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Next Antiwar Date: April 13-18

Rising Protest Over Chicago Sentences



ATTORNEYS KUNSTLER AND WEINGLASS, among principal victims in Chicago witch-hunt trial. See page 176.

Vincent R. Dunne -- 1889-1970

Healyites and Lambertists in Strange Company

Ruined Irreversibly?

In testimony before the foreign affairs subcommittee of the U. S. House of Representatives, Dr. Galton, a botanist, listed some of the probable damage from the massive doses of defoliants used by the U. S. in Vietnam to destroy possible ground cover for guerrillas.

About 100,000 acres of mangroves will not recover for twenty to twenty-five years. During this time, erosion will increase, destroying the fish and shellfish which feed there and which constitute the main protein content in the diet of the Vietnamese in this region.

In some areas, bamboo tends to take over. This is one of the hardest plants to destroy.

Damage to the soil can be permanent. Microorganisms constituting up to half of the soil content are deprived of their food source upon destruction of the roots of trees and other vegetation. The soil can then compact into a hard clay or become laterized.

Laterization, to be seen in tropical areas where the jungle cover has been stripped away, is irreversible. The soil is converted into stone.

Part of the wall in the temple of Angkor Wat in Cambodia is built of laterized soil that has stood for eleven centuries without showing signs of reverting to soil.

A new chemical being used by the U. S. in Vietnam, picloram, is one of the longest-lived pesticides. It contaminates the ground for years.

One of the herbicides dumped on the vegetation in Vietnam (2, 4, 5/T) is an extremely potent teratogenetic chemical. In experiments with rats, 100 percent of the litters have shown abnormalities, with 70 percent of all births being abnormal. The abnormalities include lack of eyes, heads, and so forth.

One year after this chemical came into use, Saigon newspaper reports described the appearance of a completely new type of birth abnormality there.

The Pentagon claims that these reports have not been substantiated. But nonetheless use of the chemical has been banned in the United States.

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Vincent R. Dunne

On February 17, Vincent Raymond Dunne died of cancer. He would have been eighty-one on his next birthday, April 17.

Ray was one of the central figures who maintained the continuity of revolutionary Marxist leadership from its pioneer period in the United States. Educated in the school of the Industrial Workers of the World and the Socialist Party of the days of Vincent St. John and Eugene V. Debs, he became a partisan of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and one of the founders of the Communist Party of the USA.

When the Communist Party fell under the influence of Stalinism, Ray Dunne fought with all his ability for proletarian democracy and continuation of the program and practices of Leninism. He became one of the small group that founded the American Trotskyist movement in 1928.

In 1934 he gained nationwide fame as a mass leader and strike strategist in the upsurge that converted Minneapolis from an open-shop paradise to a union town.

For his opposition to imperialist war, he became one of the first victims of the Smith "Gag" Act at the opening of World War II, serving time in Sandstone penitentiary together with James P. Cannon, Farrell Dobbs, and other leading Trotskyists.

Since the founding of the Socialist Workers Party in 1938, he served continuously as one of its top leaders, placing his vast experience and knowledge at the service of several generations of younger leaders.

We will have more to say about Ray Dunne in subsequent issues. For the present we would like to give Ray himself the floor, to tell how he became a revolutionary socialist. This is an interview granted to Harry Ring, which appeared in *The Militant* of May 4, 1959, under the title, "Interview with a Twentieth Century Pioneer."

* * *

Vincent R. Dunne became nationally famous in the bitterly fought teamsters strikes of 1934-35 that transformed

Minneapolis from a notorious open-shop fortress into a stronghold of unionism. This was one of the key victories that inspired workers from coast to coast and contributed significantly to the great upsurge that culminated in the organization of the CIO.

In his book *American City*, a history of the dramatic strike struggles in Minneapolis, Charles R. Walker judged Dunne to be the principal leader. In sketching Dunne's role, Walker wrote that "his whole life and character prepared him for the position he took in the strike crisis of 1934."

This has stuck in my mind since I first read it. What was it in Dunne's life and character that prepared him to lead one of America's most crucial union-organizing struggles?

On April 17 Dunne celebrated his seventieth birthday and fifty-five years of continuous activity in the labor and socialist movement. He was in New York that weekend and the editor of the *Militant* asked me to interview him. I decided to satisfy my own curiosity about Ray's early background.

"Did you have any idea as a youngster that you would become a workers' leader?" I asked him by way of an opener.

He seemed a little taken aback. "I had no thought of ever becoming a leader. That was only accidental. I was surprised to observe people looking at me and thinking of me as some kind of leader. It was a strange feeling."

"But you seem to have handled the responsibility all right."

"I did the best I could."

That turned out to be one of the threads in the fascinating pattern of his life. He was loaded with responsibility at an age that nowadays would be considered somewhat tender.

He was born in Kansas City, Kansas, in 1889. His mother was the daughter of a Wisconsin shoemaker. His father, an itinerant worker, was an immigrant from County Clare, Ireland. Coming up one day from repairing cables for the cable car com-

pany, Ray's father stepped accidentally into a hole and broke a knee cap.

In those days there was no workmen's compensation. The family lost the small house they had been struggling to buy. Things looked bleak in Kansas City for the Irish immigrant when he got out of the hospital.

The mother took the three-year-old Ray and his older brother, Bill, to live with her parents, who had settled on a farm east of Little Falls, Minnesota. When Ray's father could move about, enough money was scraped together to get him up to the farm and the family moved into an old log house.

Aside from more children, the family continued to be blessed with not much more than hardships. Among other things their log home burned down.

"We lost everything," Ray recalled. "We had to go to my grandfather's house a quarter of a mile away in the middle of the night in freezing weather. Bill and I had to carry some of our younger brothers and sisters. I was about six or seven."

Solidarity was a powerful force among these frontier dwellers and the neighbors organized a building bee to put up a new home for the Dunnes. Things like that stuck in Ray's mind.

"By that time my father had sufficient strength in his leg and he went back to his former occupation as an itinerant worker, taking what he could find—building railroads, felling trees as a sawyer in the lumber woods."

Such rough circumstances shaped the children. "As we grew up we went out to work on nearby farms, on threshing rigs in the fall, helping with the plowing in the spring. We used to work by the month—plow, take care of the horses. We could drive a team by the time we were eight or nine years old. We were useful that way, you see. By the time we were twelve or thirteen, we could take the place of a man at any task around the farm.

"We worked for farmers for \$7 or \$8 a month. That included board of course. We worked from four o'clock

in the morning until it was dark at night. After dark, and before daylight, you cleaned the stable and curried your team and milked a few cows. After a quick breakfast—but a hearty one, I assure you—the day's work began."

School was sandwiched into the winter months when work around the farms slacked off. "I went from the first through the seventh reader. They didn't go by grades then but the McGuffey reader. You could make two or three readers in one term, depending on how fast the teacher pushed and how much you could do. The important thing was to get through as fast as you could. The determining factor in finishing your education was your height and weight. The faster you grew, the less education you got. The average was about six years. I think I had five."

Then came his first "man's" job. Ray graduated to this at the age of eleven or twelve. He had the reins on a team pulling a water wagon for the threshing machine at harvest time. Like any boy of those days, Ray was proud of the trust placed in him.

"You took care of your team. That was the special charge. A team was valuable, you know. If you hurt a horse, that was a terrible thing. Besides, you fell in love with the horses. You wanted to take care of them."

"I don't know if I can understand that," I said to Ray. "Being a pavement kid, I never drove a team of horses. But didn't you miss school?"

Ray laughed. "You didn't regret that so much. Sometimes you missed playing with the other children, but on the other hand you felt a little bit superior to them."

"Besides, you knew that you were earning money that you could send home to your mother, and that was an all-encompassing responsibility. It was a responsibility you liked. You didn't feel that you were put upon or abused by it. You were proud to bring home a whole dollar, even two sometimes. It went a long way."

At fourteen, Ray got his "cork shoes" and struck up an acquaintance with logs in the Minnesota lumber camps. At fifteen, he had ranged far enough to reach the Montana camps. That was a significant year in Ray's life, for unionism had not reached Minnesota, but in Montana the Western

Federation of Miners was already a power.

"When I arrived at the camp, I was met by a man that turned out to be the union steward. He didn't talk about the union right off. He first introduced me to some of the benefits of unionism. He took me down to the bathhouse. They had a stove going and plenty of hot water. All new men had to scrub themselves and boil their clothes—sometimes the steward lent a hand. This was to prevent bedbugs and lice from being brought in.

"Then he took me to the bunk house. I had never seen anything like it. In Minnesota the bunk houses were dark and dirty, the chinks packed with mud. Here they were light and airy with high ceilings and plenty of windows. Everything was spotless and the bunks even had sheets!

"I was amazed at the difference the union made. I had known very little about unions except for some talk I had heard as I made my way to Montana. But after the steward had let my impressions sink in and then casually asked me if I wanted to join up, I didn't wait."

That was how the union man was born in Vincent R. Dunne. "The union made all the difference in the world. There was no starting out before dawn and working until dark, and never any Sunday work. They couldn't fire a man at will the way they did back in Minnesota. And if a foreman cursed out a man, he cursed him right back."

Ray soon learned that the steward had other responsibilities besides seeing to it that standards of cleanliness were maintained. Among other things, he appeared to be a literature agent with a stock of books for sale. Some of the books might even have been called somewhat radical. As literature agent, the steward took an interest in furthering young Ray's education and suggested some titles that seemed to fit his age level.

The first of these was *The Origin of Species* by an Englishman named Charles Darwin. A dictionary went with the order.

"The book made a deep impression on me," Ray said. "I read it and reread it throughout the entire season. It was a big factor in shaping my thinking."

The young evolutionist graduated next into a revolutionist. It was in the lumber camp that Ray heard about

the Russian Revolution of 1905. Speakers from the IWW, the Industrial Workers of the World, occasionally came through for a friendly visit with the steward and other comrades and they brought ideas that widened the world for the lumberjacks. One of them told about the uprising of the Russian people against the Czar.

"When we heard about this, we regarded it as part of our own struggle, our comrades in Russia fighting the same enemy." The IWW had done well in inspiring the young lumber worker with the view that the American workers' own struggle wasn't just for wages and better conditions but for an end to capitalist exploitation as a whole.

Then came 1907 and the "money panic." Men were laid off in droves. Many were paid in script, and since this wasn't legal tender, they found themselves stranded in a Montana winter.

Ray and some of his comrades headed toward warmer climate and rumors of jobs in the Pacific Northwest. At eighteen, the young worker enjoyed his first ride on a passenger train—"on top, that is."

In Seattle, thousands of jobless were camped, waiting for something to turn up. The IWW campaigned militantly for aid to the unemployed and Ray became one of the "agitators." He learned how to speak from a soapbox. He felt a policeman's stick. He was arrested in one of the historic "free speech fights."

The local capitalist politicians conceded to the pressure organized by the IWW and authorized a state road-building project. But this meant work for only some of the unemployed. Ray headed down to California, using the type of transportation to which he had now become accustomed. It was a dangerous way to travel, for besides the hazards of riding the blinds, the tops, or the rods, railroad dicks were free with their clubs and would not hesitate to shoot.

In Los Angeles, the 18-year-old agitator was sentenced to a road gang and he helped briefly in laying out what he later recognized as Sunset Boulevard. After a few days he was made a trustee and the ball and chain was removed so that he could fetch water for the men. A few trips with the bucket brought him to an old Wobbly—at least he seemed old to Ray.

"He told me if I came back once

more, he'd beat the daylight out of me." Ray smiled. "He was pretty big so I took him at his word and headed to places where speakers and organizers were needed."

From Los Angeles, the IWW trail took Ray into the South. In Louisiana he worked in a sawmill. It was unorganized and conditions were fierce. Ray found himself the center of those who wanted to do something about it. But the effort was defeated and they lost their jobs. It was Vincent R. Dunne's first attempt to organize a strike.

On an Arkansas road gang, he saw how brutally Negro prisoners are treated, "far worse even than white prisoners."

In Clifton, Texas, working as second cook in a restaurant, he got another taste of racist prejudice. "I had to stand there and serve whites at the counter and hand plates out the back door to Negroes, who had to pay for whatever was given them. I had to listen to these fellows at the counter plan and organize rapes for Saturday nights, picking out the Negro girls they were going to get. For three solid months I listened. I was pretty hardened from my association with itinerant workers in the lumber camps and harvest fields, but I was sick to my stomach. These were things I had heard about but never seen. It seemed to set my radical thinking so that it never changed."

Two years after leaving Montana, Ray finally made it back to his family in Minnesota. They had moved to Minneapolis. "I was happy to be in the Twin Cities where the Wobblies had their biggest local. But I was no longer just a Wobbly, a syndicalist, even then. I knew about Debs and socialism. I had heard it discussed in the jungles, on jobs, in the box cars. I had absorbed a lot. And my experiences on the road made my belief in socialism deeply ingrained."

As a skilled teamster, Ray went to work for various express companies. Attempts to organize under the AFL were frustrated because of the conservatism of the small craft union. Ray kept up with the IWW and plunged deeper into the study of socialism.

In 1914 he married. He and Jenny reared two children of their own and three adopted children. Ray took care of his family obligations, but his main

goal in life remained the advancement of socialism.

Activities consisted of recruiting, organizing meetings, advertising speakers, such as Debs, who came to town, selling literature, and reading everything possible about socialism.

In 1917 the Russian Revolution stirred the entire radical movement to its depths. New alignments appeared. Some of the old formations began to wither. Ray, together with some of his closest associates, became members of the Communist Party.

