


An Apology for Aggression:

Nixon Admits Laos Bombing



"That statement [Nixon's press release on Laos], in the view of Washington observers, was primarily an effort by the Administration to retrieve something from the military and political reverses it has suffered in Laos—and the political losses it has sustained at home—over the last few weeks." — March 8 *New York Times*.

Livio Maitan:

The Situation in Italy

Limbourg Miners' Strike Ends

An Appeal by Hugo Blanco:

Free Vicente Lanado!

'Reunification'
of the Finnish CP

The Algerian Revolution from 1962 to 1969

Bluish-Purple Seine

A court in the town of Evreux, in the *département* of Eure, about fifty-five miles northwest of Paris, inflicted the maximum legal penalty for pollution on a cellulose plant in late February. The Alizay plant of the Société Industrielle de Cellulose (SICA) was ordered to pay a fine of 5,000 francs (about US\$1,000) for polluting the Seine.

The charge grew out of an incident in 1964 when a foamy bluish-purple coating covered the Seine for about eight miles below the Alizay plant. Thousands of tons of dead fish had to be removed from the river.

The prosecutor charged that the Alizay factory dumped as much pollution into the Seine as a city of 500,000 people. He noted that the government regulations issued in 1953 limited the amount of toxic material that could be disposed of in rivers and streams to thirty milligrams per liter of water. Experts estimated, however, that the Alizay factory pumped pollutants into the Seine totaling 217.6 milligrams per liter of water.

Lawyers for the cellulose plant argued that the management had spent more than \$1,000,000 in 1952-54 to prevent pollution. The poisoning of the Seine which occurred in 1964 was an accident, they said. Something went wrong when a chemical vat was being cleaned.

When the Alizay factory was built in 1951, fishing companies in the area protested against the dangers of pollution. However, a multimillion-dollar cellulose company has, of course, considerably more weight than a few inland fishing concerns.

The Paris daily *Le Monde* admitted in its February 24 issue that this case showed the impotence of the government in curbing pollution. The maximum fine of \$1,000 was no more than might be imposed on a single individual for creating a threat to the health or livelihood of his neighbors.

Moreover, it took almost six years to get a judgment against the cellulose company for an extreme case of pollution. "In the meantime," as *Le Monde* put it, "the fishing companies have lost their interest in the matter."

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Nixon Admits Laos Bombing

Despite his assurances that he has "no plans for introducing ground combat forces in Laos," President Nixon's March 6 statement on U.S. intervention in that country did little to allay fears that a new American escalation of the war is in the offing that could lead to a "new Vietnam" in Southeast Asia.

Nixon's statement was prompted first and foremost by the rout of the CIA-controlled private army of General Vang Pao on the Plaine des Jarres February 21, followed by the loss of the American-run airfield at Muong Soui February 24. These victories for the insurgent Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese allies were won in face of the most serious escalation of U.S. bombing to date: the use of B-52 superbombers, in addition to more conventional planes, in saturation bombing of the Plaine des Jarres.

Jack Foisie, writing from Vientiane in the March 2 *Washington Post*, described this scorched earth policy:

"The aim was to leave the Communist enemy nothing upon which he could live—no people, no shelter, and no stocks of food or buffalo." (Emphasis added.) Those civilians who were not exterminated in the bombing were forcibly evacuated by Meo troops under American orders and in American planes. Foisie put the number evacuated at 13,000.

This forcible removal did not begin with the new Pathet Lao offensive February 11. "Last Sept. 13," Foisie wrote, describing events at the village of Khang Khay on the northern side of the plain, "troops of Vang Pao's army came in and ordered all the villagers to prepare to leave in an hour. Then, this man [a villager now in a refugee camp] claims, the troops began burning houses, helping themselves to people's possessions, and molesting women. He says the soldiers shot all the livestock." American pilots flew the reluctant villagers to Vientiane. Approximately one third of the entire population of Laos have been killed by American bombing or made refugees in this fashion, mostly in the last year.



PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA

It is this genocidal policy that Nixon described as "supporting the independence and neutrality of Laos."

Nevertheless, bombs have proven to be an inadequate means of building a repressive apparatus capable of subduing a people fighting for their independence.

As Henry Kamm put it in the March 6 *New York Times*, "... there is no hope of defeating the Communists from the air and little faith in the power of the Laotian forces to withstand a major attack."

Fear that Nixon was contemplating a further massive intervention in Laos to save his puppet prompted a barrage of criticism in Congress and in the press of the secrecy in which the American aggression has been carried out.

When Nixon was finally forced to say something, he refused to answer the central question raised by these sources: How far is the U.S. planning to go in its aggression in Laos? Even his "pledge" on the use of ground troops is highly conditional in light of his promise to sustain the moribund Souvanna Phouma regime.

What, then, did Nixon say? He lifted the lid a little on the dirty business of the American bombing, admitting to what he coyly described as "com-

bat-support missions for Laotian forces." But his admissions were belated, covered up the true extent of American bombing, and tried to whitewash the intervention by claiming it was "at the request of the legitimate Government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma." In fact the "legitimate Government" is bought and paid for by the United States and could not last a day without American backing.

Nixon's appeal to the Soviet Union to intervene to restore "peace" in Laos must be seen as a cynical propaganda ploy to shift responsibility away from the U.S., although Nixon may calculate that the Kremlin can be persuaded to exert some pressure on his behalf for the sake of "peaceful co-existence." It remains to be seen whether his hopes have any justification.

There is still the question of the Geneva Accords of 1962 and Nixon's allegation that North Vietnam was the first to violate the neutrality of Laos. In the first place the American government engineered the breakup of the coalition regime in Laos in April 1963 as part of its growing intervention in South Vietnam.

In a larger sense it is true that the war in Laos is inseparable from the war in Vietnam. It is the American government that is violating the right to self-determination in both countries through the support of dictatorships which could not survive without its aid. The distinction between being killed by an American bomb in Laos or an American bullet in Vietnam is a technicality.

It should be pointed out that the main thrust of congressional criticism of Nixon's policy in Laos has aimed at ending the official secrecy. But it is not enough merely to know what is going on. The Student Mobilization Committee and other antiwar organizations have called for massive demonstrations April 13-18 against the war in Vietnam. Antiwar activists around the world are working to see that on those days a massive outpouring gives voice to the demand that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from Southeast Asia now!

What Next for the Limbourg Miners?

[The following article on the end of the Belgian miners' strike has been translated from the February 20 issue of *Rood* (Red), the biweekly Flemish-language organ, published in Antwerp, of the Revolutionaire Socialisten (RS—Revolutionary Socialists). The RS is the Flemish affiliate of the Confédération Socialiste des Travailleurs (CST—Socialist Workers Confederation). The JGS-SJW (Jeune Garde Socialiste/Socialistische Jonge Wacht—Socialist Young Guard), the Belgium-wide Trotskyist youth organization, has fraternal ties with the RS-CST.]

* * *

In the sixth week of the strike in the Campine Basin, the majority of the strikers gave a resounding answer to the referendum maneuver*—they continued their strike with greater determination than ever. The press had to admit that the demonstration on Thursday [February 19] of 3,000 miners from Winterslag and Waterschei was the most combative of the entire strike. *De Standaard*, in fact, conceded the same day that the referendum was rigged.

The proposal for an "underground action," in fact, an occupation of the mines, came forward on Friday during the meetings of miners at the various pits. They saw this as the only possible response to the bosses' policy of starving them out. This was supposed to make it possible to restore the strike front—which had broken through especially in Beringen—in the mines themselves and in that way the strike was supposed to become more active.

This mine occupation was, however, not really successful. In Winterslag the occupation was complete; the first shift stayed down to occupy the mine and the following shifts could not descend. In Waterschei, Zolder, and Eisden, the occupation was only partial-

ly successful and only for a very short time. And in Beringen the occupation failed. What reason could there be for this?

Black Thursday had, however, been a success in all the mines. Along with the big march there were several additional demonstrations by the miners in the other pits; in various parts of Limbourg, high-school students came out on the streets; and in Antwerp 2,000 university students demonstrated against Eyskens.* The day afterward, the idea of occupying the mines as an underground strike was advanced everywhere. Everywhere general assemblies were organized to prepare the action.

These assemblies were the best that came off. About 100 miners in Beringen and 360 to 700 in the other mines adopted the occupation plan enthusiastically and the practical aspects of carrying out the action were discussed.

What exactly happened, then?

On Monday morning when the first shift went down, all potential organizers of an occupation were pulled out by foremen surrounded by a heavy guard of police. At the same time agents of the mine management went down into the pits to warn the workers that any strikers would be fired on the spot. Despite this the overwhelming majority struck in Winterslag, Waterschei, and Zolder; and in Eisden about forty miners maintained a partial occupation of the mine for the entire day.

By Tuesday afternoon, however, it had to be recognized that—with the exception of Winterslag—the action was stalled, despite the enthusiasm that the idea of an occupation had originally inspired. It was decided then to suspend the action temporarily and to set about immediately planning a later action.

We must ask ourselves how the miners could go back to work after they had held firm for more than six weeks against all kinds of intimidation, against the lies in the press, radio, and TV, against the brutal repression

by the police, against the lure of partial concessions, against the pressure from the union leadership, against threats of being fired, etc.

We cannot, therefore, attribute the end of the action to intimidation alone. Otherwise the strike wouldn't have lasted three hours. There was of course the policy of starving out the strikers carried out by the bosses and their government, as well as the trade-union leadership. These forces used every possible means to prevent the miners from getting together the material resources to continue their strike.

In this respect, the time was a rather unfavorable one for the miners. Many families had gone into debt in expectation of the year-end bonuses the workers were supposed to receive. But now, that money had to be used for the basic necessities, for food. A thin wallet and the family pressure that goes along with it unquestionably forced some workers back to the pits when it became obvious that the strike leadership could not give sufficient material support to the strikers. Solidarity actions, of course, were blocked by every means, such as banning collections (for example, in Mechelen and in various towns in Limbourg).

But this starving-out policy by itself is not a sufficient explanation for the failure of the strike. A high percentage of the miners could have held out materially for a good while longer; for example, the bulk of the union members, who had received 5,000 francs [about US\$100] as an advance on strike pay.

There were some other reasons why the occupation was only partially successful and had to be given up after two days. The first was that it came too late, that is, during a defensive phase. The Socialistische Jonge Wacht had called for an occupation at the end of the third week, when the strike was still on the upswing.

This measure could certainly have been applied with greater success before a break appeared in the strike front, that is, before Wednesday of the sixth week, when a section of the miners went back to work, especially in Beringen. After that point an

* A referendum on whether or not to continue the strike was organized by the Catholic union which has traditionally been dominant in the area. The workers were to fill out ballots at home, in isolation from the struggle. —IP

* The Belgian premier. —IP

occupation was, to be sure, still the most serious alternative; but it was seen more as a defensive move to close the breach in the strike front.

If the occupation had been launched earlier, however, it would unquestionably have given the strike a much more active character and won greater results. Now it appeared more as the only possible way out of the impasse that followed the successes of Black Thursday.

Another cause of the failure was the lack of adequate organization. This was a result of the strike's spontaneous character. Despite the organization of the workers in mine committees, the structure of the strike was still too weak for the extent of the action. This is in no way a reproach, simply the recognition of a fact.

Everything possible was done during the strike to organize the workers with a view toward the further development of the strike and the continuation of the struggle afterwards. But these efforts did not measure up to the kind of organization needed to carry through an occupation successfully in a defensive phase. In most pits all that had to be done to break the organization of the occupation was to keep about twenty workers from descending.

A further reason for the return to work is that adequate solidarity actions were not organized. Aside from the actions on Black Thursday, the solidarity campaign left something to be desired, especially in the other mines and plants. Outside of the strikes in the Walloon mines and Cockerill-Ougrée, and outside of collections in various plants and offices, these actions got underway much too slowly.

It is clear that support actions could have been carried out on a large scale. However, except for the actions of the SJW and the Louvain students, attempts were made only by individuals. It is very noteworthy that it was precisely on the last day of the strike that the biggest solidarity actions took place.

The SJW—sometimes in collaboration with others—took the initiative for the solidarity strikes and demonstrations in Liège, Ghent, Antwerp, and in Limbourg itself. Along with the SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund—Socialist German Student Union], the SJW organized various mass meetings and other actions

in West Germany. But organized solidarity on a mass scale did not come in time to make it possible to win the strike, although it showed the miners that they could count on broader support in subsequent actions.

