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March 9, 1970

Pro-U.S. Troops Routed in Laos

Interview with Nayef Hawatmeh:

For a Multiracial State in Palestine

**A New Deepening
of the Crisis of Stalinism**

Belgium:

Role of the JGS in Miners' Strike

Nineteenth Congress of French CP

First Time in English:

By Leon Trotsky

The Decapitation of the Red Army



GARAUDY: Top intellectual of the French Communist party gets his answer at congress. See page 197.

Some Proposals

"Pollution Fight Gains in Colleges Here," was a headline in the February 23 *New York Times*. The report by David Bird outlined some of the demands and proposals of the numerous antipollution groups that have sprung up on campuses around the United States.

"The strength and breadth of the issue's appeal," Bird said, ". . . have become increasingly apparent as campus leaders have mobilized for a nationwide environmental teach-in on April 22."

The *Times* reporter listed some of the proposals advanced by various campus groups:

"Sit-ins or phone-ins to immobilize at least part of the operations of a corporation such as General Motors, to emphasize the opposition to automotive pollution.

"The take-over from 'lagging Government' of the job of getting evidence against polluters that will stand up in court.

"A blockade of parts of the city to paralyze automobile movement and even bring polluting industries to a halt by cutting off their supplies.

"A new program to shine large spotlights on smokestacks that take advantage of darkness to spew pollutants into the atmosphere."

Student activists have found that President Nixon's attempt to co-opt the pollution issue has not been very successful. Andy Garling, a coordinator of the Columbia University Environmental Action group, told a student audience in January: "President Nixon seems to think that the environment issue is a good thing to quiet down the campuses and patch up the country." According to David Bird, "The audience laughed loudly."

Hector Bejar Series

To allow space for the two articles on the Red Army by Leon Trotsky in this issue, we have held over the seventh and final installment of Hector Bejar's *Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience*. This will appear next week.

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Pro-American Troops Routed in Plaine des Jarres

The rout of more than 2,000 pro-American troops on the Plaine des Jarres in Laos February 21, despite massive U.S. air support, including giant B-52 superbombers, was a major defeat for the puppet government of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

The plain, which was captured by the royalist troops last summer after saturation bombing by American aircraft,* fell to the insurgent Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies after an offensive of only ten days. This included two days—February 17 and 18—in which "all 75 of the Strategic Air Command's B-52's were used over Laos," the Associated Press reported from Saigon February 19. It was the first time the bombers have been used in Laos other than on the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail.

The use of B-52s was widely recognized as a qualitative step-up in the war. The *New York Times* reported from Vientiane February 19: "Most observers called the decision the most serious escalation yet of the United States war effort in Laos. . . .

"The decision to use the B-52's in support of Government troops, usually authoritative sources said, was apparently taken to avert the evacuation of nearly 2,000 Laotian troops who are cut off at the Plaine des Jarres airfield, 15 miles northwest of Xienghouang."

But Nixon's escalation failed to turn back the freedom fighters. An estimated 6,000 Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese soldiers, using tanks, attacked the Plaine des Jarres airstrip at 1:00 a.m. February 21. By 3:15 a.m. the key base fell. The royalist defenders retreated, first to Ban Thang, a landing zone eight miles southwest of the airstrip, then into the hills to the west.

A February 21 Associated Press dispatch from Vientiane quoted one "source" as saying, "It appears to be as orderly a withdrawal as possible, it's no rout."

* For background on the current situation, see "Laos: '20,000 Bombing Sorties a Month,'" *Intercontinental Press*, January 19, page 27.

This claim was repeated in a report to the *New York Times* dated February 21:

"The number of casualties and survivors was unknown, although military sources said that the Laotian units had retreated before dawn to the Ban Thang airfield in an effort to form a second defensive line.

"Subsequent enemy attacks forced the Laotians to abandon Ban Thang and retreat into the nearby hills. The sources said, however, that all important Laotian units had maintained contact with the American headquarters in Laos at Long Cheng, and that 'the retreat was as orderly as possible under the circumstances.'"

A very different picture emerged from an Associated Press dispatch later the same day.

"The Laotian Government garrison retreated in confusion today," the wire service reported, "with a third of its force dead or missing, a high Laotian officer said. He added:

Bertrand Russell's Last Message

'What Israel Is Doing . . . Cannot Be Condoned'

[Bertrand Russell's final public statement before his death February 3 was addressed to the delegates at the International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East Crisis, meeting in Cairo on February 2. The world-famous philosopher condemned the recent escalation of the Israeli bombing of the United Arab Republic, and outlined his views on a general solution to the Middle East problem. The text given below is taken from a full-page advertisement in the February 23 *New York Times*, sponsored by the Arab States Delegation to the United Nations.]

* * *

The latest phase of the undeclared war in the Middle East is based upon

"There is utter confusion and chaos. We do not know where the Government units are, whether the wounded are still lying on the plain or whether they have got into the mountains."

The February 22 *New York Times* summed up the new situation:

"Western diplomatic sources today said that the loss of the plain, despite the growing United States war effort in Laos, meant that the United States was now faced with involving itself even more deeply in the Laotian war, probably through expanded B-52 raids, or seeing the Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma face further defeats."

The remainder of the 10,000 troops of the so-called secret army of the pro-American General Vang Pao are said to be preparing for a "bitter stand" at their headquarters at Long Cheng, thirty miles south of the Plaine des Jarres.

a profound miscalculation. The bombing raids deep into Egyptian territory will not persuade the civilian population to surrender, but will stiffen their resolve to resist. This is the lesson of all aerial bombardment. The Vietnamese, who have endured years of American heavy bombing, have responded not by capitulation, but by shooting down more enemy aircraft. In 1940 my own fellow-countrymen resisted Hitler's bombing raids with an unprecedented unity and determination. For this reason the present Israeli attacks will fail in their essential purpose, but at the same time they must be condemned vigorously throughout the world.

The development of the crisis in the Middle East is both dangerous and in-structive. For over 20 years Israel

has expanded by force of arms. After every stage in this expansion Israel has appealed to "reason" and has suggested "negotiations." This is the traditional role of the imperial power, because it wishes to consolidate with the least difficulty what it has taken already by violence. Every new conquest becomes the new basis of the proposed negotiation from strength which ignores the injustice of the previous aggression. The aggression committed by Israel must be condemned not only because no state has the right to annex foreign territory, but because every expansion is also an experiment to discover how much more aggression the world will tolerate.

The refugees who surround Palestine in their hundreds of thousands were described recently by the Washington journalist I. F. Stone as "the moral millstone around the neck of world Jewry." Many of the refugees are now well into the third decade of their precarious existence in temporary settlements. The tragedy of the people of Palestine is that their country was "given" by a foreign power to another people for the creation of a new state. The result was that many hundreds of thousands of innocent people were made permanently homeless. With every new conflict their numbers have increased. How much longer is the world willing to endure this spectacle of wanton cruelty? It is abundantly clear that the refugees have every right to the homeland from which they were driven, and the denial of this right is at the heart of the continuing conflict. No people anywhere in the world would accept being expelled en masse from their own country; how can anyone require the people of Palestine to accept a punishment which nobody else would tolerate? A permanent just settlement of the refugees in their homelands is an essential ingredient of any genuine settlement in the Middle East.

We are frequently told that we must sympathize with Israel because of the suffering of the Jews in Europe at the hands of the Nazis. I see in this suggestion no reason to perpetuate any suffering. What Israel is doing today can not be condoned; and to invoke the horrors of the past to justify those of the present is gross hypocrisy. Not only does Israel condemn a vast number of refugees to misery; not only are many Arabs under occupation con-

demned to military rule; but also Israel condemns the Arab nations, only recently emerging from colonial status, to continuing impoverishment as military demands take precedence over national development.

All who want to see an end to bloodshed in the Middle East must ensure

South Africa

22 Victims Accuse Police of Torture

Twenty-two black South Africans imprisoned in a Pretoria jail under the Terrorism Act have accused the police of using torture against them.

One of the victims, Mrs. Rita Ndzanga, alleged in a statement, according to the February 21 *New York Times*, "that during interrogation a white policeman had lifted her by the hair and dropped her to the floor.

"She was beaten, the statement said, and when she screamed, the windows of the room were closed. Policemen worked day and night in shifts, questioning her, she said, adding that 'day and night became the same, because the windows were covered with thick planks.'"

In another of the several statements submitted to the Supreme Court, George Mokwebo said: "I was kicked on the back and the stomach for a considerable time, leaving me gasping for breath." He added that his hands had been tied to a railing and bricks removed from under his feet so that only the tips of his shoes touched the ground.

An affidavit was also filed for Mrs. Winnie Mandela, a defendant and the wife of Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned leader of the African National Congress. The defendants include Peter Magubane, a press photographer, and other journalists.

The prisoners were arrested in May and June of last year. Originally they were charged under the Suppression of Communism Act which bans anti-apartheid organizations, such as the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress and the Unity Movement. The act states that members of these "Communist" organizations are not allowed to attend public meetings, or have any relationship with an ed-

that any settlement does not contain the seeds of future conflict. Justice requires that the first step towards a settlement must be an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in June 1967. A new world campaign is needed to help bring justice to the long-suffering people of the Middle East.

ucational institution. According to the September, 1969, *Anti-Apartheid News*:

"They are also usually prohibited from attendance at social gatherings of more than one person. This has been interpreted as preventing a banned person from playing in a doubles tennis game."

As of 1969 more than 350 people were banned under the act.

The February 17 *New York Times* summarized the charges against the twenty-two defendants:

"They were alleged to have inspected trains and railway installations in the Johannesburg area to find targets for sabotage and to have arranged visits to prisons—including Robben Island, where Mr. Mandela is imprisoned—in connection with National Congress business, to have worked with others in arranging financial aid and assistance to the organization, to have arranged to have contact with 'guerrilla fighters' and to have 'encouraged feelings of hostility between the races.'

"They were also charged with having abetted the aims of the banned South African Congress party and the South African Indian Congress party and the South African Communist party to further political, social, industrial and economic change."

When the court resumed February 16 after the year-end recess, charges under the Suppression of Communism Act were unexpectedly dropped. This, however, did not mean that the prisoners were set free. They were immediately rearrested under another act, the Terrorist Act, and taken back to prison.

As the February 21 *New York Times* explains it:

"The act empowers any officer of

the police, of or above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, to order the arrest without warrant and detention for interrogation of any person he has reason to believe is a terrorist or is withholding from the police information relating to terrorist activities."

"The act allows for indefinite detention without trial and, if the cases are ever brought to trial, those convicted are subject to a minimum of five years' imprisonment and a maximum of death."

The chances of surviving a long period of detention under the Terrorism Act are not particularly good. Official government figures listed thirty-one persons held under the act at the end of 1968, and the South African Institute of Race Relations reports that five detainees died between September 1968 and May 1969.

Some of the twenty-two defendants may meet the same fate if South African police torture fails to extract "confessions" from them.

Unrest Hits Pakistan

The radical student movement in Pakistan, which toppled Ayub Khan last year and was then suppressed by General Yahya Khan's military dictatorship, is on the rise again.

"In the first weeks of 1970," the February 22 *New York Times* reported, "the military regime arrested at least 61 students. Sixteen were jailed. . . ."

"At Punjab University, 700 miles north [of Karachi] in Lahore, students invaded the home of the vice chancellor, Dr. Allama Alauddin. . . . Twenty-one students were expelled."

Troops were called out to suppress student demonstrations at the University of Sind. Shortly afterward, the *Times* reported, ". . . dental students in three western cities were on strike, and agitation had closed a large agricultural college in Lyallpur. . . . Other students in Dacca quit their classes to organize rallies for their favorite political parties or to organize general strikes, which in one week tied up the East Pakistan capital for three days. . . ."

"Despite increased arrests, student activity continues in West Pakistan and, in East Pakistan, students are virtually untouchable by the authorities."

March 9, 1970

Garaudy Gets His Answer

Nineteenth Congress of the French CP

By Daniel Elkan

Paris

"Sour notes will only be heard in the municipal conferences; it is almost certain that at the congress the music will be harmonious, however mediocre the themes. A CP congress is not the scene of collective elaboration of the party's policy but a pagan ritual ceremony where a leadership worked out in backroom bargaining is enthroned, and the line elaborated by the nineteen Political Bureau members (or some of them) is unanimously ratified." (*Rouge*, weekly of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International], January 19.)

The Nineteenth National Congress of the Parti Communiste Français [French Communist party—PCF] met at Nanterre February 4-8. As predicted, after a largely sterile discussion, the 960 delegates unanimously approved the reformist *Theses* and nearly unanimously approved the slate of 107 for the new Central Committee.

In the main, what distinguished the congress from the previous one in February 1968 was the "Garaudy affair"; that is, the novelty of permitting a dissident voice to be heard. The voice was quickly silenced, of course, and Garaudy, with no visible support among the delegates, was dropped from the Political Bureau.

This was a fitting climax to the pre-congress "discussion." The CP daily *l'Humanité* opened its pages to debate in preparation for the congress, but only a tiny number of the contributions contained any criticisms at all. And these, it seems, had to begin by announcing support of the party line. Each was answered by the leadership in the columns of the "Tribune of Discussion."

Amendments proposed to the *Theses* were hardly deepgoing. For example: change Point 53 from "CP members are patriots" to "CP members have always been patriots" (contribution from the Berliet section).