In 1928 Ray was elected to his second term on the Minnesota district committee of the party. It was then that three members of the Central Committee, Cannon, Shachtman and Abern, were expelled for opposing Stalin and supporting the Trotskyist Left Opposition in the Soviet Union.

"This had to be challenged," said Ray. "We had to protest this expulsion, this bureaucratic disregard of all rights in the party. When we made our protest we were expelled too."

As a consequence, Ray and some thirty of his Minnesota comrades became founding members of the organization that eventually developed into the Socialist Workers Party.

Throughout the fight, first to reform the Communist Party and then to continue the program of revolutionary socialism, Ray and his comrades continued their union-organizing work. They finally succeeded in the Minneapolis coal yards in 1934 and this precipitated the great struggle that ended by bringing the bulk of the city's truck drivers into the union.

Preparations Continue for Okinawa Strike

Osaka

Preparations for the projected third general strike in Okinawa to protest mounting layoffs of workers employed by the U. S. authorities are proceeding more slowly than anticipated.

The Okinawa trade-union leaders are wavering in face of an offer from the Japanese government to intervene. Tokyo proposes instituting an "indirect employment system." The Japanese government would act as a contractor in securing workers for the U. S. bases. This is the system used in the main islands of Japan.

The Sohyo [General Council of Trade Unions of Japan] bureaucrats are putting heavy pressure on the Okinawa union leaders to accept the offer.

Among the rank and file, however, militancy remains as high as ever.

A two-day "National Congress for the

Then came World War II and a conspiracy among Teamsters' boss Tobin and state and federal government officials to smash the militant leadership of the Minneapolis teamsters. In 1941, Dunne and seventeen other leaders of the union and of the Socialist Workers Party became the first victims of the Smith "Gag" Act.

The sentence of sixteen months in Sandstone did nothing to change Ray's mind about the evils of capitalism and the desirability of socialism. He came out as convinced as ever of the correctness of his socialist beliefs, and he turned even more energetically to the work of building the Socialist Workers Party.

Today he is chairman of the Socialist Workers Party in Minnesota, and at seventy he feels that he still has energy to keep going at the task he chose as a youth—building for socialism.

"But haven't you ever thought about a socialist victory in America being postponed more than you expected?" I asked.

"I never was concerned too much about when it would come exactly, although I would sure like to see it soon. For me the main thing was to work for it. That's a job and a responsibility in itself. You're working for a cause, for the future. That's enough."

"And looking back from the age of seventy, you don't have any regrets?"

"Of course. I suppose everyone has some regrets. I wish I could have done more."

Return of Okinawa" ended February 14 with a resolution calling for stepped-up preparations for the strike.

The Zenchuro, at a meeting of its Central Struggle Committee February 14, decided to stage the first action on February 27. This will be a four-hour strike. A twenty-four-hour strike is projected for the latter part of March.

If this does not meet with a satisfactory response, a forty-eight-hour strike will be staged in April.

According to a recent decision of an "impartial" arbitration board in Denmark, a skilled worker can be subjected to a fine of 89.25 *kroner* [US\$11.90] a day for engaging in a wildcat strike. This is about 50 percent higher than the previous scale of fines.

April 13-18 Set for Next Antiwar Mobilization

By James Farrelly

In the largest gathering of its kind to be held so far, student antiwar activists from all over the United States met at the Student Mobilization Committee conference in Cleveland on February 14-15 to plan student participation in the first phase of the 1970 offensive against the Vietnam war. About 4,000 persons attended, of whom 3,469 registered officially.

The conference enthusiastically approved a proposal to organize massive actions against the war April 13-18. April 15 will be the focus of the week of action, with student strikes and mass demonstrations in towns and cities across the country. These actions are designed to link up with, broaden, and deepen the antiwar activity proposed for the same week by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee and the New Mobilization Committee.

The conference began with greetings from antiwar organizations around the world. The biggest cheer went up when the chairman read greetings from the National Liberation Front mission in Prague and from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The Hanoi telegram called the conference a "valuable initiative for gathering student forces to strengthen anti-aggression Vietnam war movement urging Nixon administration to withdraw all U. S. troops from South Vietnam."

Attorney Jerry Gordon, Chairman of the Cleveland Area Peace Action Council, opened the conference with a speech that drew heavy applause. He praised the work of the SMC for mobilizing hundreds of thousands of students for the November 15, 1969, and previous actions, and for insisting that the only way to compel the withdrawal of all U. S. troops from Vietnam is to continue to organize mass actions in the streets of America. Sidney Peck, cochairman of the New Mobilization Committee, and David Hawk of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee also gave greetings to the conference.

Debate at the meeting centered around the proposal of the SMC lead-

ership for an April mass action around the central concept of immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of U. S. troops from Vietnam. This was opposed by a variety of organizations, many of which—such as the Worker Student Alliance (WSA), the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), the Weathermen, the International Socialists (IS), the National Caucus of Labor Committees, the John Brown Caucus, and the Communist party youth (now organized as the Young Workers Liberation League)—were previously active in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) before it broke up last year.

Other members of the opposition included left elements in the Democratic party (who were involved in the Radical Caucus), the Youth International party (Yippies), the Grass Roots Community Coalition, Youth Against War and Fascism, and the Workers League.

Practically all of these groups, with the exception of the IS, Radical Caucus leaders, and perhaps some RYMers, have not previously been active within the SMC. They came to the conference chiefly to put forward their ideas before the huge gathering, and to attempt to red-bait and discredit the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), which has provided leadership in the SMC.

Members of the WSA, which is controlled by the Maoist Progressive Labor party, spoke at the conference, even though they continue to refuse to support the SMC. The WSA organizes its own antiwar actions which, while they demand that the U. S. get out of Vietnam, place equal emphasis on attacking the NLF and North Vietnamese leadership on the grounds that they are revisionists seeking to liquidate the Vietnamese struggle through a deal at the Paris talks.

The Maoists argue in favor of students supporting workers' strikes, but their propaganda on this remains abstract while in practice they engage in ultraleft adventures that have cost the participants heavily.

The Moscow-line Young Workers

Liberation League, a new and very weak organization, maintained a "low profile" at the conference.

Like the left-wing Democrats (and the Vietnam Moratorium Committee) they would like the antiwar movement to develop a reformist program covering a whole range of issues, and support "progressive" Democratic party candidates in the 1970 elections.

The RYM, previously one of the larger factions of SDS, treated the conference to a display of the kind of political confusion that led to its rapid decline. It distinguished itself by attacking the SMC demand of "Bring All the Troops Home Now" as racist, on the grounds that it does not explicitly acknowledge that Vietnamese are also dying in Vietnam. This ties in with its theory that white persons must publicly renounce their "white skin privilege" before they can become true revolutionaries. Along with the ultraleftist Youth Against War and Fascism, RYM counterposed pseudomilitant "anti-imperialist" rhetoric and a multi-issue mishmash to the SMC's clear policy of mass action on the issue of the war.

The left social-democratic IS and the Workers League, an ultraleft affiliate of the Healyite Socialist Labour League in Britain, put forward somewhat similar proposals. They urged the SMC to mobilize antiwar forces, as if it were some sort of labor party, around what IS in their conference proposal called "... a full program of proworking class demands."

A few members of the Weathermen faction of SDS were present but did not participate otherwise than to join some of the RYMers, Yippies, and others in trying to disrupt proceedings by stamping their feet, throwing paper darts, and chanting, "Bullshit."

All these counterproposals had a common element. They sought to undermine the proposed mass action or to change the SMC from an action-oriented antiwar organization to a more general political formation committed to various issues.

Leaders of the SMC and spokesmen

for the YSA (who supported the mass-action proposal) pointed out that to try to commit people to some of these issues at this time would narrow rather than broaden participation in the antiwar movement, and tend to divert action from the vital question of the war.

In spite of a similar thread running through the politics of the various opposition groups, many fundamental issues divided them. But, just as the final vote on the proposals was being taken, diverse groups discovered that factional opposition to the SMC majority and the YSA united them all. The Radical Caucus, Youth Against War and Fascism, RYM, and the Grass Roots Community Coalition merged their proposals. It was never properly explained what exactly this hybrid proposal was, and how it bridged the contradictions between the original proposals.

In the vote, the basic nature of the SMC was reaffirmed and the proposal for mass action adopted by a big margin. With the announcement of the vote, the hall rang with the chant, "Bring All the Troops Home Now!"

A democratic structure for the SMC was adopted. Carol Lipman was elected for another term as national executive secretary.

Workshop sessions of the conference discussed how the antiwar movement could be developed in its various sectors: students, GIs, the Third World people of America, and women.

One of the most important outcomes of the panel discussions was adoption of a high-school "Bill of Rights" on the freedom of speech, press, and political activity that students already have, in theory, under the constitution of the United States, but that are in practice denied them when they organize in their schools to fight against the war in Vietnam. The conference launched a nationwide campaign in behalf of these rights, with the aim of mobilizing millions of high-school students against the war.

The women's workshop, the biggest of the conference, decided to choose one day in the April week of mass action to mobilize women against the war and to explain how the war helps to perpetuate the oppression of women in America.

Plans for the establishment of a national "GIs United Against the War in Vietnam" were discussed at the GI and Veterans' workshop, which included about twenty active-duty GIs. The workshop emphasized the need to ex-

pand and defend the GI antiwar newspapers that have sprung up on bases everywhere.

The recent Chicano [Mexican-American] and Asian-American antiwar demonstrations in Los Angeles and the greatly increased Afro-American participation in the last October and November actions was seen by the Third World workshop as important indications that masses of Third World people, who, like the Vietnamese, are subject to national oppression, can be mobilized for the April action.

The campus workshop mapped out plans to collect information on the complicity of university administrations in the war, and to push the war machine off the campus.

The international workshop was attended by antiwar activists from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Argentina. It praised the SMC for its work in building an international antiwar movement through the publication and global circulation of *SMC International* and the world tour by Allen Myers, editor of the SMC's *GI Press Service*. It was pointed out that the SMC's call for international demonstrations in November and December last year was printed and acted upon in a number of countries, and that international participation in the April demonstrations may be even bigger.

It became clear from the broad representation at the conference—virtually all tendencies on the student left were represented—that the SMC is now the mass expression of student radicalism in America and the place where the various political tendencies are contending for leadership of the student movement. The conference sessions, workshops, corridors, and dormitories were scenes of intense and continual political debate.

The press gave extensive coverage to the conference. The February 16 *Washington Post* said that the meeting was the "first major effort by students to revive the antiwar movement since the lull that followed last fall's demonstrations in Washington, San Francisco and elsewhere."

The *Post* paid particular attention to "the presence of about 1,000 young people below college age.

"Hardly distinguishable from their older conference colleagues, the high schoolers showed the same militant concern over the war and related issues and added a new one of their own, a high school Bill of Rights."

The February 16 *New York Times* reported what is alleged to be "the exercise of tight control by the Young Socialist Alliance.

"The alliance, a Trotskyist organization that has been gaining strength on a number of campuses over the past year, has asserted control over the Student Mobilization Committee, a coalition of radical and antiwar groups, by filling most of the key staff positions."

The *Times* failed to point out that YSA's program of mass action against the war expressed the feelings of the great majority at the conference, even though the YSA was numerically very much a minority at the conference. In fact, as the February 16 *Cleveland Press* reported, ". . . an almost overwhelming democracy prevailed. Nearly everyone who wished got a chance to speak."

The conference showed that antiwar sentiment is striking deeper and deeper roots among the American people and that the April actions in America, and internationally, may turn out to be the most effective yet.

Another Massacre

On an NBC newscast February 18, a Vietnamese woman, Mrs. Ngo Thi De, testified that on March 16, 1968, the same day as the massacre in the Songmy area, a massacre took place at her village, Mykhe 4, about a mile and a half away.

The American troops had been to the village before. This time when the children ran out to greet them, the soldiers shot them dead.

Mrs. De fled. In the evening she returned. She found about 100 persons dead, including her daughter and grandchild.

Two Vietnamese men, interviewed by NBC, confirmed Mrs. De's account. They said that there were no "Vietcong" in the village that morning.

One of the men, a venerable figure in his eighties, said that the U.S. troops walked him around the village and made him look at the bodies. Then they let him go. He did not know why.

New Plastic Pollution Threat

Jan Hahn of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution reports spotting a sea gull with its head stuck through one of the rings of a "six pack" plastic holder for canned beverages. The answer to this pollution threat, Mr. Hahn says, is to build "perishability" into all plastic materials. More practical, under capitalism, would be to teach sea gulls the right way to pry beer cans out of a "six pack."

Rising Protest Over Witch-Hunt Sentences

By Les Evans

Judge Julius J. Hoffman, ignoring demonstrations throughout the United States in solidarity with the defendants in the Chicago "conspiracy" case, on February 20 sentenced the five anti-war and radical figures to five years in prison and \$5,000 fines each.

This was the maximum possible prison term allowed by the unconstitutional "antiriot" law under which the men were convicted February 18. Judge Hoffman also ordered the defendants to pay "the costs of prosecution," which could amount to hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars for the four-and-a-half-month trial. Hoffman ruled that the men could not be released from prison until they had paid the full amount, which he has not yet specified.

The sentences are to run concurrently with the long prison terms he gave the defendants and their attorneys for "contempt of court" even before the jury had reached its verdict.

There were originally eight defendants. Black Panther party leader Bobby G. Seale was severed from the trial early in the proceedings and sentenced to four years in prison for "contempt" after insisting on his constitutional right to act as his own defense counsel.

The seven who remained were all acquitted of the principal charge, of conspiring to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic party convention in Chicago.

