

**SONGMY:**

# True Face of Nixon's War

**Ernest Mandel  
Barred from  
Speaking in U.S.**

**South Korea:**

**Shape of Things  
Under Chung Hee Park**



ATTORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL: Fears "Russian revolution" in the U.S. See page 1085.

**Czechoslovak Issue Speeds Erosion of Swedish Communist Party**

## 'Point of No Return'

Dr. Barry Commoner, director of the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, told a conference on environmental problems November 18 that the United States was "approaching the point of no return" in its disruption of nature's chemical balances.

He said the country had only a generation left in which to reverse its "suicidal course."

The conference, held in Los Angeles, was organized by California's ultra-rightist Governor Ronald Reagan, who appears to be seeking "conservation credentials for his reelection campaign next year. Dr. Commoner's warning was all the more remarkable at a gathering held under such sponsorship.

He was particularly concerned over the effects of nitrogen pollution. "The agricultural wealth of California's Central Valley has been gained," he said, "at a cost that does not appear on the farmers' balance sheet—the general pollution of the state's huge underground water reserves with nitrate."

The main source of the pollution is chemical fertilizers, although automobile exhaust also contributes a considerable amount. Excess nitrogen in drinking water is a cause of the serious infant disease of methemoglobinemia.

Nitrogen pollution is already widespread. It has seriously affected San Francisco Bay and has appeared in natural rainfall in California's Central Valley, in the corn belt of the Midwest, and in Texas. In Illinois, Dr. Commoner said, "every major river is overburdened with fertilizer drainage."

Another, "more ominous" danger linked with excess nitrogen has also appeared. "In New York Harbor, in the period of 1948-68," the scientist said, "there has been a 10 to 20-fold increase in the bacterial count despite a marked improvement in the sewage treatment facilities that drain into the bay.

"The possibility exists that the bacteria, entering the water from sewage or the soil, are now able to grow in the enriched waters of the bay."

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## Ernest Mandel Barred from Speaking in U.S.

By George Novack

Ernest Mandel, the noted Belgian Marxist scholar, who is a contributing editor of *Intercontinental Press*, has been barred from speaking in the United States for the second time this year. His exclusion, announced by the State Department November 26, has created a policy split and open breach in the highest circles of the Nixon administration. The division between Secretary of State William P. Rogers—who favored Mandel's admission—and Attorney General John N. Mitchell—who overruled the State Department—may ultimately have to be resolved by the president himself.

It is widely recognized that the disposition of the Mandel case has significant implications for the course of American politics and the state of civil liberties in the U.S. The ban on the internationally known Trotskyist represents a deliberated revival of the closed-door provisions against foreign revolutionists incorporated in the infamous 1952 McCarran-Walter Act which had largely been permitted to lapse during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Mandel is the editor of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly *La Gauche*, and author of the two-volume study *Marxist Economic Theory*, which has received exceptionally favorable reviews in publications ranging from *The Economist* to the *New York Review of Books*.

Nixon and Attorney General Mitchell, his campaign manager in 1968 and chief political strategist today, have instituted repressive measures and warnings designed to curb dissent and to consolidate the Republican constituency in the Southern states and "middle America."

This tactical course was touched off by Vice-president Agnew's attacks upon the TV networks and the Eastern establishment press, particularly the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. The State Department officials, who are more sensitive to world and liberal opinion, are trying to warn

the White House not to go too far and too fast in this direction.

The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and many liberal Democrats have taken hold of the "incredible example of autocratic insensitivity" (as the *Times* put it) exhibited in the barring of Mandel as another stick to beat the most aggressively reactionary wing of the administration with. Nixon's liberal critics are well aware of the growing apprehension about a resurgent McCarthyism in the seats of power.

Two Nobel laureates, Salvador E. Luria of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and George Wald of Harvard; the presidents of Stanford, Princeton, and Vassar; and faculty members of more than fifty universities condemned the government's re-

fusal October 18 to permit Mandel to enter the country to debate Professor John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard at Stanford University in California. (See *Intercontinental Press*, November 3, page 963.)

They called upon the administration to reverse its position. The State Department yielded, only to be vetoed by Mitchell.