As *Rouge* declared, the purpose of the discussion was to indicate precise-

ly to party members within what limits their opinions could be expressed. Otherwise, it might be asked, with all this unanimity—of 19,250 cells, only 12 proposed any amendments at all to the *Theses*—why hold a congress at all?

Enter Roger Garaudy, director of the Center for Marxist Study and Research, and author of *Le Grand Tour-nant du Socialism* [Socialism's Great Turning Point] [see *Intercontinental Press*, February 2, page 84].

Garaudy sees the workers and intellectuals as forming a "new bloc" because of the "scientific revolution," whereas the leadership separates the two groups. Garaudy wants to extend a friendly hand to religion and participate as a Marxist in a dialogue mainly with the Catholics while the leadership prefers to make an appeal to all Christians without preference among theological currents.

Garaudy, who at times has attacked the "apparatus" as such, demanded a free discussion and predicted in an interview at the congress that those who supported him would not be heard.

He feels it is necessary to construct new "models" of socialism inasmuch as the Russian one is unattractive and the official Czech model of "panzer" socialism is worse. All this is in the context of support for the *Theses* and the basic role of the CP—for example, approving the 1956 invasion of Hungary. Garaudy makes no analysis of Stalinism.

In his report on the party *Theses*, Etienne Fajon called Garaudy a revisionist, a right-wing opportunist, and a liquidator.

The political position of the CP itself can be examined in the Central Committee report given by Georges Marchais.

International questions were discussed under point No. 1 (the party's estimate of the current relationship of forces in the world) and point No. 8 (the CP's relations to other parties).

"Imperialism has lost the historical initiative," Marchais said. As proof

he cited the victorious struggle of the Vietnamese.

But Marchais did not stop there. Since the Moscow conference, Sudan and Libya have acquired anti-imperialist regimes; Peru and Bolivia have taken anti-imperialist measures; and in India the candidate of the "progressive forces" was elected president.

Marchais left out the revolutionary-socialist opposition in these countries. He neglected the anti-imperialist struggles in the Philippines, Ceylon, Japan, Africa, Indonesia, and the Middle East.

Once again, he called for peaceful coexistence among "different social systems."

This principal, however, is not to be applied in relations among workers states. Though Marchais reiterated the French CP's "disagreement" with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he noted with satisfaction "the efforts made to find a political solution." He was plainly not referring to the efforts of the Czechoslovak workers or banned intellectuals.

In discussing the "policy of big capital," the CP reporter labeled the Pompidou government "Gaullist-centrist." Formerly it was merely "Gaullist." This change in terminology is in some undefined way meant to imply an increase in the power of the monopolies. Marchais noted a new stage in the internationalization of French monopoly capitalism (he avoided the term imperialism) which brings the "Gaullist centrists" closer to their U.S. imperialist partners, all to the detriment of the national interest, which the CP is pledged to defend.

The import of Marchais's thesis is that the CP can get together with those bourgeois interests left out of the regime, in defense of the "national interest" against the monopolies. Such "unity of the left" could even include "democrats" like those of the bourgeois Radical party.

Since 1936 the CP has never given up its Popular Front perspective. To achieve unity in the working class, common action with the Socialist party is not enough—a common program is demanded. And the program the CP has in mind, as indicated by its talk about "national interest," is one of reformism.

What is the purpose of the unity the CP seeks? It is not a socialist revolution, but "advanced [bourgeois]

democracy, a necessary step on the road to socialism."

This is to be accomplished through the nationalization of the principal industries and banks—by a bourgeois state. "Nationalization," the CP says, "is the democratic and modern form of concentration." It is not explained why workers find it necessary to struggle and strike in the sector that has already been nationalized.

The CP sees the solution of broad social and political problems as being possible under a "left" bourgeois government and within the bourgeois economy. To Marchais, "It goes without saying that an advanced democracy, in realizing these antimonopoly measures, will not eliminate the exploitation of man by man."

The upsurge of May-June 1968 was perfunctorily discussed. The striking workers had for their central objective the satisfaction of economic demands, said Marchais. There was, then, no reason to call for a general strike, or even to admit that what took place was a general strike.

In some abstract way, nevertheless, the question of who should govern did come up in 1968. It was, however, according to Marchais, the Socialist party and other smaller left parties that blocked attempts by the CP to institute advanced democracy.

There were some interesting admissions during the discussion. A member of the Union des Etudiants Communistes [UEC—Union of Communist Students] declared that students are a difficult sector to penetrate with

Communist ideas. In the name of the Communist party students at Nanterre, Gilbert Wassermann said that the CP had stood against the stream in May-June 1968.

There was some discussion of the "ultraleftist problem." A delegate from Seine-St. Denis, for example, said that the danger posed by the Trotskyists to the CGT leadership and to the CP had been underestimated.

Sixty-six foreign delegations of Communist parties and national liberation movements attended as observers. These included Fatah, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, and the Workers party of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Le Monde reported that the PCF leadership attempted to censor the remarks of Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist party concerning differences over the Moscow conference of CPs held last June.

The unfavorable age level of party members was officially noted in the discussion of organizational problems, as was the lack of activity in some cells. Waldeck Rochet was reelected national secretary despite severe illness that has virtually incapacitated him for some time.

Of the 960 delegates, some 60 percent were over thirty years old; less than 22 percent were women. There was one woman on the new nineteen-member Political Bureau.

The conference closed with the singing of the *Internationale*—and the *Marseillaise*.

Ben Bella Reported Still Alive in Prison

A source said to be close to the family of Ahmed Ben Bella, the legally elected president of Algeria, has reported that the conditions of his imprisonment by military dictator Houari Boumedienne have improved markedly in recent months, according to a February 13 Agence France-Presse dispatch.

The mysterious source claims that Ben Bella is being held in a large villa with a garden not far from Algiers. A niece and his mother Fatima Ben Bella are permitted to visit him twice a month.

However, the dispatch noted that Ben Bella is still being kept under tight

surveillance. All of his guards are Algerian army officers.

According to the same report, circles close to the Ben Bella family are now speculating that Boumedienne may be planning to release him soon.

These hopes are reportedly based on the fact that other prominent political prisoners have been released in the past year.

The rumors may also have been deliberately planted by Boumedienne in order to counteract the campaign being waged, principally in France, demanding the immediate release of Algeria's top political prisoner.

Role of the JGS in the Belgian Miners' Strike

By Richard Wood

[This is the second of two articles on the Belgian miners' strike.]

* * *

Brussels

The Jeune Garde Socialiste is at present based mainly among students, and its support for the strike has been conditioned by this fact. Also, the JGS was weak in the Limbourg region at the beginning of the strike. Another grouping among the students, which could be characterized as "Maoist-Spontanéist," had a base at Louvain University which is not too far from the mines. The Maoist-Spontanéists combine Maoist features with some anarchist ideas, and their methods of operating and political approach to the strike have contrasted sharply with those of the JGS.

One difference between the two groups has been the question of the Permanent Committee itself. "There has been a lot of noise," François Vercammen told me, "about the political views of some of the miners in the Permanent Committee. The Maoist-Spontanéists have especially attacked the Permanent Committee. They say that it represents the foremen, etc., in the mine and not the real workers.

"It is true that the president of the committee is a foreman, but there is absolutely no question that the Permanent Committee is the genuine leadership of the rank-and-file workers. Second, they say that the Permanent Committee is run by the Volksunie [Flemish National Union], a rightist Flemish nationalist party. For these reasons, they say, they don't support the Permanent Committee.

"It is true that after World War II the Volksunie represented those who had collaborated with the Nazis, and that it still has a fascist faction inside it. Since the war, however, it has become more and more the spokesman for some layers of the Flemish petty bourgeoisie. The backbone of the party is made up of doctors, lawyers, etc.

"But along with the new industrial-



FRANCOIS VERCAMMEN

ization of Flanders, a middle Flemish bourgeoisie is developing, with which the Volksunie is becoming identified. This one region in Limbourg is now the only place where the Volksunie has a base among the workers.

"Because of the backwardness of the area, the Social Democracy was late in developing, and the Communist party is extremely weak. Both the Social Democracy and the CP appear conservative and electoralist-oriented, and the only party that speaks a radical-sounding language to the workers is the Volksunie, which has won a base there.

"This of course doesn't make the Volksunie a workers party; but it is a fact we have to take into account. Our position is that while many of the striking workers support the Volksunie, and we are radically opposed to the Volksunie, nevertheless this must not stand in the way of support-

ing this strike which objectively favors the working class.

"In the same way, we support the Permanent Committee as the legitimate leadership of the strike, even though some of its members support the Volksunie. We feel we must be with the real movement itself, where we can best oppose the dangerous and rightist conceptions to be expected from the Volksunie. A legitimate strike committee is always representative of all tendencies existing among the strikers, and it is unavoidable that there should be a Volksunie tendency inside the committee.

"The Maoist-Spontanéists, on the other hand, have set up their own committee, called Force des Mineurs [Miners' Power], against the Permanent Committee. They first rejected the demand adopted by the workers themselves for the 15 percent wage increase, substituting their own demand for a considerably larger increase — trying to justify setting up this sectarian rival to the workers' own organization by upping the ante on the demand. Later they were forced to abandon this stand and accept the 15 percent demand.

"At the same time, they do not discuss general political problems, such as the union bureaucracy, the role of the government, etc., because of their 'serve the people' line, which they interpret in an economist way. They talk only about wages. So they are opportunist and sectarian at the same time."

* * *

The JGS first began its solidarity campaign in those areas where it had some strength. It worked to win student backing for the embattled miners on the university campuses and in the high schools.

"We believe that students around the world have shown themselves to be a social force with a new weight, and that they can intervene in struggles. This was our starting point. We organized meetings of solidarity at many universities and schools — in Antwerp,

Ghent, Brussels, Liège, Louvain, Hasselt, in the Borinage, etc. — giving the strike leaders the opportunity to speak to the students about the issues involved and to appeal for support. We helped bring out students. They joined the demonstrations and picket lines, distributed leaflets, and so on.

"There have been two demonstrations in support of the miners—one in Hasselt and the other in Genk—which students helped to build. Actually, the students have been a key factor in spreading the strike and, according to the workers, in maintaining it in the Campine. The Maoists, with their superproletarian orientation, deny these facts—they hold that students can only 'serve the people' and are not an important force in their own right.

"One of the things we did first was to put out a pamphlet explaining the issues of the strike. This was a big success, and much appreciated by the workers, many of whom have for the first time begun to understand the structure of the industry, who controls the mines, etc.

"Our role in mobilizing student support for the strike helped us to win the confidence of the workers. While we still continue this activity, we were able at a certain point to work directly with the leadership of the strike. Of course, as we are a political organization, we are not inside the Permanent Committee, which is composed only of miners, but we support it.

"We have done a lot on the technical level, writing press releases, organizing cars for the demonstrations, organizing the demonstrations themselves. We have been putting out a leaflet to the workers every day, explaining the perspective for the day, raising such issues as the role of the government, the union bureaucracy, etc., in a concrete way. At least twice a week we have been putting out a leaflet directed to students all over the country. To do these things, we sent some of our leading cadres into the Campine to work directly with the miners.

"One of the concepts we have fought for is workers democracy. We helped in the organization of strike committees in each mine. This was another source of friction with the Maoist-Spontanéists, who are opposed to the spreading of the rank-and-file committees because they are opposed to workers democracy in general.

"The situation is such that every day at each mine there is a general meeting of the workers, a strike committee meeting in fact, sometimes smaller, sometimes larger. The meetings discuss what has happened in the strike, and what to do next. Members of the JGS are usually among the speakers, and we try to also present ideas on workers control and democratization of the unions, etc."

The presence of the JGS has been key to the miners' taking certain actions. This includes the mass demonstrations of workers and students at Hasselt on January 17 and at Genk on January 24. These helped to dramatize the miners' case nationally, and to maintain the momentum of the strike.

Another action related to the end-of-the-year bonuses. "The unions were afraid to oppose the workers on this," Vercammen said, "and sent a telegram to the government asking that the bonuses be paid. A government spokesman said he 'hadn't received' the message, and refused to pay. This was at eleven o'clock in the evening on January 22; an hour later barricades were built at Winterslag out of trees and old tires which were set on fire. There was a sharp clash between the miners and the gendarmes. JGS members supported the workers in this spontaneous action, then proposed that on the following day—on which the bonus payment was due*—the miners and their families stage a mass picket in Winterslag to demand payment from the mine bosses. This was done: for three hours the workers and their families occupied the mine. As a result, a few days later the government agreed to pay the bonus to all the strikers."

Rightist political forces have attempted to influence the strikers in an antiunion direction. "We are against the misleadership of the union bureaucracy," Vercammen said, "but not against the unions themselves. We have opposed either leaving the unions or setting up rival unions, which would only weaken the miners. Instead, we have put forward the idea of fighting within the unions against

* The bonuses for 1969 were scheduled to be paid to all miners February 15. Only strikebreakers were to get their money early, if they came back to work on January 23. — IP

the bureaucracy, to form an opposition to transform the unions into democratic, fighting organizations of the miners. This perspective has been adopted, after long discussions, by the Permanent Committee."

(It is significant that while the Maoist-Spontanéists refuse to support the Permanent Strike Committee under the pretext that there are rightist tendencies in it, they carry on a straight antiunion propaganda—"Down with the unions"—along identical lines with the rightists.)