The jury, after nearly forty hours of deliberation, brought in a guilty verdict on the second charge—attempting individually to provoke a riot—against pacifist Dave Dellinger, former Students for a Democratic Society leaders Rennie Davis and Thomas Hayden, and Yippie organizers Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin.

The two other defendants, John Froines and Lee Weiner, were acquitted on both counts.

Judge Hoffman handed down his "contempt" sentences while the jury was out. The harshest term went to chief defense counsel William M. Kunstler, who was ordered on February 15 to serve four years and thirteen days

in prison. The other defense attorney, Leonard I. Weinglass, received a term of one year, eight months, and three days.

Kunstler's sentence was the longest term given by a judge on a contempt charge in the whole history of American jurisprudence. The fact that the victim was an attorney jailed for carrying out his professional duty of defending his clients made the case even more outrageous.

The Chicago Council of Lawyers issued a statement expressing its "grave concern" at Judge Hoffman's "extraordinary exercise of summary criminal contempt power." The lawyers' organization scored the "potentially repressive effect such action may have on the willingness of lawyers in future cases fully and vigorously to defend their clients."

Others put it more sharply. Nicholas von Hoffman declared in his column in the February 18 *Washington Post* that "what Judge Julius J. Hoffman did over the weekend was to persuade many thousands of people that law is a profession which makes its practitioners choose between being crooks or being martyrs." As it stands now, he added, "you'll pull less time for dope pushing or bank robbing than for defending the accused."

In New York, some 3,000 persons participated in a demonstration protesting the contempt citations, while another 1,000 marched in Berkeley, California, on February 16.

About 1,000 persons held a rally outside Judge Hoffman's court on February 17, chanting, "Jail the judge, free the conspiracy."

On February 19, "The Day After" the verdict was handed down, some 500 marchers in Washington, D.C., held a demonstration in front of the apartment building where U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell and other cabinet members live. They were dispersed by police who used clubs and tear gas.

In Boston the same day at least 5,000 persons took part in a demonstration that was attacked by po-

lice. Twelve demonstrators were arrested.

The guilty verdicts in the frame-up trial were hailed by Chicago's mayor Richard Daley as proof that his cops were justified in their brutal assault on peaceful demonstrators during the Democratic party convention.

This "proof"—the alleged acts of the defendants on which the government secured its convictions—consisted of nothing more than public speeches, some of which were reported to the jury as "remembered" by police undercover agents.

"It was all speeches," defense attorney Kunstler told the *New York Times* February 18. "Speeches in Grant Park, speeches in Lincoln Park, speeches in churches around the country. All we have left is what the Government is most afraid of—speech."

Judge Hoffman indulged in such flagrant perversion of justice that even the *New York Times*, the most substantial voice of the U.S. capitalist class, was moved to indignation (while carefully indicating that it holds no sympathy for the hanging judge's victims). What the editors of the *Times* are really concerned about, of course, is the blow struck by Hoffman to the image of American capitalist justice. The judge should have used a longer rope, or one of silk, it seems.

In any case, the following is the complete text of the *Times'* February 21 editorial entitled "Judicial Disaster":

"Federal Judge Julius Hoffman brought down the curtain on the dismal Chicago conspiracy trial with sentences which can only be explained as an act of personal vindictiveness. The imposition of maximum penalties of five years imprisonment and \$5,000 fines plus payment of the cost of prosecution—combined with an order that the defendants remain in jail until all costs and fines have been paid—is an assault on every civilized concept of justice.

"Throughout the trial, judge and defendants vied with each other to distort and cheapen the legal process in a case built on a law whose intent contradicts the spirit and probably the letter of the Constitution. Although Judge Hoffman had no choice but to penalize the defendants' often offensive behavior, he not only resorted to excessive and possibly illegal contempt sentences but in the end evi-

dently allowed personal outrage to affect the sentences in the case itself.

"It is difficult to understand how a conviction, not for any commission of violence but for the dubious act of crossing state lines with intent to incite to riot, could warrant penalties of such dimensions, particularly in a situation in which the police were also accused of having engaged in rioting.

Meaning of the B-52 Bombings

Nixon Escalates the War in Laos

The *New York Times* on February 19 confirmed reports that American B-52 bombers have been used in saturation bombing of the Plaine des Jarres in a major new escalation of the war in Laos.

The *Times* quoted "informed sources" in Saigon, who told reporters February 18 that "B-52 bombing raids in South Vietnam had been halted for 36 hours while the planes, the biggest bombers the United States has, went into action for the first time against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops threatening the Plaine des Jarres in Laos."

The United States command in South Vietnam refused to comment on the report, but the *Times* pointed out that "its communiqués did not report any B-52 strikes in South Vietnam during the 36 hours that ended at noon today [February 18]."

The United States government has carried out massive bombing of Pathet Lao-held areas for months, using the smaller F-4 Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers, which carry a payload of about seven tons of bombs.

These planes have been flying about 20,000 sorties a month since last summer, when heavy American air support enabled pro-U.S. Royal Laotian troops to capture the Plaine des Jarres, which had been held by the Pathet Lao for the last five years.

Now the insurgents, reportedly aided by North Vietnamese regulars, are moving to recapture the strategic plain. The crumbling of the defense by Washington's Laotian puppets is what prompted the latest escalation. And the current increase in the number of bomb-

"To assess the cost of the prosecution against the defendants—and to hold them hostages pending full and undoubtedly astronomical payment—turns what had been a chaotic farce into a judicial disaster. The legal system must now look to the higher courts for rectification of a miscarriage of justice that, if allowed to stand unchanged, will invite contempt for the law itself."

ing raids was plainly an escalation even before it was revealed that the B-52 superbombers were involved. The February 17 Paris daily *Le Monde* reported:

"More than 400 American fighter-bombers on Sunday attacked North Vietnamese supply roads, convoys, and troops in Laos, an informed source declared Monday in Saigon. It is one of the biggest air operations ever mounted in Southeast Asia."

The *Christian Science Monitor*, which generally reflects the views of the State Department, fixed the responsibility for the decision to use the B-52s with the president himself.

Washington correspondent George W. Ashworth testified to this in the February 19 issue of the Boston daily, under the headline, "How Nixon reached Laos bombing decision."

"Lengthy discussions here," Ashworth said, "apparently have culminated in the start of B-52 bombings of North Vietnamese positions in the Plain of Jars in Laos. . . ."

"The big B-52 aircraft each can drop from extremely high altitudes 108 500-pound bombs. With modifications, the bomb load is five times higher."

Ashworth indicated that even in Washington there was some uneasiness over this obvious decision by Nixon to deepen U.S. involvement in another theater of war in Southeast Asia:

"The use of B-52's in Laos, however," Ashworth wrote, "is not a course that will win wholehearted approval here. The North Vietnamese have demonstrated throughout the course of the Vietnam war their willingness to escalate along with the Americans as

the depth of each nation's endeavor has increased. . . .

"Without added B-52 strikes, the Plain of Jars probably will be lost—despite continued heavy air support by fighter-bombers. . . ."

"If some sort of military gains can be realized with B-52's, there is a real question how permanent they might be. Sources here point out that a further North Vietnamese buildup probably would take too long to frustrate the allies now, but the future would be decidedly uncertain.

"With enhanced enemy forces, the U.S. could face the dismal prospect of continuing B-52 strikes merely to hold whatever uneasy status quo the strikes helped achieve."

Not all observers were as optimistic about the future of imperialism in Laos as the reporter for the *Christian Science Monitor*. The February 19 *New York Times*, for example, indicated that the Royal Laotian forces have already been virtually driven from the Plaine des Jarres, and that at the one major position they still occupy they are being used as nothing more than "bait" to lure the guerrillas into the open where they can be bombed and strafed by American air power.

"With most of the rest of the plain fallen to the North Vietnamese," the *Times* said, "one diplomatic source today called the strategy 'disturbingly reminiscent of Dienbienphu,' and said that the ultimate success of the Laotian-American effort would depend on how efficiently United States aircraft could evacuate the airfield, where most of the United States-supported troops and equipment are concentrated."

The Why of Reforms in Latin America

Why the military are granting timid reforms in certain Latin-American countries was explained by "a Peruvian Army officer" to H.J. Maidenberg of the *New York Times* (January 26):

"When one is pursued by a herd of maddened bulls, one has three options. One is to kneel, close the eyes and pray. The second is to fight the bulls, which is as good as the first option. And the third is to lead the stampeding herd into terrain that is more advantageous to the pursued.

"The masses in Latin America are starting to stampede. We, the military, are the only ones who are capable of leading them—and us—into safe ground."

Vicunas, prized for their wool, still numbered 200,000 in Peru ten years ago. Today no more than 20,000 are left.

The Issues in the Belgian Miners Strike

By Richard Wood

[This is the first of two articles on the Belgian miners' strike and the role the vanguard youth are playing in it.]

* * *

Brussels

The wave of wildcat strikes that has swept Europe since the May-June 1968 events in France reached Belgium in the first weeks of 1970. It began with a strike among the coal miners of the province of Limbourg, in the eastern part of the Flemish-speaking section of the country, not far from the border of Wallonia, the French-speaking section.

On February 1, as the strike was about to enter its fifth week, I was able to interview François Vercammen, a leader of the JGS [Jeune Garde Socialiste/Socialistische Jonge Wacht—Socialist Young Guard], a revolutionary socialist youth organization in political solidarity with the Fourth International, which has played a role in the development of the strike.

"The strike started in the mine at Winterslag," Vercammen said, "a small town in the region, on January 5. It began among the surface workers, who blocked the entrance, and soon the whole mine was on strike. Three other mines in the region struck within twenty-four hours, and it quickly spread to include about 23,000 coal miners in the area. This was remarkable considering that the political level of the miners in this area is low, that the workers have been poorly organized, and that the union gave no leadership to the workers."

Vercammen explained why the wildcat movement spread so rapidly. "The Limbourg miners receive wages considerably lower than their counterparts in other countries of Western Europe, and lower than in the coal mines of Wallonia where a tradition of working-class militancy has resulted in better wages. In addition, many jobs in the mines pay less than similar jobs in other industries. So, there was a

general feeling that wages should be substantially raised.

"Last April, sentiment for a strike was blocked by the leaderships of the unions. The workers were told that it was not the right time to strike, that a 'collective work agreement' was due to be negotiated at the end of 1969, and that the workers should wait to see the results of that."

"Collective work agreements" are tripartite compacts between the bosses, the unions, and the government on wages, conditions, etc., covering a whole branch of industry.

About 75 percent of the unionized workers in the area belong to the union affiliated to the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens [CSC—Confederation of Christian Trade Unions], the rest to the Fédération Générale des Travailleurs de Belgique [FGTB—General Federation of Belgian Workers—the Social-Democratic union]. About 80 percent are unionized.

"The general feeling among the workers that there should be a significant raise in wages," Vercammen said, "was reinforced by the leadership of the Christian union itself. They gave their pledge to fight for an immediate raise of 15 percent and began to campaign on this demand in their paper and in the mines. So it began to be accepted among the workers that if the demand wasn't granted, a strike would be called."

* * *

"Now, I must say something about the particular problems of the mining industry, which is in a general crisis throughout Europe," Vercammen continued. "If we lived in a socialist economy, we could make a general plan for the production of energy—how much coal to produce, how much electricity, how much atomic energy, etc. But we live under capitalism, and the capitalist owners of the mines try to get as much profit as they can.

"To the extent that there are other sectors of industry that are more profitable, they take their money out

of mining and put it in those other industries.

"But they are also receiving subsidies from the government to maintain the mines at a certain level. For example, the capitalist concern called Société Générale, which dominates the mining industry, receives subsidies from the government—which it promptly invests in the steel industry.

"One section of the bourgeoisie says it is possible to grant the 15 percent raise, if the price of Belgian coal is raised. The Belgian mines are presently selling coal at below world-market prices—about \$6 less per ton than U. S. coal, for instance. So some sectors of the Flemish middle bourgeoisie directly linked to coal mining are asking for higher prices.

"But the nucleus of the big Belgian bourgeoisie, especially the Société Générale, which dominates the mining industry, says, 'No, the price must remain where it is; otherwise the steel industry (which we also control) would not be competitive on the world market.'

"The position of the Coal Directorate, a so-called neutral state organization with strong Social-Democratic influence in it, was that, unfortunately, the 15 percent increase is impossible. We then had the situation where the CSC union was demanding the 15 percent raise while the Social Democrats, who are more closely linked with the governments, said that 10 percent was enough.

"The Social Democrats had their way. The collective work agreement negotiated on December 15 granted a 10 percent increase spread out over two years. There was to be a raise of 4% in January 1970, 2% in mid-1971, and another 2% at the end of 1971. The Christian union bureaucrats caved in and dropped the demand for 15 percent.

"The workers were very surprised and angry, and there was talk of an immediate strike on December 15. But after some discussion it was decided to wait until after Christmas to collect the double-time rate for working dur-

ing the holidays. The strike was set for January 5."

* * *

"Between December 15 and January 5," Vercammen said, "there were forty-two small strikes or slowdowns in the mines, so there was a general feeling of mounting tension.

"On January 5 it started in Winter slag, the most politically advanced mine (for example, the Social Democrats have a small majority of the workers there), and spread to Zolder, Waterschei, and Beeringen within twenty-four hours. Another mine that was scheduled to be closed at the end of 1970 joined in after the first week. The workers in this mine feared a repetition of what happened in Zwartberg in February 1966, when the mine was closed permanently after a strike was defeated.

"So in about a week and a half the strike was solid throughout the Campine [Limbourg], and remains so today.