These protests are reverberating in a climate of revulsion against the war in Vietnam, epitomized in the Songmy massacre and the attempts by the army brass to cover up the atrocities. The belated reaction of the White House to the Songmy disclosures and the decision to bar Mandel were front-page feature stories in the *New York Times* November 27.

### As Reported by 'The New York Times'

[The following is the full text of a special dispatch in the November 27 *New York Times* reporting the decision of the Nixon administration to bar Ernest Mandel from speaking in the U.S. It appeared under the headline: "Mitchell Bars Belgian Marxist from U.S. Visit—Rejects Advice by Rogers to Give Scholar a Visa."]

\* \* \*

Washington, Nov. 26—Rejecting the advice of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Attorney General John N. Mitchell acted today to bar a Belgian Marxist from visiting the United States.

The Justice Department refused to take the legal steps required under the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act to admit Dr. Ernest Mandel, editor of *La Gauche*, the weekly journal, for a one-week lecture tour that was to start next week.

State Department officials made the decision known after the Attorney General's opinion had been conveyed to them in writing.

They took the unusual step of disassociating the Secretary of State from the decision, stating that the department had recommended that Dr. Mandel be allowed to make his scheduled visit. They further indicated that an effort might be made to reverse the decision, although this probably could not be done in time for Dr. Mandel's first scheduled appearance in New York this Saturday.

Justice Department spokesmen refused to comment on the case, referring all questions to the State Department.

Liberal academic figures in the United States have warned that the Mandel case raises the question of whether a person should be excluded from the United States because of his political views.

Dr. Mandel visited the United States twice before, in 1962 and 1968, under special visas authorized by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

Reliable sources said that earlier this month, when his present application was made, State Department of-

officials reviewed his case and, with the specific endorsement of Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson and Mr. Rogers, proposed to the Justice Department that he be admitted.

From consultations between the two departments, the sources added it was clear in advance that the Attorney General did not share their opinion on how the visa-granting power should be used.

Even in today's announcement, no effort was made to paper over the differences among two Cabinet members, as is usually done once a decision is made final.

State Department officials refused to make public the Justice Department's explanation for the decision. One said, "It's not up to us to take the blame for their argument."

Dr. Mandel is technically ineligible for a visa, under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, because of membership in certain "proscribed organizations" on a list compiled by the Justice Department. Only the Attorney General has the statutory authority to grant exemptions from this ban.

Democratic officials granted so-called "waivers" of this ineligibility for his two previous trips, noting at the time that the political atmosphere had changed since the act was passed during the McCarthy era.

Dr. Mandel's initial visa application last month was turned down by the State Department on technicalities without any references to high policy-making officials. When letters and statements of protest were received at the department, the case was quickly reviewed and Dr. Mandel was advised to submit another application.

In two letters, the second one last week endorsed by both Mr. Rogers and Mr. Richardson, the department urged the Attorney General to grant the waiver as being "in the national interest."

## Action Is Denounced

*By Will Lissner*

Several of the sponsors of Dr. Mandel's projected visit to this country held a news conference yesterday to announce that the Justice Department had blocked the issuance of a visa by the State Department and to denounce the action as "ignorant" and "bigoted."

The sponsors said Dr. Mandel was one of the major socialist critics of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Among those at the conference were Ralph Schoenman, director, and Arthur Felberbaum, New York executive secretary of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, and George Novack of the Steering Committee of the Socialist Scholar's Conference.

Also present was Prof. Arno Mayer, a historian at Princeton University, where Dr. Mandel had been scheduled to address the philosophy department next Monday.

The foundation and the conference have scheduled an all-day conference Saturday at Town Hall at which Dr. Mandel was expected to speak, along with Andre Gorz, an editor of *Les Temps Modernes* in Paris, and Paul Sweezy, co-editor of *The Monthly Review*.

The conference, according to Mr. Felberbaum, is on "Agencies of Social Change; Toward a Revolutionary Strategy for Advanced Industrial Countries."

Despite the ban, Dr. Mandel will contribute his views by a recording and will take part in the discussions over a trans-Atlantic telephone hookup, Mr. Felberbaum and the other sponsors said.