"Another means of countering the rightist Flemish nationalist forces," Vercammen added, "has been to push for class solidarity across the language lines in Belgium, and internationally. Thus we helped spread the strike to Wallonia, and establish connections between the Flemish and Walloon miners. We urged putting out press releases in support of the striking Spanish miners in Asturias. And we made an appeal to West German miners and railroad workers not to send coal to Belgium while the strike is going on. These things have helped create more class consciousness and internationalist consciousness, and have provided occasions for us to discuss these questions with the workers at the mines."

The role of the JGS in the strike is the subject of frequent comment in the daily press and on television. Out of this action, the JGS is growing throughout the country, especially among university and high-school students, including in the Limbourg region. This is another difference with the Maoist-Spontanéists, who, from their "spontanéist" side, are in principle against building revolutionary-socialist combat organizations. It is just such an organization that the JGS is working to construct.

American Tax Dollars at Work

"When bombing of North Vietnam was stopped in November, 1968, the American bombing campaign was switched almost intact into Laos," the Boston daily *Christian Science Monitor* said in its February 14-16 issue.

At present, the paper reported, "an estimated 90 percent of the Lao Government's air strikes are flown by Americans. . . ."

"There is little doubt here [Washington] that if Laos were to lose United States aid, the government would collapse almost immediately. . . ."

For a Multiracial State in Palestine

[The following interview with Nayef Hawatmeh, a leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, appeared in the January 19-February 1 issue of *Africasia*, which is published in Paris. The Democratic Front was organized in February 1969 as the result of a split in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The translation from the French is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

[On one point we should like to register a difference with Nayef Hawatmeh, even though it may be of only a terminological nature. He categorizes the privileged bureaucracy in the Soviet Union as a "class"; we would use the word "caste." In Marxist terminology a social class plays a necessary function in a specific economic framework. Both capitalists and workers are essential, for instance, in the functioning of the capitalist system. But the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union plays no such necessary role. As a privileged layer it is a *parasitic* formation. It can therefore be eliminated through a political revolution without overturning the planned economy. In fact the planned economy will function much better when the bureaucratic excrescence is removed.]

* * *

Question: What distinguishes the Democratic Front [DF] from the other resistance groups organizationally? Have the enlarged meetings you have held recently produced anything new in this regard?

Answer: It can be said that at the beginning the Democratic Front was only a revolutionary project. Today, it is becoming a more and more solid organization. As regards the national conference of cadres in October 1969, we were able there to establish the basic principles of the Democratic Front and demonstrate its genuine revolutionary Marxist-Leninist character both to our own members and to the broad masses.

We have rescued Marxism from the pillory where the bureaucratic practices of the Arab Stalinists had kept

it for the last forty years. The Stalinist parties stood Marxism on its head. The Democratic Front has set it on its feet. Now, thousands of men march under its banner. Moreover, we have broken the counterrevolutionary blockade against the DF and built, from a position of strength and in the framework of a clearly defined strategy, a network of political and social relationships and pacts on the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Arab scene.

Finally, we have established the essential structures for an organization capable of engagement in the struggle of the proletariat, and we have backed it up with an effective military sector capable of responding to any treacherous attacks—which gives us much greater tactical flexibility.

The conference also discussed the question of the relationships between the Democratic Front and the Party, and reached the conclusion that the formation of a party requires training a great number of qualified cadres. Also discussed was the question of recasting the relationships inside the Democratic Front so as to complete the present transitional stage as soon as possible and move on to full democratic centralism.

Thus, the elective principle will be applied to all levels. Congresses will be held regularly. All of the cadres and rank-and-file members will participate in making decisions and carrying them out, and will have the right to criticize and to exercise control. Likewise every committee will be backed up by a soviet, extending from top to bottom, from the soviets in the military bases, the refugee camps, and the villages to the Central Committee. Already, the Military Committee is under the control of the soldiers' soviet representing all the rank-and-file soviets.

All the soviets meet periodically to assign the new tasks and review the execution of the old. The Council of Soviets has full powers to censure all or a part of any higher body. Neither the Political Bureau nor the Central Committee has the right to oppose

decisions made by the soviets. It is these soviets which constitute the nucleus of the future party. Parallel to this, the Democratic Front has undertaken to form workers', peasants', and women's organizations. At this time, one such organization has already been set up—the National Union of Jordanian Students.

The majority of the left groupings have come into the DF. This is true for the League of the Palestinian Revolutionary Left and the Palestinian Peoples Organization. Only the Jordanian Communist party has remained outside the DF. This is natural because this reformist and bureaucratic party is communist in name only.

Q: What specific role does the Democratic Front intend to play inside the resistance movement?

A: Our participation in the Sixth Palestinian Conference and the consistent action program we presented to the masses as well as to the congress helped to differentiate the right-wing currents and elements sharply from the advanced elements. Thus, the Democratic Front intends to:

- Play the role of revolutionary agitator inside the resistance and Arab revolutionary movement.

- Subject all the existing situations to unrelenting theoretical and practical criticism and exercise a two-fold pressure (through the ranks and at the summit) on the resistance movement.

Q: Do your fighters receive any pay?

A: We have neither ranks nor pay. Our fighters are recruited on a volunteer basis and receive a systematic political education. On the military level, our operations are carefully planned and therefore effective. There are no distinctions between ordinary fighters and leaders. Recently we lost a member of our Central Committee, Omar Mosaâd, in an operation.

Q: How has the DF implemented its original strategy of the Arab revolution thus far?

A: As we see it, the Palestinian national liberation movement is an integral part of the Arab national liberation movement and is closely bound up with the problem of the socialist revolution throughout the world. The DF is undertaking to extend the armed struggle against the bases and positions of the counterrev-

olution throughout the Arab world. Naturally this requires us to struggle for the formation of an Arab revolutionary front.

Furthermore, our bases are open to all revolutionary elements, Arab or foreign, who want to receive military and political training. Afterwards they are free to fight in our ranks, or, better, return to their own countries to prepare the conditions for a revolution there. At present there is a brigade in the DF composed of revolutionists from all the Arab countries. We also have a group of foreign revolutionists and it is not impossible that it will be expanded to form an international brigade.

The DF is also seeking to strengthen its relations with the revolutionary and internationalist movements. Thus, we invited Comrade Cabral (Guinea-Bissão) to come and visit our bases. Similar invitations were sent to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Communist party of Cuba. An encampment under the auspices of the DF has just ended in Jordan. We are also establishing contacts to organize a conference of the Arab and international left.

Besides this, we have organizational links with certain Arab left formations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (Dhofar) and the Revolutionary Movement of the Arab Gulf.

Q: As regards the final objective of the struggle, what solution does the DF advocate for the Israeli and Palestinian questions?

A: For the first time in the history of the Arab revolution, the DF has proposed an internationalist solution to the Israeli and Palestinian questions. Up to now, in relating to the Israeli question, Arabs have been under the influence of the ideology of the ruling classes, a feudal and religious, or at best, petty-bourgeois ideology, with an anti-Semitic tinge.

All of the solutions to the Israeli problem presented so far by the Arab right have been racist and chauvinist, varying between "driving the Jews into the sea" and at best sending them back to their countries of origin. The Arab and Palestinian right have been raking up the history of the Prophet's disputes with the Arab Jews in order to incite anti-Jewish hatred. For twenty years, exploiting the Palestinian problem has been a profitable business in the Arab countries; it served

as an alibi and cover for every dubious undertaking.

Today, the Arab reaction is raising the slogan of "*unity of all classes for the liquidation of Israel.*"

On the other hand, the Jews throughout their long history have been subjected to the same chauvinist education. Under the cover of slogans such as "the chosen people," the Jewish feudalists were able to mask the class contradictions within the Jewish community, creating contradictions between the Jews as a whole on one side and the "gentiles" on the other.

In the modern period, too, Jewish capitalism has likewise subjected the Jews to its ideological domination with the slogans "*Unity of all Jews*" and "*The Jewish question must be solved by the return of the Jews to the promised land,*" etc. Jewish capitalism has taken advantage of its struggle against European capitalism and all the suffering this struggle has brought on the Jewish people, and especially its poorer strata, to isolate the Jewish proletariat from the workers of their respective countries.

All the efforts by the first Marxists, by the Social Democracy, and later by the Bolsheviks, were in vain. The ideological and religious alienation of the oppressed Jews was stronger than their real interests. The example of Poaley Zion and the Bund is very significant in this regard.

The founding of the Zionist state was to reinforce this alienation. All, or almost all, the Israeli parties have openly or surreptitiously adopted the Zionist positions. There is, of course, the Israeli Communist party, which split into a Zionist and pro-Soviet wing after the June war.

In fact, there is no fundamental difference between them because they both propose a reactionary solution based on maintaining Israel, an oppressive usurper state linked to imperialism. At present there is only one small group in Israel, the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen), which is evolving toward a progressive solution of the question.

As for us, we intend to build a democratic and socialist state where Israelis and Arabs will enjoy the same rights, a state where there will be no form of oppression, a state, finally, where the power, and all the power, will be exercised by workers' and peasants' soviets.

It is in this sense that we intend to

destroy the apparatus of the Zionist state. The future state will be integrated into an Arab federation or confederation (like Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia, for example). The organizational form matters little. What matters is the type of regime.

Q: At the beginning of the interview, you characterized the DF's attitude toward the worldwide and Arab revolutionary movements as one of critical examination. What assessment would you make, then, of the present state of the official Communist movement?

A: That is the problem of the century. . . In our opinion, you have to begin by subjecting the entire revolutionary movement to a thorough critical examination. Following Marx, we think that in order to rebuild you have to begin by criticizing what exists.

As a result of certain precise objective conditions, the Communist movement underwent a bureaucratic degeneration. The appearance of a new bureaucratic class endowed with exorbitant material and social privileges created a contradiction between the needs of the international proletarian revolution and the interests of the bureaucracy. It goes without saying that no class pursues a policy contrary to its interests. This is why the new bureaucratic class refuses to jump into "the adventure" of supporting the world revolution.

Historically, the bureaucracy had already appeared during Lenin's lifetime as an objective process and an expression of the backward state of Russian society. With his habitual frankness, Lenin raised his famous cry: "In words, the Soviet state belongs to the workers. In reality, this is far from so. The socialist revolution will triumph only if it carries the struggle against bureaucracy through to final victory. In order to do this, the entire population must participate in managing the country's affairs."

The phenomenon of bureaucracy, then, is not the product of any subjective will but the result of a lack of maturity on the part of the masses and their incapacity to take their own affairs in hand. On top of this, there were the factors of the capitalist encirclement of the Bolshevik revolution and the activity of the counter-revolution within the country.

Under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, the Russian proletariat was

able to make the revolution and defend it against its foreign and domestic enemies. However, weakened by the civil war and the involvement of a large part of the workers in the fighting, as well as by the famine, the Russian proletariat could not hold back the bureaucratic tide.

It must be said that the working class numbered only 6,000,000 to 7,000,000 persons in a population of 160,000,000. Moreover, the Bolshevik revolution did not totally destroy the Czarist state apparatus (there were White generals in the Red Army). Likewise, the Bolsheviks were unable to put *State and Revolution* into practice and this blueprint has remained a mere historical document up to the present day. An omnipotent bureaucracy converted "building socialism in one country" into a dogma instead of placing the Soviet state in the service of the world revolution.

At the present time, the socialist camp that follows the Soviet Union advocates resolving the contradictions in the world by peaceful means. In the last analysis, this proposition serves the interests of the bureaucracy which is anxious to avoid all conflicts that might jeopardize its privileges. This is how peaceful coexistence must be understood. All this has led the Soviet leadership to move progressively away from the proletarian line of struggle against imperialism; and, at the same time, has encouraged imperialism to take the offensive against the national liberation movements and even to defy the socialist camp. The savage aggression against the heroic Vietnamese people is an eloquent example of this. . .

The result has been a weakening of the anti-imperialist front throughout the world. The countries of the socialist camp are being displaced from the center of the revolutionary process by the new forces of the revolutionary Marxist left in the underdeveloped countries and in certain capitalist nations. As these forces develop and acquire rich theoretical and practical experience through struggle, they will be able to establish international relationships on a revolutionary basis. To develop, these forces must combine in an international front so that they can help each other and so that they do not wage isolated struggles. Their slogan must be: Revolutionists of all countries unite to create more and more Vietnams.

In a World Run by Idiots

Can Man Survive?

Biologist Albert Szent-Gyorgyi was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1937 for his discovery of vitamin C. Today at seventy-six, this scientist, whose goal in life was to serve mankind, has become somewhat pessimistic.

"Any race that does not adapt, will have to disappear," he told Robert Reinhold of the *New York Times* in an interview published February 20 in which the subject was a forty-page book he has just completed, *The Crazy Ape*.

"Man is a very strange animal," he continued. "In much of the world half the children go to bed hungry and we spend a trillion on rubbish—steel, iron, tanks. We are all criminals. There is an old Hungarian poem: 'If you are among brigands and you are silent, you are a brigand yourself.'"

Because of the "terrible strain of idiots who govern the world," the human race may be doomed.

"In order to survive, every race must be adapted to the surrounding." The human race, now about 100 million years old, must have been adapted to a simple habitat of rocks, caves, rivers, mountains, bears, wolves.

"The level of human life has always depended on the measure to which man understood nature and could use the forces of nature to his advantage."

Science began to play a role in this during the Renaissance. But it took centuries before science really began to change human life. This was in the middle of the nineteenth century with the Industrial Revolution.