"The spirit of the miners reflects what happened in Zwartberg in 1966. That strike was the first sharp class battle in this region of Belgium. All the workers are now talking about Zwartberg:

"If we had united in Zwartberg like we are united now, if we could have gotten student support like we have now, we could have won in 1966."

"In fact, there are certain parallels between this fight and the earlier one. In Zwartberg two strikers were killed by the gendarmerie [federal police], which were under the control of a Social Democratic minister of the interior. Today we also have a Social Democrat in the same position. Then, as now, the unions didn't support the strike."

After the defeat of the 1966 strike, a committee of Zwartberg workers who had been in the leadership continued to function to help the miners find new jobs, etc. The Zwartberg workers, scattered throughout the other mines of the region, maintained a kind of fraternity and have been a source of militancy in the present strike.

* * *

I asked Vercammen how the strike was organized and led.

"As it is a wildcat strike, without union leadership," he said, "the orga-

nizational forms have been spontaneous. What has emerged is the Permanent Strike Committee of the Campine area, which is the recognized leadership. It is composed of two or three delegates from each mine. These delegates have not been actually elected, as the movement spread so quickly, but have emerged as the rank-and-file leadership of the workers in each mine. These are the fighters, generally recognized by the other workers, as can be seen in the fact that the strike is now entering its fifth week completely solid.

"The Permanent Committee immediately contacted the Zwartberg group, and there are two members of this body included in the Permanent Committee."

Vercammen described the role played by the JGS in mobilizing solidarity with the strikers.

"We have distributed about 300,000 leaflets in the factories, mines, universities, and schools all over the country. Students of the JGS and other revolutionary groups, together with striking miners, have gone to other mines. In this way the strike has spread to several mines in Wallonia more or less successfully.

"In the large steel mill of Cockerill-Ougrée in Liège, where there is a high political level, there has been a solidarity strike led by older revolutionary socialists.

"In Flanders, there has been a wave of wildcat strikes in other industries, the most important being in the Ford plant in Genk, which is the largest factory in Limbourg. Cops used water cannon and tear gas to herd scabs into the Ford plant. The union leadership has been forced to give de facto recognition to this strike.

"The workers have also struck at General Motors in Antwerp.

"The government has sought to put pressure on the strikers in various ways. At first the unions did not pay any strike benefits, but now they have been forced to. Secondly, a year-end bonus was due the workers. The Social Democratic minister of labor, Louis Major, said he would pay the bonus right away if the workers went back to work, but not otherwise, because the workers 'might spend it on bread.' (The money comes from the bosses, but is dispensed by the state.) I was at a miners' meeting when this statement was reported, and I can

tell you that Mr. Major is an unpopular man with the miners.

"In the first week there was an attempt by the cops to break the strike. Many of the workers in the region live in small villages twenty to thirty kilometers from the mines and come to work on buses. These men have less contact with what is happening in the mines than the workers in villages closer to the mines.

"The buses have to stop outside when they get to the mines, except at Waterschei. In the other towns, pickets were able to meet the buses, talk to the workers, and bring them out on strike. But in Waterschei it is possible for the buses to drive right into the mines. The cops tried to do this a few times, but the workers organized squads to 'greet' the buses ten kilometers or so outside of town. The cops had to give the tactic up.

"They also tried to split the workers along national lines. About two-thirds of the miners are foreign workers — Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, Turks, Moroccans, and Algerians. The political police have told these workers that if they participate in any demonstrations or meetings they will be expelled from the country. Nevertheless, the workers' unity has been remarkable.

"The foreign workers have been the best fighters, the most militant. Most of the participants in the miners' committees are foreign workers, which means that everything must be translated into Flemish, French, Italian, Greek, Turkish, and Arabic."

Bourguiba Retaliates

Following violent demonstrations and a 100 percent effective student strike at the University of Tunis protesting the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, the Bourguiba regime again retaliated against dissidence on the campus. As yet, however, it has not imprisoned the students involved.

The Tunis government announced February 18 that "unless new facts appeared," it would not prosecute the forty students arrested in connection with the anti-Rogers demonstrations. However, it was indicated that they would be expelled from school "in order to make it impossible for those who consider the campus a fertile ground for agitation and seem not to have grasped the significance of the recent clemency granted certain of them to do any harm."

The "clemency" referred to was an amnesty granted to thirty-one students imprisoned for participating in the June 1967 anti-imperialist demonstrations.

The Bolivian Guerrilla Front Under a New Leader

An informative article on recent developments in the guerrilla movement in Bolivia appeared in the January 30 issue of *Marcha*. The author, Carlos María Gutiérrez, one of the political editors of the Montevideo weekly, on assignment in La Paz, was able to interview various guerrillas, including Chato Peredo, the brother of the martyred Inti Peredo.

Chato Peredo, according to María Gutiérrez, has left his home in Santiago de Chile to assume leadership of the guerrilla movement initiated in Bolivia by Che Guevara.

María Gutiérrez begins by establishing how Inti Peredo sought to re-form the guerrilla front. A year after the death of Che Guevara, "compelled to live in the cities in order to reconstitute and strengthen an urban network before opening a rural *foco** (a hard lesson driven home by the death of Che), Inti showed how he had matured as a result of his tragic personal experience."

For Peredo, the main ideas held by Che upon initiating an armed struggle in Bolivia "remained immutable."

Inti Peredo summarized them in an interview granted to Augusto Olivares of the Chilean magazine *Punto Final* in June 1969, about three months before he met death in La Paz at the hands of the Siles Salinas regime.

"In Bolivia," Inti Peredo told Olivares, "no revolutionary can seriously maintain that it is possible to take power on the electoral road."

On the *foco* concept, Peredo said: "The ELN [*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*—Army of National Liberation] maintains the principles established by Che. We hold valid the thesis of the need for a guerrilla *foco* in the current situation in Latin America. Because of this we announced that we would return to the mountains. We will build an armed force. We

are not trying to form a political party. We are aware that organizing a military apparatus has its problems, but I believe that political definitions will be attained in action. . . I know those that speak about an armed wing and a political wing. This is equivalent to converting the sector fighting in the mountains into a pressure group that operates in conformity with political directives issued in the city. I know of some chiefs who have spoken of imposing truces in the armed struggle, which would mean keeping the military organism in the mountains inactive. This can be said by someone who does not understand genuine armed struggle or by the pseudo revolutionary, who, in the final analysis, uses the armed struggle to exert political pressure on the electoral road."

On the resumption of guerrilla war, Inti Peredo said: "We are in the stage of reorganization. Our people want to fight, because many problems encountered in periods of preparation can be solved in action. . . They appeal for solidarity in the struggle of the ELN, which is the struggle of Che and thereby of all of Latin America. Solidarity. We need financial resources. Arms cost a lot."

This interview was granted June 24. "Twenty days later," continues María Gutiérrez, "the work of informers plus the enormous repressive apparatus of the *Dirección de Investigaciones Criminales* (forever in the hands of the CIA) dealt a terrible blow to the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*. In Cochabamba on the evening of July 14, several dozen police surrounded a house on Lanza Street used by the ELN as a center for armaments, the documents of the movement, and the most valuable men. Inside was a university professor named Víctor Guerra (second in command in the ELN), the guerrilla girl Maya—Rita Valdivia—and two or three more members of decisive importance in the stage of armed struggle that was to begin in the jungles of Chaparé."

In the ensuing gun battle, the police finally managed to take the house. They found one guerrilla dying, an-

other wounded, Maya shot in the head, and Professor Guerra seriously wounded in the chest.

After this came the "tragic dismantlement of the ELN." In La Paz, an arsenal was captured in Carrasco Street. "On July 23 the painter Luis Zilveti Calderón, winner of the grand national prize in painting, was arrested in one of the plazas. He proved to be linked to the ELN. Zilveti was carrying very important lists of names and addresses. (Around this murky fact there are serious suspicions concerning the loyalty of the painter, who surprisingly later turned up as a refugee in the Ecuadorian embassy, obtaining a safe-conduct to leave the country.) Then began innumerable raids and jailings."

María Gutiérrez continues:

"In a house in Bueno Street another arsenal and store of explosives were found. In an apartment on Tejada Borzano Avenue, the DIC seized arms, radio equipment, and a great number of documents (among them a plan to execute the CP leader Mario Monje, apparently condemned to death as a traitor, and who is now being held in the La Paz prison). On July 30 in a shoot-out at a house in the Obrajes district, they captured Gonzalo Oroza Bellido, the third key man in the movement, and his Finnish wife Terttu Tuliki. Almost immediately, another top-rank leader fell, the engineer Jürgens Schutt Mogro. In Cochabamba, the police raided the home of Maya's parents and seized a third arsenal there.

"Closely pursued by the police, Inti Peredo nevertheless remained in La Paz. The urban network had disintegrated and the ELN was now scattered along with its fighters, without arms, financial resources, or secure places in which to hide out while waiting for this difficult stage to pass. In August the Cochabamba police claimed to have found the decomposed body of Rigoberto Zamora Zazzo, a Chilean who belonged to Víctor Guerra's group and who was supposedly in the house on Lanza Street when it was raided in July. According to the police version Zamora fled from

* *Foco*: A geographical center set up and maintained by the guerrilla forces to polarize their struggle. The concept, given extreme expression by Régis Debray in his *Revolution in the Revolution?*, is currently under debate among revolutionists in Latin America.

the area and committed suicide upon learning of the death of Maya, with whom he was allegedly in love. But it was proved later that he had been terribly tortured by the police for a month, dying from the effects. The story about finding his body was only a police alibi.

"Arrests continued throughout the country. In Santa Cruz, the DIC captured Carlos de Miguel (a youth who had lived a long time in Montevideo and who had recently returned to Bolivia), Oscar Busch Barberi and Miguel Rivera, accusing them of belonging to a network in Santa Cruz. On August 29, they detained Edgar Peña, the respected president of the Football Federation of Santa Cruz.

"By September, the ELN appeared to have been completely destroyed."

Then came a surprising development. On September 4 the ELN made a spectacular reappearance. In various cities, commandos took over the radio stations briefly to broadcast a taped message from Inti Peredo. Among other things, he said:

"The ELN is not a ghost. It is alive, ready to renew the struggle in the mountains. . . It is true that we committed some errors, and we recognize and must correct these as is our revolutionary duty. But it is also true that these were committed in the course of work, mistakes that are encountered by those who engage in action, mistakes that are not committed by those who only watch the action. . . The ELN does not have any pact or agreement with any party whatsoever. No 'documents of great value' have been seized, as the government ministry glibly claims. It is false that Víctor kept notes evaluating the capacities of the fighters which were found by the police. The government has no messages in its possession. It is false that a great quantity of arms and ammunition was taken. Yes, we lost a part, which we will recuperate in fighting. . . We are on the threshold of a new historic stage. The battle begun at Nancahuazú,* which was interrupted briefly, has begun again."

Four days later, on September 8, Inti Peredo was trapped by the police in La Paz. María Gutiérrez appears convinced that Peredo took an unwarranted risk. He stayed for one night at the home of a member of

* Where Che Guevara established his *foco*.

the Communist party. This ambiguous person may have turned informer.

Inti Peredo held off a hundred police for two hours. He was finally captured. The police claimed that he committed suicide with a hand grenade. "In reality, Inti was beaten to death. After he ran out of ammunition, the police entered the house and killed him with their gun butts and by kicking him."

Last December, María Gutiérrez interviewed Chato Peredo, "who, since the death of his brother, has occupied Inti's post." The interview took place in La Paz.

"A former member of the CP, a doctor, Chato in 1966 was one of those favored by the leadership, which sent him to Moscow to keep him from being tempted by the guerrillas. Today the succession of events, the heroic deaths of his brothers, and the obstacles which the reorganization of the movement continues to encounter from his former coreligionists, have endowed his political ideas with a bitter and tranquil realism.

"A great part of our interview was devoted to examining the behavior of the Bolivian CP and the other parties in Latin America (among them the Uruguayan party) with respect to the guerrilla struggle of 1967. Chato knows that period from both sides. Later he learned from reliable sources what happened internally in the movement. Now in command of the ELN, his analysis of the errors, betrayals, and perspectives has been completed."

In response to a series of questions, Chato stated that at the time of Inti Peredo's death, the guerrillas were ready to begin operations, but they suffered some blows and this has delayed reopening the struggle.

At present an urban network has been reestablished of sufficient strength to make it possible to begin operations in a rural *foco*.

Asked about the first police raid in Cochabamba, Chato Peredo said he thought that it was the work of an informer. The identity of the informer, however, is not yet known.

María Gutiérrez continues:

"Although it is little known, during 1969 the ELN received a political infusion—a Trotskyist sector headed by the dissident Hugo González, separated from the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario] and affiliated to the tendency in the Fourth International

led by Pierre Franck [sic]. The González sector did not enter as a bloc, but reached an agreement with Inti permitting its members to enter individually into the ELN.

"Many observers in La Paz hold that this opened a way through which the intelligence services possibly infiltrated the guerrilla movement. I asked Chato Peredo about this point.

"It is quite possible," he replied."

María Gutiérrez does not deal further with this point. Why he included it is hard to say. It sounds like a belated echo of the old Stalinist slanders of Trotskyism in general. The problem of informers has always been present in the guerrilla movement as it has in the revolutionary movement generally. It is sufficient to recall that the Czarist police succeeded in penetrating the top leadership of the Bolshevik party in Lenin's time. Che Guevara faced the same problem in Bolivia.