Mr. Schoenman termed the Justice Department's action inconsistent because Dr. Mandel had been given visas in 1962 and 1968. He spoke

at 30 colleges and universities last year.

"It should be made clear," Mr. Schoenman said, "that the refusal to grant Dr. Mandel a visa is of a piece with the Nixon Administration's attacks on the news media and its attempt to suppress news about the massacres in Vietnam."

Mr. Schoenman said the Administration had cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and had notified Communist China that it wished to engage in cultural exchanges that would involve admitting Chinese Marxist economists, Dr. Mandel's Asian counterparts, to the United States.

"It refuses to admit Dr. Mandel because it knows he will make an analysis of the Nixon Administration policy," Mr. Schoenman said. "It is his ideas that they fear."

Besides his scheduled talks at Town Hall and Princeton, Dr. Mandel had planned to lecture at Amherst, Columbia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vassar and the New School for Social Research.

Miss Edith Tiger of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee said that Leonard Boudin, its counsel, was studying the matter to see if American participants in the events in which Dr. Mandel was to have taken part might challenge the constitutionality of the law that prevents them from hearing him.

Mr. Felberbaum exhibited several folders of letters and telegrams that he said were protests by professors and students.

## Editorial Opinion of the 'Times'

[Under the title "McCarranism Revisited," the *New York Times* expressed the following editorial opinion, November 27, on the Ernest Mandel case.]

\* \* \*

The arbitrary refusal by the Justice Department to issue the waiver that would have allowed Dr. Ernest Mandel, a Belgian Marxist scholar, to speak at academic conferences in the United States, is an incredible example of autocratic insensitivity. It has resulted in public humiliation of the State Department by an Attorney Gen-

eral who ignores the damage thus inflicted on the image of America as the defender of freedom of ideas.

The denial of the waiver that was necessary for issuance of a visa by the State Department assumes added significance because Secretary Rogers himself is known to have recommended approval of Dr. Mandel's visit. While the battle of the visa began at low levels of routine bureaucratic hurdles, it has culminated in a contest of conflicting authority and ideology at the highest stratum of the Administration. The plain fact is that the Justice Department, on Attorney

General Mitchell's orders, overruled a request which the State Department considered in the national interest.

The planners of the Socialist Scholars Conference now expect to have the Belgian professor "attend" via trans-Atlantic telephone. The empty

chair on the panel and the electronic circumvention of the travel ban will add to the embarrassment suffered by this country as a result of this triumph of police over diplomacy, of fear over freedom and of ideological rigidity over democratic common sense.

Klein, but he indicated that his approval reflected what everyone at the White House felt about it.'

"'I haven't heard from John yet,' she said. 'But we always agree.'"

Miss McCardle added: "Dressed in a blond mink coat that matched her bouffant blonde hair, a brown silk dress with gold buttons and long dangling gold earrings, Mrs. Mitchell seemed unaware of any adverse reactions to her TV appearance."

Was that a blond mink coat the Czarina was wearing on the eve of the Russian revolution?

## What the 'New York Post' Thought

[The *New York Post*, a liberal daily, expressed its views November 28 on the Ernest Mandel case in the following editorial, titled "In re Mitchell vs. Rogers."]

\* \* \*

Secretary of State William Rogers believes it would be "in the national interest" to permit Dr. Ernest Mandel, editor of a Belgian Marxist journal, to enter this country and participate in a series of public discussions. Twice before—in 1962 and 1968—he has been allowed to do so despite provisions of the oppressive McCarran-Walter Act that would brand him a dangerous character. Our democracy sur-

vived his presence on both occasions.

Unhappily Mr. Rogers' appeal to rationality had to be addressed to Mitchell's Justice Department. In that hotbed of hysteria, it was rejected. Perhaps Mr. Mitchell just didn't know how he could explain such tolerance to Mrs. Mitchell after bringing her to the brink of panic over the peace demonstrations.

The unsolved mystery remains. When two Cabinet members of high rank disagree on an issue that is already subjecting us to ridicule and resentment in much of the world, where is President Nixon? Did he throw his weight behind Mitchell's folly? Is it conceivable that the case was never brought to his attention?