For six weeks the SJW activists have stood in the breach. Are they going to abandon the miners now, wash their hands of the matter, and put the blame for the movement's weaknesses on others? We think that now also, after the strike has ended, very important work is to be done. During the strike we helped very actively in promoting independent organization of the workers in committees. Now these committees must be built up further in the perspective of reconquering the unions.

Together with the workers we must try to find the exact weaknesses of the strike and see what more can be done in the way of action. Therefore, we must inject into the committees in concrete ways the idea of building an opposition to oust the present trade-union leaders. If it is planned to re-

sume the actions in a few months, we must progress both in the level and in the kind of organization we have.

Another objective came to the fore during the strike—workers control. The next time most workers will not struggle only for percentage raises but for control over subsidies, work tempos, and investments. They will challenge the authority of the bosses in a more conscious way (as thousands of them have already done). They will say: "The mines are ours," and they will also say that "the unions are ours," which is what the committees must fight for now so that the next time the strike cannot be sabotaged by the trade-union bosses as it was this time.

Therefore, the SJW activists, both the new local activists and those who have established themselves in the Campine Basin, will continue their work there. In this perspective, the Limbourg SJW has been built up and work will be continued to achieve a firmly rooted Permanent Committee of the miners.

New Zealand

April Antiwar Actions Called

By Hugh Fyson

Wellington

On February 23, at its monthly meeting, the Committee on Vietnam [COV] resolved to build major antiwar demonstrations April 17-19, to coincide with demonstrations in the United States called by the Student Mobilization Committee and other antiwar organizations.

At present, plans are for a march of students from Victoria University at midday on Friday, April 17, ending at the DIC building, which houses the diplomatic mission of the Saigon regime. There a vigil of trade unionists, students and others will begin, and will be carried through to Sunday.

On Saturday night an indoor rally will take place, and on Sunday, April 19, an outdoor rally and a large march to parliament grounds.

[The Wellington fortnightly journal *Socialist Action* reported in its Febru-

ary 20 issue that "The Committee on Vietnam (COV) here in Wellington is already beginning the organizing work. This will include not only enlisting people to organize Wellington residents, but also to inform antiwar groups throughout the country and to develop contacts with the Australian counterparts. This will be the first time there has been such a united trans-Tasman action."]

'Por Que?' Editor Indicted

Mario Menendez Rodriguez, editor of the Mexican radical magazine *Por Que?*, was indicted in Mexico City March 3 along with six other persons on charges of financing guerrilla training camps and helping to organize recent bombings in the capital.

Jose Rojo Coronado, Menendez's attorney, was quoted by the March 6 Paris daily *Le Monde* as denouncing the indictment as a "maneuver of the government to discredit one of the few journalists who has adopted a critical attitude toward corrupt functionaries."

The 'Reunification' of the Finnish Communist Party

By Pekka Haapakoski

Helsinki

The Communist party of Finland, at a special party conference February 14, officially ended a split which had led to the existence of two organizationally independent rival blocs inside the party since April 1969. At the February conference the party got a new leadership, which consists of representatives of both groups, in proportion to their strength.

Also, the most prominent figure in the opposition, Taisto Sinisalo, was elected vice-chairman of the party. Thus the CP approaches the parliamentary election to be held in mid-March formally united. But there are factors, both inside the party and in Finnish society, which suggest that the period of "peace and calm" will not last long. The real troubles of the CP are not behind it; they are just beginning.

The open split in the party in 1968-69 was caused by two independent factors, which the "Stalinist" wing tied together in a tactically clever way, thus succeeding in building a mass opposition.

The first factor was the so-called stabilization policy, a form of "incomes policy" based on freezing wages, initiated in 1968 by the "popular front" government — which includes the Communist party. This policy awakened great opposition against the government in the working class and in the ranks of the CP.

In the autumn of 1968 the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops also had a great effect on the party split, with the official leadership refusing to endorse the Soviet action.

The "Stalinist" opposition attacked the party leadership both for its acceptance of "the bourgeois incomes policy," and for its "deviation from proletarian internationalism." This latter meant simply that the leadership had condemned the invasion (albeit in a very mild way).

Thus the opposition was able to make use of the reaction in the working class to the incomes policy, and

of the traditional blind trust in the Soviet leaders among the older party cadres.

Many circles in Finland consider the "reunification" to be a great victory for the opposition. It is necessary, however, to look at the other side of the question as well.

The "external" factor no longer has any serious effect on the situation. Both wings want to win the favor of the Soviet bureaucrats and have accepted wholeheartedly the normalization à la Husák in Czechoslovakia.

The "internal" factor is the only decisive one now. After the reunification, the opposition has less and less room for maneuver. It has reassumed responsibility for CP policy. The CP will probably continue to sit in the government after the elections, and some kind of incomes policy will be continued as well. It will be hard, under the circumstances, for the opposition leaders to control their troops. This is especially true because the "reunification" was from the very begin-

ning a compromise at the top level.

At the local level the struggle is continuing, and has, for instance, led to many expulsions in local branches.

Also, the role of the Soviet Union is becoming clearer to the ranks, inasmuch as every day it praises the "co-operation of democratic and progressive forces in Finland." This has led to the appearance of Maoist tendencies in the opposition in some places.

It is probable that a new four-year term for the popular front will not only break the CP's grip on the masses, but will also put an end to the quasi-Marxist line of the Stalinist, pro-Moscow opposition inside the party, which has been an apparent alternative.

This gives promising perspectives for the future of revolutionary Marxism in Finland. The first cadres of an independent revolutionary socialist movement are already forming among the rapidly radicalizing Finnish students and workers.

Demonstrations Continue in Philippines

A new mass protest against American domination of the Philippines was held March 4 in Manila, the latest in a series of mobilizations which saw an anti-imperialist rally of 17,000 persons February 18 followed by the sacking of the U. S. embassy.

The March 4 demonstration was supported by the striking minibus drivers, who were protesting their exploitation by the American oil companies, as well as by students and other labor groups.

About 1,000 demonstrators reportedly broke away from the main body of marchers in an attempt to storm the American embassy once again.

As the protesters approached the embassy, Philippine police and marines opened fire on the crowd with rifles and pistols. One person was shot in

the thigh; another suffered a fractured skull.

"Some of the policemen seemed to be firing nervously," *New York Times* correspondent Philip Shabecoff wrote. "One officer accidentally snapped off a shot into a newsman's foot."

The demonstrators did not attempt mass actions in the face of police fire power. However, widespread skirmishes continued through the night. The same capitalist reporter lamented: "Although the police were able to stop the demonstrators from reaching the embassy . . . they could not stop them from burning taxis and stoning buses. They could not protect the citizens of Manila from the pall of tear gas [used by the demonstrators?] that sent many children to the hospital. . . ."

Mass Struggles and Political Crisis

By Livio Maitan

Rome

At this writing a governmental crisis has opened in Italy and a solution is not yet very near. However, the essential elements of the situation and the lines of action for the working class and for revolutionists at this stage can be seen clearly as of now.

First of all, it must be said that the operation attempted by the reactionary forces following the tragic Milan bombing of December 12 has failed. The offensive by the extreme right and even the attempts of the bourgeois moderates to capitalize on the incident have had only marginal effects. The relationship of forces between the fundamental classes has not changed. The working class has not been disoriented by the enemy's propaganda, and the reactionary backlash among the petty bourgeoisie has affected only very limited sectors.

This failure is a result essentially of the fact that the mobilizations of 1968 and 1969 profoundly revolutionized Italian society, and a noisy propaganda campaign, centering even on a tragic event, was not sufficient to reverse this development. It should be added that the division in the bourgeoisie at the level of its political apparatuses has prevented it from maneuvering with the necessary adroitness (from its point of view, needless to say).

The clumsiness of the bourgeoisie has been especially evident in the campaign of repression that was unleashed in the aftermath of December 12 and which is still continuing. This campaign would be far more dangerous and insidious if it were carried on in a selective fashion. On the other hand, extending it to thousands of people, including hundreds of trade-union officials, could not help but provoke a massive counterattack, broad unity in action, and even a mobilization of sectors previously passive (among other things, the protest movement of the journalists, which has attained considerable proportions, must be noted).

All of these facts were already clear

a few weeks after December 12. However, the demonstration against the repression which took place in Milan January 31, in which 50,000 people participated, gave the clearest demonstration of this development, to the great despair of *Corriere della Sera* and the forces for which it speaks.

This demonstration—which the students of the *Statale* (the State University) can be credited with initiating—was significant in several aspects. It was marked by a mass mobilization which was automatically to make the march held the next day by a few hundred fascists look ridiculous. It was distinguished by the participation of a high percentage of workers (young workers in particular). It exhibited an effective system of self-defense (which one would be tempted to compare with the Japanese model). And, finally, it proved to be a very successful demonstration of a united front.

I cannot share the estimation of some ultraleft leaders and intellectuals who, obsessed with the bogey of "co-optation," did not hide their unhappiness over the participation of the traditional workers organizations. I cannot share this estimate, first of all, because in the given circumstances, the primary need was precisely a mass mobilization—and there is not a shadow of a doubt that the calls supporting the demonstration by the traditional parties contributed substantially to achieving this result. Secondly, the tone was not set by the line of the opportunist leaderships and in practice all the left and extreme left tendencies were able to raise their own slogans. Finally, January 31 in Milan once again showed the potential of the student movement when it acts as a mass movement.

The success of the strikes in January and the first half of February—coming after the conclusion of the great wave of contract struggles in the fall—confirmed, moreover, the fact that the combativity of the industrial working class and other strata of workers has

remained undiminished. At the same time, even in the plants involved in the fall struggles, strikes and mobilizations have developed rapidly whenever the bosses have made the least attempt to reduce the meaning of the new contracts or impose a speedup. The bosses, then, cannot entertain any illusions. Following the 1968-69 upsurge, a new relationship of forces exists in the plants which they cannot expect to alter in the short run.

All of this forms the background of the February governmental crisis. As I have said, the specific outcome of this crisis is doubtful. What is clear, in any case, is that the crisis of the ruling class, of the system, is continuing or even deepening. An extra-parliamentary solution of a rightist type seems more problematical than ever and I do not believe either that there is a real possibility of a Greek style coup d'etat as long as the mass movement retains its present power and consciousness.

In the parliamentary arena there are not many alternatives. While a right-wing solution is excluded, PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano—Italian Communist party] participation in the government—either directly or indirectly—remains equally impossible both because of the opposition of the decisive layers of the bourgeoisie and because of a lack of interest on the part of the PCI leaders in putting themselves in a position which in the present conditions would seriously compromise their relations with the masses.

The only road, therefore, seems to be an agreement between the so-called center-left parties (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans), no matter whether this takes the form of a four-party government, a two-party government, or a resurrection of the formula of a so-called *monocolore* government (that is, a cabinet composed entirely of Christian Democrats supported in parliament by the other allied par-

ties), which was adopted after the new Socialist split in July 1969.

As for resorting to new elections, the immediate consequence of this would be to increase political tension both in the country and among the center-left allies. Very likely the results of this would provoke still more dangerous fragmentation and instability than exist now. In any case, the most likely perspective is for a continued deepening of the political crisis, which will tend to become chronic.

In this context, the working class must continue to mobilize in the struggles that remain open; prepare for the battles over plant and industrywide accords complementing the national contracts; and counterattack without the slightest hesitation against any at-

tempt by the bosses to wipe out the gains of the fall (either by intensifying the rate of exploitation, or by broader measures of economic policy, or by using both methods at once).

At the same time, the workers must strive to consolidate the new relationship of forces in the plants. The essential task in this area must be to organize and broaden the movement for shop delegates, which represents the most important experience of the 1969 upsurge.

This area is the focus of the efforts of the Italian revolutionists in the present stage. Parallel to advancing this task, they stress the need for a transitional program adapted to the needs of the masses and designed to have a dynamic of anticapitalist struggle.

Finally, the Italian revolutionists are striving to win acceptance of this orientation by the revolutionary left and they are preparing a national conference to clarify their perspectives and strengthen their means for intervening politically and organizationally in the process that is going on.

It goes without saying that the need for a united front against the repression remains a vital one. For this reason the Italian revolutionists associate themselves with every initiative capable of broadening and strengthening the counterattack against the assault of the governmental machinery, and firmly combat all forms of sectarianism.

