

Intercontinental Press

Africa

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Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 8, No. 6

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February 16, 1970

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U.S. Senate (Deleted) Debate on (Deleted) Policy



"FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]"

Bertrand Russell: 1872-1970

Meaning of Okinawa Strikes

Belgium:

**Limbourg Miners Spark
Militant Strike Wave**

The Case of Vladimir Borisov

A Review by Gisela Mandel:

Peter Weiss's New Play: 'Trotsky in Exile'

Six Times as Filthy

According to Alfred Friendly Jr, writing from Coccolia to his newspaper, the *New York Times* (January 30), the inhabitants of the sunny Italian village near the Adriatic are "furious." They have decided to change the name of their town to "Puzzolia," which is "freely translatable as 'Stinkville.'"

The older generation can recall when their stream, the Ronco, ran clean and pure. "When I was growing up," said Marisa Balzani, "we used to wash our clothes and take baths in the Ronco. Now just the smell of the river makes you want to vomit."

What happened was capitalist progress. Upstream now stand imposing enterprises, including a distillery and two sugar refineries. Downstream stretches "the longest water closet in the world" or "the toilet of the authorities," as hand-painted signs at the edge of town inform tourists.

Dr. Analdo Foschi, director of the Provincial Hygiene Laboratory at nearby Foli, who has been studying the Ronco for twenty years, admits that a problem exists. The river alternately floods and evaporates, but the industrial plants continue to pour their effluents into the stream. "It is a true sewer," he said.

Luciano Ghetti, leader of the local protest movement, disputes this. "In the summertime," he told a visitor, "the Ronco dries up but the industries and the towns upstream continue to throw their untreated wastes into it. Studies have been made that show the stream is six times as filthy as the ordinary sewer."

The *Times* correspondent points out that Coccolia is not the only town in Italy faced with inordinate pollution. "In a country of 50 million people there are fewer than 20 sewage treatment plants, experts in Rome say."

The authorities aren't doing much about it. Legislation has hardly improved over the regulations of feudal times. But the 600 inhabitants of Coccolia are doing something. They have set up roadblocks and are passing out handbills to motorists explaining why they can't stand the stink any more and why the town is now Puzzolia.

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Intercontinental Press, Post Office Box 635, Madison Square Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, and black liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion,

unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York 10010. Because of the continuing deterioration of the U.S. postal system, please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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Limbourg Miners Touch Off Militant Strike Wave

By Les Evans

Some 5,000 workers at the General Motors plant at Antwerp struck February 2, bringing to 36,000 the number on strike in the Flemish-speaking region of Belgium. The strikewave was initiated by the coal miners of Limbourg province who have been on a "wildcat" strike since January 6. The new upsurge of labor unrest is the most severe in nearly a decade—since the general strike of December 1960-January 1961.

The miners—about 18,000 at first—walked out in opposition to a contract signed by their union leaders and the big collieries. The Fédération Générale des Travailleurs de Belgique [FGTB—General Federation of Belgian Workers] and the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens [CSC—Confederation of Christian Trade Unions], Belgium's two largest labor federations, have opposed the strike from the beginning.

The miners are demanding an immediate 15 percent wage increase to meet the sharp increases in the cost of living they face. The contract called for only a 4 percent increase January 1 to be followed by another 6 percent over an eighteen-month period. The average salary of a surface worker in the collieries is 436 Belgian francs [US\$8.72] a day; an underground miner makes 510 francs [US\$10.20] a day.

The strike was organized by a rank-and-file workers group called the Comité de Grève Permanent [Permanent Strike Committee]. Leaders of the committee charge that coal is sold at less than its actual value as an indirect subsidy to the steel companies. The difference is made up in a direct government subsidy to the collieries, which claim that because they are subsidized already, they cannot afford to raise wages.

In the first week of the strike, the number of participants grew to 23,000 out of a total of 25,000 miners in the industry. By January 14 all the coalpits in Limbourg were closed.

In the absence of backing from their unions, the miners have drawn heav-

ily on support from the student and youth movements, particularly the Jeune Garde Socialiste [JGS—Socialist Young Guard—the Belgian Trotskyist youth organization and a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International].

The press and the union leadership have tried to discredit the strike by claiming that the Permanent Strike Committee is unrepresentative of the ranks. But the continuing growth and solidarity of the strike has effectively refuted this argument. The strikers took part in two mass demonstrations called by the Permanent Strike Committee to further drive the point home—at Hasselt on January 16 and at Genk on January 24.

There have been a number of sharp clashes with the police, and in at least one case, at the Winterslag colliery, the workers have occupied the mine.

A major confrontation on January 23 forced the government to back down on an attempt to use the payment of bonuses as a weapon to defeat the strike. The miners were scheduled to receive their bonuses for 1969 on February 15—about 6,000 Belgian francs per man [US\$120]. The government, however, in what the Paris daily *Le Monde* described as its "greatest blunder" of the strike, announced that miners reporting for work on January 23 would be paid their bonuses immediately.

The strike committee denounced the government's action as "blackmail." The committee called for mass picketing the morning of January 23 to prevent anyone from collecting their bonus at the regular opening time of 6:00 a.m. At 2:00 in the afternoon all the strikers would walk up to the pay windows together and demand their money.

The January 25-26 issue of *Le Monde* described the mood of the strikers on the morning of the confrontation at the Waterschei colliery:

"Friday, the 'decisive day' for the miners of Limbourg, whose 'wildcat' strike has lasted three weeks, passed in confusion but without serious in-

cidents among the towers and massive buildings of the colliery of Waterschei, the Limbourg mine at the center of the conflict. The big avenue, white with frost, that leads to the entrance is strewn with debris. Behind some not too impressive barricades improvised out of billboards, signposts, and felled trees, the striking pickets warmed themselves around a flickering fire and waited for the 'test of strength.'

"Since the beginning of the conflict the volunteers who mount guard during the freezing night have been mainly 'Southerners': Asturians muffled in thick scarfs and leaning on clubs, Neopolitans lost in the Nordic mists, Greeks, Turks or Kabyles whose animated accents are surprising here in Flanders. In the neighboring bar, which has become the advance post of the 'revolution,' the strikers drink their beer and gin, and the benches along the wall are occupied by confrontationist students and 'Jeunes Gardes Socialistes,' who have come to the mining area to support the strike."

About 500 strikers appeared at Waterschei to collect their bonuses. Police were called out to guard the colliery gates, armed with clubs, carbines, and tear-gas grenades. There were no serious injuries, although gas was used against the strikers.

At Winterslag, some 500 workers entered the colliery and occupied it from 2:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m.

A battle took place at Zolder where a car and a police bus were burned.

On January 27 the cabinet conceded to the strikers' demand for the immediate payment of bonuses to all miners without conditions.

* * *

The strike spread to the automobile industry January 30 when 9,000 workers halted operations at the Ford plant in Genk, in Limbourg province. They are demanding pay raises and a forty-hour week.

The Ford workers clashed with police within hours after the strike be-

gan, when pickets stoned cars of strike-breakers leaving after the morning shift. According to the February 1-2 *Le Monde*, "The police charged, clubs in hand, and used tear-gas grenades. Several demonstrators were arrested."

The government is seeking to split the miners and auto workers from their youth and student allies. The minister of the interior has ordered the arrest of all persons in the vicinity of the struck plants and mines who are not regular workers. On February 2, forty-eight persons were arrested under this order at the Genk Ford plant and in the Limbourg mines.

As the strikes spread, the union bureaucrats appear to have been forced to make some concessions in face of the mood of rising militancy. Thus, while the miners are on a wildcat strike opposed by the union officials, the Ford workers are staging a "spontaneous" strike, sanctioned after it began by the bureaucrats. The General Motors workers are participating in a "legal" strike, inasmuch as their union leaders approved the action before the workers walked out.

The JGS summed up its assessment of the current stage of the strike and the immediate perspectives in a report in the January 31 issue of the revolutionary-socialist weekly *La Gauche* published in Brussels:

"The JGS distributed a tract Saturday [January 24—at the Genk demonstration] which concluded by indicating a certain perspective, calling, in effect, for an occupation of the mines.

"The same thing has happened in other places more or less successfully. It is not a question of provocation, but of the *strict defense of the miners' rights*. This initiative has been taken in close collaboration with the Permanent Committee. It is in this sense that the keynote has been sounded by the Jeunes Gardes after consultation with the miners, particularly those of Winterslag.

"After Saturday's big demonstration, the strike needs to take a step forward. The next stage cannot be a new demonstration because the demonstrations of Hasselt and of Genk have fully proved that the Permanent Committee constitutes the true leadership of this strike, as much in relation to the union as in relation to the Force des Mineurs [Miners' Force]. The workers had to demand what was due them. And a

frontal attack on the mines by groups of miners was never envisaged without the support of the miners as a whole.

"We are clearly not opposed to such a perspective, but we think that it is necessary for the workers to win successive victories for objectives which correspond to a spirit and consciousness which is developing among the mass of miners. It is, then, in a prolongation of the action engaged in since last Friday that we have spoken

Belgium

Appeal to German Workers for Solidarity

The Council of Administrators of the Belgian steel industry admitted in the February 3 issue of the conservative Brussels daily *La Libre Belgique* that West German and American coal was being brought into the Liège steel district in an effort to break the strike of the Limbourg coal miners.

The following day an appeal to the West German workers and left organizations was jointly issued by the well-known Marxist economist Ernest Mandel, on behalf of the editorial board of the Brussels revolutionary-socialist weekly *La Gauche*, and by Nicole Gérard, for the executive committee of the Jeune Garde Socialiste [Young Socialist Guard—the Belgian Trotskyist youth organization].

"Do not let German coal be used to break the strike of the Limbourg miners," Mandel and Gérard urged.

"The creation of the Common Market," they said, "the facilitation of transport of freight, the international interlinking of capital endangers *every* strike, those of the German workers as well, if the wage workers do not stand in international solidarity against the international solidarity displayed by the bosses!

"In this sense every blow against the transport of German coal to Belgium strengthens and defends the German trade unions and future German strikes. Indifferent passivity to and toleration of such strikebreaking maneuvers are crimes, not only against the Limbourg miners but also against the power of the German trade unions and against the interests of the German wage earners.

of an occupation of the mines, in agreement with the Permanent Committee.

"Evidently, when the press posed the question to Slegers [a leader of the Permanent Committee], he voiced disapproval of an occupation of the classic type, that is, a frontal attack against the police in which the mines are occupied en masse.

"What is the situation now? If the bonuses are paid, we must continue the struggle for the 15 percent."

"The Limbourg miners have kept up their strike for four weeks. An attempt has been made to starve them out. Up to now they have not received the full strike pay which is due to them. They lack food and medicine. Nevertheless the strike has now spread to two important automobile factories—Ford-Genk and General Motors-Antwerp (with full trade-union support in these two cases)—and it can also spread to Ford-Antwerp. 50,000 workers are on strike.

"In Limbourg, for the first time since the creation of the Common Market, a 'Europe of the workers' has developed—on a modest scale and still to a small extent. The striking miners are Flemish, Walloons, Greeks, Turkish, Spaniards, and Italians. The appeals and declarations of the strike leadership appear in six languages. At meetings, six languages are spoken. And contrary to the fears of all skêptics and defeatists, it must be said that the collaboration is beginning to work.

"German trade unionists and German workers must not permit themselves to be used as strikebreakers in this admirable struggle. They should not let a single ton of coal, a single ton of coke, come into Belgium as long as the strike continues."

New Beast Takes Bow in "Pogo"

Artist Walt Kelly has introduced a new beast in his "Pogo" cartoon strip that looks like Agnew. Kelly said the beast will be a "heavy" like the hyena he drew in the McCarthyite period resembling the witch-hunting senator.

U.S. Senate (Deleted) Debate on (Deleted) Policy

By Dick Roberts

New confirmation of the escalating U.S. involvement in the Laotian civil war came from the United States Senate, January 21. The Senate made public in the *Congressional Record* a "sanitized" version of a secret debate on U.S. policy in Laos held last December 15.

The heavily censored transcript of the debate justified recent reports that Washington has launched a massive bombing attack against those parts of Laos under the effective control of the Pathet Lao.*

The fact of a major U.S. military commitment to the Vientiane regime was underlined in the Senate debate by constant warnings from participants that Laos "is turning into another Vietnam."