## Ceylon

### Students Spurn Oaths

Three of the faculties of the University of Ceylon at Peradeniya, shut by a student strike October 23, remained closed in mid-November as administrators sought to extract signed loyalty oaths from the students before readmitting them to the campus. Vice-Chancellor E. O. E. Pereira sent out notices to 3,000 undergraduates of the Arts, Science, and Oriental Studies faculties November 10 asking them to sign "stipulated conditions" committing them to obey restrictive campus rules.

P. P. Liyanage, president of the Student Council, told the Colombo *Observer*: "These conditions amount to a negation of human rights."

The Peradeniya students have received wide support from Ceylon's three other universities. The Colombo weekly *Ceylon News* reported November 20:

"Student bodies have made joint appeals to the Peradeniya authorities to withdraw this requirement and have also requested the students affected by the closure of certain faculties not to sign the forms."

Dr. G. P. Malalasekera, chairman of the National Council of Higher Education has threatened the Peradeniya students with expulsion if they do not sign by a certain date.

In reply, K. K. Whyman, president of the Students' Council of Colombo University, has warned that any action against the Peradeniya strikers would be met by a general strike of all university students.

## Additional Light from Mrs. Mitchell

In a television interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System November 21, Mrs. John N. Mitchell described her husband's reaction to the November 15 antiwar demonstration in Washington, which she herself had not witnessed.

"I will tell you, my husband made the comment to me, looking out the Justice Department it looked like the Russian revolution going on."

Apparently the Attorney General was referring to the size of the demonstration—some 800,000 participants—or to the use of tear gas by the police to disperse a small group that sought a "violent" confrontation at the Justice Department building.

"I don't think the average Americans realize how desperate it is when a group of demonstrators, not peaceful demonstrators, but the very liberal Communists move into Washington," the Attorney General's wife went on.

"This place could become a complete fortress. You could have every building in Washington burned down. It could be a great, great catastrophe.

"And this is the thing I worried about way before I came to Washington, knowing the liberal element in this country is so, so against us. As my husband has said many times, some of the liberals in this country, he'd like to take them and change them for Russian Communists."

Mrs. Mitchell did not make clear what her distinguished husband meant by this. Judging from his action in the Ernest Mandel case, the Attorney General may view all the antiwar demonstrators in the U. S. as "Trotskyists" whom he would like to exchange for Stalinists officially approved by the Kremlin bureaucrats.

Later in the afternoon during a party at the Supreme Court, according to Dorothy McCardle in the November 22 *Washington Post*, Mrs. Mitchell was elated over her TV interview.

"The Attorney General's office called to tell her their switchboard was swamped with compliments for her.

"'I even had a call from the White House,' she said. 'It was from Herb

## Songmy: the True Face of Nixon's War

By Les Evans

The Songmy massacre took place more than a year and a half ago—March 16, 1968. The story, as told by one of the survivors, Do Hoai, was not to appear in the *New York Times*, America's leading newspaper, which specializes in "All the News That's Fit to Print," until November 17, 1969.

As paraphrased by the *Times*, here is Do Hoai's account:

"A heavy artillery barrage awakened the villagers around 6 A.M. It lasted for an hour, then American soldiers entered the village, meeting no opposition. They ordered all inhabitants out of their homes. . . .

"When the houses had been cleared, the troops dynamited those made of brick and set fire to the wooden structures. They did not speak to the villagers and were not accompanied by an interpreter who could have explained their actions.

"Then the Vietnamese were gunned down where they stood. About 20 soldiers performed the executions at each of the three places, using their individual weapons, presumably M-16 rifles. . . .

"Mr. Hoai, 40, a rice farmer like most of the villagers in this green and marshy area between the central highlands and the South China Sea, said that those who escaped the slaughter, as he and his wife did, had hidden under the bodies of victims until the Americans left." Hoai said a count of the survivors showed 567 had been killed.

"Responsible" South Vietnamese officials, the *Times* said, put the death toll at 450 to 500.