"The great change in human life came at the turn of the century when four discoveries were made which indicated that behind the world we see is hiding another world which we did not see—of which man had no idea at all. These were the discovery of the electron, X-rays, quanta and radioactivity, followed shortly by relativity.

"Now this new world is dominated by cosmic forces and man holds command over cosmic forces. The force of our arm was exchanged for forces of the atom, which can move mountains or dig harbors in seconds."

With such power, man can do anything he wants. "You have only to

wish it and you can have a world without hunger, disease, cancer and toil—anything you can wish, wish anything and it can be done. Or else we can exterminate ourselves.

"So now the question is which course will man take? Toward a bright future or toward exterminating himself? At present we are on the road to extermination.

"American society is death-oriented. If you watch and if you read the newspapers, a great part of it is taken up by war, by killing, by murder, atomic bombs, MIRV's, gases, bacterial agents, napalm, defoliants, asphyxiating agents and we have war. All our ideas are death-oriented."

How did the human race get into this fix and what is to be done about it? Here the renowned biologist made the error of seeking the answer in his own scientific field instead of the fields of economics and politics. Still, he scored a telling point:

"The question is how can we get out of this groove, what is the solution? There is no solution to my mind because we are so deep in the groove that we cannot make a turn. The only way we can survive is to make a new beginning. There is one factor that makes a new beginning very difficult—that the human brain freezes up for new ideas at a certain age, around 40. And our whole government is over this age."

Dr. Szent-Gyorgyi does not consider the outlook to be completely hopeless. "The only people who can make the turn is youth—our present youth. And if we live long enough, if our human kind is not exterminated, they will make the turn." He wishes they "would feel more their power because they have to come to power whatever they do . . .

"So I wish that instead of expressing themselves with superficial symbols the whole youth of the world would come together and hammer out the constitution of the future world, which they can then implement, not to freeze up before they have thought up what the world should be like. So this is my only hope—youth—and I do not expect anything from the present leading class."

The Decapitation of the Red Army

By Leon Trotsky

[In 1937 it was quite clear to responsible observers of world affairs that German imperialism was preparing for another world war. Since the rise of fascism to power in 1933, Leon Trotsky, for instance, had repeatedly warned that this was Germany's policy and that it was perfectly obvious that Hitler would eventually strike at the Soviet Union.

[It is thus understandable what stupefaction was caused in 1937 by a purge of the Red Army in which the majority of the top command and thousands of members of the officer staff were shot. The purge included thousands of others who were sent to the forced labor camps where many perished. This bloodletting was initiated and carried out under Stalin's orders.

[How was such a blow to the defense of the Soviet Union to be explained? According to the Kremlin, a "plot" was involved. The Nazis had succeeded in subverting the cadre of the Red Army!

[Informed public opinion turned to Trotsky for a more reasonable explanation. As founder of the Red Army and its leader during the civil-war period when the imperialist powers sought to smash the world's first workers state, Trotsky knew the real situation in the armed forces of the USSR better than anyone else.

[Trotsky gave his opinion in statements to the press that were featured on the front pages of newspapers internationally. In the article below, evidently written in hope of selling it to a magazine or news syndicate (for that was how he made his living), Trotsky took up the purge in greater detail. However, his article was not accepted, and it appeared only in Russian, outside of an excerpt published in the October 4, 1941, issue of *The Militant*. The English translation below, by George Saunders, is the first to be made of the analysis in its entirety. It is from the Russian as printed in the July-August 1937 issue of the *Bulletin of the Opposition* (No. 56-57).

[The timeliness of this article, even after more than three decades, is illustrated by the struggle still going on in the Soviet Union over the question of Stalin's role as a "military leader"—a struggle whose seriousness is underlined by arrests and official intimidation. In Khrushchev's "secret speech" of 1956 Stalin's purge of the army was condemned—and much of what Trotsky had stated in 1937 was confirmed by Khrushchev's admissions. At the height of de-Stalinization in the late 1950s and early 1960s, many Soviet historians and military writers elaborated on the points Khrushchev had made, without carrying the analysis deeper, to the social roots of Stalin's crimes, and still leaving much factual material unmentioned.

[In the late 1960s, the official Soviet press began to run articles tending to "rehabilitate" Stalin as a military leader. Oppositionist spokesmen such as Pyotr Yakir—son of the murdered Red Army general, Ion Yakir, of whom Trotsky writes so warmly—and former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko have replied to these attempts by documenting the

ways in which, under Stalin, the military defense of the Soviet Union was harmed. The evidence these and other Soviet oppositionists have brought out is dramatic confirmation of how far the bureaucratic clique went, and will go, in the interests of its own self-preservation. (See "Pyotr Yakir's Indictment of Stalin," *Intercontinental Press*, June 2, 1969, page 542; and "Why Hitler Was Able to Overrun the USSR," by Pyotr Grigorenko, *Intercontinental Press*, November 10, 1969, page 1004.)

* * *

Is there any further need to dig into all the details, to check through the trial reports letter by letter, to bring together all the necessary refutations, to subject the frame-up methods to microscopic analysis? Stalin himself provides the proofs needed to refute him—and on an incomparably more massive scale. Every day brings more sensational news from the USSR testifying that the regime is caught up in its last crisis, which could be called its death agony if that analogy with living organisms did not conjure up the idea of too short a time.

The "Old Guard," in whose name the struggle against "Trotskyism" was opened in 1923, has long since been liquidated *politically*. Its *physical* extermination has now been accomplished in Stalin's style, where sadistic savagery alternates with bureaucratic pedantry. It would be too superficial, however, to explain the murderous and suicidal measures of Stalin only by his lust for power, cruelty, vindictiveness, and other personal qualities. Stalin long ago lost control over his own policies. The bureaucracy as a whole lost control over its own self-defense reflexes. The new wave of repressions, which exceeds all comprehensible bounds, is imposed upon the bureaucracy by a logical progression from its previous repressive actions. Any regime that is obliged to stage frame-up after frame-up before the eyes of the whole world, automatically expanding the circle of its victims, is surely doomed.

After his first experiments, Stalin was forced to abandon further "public" trials. The abandonment was motivated semiofficially by the argument that the country had "more important tasks." Using this slogan, the "friends" of the Soviet Union in the West are carrying on a struggle against any countertrials. At the same time in various parts of the Soviet Union, new centers of "Trotskyism, sabotage, and espionage" are continually being discovered. In the Soviet Far East since the beginning of May, eighty-three "Trotskyists" have been shot, according to the published figures.* The work continues; nothing is reported about these trials, not even the names of the victims. Who are the people who have been shot? A certain percent

* According to the latest Moscow dispatches, this number has risen to 214. [Note by the editors of the *Bulletin of the Opposition*.]

probably are actual spies. There is no shortage of them in the Soviet Far East. Another part is composed of oppositionists, the discontented and dissatisfied. A third part is made up of the agents provocateurs who have served to link the "Trotskyists" with the spies and have thereby become dangerous witnesses. But there is also a fourth part, and it is growing—that is, the relatives, friends, subordinates, and acquaintances of those who were shot, people who know about the frame-ups and who are able, if not to protest, at least to tell others of Stalin's crimes.

What is going on at the lower levels, especially in outlying areas where the murders take on an anonymous character, can be imagined from what is going on today at the highest levels. Stalin did not manage to stage the public trial of Bukharin and Rykov at the time he had wished, inasmuch as the accused refused to "confess." It became necessary to take up their further reeducation. According to several reports, Rykov and Bukharin, the former head of the government and the former head of the Comintern respectively, were sentenced behind closed doors to eight years in prison—just as in July 1935, between two staged trials, Kamenev was sentenced behind closed doors to ten years in prison. This parallel already forces the conclusion that the sentencing of Rykov and Bukharin is not a final measure. The press, headed by the vulgar know-nothing Mekhlis, a former personal secretary of Stalin's, demands the "extermination" of the enemies of the people. The most surprising thing—if one may be permitted the luxury of surprise—is the fact that Rykov and Bukharin are now called "Trotskyists." After all, the Left Opposition always and invariably directed its main blows against the right wing headed by Rykov and Bukharin. On the other hand, in the struggle against Trotskyism, only Bukharin provided the semblance of a doctrine for Stalin to base himself on—to the extent that he based himself on doctrine at all—over a period of many years. Today it turns out that Bukharin's countless articles and books against Trotskyism, on which the entire apparatus of the Comintern was trained, were only the cover for his secret collaboration with the Trotskyists on the basis of terrorism. Just as though the archbishop of Canterbury used his church functions as a mask for atheist propaganda. But who cares about such nonsense today? Those who know the past are either dead or are forced into silence through fear of extermination. The hirelings of the Comintern, who were groveling before Bukharin several years ago, now demand his crucifixion as a "Trotskyist" and enemy of the people.

A revolutionary epoch brings the popular masses close together. On the contrary, a period of reaction signifies the triumph of centrifugal forces. During the last fourteen years not one single breach in the Bolshevik party has been closed up again, not one wound has scarred over, not one conflict has ended in reconciliation. Capitulations and acts of self-abasement have not helped. The centrifugal forces have acted to enlarge the slightest opening until it is transformed into an unbridgeable chasm. Anyone drawn into this opening, even by their little toe, has been lost irredeemably.

The "Old Guard," that is, the Bolsheviks of the czarist underground, have essentially been finished off. Now the Mauser of the GPU is aimed at the next generation, which began its rise in the civil war. Of course even in the earlier

trials, younger accused persons figured alongside the old Bolsheviks. But these were secondary figures, necessary for rounding out the amalgam. Now the testing of the forty-year-olds, that is, of the generation which helped Stalin deal with the Old Guard, has assumed a systematic character. What is involved is no longer accidental figures but stars of the second magnitude of brightness.

Postyshev rose to the post of secretary of the Central Committee thanks to his ardent participation in the struggle against Trotskyism. In the Ukraine in 1933 Postyshev purged the party and state apparatus of "nationalists," and drove the Ukrainian people's commissar, Skrypnik, to suicide by slandering him as a "protector of nationalists." This fact surprised the party all the more because just a year before, the birthday of Skrypnik, an old Bolshevik member of the Central Committee and 100 percent Stalinist, had been gloriously celebrated in Kharkov and Moscow. In October 1933, I wrote on this subject: "The fact that the Stalinist system requires sacrifices of this kind shows what sharp contradictions are tearing it from within even at the highest levels." (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 36-37.) Four years later it turns out that Postyshev, who after his exploits was made dictator of the Ukraine, himself is accused of covering up nationalists. As a disgraced official, he was recently transferred to the Volga region. One may conjecture that this will not be for long. Not only wounds but even scratches fail to heal any longer. Whether Postyshev will resort to suicide or will confess his uncommitted crimes does not matter, there is no salvation for him.

In Byelorussia, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Cherviakov, has shot himself. In the past he was connected with the right wing, but he long since had joined publicly in the battle against them. The official dispatch shamefully declares that Cherviakov, who according to the constitution had the same rights as Kalinin, put an end to himself for "family reasons." Stalin decided not to declare the head of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic an agent of Germany after all. But simultaneously with this suicide, the people's commissar of Byelorussia, who had been closely linked with Cherviakov, was arrested in Minsk. Was this also for "family reasons"? If you consider the bureaucracy a "family," then it must be acknowledged this family has reached a stage where its bonds have been loosened in the extreme.

Incomparably more surprising (again if one may be permitted surprise) is the path traveled by Yagoda, who over the past decade has been the closest person to Stalin. No member of the Politburo was ever entrusted with such secrets as Stalin entrusted to the head of the GPU. That Yagoda was a scoundrel everyone knew. But first of all, he did not surpass most of his colleagues in this respect. Second, it was precisely as a consummate scoundrel he was so necessary to Stalin—for the fulfillment of murkier assignments. The entire struggle with the Opposition, which took the form of a chain of growing falsifications and frame-ups, was carried out under Yagoda's leadership, following lines directly laid down for him by Stalin. And here this guardian of the state, who had eradicated the older generation of the party, turns out to be a gangster and a traitor. He has been arrested. Will he confess according to the ritual that he himself worked out? That will not alter his fate. Meanwhile, the world press discusses in all seriousness whether or not Yagoda was really con-

nected with . . . the Trotskyists. Why not? If Bukharin eradicated Trotskyism theoretically, then Yagoda could eradicate the Trotskyists physically, the better to mask his connections with them.

But the most astonishing news comes from the War Department, beginning with the very highest levels. Stalin, having beheaded the party and Soviet apparatus, has proceeded to decapitation of the army.

On May 11, the celebrated Marshal Tukhachevsky was suddenly removed from his post as vice-commissar of defense, and transferred to a minor post in the provinces. Within the next few days the commanders of the military districts and other prominent generals were likewise transferred. These measures boded nothing good. On May 16 a decree establishing Military Councils in charge of the districts, both of the fleets and the armies, was published. It was evident that the ruling tops had come into serious conflict with the officer corps.

"Revolutionary Military Councils" were introduced by me during the civil war. Every council was composed of a commanding officer and two, sometimes three, political members. Although the commanding officer formally retained the full power of command, in fact his orders did not go into effect unless signed by the council's political members. The necessity for this kind of insurance, which we viewed as a temporary evil, flowed from the lack of a reliable corps of commanders and from the soldiers' mistrust even of loyal commanders. The gradual formation of a Red officer corps was expected to bring the councils to an end and to establish the principle of unitary command, unavoidable in military matters.