Here is a typical section of the transcript: The speakers are J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a leading "dove"; and Senator Allen J. Ellender, a Louisiana Democrat and Pentagon mouthpiece.**

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator may know the situation but I did not know the situation on these bombings in the north. [Deleted.] I did not know it. I did not know apparently what the Senator knows about this operation. But I do not see, if this

* Arnold Abrams and T.D. Allman reported from Vientiane in the January 1 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* that U.S. bombing of Laos has already reached the level of the attack on North Vietnam. See "Laos: '20,000 Bombing Sorties a Month,'" *Intercontinental Press*, January 19, 1970, page 27.

** All quotations in this article are from the official transcript which appeared in the *Congressional Record*, January 21, pages E151-E166. In this transcript, censored remarks are indicated by the word "deleted" in brackets. According to the transcript itself, it was Senator Ellender's job "to approve, to sanitize and to clear the final version"; this undoubtedly meant it was Ellender's job to pass the transcript through the required censorship bureaus of the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence Agency. The "sanitized" version was not published until five weeks after the secret debate.

is in the national interest, why it is not open and public knowledge . . . Nearly everyone that has spoken out recently has said that they think it was a mistake to become involved in Vietnam or, in this instance, in Laos. [Deleted.] This is escalating into a major operation. [Deleted.]

"Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]

"Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]

"Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]

"Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]"

On no occasion did testimony revealing the area of bombing, type and number of aircraft, or weight of bombloads escape the censor's pen. Senator Frank Church, Idaho "dove" candidate for the Democratic party presidential nomination in 1968, charged:

"The present activities in the nature of aerial sorties over Laos are in violation of the [1962 Geneva] Accord. [Deleted.]"

Ellender responded by attempting to "justify" the bombings on the grounds that they are directed only against North Vietnamese troops allegedly moving to South Vietnam through Laos: "There is no question but that [deleted] these sorties were [deleted] for the purpose of interdicting men and supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh trails into South Vietnam. [Deleted.]"

One bit of information about the bombing did slip through the "sanitized" transcript: The bombing is *not* being financed by the money supplied to the Royal Laotian Army, a figure which has been made public. Senator John Stennis, Mississippi Democratic chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, said: "We have been carrying on military aid in many forms since World War II. A very small sum of military aid is involved directly here [\$94,000,000 — D. R.] . . . That money . . . is not involved in the bombing."

The point under debate was an

amendment to the military appropriations bill passed by the Senate later that same day. The bill supplied \$69,300,000 for war expenditures in the fiscal year 1970, beginning next July 1. The amendment was sponsored by Mike Mansfield, another "dove," who is the Democratic party majority leader in the Senate. The wording of Mansfield's amendment is significant:

"SEC. 643. None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used for the support of local forces in Laos or Thailand except to provide supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, or to provide training for such local forces."

It was generally reported in the U.S. press that Mansfield's amendment implied nonsupport of the Vientiane regime's war against the Pathet Lao. This could not be further from the truth. Mansfield and other "doves" made it abundantly clear in the secret debate where they stood on the question of the Laotian civil war.

"To look at it particularly, without any personal feelings, insofar as I can," said Mansfield, "if we were to take away this air support from the Royal Laotian Army and the Royal Laotian Government which is being furnished at the request of the Lao Government, it is quite possible that the 50,000 to 55,000 North Vietnamese who are in Laos, contrary to the Geneva accords—I think they were a signatory to those accords—would then find it easy to sweep down into the Mekong to take over the capitals of Luang Prabang and Vientiane."

Mansfield's theme was then taken up by Senator Stephen Young, Ohio Democrat, and the one senator who has publicly demanded immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Said Young, ". . . the Senator from Montana [Mansfield] made my point much better than I could myself with reference to the step-up in the bombing of Laos and especially of north Laos . . . [which] corresponds with the

increase of the number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. It was to our interest to bomb those troops. It also is much more preferable to bomb them, than to send our men in there."

Or to put it plainly, the "doves" are 100 percent in favor of the genocidal bombing of Laos.

Then what were the "doves" against? Why the secret debate? What did the amendment really mean? Senator Jacob Javits, New York Republican, pressed Mansfield on these questions:

"Mr. JAVITS. Then there is no word in this amendment that deals with American forces at all?

"Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

"Mr. JAVITS. My second question is this: We understand what we are going to give them—supplies, materiel, equipment, facilities, maintenance and training. Now, what are we not going to give them by this amendment?

"Mr. MANSFIELD. Ground combat troops.

"Mr. JAVITS. American combat troops are ruled out; they are not provided for. But we are not going to give them money to engage in combat with or pay salaries of soldiers who fight?

"Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, we are; and that would be continued, because if we did not subsidize the Laotians, they would not last for a fortnight. . . . That is common knowledge. If the Senator read the New York Times, from his own State, just a month or so ago it had a 2- or 3-page analysis of what was going on in Thailand and Laos. This is not a secret; this is public information."

Mansfield was pressed from another side. The "doves" were claiming that they didn't have previous knowledge about the bombing of Laos. "Let me make a couple of comments here which are of interest," Senator Peter Dominick, a Colorado Republican, said:

"When we were at the White House in 1967, and President Johnson called us down in equal thirds on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday in 1967, I think the Senator from Arkansas [Fulbright] was there. At that time a map was shown of Southeast Asia by Secretary [of Defense] McNamara, on which he had dots in Laos. Someone asked what those dots were. He said, 'Those are the areas [deleted] we are engaged in bombing.' [Deleted.] This was at the White House in 1967.

. . . We knew and I knew what was going on in Laos for a considerable period of time."

If what Mansfield really had in mind was simply a bill preventing the use of U. S. ground combat forces in Laos, why didn't the Senate pass such a bill? Javits suggested a substitute amendment:

"None of the funds appropriated by this act shall be used for ground forces



"CHURCH. [Deleted.]"

in Laos or Thailand except to provide supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, for the support of local forces or to provide training for such local forces."

Careful reading of Javits's substitute amendment shows that only one "operative" word has been changed: The Mansfield amendment reads "local" forces; the Javits substitute reads "ground" forces. But that is precisely the change that neither the "doves" nor the Pentagon adherents wanted to make. In fact, the wording of the Mansfield amendment *does not exclude the use of U. S. ground combat forces in Laos*. Only one's personal interpretation of the amendment—if one so chooses—makes that exclusion!

Senator John Pastore, Democrat from Rhode Island, touched on the reasoning of the Mansfield amendment: ". . . after reading the amendment of the Senator from Montana very carefully and listening to his explanation, I think we should either accept his amendment or do without his amendment, because if we become too clear, I am afraid that all we are going to do is hint to our enemy to the extent that he will intensify his infiltration in Laos . . .

"We all know that is what we mean. The Defense Department knows what we mean. . . . Therefore, why do we not let that stand there and rely on one another's integrity . . . ?"

Javits withdrew his substitute proposal. At the same time, however, he shifted the debate onto grounds where there really are matters that irritate the "doves": The question of White House usurpation of the control of foreign policy. In Washington's language, it is the question of "Executive" domination of foreign policy over "Legislative." And related to this question is the question of the details of that foreign policy, the actual commitments in Washington's global military entanglements. The members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the "dove" stronghold, have long been annoyed by White House effrontery on this score. They often say that they got dragged into the war in Vietnam without knowing what was going on, and if there are going to be "two, three . . . many Vietnams," they want to know more about the details.

Senator Javits took the lead: "I am not going to go into the details of how the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was recommended and discussed, and how it was used, and the toll in lives as a result," said Javits.

This was the resolution, adopted by both houses of Congress in 1964, that President Johnson seized upon to "legalize" his escalation of the Vietnam war. It was the first and last time the White House deigned to ask Congress for a direct vote on Vietnam war policies.

Fulbright picked up Javits's comment and turned to the questions that were bothering him. For one, the Foreign Relations Committee had recently attempted to question the U. S. Ambassador to Laos about what was going on there, and the committee had been rebuffed. Said Fulbright,

"This practice as between the legislature—the Senate—and the Executive with respect to our Ambassador [deleted] is an unacceptable practice.

"I have been in this body 25 years, and 2 years in the other body, and I have never before heard an Ambassador tell the committee that he cannot talk about [deleted], under instructions. He said he had been instructed [deleted]. . . .

"Recently, the fifth amendment was taken by Army officers, but that is also less unprecedented. Here we had [deleted].

"This again indicates a certain attitude on the part of the executive branch—and I do not say it is just this Executive, but the previous administration, too. . . .

"I thought it was my duty to raise this question. *The central question is whether this body had a right to know what it is voting on.*" (Emphasis added.)

Fulbright attempted to draw out the main lesson of Vietnam: "The war in Vietnam began, before we ever had any combat troops there, as a civil war. Once we entered it with combat troops in the Kennedy administration, then it became an international war." And Fulbright ended his comments with a significant observation: "I would close with this thought: It is not only the secrecy in Laos. We run into the same thing in *the Philippines* and *Thailand*. [Deleted.]" (Emphasis added.)

But knowing the Pentagon's plans, having more to say about them, and even having tactical differences with them—although no such differences were expressed in this debate on the question of Laos—are not the same thing as objecting to the fundamental military strategy of U.S. imperialism.

The senators on the Foreign Relations Committee are no less aware than senators who speak for the Pentagon that "wars of national liberation" tend to go over into wars that must embroil U.S. military forces. However much they fear the political ramifications, they do not oppose the fundamental necessities of imperialism.

Senator Fulbright's support of the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam was expressed in this debate in a particularly ironic exchange between Fulbright and Senator Barry Goldwater, who was reelected from his home state of Arizona to the Senate in 1968.

Fulbright had once again reiterated the experience of Vietnam:

"President Johnson said throughout the summer and early fall of 1964 that he was against a wider war.

"I believe the Senator from Arizona did advocate some of the things that were later done by President Johnson.

"Mr. GOLDWATER. In his heart he knew I was right.

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I look back upon it, I believe you were, too."

And so the fluttering of the "doves" comes down to what it really is—fluttering—and something of a sham at that.

Mansfield's amendment was adopted

by the Senate with a few frank words:

". . . there is something to be said for ambiguous language," stated the Democrat Mansfield, "and there is a great deal more to be said for the intent of the Senate."

Republican Senator Clifford Case, a strong Nixon supporter from New Jersey, joined in: "I wish to express agreement with the conclusion just stated by the majority leader. The language is ambiguous. Our beloved colleague, the Senator from Kentucky [John Sherman Cooper, author of the Mansfield amendment], has a very subtle mind, and so does our majority leader."

Iranian Students Hold Convention

By Javad Sadeg

The Confederation of Iranian Students (National Union) held its tenth annual convention in Karlsruhe, Germany, December 27 through January 4.

About 400 Iranian students, fifty-six of whom were delegates, came from universities around the world—from Istanbul to Moscow and Berkeley. The representatives of students in Iran were conspicuously absent; the shah's regime does not allow the students in Iran to organize, much less participate in a convention where the opposition to the oppressive regime and its imperialist backers is the major item on the agenda.

The convention resolved to continue to call public attention to the activities of the shah's secret police (SAVAK) and to keep campaigning in defense of the political prisoners in Iran.

The number of political prisoners is steadily increasing. Parviz Nikkhah, one of the founders of the confederation, who, together with his comrades, was saved from execution five years ago through a massive international defense campaign, is still being held in prison in southern Iran.

The convention also decided to open a discussion on the attitude the organization is to take in relation to the struggles of the Iranian people, in particular towards the struggles of the toilers. During the year, seminars will be organized to study the nature of

feudalism in Iran and the antifederal, anti-imperialist character of the resistance movement.

On the international level the organization reiterated its earlier positions and voiced support to the Vietnamese revolution and the Palestinian resistance struggle; it condemned U.S. and Zionist aggression. In this connection it was decided to make preparations to leave the IUS [International Union of Students, an ossified organization controlled by the Soviet bureaucracy] and start towards organizing an international anti-imperialist student movement.

The convention again condemned the support given to the shah by the Soviet government and decided to open a discussion on the character of the Soviet Union and its international policies.

The delegates of the Iranian Students Association in the U.S. submitted a motion proposing that the confederation consider as its long-term allies the student organizations in the imperialist countries with a working-class orientation. This was approved.

Deliberations on the credentials of some of the delegates took up an unexpected three days, and at the end of the convention no slate for new officers was agreed upon. An interim committee was elected which will call a special convention within four months to elect a new leading body.

Okinawa Workers Threaten General Strike

The dismissal of some 2,400 civilian workers from U.S. military bases in Okinawa has been met by the biggest strikes since the American occupation began during World War II. The action threatens to escalate into a general strike at the end of February if Washington does not agree to union demands.

Between 20,000 and 30,000 workers, led by Zengunro [All-Okinawa Military Workers Union], staged a forty-eight-hour strike January 8-9, and an even more militant "second wave" strike of five days, January 19-23.