The November 20 London *Times* published an interview with three American soldiers involved in the shootings. One of them, Private Michael Terry, said:

"They just marched through, shooting everybody. Seems like no one said anything—they just started pulling people out and shooting them.

"They had them in a group standing over a ditch—just like a Nazi-type thing. . . . One officer ordered

a kid to machine-gun everybody down, but the kid just couldn't do it. He threw the machine-gun down and the officer picked it up. . . .

"I don't remember seeing any men in the ditch. Mostly women and kids. . . .

"Many of them in the company were shooting these civilians point-blank."

Sergeant Michael A. Bernhardt, in a November 19 telephone interview with the *New York Times*, said that "most of the men" in the company—C Company of the First Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade of the Americal Division—took part in the killing.

The victims "were women and children and old men mostly," Bernhardt said. The sergeant refused to take part in the massacre.

Bernhardt accused the company commander, Captain Ernest Medina, of briefing the unit in advance "to the effect that the village and the occupants were to be destroyed."

On November 24, in a television interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System, Paul David Meadlo of Terre Haute, Indiana, a private who lost a foot in a land mine explosion the day after the massacre, admitted how, under what he said were orders of First Lieut. William L. Calley Jr., he had emptied four clips into forty to forty-five "men, women and children."

Meadlo said: "They was begging and saying, 'No . . . no.' And the mothers was hugging their children and, but they kept right on firing. Well, we kept right on firing. They was waving their arms and begging . . ."

Meadlo said that he and several other soldiers rounded up seven or eight more villagers and herded them with seventy to seventy-five others beside a ravine. Lieut. Calley and his men, Meadlo continued, "just pushed them all off [into the ravine] and just started using automatics on them."

Since then, he said, "I see the women and children in my sleep. Some

days . . . some nights, I can't even sleep. I just lay there thinking about it."

The reaction of most Americans to these revelations were vividly expressed by Private Meadlo's father, Anthony Meadlo, as quoted in the November 30 *New York Times*: "If it had been me out there I would have swung my rifle around and shot Calley instead—right between the Goddamned eyes."

In contrast to this, the Saigon government, which is very responsive to suggestions from the White House, has coolly asserted that there was no massacre and that the case is closed. From the viewpoint of Thieu and his American backers, of course, there is a certain consistency to this. What happened at Songmy was but a typical incident. Why the uproar over this case out of the hundreds and thousands that have occurred?

When the incident at Songmy came to light, the initial reaction was much sharper in the communications media abroad than in the U.S. This probably reflected disappointment of the expectation that Nixon would end the U.S. aggression in Vietnam as he had promised in running for office. Nixon's decision to assume responsibility for Johnson's war and to continue it indefinitely was not welcomed by the satellite powers, for it would inevitably revive antiwar demonstrations that always have the potentiality of spilling over into something even more formidable.

The London *Daily Mirror* carried a banner headline, "The Massacre That Chilled the World." Papers in West Germany compared Songmy to atrocities committed by the Nazis. Revulsion was voiced throughout Latin America.

On November 28, four major West German newspapers ran editorials on the murder of the Vietnamese civilians. The *Stuttgarter Zeitung* said that Songmy could not be compared to the Nazi death camps, but was comparable to Nazi executions of civilians in reprisals for partisan resis-

tance. The "accusers at the Nuremberg trials," the paper said, "must now sit before a court for mass murder."

In Israel a motion was introduced in the Knesset condemning Premier Golda Meir for her endorsement of Nixon's war. The motion was defeated November 26, but Deputy Uri Avneri in backing the motion charged that Meir's message to Nixon was being used deliberately by U. S. officials to offset criticism of the Songmy massacre.

Anthony Lewis, writing from London in the November 22 *New York Times*, described the impact there.

"The reports of mass murder by American soldiers have been devastating in their effect on the British, long our closest ally. . . .

"It was the sense of a corrupting effect on the American character that changed a man as devoted to the United States as Lord Harlech from a supporter to a resolute critic of U. S. policy in Vietnam. . . .

"Last Sunday's *Observer* devoted four pages to a condensation of Daniel Lang's horrifying *New Yorker* article, now a book, on how four American soldiers on patrol kidnapped, raped and killed a Vietnamese girl. . . .