February 19.

'As a Combat Leader, Ray Was Outstanding'

Memorial Meeting Honors V.R. Dunne

Friends and comrades gathered at Skoglund Hall in Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 3, to pay tribute to Vincent Raymond Dunne, pioneer American communist and founding leader of the Socialist Workers party, who died on February 17.

Present at the meeting were a number of participants in the famous 1934 Minneapolis Teamsters' strikes, of which V.R. Dunne was one of the principal leaders. The memorial address was given by Farrell Dobbs, national secretary of the SWP, who was himself a participant in the 1934 strikes and a lifelong friend and political collaborator of the Trotskyist leader.

Messages of solidarity were sent to the meeting from throughout the world Trotskyist movement, and from branches of the SWP and locals of the Young Socialist Alliance across the United States.

"Comrade Dunne," the United Secretariat of the Fourth International declared, "has become for the world Trotskyist movement the very symbol of those we try to gather around the banner of Lenin and Trotsky: a revolutionary working-class cadre. World revolution will be victorious and mankind will have a glorious existence open to it when there will

be enough Vincent Dunes everywhere."

Letters and telegrams came from Trotskyists in Japan and Ceylon, from the International Marxist Group in Britain, the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari in Italy, the Ligue Communiste in France, to name only some.

Peng Shu-tse and Chen Pi-lan, pioneer members of the Chinese Communist party and founders of the Chinese Trotskyist movement wrote: "Just as Comrade Dunne took great interest in the youth of our movement, his work stands as a heritage toward which the young comrades can look."

Farrell Dobbs described Ray Dunne as he first met him 1934:

"As a youth, just entering the trade-union and revolutionary movement, I looked to him as my leader and teacher, as a captain in combat, a political mentor and an educator in the task of building a revolutionary combat party.

"I quickly found Ray to be the kind of educator who reinforced his teaching by the example that he set. He was one of the most selfless persons I ever knew. He tried to avoid subjective reaction to people and events, striving instead to see things objective-

ly, wholly apart from his own personal feeling in the matter. . . .

"As a political mentor Ray played a key role in the trade-union struggles. This derived from both his internationalist outlook and his ability to relate national factors to the local scene. He had an intimate grasp of the trade-union movement. He knew it up one side and down the other. And he knew the score about union bureaucrats and social democratic and Stalinist misleaders. Add to this a basic grasp of the antilabor role of the capitalist government, and it comprises a vital body of political knowledge. . . .

"As a combat leader, Ray was outstanding in many respects. He had the vital quality of keeping a cool head in a critical situation. And we went through some rough ones, not only in 1934. He never shirked hazardous duty as a leader. Nor did he disdain minor tasks. From his teaching and example in this sphere we learned important lessons. 'Never dabble in anything you do,' he used to say to us over and over again. 'If it's worth doing, it's worth doing right. . . .'

"I learned a lot from Ray about the team concept in leadership. He taught and demonstrated in action what a

team means, how vital it is, how a combination of men and women working as a team can act unitedly in such a way so that they emphasize their collective strengths as a totality and through the collaboration compensate for one another's weaknesses. . . ."

Farrell Dobbs discussed Ray Dunne's understanding of the revolutionary dynamic of workers struggles:

"While fully aware of the inherent revolutionary power of the working class, Ray knew that only time and events would bring the class to revolutionary action. And that along the way it is the task of the revolutionary party to help the workers through the developmental processes of acquiring political class consciousness.

"His knowledge in this respect stems from rich class-struggle experience. And this knowledge, this know-how, gained in part from what he learned as a party man and in part from his experiences in the class struggle, equipped him admirably to participate in discussions with Leon Trotsky, as he did in the late 1930s, through which were shaped the concept of the transitional program of the Trotskyist world movement.

"This program, of which Ray was in a real sense a coauthor, is designed to help revolutionary militants pro-

mote mass development of anticapitalist political consciousness. It takes as its point of departure a reaching out to the masses at their present level of political understanding."

Dobbs read to the memorial meeting a letter from Jack Barnes, the organizational secretary of the SWP, who was trained by Ray Dunne in the early sixties.

"It would be impossible to measure the profound influence which Ray Dunne had on those revolutionary youth who came to know him over the past decade," Barnes wrote, "who worked and collaborated with him and learned from him. His whole life and personality stood as a challenge to us to be part of the most genuinely human and fulfilling endeavor possible—the struggle for socialism. . . ."

"I know of young students from social backgrounds and experiences as different from Ray's as could be imagined who because of the force of his character decided to join the revolutionary movement long before they totally understood the political meaning of their actions. Ray's impeccable revolutionary character was the powerful initial argument persuading many of us to throw our lots in with the struggle of the working masses to advance mankind."

a result of this unprecedented united strength of the workers, jotdars and other rich peasants of Banskopa, Athkara, Sidabaaaid, Bhedua, Pathanchla, Krishnapur and some other villages have now conceded the demands of the village workers, and have agreed to pay them, instead of two-and-a-half kilograms of paddy [threshed unmilled rice], four kilograms of paddy and two square meals a day towards daily wages for all the seasons.

Though the district SWP is being approached from distant areas for holding meetings and organizing the movement, it is not able, with its limited manpower, to meet the growing demands of the movement. While the CPM leadership is opposing this movement of village workers for their bare existence, a section of their rank-and-file workers are coming forward to join the movement. Numerous enthusiastic youth are coming up. Comrade Anil Roy, secretary of the Krishnapur unit of the party, along with Comrades Fakir Singhababu and Laxmi Kanta Roy are leading the movement.

Big landlords with the help of other political parties have filed dozens of false complaints against them and other leading workers, without much success so far. On December 14, leading workers of about twenty-five villages including Comrades Anil Roy, Fakir Singhababu, Laxmi Kanta Roy, were taken to Simlapal Police Station. But the utter falseness of all the complaints against them was proved. To make the position worse for the jotdars, at that very time news of two cases of violence perpetrated by the jotdars within the jurisdiction of the same police station was received by the authorities. Thus the conspiracy of the jotdars and reactionary parties fizzled.

The Bankura district unit of the SWP, conducting the entire movement under the guidance of Comrade Jagdish Jha and Comrade Bhutnath Mohanta, have planned to launch a bigger movement on the basis of other demands of the eighteen-point charter of rights and demands of the Village Workers and Peasants League, after achieving complete success in the present struggle for increased wages.

Colombian troops occupied the National University in Bogota in late February to break a student strike. The campus will be closed until June.

India

Village Workers Movement on Rise

[The following article is taken from the February issue of *Marxist Outlook*, the monthly magazine of the Socialist Workers party of India, the Indian section of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Under the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party, the strike movement of the West Bengal village workers of Bankura district is growing in strength, gradually bringing in new areas under its influence. After the central rally at Krishnapur, big agricultural workers' rallies have taken place during the last fortnight at Pathorkuria, Jawla-Boni, Bikrampur, Pithabakra, Ratanpur, Agia, Panchmura,

Banskopa, Phulmoti and other places apart from numerous big and small gatherings daily in scores of villages.

When the Krishnapur unit of the SWP decided to launch the movement they had practically no financial and other resources. But the movement has gained momentum and spread like wildfire to the neighbouring areas, even to the adjoining Midnapore and Purulia districts.

Jotdars (landlords) and even the political parties including CPM [Communist party of India (Marxist)—the large "left" split from the pro-Moscow Communist party of India; the CPM heads the "United Front" government in West Bengal], are opposing the movement, but the fighting strength of the workers is on the increase. As

What the CP Congress Showed

By Pierre Frank

Paris

Has the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party] changed? That was the question many commentators asked following the party's Nineteenth Congress.

The question was raised because for the first time in thirty-five years a member of the outgoing Political Committee, Garaudy, who disagreed with the *Theses* submitted by the leadership, was not expelled prior to the congress. He was able to present his views for a quarter of an hour before being relegated to the ranks. He had not been expelled even though he had expressed his views publicly in the preceding months in books, over the radio, and by other means, despite the condemnations of the Political Bureau.

This Nineteenth Congress, then, was marked by a sensational "innovation" for the PCF, an innovation which had a great political importance regardless of how you assess the positions taken by Garaudy. Nonetheless, it can be said that despite this important change, the PCF is still essentially what it has been ever since it was totally conquered by Stalinism—a party aligned with the Kremlin's policy of "peaceful coexistence," a party with a reformist line and a bureaucratic structure from which workers democracy is excluded.

If Garaudy had an article published in *l'Humanité's* pre-congress "discussion section," if he was able to speak at the congress, this was by no means a matter of exercising a normal right accorded minorities under a system of democratic centralism—it was a favor granted from above.

Like all the participants in the congress, Garaudy had been sifted through a series of skillfully erected filters, starting with the section conferences—if not even the cell delegations to these conferences—and the *département* conferences. This system was designed to screen out anyone who might have serious disagreements with the *Theses* presented to the congress, except Garaudy.

It should be added that although formally an equal of the other members of the outgoing Political Bureau, Garaudy did not have the right to sit on the presiding committee along with the rest. He found himself isolated in the hall, shunned like a leper by all the delegates.

The exception, the innovation, that was made for Garaudy did not mean that the congress was going to formulate the party's policy. The Nineteenth Congress, like all that preceded it, was a ritual ceremony designed to praise the party "line" and reenthroned the leadership. What, then, was the meaning of the favor granted to Garaudy? The leaders of the PCF consider themselves "responsible" people; they make no move without a reason.

The PCF leaders would certainly have preferred not to make an innovation of this kind. Despite its calculated character, it could have consequences in the long run that are not without dangers from their point of view. The example—the first in the history of this super-Stalinized party—of a member of the Political Bureau remaining in his position for months after making his disagreements known publicly and then expressing these disagreements on the floor of a congress is a precedent that might be invoked by others. After all, who knows whether some day this might not even be done by one of the leaders who are casting stones at Garaudy today.

Why did the leadership make this apparently democratic move? First and foremost because the circumstances did not permit it simply to use a steamroller as it has in the past. Throughout the party—in the ranks, among the cadres, and in the apparatus—a great malaise has existed since May 1968 and above all since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. If a democratic look had not been put on the party, if Garaudy had been expelled prior to the congress,* the opportunity

this event offered for temporarily reducing the malaise would have been lost and the trouble aggravated.

The PCF leadership was confronted with a choice between two evils, and it chose the lesser one. This course was facilitated because, despite his profound differences, Garaudy in general made a convenient target. He declared himself in agreement with the political line of the party (peaceful coexistence, peaceful and parliamentary roads) and was so in fact. Thus, he had no alternative policy to offer and made his fight over issues which could elicit support only from very limited layers of the party.

All this said, however, it is no less true that the PCF leadership was unable to follow the routine of the past decades; it had to maneuver, make a formal concession, and thus it was forced to let Garaudy put his finger on the party's most sensitive point.

There is no doubt that the question that has most shaken the PCF as a whole has been the invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops of its Warsaw Pact "allies." This jolted the party much more than the May movement. This was so first of all because a great many members of the PCF do not have a revolutionary outlook and did not judge May 1968 from that point of view; and, secondly, because the members of the PCF have long been trained in the spirit of unlimited confidence in the Soviet Union and its policy. Of course, the Twentieth Congress already gave them their first big shock, but its effect was cushioned by the argument that the Soviet Union was capable of correcting its errors.

This time the situation took quite a different form. The developments of the "Prague spring" aroused the sympathy of the PCF members and the working class. And at that moment the Soviet government intervened, sending a half million troops, who, as the television showed, met

* Garaudy, who has now been "democratically" returned to the ranks, can be no less "democratically" expelled the first time he publishes an article or a book outside the CP bodies or publications.

with the resistance of the entire people, including the great bulk of the Czechoslovak CP. For the first time, doubt was cast on the "leading state" and the sister party. The crisis struck at the heart of the PCF. For opportunistic reasons, the leadership disavowed the Soviet intervention.*

Since then, conscious of the party's vulnerability on this question, the PCF leadership has strained every effort to minimize it. And Garaudy was not the least bit accommodating on this matter. He said that the best thing for Brezhnev and the others to do was resign. Far from weakening on this point, Garaudy directed the most vigorous part of his speech at the congress to the international policy of the workers states. Throughout most of this, he was listened to in silence, probably because the delegates had gotten the word from above.