Frunze, who replaced me as head of the War Department in 1925, introduced unitary command at an intensified rate. After him, Voroshilov followed the same path. It would seem that the Soviet government had sufficient time to train a reliable officer corps and so get around the burdensome necessity of using commissars to supervise commanders. But things turned out differently. On the threshold of the twentieth anniversary of the revolution, the Moscow oligarchy, while getting ready to destroy the officer corps, establishes a collective administration over the army. The new Military Councils are no longer called "revolutionary." And in fact they have nothing in common with their prototype. The Military Councils of the civil war ensured control by the revolutionary class over the military technicians who had come from the enemy's ranks. The councils of 1937 have the task of helping the oligarchy that has raised itself up over the revolutionary class to protect the power it usurped against any encroachments on the part of its own marshals and generals.

When Tukhachevsky was demoted, every informed person wondered, "Who will henceforth take charge of the work of Soviet defense?" Appointed to replace Tukhachevsky was Marshal Yegorov, a lieutenant-colonel during the world war—and a vague mediocrity. The new chief of staff, Shaposhnikov, is an educated executive officer of the old army, devoid of strategic talent and initiative. And Voroshilov? It is no secret that Voroshilov, the "old Bolshevik," is a purely decorative figure. While Lenin was alive, it never entered anybody's head to include him in the Central Committee. During the civil war, Voroshilov, while displaying an indubitable personal courage, showed a complete lack of military and administrative talent and, besides, a narrow, utterly provincial outlook. His only

qualification for a seat in the Politburo and the post of people's commissar of defense is that at Tsaritsyn he supported Stalin's opposition to that military policy which insured victory in the civil war. Incidentally, neither Stalin nor the other members of the Politburo ever entertained any illusions concerning Voroshilov as a military leader. Just because of this, they had surrounded him with qualified collaborators. The actual leaders of the army in recent years were two men: Tukhachevsky and Gamarnik.

Neither one belonged to the Old Guard. Both came to the fore during the civil war, not without the intervention of the author of these lines. Tukhachevsky gave indubitable evidence of outstanding talent as a strategist. However, he did not have sufficient ability in evaluating a military situation from all sides. In his strategy an element of adventurism was always apparent. For this reason he and I had several clashes, which, however, were handled in a completely friendly way. I was obliged as well to criticize his attempt to create a "new military doctrine" on the basis of some hastily absorbed elementary Marxist formulas. Let us not forget, however, that Tukhachevsky was a very young man at the time and had made an overly rapid leap from the ranks of czarist officerdom to the camp of Bolshevism. Thereafter he apparently applied himself assiduously, if not to the study of Marxism (no one studies that now in the USSR), then to military science. He acquired a knowledge of modern military techniques and, not unsuccessfully, played the role of mechanizer of the army. Would he have succeeded in acquiring the necessary equilibrium of inner forces without which one cannot be a great field commander? Only a new war—in which Tukhachevsky had been assigned the role of generalissimo in advance—would have been able to show.

Jan Gamarnik, born of a Jewish family in the Ukraine, distinguished himself during the civil war by his political and administrative talents—to be sure, on a provincial scale. In 1924 I heard of him as a Ukrainian "Trotskyist." My personal ties with him had already been broken. The troika (Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev) then leading the party tried first of all to break the most capable "Trotskyists" away from their familiar environment, to throw them into new situations, and if possible, to buy them up with the perspective of a career. Gamarnik was sent from Kiev to the Far East, where he rose quickly up the administrative ladder, having radically finished with his "Trotskyism" in 1925, that is, two or three years before the capitulations of the most prominent defendants in the recent trials. When Gamarnik's "reeducation" was completed, he was transferred to Moscow and soon put in charge of the Political Department of the Army and Navy. For a period of ten years Gamarnik held important posts at the very center of the party apparatus and was in daily collaboration with the GPU. Is it conceivable in such circumstances that he could have conducted two policies: a public one for the external world, the second private? A member of the Central Committee, the highest representative of the ruling party in the army, Gamarnik, like Tukhachevsky, was flesh of the flesh and bone of the bone of the ruling caste.

Why, then, did the axe descend on these two leaders of the army forces? Zinoviev and Kamenev perished because, in the light of their past, they seemed dangerous, but more importantly, because Stalin hoped to use the fact that they were shot to help him deal a mortal blow to "Trotsky-

ism." Piatakov and Radek, former prominent Trotskyists, proved to be the only suitable figures for a new trial that would correct the oversights of the first concoction, which had been made too crudely. Neither Tukhachevsky nor Gamarnik were appropriate to those aims. Tukhachevsky had never been a Trotskyist. Gamarnik was briefly involved with Trotskyism, but at a time when his name was as yet unknown. Why, then, was Radek instructed to name Tukhachevsky during the pretrial investigation? And why has Gamarnik now, after his mysterious death, been added to the list of "enemies of the people"?

As educator of the commanding staff and future generalissimo, Tukhachevsky could not but value talented military leaders. Putna was one of the most outstanding officers of the general staff. Did Tukhachevsky really send him to Radek for certain information? Radek was a semi-official spokesman on foreign policy. Putna was a military attaché in Britain. Tukhachevsky may have gotten information from Radek through Putna just as Stalin himself often used Radek's material for his own speeches and interviews. It is possible, however, that this entire episode, like so many others, was simply made up. That does not change matters. Tukhachevsky undoubtedly intervened in behalf of Putna as he must have done in the case of other officers dragged into the amalgams of the GPU. It was necessary to teach him a lesson. What was Voroshilov's role in this? * Up to now Voroshilov's policies have been determined to a far greater extent by his ties with Stalin than by his ties with the army. Moreover, Voroshilov, a man of limited horizon and rather a scatterbrain, could not but have cast jaundiced glances in the direction of his far-too-talented vice-commissar. Such could very well have been the source of the conflict.

Gamarnik took a leading part in all the purges of the army, during which he did all that was demanded of him. But what was involved there, at most, was oppositionists, malcontents, and suspect types—consequently, the interests of the "state" were involved. But over the past year it became necessary to expel from the army people who were guilty of nothing, but who because of old ties, or the posts they occupied, or for purely accidental reasons, turned out to be useful in the process of organizing new judicial frame-ups. Gamarnik, like Tukhachevsky, was linked with many of these commanding officers by bonds of friendship and comradeship. As the head of the Political Department of the Army and Navy, Gamarnik was obliged not only to deliver his collaborators into the hands of Vyshinsky but also to participate in the fabrication of false charges against them. It is highly probable that he came into conflict with the GPU and complained about Yezhov . . . to Stalin! This in itself was enough to endanger him.

Moved by the interests of Soviet defense, the commanders of the districts and the responsible generals might have intervened in Tukhachevsky's behalf. The whirl of transfers and arrests in the month of May and the first days of June can be explained only by panic in the ruling circles. On May 31 Gamarnik either shot himself or was shot. The commanders of the military districts no sooner arrived at their new posts than they were placed under arrest and turned over to the court. [On June 9] the following were

arrested: Tukhachevsky, who had just been appointed to Samara; Yakir, who had just been transferred to Leningrad; Uborevich, commander of the Byelorussian military district; Kork, head of the Military Academy; Feldman, chief of the Personnel Section of the Army; Eideman, head of the Osoaviakhim; and, somewhat earlier, both Putna, former military attaché at Tokyo and London, and Primakov, a cavalry general. [Two days later] all eight were sentenced to death and shot.

The army must have been stirred to its very depths. In the mind of everyone was the question: Why kill the legendary heroes of the civil war, the talented field commanders and organizers, the heads of the Red Army who only yesterday were the mainstay and hope of the regime? Let us recall briefly who they were.

Tukhachevsky, an officer in the czar's army, became a Bolshevik, while Yakir developed from a young tubercular student into a Red commander. From the very outset Yakir revealed the imagination and resourcefulness of a strategist. Veteran officers more than once cast astonished eyes on the gaunt commissar as, matchstick in hand, he traced moves on a military map. Yakir had occasion to prove his devotion to the revolution and the party in a much more direct way than Tukhachevsky. When the civil war ended he plunged into serious study. The authority he enjoyed was great and well-merited.

Alongside Yakir we may place Uborevich, a somewhat less brilliant but thoroughly tested and reliable field commander of the civil war. It was these two men who were entrusted with the defense of the western frontier, and they prepared themselves for years for their roles in the coming great war.

Kork, a graduate of the czarist military academy, successfully commanded one of the armies during the critical years, was later given command of a military district, and finally, was placed in charge of the Military Academy in succession to Eideman, who belonged in Frunze's close periphery.

For the last few years, Eideman directed the Osoaviakhim, through which is effected the connection between the civil population and the army.

Putna was an educated young general with an international outlook.

In Feldman's hands was concentrated the power of direct supervision over the commanding personnel. This alone indicates the measure of confidence he enjoyed.

Next to Budenny, Primakov was unquestionably the most outstanding cavalry commander.

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the Red Army there is left not a single name, with the exception of Budenny, that as regards popularity, not to speak of talent or knowledge, is comparable to the names of the alleged criminals. The destruction of the Red Army's leadership, then, was carried through with full knowledge of what it implied!

Careful attention should be paid to the way the trial was organized: under the chairmanship of that low-caliber bureaucrat Ulrich, a group of senior generals headed by Budenny were forced to impose on their comrades-in-arms a sentence dictated from the Secretariat by Stalin. Thus the devil put truth to the test. The military chiefs remaining alive are bound to Stalin from now on by the shame that he intentionally covered them with. But the system

* Voroshilov was then commissar of war and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. — G. S.

of intrigues goes even farther. Stalin feared not only Tukhachevsky but Voroshilov as well. Testifying to this in particular is the appointment of Budenny as commander of the Moscow military district. As an old noncommissioned officer in the cavalry, Budenny always scorned Voroshilov's military dilettantism. During the time when they were working together in Tsaritsyn, they more than once threatened each other with revolvers. Their important careers smoothed over the outward expression of their enmity but did not moderate it. Military power in the capital is now given to Budenny as a counterweight to Voroshilov. Which of them stands next on the list of the doomed the future will tell.

The accusation that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and the others were agents of Germany is so stupid and so shameless that it does not merit refutation. Stalin himself did not hope that this foul slander would be believed abroad. But for the Russian workers and peasants, he had to provide overpowering arguments to justify the extermination of these talented and independent people. In this he relies on the hypnotic impact of the totalitarian press and radio.

But what are the real reasons for his extermination of the best Soviet generals? On this subject only hypotheses can be posed, on the basis of a certain number of direct and indirect symptoms. Given the approach of the danger of war, the most responsible commanders could not help becoming alarmed by the fact that Voroshilov stood at the head of the armed forces. There need be no doubt that in these circles the candidacy of Tukhachevsky was put forward to replace Voroshilov. In its first stage, the generals no doubt tried to base their "plot" on Stalin, who had been playing his usual ambiguous game for a long time, exploiting the antagonism between Voroshilov and Tukhachevsky. Tukhachevsky and his adherents apparently overestimated their forces. Placed in a situation where he had to choose at the last moment, Stalin preferred Voroshilov, who till then had remained his submissive instrument, and surrendered Tukhachevsky to the executioners as one who could become a dangerous adversary. Deceived in their hopes and angered by Stalin's "betrayal," the generals might have held discussions on how the army ought to be freed from the yoke of the Politburo altogether. From this to an outright conspiracy is still a long way. But under the conditions of a totalitarian regime it is already the first step.

If the past of those who were shot and the particular features of each are weighed accurately, it is hard to conclude that they were connected by any common political program. But a part of them, headed by Tukhachevsky, could have had a program in the sphere of national defense. Let us not forget that after Hitler's rise to power Stalin did everything possible to preserve friendly relations with Germany. Soviet diplomats did not stint in making obliging declarations in regard to fascism that today have a scandalous ring. The philosophy for this policy was provided by Stalin: "Above all we must protect the construction of socialism in our country. Fascism and democracy are twins not opposites. France will not attack us and the threat from Germany can be neutralized simply by collaboration with her." Following this signal from above, the leaders of the army tried to maintain friendly relations with the German military attachés, engineers, and industrialists and to convey to them the idea

that collaboration between the two countries was entirely possible. Some of the generals took up this political line the more readily, the more German technology and "discipline" was urged upon them.

As it turned out, though, Stalin was obliged to supplement his "friendly" relations with Germany by a defense pact with France. Hitler could not go along with this. He required a free hand in either direction. In reply to Moscow's rapprochement with Paris, he gave Stalin a demonstrative rebuff. Mussolini followed quickly with the same. Despite his original intentions, Stalin had to abandon his theory of "twins" and take a tack toward friendship with the Western "democracies." In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a symbolic shift was made: Litvinov's deputy Krestinsky, former Soviet ambassador to Germany, was removed; taking his place was Potemkin, former Soviet ambassador to France. At the top levels of the officer corps it was not possible to make a changeover with such ease; by its very nature the military caste is much more numerous and less pliable than the diplomatic corps.