It could be that María Gutiérrez has taken for good coin the libelous assertions of the Lora group which split from the POR in 1966 and which has maintained a bitterly factional attitude since then toward the Fourth International and its Bolivian section.*

Chato Peredo expressed a hostile attitude toward the Ovando regime. "It is not going to carry the revolution to its ultimate consequences," he told María Gutiérrez. "Not even a limited petty-bourgeois revolution."

This means that the guerrilla movement under his command does not intend to change its plans.

The ELN, according to Chato Peredo, is seeking to extend its base into the working class. But don't the Bolivian unions, which are directed in the majority by political forces hostile to guerrilla war, stand in the way?

"The ELN's method of work in this stage of reorganization, carried out above all by Inti, is certainly based on individual recruitment. We are continuing to follow these methods and we believe that we must recruit along these lines. The guerrilla movement must above all be a reduced group that finds its point of support in broad sectors of the people, above all the working class. In view of this, we

* For more on this point see the article by Joseph Hansen elsewhere in this issue "Healyites and Lambertists in Strange Company."

are not getting in contact with the trade-union leaders, because experience has shown that these leaders are geared in with party politics and its interests. We are working among the rank and file, with individuals."

"You have not changed your tactical concepts so as to exclude a rural *foco*? There are various persons, like Béjar in Peru, who have the opinion that the old thesis based exclusively on a *foco* should be revised in view of new experiences. Are you following the previous concept?"

"Rather, our experience shows us that Che's original theory remains valid."

"Do you see the peasantry as the principal force for the armed road?"

"Above all, because that is where the struggle develops—in the countryside fundamentally. Experience has shown that the city is the worst enemy, because that is where all the means of the repressive apparatus are concentrated. That means that going into action in the city would be going into action in the enemy's terrain. Che's idea, which we are continuing, was to form an army on the basis of peasant elements, but with a proletarian ideology, that could defeat the other army holding up the system. And this new army cannot be formed in the city, but in the terrain where we can move most freely and with the best prospects of developing."

María Gutiérrez asked Chato Peredo about Che's comments in his *Diary* on the lack of receptivity among the peasants even as an arena for work.

"Che was aware of this problem. We know that in the first stage we are not going to be supported by the peasants either and that basically the guerrillas will have to draw on the elements recruited in the city. But these elements will have to go into action in the countryside, which is our terrain, bringing the enemy into our terrain. In the first stage, the peasantry is not going to support us. But new stages will arise, in which the peasantry will have to take a neutral stand, in which the struggle continues, and the peasantry sees that it will be a prolonged struggle, so that at first they are neutral and then they will turn to supporting the guerrillas, even joining them."

Marcha's correspondent asked what would happen if Cuba and Bolivia were to resume trade relations. Would this affect organization of the guerrilla struggle?

"In principle, we do not believe in that possibility. We don't believe that diplomatic relations will soon be established with Cuba."

"I was referring to trade, not diplomatic, relations. They themselves haven't yet moved toward suggesting that."

"The same goes for commercial relations. In any case, we are maintaining an independent policy with regard to this. We don't have sufficient material to make a definitive judgment on this question."

The interview was held December 14. In the following weeks, according to María Gutiérrez, the guerrillas engaged in various actions in the heart of La Paz and in full daylight. These actions included holding up a truck carrying a large sum of money on December 30. One guerrilla was killed in this action.

Polish Press Attacks Student Defendants

In conjunction with the trial of the five Polish students charged with spreading propaganda "damaging to the good name and interests of Poland and of socialism," the government-controlled press has conducted a vehement campaign against the accused.

"Almost every day, the papers, and especially two, *Zycie Warszawy* and *Express Wieczorny*, have devoted about half a column to the trial; and the radio has not lagged behind," *Le Monde's* special correspondent wrote in the February 15-16 issue of the Paris daily.

"These accounts, to be sure, make rather monotonous reading," the French correspondent continued. "They report day after day only what would seem to support the indictment. Thus, for example, when Maciej Kozlowski [the main defendant] admitted most of the facts charged against him but added that he did not see anything wrong in them—that freedom of opinion existed in Czechoslovakia at the time and he thought it could be the same in Poland—the Warsaw press noted only that the accused admitted the facts for which he was indicted. At the most, the press indicated that he 'tried to minimize the significance of these facts' (*Zycie Warszawy*) or that 'at the same time he gave his own evaluation of his admitted illegal ac-

On the following day, the police located their hideout and another guerrilla was killed in the encounter. One of the leaders, Darío Adriaola, who had fought beside Che, was wounded and captured by the police.

María Gutiérrez ends with the following two paragraphs:

"Paralyzed by an option that is likewise a vicious circle, the ELN must obtain funds to keep moving forward and to get out of the deadly trap of the cities. These funds are at the same time in the cities, and to obtain them calls for too high a price—the lives of the best ones.

"If a serious change does not occur abroad in 1970 in solidarity toward the Bolivian guerrillas, it is not clear how the ELN will be able to continue positively fulfilling a task that is today heroic but which could soon become suicidal."

tivity, demonstrating an extraordinary megalomania."

The central charge against the students — Maciej Kozlowski, Maria Tworkowska, Krzysztof Szymborski, Jakub Karpinski, and Marguerita Szpakowska—is gathering information for the emigré publication *Kultura* and distributing this journal illegally in Poland.

An *Agence France-Presse* dispatch February 11, two days after the trial began, indicated that the copy of *Kultura* offered in evidence was a special issue devoted to the March 1968 Polish student demonstrations.

That issue printed a number of statements issued by the students which did not follow *Kultura's* line. For example, the Warsaw Polytechnic students' *Appeal to the Citizens of the People's Republic of Poland* said: "We demand honest news in the mass media; we do not want to have to get our information from sources like Radio Free Europe, which, despite the fact that it has reported the events in Poland objectively, is by its very nature anti-socialist and anti-Soviet."

The appeal of the Wrocław students, also printed in the special issue, included this point: "We demand consistent realization of the bases of socialism instead of exploiting its ideas to defend positions in the leadership."

Healyites and Lambertists in Strange Company

By Joseph Hansen

In his informative report on recent developments in the Bolivian guerrilla movement, which is summarized elsewhere in this issue, Carlos María Gutiérrez of the Montevideo weekly *Marcha* mentions rumors in La Paz that the Trotskyists who participated in the armed forces led by Inti Peredo may have provided a channel through which the intelligence services "possibly infiltrated the guerrilla movement."

It is not known specifically who started these foul rumors. The intelligence services themselves are the most likely. They have an obvious interest in diverting attention from their stool pigeons and in sowing suspicion among the revolutionary forces so as to make it more difficult for them to hold together in face of the repression.

Another possible source is the Stalinists, since the rumors smack of the ancient slanders cooked up by Stalin's secret police and used in the Moscow frame-up trials.

The most shameless purveyors of the slanders, however, have been the leaders of the Guillermo Lora tendency in Bolivia and some new allies they have found in Great Britain and France, the Healyites of the Socialist Labour League and the Lambertists of the *Fédération des Comités d'Alliance Ouvrière*. It may have been from these tainted sources that María Gutiérrez heard the rumors he mentions in his article.

It will be recalled that nationwide raids were staged by the dictatorial Bolivian regime last summer. Prominent among those thrown into prison and tortured were the Trotskyists who had participated in the guerrilla movement headed by Inti Peredo. The leader of these Trotskyists, Hugo González Moscoso, was the object of an intensive police hunt. His home was raided, and the police sought to terrorize his family.

An international campaign was launched to help these victims of the witch-hunt. In Europe and elsewhere money was collected to help the Bolivian guerrillas recover from the blow dealt their struggle. This was the mo-

ment chosen by the Lora tendency to attack the victims, whom they call "Pabloites" instead of Trotskyists.

In a press release dated November 8, 1969, Alberto Saenz, a leader of the Lora group, asserted that the solidarity campaign was a "fraud."

This statement, so far as can be ascertained, was first published outside of Bolivia in the November 19-26, 1969, issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, the Paris publication of the Lambert group.

Among Saenz's assertions was the following:

"2) The Bolivian Pabloites in any case do not possess any organization because they dissolved it in order to enter the ALN (Army of National Liberation) individually. The latter moreover has denounced some of them as informers and confidants of the Ministry of the Interior. Serious suspicions exist today that Mr. González [sic] Moscoso in person is working in the pay of the Bolivian government."

"(2) *Les pablistes de Bolivie ne possèdent en tout état de cause pas d'organisation car ils l'ont dissoute pour entrer individuellement dans l'A. L. N. (Armée de Libération Nationale). Celle-ci en a dénoncé d'autre part certains comme informateurs et confidants du Ministre de l'Intérieur. Il existe aujourd'hui de sérieux soupçons sur le fait que le sieur GONZALES MOSCOSO en personne travaillerait pour le compte du gouvernement bolivien.*"

The Paris weekly *Rouge*, the organ of the *Ligue Communiste*, the French section of the Fourth International, in its issue of December 1, 1969, denounced this libelous statement as "garbage."

Guillermo Lora thereupon issued a statement which appeared in the December 10-17 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*. The nature of this statement can be judged from the first point:

"1. I solidarize completely with the communiqué that was written by my party in order to unmask the adven-

turers who have turned revolutionary involvement into a business proposition designed to satisfy their personal needs."

The Healyites in London utilized this priceless windfall for feature material in the current campaign they are waging against the Fourth International (which, like the Lora tendency, they call "Pabloite").

They retreated a bit only on the libelous statement concerning Hugo González Moscoso when it was challenged by Pat Jordan of the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International.

Mike Banda, the "Assistant National Secretary" of the Socialist Labour League, said in the January 17 issue of *Workers Press* that the particularly libelous slander of González quoted by *Intercontinental Press*¹ had been mistranslated.

Banda offered as a correct translation: "Today it is seriously suspected that Mr Gonzales [sic] himself *would* work on behalf of the Bolivian government." [Banda's emphasis.]

In order to inject some kind of meaning into this nonsensical English, Banda added: "Our interpretation of the text leads us to believe that political collaboration between Moscoso [sic] and a bourgeois government *in the future* is quite possible. You don't have to be a police agent to work for a bourgeois government." [Banda's emphasis.]

Two observations can be made on this squirming.

1. Banda did not supply the original Spanish so that his English version could be checked.² He did not even cite the French.

(As an authority in linguistics — like Stalin — Mike Banda ought to put the Paris daily *Le Monde* right on the way the conditional mood is trans-

1. See "Lambertists Knife Aid for Bolivian Victims," by Gerry Foley in *Intercontinental Press*, December 15, 1969, page 1119.

2. We have seen only the French version, which we have quoted above.

lated in certain articles in its weekly English edition. Here is a current example of this standard usage:

(A sentence in the January 28 *Le Monde*, page 8, column 5, reads: "*Le commandant en chef aurait invité le président Onganía à révoquer l'ambassadeur.*" This appears in the February 4 "Weekly Selection," page 8, column 6, as: "The ambassador's dismissal was reportedly pressed on the President by General Lanusse."

(In the Mike Banda school of languages this comes out: "It is seriously suspected that the ambassador's dismissal *would be pressed in the future*, it is quite possible . . . you don't have to be a police agent . . .")

2. Mike Banda did not refer to the sentence preceding the one with which he went into his twisting act. That sentence reads, as can be checked above: "The latter moreover has denounced some of them as informers and confidants of the Ministry of the Interior."

The words used are "informers" and "confidants"—not in some distant future but in Bolivia last summer and right now.

This is the garbage that the Healyites found so much to their taste they even put out a pamphlet on it for the delectation of their members.

If one wonders why ultraleft sectarians like these should be found running with the hounds in Bolivia, the explanation is simple. The quarry hunted by the police happens to be a "Pabloite."

We should like to close by asking Healy to please explain the basis in principle of the bloc he and Lambert have formed with Lora. We do not ask Lambert because he is tongue-tied.

"Does Lora, like the Socialist Labour League and Lambert, believe that the Cuban revolution was not socialist, giving rise only to state capitalism? Does he hold with them that Fidel Castro is another 'Batista'? Does he approve of the slanders that appeared in the Socialist Labour League press (before it became known that Che Guevara was in Bolivia) that Castro had liquidated his comrade in arms?"

These questions were asked by Gerry Foley in the December 15, 1969, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

Neither Healy, Lambert, nor Lora have answered these questions. To this

day they have not made public the basis in principle of their political combination.

Or have they? Take another look at the slanders repeated by Lora, be-

Philippines

17,000 in Manila Demonstration

At least 17,000 students and workers held a giant rally in the Plaza Miranda, Manila, February 18, to protest the slaying of five students by police during a January 30 demonstration at Malacañang, the presidential palace. The protesters also denounced Washington's influence over the regime of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

According to the February 19 *New York Times*, "The six-hour demonstration during the afternoon, with about 17,000 participants, was organized by a group known as the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, together with the National Association of Trade Unions and the Socialist party, in protest against 'imperialism, feudalism and fascism' by American and Filipino 'exploiters.'"

Eighteen groups participated in the rally. Some, according to the *New York Times*, "preached revolution as the only salvation for the Filipino people."

Later, some 3,000 youths clashed with American marines at the U.S. embassy and fought police and sol-

smirching the Bolivian Trotskyists in the prison cells and torture dungeons of the Bolivian political police.

There's genuine Healyism at its purest and finest!

diers in the well-to-do Ermita district of Manila. More than 100 persons were arrested and at least fifty injured in the course of the evening.


The demonstrators, the *New York Times* said, "marched from the orderly rally, held at the Plaza Miranda, toward the American Embassy on Roxas Boulevard, led by members of the radical Patriotic Youth organization.

"With white handkerchiefs tied around their heads, and carrying Filipino flags upside down, a symbol of the nation at war, they besieged the new embassy building for an hour, throwing sticks, stones and flaming objects.