But this silence ended when he mentioned the anti-Semitism, the arrests of writers, and above all, the shipping of Polish coal to Spain when the Asturias miners were on strike, and the steam power stations that the Soviets—who were directly responsible for dividing the Greek CP—built for the colonels. Then this audience composed overwhelmingly of paid functionaries, up till that point more astonished than outraged, sent up a very significant howl.

It was not these scandalous facts that they condemned but the speaker who raised them and precisely because he dared to do so. It should be added that he took this liberty in the very presence of the high-ranking representatives who came from Moscow expressly to receive the homage of a vassal to his lord. This is also why the report in *l'Humanité* did not repeat these sacrilegious statements, and stressed Garaudy's "anti-Sovietism" over his "revisionism."

Other accusations the leadership has brought against Garaudy testify to worries equally revealing about the state of the PCF. Garaudy criticized the party regime—he favored using the term "methods"—demanding that minority views like his be put before the party members, as Lenin did when

he was in the leadership of the Bolshevik party.

Although Garaudy did not explicitly raise the question of the right of tendencies, he was accused of anti-Leninism for being an advocate of tendencies and factions. The PCF leadership knows that a good many party members are thinking about this question, because there can be no democracy in an organization where tendencies cannot exist, where in effect any minority is bound hand and foot and only the leadership faction has the right of expression.

In connection with this question, another point relating to the party regime aroused the anger and the indignation of the apparatus. Garaudy and certain members of the PCF have mentioned the role played by paid functionaries in the party, especially their role in transmitting the desires of the leadership and in blocking political discussion. On this point also the blow struck home. It was more a matter of material interests than ideology because the bureaucracy is concerned primarily with material interests to which ideology is adapted.

Thus, even though the PCF's general line was not specifically challenged, even though Garaudy's own course is oriented toward the right, the criticisms which he lodged from the podium of the congress against Soviet policy and against the party regime made his speech a considerable political event. It struck at a whole series of the PCF's taboos and the monolithism which prevailed to such an extent in this party.

* * *

Aside from Garaudy's speech, the Nineteenth Congress resembled the preceding ones. There were the same ritual speeches for the artisans, the peasants, the small businessmen, etc. The only note that was a bit more marked than in previous congresses was the speech addressed to the technicians and research workers, for whom the PCF has just started a new publication.

In the preliminary discussion, two or three articles tried to get some clarification on the "advanced democracy" that is supposed to assure a transition from capitalism to socialism by peaceful and parliamentary paths. How could a bourgeois regime give

birth to a society building socialism by such means? There was no more clarification in this congress than in the past.

On this point, the *Theses* of the congress declared that the PCF could not achieve this "advanced democracy" by itself, that it could only do so in collaboration with reformist, democratic, and other types of formations. Hence the necessity, from this point of view, of finding "allies." It has been the same old refrain for many a year; but since May 1968 the fallacious and deceptive character of the policy is more evident than ever. The allies that the leadership needs so much to achieve the victory of this policy are very difficult, if not impossible, to find.

There is no question of the PCF looking for them on its left; it wants nothing to do with anybody in that direction. Besides, the formations to the left of the PCF do not believe in reformist methods. There is the PSU, but this organization exasperates the PCF leaders because of its ambiguous policy, which seems sometimes to the right and sometimes to the left of the PCF's line. Since May 1968, the Radical party has evolved toward the right and is not prepared to get involved with the PCF. There used to be Guy Mollet's Socialist party, which made a very convenient ally because it was equally bureaucratized and slow moving. But even in its new form, this party is very anemic. It is a rare spectacle to watch the PCF's comic efforts to reinflate this "new" Socialist party led by (!) Savary.

* * *

The May 1968 movement came in the period between the eighteenth and nineteenth congresses. There was no analysis of this movement at the congress. It could not be said, however, that the PCF leadership did not concern itself with this question. If you compare the draft theses submitted at the opening of discussion (published in the November 15, 1969, issue of *l'Humanité*) with the *Theses* finally adopted, you will note the following: A passage in point No. 13 of the *Theses*—which was only a repetition of remarks made by Waldeck Rochet in the aftermath of the May-June days—was expurgated; the two paragraphs surrounding this passage show up almost verbatim under point No. 14. These are the lines that disappeared:

* In August 1968 the PCF leadership used the terms "reprobation" and "disapproval" in regard to the Czechoslovak invasion. In the theses of the Nineteenth Congress, it was only a "disagreement" over the military intervention. Shadings. . . .



Stop walking around in circles, Garaudy, you're getting on our nerves!

"In May-June 1968, the workers and the democrats expressed their desire to put an end to the regime of big capital and replace it with a democratic government capable of undertaking the social, economic, and political changes required by the age in which we are living and by the needs of the popular masses."

These were not subversive remarks, but they were still too much. It was all right to make them right after the events, but every effort had to be made to fuzz over the importance of what occurred and above all it could not be said that this movement expressed a desire to change the regime. . . . That might be exploited by the "leftists."

While the youth — young workers and university and high-school students — are playing an incomparably greater political role than at any other time in history, the congress and the *Theses* adopted accorded this question scarcely more attention than previously. The customary blather was a little more profuse but no more meaty. Far more revealing than a good many commentaries were these words from the general secretary of the UEC [Union des Etudiants Communistes — Union of Communist Students], a person named Molina:

"The ideas that have the biggest following on campus now are and will be for a long period to come reactionary ideas. . . . The biggest student demonstration of 1968 was the Gaullist demonstration!" (*l'Humanité*, February 7, page 6.)

So, the barricades, the nights of clashes that paved the way for the general strike, the big street demonstrations, and the occupations of

plants, university buildings, and high schools, which lasted for weeks, were not comparable to the Gaullist demonstration of May 30. This was the opinion of the secretary of the UEC and was endorsed by the congress. According to them, all these militant actions could not be compared with a demonstration which, even after the May movement had begun to recede as a result of the betrayal by the leaders of the PCF and the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail — General Confederation of Labor, the CP-controlled union], amounted to nothing more than a rally of hirelings drawn from all over France at a great price, a muster of the rabble, the scum, the dregs of society in the service of the Gaullist regime.

These words from the leader of the Communist students show how decisively the PCF tops have turned their backs on a renewal of the revolutionary struggles. They also give an idea of the quantity and quality of the recruits the UEC has been able to win up till now — boys and girls who will be very obedient to mommy and daddy.

There were displays at this congress of "proletarian internationalism" as it is understood by the followers of "socialism in one country." In the name of the Soviet CP, Kirilenko congratulated the PCF for its struggle against "anti-Sovietism." Bilák, the representative of the Czechoslovak CP, was received with all the honors by Fajon, the editor of *l'Humanité*. The congress also applauded Siqueiros — a fine show of Stalinist continuity.

Before taking the floor, the delegate

from the Italian CP was asked by the PCF leadership to correct his speech. At the same time they let it be known, behind the scenes, that in order to maintain a balance, Aragon was to be given the chairmanship of the congress for an afternoon, which must have displeased the Soviets. Once again this old buffoon proved true to character. He showed up only after the operation against Garaudy — whose opinions he shared outside of the Central Committee and the PCF — had been concluded.

The absence of a Cuban delegation was noted, but no one knew what meaning to attribute to it.

* * *

The congress was also the occasion of a scandalous though thoroughly silent operation. Waldeck Rochet did not attend the congress because of ill health; however, this body reelected him to his post. But Waldeck Rochet's incapacitation is not temporary. The truth is now well known outside the PCF.

The well-informed *Canard Enchaîné* wrote in discreet but clear terms: ". . . The general secretary's mental state is truly unsatisfactory. They cannot produce him in public or even get him to give a little speech to be recorded."

So, although, in Marchais's words, the PCF is "an open book," this situation is being concealed from the party. And a general secretary was elected at the congress who will never be able physically or intellectually to discharge a leading function. The problem is not one of an illness for which the doctors can do nothing but of an operation behind the back of the ranks to keep them from interfering in the infighting among the party tops over choosing Waldeck Rochet's successor.

A deputy general secretary has been designated: Marchais. He has the support of the Soviets but is running into strong opposition in the Political Bureau and the apparatus because of his mediocre background. He joined the PCF in 1947 at the age of 27 without having participated either in the Resistance or the liberation. He began his party career as a bodyguard of Thorez, who gave him a quick boost up the hierarchy. His article in the May 3, 1968, issue of *l'Humanité* against the "splinter groups" and denouncing "the German anarchist"

Cohn-Bendit is still remembered in France.

Whatever Marchais's future, the reelection of Waldeck Rochet alone attests to the leadership's contempt for the party that it leads. As in the past, the decisions were made by a very select fraternity and the party was called on only to ratify them.

An Appeal by Hugo Blanco

Free Vicente Lanado!

[The imprisoned Peruvian revolutionist Hugo Blanco sent an appeal to the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA Justice Committee) in February on behalf of the peasant leader Vicente Lanado, whom the Lima government refuses to release despite the fact that he has served his sentence.

This appeal is printed below. It is followed by a note from Hugo Blanco that explains the special importance of this case for socialists.]

* * *

El Frontón Prison

Compañero Vicente Lanado was accused of sending food to us guerrillas of the Remigio Huamán Brigade when we were in the mountains. For this offense he was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison by the military tribunal in Tacna.

This compañero was captured together with two other peasants of the region. They were tortured barbarously. As a result of these tortures Compañero Carmen Candia died. Vicente Lanado suffered brain damage and impaired vision. On various occasions, the police broke into his home and totally looted it, taking even his agricultural implements. They drove off his domestic animals. His wife was also arrested and tortured. His small children suffered such shock that they scream in terror when they see a Guardia Civil [Civil Guard].

After being tortured for ten days, Lanado was moved to prison on December 28, 1962. He was released on bail April 30, 1963. After being sentenced, he was captured on June

But this same affair also shows that this exclusive body is not as firmly united as formerly and the fissures are getting more and more numerous. A well staged theatrical operation like the Nineteenth Congress will not halt the process of political disintegration that the PCF is undergoing despite its electoral successes.

12, 1968. Thus on February 12, 1970, he had more than completed the twenty-four months to which he was sentenced.

It must be taken into account that all first offenders are paroled when they have completed two-thirds of their sentence. They not only denied Compañero Lanado such parole but now after he has more than served his two-year sentence they are refusing to release him and say he must stay in prison another four months. They have no legal pretext for this.

The reason is that Compañero Vicente Lanado was the general secretary of the Sindicato de Campesinos de Paltaybamba [the Paltaybamba Peasant Union]. He led his union in an exemplary manner, succeeding in doing away with the exploitation of the peasants—which had feudal characteristics—practiced by Sebastián Pancorbo and his heirs.

The *gamonales* [landlords] of this *hacienda* had the workers' quarters constructed alongside a well-traveled road. They set up a "toll gate" and made it an obligation for all passers-by to stop and pay their respects to the landlord. On one occasion a Guardia Civil was slapped by the *hacendado* for greeting him without uncovering his head. The peasants were forced to mount the steps of the ranch house on their knees.

The *comunidades* [peasant communes] in the area had the obligation of working for nothing on this *hacienda*. The *hacendado* seized many coffee plantings from the peasants.

The landlord was a member of parliament and a friend of the president of the republic. The chief executive presented his friend with an

alcohol distillery which he then had transported "on Indian back" for a long way over rough roads. The labor for growing the cane and running the distillery cost the landlord nothing. But this work imposed a killing burden on the peasants.

When a peasant died, the *hacendado* ordered his livestock seized on the pretext that the deceased owed him money.

The landlord buried his victims in his garden.

He ordered the capture of a *vaquero* who had fled from his oppression. He ordered the *vaquero's* hands and feet tied to four stakes driven into the ground. He lashed his victim with a whip until he was out of breath. After resting he began whipping the *vaquero* again until he was exhausted; and after another rest he resumed beating him. Since his hand hurt from the exertion, the landlord continued beating the *vaquero* with his hand wrapped in a handkerchief.

Afterwards, the landlord called a locksmith to chain the *vaquero's* hands to his shoulders. He got angry because the chain was slack and ordered it tightened with a pair of pliers until it bit into the peasant's wrists. He kept him that way until the following day, when he ordered a chain fastened around the *vaquero's* waist. He sent him to work in the fields under the supervision of an employee who held him by a rope attached to the chain around his waist. At night the *vaquero* was locked up together with his family and in the mornings he was obliged to work at the end of the rope held by the employee.

It would be too long a story to tell all the atrocities of this gentleman, deputy to the parliament of the nation, and later senator. His heirs followed in his footsteps.