Zengunro is demanding higher severance pay and longer advance notice for those dismissed. Both demands have been rejected by U.S. authorities.

"Consequently," the January 24 *Asahi Evening News* reported, "Zengunro has begun to make preparations for its third wave of strikes, while Kenrokyo (Okinawa Prefectural Council of Trade Unions) and Fukkikyō (Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland) have started making plans for a gen-

eral strike to support the Zengunro strike. . . .

"The date and scope of the third wave of strikes will be decided by Zengunro after discussions with Kenrokyo and other progressive organizations, but the possibilities are great that a unified strike of general strike proportions will be carried out about Feb. 20."

The U.S. military authorities, in violation of a "truce" that settled a June 5, 1969, strike, pushed through the wholesale dismissals before the February 15 expiration of the agreement. On December 5, 426 workers were fired. This was followed January 5 by the firing of another 700 to 800, precipitating the January 8-9 strike. On January 13 U.S. officials announced the "transfer" of an additional 1,043 men. As the January 14 *Asahi Evening News* put it, "In most cases, however, either the nature of the work or the commuting distance, makes the new posts unsuitable."

The timing of the cutbacks was significant. The occupation authorities claim that by striking before February 15, the union violated the "truce."

On the eve of the January 8-9 walk-out, the U.S. command tried to blackmail Zengunro by threatening to invoke punishment "retroactively" against participants in the 1969 strike if the scheduled strike took place.

The *Asahi Evening News* revealed January 13 that this threat was carried out and five workers were fired. More than 360 workers may face the same fate in retaliation for their union activities.

This effort at intimidation had little effect, however. Choko Uema, writing from Naha in the January 29 issue of the Hongkong *Far Eastern Economic Review*, reported: "Although a military spokesman announced that only 55% of the workers were listed as on unauthorised absence [in the January 8-9 strike] and that many military bases functioned well, spot checks indicated the base operations seemed to have been almost paralyzed."

The Sato government has decided to submit several proposals to Washington to defuse the situation. But as the *Far Eastern Economic Review* correspondent writes, "Quick action by Tokyo . . . could not appease the massive unrest which sparked last week's second strike and it seemed that for Washington, its military legacy in Okinawa might present an abundance of additional headaches."

A Background Article

Meaning of the Okinawa Strikes

By Wataru Yakushiji

Osaka

On January 23 about 30,000 workers held a rally at Ginowan, Okinawa, and staged a massive demonstration at the U.S. Army Headquarters. The rally was sponsored by Zengunro [All-Okinawa Military Workers Union], Kyoshokuin-kai [Okinawa Teachers Association],* Kenrokyo

[Okinawa Prefectural Council of Labor Unions], and Fukkikyō [Okinawa Conference for Return to the Homeland]. Some participating unions called twenty-four-hour strikes for the day.

The purpose of the rally was to draw the lessons of the five-day Zengunro strike, then in its last day, and to prepare for a third offensive to be staged in February as a general strike throughout Okinawa.

The *Asahi Shimbun*, the Japanese-language daily with the largest circulation, reported January 24 that a third offensive will probably be staged around February 20, but that if U.S. military authorities continue to act in a high-handed manner, Zengunro may stage its third strike even sooner, ahead of the Kenrokyo unions.

Zengunro's first major struggle against the firing of 2,400 base workers was the forty-eight-hour strike January 8-9. Militancy has been rising so high since the U.S. authorities announced the dismissal that the officers' club chapter of Zengunro was about to stage a strike ahead of every-

* While Nikkyōso [Japan Teachers Union] of mainland Japan does not include principals or vice-principals of primary, junior, and senior high schools, Kyoshokuin-kai of Okinawa includes both teachers and administrators of these schools. To date the struggle of teachers in Okinawa has been solely against military

rule. But it is said that differences have begun to appear inside Kyoshokuin-kai between ordinary teachers and principals since the imperialist return of Okinawa was arranged between Nixon and Sato.

body else December 31-January 1.

Following the first offensive, a 120-hour strike was staged January 19-23, paralyzing almost all the daily activities of the U.S. bases in Okinawa.

During the five days of the second strike, about 10,000 Kenrokyo workers and quite a number of teachers (from Kyoshokuin-kai) and militant university students backed Zengunro, posting strong picket lines at more than 100 important gates to the bases. Thus 95 percent of the base workers reportedly participated in the strike.

This figure is even more remarkable considering that Zengunro has a membership of only 22,000 out of the 38,000 base workers. Membership has been rapidly increasing, however, since the June 5, 1969, strike, as base workers know that membership in Zengunro is their only hope to fight pending dismissals.

Unlike unions on the mainland, the U.S. authorities do not permit Zengunro to deduct dues from workers' pay, and Zengunro organizers must collect dues themselves [often at workers' homes in the evening—*IP*]. Thus the union has no strike funds, and workers receive no payment from the union for wages lost during a strike. This is important in appreciating the militancy of the Zengunro workers.

The U.S. forces answered the strike with extremely severe repressive measures. Many picketing workers and students were injured in a number of clashes with heavily armed American troops. In several cases soldiers drove a car through the picket lines at high speed, seriously injuring some workers.

Even gangster squads attacked the picket lines. These squads were organized by the owners of so-called A-sign bars (sanctioned by the U.S. military authorities as suitable for GIs, and marked with a big letter "A"). These groups were armed with stones and staves.

In self-defense the Okinawan workers wore helmets, armed themselves with staves, and wore towels over their faces so the soldiers could not identify them.

Black GIs are reported to have held up their hands in the "V" for victory sign to the struggling workers and students. Even the riot police are said to have shown sympathy with the strikers. Thus, despite the repression,

workers remained highly militant. The *Asahi Shimbun* describes one worker who was "surprised at his own strength to fight and struggle." The U.S. authorities could not help recognizing that there were very few strikebreakers.

* * *

The dismissal of 2,400 base workers in Okinawa, announced by the U.S. forces December 4, 1969, is not an isolated phenomenon. Since the Pentagon decided last July to curtail 10 percent of base personnel abroad, dismissal of base workers—both civilians and soldiers—has been carried out on a large scale, especially in the Far East.

In mainland Japan, more than 8,000 workers have been fired or informed of dismissal since last October. Another 3,000 workers reportedly are to be fired in the near future.

In the Republic of Korea, more than 1,000 workers at U.S. military institutions have been fired since the end of October.

It is true that in general these dismissals have been brought about by the curtailment of military expenses by the U.S. government. However, some anomalies are observable. In Okinawa, for example, base workers are generally classified in two categories: those directly employed by the U.S. forces, and those employed by individual GIs. The current dismissals have hit both categories about equally. In some cases this means that highly paid Americans have taken over the jobs of much lower paid Okinawans, hardly contributing to a reduction of the U.S. defense budget.

But what is most important is that this does not mean any curtailment of military forces in the Far East. To the contrary, as U.S. military authorities repeatedly confirm, the U.S. is going to maintain the present scale of forces there, if not strengthen them. Therefore, when Chobyō Yara, chief executive of the civil Ryukyu government, expressed his expectation that Okinawa bases would be curtailed, this was nothing more than an excuse for his compromising attitude and policies.

* * *

Zengunro is now one of the most important antiwar forces in Okinawa. Since Zengunro asserted its right to

strike with the "simultaneous annual leave struggle" of April 24, 1968, it has kept on growing as an antiwar and anti-imperialist force.

Zengunro proved itself to be the strongest antiwar force when it staged a twenty-four-hour strike on June 5, 1969, against the Labor Ordinance, against sending of workers to Vietnam, and against the dismissal of 150 workers at air bases. Almost all the activities of the bases were paralyzed.

Zengunro workers have been militant participants in the campaigns for the "antiwar" return of Okinawa to the mainland. Base workers themselves insist upon the withdrawal of U.S. military bases from Okinawa as the essential condition for the return. They confirmed their fighting spirit against the "imperialist return of Okinawa" at a rally of 50,000 workers at Kadena on November 17, 1969.

They now understand that Okinawa is going to be sacrificed for the imperialist interests of the U.S. and Japanese governments, inasmuch as the Joint Communiqué issued by Nixon and Sato November 21, 1969, speaks of "the vital role played by United States forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East."

Zengunro has thus been struggling against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, under the terms of which Nixon and Sato agreed to "retain . . . such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries." (Joint Communiqué)

* * *

The U.S. forces now want to dispense with this antiwar and anti-imperialist yoke around their necks. Following the punishment of the leaders of the June 5 strike, the U.S. military made its first attack upon Zengunro leaders by firing them outright. They carried out a substantial dismissal by transfers or downgrading of rank-and-file militant workers. To such an extent is Okinawa the "keystone of the Pacific" in maintaining the existing imperialist order in the Far East.

The imperialists hope to make U.S. bases in Okinawa relatively independent of the surrounding communities so that, defended from the public by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, military activities will not be interrupted

by the radicalizing antiwar movement. This is the true meaning of the "rationalization."

* * *

The situation is quite different in the Republic of Korea. Developments in military technology now make it possible to withdraw U. S. forces from the ROK. In that country where the mainstay of the regime is massive [Korean] military forces, the ruling class is quite eager to continue this setup and give it further weight and importance. U. S. imperialism now finds it possible to withdraw its own military forces from the country and maintain its rule over the population by means of the national forces alone.

Moreover, in stating that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security" [Joint Communiqué], Sato expressed the willingness of the Japanese government to assume responsibility for securing the southern part of the peninsula under neocolonialism. Now that the U. S. has confirmed that it will maintain its bases in Okinawa, and Japan is continuing to strengthen its own "defense forces," the ROK can be firmly held under their rule.

This is the general picture, which illuminates the dismissal of 1,000 workers from U. S. military institutions in the ROK (they are members of the Foreign Institutions Workers Union of the ROK).

* * *

Under the circumstances in which the 2,400 base workers were dismissed, Okinawan enterprises are going to refrain from employing new workers. They now see that the economic structure of Okinawa is going to be completely changed toward 1972 when it is expected to "revert" to Japan.

The greatest "industry" in Okinawa is the U. S. military bases themselves. Some 25 percent of the working population is said to be engaged in jobs in one way or another related to the bases. The bases occupy the bulk of the arable land. It is generally said that "Okinawa" exists *among the bases*, not that bases exist in Okinawa.

As of 1968, 30.7 percent of the Okinawa Gross National Product was dependent upon the U. S. bases. Thus, base workers, the majority of whom are middle-aged and have families to

support, can never find jobs at all after being fired. Almost all of the base workers are people who have been deprived of their farming land by the U. S. bases for twenty-five years and have been obliged to work on the bases in order to live. Unless the rationalization of U. S. bases by dismissal of workers is made concomitant to withdrawal of the U. S. military forces (and the bases are not turned over to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces), it cannot be accepted by these people.

As a matter of fact, the dismissed workers are quite reluctant to go to the mainland, as shown by an investigation by the Ryukyu government. They reject the regime's opportunistic measure urging them to leave Okinawa after twenty-five years in which they were confined to the islands.

Japanese government officials have been talking about an "industrial project" for Okinawa since last year. They have been talking about "rich manpower" and "suitable places for industry." They are going to proceed to "develop" Okinawa as Japanese imperialism's outpost to the Far East. Okinawa is now going to be firmly set in the economic structure of the mainland.

The case of an oil refinery base of the Toyo Oil Company (a joint enterprise of Caltex and Ryukyu Oil) indicates the character of the regime's "industrial project." The Ryukyu government, headed by Chobyō Yara, has granted Gulf Oil, Caltex, Esso, and Kaiser licenses to construct oil refineries.

As there is rigorous restriction of the activities of foreign capital in oil in Japan at present, these companies have proceeded to establish their camp on Okinawa. They hope to advance to Japan after the "reversion" of the islands. The refineries are to have a daily capacity of more than 220,000 barrels of oil. Okinawa's present consumption is about 20,000 barrels a day, including oil for military use.

As Toyo went ahead building its refinery, the villagers of Nakagusuku, Kita-Nakagusuku, and Nishihara moved into action, first against expropriation of the village lands. But in the course of their struggle, they came to understand that the inevitable public nuisance brought about by oil refining is born of capitalist logic, and that they are to be sacrificed in the

interest of capital. In short, they have gone beyond taking action against a public nuisance. Despite the compromising attitude of the Kenrokyo leaders and repression by the riot police, villagers, young and old—and even children—have been staging a radical struggle against the construction of the refinery.

* * *

In the course of twenty-five years of separation from Japan, under the rule of U. S. military forces, the people of Okinawa managed to establish a relatively democratic system of education, including the election of boards of education. In Japan these are appointed by the local government under the "guidance" of the Ministry of Education.