"And then came the stories of American soldiers shooting down hundreds of unarmed old men, women and children in Songmy village. In London, memories of the Nazis were inevitably evoked. Songmy was compared with Lidice, the Czech village destroyed by the Germans in a 1942 reprisal. But at Lidice the Nazis spared the women and children.

"One of the most awful visual images of the Nazis was that of a storm trooper leading a child who could barely walk into the gas chambers. It was the description of the children at Songmy that was most heart-rending.

"Sgt. Michael Bernhardt, in his account, spoke of a boy three or four years old holding a wounded arm while blood trickled between his fingers. 'He just stood there with big eyes staring around, like he didn't understand; he didn't believe what was happening. Then the captain's radio operator put a burst of M-16 fire into him.'"

John Mendelson, a Labour party M. P., on November 20 questioned

Prime Minister Wilson about his forthcoming visit to Washington.

"When you meet the President," Mendelson asked, "will you point out the very strong and deep feeling in this country about the wholesale assassination of ordinary village people in South Vietnam by members of the United States forces . . .?"

Wilson said of the reports:

"Even if they prove to be only one-quarter true, they would be regarded



LAIRD: Sought to keep it a secret.

as very grave atrocities." But Wilson refused to dissociate his government from its policy of support for the imperialist invasion of Vietnam. He sought to lay equal blame on the invaders and on the victims of the invasions: "There have been atrocities on both sides in this horrible and tragic war," he piously added.

Some 300,000 persons staged a mammoth rally in East Berlin November 27 branding Nixon as a war criminal and demanding that he be tried for the Songmy massacre. The move was unusual in Stalinist-controlled East Germany inasmuch as protests against the Vietnam war have been noticeably feeble throughout Eastern Europe and were even banned in East Berlin after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The government-organized rally was the largest protest of U. S. policy since the outbreak of the Korean war.

Both the Democratic and Republican parties, two administrations, and the top levels of the government bureaucracy are implicated in the twenty-month conspiracy of silence that sought to hide the events at Songmy

from the American people and the rest of the world.

The army, which on some high level of command had ordered the destruction of Songmy, whitewashed the massacre in its own investigation of April 1968. Credit for exposing the truth goes to a former GI, who refused to acquiesce in the horror.

Specialist 4 Ronald L. Ridenhour served in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968. While there he heard of the Songmy killings and questioned at least five members of the unit that had carried out the massacre. On his return to the U. S., and after recovering from a case of malaria, he wrote to President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, "dove" Senators Edward M. Kennedy, George S. McGovern and Eugene McCarthy, and some twenty other members of Congress last March. Only one member of the House of Representatives even expressed interest in the former soldier's information.

The army interviewed Ridenhour in April, but did nothing more.

Finally Ridenhour offered his story to major newspapers in Boston and New York, three national magazines, two news agencies, and at least one television network. None would touch it.

By this time, however, rumors had begun to circulate and witnesses had begun to talk.

A little-known news agency, the Dispatch News Service, revealed in mid-September that the army was "investigating" charges against Lieut. William L. Calley Jr., the leader of the company that had leveled Songmy. A hearing was held September 5, but the army brought no charges against Calley. Evidently the brass were stalling.

Then came the October 15 antiwar Moratorium and the November 13-15 demonstrations.

The Nixon administration responded with . . . witch-hunting. One of the first targets was the communications media, the objective being to induce them to play down the upsurge in the antiwar movement and to serve the administration in the style of a totalitarian country. But the communications media were themselves under enormous pressure from the majority of the American people, who want to know the truth, and who want the war in Vietnam ended now. Thus, the press and the television networks

suddenly "discovered" the Songmy story. It was their way of answering the attack Nixon had mounted against them through his mouthpiece, Spiro T. Agnew.

The White House, so hasty to denounce the "violence" of antiwar demonstrations, remained silent for weeks after the story broke. Then it was admitted that Nixon had known about the Songmy killings since "early summer," while Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was first informed in April.

It was not until November 26 that a White House press secretary bothered to tell reporters that the president considered the mass murder of civilians "abhorrent." Nixon himself refrained from making any public statement.