These things do not constitute crimes in Peru, but combating them is an unpardonable offense; eliminating this state of things is a capital crime. *This is why they are not releasing Vicente Lanado despite the fact that he has more than served his sentence.*

They are not releasing him because the union led by Vicente Lanado, an illiterate peasant who speaks only Quechua, swept away this exploitation, built schools, employed social labor for the collective good, and, after driving out the landlord, restored

the human dignity of the peasants of the area.

The exploiter government violently suppressed the union, set up a Guardia Civil post in the ranch house, and imprisoned the union leaders. Vicente Lanado paid for this "crime" with sixteen months in prison, besides the two years he served for sending food to us in the mountains.

From prison Compañero Vicente Lanado publicly protested against the massacre of the peasants in Huanta and Ayacucho.

The unflinching defense of his class brothers by this self-sacrificing illiterate peasant is the real cause of the exploiter government's cruelty toward him.

The eight small children of the peasant Vicente Lanado are uncared for; they no longer have even the bread of their poverty to eat.

This government has exposed itself by its treatment of this peasant and of his children.

This is the same government that said: "*Peasants, the landlords will no longer eat the bread of your poverty.*"

* * *

The case of Vicente Lanado is very important. There was a small demonstration of the permanent revolution in Paltaybamba. The plots of land occupied by the peasants, for the use of which they were subjected to exploitation of a feudal type, became the private property of the peasants. (The peasants continue in possession of these lands, refusing to respect the "Agrarian Reform Law" which demands that they pay for them.)

On the other hand, the industrial installations on this *hacienda* — the rum distillery and the tea factory, as well as the plantings expropriated from the landlord — became the social property of the union, which exploited them collectively. Of course, this setup lasted barely a month and a half; the bourgeois system could not tolerate it.

Another symbolic thing about this union was that since the landlord was unnecessarily prolonging his presence in the ranch house, the union officially sent a committee to ask him to turn over the keys of the manor and to notify him that since he played no role in the productive process he had to leave the area. The *hacenda*

do obeyed, handing over the keys to the committee of the Sindicato de Paltaybamba, which was accompanied by an armed militia from Chaupimayo.

The fact that the top leader of this union was an illiterate peasant who spoke only Quechua is a demonstration of the revolutionary potential of our people which refutes all the prejudices about the incapacity of illiterate Indians.

Poland

Students Given Harsh Prison Terms

Five students accused of participating in an international "anti-Socialist" propaganda network were sentenced to prison terms February 24 in Warsaw.

The court's decision was reported in the February 15 issue of the Warsaw daily *Zycie Warszawy*: "A three-member tribunal presided over by District Judge R. Bodecki pronounced the accused guilty of the acts for which they were indicted. It sentenced Maciej Jan Kozlowski to four years and six months' deprivation of freedom; Maria Joanna Tworkowska to three years and six months; Krzysztof Szymborski to three years and six months; Jakub Swiatopelk Karpiński to four years; and Maria Malgorzata Szpakowska to three years."

The court deducted the time the students had already spent in prison from their sentences. The amnesty of July 21, 1969, was also applied to the accused, further cutting their terms. As a result, the dissidents have the following time left to serve: Kozlowski, two years and three months; Tworkowska and Szymborski, one year and seven months; Karpiński, one year and six months; Szpakowska, six months.

These five students were among about fifty dissidents rounded up by the Polish police in a crackdown on the distribution of oppositionist literature in the spring of 1969.

The central figure in the trial was the twenty-nine-year-old archaeologist, amateur journalist, and mountain climber Maciej Kozlowski. He was accused of smuggling into Poland copies of *Kultura*, published in Paris

Vicente Lanado is a symbol; it seems that the enemy has understood this and we ourselves must understand it.

I appeal for a broad campaign in his support. Among other things, telegrams should be sent to General Juan Velasco Alvarado, Palacio Presidencial, Lima, Perú. Copies of protests should be sent to Dr. Alfredo Batillana Maggiolo, Oficina 215, Avenida Nicolás de Pierola 966, Lima, Perú.

by emigrés, as well as documents of the "Prague spring."

Czech secret police arrested Kozlowski and Maria Tworkowska near the Polish border May 30, 1969. The police found thirty copies of *Kultura* in their car. They also allegedly found a letter hidden in Maria Tworkowska's cigarette case which is said to have contained recommendations for building a network for gathering and distributing information in Poland. The letter was reportedly written by the director of *Kultura*, Jerzy Giedroyć.

The prosecution directed its heaviest fire against Giedroyć and his publishing enterprise, which was supposed to be a center of "ideological diversion" throughout the Soviet-bloc countries. The bureaucrats sought to make their customary amalgam by claiming that the CIA and the international Zionist movement were involved.

The Gomulka regime's attitude to *Kultura* has not always been the same, however, as the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* pointed out in its March 2 issue:

"During the Polish October of 1956 this . . . magazine supported the rehabilitated Gomulka against the domestic Stalinists. This won it the silent goodwill of the Warsaw rulers. Premier Cyrankiewicz quoted it in the Polish parliament. . . . But this changed quickly as Giedroyć's *Kultura* became increasingly a forum for dissident Communist reformers."

Along with anti-Communist articles, *Kultura* printed statements by revolutionary-socialist and anti-Stalinist oppositionists in order to win an audience among Polish youth.

The Algerian Revolution from 1962 to 1969

[The following resolution was passed by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International at a meeting held last December.]

* * *

I

Six months after the coup d'etat that overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella, the Eighth World Congress of the Fourth International, meeting in December 1965, analyzed the situation in Algeria in a resolution, "Progress and Problems of the African Revolution." This analysis singled out the following aspects in the development of the Algerian revolution from 1954 to 1965:

1. Before independence, the Algerian revolution took the form of a deep-going mobilization of the masses. The political instrument of the revolution, the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale—National Liberation Front], took form as a politically ill-defined multiclass front.

2. Following independence, the FLN literally burst into fragments at the time of the crisis in the summer of 1962, which developed along very unclear lines.

3. A new stage, characterized by a dynamic of growing over into socialism, opened with the exodus of the French *colons*. The rising curve in the revolution reached its highest point with the March 1963 decrees and continued up to the expropriation measures in October of the same year. Observing this process, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International took note of the fact that a workers and peasants government had been established in Algeria. At that time the process had already slowed and a pause had set in.

4. Algerian society remained marked by the coexistence and conflict of different and antagonistic forces and sectors. A significant Algerian private capitalist sector continued to exist, including in the countryside, as well as a powerful foreign capitalist sector (oil and gas). Furthermore, imperialist aid continued to be important and Algeria remained dependent on the franc zone. An administrative, economic, and military state bureaucracy developed which enjoyed a privileged share of the national income.

5. The coup d'etat of June 19, 1965, was the outcome of the deterioration in the situation which Ben Bella could no longer forestall. The coup d'etat was supported by the most well-known representative of the state and army bureaucracy. Its result was to encourage those forces most hostile to a socialist conclusion to the Algerian revolution.

In adopting these conclusions, the world congress, however, left discussion open on the Algerian question.

II

Immediately after June 19, 1965, two factors favored a temporary misunderstanding of the nature of the coup

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d'etat and some hesitation among the revolutionary vanguard in designating the character of the Boumédiène regime.

(a) The fact that the coup eliminated only a relatively small number of figures, while a whole series of ministers in the Ben Bella government joined Boumédiène's "Council of the Revolution."

(b) The support which the Chinese leadership gave to the Boumédiène regime in the weeks following the coup and which was motivated by considerations of a factional nature linked to the way in which Ben Bella and his team had been preparing the Afro-Asian conference.

Today these factors are no longer operative. The nature of the Boumédiène government became clear to the revolutionary vanguard when Boumédiène adopted a completely different orientation from that of the Ben Bella government.

Other changes should be noted. Moscow, and not Peking, is making conciliatory moves toward the regime, accompanying this with an attempt on the ideological level to paint up the Boumédiène regime as "anti-imperialist." This line is being followed by the PAGS [Parti de l'Avant-garde Socialiste—Socialist Vanguard party, formerly ORP (Organisation de la Résistance Populaire—People's Resistance Organization) founded after June 19] in which former members of the Parti Communiste Algérien [PCA—Algerian Communist party] are active. In addition, after the Algerian leaders assumed verbal "leftist" positions in the Israeli-Arab conflict, Fidel Castro, who had very severely condemned the authors of the coup d'etat, went back on his condemnation, doing this in the form of self-criticism.

In view of possible confusion from these sources, it is necessary to reaffirm the position of the revolutionary Marxists on the present regime in Algeria without any ambiguities.

The June 19 coup d'etat marked the destruction of the workers and peasants government. The molecular changes for the worse, which had been accumulating both in the consciousness of the various classes and in the government personnel and organization, had ended in a qualitative change. Having seized power with relative ease, owing to the previous deterioration in the situation, Boumédiène and his army had little trouble in putting down the opposition. The new power represented a reactionary resolution of the contradiction that had existed between the capitalist state and the workers and peasants government with its socialist orientation.

In the following period extending from 1965 to the end of 1967, there was an increasing drift to the right although centers of resistance still remained. At the end of 1967, a second period opened, which continues to the present, with the rise of Kaïd Achmed (former Commander Slimane) to the second highest political post in the country, the position of head of the "party."

In this shift, a dual phenomenon should be noted:

(a) The development of a state capitalist sector in the economy in close osmosis with imperialist interests.

(b) The steady loss of momentum by the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens—General Union of Algerian Workers] trade-union apparatus. This apparatus thought it could maintain its independence and serve as a center for a new mobilization of the masses by limiting itself in the interval to a defensive struggle to preserve self-management, if not to a purely economic struggle.

The attempted counter coup d'état of El Affroun, led by Tahar Zbiri in December 1967 and supported by a section of the trade-union militants, was a desperate attempt to reverse the trend to the right. The masses did not intervene in any way.

III

The essential feature in the changes which have occurred in the Algerian economic structure has been the strengthening of the "mixed" (state capitalism and foreign capital) fuels sector of the Algerian economy. This is the main sector of the economy from the standpoint of export and has undergone constant expansion (39,700,000 tons produced in 1967 as against 26,100,000 in 1964). The fuels sector is dominated by Sonatrach [Société Nationale Algérienne pour la Recherche, la Production, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures—National Algerian Company for Research, Production, Conversion, and Sale of Hydrocarbons], a state company which was created originally to manage the third Hassi Messaoud-Arzew pipeline completed in 1966 but which has developed into one of the principal petroleum producers. The activities of Sonatrach, which is aided by American and Soviet experts and collaborates closely with foreign interests, have expanded to such a degree that this enterprise constitutes a veritable state within a state. The basis for the collaboration between imperialism and the state sector is still the 1965 oil agreement concluded shortly after the June 19 coup d'état and ratified in the French parliament by a UNR-PCF [Union pour la Nouvelle République—Parti Communiste Français—Union for the New Republic (the Gaullist party)—French Communist party] majority. Algerian state capitalism has been collaborating with imperialism without any major conflicts. The "nationalization" of the American oil companies' distribution network in September 1967 was, in appearance, an anti-imperialist measure in response to the Israeli aggression. In reality it was a purchase agreed to by the companies involved. The same was true of the purchase of the other distribution centers in May 1968. While collaborating with imperialism, the state sector seeks to assure its control over the transfer of currency and to impose its conditions with regard to export prices. These are minor conflicts in which the primary objective is "getting into position" for the renewal of the 1965 agreement in 1969.

It must be added that the Algerian left forces have never advanced specific demands for this sector, limiting themselves to declaring that nationalization of mineral and energy resources was a "long-term goal" (1964 *Algiers Charter*).

As against the constant expansion of this sector, the modest self-managed industrial sector, composed in gen-

eral of old plants, is steadily losing momentum. Its social weight is minimal. The workers in this sector are calculated at less than 15,000 (6 percent of the Algerian working class). Moreover, the new investment code freezes the limit of development of this sector. It guarantees that there will be no nationalization of the foreign capital invested in Algeria for ten years' time and that after that it can be nationalized only with payment of 100 percent compensation.

The nationalization of the French plants in June 1968, planned by American and Swiss "experts," was carried out according to this schema. These plants were turned over to state companies that were not self-managed. Some of them were previously self-managed plants returned to their former owners (Norcolor). In other cases, the "nationalization-purchase" was made long after these concerns had brought the enterprises in the self-managed industrial sector to their knees (oil works, soap factories).