The imperialist return of Okinawa will mean imposition of the "kinpyo" system (governmental control of schoolteachers through principals' reports on the service merit of teachers).

In the course of "unification of Okinawa with the mainland," Okinawa is going to lose its rights of administration in the police, finances, water supply, electricity, etc. It is going to be the forty-seventh prefecture with only "30 percent autonomy."*

When Okinawa is "unified" with the mainland it will continue to be exploited and sacrificed as it has been for the last 400 years. The people of Okinawa will continue to suffer from the damage of World War II. Discrimination will be applied against them, as it has been these 400 years.

* * *

Zengunro's January 17 appeal to the people of Okinawa lists the following demands: (1) complete revocation of dismissal or at least postponement or deferment; (2) six months' notice before dismissal, with an "adjustment system," so that fired workers may get jobs; (3) increase of the dismissal fund; and (4) revocation of transfers which result in a loss of pay.

At present workers are fired with only thirty to forty-five days' warn-

* The forty-six prefectures in Japan are deprived of fundamental autonomy by the central government, although the constitution guarantees autonomy to local governments. This verbal autonomy is called "30 percent autonomy."

ing. The dismissal fund — severance pay — is only 1.3 months' payment at best. In many cases, base workers are fired with no dismissal fund at all.

When Chairman Uehara of Zen-gunro tried to save jobs by calling off the last day of the five-day strike January 23, he wanted to persuade workers that the U.S. military authorities would *perhaps* give them three months' notice before dismissal, as mainland base workers (organized in Zenchuro, the All-Japan U.S. Base Workers Union) have been granted by the arrangements made between the Japanese government and the U.S. on January 21, 1970.*

Meanwhile, what Okinawa base workers really want is the return of their farmland expropriated in the past twenty-five years by the U.S. bases.

The only possible condition for accepting dismissal is withdrawal of U.S. bases from Okinawa. The base workers are now going to fight to the end, even when the imperialists try to persuade them by using corps of the Self-Defense Forces to guard the U.S. bases. Their struggle is not a narrow nationalist one.

The situation is quite similar with the rest of the people of Okinawa. Their standard of living cannot be protected under the imperialist plan for integrating Okinawa into the ruling structure of the Japanese mainland. In order to reconstruct the basis of their livelihood, which has been progressively destroyed by the bases, they cannot allow monopoly capital to make inroads into Okinawa.

What is more, the people will inevitably oppose capitalist-imperialist control of education, the police, electricity, and the water supply.

The struggle of the people of Okinawa, therefore, has a strongly anti-imperialist character. It is necessary to have a transitional program with the demand for complete autonomy for Okinawa as the essential condition for the return to Japan. In battling for this demand, the masses will surely move toward establishing their own form of government, based on

* Zenchuro called off the January 27 solidarity strike because of this arrangement. This shows the complete lack of solidarity struggles by mainland unions. Sohyo, the largest trade-union federation in Japan, has stayed away from organizing any campaigns so far.

direct democracy, or workers democracy.

In the course of struggle, the people of Okinawa will find allies among militant antiwar workers and students of the Japanese mainland who have been carrying on radical struggles independent of Sohyo or other trade-union bureaucrats.

France

Prison Terms for Three Antiwar Soldiers

Three French soldiers, jailed since October 20 for their antiwar views, were sentenced to prison terms February 6 by a military tribunal at Rennes.

Private Serge Devaux, 24, was given a year in prison. Michel Trouilleux, a former electrical worker, and Alain Hervé, a technician, received sentences of eight and four months, but it was not immediately reported which had received the harsher term. The only specific accusation against them was that they possessed copies of an "underground" journal called *Crosse en l'Air*.

An indication of the widespread support for the jailed soldiers was the turnout of more than 3,500 persons for a defense rally in Rennes, January 29, addressed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Rocard, national secretary of the Parti Socialiste Unifié [United Socialist party], and Alain Krivine, a leader of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League — the French section of the Fourth International].

The local Communist party issued a leaflet declaring that "the Communists cannot associate themselves with this meeting. . . . they express their hostility to the forms of action advocated and defended by the national secretary of the PSU, because they invite repression and the division of the workers' and democratic forces, and, because of this, help keep the present regime in power."

The right-wing *Comités de Défense de la République* [CDR — Committees for the Defense of the Republic], organized a physical attack on the meeting. The February 2 issue of the Paris revolutionary-socialist weekly *Rouge* reported:

"Led by the [CDR] cadres from the

The people of Okinawa, struggling for autonomy, will seek solidarity with the American antiwar movement. The GI antiwar movement especially, along with the broader mass movement, will play an important role in assisting and developing the struggle by the people of Okinawa.

January 31.

local Citroën plant and some police agents looking for a fight, they chose seats in the middle of the audience. From the moment the speakers began, they acted in their customary courteous way — yelling and swinging their clubs. Several persons were injured. The ushers, who lined the hall, reacted rapidly, and, aided by the audience, threw out the provocateurs . . .

"From outside, they attacked the side doors of the hall, trying to smash them in with a battering ram. The 'forces of law and order,' always present where there is danger of a disturbance (were they tipped off in advance about CDR's plans?), did not remain indifferent to this spectacle. They added the final touch by coming to the aid of their brothers-in-arms in their dirty business. Despite this obvious and undisguised collusion, which was countered by the meeting's ushers, they did not achieve their objective and were forced to resign themselves to waiting for the audience to leave before launching their 'frontal' attack.

"And when the meeting let out, there was in fact a 'unique front,' of police and the CDR, which greeted the participants.

"The audience went back into the hall, deciding not to leave until the police dispersed the CDR. This ultimatum was announced to the police, who did not appear to be very troubled by it. They allowed their cohorts to throw firecrackers and other missiles into the hall. After a half hour of discussion, some reinforcements arrived, who made the CDR 'move on.' The audience, which had not yielded to a single provocation, went outside then, and dispersed quickly after a few incidents."

Bertrand Russell: 1872-1970

By George Novack

In 1921, when Bertrand Russell came close to dying during a visit to Peking, the *Manchester Guardian* published an obituary on him. The philosopher recovered and managed to do and write more than ten ordinary mortals over the next fifty years.

Upon his death February 2 at the age of ninety-seven at his home in Wales, he was one of the towering personalities of our time. Someone has said that he was the twentieth century Voltaire—or was Voltaire the Bertrand Russell of the eighteenth century?

His span of life extended from the Victorian age (he was raised by his paternal grandfather, the first Earl Russell, who was twice prime minister under that queen) to the nuclear age, in which he fought to save mankind from destruction by the atomaniacs of Washington.

Despite the influence he exerted upon the course of academic philosophy in the West, he did not conform to the pattern of an academic philosopher any more than he conformed to the prejudices of Anglo-American respectability. Throughout his career, he combined diligent dedication to his professional work in logic and philosophy with equally energetic intervention in crucial issues of politics, morals, education, and other social problems. Before he was thirty, Russell gave away his inherited wealth to the movements he favored.

Before the first world war, while completing his major work *Principia Mathematica* in collaboration with Alfred North Whitehead, he was involved in the struggle for women's rights and the activities of the Fabian socialists. During the war, he was dismissed from his post at Trinity College, Cambridge, for writing pamphlets against conscription, and jailed for six months because of his pacifist opinions. He also supported the Indian National Congress in opposition to British rule.

Russell welcomed the Russian revolution in 1917, and visited the Soviet Union after the war, meeting Lenin,



BERTRAND RUSSELL

Trotsky, and Gorky. While he expressed sympathy with the aims of Communism, he rejected the methods of Bolshevism as well as the ideas of Marxism.

Like his friend, the American philosopher John Dewey, Russell was especially interested in the application of his ideas to children's education. In the 1920s he conducted an experimental school together with his second wife.

The state of adult education in the United States can be gauged by the fact that in 1940 this world-renowned thinker was found unfit to teach at City College of New York because of his "immoral and salacious attitude toward sex." A justice of the State Supreme Court voided his appointment, calling it an attempt to set up a "chair of indecency." Whatever little respect Russell retained for established authority was erased by such experiences.

Out of fear of fascist aggression, Russell abandoned his pacifism and took the side of the Allied imperialists in the second world war.

After Hiroshima he became preoccupied with the problem of the nuclear bomb. At one point he even suggested a preventive nuclear war to impose disarmament upon the Soviet Union.

But he rectified this false position as he came to recognize that the principal danger to world peace and to the survival of humanity came from the imperialist warmakers in Washington. He acted as a leader of the nuclear disarmament movement in Britain. At the age of eighty-nine, he even spent seven days in jail for taking part in an antibomb demonstration in London and refusing to comply with a magistrate's request that he pledge himself to "good behavior."

In his final decade, Russell's political views swung further to the left and he became more and more sharply anti-imperialist, anti-Stalinist, and prorevolutionary. He condemned American intervention in Vietnam in unsparing terms, likening it to the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, the French terror in Algeria, and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt.

He initiated the War Crimes Tribunal, presided over by Jean-Paul Sartre and Isaac Deutscher, which found the U. S. government guilty of atrocities in May 1967, several years before the recent Mylai disclosures.

He denounced with equal vehemence the Kremlin's invasion of Czechoslovakia.

* * *

Russell's most enduring theoretical work will likely turn out to have been in symbolic logic. He gave an immense stimulus to fruitful inquiry in this field through *Principia Mathematica*, which set problems for an entire generation of logicians. In this treatise, he systematically, though unsuccessfully, sought to reduce the whole of mathematics to a formalized logic by analyzing such fundamental mathematical concepts as order and cardinal number.

He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950 for the score or more of books he wrote on philosophical and social questions. He had already acquired a commanding position in Anglo-American thought forty years before and his reputation has not lessened since. In the index to the second edition of John Passmore's *A*

Hundred Years of Philosophy there are more references to Russell than to any other thinker.

Russell was essentially a continuator and consummator of the empirical school. He belonged to that deep-rooted tradition of British philosophy both in the clarity and felicity of his prose style and the substance of his basic ideas, which he amended with certain findings of contemporary natural science and made more sophisticated with the techniques of formal logic.

His distinctive contribution to philosophy was the theory of "logical atomism." This set of doctrines blended an extreme formalism, based on the axioms of symbolic logic, with the tenets of an empirical theory of knowledge. He attempted to build up an explanation of the world on the twin pillars of absolutely disconnected singular facts and irreducible elementary propositions. This was a re-edition of Hume's mistaken conception that "all events seem entirely loose and separate."

Although his principal premises were presented under the guise of factual reality, they were thoroughly metaphysical in nature. They denied the existence of internal relations in both things and thoughts and ignored the flux and interconnection of events in an ever-changing, objective, and materially unified world. Russell's method of analysis did not overcome a single one of the fundamental flaws of the empirical school, and his unsatisfactory conclusions simply highlighted their inadequacies.

* * *

Toward the close of his career, by virtue of his activities and achievements in so many spheres, this unconventional scion of the British aristocracy became a power in his own right. His international prestige and moral authority were not derived from any state, military, or religious office, but from his courage, rectitude, and zeal on behalf of the oppressed. In that capacity, he corresponded with the heads of state in London, Washington, Moscow, Peking, and other capitals. Victims of injustice and political persecution who appealed to him from all parts of the planet could count on his sympathy and support.

The compassionate concern for human beings and their welfare that ac-

tuated this seeker of knowledge and friend of the unfriended can best be expressed in his own words:

"Echoes of cries of pain reverberate in my heart. Children in famine, victims tortured by oppressors, help-

less old people a hated burden for their sons and a whole world of loneliness, poverty and pain make a mockery of what human life should be. I long to alleviate this evil, but I cannot, and I too suffer."

France

LC and PSU to Engage in Joint Actions

[The Ligue Communiste (Communist League—the French section of the Fourth International) and the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party) have agreed to undertake joint action on certain specified issues while continuing to discuss differences on other questions.

[The following is our translation of a joint communiqué, reporting the agreement, which was published in the January 26 *Rouge*, the weekly newspaper of the Ligue Communiste.]

1. Representatives of the National Bureau of the PSU and the Political Bureau of the Ligue Communiste met again January 20 in the headquarters of the PSU. The delegations continued their discussion of the full range of problems affecting the workers and revolutionary movement in France.

The two delegations noted the convergence of their analyses on the nature of the social battles that have developed since the summer of 1969. Their views were as follows: Although these battles have been confined to isolated sectors, and no attempt has been made to coordinate them, the range of actions conducted by the working class was marked by a high level of consciousness and combativity. These aspects were expressed particularly in the mass character of the mobilizations; the active participation of the workers in decision-making and in conducting certain of these mobilizations; and the character of the demands raised, which showed the desire of the workers to assume control over their working conditions.