"After forcing the gates open, they rushed into the visa and veterans affairs sections, smashing doors and partitions. Shouting 'Yankee go home!' and 'Imperialist pigs,' they broke into the main embassy offices, where they smashed most of the ground-floor windows and office furniture."

American marines threw tear-gas grenades into the crowd to force them out of the building.

Polar Bear's Survival Hinges on 'If . . .'



Swiss ecologists warned February 5 that "offshore drilling, oil pollution, and predatory Eskimos" are endangering the survival of the polar bear.

They agreed, however, that if the polar bear is threatened as a species, its prospects are good "if" mankind acts "carefully."

It was not clear why the Swiss experts called the Eskimos "predatory," since they are not known to have engaged in any off-

shore drilling or oil pollution. They have lived with the polar bear and other animal sources of food and clothing since time immemorial without threatening to destroy them as a species.

It was likewise obscure why these experts remained silent about the fact that the Eskimos themselves face extinction as the capitalist spoilers from the "advanced" countries go about wrecking the ecological balance of the Arctic.

Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience*

By Hector Bejar

[This is the sixth installment of a translation by Gerry Foley of Héctor Béjar's essay.]

Chapter VI: The Ayacucho Front

In the central cordillera of the Andes, in a sharp indentation formed by the narrow and deep channels of the Pampas and Apurímac rivers, is the province of La Mar.

The *comunidades* [peasant communes] of Chungui and Ancco live on the summits of the cordillera, about 4,000 meters above sea level. From these heights, hundreds of streams drop down incredible slopes toward the Pampas and the Apurímac.

In the south the slopes are desolate and baked by an implacable sun. To the northeast they are covered with dense, perpetually humid woods.

There are no roads. A traveler who ventures to cross the province has to go by mule or on foot, painfully climbing up and down over gigantic stone ramps, interminable stretches of mud, and enormous sand dunes.

Arable land is scarce and poor. In the high places, the *comuneros* [communal villagers] grow potatoes and *ocas* [wood sorrel tubers]. On the slopes and in the warm belts, maize and sugarcane. In the "jungle fringe," coffee and cacao.

After transporting them for several days on the backs of mules, the *comuneros* sell their scanty produce for low prices at roadside markets. The markets are their point of contact with capitalist civilization, the front line of capitalism that is penetrating into the Andes as the roads advance.

The great majority of the peasants speak only Quechua, although some young people are being educated in the provincial capital.

The 1940 census showed 38,590 inhabitants. Of these, 35,129 lived in the countryside and 3,461 in towns.

The 1961 census showed 40,961 inhabitants over five years of age, of which 32,598 did not speak Spanish and could neither read nor write.⁵⁶

Comunidades and *haciendas* exist side by side as forms

* Published by permission of Monthly Review Press. Copyright © 1969 by Librairie François Maspero. (This notice of copyright applies also to the first two installments which appeared in the issues of *Intercontinental Press* dated January 26, 1970, and February 2, 1970. Through an oversight, the notice did not accompany those two installments.) Monthly Review Press is publishing Héctor Béjar's essay in a translation by William Rose to be released shortly. The cost for the book, clothbound, is \$6 and the address is 116 West 14th St., New York, N.Y. 10011.

56. VI Censo Nacional de Poblacion. Tomo V.

of land tenure and the points of conflict are numerous. The aspiration of the *yanaconas* [serfs] is almost always to free themselves from the *haciendas* and become *comuneros*.

Background

The province has a turbulent history.

In 1922 the Indians of Ancco and Chungui rose up "because the men heading the town and district administrations committed such thefts and outrages."⁵⁷ The local administrators took money from the Indians under various pretexts and loaded them down with excessive taxes and duties.

Starting at noon on December 12, 1922, the Indians of both sexes and of all ages, from children to old men, assembled from the villages of Llachuapampa, Illaura, Pampahuasi, Retama-pampa, and others, and assaulted the house of the Añaños in Patibamba. They also surrounded the towns of San Miguel and Tambo for several days.

For eleven years the country had been under Leguía, a civilian reformist dictator who based his regime on financial support from the United States and Great Britain. The uprising produced only distant echos in the languid routine of the capital. The government sent reinforcements to "subdue the Indians."

So, 150 "pacification" troops armed with machine guns combed the towns of the province for several weeks. According to official figures, the toll of the "pacification" was 430 Indian casualties, including dead and wounded; more than 1,400 homes destroyed by fire in the towns and in the villages; and incalculable losses of livestock of all kinds.

The Spanish priest Fray José Pacifico Jorge, the head of the Franciscan mission in the province of La Mar in those years, wrote a moving letter to the prefect of Ayacucho who was responsible for these massacres. This document gives a vivid description of the crimes of the repressive forces:

"Horried by the crimes I have just witnessed in this province of La Mar, I write you this letter. As I write, I have still not recovered from the deep impression that all I have seen has made on my spirit.

"In fulfilling my holy mission, I had to frequent all the localities and villages of this parish in the days of the unjustified bloodbath inflicted on this defenseless province.

"In the village of Lacc-huapampa where 2,000 Indians live, I witnessed the burning of more than 200 huts. After setting fire to these dwellings, the troops hunted

57. Vilchez Amesquita, Antonio. *Ensayo monográfico de la provincia de La Mar*. Empresa editorial Rimac. Lima, 1961.

their unfortunate inhabitants as if they were stags or wild animals, cutting them down with a deadly rain of fire as they tried to escape to the nearby hills and ravines.

"In Illaura I myself witnessed a terrifying scene of three peasants in their death agony—two old men and a little boy of four. Dragged out of a half-burnt hut, the bodies of these poor souls exhibited horrible wounds over their entire surface. The old men expired slowly in horrible agony and the little boy died a few minutes after being taken from the ashes. Before their death, I administered the last comforts of our holy religion.

"In Lacc-huapampa I witnessed another crime which shocked me deeply. A poor woman with an infant at her breast fled from her hut away from the troops who were setting fire to these buildings. One of these fiends aimed his gun at the poor woman and fired, striking her in the shoulder and knocking her and her tender son down. I could not approach the victims to administer spiritual comfort for fear of being struck down myself, because these criminals seemed to have no conscience and there seemed to be no restraint imposed on their excesses and passions.

"In the other villages of La Mar, I have seen scenes of indescribable suffering—poor dying Indians with horrible bullet wounds, surrounded by a few aged relatives (because the young people were still in hiding) weeping for an irremediable wrong. I have seen the bodies of men, women, and even infants stretched out on the ground, remaining unburied for many days. Some gave off an unbearable odor. Is it possible that such crimes will go unpunished?"⁵⁸

The memory of this massacre has become part of the traditions of the people. Still today the people of Chungui are known for their valor and coolness.

Like all the *comunidades*, Chungui has had to remain on the alert against landgrabbers—*gamonales* and shyster lawyers.

The procedure is well known. A shyster forges titles and appeals to the local magistrate, claiming possession of land allegedly seized by the *comunidad*. Greased by bribes from the claimant, the judicial machinery functions rapidly. A decision is very quickly handed down upholding the claim.

Meanwhile, the *comuneros*, the real owners, are unaware that the spider is spinning his web. They only learn of it when the shyster turns up to take possession of "his land" under the protection of the judge and the *guardias*.

What can they do then? If they obey the judge's decision, they will lose their houses and their fields and have to move to higher and higher and poorer and poorer places. . . . If they resist, they will be accused of being "invaders," and massacred.

In 1963 Chungui decided to collectively resist the intrigues of a shyster. And the *guardias*, disarmed by the infuriated *comuneros*, had to return to the provincial capital.

But it didn't stop there. The "Indians" had resisted authority and in Peru that is a crime for which you have to pay very dearly. Very quickly, the local attorney, administrator, and mayor were arrested and taken to Ayacucho.

But the marvelous collective strength of the peasants remained invincible. Night and day the *comunidad* remained on the alert against its enemies, mobilized on an almost military footing. Hundreds of eyes and ears watched and listened for any strange move in order to prevent the fields from being invaded. Finally, the village authorities were released. The second battle had been won.

Chapi, the biggest *hacienda* in the province, was also a focus of irritation and the center of all the abuses and intrigues against the peasants. Its territory embraces a good part of the province. From the Pampas and Apurimac rivers, the Chapi's lands rise to the barren high plateaus and descend into the jungles. It takes several days traveling by foot and on muleback to cover it.

Its principal activities are cattle raising and the production of raw cane alcohol. It is divided into four "*pagos*" [smaller ranches]; each *pago* has to work for the *hacienda* a set period of the year. No wages are paid, only alcohol and coca.

The Carrillos, the owners of the *hacienda*, were distinguished for their brutality and ruthlessness.

Already in 1956, in a gripping book,⁵⁹ the French explorer Michel Perrin had described his adventure at the Chapi *hacienda*, where he came, accompanied by his student Teresa Gutiérrez, looking for the source of the Alto Amazonas.

Deceived by Miguel Carrillo, who told him that the Apurimac river was navigable as high up as his *hacienda*, Perrin tried to travel it on a fragile raft. He was swept away by torrential currents and carried about ten kilometers. By a miracle he escaped, but his student Teresa perished.

In his spirited book Perrin exposes Carrillo's intrigues, his behaving like a feudal lord, and his domination of the Indian peons. Perrin proves point by point that Carrillo was aware of the risk, despite which he urged him to attempt navigating the river.

Carrillo's aim, Perrin claimed, was to get rid of him, in the belief that Teresa, who had a life preserver, would survive the tragedy:

"Inattentive readers have often asked me: What was Miguel Carrillo's role? I thought that I had clearly stated this after the accident to the police, later to the Peruvian courts, and finally in these pages. Four years later I can only reaffirm what I said, and I do so in full knowledge of the meaning of my words: Carrillo is guilty of premeditated murder. Who was the intended victim? I was, of course. Teresa and I? Or perhaps Teresa alone? I don't think so. It is possible, to the contrary, as I was advised, that he thought only I would disappear and that the peons would bring Teresa to him. Maybe he wanted us all dead; the death of peons was unimportant in his eyes."⁶⁰

But the Carrillos were masters of the province and they had powerful friends in Lima. And although the tragic death of Teresa Gutiérrez, a young student from the University of San Marcos, shocked the whole country, the case was covered up very quickly and Perrin found himself forced to leave Peru.

Chapi faces La Convención across the Apurimac river.

59. Perrin, Michel. *La Tragedie du Haut-Amazone*. Robert Noel. Paris, 1956.

60. *Ibid.*, page 263.

58. *Ibid.*

The peons there had only to cross the river to learn that there were unions on the other side and that the people were demanding wages. . .

The response to the demands of workers whom the Carrillos forced to perform services without payment had always been violent. The rebels were hanged, whipped, and chained in the ranch house.

In January 1963, Miguel Carrillo personally strangled and later decapitated Julián Huamán, a *colono* from Oronjoy, one of the "pagos" of the *hacienda*. Huamán had committed the impertinence of asking Carrillo to return a bull that he had sold without its being his property. Not content with the outrageous murder of Huamán, Carrillo threatened to do the same to anyone who complained in the future.

This crime aroused the peasants. On January 8, 1963, the women of Oronjoy caught Miguel Carrillo, tied him up and, without harming him, took him to the justice of the peace in Chungui, in whose office they read a long list of complaints.

The reaction of the peasants was, after all, measured and calm. The document which they drew up on this occasion is one of the most illustrative of the abuses of the *latifundistas* and forcefully demonstrates the sinister conduct of the Carrillos.

Among other innumerable abuses, they accused Carrillo of raping the following peasant women: Ignacia Orihuela, Lorenza Balboa de Huamán, Mercedes Pacheco de Huamán, Rosa Santa Cruz de Sánchez, Evarista Sánchez de Cose, and the wife and younger daughter of the *colono* Emilio Contreras. They accused Miguel Carrillo of assaulting Señora Catalina Orihuela de Ccorahua and of inflicting serious cuts and bruises on her, as well as stealing the cows and horses of ten *colonos*.

As is the custom in these cases, long and tedious proceedings began. Despite being guilty of a murder committed in the presence of numerous witnesses, Miguel Carrillo was released immediately and the complainants were imprisoned for "depriving Señor Carrillo of his freedom."

The judicial machinery in the region, which is in the power of the *gamonales*, started to function. The complainants were accused of stealing 20,000 *soles* and sentenced to prison for four years.

And so, on December 20, 1966, the *Corte Superior de Ayacucho* [Supreme Court of Ayacucho] pronounced an incredible sentence:

". . . all these accusations [murders, abuses, crimes of violence—*H. B.*] were unsubstantiated in the trial and in nowise detract from the crime against private property committed against the victim Carrillo Cazorla, as well as the theft of produce and food from his Oronjoy storehouse and the lesions inflicted on him.

"We find the accused Basilio Huamán Ccorahua, Virginia Huamán Berrocal, and Marcelina Castro Ccaicuri guilty of crimes against individual freedom, aggravated assault, and theft of food committed against the person of Miguel Carrillo Cazorla. We sentence the first to six months in prison in the Departmental jail in this city . . . the latter two to six-month suspended terms and payment of 10,000 *soles* by way of compensation which they will pay jointly with those already sentenced."

Saturnino and Emeterio Huamán, relatives of the victim, were kept in prison for four years while the "aggrieved party" Miguel Carrillo enjoyed his freedom. From

prison they kept in communication with their companions in suffering, urging them to keep their morale high and to continue resisting the oppression of the Carrillos.

This was what the province of La Mar was like when the guerrillas arrived.

La Mar, 1965

April, Chinchibamba, a small place in the jungle.