Vice-president Agnew, so vociferous in denouncing peace demonstrators or newspapers that are insufficiently pro-war, seemed to have lost his voice.

Laird, in a note to Senator Fulbright, said he was "shocked and sick." He would not say who was responsible, or why he had kept the massacre a secret for six months.

Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor—who held the same post at the time of the slayings—showed color slides of the dead civilians to pan-

## 'Inkydink'



Maxine Cheshire reports in the *Washington Post* that a new rubber stamp caricature of President Nixon is "hidden away surreptitiously in desk drawers all over town."

Called an "Inkydink," the unofficial portrait is appearing on the office paper that circulates in vast quantities in the government departments.

"Even White House employees have been known to use them on intramural memos . . ."

els of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees November 26. One congressman walked out in the middle, saying, "I have one of those queasy stomachs."

But the congressmen were able to stomach voting funds for the war all these years, and will no doubt continue to do so.

The government and much of the press have sought to depict the Songmy massacre as somehow exceptional to the war in Vietnam. An army judge on November 25 ordered all witnesses, in and out of the army, to remain silent until after the trial of Lieutenant Calley—for which no date has been set. Only two men are even under indictment, Calley and one of his sergeants.

The truth is that Songmy is not very exceptional. Since Johnson escalated the war, the White House has followed a policy in Vietnam that can only be described as genocide. In the November 23 *New York Times Magazine*, a defector from the National Liberation Front, now working for the Saigon regime, described life in the NLF zones:

"There are B-52 strikes, strikes from helicopters, bombing by jets . . . They used to machine-gun into underground bunkers or throw hand grenades into bunkers where women and children were hiding. In many cases they killed five to eight people in one bunker; they were innocent people. The guerrillas left the area before the U.S. and South Vietnamese Army forces arrived. What we fear the most is the B-52 strikes. I saw 50 villagers killed one time and 70 another, all of them children and old people."

Two reporters, Jonathan and Orville Schell, in a letter to the November 26 *New York Times*, described from personal observations, the genocidal policies of the American command in Quangngai Province, where Songmy is located, at the time of the massacre:

"In August 1967, during Operation Benton, the 'pacification' camps became so full that Army units in the fields were ordered not to 'generate' any more refugees. The Army complied. But search-and-destroy operations continued.

"Only now peasants were not warned before an airstrike was called in on their village. They were killed in their villages because there was no room

for them in the swamped pacification camps. The usual warnings by helicopter loudspeaker or air dropped leaflets were stopped. Every civilian on the ground was assumed to be enemy by the pilots by nature of living in Quangngai, which was largely in a free-fire zone."

The army reports issued immediately after the Songmy killings said that 128 of "the enemy" were killed in "battle." How many more of the thousands of "enemies" listed in the body counts each week are women and children killed by napalm, bombs, artillery, and the rifles of individual servicemen?

As long ago as December 1967 the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal reported that American sources listed 250,000 Vietnamese children killed since the beginning of the war.

The Tribunal, made up of internationally known writers, historians, and figures of the world labor and socialist movements found the United States government guilty, by unanimous vote, of genocide against the people of Vietnam. The Tribunal's verdict was based on voluminous testimony from American veterans, its own investigative teams, and residents of both North and South Vietnam.\*

This is the war that Nixon wants to prolong indefinitely under the slogan "Vietnamization." The carnage will only stop when the antiwar protest in the United States and elsewhere reaches such a peak that the rulers of America are forced to withdraw the troops.

\* The proceedings of the Tribunal, held in Stockholm and Copenhagen in 1967, have been published under the title *Against the Crime of Silence*. It is available from O'Hare Books, 10 Bartley Road, Flanders, New Jersey.

## Nixon Uptight on Pornography

Nixon, it seems, is standing up firmly against pornography. According to a report in the *Washington Post*, guards at the Census Bureau seized a picture of the president of the United States on grounds that it was "obscene."

The bit of smut was an "unflattering" likeness of Nixon with the caption, "Would You Buy a Used War From This Man?" which had been pinned up by an employee.

The worker protested, saying he either wanted the picture back or 25 cents to cover what he had paid for it.