Facing the spread of working-class combativity, the government had to try to find a more flexible strategy. The sliding-scale contracts linking wages to the level of production and sales that were inaugurated at the EDF [Electricité de France—the French elec-

trical utility] and accepted by certain trade-union organizations show the government's intention to tie the unions up in an institutionalized framework and incorporate them into a policy conforming to capitalist interests.

The workers must struggle against this attempt to co-opt the unions. They must fight to maintain the independence of their organizations from the bosses and the capitalist state. The widest possible exercise of workers democracy in the plants is the best guarantee against these dangers.

For their part, the members of the PSU and the Ligue Communiste pledge to scrupulously respect the tenets of union democracy and to respond jointly to any bureaucratic repression inside the workers organizations.

In view of the lack of clear political perspectives, a lack from which the workers struggles are suffering today, trade-union democracy requires that revolutionary militants be able to present their conceptions about orientation and strategy in the struggle.

2. Both delegations agreed, moreover, on the need for reviving a campaign to arouse public opinion against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and to work out together the ways and means of conducting actions for this purpose.

3. The delegations expressed their concern over the repression in progress against revolutionary militants in the army and decided to conduct jointly a vigorous campaign in defense of these militants.

4. Finally, both organizations will continue to debate their respective conceptions on the campus struggle and on the steps that must be taken in opposition to the policy of repression now in full swing in the high schools in particular.

Political Prisoners Were Sentenced Without a Trial

[The hunger strike of Lecumberri's political prisoners continues to reverberate in Mexico and far beyond. It began on December 10, with eighty-nine of the 120 political prisoners participating. Two had to drop out for medical reasons. The other eighty-seven held out for forty days. This included facing an attack organized by the prison authorities, in which several hundred ordinary prisoners, armed with knives, pipes and similar weapons, moved against the hunger strikers, gravely wounding a number of them. The evident plan of the authorities was to put down the hunger strike in blood, covering up the repressive action by presenting it as a prison brawl provoked by the hunger strikers. Despite this, the group maintained their strike until January 20.

[It is obvious that they had serious grievances to have caused them to undertake and to maintain such an action. What were those reasons?

[The prisoners themselves stated them November 26 in a declaration made public before they undertook their hunger strike. The following are excerpts from this declaration.]

* * *

The illegality of the trials against more than a hundred students, teachers, and citizens of all classes and ages, jailed during or after the student movement of July-October 1968 in Mexico City, has now been proved unquestionably, if there were still any doubt, with the latest infringement, not only of the law but even of the most elementary human rights.

The venality of all the Mexican judiciary, and their complete dependence on the executive power, were evident when the judges decreed imprisonment for groups of eighty or more students during the months of conflict: imprisonment was decreed not for each individual, but for the whole group. Later, when the jails were no longer sufficient to contain such a large number of prisoners, whose average age was between eighteen and twenty-three years, the government in a few months

freed more than half of the young prisoners. But during the rest of the year 1969, on different dates and with different pretexts, new groups of students and workmen were jailed. In this manner, the number of prisoners grew again during the year to the number of 120.

Some have been in jail since July 26, 1968; others since October 2 of the same year, the rest on different dates.

We prisoners are the same people who demanded freedom for the political prisoners of Mexico during the great marches and rallies of August and September of 1968. The prisoners whom we referred to then, for whom we fought, are still in jail, and are approximately forty in number. Some of them are held in other prisons, in different states of the Republic of Mexico. . . .

Only with some of these groups of prisoners [arrested during the 1968 student movement] has the appearance of due process been respected, with shows which pretended to be hearings, in which the supposed witnesses, who are always *granaderos* [riot police], secret agents, or policemen, get confused and contradict themselves or each other even without being questioned by the lawyer for the defense. They come so ill-prepared to give their false testimony, and are so incoherent, that no judge in his right mind, in any country of the world, would accept their testimony. But in Mexico, the judge asks that it be taken down in the record of the proceedings that the defendant took undue advantage of his superior intellectual capacity. . . .

For those of us who must be judged under the so-called federal law, not even these attempts have been made to give the appearance that we are on trial. We have simply seen how the time limit established in the constitution ends without our trial even beginning. We have not seen our file, nor the proofs which the government prosecution should have presented to establish that we are presumably responsible for the twenty crimes of which we are accused. Nor does our legal counsel have access to this file.

No hearings have been held, and, for this same reason, it has been impossible to know the evidence presented against us or to present evidence for the defense. We are held, for all practical purposes, as hostages; and this is not just an assertion. Here is an example:

Recently the government prosecutor's office summoned our relatives in order to offer them our freedom in exchange for our accepting the following condition: that we leave the country immediately. As soon as we heard of this proposal we thought that, in the present circumstances, the only thing we could do was accept, and we did so. It should be made clear, however, that a considerable number of us are persons who worked at very low-paying or menial jobs, and who have no training which would enable us to earn a living in a foreign country.

In spite of this serious drawback, we accepted what would, in fact, amount to exile, and formally agreed among ourselves to obtain for those who could not afford it the cost of transportation to a foreign country, which the government would not pay, and to help them later to survive in some Latin-American country by contributing a part of whatever we could earn ourselves.

In spite of the fact that, in many cases, it was the assistant prosecutor in person who called the families that live in other parts of Mexico, in order to make them come as soon as possible; and in spite of the fact that the prosecutor's office did everything in its power to get the necessary passports delivered immediately, with no reason, no explanation, all of the procedures were suspended and the prosecutor's office put an end to the matter as if nothing had happened. Not even the relatives who had come from distant states of the republic were given the slightest explanation.

All of these arbitrary practices are common in such an incredibly corrupt institution as the Mexican judiciary. But never, until now, have they dared to dispense with certain formalities. We have already described the

rigged hearings of many of our companions, with prepared witnesses, taken from the various police corps. The defendants' lawyers are not notified of these hearings, in order to avoid their presence, if possible. The defense lawyers must rush to the judge's chambers if through friends they learn of the hearing in time. The judge already knows that the defendant must be found guilty, and even the sentence is decided upon while the defense is still trying to fight obviously falsified evidence.

All of this is common. But these arbitrary practices seemed less important when, on Saturday, November 22, we, accused of federal crimes, were informed that the hearing of evidence in our trial had been completed by Judge Ferrer MacGregor.

Without the defense ever having seen or heard the "proofs" or "evidence" allegedly showing our responsibility for twenty crimes; without the accusing party ever having formally presented charges, nor our lawyers having had an opportunity to defend us; without hearings, without witnesses, without respecting, even in appearance, the proper penal procedure, with all possible cynicism they closed the proceedings of what amounts to a fascist trial. This is why we speak of violations, not only of the law, but of the most elementary civil rights, respected by all nations.

The attitude of the press was what might have been expected: a laconic note announcing that the proceedings had been concluded, but without making it clear that there had been no trial, and after that an absolute silence which cannot be broken even by paid insertions, since these are refused. . . .

And who are the terrible conspirators, accused of as many as twenty crimes, who merit this summary trial just terminated? Some thirty of them are members of the Mexican Communist party; another few represented our schools in the *Consejo Nacional de Huelga* [National Strike Council], perhaps twenty of these; the rest are youths apprehended at some rally, or squads arrested at a market while distributing leaflets, or the speaker at a lightning meeting who lagged behind his companions; and a large number of simple passersby who had the misfortune to walk by a recently burnt trolley bus or other vehicle, and the misfortune of being young—this

last detail was enough to be chosen for haphazard arrest from a crowd gathered to watch a blazing bus. The only requisite for arrest was to be young. After that the police, by torture, beatings, electrical shocks applied to the tongue or to the testicles, extracted the necessary "confessions". . . .

* * *

The present treatment of the political prisoners at the hands of the government, the anonymous threats to our families, the trials terminated without any proof or evidence being presented, fascist trials in every sense of the word, cannot be understood except as a way to make an example of us for all those who are not content, for those who in the future should dare to oppose the methods of government of a regime which was led by

intolerance and disdain for human life to commit crimes against its own people.

As soon as we received the news that our trial was closed without our having had a chance to defend ourselves, we decided not to wait for the sentence before making a last attempt to obtain our freedom. For this reason we have resolved to begin, on the tenth of December, an indefinite hunger strike in order to demand that the charges against us be dropped (charges which, in spite of the imminent sentence, can never be proved). By submitting us to a summary trial they have given us the most uncontradictable of reasons.

Luis González de Alba
For the Political Prisoners

Lecumberri Prison
November 26, 1969.

Lebanon

Indicted for Criticizing Religion

A Lebanese court indicted the philosopher Dr. Sadek Jalal el-Azm January 27 on a charge of violating Article 317 of the penal code which stipulates: "Any act, writing, or speech whose aim or effect is to incite religious or ethnic intolerance or to stimulate conflicts among the communities or different elements of the population shall be punishable by one to three years imprisonment and a fine of 50 to 400 pounds [3.31 Lebanese pounds equal US\$1] . . ."

The population of the small country is divided about equally between Islam and Christianity and the differences have often been exploited by reactionary forces.

Dr. el-Azm was indicted, however, for publishing a book *A Critique of Religious Thought* which the court interpreted as attacking both religions and fostering a denial of the existence of God. The book consisted of articles previously published in a magazine with a much wider circulation than could be expected for the book.

The publisher of Dr. el-Azm's work, Dr. Beshir Dauk, was also indicted on the same charge.

At a reception given in his honor January 26, the minister of the in-

terior, Kamal Joublatt, attempted to explain his attitude.

He began, according to the January 28 Beirut daily *L'Orient*, by expressing "astonishment" that his name had been linked to the el-Azm case. He "declared that he had forbidden the expulsion of Dr. el-Azm from the country in order to prevent the affair from being swept under the rug."

To clarify his position, Joublatt added: "I received Dr. el-Azm and informed him that while I support freedom of expression and thought, I am against exercising it to the detriment of religion."

Joublatt admitted that the material on which the indictment was based had already been circulated for more than a year and a half. He wondered, he said, why this accusation was being raised now.

"Joublatt went on to criticize the way in which the campaign against the author of *A Critique of Religious Thought* has been conducted," *L'Orient* reported. The Beirut paper did not report if the minister of the interior had explained how this case could have been initiated over his objections, since the courts and the prosecutor's office fall under his authority.

The Case of Vladimir Borisov

[An attempt by Soviet young people to form an independent organization dedicated to promoting socialist democracy, and the consequences of this attempt, have been reported in recent issues of the *Chronicle of Current Events*. The *Chronicle* is the clandestine publication that has appeared regularly over the past two years with extensive details on oppositional activity in the struggle for socialist democracy and on government reprisals against oppositionists.

[The reports translated below, concerning the Union of Independent Youth of Vladimir, a small city near Moscow, appeared in issues 8, 9, and 10 of the *Chronicle*, which recently became available in the West.

[Most interesting in these reports is the attempt to win legal recognition for an organization not controlled by the bureaucracy, to use the democratic rights promised in the Stalin constitution against the bureaucracy itself. Likewise the clear indication that these rebel youth feel that they can derive strength from an open appeal to public opinion, based on legal rights.

[The difficulty of obtaining full and clear information about such important events is also illustrated by these reports in the *Chronicle*, which from issue to issue tries to make its information more exact, not always successfully. One unclear paragraph from the first report has been summarized by us in brackets rather than quoted word for word.]

* * *

[From the *Chronicle*, issue No. 8, June 30, 1969:]

From two issues of a typewritten information bulletin, *Molodost* (Youth), it has become known that on December 16, 1968, a Union of Independent Youth was organized, operating legally on the basis of article 126 of the Constitution of the USSR.¹ The organizers of the Union

1. Article 126 of the Soviet constitution states without qualification that "citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the right of uniting in public organizations: pro-

submitted a declaration of registration to the city executive committee.

According to its bylaws, "The Union of Independent Youth is a self-supporting, independent youth organization, the master of which is the youth itself, who of their own accord direct the entire activity of the Union within the framework of Soviet legality and who without outside assistance provide the leadership for all its activity. . . . The fundamental aim of the Union of Independent Youth is to promote the development of socialist democracy and social progress in our country in every possible way."

The Union demands "the introduction of genuinely free and democratic elections," "real, de facto freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstrations, and organization," "no persecution because of one's opinions," "publication of all works by Soviet writers," "abolition of the illegal, unconstitutional censorship," and "intensification of the fight against actual criminal offenses."

In addition to telling about the organization of the Union, the *Chronicle* provides news and reports on the life of the country and of the city of Vladimir.