There are a few of us, moving only at night to avoid contacts with the peasants. We do not want them to learn of our presence yet. But they are more skillful. They find our tracks, spot us through the foliage, hear our footsteps. The rumor spreads and the explanations are fantastic—cattle rustlers, "pishtacos,"⁶¹ Communists. . . But what do they know about Communists except what their village priest, their Aprista *hacendado*, or prejudiced schoolmaster has inculcated into their simple, superstitious minds?

We are obstinate and continue marching at night. Our food is gone and for several weeks we have eaten little or nothing. There is no other solution. We have to talk to the peasants.

We begin making friends. The reactions differ. Some distrust us, others fear us, but no one denies us help. When we first look each other over, it is the word "papay" that separates us. "Papay" is the boss, it is any white or mestizo, any foreigner. We have to stop being "papás" ["papas"]. Our fate depends on it.

Another barrier is the language. Very few of us speak Quechua (I only know a few words and my pronunciation is disastrously bad). One *compañero* knows the Quechua of Cuzco, which is pronounced differently. Only one knows the local pronunciation.

Despite these difficulties, friendliness grows and the number of invitations increases. We explain who we are and why we have come, and our language becomes more comprehensible. We have to choose our words carefully. This is the first time many of the peasants have heard them. Those who know Quechua serve as interpreters or speak themselves.

These peasants live in their own world, with their tragedies, rivalries, and joys. They are *comuneros* and are not basically unhappy with their situation. Habituated to seeing their poverty as inevitable, they do not feel victimized. On the basis of forged titles, a would-be *gamonal* sought to exploit part of the area belonging to the *comunidad*. They defended their land against him. The shyster was thrown out and the police protecting him had to withdraw cautiously, later arresting the local leaders.

This was the world we had to integrate ourselves into and we were received with enthusiasm, geniality, and joy.

June 1965. We are no longer "papás"; we are "brothers."⁶² We help wherever we can. The universal problem is doctors. There are no doctors or medicine, and peo-

61. According to local superstition, "pishtacos" are murderers who trade in human fat.

62. We used the word "compañero" or "camarada" [comrade] very little. The word "brother" spread spontaneously throughout the area. It says more and is closer to the psychology of the peasants who associate love and friendship with family ties (your best friend is always a "spiritual" relative). So a guerrilla was always someone's brother. And to find out if a certain person was worthy of confidence we asked if he was a brother or not.

ple die for lack of treatment. An aspirin has inestimable value. We cure the sick and distribute what little medicine we have, which is double reason for being well received. Many agree with our objectives, others just listen, two or three are mistrustful, but at last they all know that we are neither thieves nor bandits. Now, no one is afraid of us and we can go to any house certain of finding food and help.

We note that the population in this locality is sparse and seasonal. The densest population lives in the high places and comes into the ravines or the jungles along the Apurimac river only for a few months. We are interested in making contact with this population but going to the high regions poses the tactical problem of how to move and where to hide. It is not only a problem of terrain but of equipment. A night at 4,500 meters under the open sky is no joke. We would need shelter, blankets, heavy clothing. But we do not have it and we cannot weigh ourselves down carrying it while we are climbing the 3,000 meters that separate us from the summit. However, we will risk it. By night, chilled to the bones by a merciless rain, we climb painfully upward.

A height of 4,500 meters above sea level teaches us some interesting things. You can fight the cold by walking at night and resting by day in the hollows warmed by the meager sun of the high plateau. If you are constantly on the march, no cold can bother you and this is better because it gets you used to moving about in the dark, which is good practice. The visibility is a hundred times better. All you have to do is climb up a little crag and you can see everything that is going on two days' walk away. A good long-range look and the problem is solved. And for protection against aircraft, there are caves. The stony areas can provide hiding places and camouflage for guerrillas. Will the future insurgents rewrite the legendary pages of the *montoneros* [guerrillas of the colonial period]? They will and it will be one of the most interesting contributions to guerrilla tactics in Latin America.

The Peruvian fighters will have to develop the physical capacity for constantly moving back and forth between the mountains and jungle. They will descend vertiginous slopes away from the roads, protected by the vegetation of the eastern Andes, and return to the heights in a constant movement. Their lives will oscillate between 1,000 and 5,000 meters above sea level. This is not a super-human task but it requires complete adaptation to our devilish territory.

In the heights, large landholdings predominate. However, the *hacendado*, a pitiless exploiter, lives as primitively as the peasants. In the whole area, we found beds only in Chapi. The other *hacendados* slept on rough planks or on sheepskins, and ate *mote*⁶³ and parboiled potatoes just like their serfs.

Big landholdings, yes; however, their size is not synonymous with wealth but with hoarding and criminal neglect. Greedy, ignorant, and poverty-stricken, the *latifundista* is the principal obstacle to progress. Not only does he obstinately oppose schools and fight against the teachers; he prevents his workers from cultivating more land than he considers proper, punishes those whose livestock increases too much, and inflicts ferocious reprisals. His spiritual poverty is expressed in the irremediable poverty

of hundreds of families and his material poverty is the result. He fears competence in his serfs; he knows that he is a useless parasite, but he defends his parasitic existence fiercely.

While the exploitation is greater and the social problems are more virulent than in the *comunidad*, the workers have a clearer view of the reality. We do not have to convince them that the landlord, the "*gamonalista*," is their enemy. They know that perfectly well and they cordially hate him. Many had attempted to form unions or build schools. They were punished—given a few lashes, or imprisoned in the ranch house, or denounced to the authorities for Communist agitation. The *hacendado* rebuked them: "Do you want to go to school to learn how to steal?"

Discontent is everywhere and the workers greet us with enthusiasm. When we begin our operations against the *latifundistas*, an indispensable preliminary step for winning their total confidence, their enthusiasm grows. Our armed propaganda, free of speeches but filled with concrete actions against the *gamonales*, brought results.

Little time was needed to drive *latifundismo* from these localities. Many landlords fled without waiting for our arrival. The workers began to realize how different it is to live without a boss. All our actions had their support.

After we took Chapi,⁶⁴ many danced for joy. They even learned to raise their right fist: "Communist!" The *guardias civiles*, great numbers of whom occupied the ranch house after our retreat, rebuked a few who looked unhappy. "Aren't you ashamed of moaning over those scoundrels?" The first ballad appeared, composed by some peddler who traveled the foothills of the *sierra* spreading the news: "*Los guerrilleros cosecharon papa en Chapi.*" [The guerrillas dug potatoes in Chapi.] He made a play on the similarity in his rude Spanish between the words "papa" [potato] and "*papay*" [landlord].

The number of peasants collaborating with the guerrillas increases. The first peasants join. In Sojos, Muyojo, Palljas, and Chapi, they promise to do much more. For the first time we realize with emotion that a powerful link is being forged between the peasants and the guerrillas. With the landlords gone and the army disoriented, unable to find us, we have become the only authority in the region.

But we have committed some gross errors. Our friends are known everywhere. Secret or public, their relations with us are widely known. One day someone tells his wife that he guided us to a given place; she tells it to her neighbor, and the neighbor to the rest. Another day some young man gets drunk at a village fiesta and shouts with pride that he is a Communist and a friend of the guerrillas. Another time we ourselves visit someone in broad daylight. Not all the people are reliable. There are informers, ex-foremen of the *latifundistas*, people who betray or inform, or simply keep their information for the future.

We realize the danger and urge our collaborators to join the guerrilla force. Some do so immediately and others tell us that nothing will happen, not to be afraid, and

64. The seizure of Chapi, in which the hated *hacendados*, the Carrillos, were killed, occurred on September 25, 1965. A military court is still looking into the case.

63. "*Mote*"—boiled maize.

that in any case they know how to take care of themselves.

October 1965. The first army patrols appear, small mobile groups looking like guerrilla bands. They ask the peasants: "Do you know where our *compañeros* are? We bring orders from Lima." It is a crude ruse to locate us but effective in trapping the unwary. We warn against the danger but it is too late.

When the invasion occurs, all our collaborators are tortured, shot, massacred. Terrible vengeance extends to their families, their relatives, and even their houses, which are ruthlessly burned down. The authorities have regressed to the days of 1922. It is systematic savagery to terrify the population and make an example of them for their friendship toward us.

But this terror also reveals cowardliness and insecurity. In no instance do the troops use persuasion or discriminate between the guilty and innocent. It is more practical for them to kill everyone than to investigate. How can they convince the people that they are defending a just cause if their desperation drives them to eliminate the danger quickly without regard for the means? In immersing themselves in the blood of their victims they were trying only to drown their own fear.

There are tremendous lessons in this. The first is that the peasantry is ready to collaborate with the guerrillas. The second is that you must guard the lives of your collaborators as if they were your own. While our survival depends on our mobility, that of our collaborators depends on secrecy. We profited from the first, but unfortunately we neglected the second.

There are differences between the *comuneros* and the *yanaconas*. The former are, in practice, small proprietors who work in complete independence, farming their small plots, consuming their products, and selling coffee and cacao in town. They rely on the *comunidad* only for allotting land to farm (jungle territory) and for opening and maintaining roads. Two fundamental problems affect them—the *latifundio*, which tends to expand at the expense of communal lands; and low prices for their products. While the landlords expel them from the best land, the merchant keeps them in poverty by subjecting them to his economic domination. The *comuneros* defend themselves collectively against the *gamonales*, many times holding them in check through the use of a marvelous collective power. But they are still not on their guard against the merchant because they are used to a disadvantageous relationship in which they sell separately to one buyer. While they employ united action against the landowners, they confront the merchant in isolation. In general, the merchant is one of the richest *comuneros* (if you can call riches a miserable little store selling a few pieces of clothing, matches, and canned food that very few buy) and is one of the town "notables." Frequently he will be the first to collaborate with the army and become the most active informer.

While the merchant is encysted in the *comunidad* like a foreign body, the *latifundista* infiltrates it, corrupting, buying, or pressuring the administrator and the justice of the peace, and intimidating the schoolmaster.

This small world is linked with the world outside by traveling peddlers working out of the provincial or departmental capital or the towns, who are engaged en-

tirely and exclusively in selling manufactured goods of a miserable quality. Some of them are good people with a certain sympathy for the left—they have sons who are university or high-school students influenced by the new ideas. And others are willing police informers.

The mercenaries' first reaction on learning of our presence was to inflict a merciless beating on the communal authorities in the *Prefectura* of Ayacucho and threaten these officials with death if they did not keep them informed of everything that happened. Some became informers and others stayed honest. The *comuneros* respect their authorities and they will always prefer their mayor, their attorney, or their chief, over strangers who come from faraway. Once intimidated, these officials were a dangerous factor working against us.

While dogmatism is harmful for party activists, it can be fatal for guerrillas. In the countryside the guerrillas will come upon new problems both large and minute and they will have to solve them with political clarity and broad-mindedness without losing sight of the objectives for which they took up arms. They will often see conflicts over land between *comuneros* or *yanaconas*, petty family hatreds, rivalries between one town and another. They will be consulted, they will be asked to intercede with this or that person or to pressure him in one way or another. They cannot refuse; the complainant might be offended.

In Ayacucho, as in other places, the *hacendados* call their serfs "*colonos*" [literally "tenant farmers"]. In exchange for a piece of land, the *colonos* are forced to work for the landlord, often without payment. The need for cheap or free labor to do the work on the *hacienda*, which the serfs are very reluctant to provide these days, forces the landlords to use force. And this exacerbates the conflict. Today someone will fail to show up for work and have to be dragged there by force so that his example won't spread. Another day a bull will be taken from its owner to be sold to some merchant. Another day the peasants will have to be prevented from working too hard on their land so that they will not enrich themselves and become rivals of the landlord. A series of abuses great and small generate a climate of hatred and the situation is always ripe for action.

It is an incontrovertible fact that *latifundismo* is decaying everywhere and every day it gets more difficult to maintain it. (This statement refers exclusively to the area in which we were active.) The *gamonales* are selling their land or moving out and leaving their serfs in possession of the fields. Production is dropping and hunger is beginning to nibble at the small landowners. The old structure, eaten away by time, is crumbling. Are we headed toward a reactionary agglomeration of impoverished small proprietors, or toward a liberating social class? Should we expect these serfs, potentially revolutionary because of their conflicts with the *latifundista*, to become petty-bourgeois egoists because of this spontaneous reform? Will the Peruvian oligarchy (the majority of which is composed of the big banks and *latifundistas* of the *Costa*) decide one day to sacrifice their poor relations in the *Sierra* to a demagogic land reform that would deprive the revolution of one of its most solid foundations? If we begin now, this mass will be our ally; if we leave the task for tomorrow, it can become more difficult. Society changes,

and the quiescence of the Peruvian countryside is only on the surface.

The serfs and *comuneros* are closely related. Often serfs have land in a neighboring *comunidad*. And if they don't, they have relatives who are *comuneros*, or vice versa. As a result, these groups are interrelated and overlapping. This is an advantage for us. Any action against a *latifundista* has favorable repercussions in the *comunidad*; and the help we give to the *comunidades* has reverberations on the *haciendas*.

Our warmest hosts were those peasants who in other times had tried to organize their brothers to unite behind demanding payment of wages and protesting abuses. Those who instigated refusing to work for the landlords, those who encouraged independence, defenseless victims of cruel reprisals, were the guerrillas' most devoted supporters and the first to join them. I pay a heartfelt tribute here to Nemesio Junco, a ferryman on the Sojos *hacienda*, a wise, upright, warm-hearted, and almost unbelievably honest *cholo* [Peruvian of mixed blood], a thoroughly good person, and the first to join us as a fighter and to become our brother. He was captured and shot in Sojos. I offer a tribute also to others whose names I cannot mention without endangering their lives.

