to a democratic climate.

With these measures and the nationalization of the Gulf Oil Co., the military command has moved to fight for the leadership of mass mobilizations, as was evident in the demonstration of last October 21. The army accepts mass mobilization as long as it is under its direction and control.

In the heat of this process, some deviations favorable to the military operation are already appearing, which must be unmasked.

a) The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties are rushing to pledge their unconditional support for the Ovando government. Through "national left fronts" they are trying to link themselves to it. This is the attitude of the FSB [Falange Socialista Boliviana — Bolivian Socialist Pha-

lanx], the MNR, PRIN [Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista — Revolutionary party of the Nationalist Left], and the PDC [Partido Demócrata-Cristiano — Christian Democratic party]. At the same time the government is promoting the creation and development of its own parties—the ANR and the PRN [Partido de la Revolución Nacional — Party of the National Revolution]. All these formations converge in their opposition to socialism, to the proletarian revolution, and to the guerrillas. In the last analysis, these currents are defenders of the capitalist status quo. Riding on the coattails of the ruling military officers, they seek to slip into the state apparatus by virtue of canalizing and leading the mass mobilization. They are selling themselves on the basis of delivering popular support. Moreover, it is they who have assumed the task of providing the political theory for the "Ovandista left national revolution." These acrobatics by notorious opportunists anxious to exploit the advantages of power have no great importance. The masses are already moving away from them with a sure-sighted discernment.

b) More important are the deviations that may occur in the workers move-

ment, developing out of the trade-union bureaucracies and the old leadership of the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana — Bolivian Workers Federation]. In these leaderships there is a mixture of pro-Soviet revisionists and reformists with a socialist veneer, who are supported by CP and PRIN activists.

The deviationist views of these opportunists are far from making a careful estimate of the interests of the working class and the needs of real economic and social development of the country through a revolution achieving national and social liberation. They start by accepting the claim, solely on the evidence of official declarations and without any sociological analysis, that the Ovando government embodies a real revolution. The only thing that is missing, according to them, is the people, a mass mobilization. The revolution, they say, is a vertical one and in that lies its weakness, a weakness which it can overcome by basing itself on the people, incorporating the masses into the government. The slogan of these opportunists, therefore, has been "Workers to Power," "The People to Power." They call on the officers to bring the workers into the regime. They complement this by presenting Ovando with a program to carry out, in the belief that the officers will move on from nationalism to socialism. For these opportunists, defending the nationalization of the Gulf Oil Co. includes giving support and political confidence to General Ovando.

This is the ideological context in which the Communists, the left Pristas and other petty-bourgeois groups are operating, although with their own characteristics.

The Communists add their ancient cliché (Form 12, 13, 14, as Fidel would say) that the contradiction between the oppressed nation and the oppressor imperialist center takes precedence over the class struggle. They continue to use this argument to justify their bankrupt thesis of "revolution by stages" and the role of the "progressive bourgeoisie." With the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, the Communists will have attained all their aspirations and will soon come out as Ovando's best defenders.

As for the Lora splinter group, which has been an instrument of provoca-

tion for years, it is devoting itself, as it has in the past, to discrediting the guerrillas. During the repression that started in July, this bourgeois poltroon spent his time condemning the guerrillas in little communiqués, which the papers published for him, and in giving lectures ridiculing the heroic and valiant conduct of the ELN fighters. In reality, the behavior of this yellow ex-revolutionary is gratifying to the counterrevolutionaries. Claiming to "evaluate" the guerrilla movement, he always tried to discredit it before the masses. His present position, as in the past, is politically yellow and cowardly and confined to mere syndicalist and economist activism. He continues spinning theories about a "mass insurrection" in the abstract and for a vague far-off time. "The conditions do not exist now," "the masses are not ready for the revolutionary program." For this ex-Marxist, ex-internationalist, and ex-Trotskyist, the conditions never exist. As a bourgeois poltroon, Lora is frightened by revolution and still more by the noise of arms that the guerrillas make. Lora's fate is to end up like Tristán Marof, a mediocre and dishonest writer. In his counterrevolutionary views regarding the guerrillas, Lora already has a fitting companion in Ricardo Anaya.