[Issue No. 8 also reported that the chairman of the Union of Independent Youth, V. Borisov, has been threatened with prison camp and that malicious slanders about him were being spread.]

The KGB-men in Vladimir do not hesitate even to steal. To be sure, they did not do so themselves, but instead they set two small-minded persons to stealing from V. Borisov—they took two stories that he had written (one was a finished story, the other was not).²

Even among party workers the pernicious spirit of Stalinism is still alive.

fessional unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and military organizations, and cultural, technical, and scientific organizations." (Emphasis added. — *IP*)

2. Such material is often important to the secret police for building up a case of "anti-Soviet slander." — *IP*

Thus, the first secretary of the party's city committee, Lapshin, in the name of KGB and the party authorities and in the presence of Afanasyev, the secretary of the party committee at the chemical plant, forbade V. Borisov to discuss politics at all, threatened him with prison camp, and declared that the KGB would follow him for the rest of his life.

The first secretary of the regional party committee, Ponomarev, refused to meet with V. Borisov after having learned what V. Borisov had said about him—namely, that Ponomarev "has fenced himself off from the people with the high wall of the MVD³ and only sees the people out of the window of his car when he drives somewhere." Ponomarev turned out to be rather touchy—not liking to be criticized.

In May of this year Vladimir Borisov, a worker, a philologist by education, was subjected to a search, after which he was forcibly placed in the city psychiatric hospital. Soon after, leaflets were distributed in the city telling about the Union of Independent Youth and the fate of its chairman. The publicity had a certain effect. One of the organizers of the Union was called in to the city executive committee and a fairly peaceful discussion was held about the Union.

Borisov's friends were allowed to see him in the hospital. They found out that he had been given some powerful injections, although he had been placed in the hospital only "for observation." The hospital administration, frightened by the fact that this had become known, promised to release Vladimir Borisov on June 30. The *Chronicle* has no word on whether this promise was fulfilled.

* * *

[From the *Chronicle*, No. 9, August 31, 1969.]

Because of the pressure of public opinion, Vladimir Borisov (city of Vladimir) was released from the psychiatric hospital at the beginning of

3. Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del — Ministry of Internal Affairs, the agency under which the secret police were placed by Stalin. The secret police is now known as the KGB—Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, the Committee for State Security, which is directly under the government Council of Ministers. — *IP*

July. His presence there was officially listed as an examination for the office of military registration and enlistment [the *voenkomat*, the Soviet office in charge of recruitment and the draft]. Borisov was ruled sane.

* * *

[From the *Chronicle*, No. 10, October 31, 1969.]

On May 31, 1969, civil police lieutenant Shary, accompanied by a citizen in civilian clothes, came to the apartment of Vladimir Borisov, chair-

man of the Union of Independent Youth of the city of Vladimir and, declaring that he must appear at the *voenkomat*, sent him ahead to the mental hospital. The supervisor of the ninth division of the hospital, Yu. A. Sokolov, forcibly injected Borisov with aminazin, which sent him into a state of shock.

After his release from the hospital, Borisov was called in to the KGB, to V. I. Buzin, who said: "Stop your thinking, or we'll put you away in prison." A month after this threat, V. Borisov was arrested.

Soviet Dissidents Under Fire

Gabai and Dzhemilev Sent to Prison Camp

On January 19 two more leading Soviet dissidents were added to the number sentenced to prison camps. They were Ilya Gabai, a Crimean Tatar intellectual and poet who had been a teacher in Moscow, and Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Tashkent worker and a leader of the Crimean Tatar national struggle. Although they denied the charges of "anti-Soviet slander," both men received three-year terms after a week-long trial.

The trial took place in Tashkent, where most of the Crimean Tatars now live, having been exiled en masse to Soviet Asia under Stalin's orders in 1944—supposedly because some had collaborated with the Nazis. Although a ruling of the Soviet Supreme Court "rehabilitated" them, restoring their rights as citizens, they have not been permitted to return to the Crimea, nor to reestablish the Crimean Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Last year, in August, Tashkent was the scene of another trial—that of ten Crimean Tatar leaders for their alleged role in a mass demonstration of April 1968. The trial of the ten had been scheduled for May 1969 but was put off until August because of the worldwide publicity and attention around it in May. It was in May that Ilya Gabai and former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko were arrested in connection with preparations for the trial of the ten.

Grigorenko had gone to Tashkent on the request of some 2,000 Crimean Tatars as a public defender. He had

prepared a detailed brief in their behalf which he was never able to present in court. Copies of it, however, have circulated by means of *samizdat* [recopied by readers]. Grigorenko himself has since been forcibly confined to a prisonlike "special" psychiatric hospital.

Curiously, the bourgeois press was silent about the August trial of the ten Crimean Tatar leaders, although a detailed account of it appeared in the August 31 issue (No. 9) of the *Chronicle of Current Events*. There was even a demonstration, according to the *Chronicle*, by 500-700 Crimean Tatars outside the court on the day of sentencing. Sentences ranged from six months to three years imprisonment.

Mustafa Dzhemilev, as well as being a Tatar activist, was one of the fifteen charter members of the "Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR," which sent an appeal to the UN Human Rights Commission last May, just after the arrests of Gabai and Grigorenko. The imprisonment of Dzhemilev brings to eight the number of those charter members who, since then, have either been imprisoned or confined in "special" mental hospitals.

Those imprisoned or facing trial include Genrikh Altunyan, Anatoly Krasnov-Levitin, Victor Krasin (exiled), and A. Yakobson. Yuri Maltsev, V. Borisov, and Natalya Gorbanevskaya have been confined in mental hospitals.

Nixon's Bid to Mao

Under the heading "'Coexistence' with Red China," the February issue of *Atlas* magazine reported that at the last of several recent secret meetings with Chinese officials in Warsaw, "U. S. Ambassador Walter Stoessel informed Chinese Charge d'Affaires Lei Yang that the U. S. welcomed Peking's proposal, made three months ago, for an agreement on 'peaceful coexistence.' If the Communists don't attach a demand for the return of Taiwan, signing of such a pact could take place as early as this spring." *Atlas* did not indicate the source of its information.

In an editorial January 29, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, noting the resumption of diplomatic talks in Warsaw, added: "But more significant still is the fact that the US Defence Department has confirmed that more naval units have been withdrawn from the Taiwan Straits—that the presence of the Seventh Fleet, once a formidable force complete with aircraft carriers, is now only nominal. Of course Washington claims that this redeployment has been made for reasons of economy; but the connection between the move, Agnew's recent Asian trip to enunciate the 'Nixon doctrine' and the recommencement of the Warsaw talks is only too obvious.

"The Chinese, even with their backs against the wall, never forsake their first principles: in this case never to talk seriously with the US unless and until Washington indicates that it is not irrevocably committed to defending the Kuomintang. Washington now has given such a hint—which is worth more than any amount of tinkering with trade embargoes."

Nixon is obviously trying to find a way of better exploiting the differences between Moscow and Peking. But the hook he is offering Mao looks rather bare. Will he prove capable of dressing it up with a worm? That remains to be seen. You can't slide a hook through Chiang Kai-shek and at the same time keep him in shape to be unleashed on the mainland.

North Vietnam Population Increase

The population of North Vietnam has reached the 20,000,000 mark, Le Duan, first secretary of the North Vietnamese workers party, reported in a February 1 speech. This is an increase of 3,000,000 since the 1960 census.

'Trotzki im Exil'

By Gisela Mandel

[*Trotzki im Exil*, Peter Weiss's latest play, opened in Düsseldorf in an atmosphere of sharp controversy, as was inevitable. A well-organized clique succeeded in breaking up a special performance for the critics. Howling and catcalling went on throughout the first act. The second act could not be presented, the disrupters taking over the stage entirely to present their own obscene parody. Peter Weiss sought to appeal to the group, but each time he took the mike, it went dead.

[With equal inevitability, the play has already had an international impact. In the February 1 issue of the *New York Times*, for instance, drama critic Henry Popkins describes what happened at the performance put on for the critics and why he could see only the first act. In passing, he does his best to damn the play with his description of the disruption.

[The following review is of the premiere for the general public. Preparations had been made to handle any hoodlumism, and the play proceeded without disruption.]

* * *

An audience of 1,500 at the Düsseldorf theater saw the premiere of *Trotzki im Exil* [Trotsky in Exile],* the latest production by Peter Weiss, Germany's greatest playwright, who became world famous with *Marat/Sade*.

Trotzki im Exil follows the ups and downs of the Russian revolutionary movement over a forty-year period, beginning with Trotsky's first exile in Siberia and ending with his final exile in Mexico. The victory of the October revolution, the events around Kronstadt, Lenin's last fight against the growing bureaucracy, Stalin's oath at Lenin's funeral, Trotsky's deportation to Alma Ata and exile from Russia, the Moscow trials, and the murder of Trotsky in Mexico—these provide the continuity.

On the stage, discussions between the main exponents of Bolshevism and Menshevism alternate with scenes from the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Representative figures of the various political and artistic currents that became linked with the fate of the Russian revolution speak like incarnations before the audience: Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Axelrod, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek, Alexandra Kollontai, Diego Rivera, André Breton. . .

We are offered a dramatic presentation of the debate around the organizational question at the Second Party Congress of the Social Democracy, with Martov and the leaders of the Bund coming out for a loose mass party, Lenin insisting on the need for centralization, and Plekhanov projecting a proletarian dictatorship in Russia.

* The play has been published in German: *Trotzki im Exil*. Stuck in zwei Akten. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, West Germany. 1970. 147 pp. No price indicated on jacket.

The Second All-Russian Soviet Congress comes alive before our eyes as Trotsky and Lenin argue for the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" and the conciliators protest in vain.

Towards the end, we hear Trotsky in Coyoacán oppose with all his vigor the pessimistic and despairing conclusions drawn by André Breton and Diego Rivera from the historical experience of Stalinism and the Moscow trials, as if they were proof that socialism and the revolutionary movement had failed.

Trotzki im Exil is a play of ideas. But it is also full of action. With his collaborators, Peter Weiss has succeeded to an astonishing degree in dramatizing the ideological debates and high points in Trotsky's revolutionary career.

One might anticipate that such a play would sink with the weight of propaganda. But this is not so; *Trotzki im Exil* is no more propagandistic than *Marat/Sade*. Yet the play can only be hailed by the "Trotskyists"—those who know the truth about Trotsky and what he gave his life for, and who have committed their own lives to the same cause. Peter Weiss shows the truth, cutting completely through all the decades of Stalinist falsification of history.

He thus strikes a most powerful blow against Stalin's crimes. Peter Weiss completely rehabilitates Trotsky and all of Lenin's comrades, who made the socialist revolution in Russia. The impact of the play in this respect must be felt to be appreciated. How pale, by comparison, was Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Congress which lifted the veil only partially.

Peter Weiss puts the Moscow trials right on the stage. You face all the well-known defendants, each illuminated separately against a black curtain. The prosecutor stands behind the audience at the back of the auditorium. You are seated between the accused and the accuser. Up until the final moment, even though you know better, it is difficult to avoid being caught up emotionally on the side of the prosecution under the terrible impression created by the confessions of those in the dock. You want, like Trotsky, sitting at his table in the center of the stage, to stand up and shout, "There must be some mistake; these cannot be the same comrades; we can prove it is false. . . ."

And while you, like Trotsky, think of this, one of the defendants speaks: "At this moment, we are sure, Trotsky and his friends will try to prove that what we say is false. He will try to fabricate 'evidence' against our statements. But we know . . . and we state herewith that our statements are the truth."

Now you start doubting your own absolute conviction of the falsity of the statements of the accused, until finally the nightmarish spell is broken: "You promised to spare our lives and the lives of our families, if we confessed!"

The soldiers, who have entered to take the victims out to be executed, break into laughter at this plea.

The writing and staging of *Trotzki im Exil* took great political and even personal courage on the part of the author. For years, Peter Weiss, as Europe's foremost radical playwright, has been a welcome guest of the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. . . All the theaters in the countries where the official ideology is Stalinist have featured his plays. In fact, the following are currently being staged there: A play about the Auschwitz concentration camp, *Die Anklage* [The Investigation]; one about Portuguese colonialism, *Die lusitanische Popdanz* [The Lusitanian Boogey]; and his famous play about Vietnam, *Diskurs über die Vorgeschichte und den Verlauf des lang andauernden Befreiungskrieges in Viet Nam als Beispiel für die Notwendigkeit des bewaffneten Kampfes der Unterdrückten gegen die Unterdrücker, sowie über die Versuche der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, die Grundlage der Revolution zu vernichten* [Discourse on the development of the long-wearing struggle for liberation in Vietnam as an example of the need for armed struggle by the oppressed against their oppressors, and on the attempts of the United States of America to destroy the foundation of the revolution]. In Western Europe, this play is known as "The Vietnam Play."