Parallel to the industrial sector, peasant self-management has had to struggle constantly against sabotage by the authorities combined with difficulties on the French wine market (wine import quotas).

As for the "agrarian reform," adopted in 1966 but left unimplemented, it itself is nothing but a caricature of the reform drawn up under the Ben Bella government. Matching the appetites of the state bureaucracy, it is limited to an area producing a net annual income equal to the state payroll.

IV

In Algeria the bourgeoisie was exceptionally weak both socially and politically. It lacked the capacity to meet the revolution head-on at this stage. The immediate source, therefore, of the counterrevolutionary initiatives was the state bureaucracy.

In order to understand the reasons for the behavior of this new bureaucracy, we must examine the elements making it up, its international context, and the international social forces on which it bases itself.

We can define three layers in the Algerian state bureaucracy. These layers are based on the social interests they have represented in post-1962 Algeria, independently of the social origins of the bureaucrats themselves. According to this criterion, a bureaucrat may drift imperceptibly from one stratum to another.

1. A layer that made it possible to maintain a "well functioning" state apparatus between the cease-fire and the formation of the first Ben Bella government. It is composed of a certain number of functionaries, who were former or recent collaborators of the colonial regime, coming from the famous "Lacoste promotion." It is made up both of Algerians and reformed and cooperative *piéds-noirs* [French persons born in Algeria]. This stratum is the most faithful supporter of the leaders who want to maintain a state of the bourgeois type. By its inertia and its sabotage of revolutionary measures, this layer plays an important braking role. It hides behind the mask of "technical competence" in order to maintain itself. But it is being subjected to criticism by the most conscious cadres, who demand that it be purged. The continually promised removal of this stumbling block is always indefinitely postponed. This stratum takes ad-

vantage of the delay to consolidate its privileges and it exercises a pernicious influence on the opportunistic nationalist cadres who are slipping into reactionary positions.

2. The national bourgeoisie was extensively represented in the first Ben Bella government. These cadres based themselves in the state apparatus on a bureaucratic layer of high functionaries (cabinet members, prefects) whose actions then and since have been guided by the same class interests. Khider, the secretary of the FLN, worked in the party apparatus to consolidate the power of these strata, if not for a seizure of power by them. Representatives of this layer were to be found in the successive Ben Bella governments. A few were unmasked, but these bourgeois bureaucrats remained throughout the machinery of state. Certain bourgeois technocrats remain also in the Boumédiène government.

3. The third layer in the state bureaucracy, and the most numerous, formed as a bureaucratic layer in the FLN administrative apparatus during the war. It emerged from the agrarian and urban petty bourgeoisie which flocked to the FLN and the ALN [Armée de Libération Nationale—National Liberation Army]. This layer rallied first to Ben Bella and then to Boumédiène. It includes the majority of the army and men in the ministries whose opposition to the June 1968 "nationalizations" tends to show that some of them, too, have slipped into the first group. The vast majority of the intermediate-level functionaries in the ministries and the local administrations have come from different strata of the petty bourgeoisie—small and middle tradesmen, middle peasants, petty functionaries of the colonial era. The ANP [Armée Nationale Populaire—National People's Army] officers are almost entirely representatives of the petty bourgeoisie.

A part of this stratum came from the working class in the cities or in emigration. Former working-class cadres in the MTLD [Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques—Movement for the Achievement of Democratic Liberties] and former CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor] or UGTA unionists have risen to positions of responsibility in the state apparatus. Boumaza, Alia Yahia, and Zerdani represented this element. But in the context of the alliance that the petty bourgeoisie has concluded with the national bourgeoisie, this layer of the working-class bureaucracy, which is rather weak, has vacillated between the government and the masses to the extent that it experiences the political pressure of the masses. This layer will never be capable (with very rare exceptions) of conducting a proletarian policy. It is being totally rooted out of the state apparatus.

The most characteristic feature of this state bureaucracy is its heterogeneity. Representatives of the national bourgeoisie are found side by side with representatives of the working class, in the same ministerial and government commissions, in the Political Bureau.

The question which arises continually for each of these strata is, whom to serve. Such a heterogeneous bureaucracy becomes conscious of its social role only through constant confrontation with the social forces and classes which it claims to serve as a whole. This is why since 1962 all government bodies have been torn by clique infighting and struggles over immediate interests.

The pressures of imperialism on this bureaucracy must not be overlooked. French imperialism has brought pressure to bear through economic cooperation, continuation of the Evian accords, and the 1965 hydrocarbon agreements; British imperialism through mixed companies. American imperialism has exercised pressure through its not inconsiderable economic aid. And West German imperialism as well as others have been present. No less important is the considerable economic aid provided by the bureaucracies of the workers states—the USSR, China, and Yugoslavia heading the list. Far from being provided in accordance with the principles proclaimed by Che Guevara at the Algiers Afro-Asian Economic Seminar, this aid has been accompanied by declarations favorable to the regimes in power and in the last analysis has favored stabilization of the state structures and the status quo. The same effect was produced by the ideological default of the former PCA (especially in the newspaper *Alger Républicain*) and later, after Harbi's arrest, of the ORP-PAGS which assumed that a "socialist state" or a "non-capitalist road" had been achieved or was in the process of being achieved (and still speculating, even today, on conflicts in top government circles).

Enmeshed in this international context, the state bureaucratic structures have become allied with the retrograde social forces.

V

The general political resolution of the Second Congress of the UGTA in 1965 pointed to the "bureaucratic layer being formed" among the "forces of counterrevolution," alongside the feudalists and exploitive bourgeoisie.

But the Oumeziane leadership of the UGTA, elected at the Second Congress, timidly avoided drawing the necessary conclusions from this analysis. It tried to counter the dismantlement of self-management by a defensive struggle, seeking support in the government. Its paper has been repeatedly prevented from coming out (May 1966, December 1967, and up to the present).

In Algeria today, the workers' right to determine the rules under which their unions function, to elect their representatives freely, to formulate their program without interference from the authorities, and to decide their actions in complete independence—that is, the four necessary criteria of trade-union independence from the state apparatus—have been deprived of all semblance of reality.

VI

At the present time, despite Cherif Belkacem's and then Kaïd Achmed's "reorganization," the "FLN party" is still nonexistent.

But on the side of the opposition organizations, the picture is not a reassuring one.

(a) The CNDR [Conseil National de la Révolution—National Council of the Revolution] or ex-PRS [Parti de la Révolution Socialiste—Party of the Socialist Revolution] was never able to develop after its initial "Menshevik-type" positions condemning the Ben Bella government's revolutionary measures as "premature."

(b) The PAGS or ex-ORP became nothing but a vehicle of the Kremlin's foreign policy, under Alleg's leadership

after Mohammed Harbi and Sahouane were arrested. This was shown by its turn on January 26, 1966, toward the formation of a broad "people's democratic" front demanding even the release of Ait Ahmed, who was imprisoned at that time, and proposing a front with the FFS [Front des Forces Socialistes—Front of Socialist Forces]. It has no mass base.

(c) Ait Ahmed's FFS and Mohamed Labjaoui's OCRA [Organisation Clandestine de la Révolution Algérienne—Clandestine Organization of the Algerian Revolution] represent factions in the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois wing of the old apparatuses.

(d) The RUR [Rassemblement Unitaire des Révolutionnaires—Movement to Unite Revolutionists], which was born of splits from the ex-ORP and the OCRA, represents, from the standpoint of its program and its analyses, the tendency closest to revolutionary socialism. Its base in Algeria, however, is as limited as that of the other movements.

VII

1. In this context the fundamental strategic task remains the organization of a revolutionary Marxist vanguard and the subsequent formation of a party of the urban and rural workers which would struggle for the overthrow of the Boumédiène regime and the establishment of a government of the worker and peasant masses.

2. Inseparably bound up with this task is the necessity of struggling to revitalize the trade-union movement and gain its complete independence from the state.

3. This struggle can only be waged through and parallel to a revival of the mass movement. And the mass movement can be revived only through struggle for:

(a) Stimulation of the noncapitalist sector of the economy by putting the entire nationalized industrial sector under self-management and giving priority to this sector as regards fiscal advantages and the development of trade relations, etc.

(b) The establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade and the introduction of mandatory national planning to avert strangulation of the self-managed sector.

(c) Nationalization of the petroleum-producing enterprises belonging to all the imperialist countries involved in the June 1967 aggression against the Arab revolution, and the establishment of workers control exercised jointly by representatives of the oil workers and the socialist industrial sector over Sonatrach and the other oil companies.

(d) Abrogation of the pseudo-agrarian reform of 1966 and implementation of a radical agrarian reform by means of expropriation of the large landowners and severe limitations on the right to hold property in land. The starting consideration must be that it is of course incorrect to call only for the restriction of large and middle landownership independent of seeking the most productive use of the land. But it is not correct either to envisage agrarian reform as an attempt to put the most land possible under cultivation according to abstract criteria of economic efficiency, independent of social relationships.

(e) Amendment of the 1966 law on municipal government for a new definition of municipal boundaries guaran-

teeing that the municipalities will be economic units and eliminating interference by the FLN apparatus.

(f) Defense of the revolution by the creation of workers and peasants militias based on the big farms, the big factories, and the municipalities.

(g) Renovation and purging of the state apparatus, the creation of organs of people's power, and promotion of equalitarian tendencies in the struggle against bureaucratic privileges. Revival of the struggle for democratic demands—emancipation of women, the struggle to keep Islam out of public affairs, the struggle against illiteracy and for education, the struggle against regional particularism.

4. Particular importance must be accorded to work among the Algerian workers in Europe as well as work for the release of all the interned militants and leaders, especially Ben Bella, Ben Allah, Zahouane, Harbi, and Hadj Ali.

VIII

Today the Trotskyist movement is unanimous in its assessment of the current situation in Algeria. After the June 19 coup d'état, however, the limited extent of the change in the government makeup led some militants to ask whether the character of this coup had not been exaggerated; since, after all, it did not exceed the dimensions of a palace revolution. Subsequently the majority agreed that the coup was the qualitative expression of a molecular deterioration which had occurred in the last period of President Ben Bella's regime. But in view of the rapidity with which the state bureaucracy accentuated its right turn, a second question arose: Did the Trotskyist movement exaggerate the advances of the Algerian revolution in February 1964 when it characterized the Ben Bella government as a workers and peasants government? This is the question that must be answered now.

There is no reason to minimize the real advances that marked the development of the Algerian revolution during the first years after independence. Real anti-imperialist and anticapitalist actions were taken by the Ben Bella government and, more precisely, the limited team around Ben Bella, which in important instances went beyond the institutional framework, legalizing the conquests of the masses by decrees. The Fourth International was correct in giving critical support to the Ben Bella team from the time it conquered power in July 1962.

It is, however, likewise necessary to take into account the fact that the masses in movement who won self-management were the permanent workers on the large estates that later became self-managed farms; that is, the agricultural proletariat in the true sense of the word. After the summer of 1962, this agricultural proletariat was the only sector of the masses in motion. This was the social base of the Ben Bella team. Its relative narrowness constituted a most serious weakness. The masses of poor peasants could have offered a broader social base, but they were atomized during the crises of the summer of 1962. They could have been mobilized through immediate implementation of a radical agrarian reform. But the Ben Bella team did not do this.

The Fourth International did not correctly estimate the narrowness of the social base on which the Ben Bella

team rested and therefore failed to see the major difference between the situation in Algeria and the situation which led to the establishment of a workers state in Cuba less than two years after the Castroist team took power.

In this situation, a revolutionary leadership possessing an adequate instrument, a revolutionary party, could still have mobilized the peasant masses. But in Algeria, the FLN was never a "party" in the class sense. Moreover, it no longer existed after 1958, except as an organization in the federation of France and as a government in the GPRA [Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne—Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic]. For all other purposes it had abdicated in favor of the ALN.

In its early stages, the Algerian freedom struggle had served as an inspiring example throughout the colonial world. The Cubans, especially, were influenced by it. After the victory of the Cuban revolution and the establishment first of a workers and peasants government and then a workers state in Cuba, this reciprocal influence continued, with Cuba now becoming an example for the Algerians. It was legitimate in Algeria to hold up the example of Cuba and to struggle for a similar outcome.