The other splinter group, personified by the ex-*Porista* [member of *POR* — *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* — Rev-

## 7. Promote an Independent Mass Mobilization Led by the Revolutionary Army of National Liberation for the Conquest of Power

The Ovando government, the army-party, and its "Mandato Revolucionario" declarations and messages do not embody a popular and workers revolution. They are not part of the revolution for national and social liberation that is advancing in Latin America and the world. To the contrary, they are a by-product of a bourgeoisie at bay, struggling to survive; they are obstacles, barriers, which a decaying capitalist society throws up to halt a revolutionary advance. Thus, they are a manifestation of the impotence and the retreat of the bourgeoisie.

We Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist revolutionists must draw a line of fire between ourselves and this government and all the opportunistic tendencies

oluntary Workers party, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International] Amadeo Vargas, has no life but that breathed into it and allowed it by the military establishment. Usurping and exploiting the name of the *POR* and the Fourth International, this agent of the bourgeoisie has stood up to openly support and glorify the military caste and Ovando. He calls them "part of the world revolutionary current." Reaching the culmination of his political degeneration, he denies the need for revolution, claiming that "power must be taken little by little." With his cult of the masses and spontaneous mass mobilizations which at bottom conceal his impotence to take a part in the process, Vargas reduces the revolutionary program to a simple platform of economic gains. Now he has become an active coordinator of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties supporting Ovando. This bourgeois agent has nothing in common with the *POR* or the Fourth International.

The radicalized masses and the revolutionary workers have nothing in common with all these opportunistic, tail-ending, and capitulationist tendencies. From the beginning of the guerrilla movement in 1967, these splinter groups have ceased to have any historical validity, becoming a crust on the mass movement which must be cleaned away.

supporting it. Our duty is to prevent the Bolivian masses from being deceived and led into a defeat. Revolutionists cannot help to confuse the masses so that they will support a government that is not their own.

The principled and revolutionary position we proclaim before the masses is *independent action and no political confidence* in the Ovando government, its bourgeois program, or the army-party and its operation to rescue the capitalist system.

But not only this. In unity with the masses, we Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyists stand up as a political alternative, as the builders of an independent revolutionary power opposing the mili-

tary government.

This is what differentiates us sharply from the other tendencies that claim to represent the working class. While they place their hopes in Ovando and the officers who call themselves "nationalists," continually appealing to them to become revolutionists, we advocate a real revolution, a revolution with a socialist content.

Since Ovando is a representative of the bourgeoisie, it is naïve, if not stupid, to appeal to him to accomplish tasks which belong to the revolutionary proletariat and its vanguard. Calling on Ovando to give the workers a share in the government amounts to a betrayal because it would subject them to bourgeois control and leadership. It is a different thing to advocate the slogan of "Workers to Power" under the leadership of the workers' vanguard and through an armed revolution. This is the revolutionary Marxists' strategy for seizing power. The rest is shameful tail-ending of impotent petitioners who hope that somebody, anybody but them, will take on the responsibility for making the revolution. The difference is clear; the opportunists resign themselves to a policy of applying pressure while remaining hitched to the cart of the bourgeoisie. We pose our own independent alternative for organizing the revolution and seizing power.

Revolutionists do not abdicate their role of leading the people to victory on behalf of anyone. We are convinced that socialism is not built with patches and crumbs begged from imperialism. We must remind any naïve elements who, dazzled by the reforms Ovando has carried out in self-preservation, might think they see an alternative road to liberation along Ovando's path that the system of imperialist exploitation, that the power of the bourgeoisie will never be destroyed by small conquests. In order to break this power, a real revolution is needed, which means the destruction of the structure of the entire system of exploitation. Because if this power is not broken and the bourgeoisie remains in control, these small conquests will be absorbed by imperialism. Bolivian history is rich in examples that teach this lesson.

Two basic tasks arise from this revolutionary position:

1. *Promoting, impelling, and leading an independent mass mobilization by means of a transitional program.* The

military's operation to rescue the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state has forced it to relax the repression of the unions. Having failed in its attempt to destroy the unions, the government is now moving to animate the unions with the aim of hitching them to its cart. This makes possible a certain democratic leeway which must be utilized to the maximum. We must provide the driving force for a reorganization of the entire workers movement from the individual unions on up to the COB, based on an independent class line. But trade-union reorganization must be combined with struggle for a program of economic, social, and political demands. We must resume the struggle from the level it had reached when the repression came. This is not a new struggle starting from zero, but one which will incorporate all the gains and experiences of past years and will be enriched by all the conclusions drawn by the workers in these last five years of military terror. In its organizational aspect, the mass mobilization will be based on the COB as the unifying center of the working class, the peasantry, the students, and the poor sectors of the middle class.