Just as he fought for the historical truth about Auschwitz, about Vietnam, about imperialism, Peter Weiss now fights for the truth about Trotsky and his restoration to humanity as he really was.

Besides being a great work of art, *Trotzki im Exil* has political significance as a sign of the times. Some artists appear to sense the advance of new tides in history. A play such as this has the aspect of an indicator of what is to come. The tide today is running in favor of world revolution, and in the bureaucratized workers states this spells the end of Stalinist rule.

As the play reaches its climax with the impending assassination, Peter Weiss has Trotsky speak:

"I cannot give up my faith in reason and in human solidarity. Since my youth, this faith has in fact grown deeper. I never felt any personal tragedy; my life is indissolubly linked with the turns in the revolution. The setbacks and disappointments cannot prevent me from seeing, beyond the present decline, the uprising of all the oppressed. This is not a utopian prophecy; it is the serene perspective of dialectical materialism. I have never lost my confidence in the revolutionary power of the masses. But we must prepare ourselves for a long war, for years, if not decades of insurrections, civil wars, new insurrections, and new wars. . .

"Just as the working class bears the bulk of the deprivations and sacrifices, in the same way it will support the transformations, the reconstruction of all that has been destroyed. Victory over world capitalism becomes possible when a revolutionary party once again appears at the head of the proletariat. If I were to happen to die today, I could say that I have worked uninterruptedly in the struggle for the emancipation of the exploited and the oppressed. For the need to develop culture and science on the broadest scale. For an art that expresses without shackles the human urge for innovation. For the expansion of technology, which will one day ease our existence

by learning how to tap the immense energy of the atom. The idea of international revolution dominates everything. Only that is capable of definitively abolishing exploitation, war, and violence."

This message of rational confidence in mankind's future and of indestructible faith in the proletariat, delivered by a man of Trotsky's years and experience as he was about to die, will strike home to the thousands upon thousands who will see Peter Weiss's play. And they will rise and applaud as they did at the premiere in Düsseldorf when the curtain came down.

New Czech Manifesto

In its February 1 issue, the Paris daily *Le Monde* quoted from a manifesto issued in Czechoslovakia on the first anniversary of Jan Palach's death. The declaration was said to have been drawn up by the "Group for Socialism With a Human Face."

The purpose of the manifesto was explained in the concluding paragraph: "This outline has no other aim than simply to express the principles that are being discussed so widely in Czechoslovakia today, even though it is impossible to do this publicly since exercising freedom of speech is a criminal offense. But these vital principles can never be suppressed and they will be proclaimed continually until they are put into practice."

Before setting forth its tenets, the manifesto warned: "The time will come, and before this decade is over, when the criminal traitors will be brought to justice with all the strictness and humanity corresponding to the traditions of the cultured people of this nation. When a new January comes [January 1968 marked the beginning of the "Prague spring"], this people, further enlightened by new historical experiences, will be able to act more effectively."

Among the principles were the following:

● Only the people of this nation of Czechs and Slovaks have the right to determine the destiny and development of Czechoslovakia.

● The people of this country want a democratic and socialist political life. Therefore all debates before local or higher bodies must be public. The government, the parliament, the president [presidium?], and the national committees must recognize that the people have the right to exercise control and be informed both in domestic and foreign policy. . . .

● In twenty-five years, a new social structure has been created, but at the cost of many unnecessary victims. It is possible now to give all citizens equal rights in practice. To this end, the rights and interests of every group, of every stratum, of every social category must be recognized. The interests of society as a whole cannot be defended unless the interests of all are respected.

● Normal relations are impossible in Europe as long as one group of countries can invade even a 'friendly state' while the others turn their eyes away from what is happening in another sphere of influence. All foreign armies must be withdrawn as soon as possible from the territories of the European countries and every state must pledge never to resort to force in settling its disputes with other states."

Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience*

By Hector Bejar

[This is the fourth installment of a translation by Gerry Foley of Héctor Béjar's essay.]

Chapter IV: The ELN

From its beginnings, the ELN was composed of a small group of young men. Among them were high-school and university students, workers, and a few peasants. Many came from the Communist youth organization and the Communist party; but for various reasons they had ceased to follow these organizations or work actively in them. It was not a preconceived plan of recruitment that had brought them together but fortuitous circumstances.

Among these youths were brilliant poets who had already won an audience and a reputation, such as Javier Heraud. There were youths with intellectual tastes, imagination, and great talent, like Edgardo Tello. There were high-school students, simple boys from the slums like Hugo Ricra. There were construction workers like Moisés Valiente. Later, in 1964, cadres with some political experience joined, like Juan Chang, who had been a member of the leadership of the FIR; Luis Zapata, the leader of the Cuzco civil construction workers; Guillermo Mercado, who had also been a member of the *Comité Central Leninista* [Leninist Central Committee] and of the FIR leadership; and others.

Alongside mature leaders with long experience marched teen-agers who were just awakening to political life. Different roads had led them to the same destination. For some it was experimenting with many tactics and finally becoming disillusioned with the methods of political struggle that had been followed in our country up to that time. For others it was the desire to participate in heroic actions. All were united by an admiration for the Cuban revolution and its leaders, and a desire to follow their example.

All claimed to be Marxist Leninists but there was a certain tendency that differentiated them from the rest of the "new left"—a yearning for political purity, a certain disdain for political struggle in the strict sense, and fear of any type of party organization.

The ELN developed a program, but it must be admitted that the best efforts of the organization were not committed to this task. In fact, as far as almost all of its members were concerned, the left had already drawn up too many programs to get involved in writing another one. Our program was formulated in brief and agitated discussions during encampments, on the road, or in the midst of clandestine activity. Some drafts were lost in the episodes of these intense years.

The points of the program were calculated to combine two qualities: to be broad enough to unite extensive layers of the population—fundamentally the workers and peasants—and clear enough so that no one would doubt the

objectives of the action to be launched. They were to be both comprehensive and capable of appealing to the popular imagination.

We were definitely not interested in making a long list of minimum and maximum demands, arid, pedantic, and difficult for ordinary people to understand. Moreover, it would be illusory to outline a governmental platform like the bourgeois parties since long hard years were still ahead of us before we could take power.

Our program had to be both a rallying cry that could be raised from the very onset of the struggle and an outline that could be filled in, corrected, and complemented by more intimate knowledge of Peruvian reality, and the desires and needs of the people.

Subsequently, the program was corrected, being successively cut down and expanded. By mid-1964, it had been condensed into the following points:

1. A People's Government.
2. Expulsion of all foreign monopolies.
3. Agrarian Revolution.
4. Friendship with all the peoples of the world.
5. National Sovereignty.

These were the five tasks to be achieved by the revolution, without which there could be no revolution. At the same time, they were objectives that the people would attain after traveling a long road.

In conclusion, we proposed socialism as the ultimate objective of our action.

Two methods were singled out as fundamental for traveling this road successfully—armed struggle and uniting the people. These methods complement each other dialectically since in Peru the one makes no sense without the other. It is armed struggle that will create real unity of all the exploited strata of the population. In turn, popular unity would have its highest expression in armed struggles against the imperialist oppressor and his national allies.

With respect to the other left organizations, the activity of the ELN was oriented from the start toward forming a broad political front which would support its actions. However, the ELN did not consider such a front indispensable for initiating these actions.

The ELN had always thought that the revolution would not be the work of a single party but a highly complex, shifting, and many-sided process to which the most di-

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verse social and political forces would contribute. As a result, we took care to present an image of complete non-exclusiveness, absolutely free of sectarianism, smoothing the path for all who wanted to take part in the insurrection in whatever task they chose.

This approach was based on two objective facts—the real-life conditions of the Peruvian people and the situation of the Marxist left.

Revolution and Party

The broad masses in Peru were always apolitical. The Inca empire first, then the Spanish colonial regime, and afterwards the mockery of a republic that we have seen for nearly all of this century have had political institutions that excluded all but the ruling classes and the privileged sectors. The Indian masses in the beginning, and later on the workers and peasants, never had any power of decision over the affairs of state. With the vote restricted to "solvent" citizens or literate minorities, there was no need to consult the people in these decisions, nor, of course, to include them in the ranks of the political parties.

Our people have waged innumerable heroic and bloody struggles against their oppressors. However, their struggle has never assumed a national scope, even in the case of the most extensive uprisings.

The Quechua chiefs who opposed the Spanish regime could not mobilize all the indigenous peoples behind them; neither could the creole caudillos who won our independence. And the history of the republic is a succession of peasant uprisings easily and rapidly isolated and suppressed, and of cruel civil wars between ambitious military and political leaders that have been viewed with a certain indifference by the great masses.

At the root of these limitations were profound class differences and disparities between the various regions of the country.

The Socialist Revolution is the first historical change that requires the active participation of all the people. Without this participation it is illusory to think that there can be a revolutionary victory.

Full participation of the people, while being an indispensable prerequisite for victory, is at the same time the best barrier to any deformation of the revolution. The peasant and worker masses, without whose collaboration no revolutionary war is possible in Peru, must raise up their own leaders and gain experience in making their own decisions.

The premature creation of a political party is a serious obstacle to this process.

If the party is created *before* the war begins, it rapidly becomes an organization with its own group interests and gives rise to a leadership which also has its own interests. The collective interests of the organization or the private interests of its leadership are often in contradiction with the needs of the revolution in countries like ours, where parties originate not in the exploited masses but in the privileged bourgeois or petty-bourgeois layers which stand apart from the bulk of the exploited masses.

These contradictions are soon expressed in repeated postponement of the time when the revolution is expected, postponement of tasks, organizational egoism, sectarianism and inflammatory phrasemongering that does not correspond to behavior.

Often the party must employ "insurreccional" language to keep its rank and file happy and attract new members. In reality, its activity is directed solely at controlling the organizations of the students and workers from the top. Isn't this really the traditional politics under cover of a "new" language?

When the pressure of the membership forces real revolutionary tasks to be considered, an ideological and political battle soon emerges. Then the revolutionary perspective is lost in a tangle of internal struggles. The revolutionary tasks are postponed again in the name of struggling against opportunism.

Once the party has managed to begin the insurrection, its political leadership, after successive purges, is compelled to transform itself into a military leadership. But revolution is not like the theater, where an actor can change costume from one scene to the next.

A political leadership cannot transform itself into a military one just by wishing to. It must first pass through the test of struggle, which remorselessly separates the more from the less capable, no matter how politically brilliant the latter may be.

The political expert is not always the one most indicated to lead a struggle, above all in its early moments which demand iron discipline and military qualities. When a party moves its entire leadership into the countryside, this leadership tends unconsciously to carry its urban liberalism over into the new setting. Thus it fails, bringing about the defeat of the attempted insurrection.

Moreover, any political party instills a certain *esprit de corps* in its members, a feeling of self-satisfaction and of looking down on the other organizations. A political party is an organization seeking power, seeking supremacy in movements in which it intervenes. This makes revolutionary unity an impossible task because of mutual fears, rivalry, and even aversion among the organizations.

The members of the ELN did not want to found one more party, a new cause of confusion and disunity. For this reason they tried always to build both a "free association of revolutionists" and a disciplined military team at one and the same time.

Discipline and democracy do not contradict each other in a revolutionary military organization. The internal life of such an organization can be a combination of subordination of the lower to the higher ranks in military questions and democracy and freedom of expression in political matters. It would be an absurdity for a guerrilla group to sit down and discuss democratically when it is under attack by the enemy, but it is possible and essential for all the fighters, without distinction of rank, to take part in making the political decisions of the guerrilla movement. This guarantees not only the education of the militants but their support of the general line of the revolutionary movement.

The name ELN [*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*—National Liberation Army] represented the aim of the task we had taken up—the formation of a revolutionary army by the entire people, by all the nonparty masses—rather than a reality in the here and now.

In the complexity of the Peruvian Marxist left, the formation of such a group, however small, represented a totally new factor. An experiment of this kind had never been made before. It ran counter to all the methods that

had been considered the only correct and feasible ones before this.

The ELN wanted the party to arise from the peasant masses and from the densely populated centers of agricultural, factory, and mine workers; it wanted the party to merge with the people, to be their creation.

This estimation was justified by the situation of the Peruvian peasants, who are quite backward and swayed by ancient beliefs and prejudices. Many of these beliefs are conservative and negative for any revolutionary process; others are positive and can be the source of future political progress.