However, the dynamics of the Algerian revolution was determined by important differences from the developments that led to the establishment of the Cuban workers state. French imperialism had drawn a lesson from the victory of the Cuban revolution; it followed a different course from the one taken by U.S. imperialism toward Castro. The mass mobilizations were much more limited in Algeria than in Cuba. The Ben Bella team was of much lower revolutionary political stature than the Castro-Guevara team in Cuba. It failed especially to smash all surviving elements of the bourgeois army—which in Cuba were smashed upon Castro's entering Havana. Instead, in accordance with one of the main provisions of the Evian agreement, Ben Bella allowed these elements to be integrated into the ALN. In view of these differences, which became evident in the course of the struggle, it was a mistake to expect an outcome analogous to the one in Cuba.

This error in estimate was made worse by a wrong assessment of the nature of the ALN, especially after the application of the Evian agreement, and by the conception, maintained primarily by the Pablo tendency, that in the concrete Algerian situation of 1962-63 the army could play the role of the party. The grave consequences of the delay in organizing an Algerian revolutionary vanguard were seriously underestimated.

The Pablo tendency, which was in charge of the work in Algeria and which also controlled the journal of the French section of the Fourth International for at least two years, tended to develop its own independent line. It advanced confused and incorrect formulas with regard to the Algerian state, calling it an "anticapitalist state" or "semiworkers state." It did not grasp the contradiction between the workers and peasants government and the bourgeois character of the state apparatus. It therefore assigned to mass mobilizations essentially the role of supporting the Ben Bella tendency and carrying out the program of the FLN, failing to appreciate that it was crucial for the urban and rural proletariat and poor peasantry to set up independent organs of power, and

clinging to the utopian and non-Marxist concept of the possibility of a gradual change in the nature of the state.

From this, various consequences followed such as minimizing certain serious events; for example, the gangster-like attack committed by the Khider apparatus at the UGTA congress, which was explained away by cailing the UGTA leaders "left Mensheviks."

The Pablo tendency eventually split from the Fourth International.

* * *

The Fourth International never used the category of workers and peasants government in the Algerian context as a synonym for a dictatorship of the proletariat. The state structure was always correctly analyzed as bourgeois.

But although the International correctly applied the designation of workers and peasants government to the Ben Bella regime, it did not sufficiently stress the imperious necessity of establishing independent organs of political power by the urban and rural proletariat. Such bodies, moreover, would have been the best instruments for a general mobilization of the masses and the sole means for making the process of permanent revolution irreversible.

A concomitant error was committed in May 1964 when the International Executive Committee set the task for the revolutionary Marxists of collaborating in the formation of a revolutionary socialist left "led by the FLN" (the IEC resolution, "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Marxists," *Quatrième Internationale*, July 1964) instead of stressing the need to work among the ranks first to create a revolutionary Marxist organization linked to the Algerian masses.

The lesson of the events in Algeria is of considerable importance. The victory of the socialist revolution in Algeria was possible. But a decisive factor was lacking: the revolutionary party.

Within the frame of this self-criticism it must be added frankly that if the participation of the Trotskyist movement in the Algerian revolution, including its material support to the struggle and its backing of the most progressive tendency after 1962, was considerable, too little was done in carrying out the specific function of the Trotskyist movement—to form the nucleus of a future Algerian revolutionary party. The work of training and recruiting Algerian militants was neglected for work at the top.

Doubtless, during an initial phase, in view of the smallness of our forces, it was correct to concentrate on a campaign of practical support for the revolution which was creating a climate favorable to the spread of our ideas. But after a given point, the formation of an organized nucleus should have been given priority and all work at the top subordinated to this goal. The International recognized this at its Sixth World Congress. It did not, however, make the necessary effort to carry out this line. Thus, it shares the blame for this error with the comrades of the Pablo tendency, who were the main ones responsible for this work and for the false orientation as regards building a revolutionary nucleus.

Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience*

By Hector Bejar

[This is the final installment of a translation by Gerry Foley of Héctor Béjar's essay.]

Chapter VII: Some Final Notes

By the end of 1965 the guerrilla movement had been totally liquidated. A group of cadres who were the product of many years of struggle had perished in the actions. They were a brilliant leadership for political struggle but proved unequal to the demands of revolutionary military combat at this time in the history of Peru.

City and Country

The 1965 actions took place almost entirely in the countryside. They did not affect either the cities or our country's extensive coastal belt, where important productive centers are located, including several mines and oil fields, the steel industry, and the sugar plantations with their agricultural proletariat and its great tradition of militancy.

Two factors contributed to the fact that the urban nuclei in the *Costa* and the *Sierra* mounted no action in support of the guerrillas: (a) the guerrillas' conceptions of the kind of war that was to be waged; (b) the incapacity of the urban nuclei for action and their inadequate means.

Both for the MIR and the ELN, the guerrilla war was to proceed from the country to the city; and, in its initial phase, its fundamental task was to win the support of the peasant masses and create a strong fighting vanguard. As a result, the guerrillas not only neglected the cities but laid down precise directives against any premature actions in the urban areas.

The objective was to set up a leadership in the countryside. It was feared that if an urban organization were launched too quickly it would tend to act on its own, creating problems of leadership. And the existence of two parallel leaderships ran counter to the principle that command should be in the hands of the guerrillas.

Moreover, the smallness of both organizations must be taken into consideration. The establishment of four fronts in the *Sierra* already exceeded their capacities. It was impossible in practice to set up an organization func-

tioning simultaneously in both theaters. So when the insurrection began, practically all the cadres were in the countryside.

If you add to this the fact that the rest of the left—from the Trotskyists to the Communist party—did not agree that the time was right for an insurrection and offered only moral support, you can see why the cities remained quiet in mid-1965 despite the fighting in the interior. The calm of the urban centers was broken only by the movements of the repressive forces and isolated adventures by elements that did not take orders from any of the organizations engaged in action.

Added to all this were the characteristics of Peruvian society. Since our country has not yet achieved full cultural, economic, and social integration, it never reacts as a whole. Strong barriers separate the country from the city dwellers, the workers from the peasants, the inhabitants of the *Sierra* and the *Costa*, the north from the south. Powerful actions in certain regions will have no repercussions in the rest of the country. This is the way it has been throughout our history, and this is the way it was in 1965. The bloody battles in the *Sierra* did not arouse the *Costa*, where the people remained indifferent and did not react to the impact of the guerrilla struggle as had been hoped.

The guerrillas did alarm the reactionaries and the oligarchy. These elements clearly perceived the danger the guerrillas represented to the stability of their system, above all in a country with economic conditions as explosive as those in Peru. But the people did not have the same capacity for analysis. Nor did any political leadership exist capable of utilizing these moments to wage an effective propaganda campaign based on the example of the guerrillas. All the left did was issue timid communiqués expressing sympathy which did not reach beyond their own narrow circle of influence.

It must be made clear, however, that by their actions the guerrillas achieved a greater impact than the left had previously in its entire history. But this impact was not reflected in actions of popular support.

The role the fighters had assigned to their few activists in the cities was to serve as a center for communications inside and outside the country, as well as for coordinating and supplying men, arms, and equipment. They were also to disseminate propaganda. These tasks proved too great for such small groups. When the guerrillas were surrounded, the urban groups soon lost all contact with them.

Guerrillas and Peasants

With respect to the peasant masses, the guerrillas' situation was also difficult. For centuries an enormous gap has existed in Peru between the urban middle and work-

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ing classes, from which the guerrillas drew their forces, and the peasants.

The city people discriminate against and look down on the people in the countryside, especially the Quechua peasants. On the other hand, the country people distrust the city dwellers. They have always seen them as exploiters, as land-grabbers, as masters.

A large proportion of our peasant population speak only Quechua and those who are bilingual prefer to express themselves in their native language. They use Spanish only for talking to the *latifundista*, when they are forced to.

The gap likewise includes customs. The behavior of city people often startles the peasants, amusing or repelling them.

There is, then, a profound division between social sectors which is deeply rooted historically in the colonial and republican regimes and which the guerrilla war itself must overcome.

It may have been owing to this that the process of recruiting new guerrillas native to the localities in which the fighting took place proved very slow. It could not have been otherwise because combined with these social barriers was the characteristic taciturnity of our country people, who measure time not in days but in harvests. . .

Action and time, then, were required for the guerrillas to convince the peasants of the correctness of the road they had begun. Action, to show that they really intended to combat the peasants' enemies; and time, in order to develop an effective campaign on both an individual and group basis to explain each action.

In the meantime, the army was in action. It knew from the experience of other countries, through the intermediary of its American advisers, that a guerrilla movement must be crushed in embryo if it is not to become uneradicable.

The guerrillas lost this race against time because they did not have the capacity to adapt rapidly, not only to the terrain but to the pattern of the peasants' daily life, to their language and customs.

This is a process in fact that takes years. But anyone who wants to carry a war forward successfully in the Peruvian countryside has to complete this development in months.

Before a fusion between the students and the peasants was achieved, the guerrillas were defeated. The process initiated, a vital one for the future of the revolution, was cut short.

Underlying all this was a class factor. The petty-bourgeois origin of the guerrillas endowed them with all the virtues and vices which typify this social sector in our country.

Along with audacity, imagination, and romanticism, these advanced groups of the petty-bourgeoisie have always been marked by sectarianism, an excessive love of publicity, an urge to command, and a tendency to underestimate the enemy. Therefore, while displaying reckless heroism in their battles against the enemy and audacity in throwing themselves into a perilous struggle, they were incapable of assimilating quickly into a peasantry which viewed their intrusion not without a certain surprise and bewilderment.

There was another gap. The slogans raised by the guerrillas seemed remote to the peasants, who were pri-

marily interested in concrete and even strictly local demands. While the guerrillas propagandized for a social revolution, the peasants wanted more tangible things. They were interested in minimal demands which the revolutionists did not always succeed in relating to, although these were the levers for raising the consciousness of the people.

However, the guerrillas brought a much more complicated and exotic program.

All their lives, the peasants have been cut off from the national life and removed from the great problems of the country, although suffering their consequences. In general, no fully formed national consciousness exists in Peru; its development has been systematically blocked by the dominant groups. Needless to say, such a consciousness does not exist in the man of the fields either. Of course, the peasants understand what these problems mean when they are explained to them in clear and simple language. But they do not experience them as something immediate and urgent, inspiring them to struggle.

The key problem in this stage is merging with the peasantry, entering into their concerns and aspirations in order to direct them toward higher objectives; to use the levers of struggle for the land and its defense against the *gamonales*. This does not involve just setting ourselves up in a determined area in the countryside and calling on the peasants to follow us. It requires linking ourselves to the peasants and the leading groups within the peasantry, sharing all their experiences. The local and immediate objectives of the peasants must be geared in with the broad, ultimate objectives of the revolution.

Does this mean that we have to reorient ourselves to the point of abandoning the perspective of immediate armed action?

In my opinion, it does not. It means only that the guerrillas must be absolutely clear on the social context in which they are going to operate and that they must plan and execute their actions in accordance with this context. It means that the guerrillas must adjust the scope of their objectives to suit the social situation in which they operate.

At the same time, guerrilla struggle must be viewed in the broadest possible light, in the context of a nation where many revolutionary forces are active which may have different methodologies. It is still possible that there will be new experiences on the order of Hugo Blanco's, since the bourgeois agrarian reform proclaimed in a timid law has not even been applied. The territory of Peru is very large and its real life very complex. The guerrillas must be ready to combine their efforts with those of other revolutionary groups despite differing methods.

There are some characteristics of the Peruvian peasants that must be taken into account by the insurgents. One is their respect and esteem for their communal authorities. The chief, the lawyer, and the mayor of a *comunidad* represent the will of all the *comuneros* and they are followed without any argument whatever. How does this affect the guerrillas? Rather than individually, the *comuneros* react collectively and their attitude toward the revolutionists depends in large measure on the opinion of their authorities. The guerrillas work not with a mass but with an organization that has a power structure of its own which they must respect or risk losing

the confidence or gaining the animosity of the people. Also, this structure will enable them at certain times to make use of a powerful collective force.

The guerrillas of 1965 did not succeed in fusing their methods with those of the peasantry. Both the peasants and the guerrillas continued to follow their separate roads, because the guerrillas did not link up in time with the social upsurge the countryside had been undergoing since 1956.

To sum up, it can be said that the guerrillas must act and work not only for the far-off objectives of the revolution but for the immediate objectives of the peasants—and not only for the peasants but with them.