Dazzled by the new road the guerrillas offered them and inspired by the truth that appeared starkly before their primitive eyes, they quickly became our best propagandists. Many made an unforgettable gesture as they talked to their brothers in their own language, raising their guns in their strong and work-hardened hands: "Brothers, the *gamonalistas* are finished. This is respect!"

These are the facts. Did we have peasant support? If you mean by that a rounded and developed conviction, massive and organized backing, obviously we did not. To ask such things is to deal in metaphysical entities and not realities. If, on the other hand, you call peasant support the cooperation of all, springing from the certainty that we were there to defend them, then unquestionably we had this support and to a degree surpassing our expectations.

To the north and east of our positions we had the Campas [an Arawak Indian people]. Originally, they inhabited all Chinchibamba,⁶⁵ but a few decades ago they were driven into the jungle. The independent ones farm and trade but continue practicing their old customs. Others, the rebels, went away to live in the mountains as yet beyond the reach of the white man's greed, returning to tribal collectivism, with their chiefs but without exploiters. In general, the Campas are subjected to pitiless assaults. Still today, as in barbarous times, the *latifundistas* raid their villages and, after driving off the adults, take the children to raise as slaves on their *haciendas* under the pretext of "civilizing them." These primitive people grow up as slaves, serving the landlords their entire lives. On the Osambre *hacienda*, one of the places that continues to use these methods in the middle of the twentieth century, the Campas are packed into two separate compounds, one for men and one for women. Of course, they receive no wages. They are forbidden to maintain relations of any kind with the outside world. Besides, very few outsiders come to such remote places. The landlord, a Yugo-

slav who showed up mysteriously in the locality and whose background no one knows, has an expert knowledge of the jungle and the customs and habits of the Indians who live in it. In addition, he speaks their language; and all this helps him exploit them better, often ruthlessly. The landlords can get away with any horrendous outrage, with murdering any of their workers. The police never find out about it since the closest outpost of civilization is Quillabamba, the provincial capital, which is six days away by foot over mountain paths. Since no authority reaches here, the *latifundista* is lord and master of the region.

Both the Catholic and Protestant religions, with their myths and fantasies, are ideally suited to the purposes of the landlord. In the primitive imagination, fear of God blends with fear of the landlord. Attacking the landlord is attacking God. Instinctively attracted to the free life, some Campas manage to escape into the jungle. But they don't get far because the landlord knows the jungle as well as they do and has the advantage of money and guns. Since no bad examples, which might prove dangerously infectious among the other slaves, can be allowed, fugitives are generally liquidated. Other times, despite the ban imposed by the landlord, a love affair develops between some Campa woman and one of the *comuneros* living near the *hacienda*. Then, as in the moving pictures, the outsider has to abduct the Indian woman and flee with her far beyond range of the landlord's ire.

Approaching and making friends with the rebel Campas, freeing the slaves, and driving out the oppressive *latifundistas* will be immediate tasks for the guerrillas, constituting their best propaganda. But this will not be easy. If there is an obvious gap between a Quechua peasant and a Creole guerrilla, this gap is still wider in the case of the jungle dwellers. In order for these two to understand each other, a long process of adaptation will be necessary in which the guerrillas learn new dialects and customs.

After many experiences which won us the sympathy of the inhabitants, overconfidence took us beyond the edge into severe conflicts. A series of successes caused us to overestimate our strength. Moreover, some desertions occurred, reducing the numbers of the guerrillas and cutting into our firepower.

We were really a small group. In our most difficult moments we dropped as low as thirteen. Moreover, the lack of communication with the urban centers kept us from being able to count on a steady recruitment of men.

We were surrounded. The encirclement did not endanger the existence of the guerrilla group itself, which was able to move around fairly easily under these conditions. But it made communications with the outside hazardous. In late 1965 our attempts had failed.

It must be admitted that we made an error in not giving sufficient importance to such connections and relying too much on recruitment in the zone where we were operating. Our intention was to find provisions and guerrillas in the area. The first was easy, especially for a group as small as ours. The second was feasible but required too long a process, because of the peasants' typical slowness in making decisions. The peasants will decide finally to join the guerrillas but they will ponder it and weigh all the possibilities before doing so. On the

65. The word "Chinchibamba" derives from "Chunchuypampa" or the pampa of "Chunchos" (forest dwellers).

other hand, the guerrilla force requires numerous recruits quickly in order to achieve maximum combat effectiveness.

Our smallness prevented us from undertaking large-scale actions against the army. Nonetheless, we relied on our knowledge of the terrain and on the many friends we had in all localities. We began to move around by day on well-known roads, depending on the information provided by the population and neglecting elementary precautions. The source of our confidence was the army's fruitless efforts to locate us and their fear of crossing rivers, streams, and rough ground watched by us.

We knew that while we stayed constantly on the move, there was no imminent danger. Moreover, the roughness of the terrain, abounding in immense heights and deep canyons, made real encirclement impossible in practice. In reality, the enemy was limited to watching the most well-known passes, which, naturally, we did not use.

For a good while, the guerrillas and the soldiers played hide and seek, looking for each other and engaging in brief skirmishes. If the guerrillas, sticking to the mobile tactics for which they were perfectly suited, had attempted a long march to some other equally well-populated areas, they would have gotten away and left the army holding the bag.

But any guerrilla who feels that he is master of a certain terrain and feels he knows it, begins to cling to it blindly. And then he is lost, because not all his information is accurate and he does not have the necessary intelligence concerning the enemy.

Late in 1965 clash after clash turned out badly for the guerrillas until an army unit caught them by surprise in a place known as Tincoj. Three *compañeros* died in this battle, including Edgardo Tello. The rest of the guerrilla force was broken up and scattered.

In a jungle as dense and rugged as the one we were operating in, it was practically impossible to reach a rendezvous. Despite all our attempts, we were unable to re-form.

Perhaps a larger group could have gotten through these difficult moments despite being badly battered. But there were very few of us and losing a single man was a real blow.

Once the guerrilla force was broken up and the fighters dispersed, each individual was left to his own fate. And they gave up their lives under the implacable fire of a genuine manhunt.

The individual fate of the *compañeros* is not known. Some died fighting. Others were captured, imprisoned, and later shot by the army intelligence services. The rest are still being hunted throughout the country.

In 1967 ELN *compañeros* also died at Che's side in the epic of Nanchahuazú. Their names were Juan Pablo Chang Navarro (*El Chino* [the Chinese]); José Cabrera Flores (*El Negro* [the Negro]), and Lucio Galván (Eustaquio).

The Causes of the Failure

Why did we fail? What was the source of the failure in Ayacucho?

The scattering and liquidation of the guerrilla force was not the result of a lack of peasant support. This sup-

port existed in manifold forms, as we have seen previously. The area, rough and unfamiliar to the army, was well chosen.

The roots of this failure must be sought in the guerrilla force itself and in its leadership.

In this as in other cases, a group of men, the majority of whom came from the city, tried to function militarily in strange surroundings.

Unfamiliarity with the land is a disadvantage which can be overcome rapidly if the unit is capable and active. The guerrilla force had the ability to overcome this obstacle and did so in fact. But it did not always use the knowledge it acquired, often preferring the easier but far more dangerous work of marching along well-known roads.

In doing this, it left a trail of information which many peasants could not keep secret when they were tortured and beaten. The guerrilla force could not anticipate concretely the breadth and depth the repression would assume.

The guerrillas won many friends but they were unable to protect them. Everyone knew who their collaborators were. When the army arrived, all it had to do to terrorize the rest of the population was to shoot these collaborators.

Moreover, the language remained a barrier separating the insurgents from the inhabitants. The peasants identify Spanish with the landlords, above all in places like Ayacucho where the percentage of the population speaking Quechua is very high. To inspire confidence, the guerrillas must speak Quechua correctly; and not just any kind of Quechua but the dialect of the region in which they are operating. As is well known, the language differs markedly from region to region in Peru.

Customs are another barrier. It requires a great deal of discipline for a body of men to learn to respect, imitate and *love* the peasants' ancient customs, so as not to offend their feelings by insensitive attitudes. It requires discipline, affection for the peasants, and modesty. And these characteristics are not always present in young student or political activists, who are filled with a certain intellectual self-satisfaction that repels simple men and who follow a style of day-to-day life that often clashes with the habits of country people.

Despite the sympathy from which they benefited, the guerrillas needed to gain a greater insight into the customs of the local people. This would have made it possible for them to spot treacherous elements more accurately and to gain better and more timely intelligence on the movements of the enemy.

A strict application of the guerrilla tactic with all its characteristics of mobility, evasiveness, concealment, and rapid attack and retreat requires considerable physical capacity on the part of the fighters and top-notch military ability on the part of the leadership. In all, it requires iron discipline and smooth functioning of the entire group. In this respect, the ELN guerrilla force, like all those that operated in 1965, was not up to the level required to overcome the difficulties and confront a numerous and well-trained enemy.

In the present conditions it is still possible for a small team of men to operate successfully in the peasant areas.

In order to achieve this, the principles of guerrilla warfare that were more or less neglected in 1965 must be

strictly applied. And the guerrillas must link their action to the masses struggling for national and local demands of concern to them.

This can be done by a team with great political, organizational, and military capacity. Such a team must be trained not in the liberal atmosphere of the urban left but in the heat of battle. And by its skillful conduct this

team must develop new fighters native to the region.

When a peasant sees a guerrilla, newly arrived from the city, act and speak in his defense, he will sympathize and collaborate with him. But when he sees his own brother in a revolutionary army, speaking his own language with his own accent, he will follow him unhesitatingly.

[To be continued]

'Hold On to Your Placard . . .'

Ceylon Mercantile Union Backs Port Strikers

Some 25,000 members of the Ceylon Mercantile Union [CMU], one of the largest unions in Ceylon, have been on a general strike since February 1 in support of the striking port workers in Colombo. The latter are demanding wage increases and payment on a monthly rather than daily basis. They have been on strike since early in December.

Premier Dudley Senanayake has used army and navy personnel as strikebreakers to load ships. The government has refused to authorize management personnel of the Port (Cargo) Corporation, the state-owned trust that runs the docks, from negotiating with the seven unions of the Joint Front leading the port strike. Police have beaten workers on the picket lines.

One of the most serious incidents occurred at the Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation where naval troops have been stationed since January 23 to prevent "disruption" by CMU workers striking in solidarity with the dockers.

P. Bala Tampoe, general secretary of the CMU, protested the conduct of the troops in a January 27 letter to the prime minister.

"Pursuant to a decision of the General Council of our Union," Tampoe said, "we have to request you to take steps immediately (1) for the complete withdrawal of Navy personnel from the premises of the Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation, where they have been stationed from 12 noon on 23rd January 1970, and (2) to institute a public inquiry into the conduct of the Naval unit that was stationed on the grounds of the Ceylonese Ladies Hockey Club, opposite the premises of the Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation at Torrington Square, on the morning of the 18th of January 1970, with particular reference to the threat

made by officers of that unit to shoot some of the members of our Branch in the Corporation, who had entered those grounds to play a soft-ball cricket match for which permission had been duly obtained."

On February 1 an attempt was made to assassinate Bala Tampoe during a meeting of the union's General Council at the CMU headquarters. The would-be assailant, who was armed with a knife, was apprehended by members of the council.

Tampoe denounced the government's threats of military violence and the attempt on his own life in a speech to a union meeting at Newnham Playgrounds on Slave Island, February 2.

"If the Government is using the armed forces against us," he said, according to the February 12 Colombo weekly *Ceylon News*, "we too will pay them back with the same coin. We too have soldiers, who are not only prepared to fight for our cause, but are ready to lay down their lives for it. . . ."

"If any of our members are killed, not only their killers but their agents too will be destroyed."

On the assassination attempt, he said, "It is known that this assailant who is a CMU Member, is a wharf peon in a British Imperialist Firm where we have an extensive branch of our union."

Tampoe sharply criticized the conduct of the Lanka Sama Samaja party-led unions in Colombo which have refused to honor the strike.

He denounced the arrest of strike pickets by police, pointing out that there is no law against carrying picket signs.

"Hold on to your placard until it is wrenched from you," he told the

strikers. "Those placards are your weapons against the Government."

On February 2 the leaders of the Joint Front issued a public letter to Prime Minister Senanayake. "In view of the long continuance of the strike," they said, "and notwithstanding the fact that the number of workers on strike has diminished in the meantime, a serious state of confusion prevails in the Ports, and heavy losses have already resulted therefrom.

"The continued use of military units for work in the Ports will not provide a solution. This requires the resumption of normal work in the Ports, which cannot take place unless the strike is settled. We would request you, therefore, even at this stage, to direct the Port (Cargo) Corporation, in accordance with recognized democratic principles, to have discussions with us, with a view to a settlement of the strike."

Police Seize 'Porque' Editor

Six armed men surrounded Mario Menendez, the editor of the Mexican radical magazine *Porque*, while he was walking along a street on the night of February 12. He was forced into a car at gunpoint and taken away. The circumstances of Menendez's disappearance were reported by Alfonso Cisneros, the business manager of the magazine, who was with him when he was abducted.

On February 14 the state prosecutor announced that Menendez was in the hands of the police and was being charged with financing guerrilla training camps in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco. He was also accused of being responsible for various bombings in Mexico City over the past six months.

Porque is virtually the only militant opposition journal still published openly in Mexico. It was the only one to print pictures of the massacre of demonstrators in Tlaltelolco on October 2, 1968. It has distinguished itself as well by exposing financial scandals involving high government officials.