It is worth remembering what Castro Pozo said:

"The superstitious simplicity of the Indian soul is filled with contradictions, resulting from the destruction of his religious, moral, and political ideals by the forcible imposition of others that he has never understood or attempted to assimilate, since they implicitly signify the negation of his identity—his exploitation and slavery."³⁵

When a party, formed in the city by people from the coastal middle class, transplants itself into the countryside, an obvious disparity appears between this party's objectives, methods, and conceptions; and the customs, traditions, sentiments, demands, and needs of the Indian masses.

To overcome this contradiction, you have to begin at the peasants' level. You have to sow and cultivate, not transplant. A party formed prematurely is always an obstacle, a barrier placed between the masses and the revolution. What needs to be done is not to call on the masses to follow a party but to build the party within the masses themselves.

If the party springs from the peasantry and the proletariat after a long process of struggle in which the revolutionists and the exploited have fused into a single phalanx, then a real vanguard of the exploited will have been created, made up of these exploited themselves.

Building a guerrilla movement in the name of a party also gives a go-ahead to other parties, old or new, to form their own guerrilla fronts, which disperses and divides the revolutionary forces.

Army and Front

Facing the simultaneous existence of a people outside the parties and of a fragmented Marxist left, the ELN proposed as a way out the formation of a very broad political front of all the forces interested in a revolutionary transformation of the country, and an army that would unite all the fighters regardless of their ideology or party membership.

The objectives of this army would be those of the Revolution. Militarily and politically capable fighters would constitute its leadership, regardless of their party affiliation. It would be a real people's army, because workers and peasants would join it without even being Marxists. It would be a revolutionary army in which the fighters, with or without party affiliations, would follow a single leadership inspired not by the interests of any party or parties, which by nature are limited and narrow, but by the higher general interests of the revolution.

The leadership of the revolutionary armed forces was to be independent. The political front would be broad and totally nonexclusive, and would hold the responsibility of mounting political actions to support the fighters.

These conceptions governed the relations between the ELN and the other left groupings from 1962 until the time of the insurrection in 1965. Very quickly the suspicious attitude of these organizations, or simply their refusal to back a struggle in which they saw no great dividends, thwarted the ELN's attempts. Our organization was able to find a basis for possible joint work only with the CP, the FIR, and the VR.

It must be admitted that the ELN's objective was utopian. The differences in the left were too great to be resolved as quickly as that. Besides, it was impossible to establish a real collaboration between an armed organization which was preparing for an imminent insurrection and several political organizations.

Thus, in a plan drawn up at the end of 1964 and published in 1965, the ELN tacitly recognized its error with the promise:

"The immediate objective of our unity policy is the formation of a broad front uniting all the people. The Front will not be the result of bureaucratic negotiations behind the backs of the masses; it will be the culmination of a stage of armed struggle by the people in which action, through its deeds, will unite all the popular forces."

And it added:

"No group can claim sole leadership of the Revolution unless it demonstrates in practice that it stands at the head of the masses and is capable of leading them to victory. The leadership of a people is not a privilege but a grave responsibility conferred by the backing of the people."³⁶

The MIR and the ELN

In No. 45 of its official organ *Voz Rebelde* [Rebel Voice], the MIR published "The Resolutions and Conclusions" of its Central Committee Assembly. In these, it was stated in an analysis of the 1965 experiences:

"In spite of efforts on both sides, we did not succeed in linking up in time the 'Pachacútec' guerrilla group of the MIR and the 'Javier Heraud' guerrilla group of the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, which operated in areas relatively near to each other. Had this been done, the revolutionary armed forces would have been strengthened and the aim of the repressive operations would certainly have been thwarted.

"This lack of a tie-up with another sector of the revolutionary left, which was also engaged in organizing armed struggle, worked against broadening this process. *However, our movement sought such a link in April 1965 and its absence was in nowise attributable to any sectarianism on our part.*" (My emphasis—H. B.)³⁷

This statement, made after the clashes of 1965, is not in accordance with the truth.

In fact, the two organizations had been in contact with each other since the middle of 1962, that is, three years

35. Castro Pozo, Hildebrando. *Nuestra comunidad indigena*. Lima, 1938, page 205.

36. Transcribed in: Mercado, Rogger. *Las guerrillas en el Peru*. Fondo de Cultura Popular. Lima, 1967, page 164.

37. *Ibid.*, page 188.

before April 1965; and they were never able to reach points of agreement that would have permitted a merger.

People without any inside knowledge of the problems of the Peruvian revolutionary organizations have often wondered why there were two guerrilla leaderships and two guerrilla organizations in Peru.

Despite the fact that the MIR and the ELN were both ready to initiate guerrilla struggle, as the facts demonstrated, their methods of work differed.

The MIR started from the basis of a preexisting political party and an already established military leadership. For the ELN, the party and the leadership were to arise from the struggle itself.

In practice, this fundamental difference prevented any effective coordination. Subsequent experience showed that coordinating two organizations which are working in secret and trying not to give away their plans is impossible. The MIR and the ELN had only one road if they really wanted revolutionary unity — a merger.

The MIR maintained that the revolution had to be led by a party — the MIR. The ELN wanted the leadership to be capable of absorbing other revolutionary forces which were active in the country in 1962.

The ELN advocated the broad conception of the revolutionary army that I have outlined above, an approach that sought to keep the revolutionary army from being restricted to the members of one party.

In the fruitless discussions between the two organizations, the MIR insisted that joining its ranks was a prerequisite for participating in the struggle, a demand which contradicted the statements made later in its 1965 Proclamation:

"The revolution which we are initiating will be carried out by the peasants and the progressive and patriotic sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of the Revolutionary Party which must be forged in the heat of the struggle and of which the MIR considers itself *only one element*."³⁸ (My emphasis — H. B.)

And Luis de la Puente himself stated in his speech of February 7, 1964:

"If unity means struggling side by side with the peasants to oppose the oligarchic regime, to make the revolution possible, then our arms are open wide for such unity."³⁹

The ELN was not interested in participating in any leadership and it never included this demand among its conditions for reaching an agreement. It asked only that the ultimate leadership of the guerrillas arise out of the struggle itself and not only from among the more "political" comrades, those on a higher "level," or with more party experience. The ELN made this demand because it saw perfectly clearly that it was one of the conditions for the survival of the armed groups that were to be created and because it was familiar with the limitations of the political leaderships.

The ELN had said on several occasions that it was not interested in leading the revolutionary movement. It had said that if a political front were formed, as it was calling for then, with the participation of the FIR

and the Communist party (which had not yet split), that the ELN would not ask to be included in the leadership.

What the ELN asked was that the military organizations have command over the entire movement, that the political front be subordinated to the military organization, and that the guerrillas not belong to any political party specifically but constitute a completely independent military organization.

This demand was still more justified if one takes into consideration that in that year, 1962, Hugo Blanco was the most prominent figure in the peasant movement in La Convención. No one who wanted to organize an insurrection in Peru could fail to recognize the scope the land occupations were assuming.

It is true that the FIR and Blanco did not accept the guerrilla warfare postulates, but an agreement could have been reached with them. And in any case such an accord could have been carried out in practice. But in no way was it correct to ignore them and act as if they did not exist.

As we have seen, the peasantry was undergoing a process which could have had a revolutionary outcome if it were fostered and oriented from within. Conceiving of the revolution as the prerogative of one party, even if this claim was not made in public pronouncements, meant closing the door to such a convergence, which was the only guarantee of success for revolutionary action at that time.

In 1962 the doors were open for a fruitful unity on the left. The FIR had made repeated appeals pointing in this direction and many of its members and leaders were ready, in fact, to engage in revolutionary actions, including guerrilla warfare.

The peasant unions could have provided the popular base that the guerrillas needed and at the same time the guerrillas could have given the peasant movement a definite revolutionary orientation.

Rejecting this road and trying to force the revolution, which is by nature complex and richly variegated, into a single channel meant abandoning a promising mass movement to its fate and denying the guerrillas their best guarantee of victory.

Another difference was over how to initiate the actions. The ELN advocated immediate action, starting with an armed group that would construct its own social base in the course of the struggle. The MIR considered it necessary to create a peasant social base through preliminary clandestine work in the countryside, following the method of "secret armed propaganda."⁴⁰

The ELN believed that it was impossible to carry out such a propaganda campaign in face of the repression the countryside was undergoing in 1962-63. Sending revolutionary cadres into the countryside unorganized, unarmed, and unprepared for combat was, in its opinion, unrealistic and naïve and meant revealing the insurrectionists' preliminary moves to the enemy. For the ELN, there was no other solution than to establish armed and mobile groups in selected spots.

Practice later demonstrated that it was possible to carry

38. *Ibid.*, page 129.

39. *Ibid.*, page 89.

40. Interview with a member of the Central Committee of the MIR by the magazine *Punto Final*, published in Santiago de Chile. *Ibid.*, page 215.

out such propaganda work despite the repression. The MIR was able to devote itself to a discreet recruitment of peasants for almost all of 1964 in conditions of relative tranquility.

However, the intelligence services of the enemy were continually observing the conspirators and preparing for the confrontation. It was possible to take time to prepare a peasant base. But it involved certain risks and disadvantages which came to light a year later, when the actions were already underway.

In any case, these differences, which seemed insuperable to our eyes in 1962, were small compared with the great tasks which we wanted to undertake. Today, a great part of these differences have been overcome.

It must be said also that unity obtained by merely combining organizations without a change in conceptions and method would not have saved the movement from its subsequent fate. In reality, both organizations had severe limitations. These, in the last analysis, determined the strife that arose in 1965.

But it would be going no deeper than the surface to point only to the tactical disagreements as the reason for the separation between the MIR and the ELN. You have to dig down into the substratum of the Peruvian left to determine what made such a division possible.

The explanation of the split is to be found in the fact that almost all of the cadres in the MIR and the ELN, or at least those who had the dominant influence, were trained in competing political shops. The MIR was the product of a split from APRA, and the ELN was led by cadres who had come out of the CP.

As a result, there was an invisible wall between them constituted by the prejudices still binding them to their political past. The struggle between the APRA and the Communist party, extending over several decades of Peruvian political history, still influenced them, although they did not admit it. It was difficult for the two organizations to find a common language.

Moreover, the MIR itself was still a heterogeneous organization, rocked by polemics, disputes, and internal struggles.

In general, in the years from 1962 to 1965, the insurrectionary left was far from having defined conceptions, methods, and organizational systems which would have made real unity possible. Under these conditions, any forced agreement would have been a hypocritical compromise, a half-way unity.

This confusion was faithfully reflected in the later actions and was one of the causes of the defeat. In order to win in 1965, the revolutionists would have had first to modify their methods of work, making them more practical and efficient.

When the ELN was constituted alongside the already established organization of the MIR, an inevitable rivalry developed between the two groups. A competition developed, which besides representing a waste and a duplication of effort and tasks, did not create the climate necessary for achieving a common policy.

On September 9, 1965, both organizations agreed finally to form a *Comando Nacional de Coordinación* [National Coordinating Command]. It was too late. In Ayacucho and Cuzco, the guerrillas of the MIR and the ELN were fighting the same enemy, unaware that a ten-day hike was all that separated them. Besides, the coordina-

tion accepted was purely propagandistic in character, limited in scope and therefore fictitious. The *Comando* was made up of city elements who had no contact with the fighters.

Some forty-five days later, Luis de la Puente, the leader of the MIR, fell in Mesa Pelada. This was the result of failure to overcome shortsightedness, sectarianism, and lack of discernment. He died because the interests of the Revolution were not put above those of groups and parties.

[To be continued]

Takes Auto Off Pollution List

Of course, the hullabaloo about pollution, especially pollution of the atmosphere, may be just panic-mongering. That appears to be the view of one expert on the question, Charles M. Heinen, who has managed to keep his cool when all the rest were losing theirs.

Interviewed by the *New York Times* (February 1), he said he was most concerned "with the number of amateurs raising Cain about the subject of pollution." The cigar-smoking Heinen "spoke scornfully" about a bill in California to ban all automobiles from the highways by 1975.

"This is sheer demagogic exaggeration," Heinen said. "It's time to take a look at where we are and what we have been able to do and not run off in all directions. We've got time to do a bit of studying and to determine whether there is a need. The only way to do this is to produce good data. In making demagogic claims, you don't produce anything."

In case you didn't guess, Heinen is an employee of one of the giant automobile manufacturers, the Chrysler Corporation. For the past seventeen years he has been Chrysler's principal technical representative on matters relating to the control of air, water, and solids pollution. After living with the problem that long, he is sure that the automobile is no longer a serious cause of air pollution.

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