The Ranks and the Leadership

The delay in perceiving all the factors working against the guerrillas and remedying them in time was a result of the nature of a good part of the leading cadres.

This leadership had, to be sure, great integrity and revolutionary consistency. This is shown by the mere fact that they died fighting for their ideals. However, because of an excess of some qualities and a deficiency in others, it was not equal to the developments.

I have already said that the qualities of a party leader are not sufficient for heading an insurgent group. Physical qualities are needed, knowledge of the terrain, and effectiveness in combat—qualities which not all of the 1965 leaders had. The will to fight is not enough to make a man a guerrilla. Many *compañeros*, who could have made excellent cadres in the urban resistance or in the support network, went into the countryside out of heroic determination but were unable to produce physically despite their iron will. Without wanting to, they became a burden on the other more effective *compañeros* and on the guerrilla force as a whole. A more coolheaded and pragmatic selection of personnel would have enabled the organizations to rely on better combat teams.

Meanwhile, hidden in the ranks of the guerrillas and the peasant masses were cadres who, through a sifting-out process, could have risen in the process of battle to positions of command. But such a process, which is long and slow by nature, did not take place because the struggle was brief and violent.

Survival and Expansion

It is possible, as has been shown in several Latin-American countries, for cadres who are militarily competent and politically convinced of the rightness of their struggle to survive despite violent and repeated attacks by armies experienced in counterinsurgency warfare. The guerrillas can maintain themselves even without the benefit of sufficient "subjective" conditions in the surroundings in which they are working.

The problem is to expand the guerrilla war to the point of really endangering the system and the overall stability of the regime.

Given the characteristics of Peru that have been repeatedly noted—disjointedness, irregularities, isolation—it is possible that a guerrilla movement could survive for many years without affecting the vital points of the system.

Guerrilla struggle is not dangerous to the ruling class

as long as it does not bring other social contradictions to a head, stimulating forms of action which must combine with it.

In order to expand the guerrilla movement, it is necessary to break with schematism. To cling to a single blueprint for action is always dangerous because it leads revolutionists into an isolated and unilateral, an exclusive and sectarian, struggle that blocks the guerrilla group's possibilities of growth.

It should be added that schematism is found more among those who propagandize for armed struggle than those who engage in it.

Arms and Politics

Does armed struggle exclude politics? We have always answered no to this question. There can be no contradiction between these two forms of struggle, because in our countries armed struggle *is* political struggle, in essence.

Our guerrillas must be both effective soldiers and capable politicians, but not only politicians. While the armed struggle is developed in given regions of the country, the political struggle must be extended to the entire national scene and in the most diverse forms.

What defines revolutionary conduct, distinguishing it from opportunism, is its objectives and the consistency with which they are pursued; the subordination of all tactics to the only strategic objective possible to those who call themselves revolutionists—the taking of power. When an organization or a group of revolutionists proposes to take power and does not become diverted from this perspective, all forms of action are possible and none can be discounted.

Strikes, passive resistance, public demonstrations, and mass mobilizations can make it possible for guerrilla actions to have an impact in the rest of the country, overcoming their isolation. Armed struggle in the countryside need not necessarily be carried over into the cities as terrorist activity, except when this is required, is politically clear and explainable to the people, and when it corresponds to the level the masses have reached in their actions.

The situation is similar in the country. If the guerrillas confine themselves to armed actions alone, they will be in a less favorable position than if they combine these actions with large-scale organization of the peasants and engagement in mass peasant struggles for clear and concrete objectives.

All of the actions by the peasants in the history of our country, let us not forget, have been collective in character and have been carried out in their own name with the leaders springing from the oppressed masses themselves. By their activity the guerrillas can assure a revolutionary perspective for the peasant struggle but they cannot replace it. That is, guerrilla warfare is part of, not the whole, struggle.

Because of their natural mobility, the guerrillas are everywhere and nowhere. Where they are not present, the masses must defend themselves against the enemy repression by their own means, organizing around the most outstanding leaders of the popular resistance.

When the guerrillas were liquidated in 1965, the people were left defenseless and at the mercy of the mass

murderers. This was the logical consequence of peasant work done only as a corollary of guerrilla warfare, to supply the guerrilla group with food and men, without considering the possibility of such a repression. The people were not prepared for this contingency because the guerrillas had neither the time nor the idea of preparing them. The guerrillas could not have done so, moreover, because of their being an alien body. Resistance must be organized by men springing from the people itself, natives of the area tempered in a kind of struggle that was not achieved here.

Mountains and Jungle

It is indispensable to note that our country's terrain has forced the peasant population to cluster in the valleys and in the high regions where conducting a guerrilla struggle according to the familiar rules is difficult and dangerous.

In fact, if you analyze the 1965 experience, you will see clearly that all the guerrilla fronts found themselves forced to retreat toward the jungle areas to the east of the country. These are the safest areas from the military point of view, but not from a political standpoint, because they are very thinly populated. The areas of densest population are in the *Sierra* and not in the *Selva*.

No solution to this problem, which will reappear in future guerrilla actions, has yet been outlined. It will be solved only when the guerrillas find ways of operating in the mountains and in the open, high expanses of the *puna*.

This can be done. There is a great guerrilla tradition in our country and the *montoneros*—the guerrillas of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth—always operated in the Andean mountains.

To sum it up, the insurgents will have to learn to wage war in the *Sierra* or they will be obliged to stay in the *Selva*. In the latter case, they will be compelled to find concrete forms and channels for influencing the peasantry of the *Sierra*. For a good while, these channels will be political and propagandistic.

Does this mean that a party will have to be formed? When the times comes, yes, so long as it assures the peasants a large enough role in leading the struggle. As long as it does not give rise to artificial leaderships which become an obstacle to the free expression of the masses; as long as it promotes the development of new revolutionary cadres springing from the people themselves. Then guerrilla warfare could progressively lay the foundations of a party through revolutionary action against the enemy.

Why 1965?

Was 1965 the right year to begin an insurrectionary process in our country? Many critics of the guerrilla movement have asked this question to answer it with an immediate no.

It must be admitted that in the eyes of the broad masses of the country the Belaúnde government still had a reformist appearance, which created illusions and hopes. Except in the areas directly affected, the masses had not yet assimilated the experience of the massacres. And the administrative corruption and immorality of the functionaries had not yet been revealed to the eyes of the urban

population in all its nakedness. So, when the guerrillas irrupted into this national context, striking fear in the reactionaries, the people were unable to understand exactly what they represented and what justified their activity.

We have said, in general, that we cannot wait until the subjective conditions develop to initiate the revolution. That is true, but we made a mistake in not waiting until the guerrillas had a clear justification for coming into being. We needed this in order to give the people the first objective explanations of our attitude. Above all, since the people are not and cannot be capable in the near future of understanding the need to radically change the system and replace it with another, the reasons for beginning the insurgency must be easily understandable.

The reasons for our attitude were rooted ideologically in our underestimation of the cities. We thought that if a guerrilla movement began developing among the peasantry it was not important to find a justification for it in bourgeois politics, which is entirely foreign, remote, and unknown to this population.

This is completely true as regards the peasants but not for the country as a whole. At any rate, we shut the door to successful revolutionary agitation among the urban masses. The workers and the poor and middle strata in the cities were becoming increasingly disillusioned with bourgeois politics but this was still not sufficient to impel them to actively support armed action against the system. In these conditions, the response of the urban population to the guerrillas did not go beyond a vague sympathy in some sectors; enthusiasm was confined to small, mainly student, circles; while most people were indifferent.

There was also a compelling and decisive subjective reason for beginning the actions early. Our organizations were launched for action; it was their only reason for being.

Therefore, we had to choose very quickly between immediate action or a long, slow growth as a party with an uncertain revolutionary future.

In the ELN this characteristic appeared with greater clarity. Any insurrectionary organization has its own laws of growth and functioning. When it does not follow them, it disintegrates. If our organizations, especially the ELN, had not begun an insurrection in a short time, they would have entered into a fatal process of disintegration. In action they would tighten up their *esprit de corps* and fortify themselves; in prolonged passivity, immersed in interminable preparatory work, they would risk disappearing because of the discouragement of their members.

Today, in view of the process that followed Belaúnde's electoral victory and resulted in his overthrow at the hands of the very people who had obsequiously served him, we can say that in the ensuing years many opportunities have appeared for an insurrectional movement to find full justification in the eyes of the people.

However, in 1965 we started the insurrection on no other basis than our own level of preparedness.

Moreover, the jealousy between the two organizations resulted in both being ignorant of each other's plans. When the MIR announced the initiation of the guerrilla movement in the beginning of 1965, the ELN was not

ready. However, it had to move up its starting date for fear that its militants would be caught in a generalized repression.

It is possible that because of a lack of coordination, a similar situation occurred with respect to the MIR fronts. It may be, for example, that the Yahuarina ambush, where the first shot was fired on June 9, 1965, caught Luis de la Puente by surprise in Cuzco when he had not yet completed his preparations. The northern guerrilla front, which was just beginning similar work, was still less prepared. The result was that the army faced groups of an uneven experience, some of which were not in full combat readiness.

Conclusion

From various quarters, we have been reproached for not presenting a coherent ideological conception and not offering the masses a developed program.

This is true in part. But it must not be forgotten that since our insurrectionary left came out of established political parties, much of what it said about ideology and program reflected the passage from old to new conceptions regarding the existence and behavior of social classes, the composition of the oligarchy and its relationship to imperialism, the objectives and stages of the revolution, and so forth.

It is also true that, owing to the insufficiency and irregularity of theoretical work, the Peruvian left as a whole has not been able to offer an interpretation of the Peruvian reality based on serious studies. The Peruvian left has always approached this reality from the standpoint of its own fixed notions. It is a commonplace in Peru to say that after Mariátegui's death, Marxists stopped looking at our reality closely and in a scientific spirit.

We do not deny this. It is part of the heritage passed on to us from the past; it still prevents us from having a completely unobstructed view of social changes, often leading us into a dogmatism that never misses an opportunity to raise its head.

But, more important than prematurely specifying a program for every stage, and so long as no theoretical or practical work has been done on the Peruvian reality, the Marxist left must establish its general and ultimate objectives with absolute clarity.

What is our final objective? In our countries, without any doubt, it can only be socialism. "Either a socialist revolution or a caricature of a revolution," Che once said.

In fact, the masses are coming more and more to see revolution as a synonym for socialism. We cannot deceive anyone but ourselves by holding to transitional forms which the enemy sees as euphemisms covering up our real ends.

All right. What kind of socialism do we want? A socialism that assures the oppressed masses the exercise of power, a part in all governmental affairs, and complete power of decision over their own destiny. The dictatorship of the class can be exercised only with full participation of the masses, which is the ultimate and decisive guarantee of the strength of the revolutionary regime.

In Peru only genuine socialism can assure national integration on the basis of the common interests of all

the people. From the beginning, our revolution must seek political forms that will enable it to maintain the support of the masses and prevent bureaucratization.

We know that this will not be easy in a country like ours which has always lived under the worst forms of rule, but we are confident that the revolutionary process, if it is led by leaders arising from the ranks of the people and conscious of the problems of socialism in our time, can culminate in an actual, real socialism.

In the meantime, we repeat that armed struggle by the peoples — in its complex, manifold, rich, and varied forms — is the only way open for liberating Latin America. The initial failures suffered in Peru do not prove that it is hopeless to try to struggle against the oppressor. They teach us only that we must correct our conceptions, study the reality more closely, link ourselves to the people, prepare the fighters better, and eliminate sectarianism and factionalism in the ranks of the revolution.

In order to achieve all this, along with firmness and fervor in continuing the road we have begun, we must employ coolheadedness and calculation to overcome errors.

In these pages I wanted to offer, along with a sober analysis, an invitation to engage in new and fruitful experiences.

Trotsky Published in Hungary

"Trotsky's name figures alongside Lenin's among the authors in an anthology of eyewitness accounts of the 1917 Russian revolution announced by a Budapest publishing house," according to an Agence France-Pressé dispatch in the March 5 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde*.

AFP noted that after Yugoslavia, Hungary will be the first Stalinist country where any text by Trotsky, "who has been on the index in the USSR since 1927," has been published. "In Czechoslovakia," the AFP report said, "Trotsky's *Revolution Betrayed* was on the presses in 1968, but the publisher could not distribute it because of the Soviet intervention."

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