If Tukhachevsky actually adhered until recently to the pro-German orientation (of this I am not certain), he did so at any rate not as an agent of Hitler but as a Soviet patriot on the basis of strategic and economic views that until recently even Stalin shared. Some generals, too, undoubtedly felt personally committed by their previous friendly statements regarding Germany. Since Stalin kept maneuvering over a long period, leaving both doors open, he consciously did not give the generals the signal to retreat. Counting on his support, the generals might have gone farther than they originally intended. It is entirely possible, on the other hand, that Voroshilov, who, as a member of the Politburo, was informed in good time of the new orientation, deliberately had Tukhachevsky overstep the bounds of military and party discipline and then, with his characteristic rudeness, demanded of him an abrupt change of course. The question whether to go along with Germany or with France was suddenly transformed into the question, "Who rules the army: Voroshilov, member of the Politburo, or Tukhachevsky, with the flower of the commanding staff behind him?" And since there is no public opinion, no party, no Soviets, and the regime has lost its last iota of flexibility, every acute problem is solved with the help of a Mauser. Stalin was all the less opposed to a bloody settling of accounts in that he needed to prove his reliability to his new international allies by finding some scapegoats for the policy he had followed till only yesterday.

What was the relation of the generals to the Left Opposition? The Moscow papers called Gamarnik a "Trotskyist" after his death. Several months earlier, Putna was mentioned in the trials of Zinoviev and Radek as a "Trotskyist." But no one called the others by this frightful name before the trial, nor, one must suppose, at the trial, since neither judges nor defendants had any need to indulge in such comedy behind closed doors. The absence of any overt links with Trotskyism was not the only factor keeping Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Eidemann, and the others from being turned into Trotskyists; there was also the wish not to overly inflate the influence of Trotskyism within the army. Nevertheless, in Voroshilov's order of the day, published the day after the executions, all those who had been shot were proclaimed Trotskyists. Frame-

ups, as we have seen, have their own logic: if the generals, like the Trotskyists, had served Germany with the aim of "restoring capitalism," then Germany could not have helped bringing them together to serve its interests. Moreover, "Trotskyism" has long since become a catchall concept, encompassing everything deserving extermination.

In our observations about the causes for the decapitation of the army there is a decided element of guesswork. In its details, which will not become known quickly, the affair may have originated differently. But the political meaning of this new bloodletting is clearer even today. If Stalin had wished to save the generals, it was entirely possible for him to open some bridges in time for them to retreat. But he did not wish to. He is afraid to show any weakness. He is afraid of the army. He is afraid of his own bureaucracy.

And for good reason. Thousands upon thousands of officeholders and commanders who came from the ranks of Bolshevism or who adhered to Bolshevism, supported Stalin until the most recent period out of conscience, not fear. But recent events have roused their fears—for the fate of the regime and their own fate. Those who helped Stalin rise have turned out to be less and less suitable for supporting him at his dizzy heights. Stalin is forced more and more often to renew the instruments of his power. At the same time he fears that these new instruments may place a different chief at their head.

This danger is especially great in relation to the army. When the bureaucracy has freed itself from popular control, the military caste inevitably tries to free itself from the yoke of the civilian bureaucracy. Bonapartism always has the tendency to assume the form of naked rule by the sword. Regardless of the real or alleged ambitions of Tukhachevsky, the officer corps must have been increasingly steeped in consciousness of its superiority over the dictators in waistcoats. On the other hand, Stalin could not help but understand that the police rule over the people which he enforced with the help of the hierarchy of party secretaries could be realized more simply and directly by one of the "marshals" through the military apparatus. The

danger was too apparent. As yet there was not a conspiracy—that is certain. But it was on the agenda. The bloodletting had a preventive character. Stalin made use of a "happy" incident to teach the officer corps a bloody lesson.

One can say in advance, however, that this lesson will not stop anything or anybody. Stalin has successfully played the role of gravedigger of Bolshevism only because he himself is an old Bolshevik. This cover was necessary for the bureaucracy to stifle the masses and crush the remaining shell of the Spartan tradition. But the camp of the Thermidor is not homogeneous. The upper layer of the privileged is headed by people who themselves are not yet free of the traditions of Bolshevism. The regime cannot pause at this intermediate layer: of Postyshevs, Cherviakovs, Tukhachevskys, Yakirs, not to mention Yagodas. The layer after them is headed by indifferent administrators, if not plain shysters and careerists. Stalin sees through these layers better than anyone. Therefore he feels that after stifling the masses and exterminating the Old Guard, the salvation of socialism lies in him alone.

What is involved is not just personal cruelty and lust for power. Stalin cannot help but strive toward the juridical confirmation of his personal power, whether in the capacity of "leader" for life, president with extraordinary powers, or finally, crowned emperor. At the same time he cannot help fearing that from the midst of the bureaucracy itself, especially from the army, opposition to his Caesarist plans will arise. This means that before falling into the abyss—with or without his crown—Stalin will try to exterminate all the best elements of the state apparatus.

In any event he has dealt the Red Army a fearful blow. As a result of the latest judicial frame-up it has been brought lower by many heads. The morale of the army has been shaken to its very foundations. The interests of Soviet defense have been sacrificed to the interests of self-preservation of the ruling clique. After the trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Radek and Piatakov, the trial of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and the others marks the beginning of the end of the Stalinist dictatorship.

June 17, 1937.

Implications of 1938 Moscow Trial

The Red Army in Opposition to Stalin

By Leon Trotsky

[The following statement was released to the press by Leon Trotsky on March 6, 1938, at the time of the last big Moscow frame-up trial, in which Bukharin and others were compelled to "confess" in public before being shot as potential political opponents of Stalin's dictatorial rule.

[The statement is of special interest in showing how Trotsky took the "explanation" offered by Stalin for shooting the top command of the Red Army on June 11, 1937, and compared it with the "evidence" offered by Stalin at the frame-up trial in March 1938. Trotsky's deductions constitute a valuable supplement to his article dated June 17, 1937, "The Decapitation of the Red Army."]

* * *

March 9, 1970

In the proceedings at Moscow are being tried not only shattered and broken people, morally semi-corpses, but also actually deceased ones. The specters of Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, of Generals I. E. Yakir, J. P. Uborevich, A. I. Kork and other assassinated generals share the prisoners dock.

After their arrest and the executions which quickly followed, the Soviet press spoke of these men as "foreign agents" and "spies." About a military conspiracy, a plan to seize the Kremlin and assassinate Stalin, not a single mention was made. It would seem plausible, however, that the government by that time should have known why exactly it had executed the best of the Soviet military cap-

tains. But, in the grip of last summer's acute political panic, Stalin acted faster than he thought.

Fearing the army's reaction, he felt it impermissible to waste time on an inquisitorial "education" of the generals for a trial. Furthermore, these men belonged to the younger generation, had stronger nerves and were inured to facing death. They were unfit for a public spectacle. There remained but one way out, to shoot first and explain later. But even after the echoes of the Mauser had died down Stalin still could not decide upon a convenient version of the indictment.

Today one can say with complete assurance that the deceased Ignace Reiss was correct when he asserted that there was no military trial "behind closed doors." Indeed, why would it have been necessary to have closed the doors, if the matter actually had involved a conspiracy? In plain language, the generals were assassinated in the same way that Hitler avenged himself upon Roehm and others in June, 1934.

Evidently, after the bloody retribution, eight other generals (Marshal T. I. Alksnis, Marshal S. M. Budyenny, Marshal V. I. Bluecher, General Brosi M. Shaposhnikoff and others) received the prepared text of the sentence which they were ordered to sign. The aim was to do away with several and at the same time check on the loyalty of others and kill their popularity. This was completely in harmony with Stalin's usual style.

Unquestionably, some of the alleged "judges," if not all, refused to appear before public opinion as executioners of their closest comrades-in-arms, especially after the executioner's work had already been accomplished by others. The signatures of the recalcitrant ones were nevertheless added to the sentence, and they themselves shortly afterward were removed, arrested and shot. The task appeared to be completed.

But public opinion, including that of the Red Army itself, did not want and could not bring itself to believe that the heroes of the civil war, the pride of the country, had turned out to be, no one knows why, German or Japanese spies. A new version became necessary. In the course of preparing the present trial it was decided to impute retrospectively to the deceased generals a plot for a military coup d'etat.

Thus, the matter revolved not about miserable trafficking in espionage but about a grandiose scheme for a military dictatorship. Tukhachevsky was to have conquered the Kremlin, Marshal Jan B. Gamarnik the Lubianka (headquarters of the GPU) and Stalin was to have been killed for the hundred and first time.

As always, the new version was given retroactive power. The past was reconstructed according to the exigencies of the present. According to the testimony of A. P. Rosengoltz, Leon Sedoff, my deceased son, recommended to him as far back as 1934 in Carlsbad (where Sedoff never was in his life) that a close watch be kept over the "ally," Tukhachevsky, because of his propensity for a "Napoleonic dictatorship." Thus the scheme of the plot is gradually expanding in time and space. The decapitation of the Red Army is but an episode in the campaign of extermination of the ubiquitous and all-penetrating "Trotskyists."

In the interests of clarity, I must say something here concerning the relations between Tukhachevsky and me. I aided him in the early days of his rise in the Red Army. I was appreciative of his military talents, as well as of the

independence of his character, but I never took too seriously the communistic convictions of this former officer of the Guard.

Tukhachevsky was cognizant of both sides of my estimate. He bore himself toward me, so far as I can judge, with a sincere respect, but our conversations never went beyond the limits of official relations. I think he accepted my departure from the army partially with regret, partially with a sigh of relief. He could expect, not without foundation, that for his ambition and independence a larger arena was opened with my departure. Since the moment of my retirement, that is to say, the spring of 1925, Tukhachevsky and I never met and had no correspondence.

He followed a strictly official line. In the army political meetings, he was one of the foremost speakers against Trotskyism. I believed that he performed this task from obligation, without any enthusiasm. But his active participation in the venomous campaign against me was fully sufficient to exclude the possibility of any kind of personal relations between us. This was clear enough to all so that it should be impossible to enter the mind of anyone to establish a political liaison between Tukhachevsky and me.

This explains why the GPU did not decide in May and June of last year to link up the case of the generals with the plot of the Trotskyist "centers." The passage of some months of oblivion and the addition of some complementary strata of falsifications were necessary before risking such an experiment.

The sentence of the so-called Supreme Court (*Pravda*, June 12, 1937) accuses the generals of having "systematically supplied . . . espionage information" to an enemy state and having "prepared in case of military attack on the U. S. S. R. the defeat of the Red Army." This crime has nothing in common with the plan for the military coup d'etat.

In May, 1937, when, according to the testimony of Nikolai N. Krestinsky, the seizure of the Kremlin, Lubianka, etc., was to have been accomplished, there was no "military attack upon the U. S. S. R." The conspiring generals, consequently, were not at all expecting war. They had designated a definite date for their military blow in advance. However, the "crime" for which the generals were executed was that of espionage with the purpose to assure, "in case" of war, the defeat of the Red Army.

Between the two versions there is nothing in common. They exclude one another. What can there be in common between a spy who hopes to be awarded in the uncertain future by a foreign power and a courageous conspirator who aspires to seize the power by force of his own arms? But, of course, neither Prosecutor Andrey Y. Vishinsky nor the President of the Court, Vassily V. Ulrich, took the trouble of counterposing the testimony of the present defendants with the text of the death sentence imposed by the Supreme Court, June 11, 1937.

The new version is given currency as if there had never been a "Supreme Court," a sentence, and an execution. With almost maniacal insistence, Krestinsky and Rozen-goltz, chief assistants to the prosecutor in this matter, revert to the question involving the conspiracy of Tukhachevsky and my alleged connections with him.

Krestinsky states that he received a letter from me, dated

Dec. 19, 1936—that is, ten years after I had broken off all relations with him—and in the letter I had recommended the creation of a "broad military organization." This alleged letter, obligingly underlining the "broad" scale of the plot, evidently aims at justifying the extermination of the best officers, which began last year but is a long way off even today from completion. Krestinsky, of course, "burned" my letter, following the example of Karl Radek, and presented nothing to the court beyond his confused reminiscences.

The same Krestinsky stated that he, together with Rosen-goltz, received a letter from me, written from far away Mexico a short time before the execution of the generals, demanding that the coup d'etat be "accelerated." One must suppose that this letter likewise was "burned," as have all other letters which have figured in the trials of the past few years.

In any case, after months of internment and a forced journey on a tanker, separated from the sphere of action by an ocean and a continent, I managed to be so precisely informed on the practical course of the latest "conspiracy" that I even gave instructions regarding the date of the coup d'etat.

But how did my letter from Mexico reach Moscow? American friends offer the supposition that the mysterious Adolph A. Rubens will figure in this trial as the courier designated to link me with the specters of the Moscow generals. Inasmuch as I know nothing about Rubens or his orbit, I am constrained to suspend judgment. I presume

that Messrs. Earl Browder and William Z. Foster could expand themselves with considerably more authority on this question.

The chief witness against the defendants in the case of Tukhachevsky and the others, Nikolai Krestinsky, was arrested in May, 1937, and, in his own words, gave a frank "confession" within a week after his arrest. The generals were shot on June 11. The judges supposedly should have had Krestinsky's testimony before them at that time. He himself should have been called as a witness to the trial (if a trial actually took place).

In any event, the government's announcement of the execution of the generals could not have mentioned espionage and been silent about a military coup d'etat, if Krestinsky's present testimony had not been invented after the execution.

The essence of the matter lies in that the Kremlin could not proclaim aloud the real reason for the execution of Tukhachevsky and the others. The generals rushed to defend the Red Army from the demoralizing intrigues of the GPU. They defended the best officers from false accusations. They resisted the establishment of the GPU's dictatorship over the Red Army under the guise of "military Soviets" and "commissars."