The following points must be central to a transitional program providing impetus to a mass mobilization: re-establishment of workers control in all private and nationalized industry; expulsion of imperialist concerns from control of the national resources; restoration of the miners' wages to the level of May 1965, combined with a general raise for all workers in the country; restoration of the jobs of 3,000 workers fired because of political and union activity and occupation of closed factories; promoting a real agrarian reform to rescue the peasants from their poverty; and opening the primary schools, the high schools, and the universities to the hundreds of thousands of young people who are getting no education or professional training. This program must be understood as the bridge that will lead the people to workers power and socialism, and agitation around it must be conducted in conjunction with a revolutionary strategy.

2. We must promote a mass mobilization, raising the class struggle to its highest level, in order to unleash a revolution and take power. Revolution is a process shaped by the class struggle. It requires flesh-and-blood revolutionists and an organizational

instrument capable of taking power. We are living in a revolutionary age when most of the conditions which the Marxist classics list as necessary for taking power are present. We must now construct the appropriate instrument for accomplishing this task.

In the present situation in Bolivia of a militarization of politics and total control of the country by an army-party, a situation which is part of the process going on throughout Latin America, the way to construct this instrument and take power is armed struggle — concretely, guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare is still a valid method. The blows suffered and the losses of men and equipment are not important. However painful, all these losses can be repaired. The important thing is to be clear on the fact that there is no other path for real revolutionists. The illusions conjured up by Ovando will quickly vanish and be dissipated by the crack of the army's guns firing on the masses. The process is heading toward a confrontation. But victory or defeat in this confrontation will depend on the extent to which a correct solution has been prepared.

The revolutionists and the workers vanguard must remember 1964 and 1965. Only those who have arms and are determined to use them, relying on their own strength, can take power.

An insurrectionary mass mobilization, no matter how broad, will end up being defeated by modern armies functioning as the political parties of the bourgeoisie. Mexico City and Córdoba are examples of this.

During the MNR regime, the COB unified the power and strength of the Bolivian masses. But this power was shattered, evaporated in the face of the preventive coup of the army commanded by Ovando and Barrientos. There are some who have not learned from reality and want to repeat the old bankrupt schemes.

The mass insurrections in Mexico City and Córdoba and the COB in Bolivia were defeated because they lacked two elements: a) Preparation and determination to take power by themselves. They limited themselves to pressuring the capitalist system in order to obtain some benefits. A mere policy of pressure does not arm the masses either ideologically or materially, and opens the way to defeat. b) An armed instrument or military

organization. You cannot take power with leaflets, street jingles, or speeches. You need a military organ, prepared, trained, and capable of meeting the armed force of the capitalist army.

Also there will be a new defeat in Bolivia if we let the opportunists and capitulationists gain control of the trade-union organizations and put them to sleep with their pacifist lullabies.

The sign of the times is war. Armies have come to replace the traditional parties of the bourgeoisie and have been converted into armed political parties. In order to confront them, revolutionists must also create an army, a revolutionary army. Otherwise, the mobilized masses will stand naked against the guns of the bourgeoisie. If in Bolivia today the army-party has taken a turn, trying to give the impression that it is with the people and leading a revolution, it is only owing to tactical measures aimed at preventing a greater spread of revolution — as we have said. Once this plan has failed, the repression will return.

But this people's army cannot be organized from the beginning on the basis of large units and heavy armament. It must necessarily begin with small guerrilla nuclei which, forged in victories over the enemy, will become a great rebel army that will take power alongside the peasant and urban masses.

In this direction, assimilating the lessons of the Bolivian experience and the needs of the militarily surrounded masses, the guerrilla movement arose in 1967 under the command of Che and reappeared in 1969 with Inti Peredo.

Despite the defeats suffered, we reaffirm the validity of guerrilla warfare. Therefore, the duty of every Marxist-Leninist revolutionary is to join in this conception. Giving life to the guerrilla movement and the revolutionary army is intimately bound up with revolutionary mobilization of the masses; this will be the culture medium of the guerrillas, as Che said. Guerrilla warfare is the continuation by other means of the class struggle; it is the culmination of the mass movement.

Here is the fundamental task for Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries — *mobilize the masses in a revolutionary struggle for the seizure of power in conjunction with, and under the leadership of, the revolutionary army!*