The generals fought for the interests of the security of the Soviet Union against the interests of Stalin's security. That is why they died. Thus, from the gaping contradictions and the heap of lies in the new trial, the shade of Marshal Tukhachevsky steps forth with thunderous appeal to world public opinion.

Balance Sheet on Voroshilov

'These Persons Neither Had Nor Have Any Honor'

By George Saunders

Trotsky's article "The Decapitation of the Red Army," published by *Intercontinental Press* in English in full for the first time, provides illuminating material for estimating the significance of the way in which the Kremlin handled the death of Klimenty Voroshilov in Moscow last December.

At his funeral, Voroshilov was given the highest honors. Long eulogies appeared in the official press. A Soviet city has even had its name restored to Voroshilovgrad since his death. (It had lost that name after 1956, because of Voroshilov's notoriously close link with the discredited Stalin.)

The honors paid Voroshilov have less to do with his personal qualities than with his functions as a symbol of loyalty to the cult of Stalin, the only thing resembling a cohesive ideology which the bureaucratic caste has as yet been able to produce. Voroshilov's public record includes a secondary role in the civil war as commander of the Tenth Army at Tsaritsyn (later called Stalingrad, and still later Volgograd). At that time he was closely associated with Stalin and acted as the chief opponent of the kind of military organization projected by Trotsky, the kind that in the end proved victorious. In the first

period of the Nazi-Soviet war, Voroshilov presided over the successive disasters, and as a result Stalin was forced to remove his old crony from supreme command of the Soviet armed forces.

Trotsky's portrait of the real Voroshilov is a perfect counterbalance to the official portrait supplied by the bureaucratic press.

Today's Soviet oppositionists have also expressed their scorn for Voroshilov—again confirming Trotsky's estimate. Such an attitude, in glaring contrast to the Kremlin's eulogies, may be found in the minutes of a discussion between Soviet historians and army representatives that have circulated clandestinely in the Soviet Union. (See "Stalin and the Nazi Aggression Against the Soviet Union," *World Outlook*—former name of *Intercontinental Press*—November 11, 1966, page 26.) The relevant passage from that document—which like Yakir's and Grigorenko's confirms and amplifies the whole of Trotsky's analysis—is as follows:

"*Deborin*: Besides, Blucher and others knew that the Tukhachevsky-Yakir group were innocent and still they condemned them.

"*A Voice in the Hall*: Of course they knew it.

"Deborin: But, comrades, I do not believe that it can be doubted that Voroshilov and Budienny, who were there at the time, were men of conscience and honor!

"*Outraged Voices in the Hall:* Voroshilov was not at the trial. What honor and conscience did these persons have? Cowards and bootlickers! . . . [Voroshilov was not one of the tribunal that condemned the Red Army leaders, but he did make the official announcement of their execution and of the charges against them. — G. S.]

"*Anfilov, of the General Staff:* First of all, on the honor of Budienny and Voroshilov. These persons neither had nor have any honor. Considerable material in our archives, which is barred for the time being from being made public, compels us to draw decidedly negative con-

clusions concerning their activities. I will cite only one minor episode. Toward the middle of 1937, at a very representative gathering, Stalin said: 'And Voroshilov and I arrived at Tsaritsyn in 1918 and in a week we unmasked the enemies of the people.' And he said this about many ex-officials of the General Staff and frontline forces who served the Soviet government with honor.

"*A Voice in the Hall:* And he drowned them all in the river without a trial.

"*Anfilov:* 'While you,' Stalin continued, 'are not even able to unmask your neighbors.' After Stalin, Voroshilov joined in, declaring he was in complete agreement with Stalin and he called on us to denounce our own friends and colleagues. My heart beats with anger when I see Voroshilov on the mausoleum during parades."

Splits and Dissension

A New Deepening of the Crisis of Stalinism

[The following article is an editorial from the January issue of the magazine *Quatrième Internationale*, published in Paris. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The international crisis of Stalinism includes a series of crises — of the bureaucratic Soviet leadership, of the leaderships of the other workers states, of the Communist parties, and of the relationships among the Communist parties. It is a chronic crisis that has afflicted all these elements throughout the last twenty years. The Communist party leaders, and especially the men in the Kremlin, have continually endeavored to find a remedy for this crisis but they have come up only with temporary palliatives whose application has often precluded a resurgence of the crisis on a broader and more spectacular scale. The situation is developing toward this once again.

At the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Communist party of the Soviet Union for several weeks found itself isolated from almost all the other Communist parties. Even the French Communist party disavowed its action! The Kremlin then made numerous efforts to reestablish its relationships with the majority of the Communist parties. It succeeded at the cost of making various concessions — and notably abandoning the unanimity rule — in achieving an international conference of Communist parties which adopted a document passing over in silence both Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet dispute, that is, the two principal questions troubling the official Communist movement. A few months later, the Kremlin granted other concessions so that a conference could open in Peking — as was desired by many Communist parties — with a view toward halting the dangerous deterioration in relations between the Soviet and Chinese states. These various concessions were supposed to sweeten the "normalization" measures in Czechoslovakia and get the Communist party leaderships to accept them.

But all the attempts by the men in the Kremlin to stabilize the situation in the "official" Communist movement

at a certain level seem, once again, to have produced only unimpressive and short-lived results. The signs are increasing of a new ripening in the crisis of the Communist parties. This is especially true in Western Europe, but we must not overlook or underestimate what is occurring in other regions of the world. In Australia, the Communist party, which openly opposed Soviet policy at the Moscow Conference, is threatened with an imminent split. The Argentinian party lost its entire youth organization. In India there are now three Communist parties, one lined up with Moscow, another claiming to base itself on Mao's thought, and the Communist party (Marxist) half way in between. In Japan the Communist party majority is no longer pro-Peking and the groups which used to follow Moscow are now hostile to it. But the crisis of Stalinism seems likely to deepen most markedly in Europe. This is unquestionably bound up with the fact that after May 1968 in France, the workers movement on this continent emerged from a period of political stagnation that had lasted twenty years. It should be remembered also that this is where we find the oldest Communist parties, those that developed under the direct stimulus of the October revolution, and that they are part of a long-established workers movement rich in revolutionary traditions. Stalinism has deeply corroded these traditions but it has not destroyed them; they have reappeared in full vigor in the young generation, somewhat like those cases of babies born not with their parents' features but those of their more remote ancestors.

Let us give a brief résumé of the situation of the Communist parties in capitalist Europe. These parties can be divided roughly into three categories: those without a mass base; those forced underground, on which the impact of the crisis is difficult to estimate precisely; and those with a mass base.

In the first category, let us begin with the new legal German Communist party, the DKP [Deutsche Kommunistische Partei — German Communist party]. In a period that is witnessing a revival of class struggle in Germany for the first time since the fall of Nazism, when the youth

—university and high-school students and young workers — are setting an example of struggle and a real vanguard is taking form, the DKP received a ridiculously low vote in the legislative elections—about 0.6 percent. Although it is not threatened with repression, it cannot claim to have the least perspective. "The German working class will rise again, the German Communist party never," Trotsky wrote in the aftermath of Hitler's rise to power. Now, when the German workers are rising again, there is no future for Stalinism, whether it takes the name of the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands—Communist party of Germany] or DKP.

Let us go on to the other small parties. In Denmark, the Communist party collapsed some years ago and there has been no revival; what remains of it is reduced to a moribund existence. In Great Britain, the recent congress of the CP disclosed profound divisions over both Czechoslovakia and the attitude to follow in the workers struggles. During the last miners strike, rank-and-file CP unionists were often in conflict with the national union leaders, who are also members of the Communist party. All of this foreshadows a worsening of the internal situation in this party, perhaps even a split. The developments in the Austrian Communist party have been widely reported, even in the bourgeois press. The Central Committee is deeply split as a result of the expulsion of the philosopher Ernst Fischer, who denounced the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia as *Panzerkommunismus* [the Communism of tanks]. A split is within the realm of possibility here. In Switzerland, what passed for a Communist party, having no real strength except in French Switzerland, expelled a large part of its vital forces in that part of the country and is also having serious difficulties with its youth in Zurich and elsewhere. In Sweden, the division in the Communist party is expressed in the fact that its publications may follow either a pro-Kremlin line or an opposition line depending on who the editors are. The Dutch CP has slipped totally out of control of the Kremlin, whose numerically weak supporters cannot get organized.

The underground parties are essentially those in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. In the aftermath of the colonels' coup, there was a split in the leadership of the Greek CP (which had a mass base). The majority of the leaders who emigrated remained tied to Moscow, while most of those who stayed in the country, either underground or in prison, disavowed them. The Spanish CP is the largest of the groups operating underground in Spain, but it has not escaped the political and organizational dispersion which afflicts all these groups. Impressed by the May 1968 movement in France, the Carrillo leadership has endeavored to adjust its policy somewhat so as to gain a bridge to the youth. The Portuguese CP is in the course of breaking up.

Among the Communist parties with a mass base, the Finnish CP did not limit itself to advocating "advanced democracy"—it entered a bourgeois coalition government in May 1966 to achieve it. The Finnish CP has not advanced democracy; its policy in the government, including especially a "wage-ceiling policy," has split it from top to bottom. The contending factions publish journals which openly attack each other. Despite the efforts of the Soviets, whose desire to avoid such a spectacle is increased because Finland is on the doorstep of Leningrad—where

what occurs in the neighboring country is followed closely —the split seems destined to be consummated in the relatively near future.

Let us turn to the big mass parties. The situation of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français—French Communist party] is highly complex. It is making gains on its right; for example, in the strata between the working class and certain categories of the new middle classes. These elements are coming to political life for the first time, or are abandoning the Social Democracy, which is in a very advanced stage of disintegration. This development is expressed most clearly in the progress of the Stalinist-inspired current in the Fédération de l'Education Nationale [National Educational Federation], which is threatening to overtake the reformist wing proper. But at the same time, and this could also be seen in this union organization, on its left flank the PCF is running up against the presence and activity of vanguard organizations and it is losing forces to them. At a recent Central Committee meeting, the member of the Political Bureau who reported on the youth question noted at the same time a radicalization of young people and a failure by the party and its youth organizations to recruit them. In appearance, the PCF remains the Communist party most resistant to internal divisions. But it is no secret to anyone that divisions are rife at the top level, not over the party's basic policy (peaceful coexistence, advanced democracy, etc.) but over the means of overcoming the centrifugal forces that are tearing at the party. The leadership seems united in its determination to oust Garaudy—who is in disagreement with the conference of Communist parties and a good many other things he defended for long years—from its ranks and perhaps even from the party. But the battle continues to rage in and around the Political Bureau over choosing a successor to Waldeck Rochet, who is gravely ill. This struggle is being waged between Marchais, whose get-tough line is patterned on that of the Soviet leadership, and others such as Leroy who think that a more flexible attitude would get better results.

For a long time, the Italian Communist party has been a kind of model for many dissident Communists. It was able to keep its distance from Moscow. It dared to take up questions which were taboo for other parties. It permitted a certain degree of internal discussion. The way it conducted itself after settling accounts with the Ingrao tendency showed that it still had a great deal in common with the other bureaucratic leaderships. The international conference in Moscow indicated that the Italian CP could assume a degree of independence from the Kremlin so long as it did not go so far as to break with it. The increasingly tense political and social situation in Italy led to the revival of divergent currents in the Communist party. This time, the matter was not allowed to slide, at least as far as the editors of the magazine *Manifesto* were concerned. In fact, several currents exist in the Central Committee of this party. Although the *Manifesto* tendency received the most publicity in the bourgeois press, it is by no means the only such grouping nor perhaps the most dangerous for the central core of the leadership.

It is absolutely clear that this acceleration in the crisis of the European Communist parties has been provoked by the contradiction between the crisis of capitalist society and the radicalization of the masses on one side, and the

policy of the traditional leaderships on the other.* As long as the political situation was stagnant, the reformist character of the policy of the Communist parties did not cause any serious strains in these parties. Only highly conscious and politically alert militants could concern themselves with the consequences of a growing "social democratization" of these parties. But it is quite a different matter when the masses are radicalizing. Even recruiting members coming from traditional reformism or without previous political experience is not entirely safe.

There is a growing contradiction now between the right-wing policy which the leaderships want to pursue and the movement of the masses toward the left. And this essential objective factor is being compounded everywhere by the fact that for the first time since the Stalinization of the Communist parties they are no longer being prodded on their left only by very small formations restricted to propagandistic activity. Now they are being harried by organizations which, while still weak, already have a certain capacity for independent action in some areas and which can thus serve as an example for much broader masses.

We will not review the conditions here that make for this mass radicalization having a rather long duration, for the crises to spread from one country to another, and for them to interact. But from this development, it follows inevitably that the crisis of the Communist parties can only widen.

First of all, the progress of this crisis is going hand in hand with the development of an extreme political confusion, and sometimes surprising occurrences. Thus, in the Italian CP, alongside those elements which proclaim their pro-Moscow sentiments out of an old loyalty, or in some cases out of certain immediate material interests, we see that the most right-wing tendency, that of Amendola, has also been manifesting pro-Moscow inclinations for some time in opposition to the central core of the leadership. A current like that around *Manifesto* handled political questions in terms that were to the left of the party's official policy. In some cases, opposition to the opportunism of the Communist party tops has profited . . . the Soviet leadership. For example, some party members associated their leaders' attitude toward May 1968 with the one they took on Czechoslovakia. Both, to be sure, were dictated by the search for bourgeois allies and not by considerations of principle. Thus, the groups outside the Communist parties condemned both the attitude of these parties toward May 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia; but left currents inside the Communist parties that condemned their leaderships' equivocation about the mass movement, on the other hand approved the Kremlin's action in Czechoslovakia.

This confusion has been blocking the development of the crisis. And, for the time being, those leaders taking the toughest line organizationally, regardless of their precise political positions, are gaining the most from it.

We will examine further on another essential element in the international crisis of Stalinism—the perspectives for the Soviet Union.

In a word, at all levels and in every area—among the

masses, in the apparatuses and leaderships, and outside the Communist parties—everything occurring points to new eruptions in the crisis of these formations.

It is not yet possible to discern the forms which the next phase of the acute crisis of the Communist parties will take. However, certain aspects emerge when you analyze the brief panorama that we have given above.

Previously the crisis of Stalinism had resulted in a break in the monolith erected in Stalin's time. But this had to be qualified. Broadly speaking, this break was among national Communist parties as a consequence especially of the Sino-Soviet dispute. We have often noted in the past the independent attitude assumed by a growing number of Communist parties. Of course there were dissidents in a number of Communist parties, sometimes even oppositions, but they were either expelled or reabsorbed without too serious difficulties. The tendency which is developing now is toward a breakup of monolithism within each party. In connection with this development, for example, we are seeing oppositionists (like Garaudy and the editors of *Manifesto*) challenge a "discipline" which they declare is based on a centralism that has nothing democratic about it. An interesting consequence of the progress of this tendency is the fact that because the Soviet leaders see the limits today of their intervention at the top, they have not hesitated in several cases to support—that is, to subsidize—minority factions (Sweden, Italy . . .).

The breakup of monolithism on the international scale was in a way a backlash of "socialism in one country" against the bureaucracy which had elevated this "theory" to the heights. The breakup of monolithism nationally is the logical consequence of this breakup internationally. Why should a Communist in a country like France or Italy be a Frenchman or Italian first and a Communist afterwards? Why should he line up with Waldeck Rochet or Longo, who more or less follow Brezhnev, and not Mao Tsetung or Tito, to say nothing of heretics like Che or Trotsky? When the conflict occurred between Tito and Stalin, the Soviet leadership's authority was at its zenith. Only a year later, the triumph of the Chinese revolution was to occur, which bore within it the seed of the entire crisis which, twenty years later, has totally ruined the gigantic Stalinist edifice.

But at the same time as this deterioration of Stalinist monolithism is spreading to every national party, another phenomenon is appearing. The Communist parties have incomparably greater difficulties than the Social Democratic parties in maintaining their unity through a free play of tendencies—even when these tendencies, as has most frequently been the case so far, do not explicitly challenge the reformist policy of the Communist parties and focus their criticism rather on the forms of this policy, rigidity in thought, the procedures of the leaderships, and so forth. Should this phenomenon be attributed to the inexperience of the bureaucratic leaderships in this area, their long habit of monolithism, and their inability to find new organizational forms quickly? Such causes could play only a very limited role. The example of the Italian Communist party leadership, whose flexibility is proverbial, shows that other causes are involved. In fact, we come back here to a question that we have mentioned on several occasions in recent years. The reformism of the Communist parties cannot be equated with that of the Social Democratic parties. It is hard to find any essential

* See the editorials in the September and November 1969 issues of *Quatrieme Internationale*. For English translations of these editorials, see *Intercontinental Press*, October 6, 1969, page 877, "The Turn in the Economic Situation"; and December 15, 1969, page 1120, "The Strike Wave in Europe."

theoretical divergences between the CPs and the Social Democratic parties in certain underlying assumptions of their policy (transition to socialism through a gradual expansion of bourgeois democracy, peaceful and parliamentary roads, etc.), and their day-to-day political practice is extremely similar. But these two reformisms differ and clash because their social origins are different. The reformism of the Socialist parties is tied up with the parliamentary democracy in the capitalist states; the reformism of the Communist parties is linked to the Kremlin's policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist world. History has shown that in the economically developed capitalist states parliamentary democracy has a relatively large measure of flexibility, though not unlimited of course. "Peaceful coexistence" is another matter. It has been a constant in Kremlin policy since Stalin. However, on the part of a regime where changes of line and personnel have traditionally been carried out in a brutal manner, the pursuit of this orientation has always involved many abrupt about-faces and sharp turns. The Communist parties' ties with Moscow long constituted a source of internal strength for these parties. As Moscow's authority and prestige as an international center have declined, these ties have engendered a growing weakness of the Communist parties. Nonetheless, the CPs cannot definitively cut these ties without incurring greater risks and dangers. They prospered as a result of the capitalist contradictions and the advances of Soviet society; now they are suffering from contradictions resulting from the mass radicalization in the capitalist countries and the contradictions of the bureaucratic regime in the Soviet Union and in the other workers states.

One of the essential elements in the crisis of Stalinism, as we mentioned above, is in the perspectives for the Soviet Union. We have no intention of engaging in vain speculations, above all in predicting rates of development and dates. What we want to stress is that many indicators point in the direction of a mounting crisis in the Soviet Union. "De-Stalinization," the policy of reforms from the top, produced all that it could more than ten years ago. The "reformist" hopes which existed for a whole period in the USSR are dissipating. And the Kremlin leadership is proving itself incapable of responding to the forces that are producing an underlying unrest in the country except by blind brutal repression. However, this repression lacks the vigor of the one carried out by Stalin. The reason is that the times have changed drastically. The repression continues to deal hard blows but it does not intimidate the opposition, which is increasingly organized. It would be, we repeat, pointless to make predictions about the time periods involved. But one thing is certain. The concept that there is no solution for this situation except through an antibureaucratic political revolution, which was developed a long time ago solely by the Trotskyists, and which the Chinese have recently picked up after their own fashion, is, in more or less clearly defined forms, beginning to win ground in widening circles. It is symptomatic that this idea has been expressed, for example, by a Garaudy while still a member of the Political Bureau. But the thought he expressed openly is also shared deep down by others, including high Communist leaders, colleagues of Garaudy who continue to advocate defense of the Soviet regime. The old bureaucratic "loyalty" has disappeared and all kinds of ideas are being circulated in

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the corridors by these men, expressing their fear of the impasse into which the Soviet rulers are leading the world they control. The shaking of confidence, even the disappearance of confidence in what for so long was the "holy of holies" can, at a given moment, become the decisive factor in the international crisis of Stalinism.

The bureaucratic edifice is rotted both at its extremities and at its heart. Of course confusion is still the dominant note at the present stage of the crisis and it is probable that it will continue to be so for a time. But this will only be a short stage if the revolutionary Marxist forces, the organizations of the Fourth International, grasp the enormous possibilities in the international crisis of Stalinism and intervene vigorously with their program and in action. Since May 1968 Trotskyism has made considerable advances in a great number of countries. It has won young forces. It has attracted the most clear-sighted elements who want to combine revolutionary activity with the theory and program which embody the lessons of the victories and defeats of the workers movement and of the broad oppressed masses. These advances themselves also testify to the considerable potential of the present situation which is revolutionary in the broadest sense of the term. Increasingly firm intervention will help to dissipate the confusion and win the revolutionary Marxist vanguard the following it needs to assure the victorious advance of the socialist revolution.

Adventurist Zigzags

The Maoist Canadian Party of Labour

By Keith Locke

[The following article appeared in the January 12 issue of the *Workers Vanguard*, a Toronto revolutionary-socialist biweekly. It is the second of a series on Canadian Maoism. For the first in the series, see the January 26 *Intercontinental Press*, page 65.]

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The Canadian Party of Labour [CPL] is a small Maoist group with forces in Toronto and one or two other southern Ontario cities. Its roots lie in a split within the original Maoist organization, the Progressive Workers Movement [PWM].

The key political issue in the split was Vietnam. For most of 1968 the Vancouver and Toronto PWM had an orientation to organizing actions "in support of the National Liberation Front." In Toronto on October 26, 1968, the "Canadians for the NLF" organized a small sectarian action counter to the mass march organized that day by the Vietnam Mobilization Committee.

These CNLF "militants" viciously slandered the mass VMC march and abused the name of the NLF by attempting to use it to pull people out of the VMC march to their own, which they claimed was the only true anti-imperialist action. The only alternative they posed to the VMC's popu-

lar anti-imperialist action for the immediate withdrawal of U. S. troops and an end to Canadian complicity was juvenile and ultraleft flag-waving and "Down with U. S. Imperialism" sloganeering.

Only one month after they organized this sectarian action these Maoists had executed a 180-degree turn and had taken up the slanderous cry of PL [Progressive Labor] in the United States that the North Vietnam and NLF leaderships were clearly revisionist and were in the process of liquidating the Vietnamese struggle through the Paris peace talks. The fact that there is no evidence that the Paris talks have in any way weakened the Vietnamese people's resolution to fight till final victory did not bother these Maoist sectarians.

Because the Vancouver-based PWM refused to adapt to this new line the Toronto Maoists broke with them to form CPL. They dropped out of the antiwar movement and since then their only contact with it has been when they have shown up to distribute leaflets "exposing" the Vietnamese leadership.

When NLF representatives visited Canada in late 1968 to address antiwar audiences, the Maoists, far from expressing solidarity with these visiting revolutionaries, viciously attacked them for participating in the Paris talks and for associating with the unionists, Communist Party members, Trotskyists and pacifists who organized the meeting.

In its early period, CPL proclaimed that the basic fact about Canada was that it was a colony of the United States and that all institutions, including its major unions, were controlled by U. S. imperialism. Therefore a focus of CPL's activity on the trade-union level became the promotion of Canadian national unions and unbridled hostility to the international unions affiliated to the Canadian Labor Congress which were, according to CPL, "Yankee loyalists," the "agents of U. S. policies," selling out their Canadian members to the "'big boss' — U. S. imperialism."

A typical example of this absurd orientation was their action at a Continental Can plant in Toronto in February 1969, where they mobilized all their members to dominate a strike of 20 members of a small Canadian national split-off from the craft International Operating Engineers Union. They attempted to take over the leadership of this strike to use it as a weapon against the major union in the plant, the Pulp-Sulphite union, which happened to be an international.

Pulp-Sulphite unionists who supported the strike were denounced as scabs when they failed to shut the whole plant down, or, failing that, to lose their jobs by refusing to cross the picket line.

Dan Heap, one of the Pulp-Sulphite unionists most active in supporting the strike, was singled out for extreme vilification as a scab and a "phony leftist." CPL twisted the fact that Heap was an NDP [New Democratic party — Canada's labor party] candidate in the last federal election to try to "prove" that the NDP was just another antiwork-class party.

Meanwhile CPL's American comrades in PL had gone to the other extreme and developed the position that all national struggles were, by themselves, reactionary. CPL "self-criticized," changed its definition of Canada from that of a "colony" to that of a "dependent capitalist state," and

declared both Canadian and Quebec nationalism to be reactionary.

According to these red Trudeaus: "The separation of Quebec would divide the workers of Canada into two and draw Quebec workers nearer to the bourgeoisie (the one which speaks French). *We must fight nationalism.*" The Quebec unilingual movement was denounced as "pro-capitalist" and its leader, Raymond Lemieux, accused of seeking a high post in a French Canadian capitalist firm.

On the campus CPL's record is no better. Here their strategy has been to set up groups pretentiously called the Worker-Student Alliance. Soon after the WSA set up shop at the University of Toronto last year the campus was hit by a big struggle against an administration which had announced its intention to suppress dissent on campus. All the WSA could do was to tell the students that the struggle was useless and that if the university wanted to suppress students nothing could stop them.

We want no "precipitate action at this time," said the WSA. "Only through patient long-term organizing (at this stage, primarily in the classroom) can a student movement be built which is strong enough to contest the authority of the university successfully."

Rather than fight student struggles, the WSA has been more concerned with students winning workers' strikes for them. This approach proved to be a brilliant failure at the University of Toronto last month. About 50 unorganized cafeteria workers went on strike because the university had refused to guarantee their jobs when the company running the cafeteria was replaced by another company. The CPL brought all its forces onto the U of T, forced its student members onto the negotiating team, and vilified other student and labor organizations that wanted to aid the workers.

The strike took place in the midst of an organizing drive on campus by the Canadian Union of Public Employees, but the WSA's response to CUPE's offer of assistance to the strikers was one of hostility.

The Young Socialists, who distributed thousands of leaflets urging student support for the strike, were heckled by the WSAers when they made the case for CUPE being involved in the strike. YSers who attempted to cut across WSA's ultraleftism were manhandled by the Maoists, who continue the criminal Stalinist tradition of threatening and using violence against opponents on the left.

By effectively preventing CUPE from being represented on the negotiating team, and leading the strike to defeat, WSA dealt a heavy blow to CUPE's attempt to organize campus workers.

In the trade-union arena, CPL has a consistent strategy of organizing picket-line mobilizations for selected strikes, preferably small strikes which they have a chance of taking over. Although CPL nominally supports unions, its activities actually undermine, rather than complement, the existing unions.

The record of the Canadian Party of Labour, like that of the Progressive Workers Movement, is vivid testimony to the disorienting effect of Maoism as a political tendency.

CPL's ultraleft adventures flow from its blind adherence to the ruling ideology of the Chinese bureaucracy or its U. S. interpreters, as a substitute for a class analysis of the living reality of the Canadian labor movement.