## Czechoslovak Issue Speeds Erosion of the CP

[The Kremlin's success in extracting testimonials from the Husák regime in Czechoslovakia praising the August 1968 invasion of their country has had little effect in soothing critics outside the range of Moscow's military control. For most of the Communist parties of Europe, public acceptance of the Czechoslovak government's apologies for the Soviet invasion would still be a risky political move.

[An interesting example of the pressures operating on the European Stalinists was shown in the September 19-21 congress of the Swedish VKP (Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna — Left party of Communists — the Swedish Communist party). Although the congress was held some months ago, the importance of the questions involved and the lack of attention given to the meeting by the world press make the report printed below of timely interest.

[The Swedish and Austrian CPs have been particularly affected by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. These parties, while small, are relatively influential.

[Both parties have carried out a face-lifting in hopes of making themselves attractive to the new radical youth and left-wing Social Democratic circles. Lacking the organizational base in the working class of the French or Italian CPs, the smaller parties cannot rely on bureaucratic inertia to sustain them and are fearful of declining into ineffectual sects if they fail to win a section of the youth.

[At the same time, the Swedish and Austrian CPs are—unlike their American, German, or Canadian counterparts—large enough to hope that an opportunist turn toward the Social Democrats may result in some modest parliamentary successes.

[The Swedish VKP has for several years modeled itself more and more on the left Social Democratic parties. The Soviet invasion was a heavy blow. The VKP suffered a severe electoral defeat in the wake of the intervention, because it was identified with

the Soviet Union despite its condemnation of the Kremlin's action.

[In addition, the ossified apologists for the Soviet bureaucracy within the VKP were spurred to new life by the leadership's criticism of the invasion.\*

[Since August 1968 the Scandinavian "new left" has been watching the trends in the VKP very closely. The following report by Berge Furre on the VKP's September congress appeared in the September 27, 1969, issue of *Orientering*, the weekly organ of the Norwegian SF (Sosialistisk Folkeparti — Socialist People's party—the left Social Democrats).

[Although it is written from a left Social Democratic viewpoint, Furre's article is of interest for the information it provides on the evolution of the VKP. We have included *Orientering's* introductory note. The translation from the Norwegian is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The spokesmen for the East European Communist parties walked out of the national congress of the Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna. The delegates condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, with only the Rumanians and the two spokesmen for the SF, Torolv Solheim and Berge Furre, sitting almost alone in the guest section.

The congress reelected C. H. Hermansson as the chairman of the party. Berge Furre writes here about the sharp conflicts now existing in our Swedish sister party. He stresses the great similarities in political views and program between the VPK in Sweden and the SF in Norway.

\* \* \*

"Now you're almost the only ones

\* See "Czech Events Hurt CP in Swedish Elections," *Intercontinental Press*, September 30, 1968, page 824; and "Pro-Moscow Minority Fails to Reverse Stand of Swedish CP on Czech Events," *Intercontinental Press*, October 28, 1968, page 943.

left," the Swedish Communist chairman told Torolv Solheim towards the end of the party congress held in Stockholm over the weekend. The chairman walked uneasily up and down through the guest seats, counting the delegations that sat there after the spokesmen from the Warsaw Pact countries—except for Rumania—walked out.

The demand for withdrawal from Prague got at least two-thirds of the votes—the vote was not even counted. The Czechs and the Warsaw Pact states walked out with Jespersen from the Communist party of Denmark in tow. The numerous Korean delegation walked in when they got the story about what the trouble was. Until then they had been drinking coffee in the foyer. The Vietnamese were sitting with coffee cups—but they showed up at the reception in the evening. The tables for the Warsaw Pact parties stood empty.

Conditions were strained for the Russians throughout the congress. Already on the first day the delegation complained about attacks against "sister parties," and the [congress] chairman appealed for an apology, under strong protests from the youth in the party. But the majority of the delegates hissed the protesters. Accusations of Soviet imperialism and "social fascism" were too drastic for most.

The congress thus confirmed the party's independent position in the international Communist movement. In this area, the congress demonstrated the party's strength. But many weak sides also came to light.

A walkout was expected at the national convention, but of a very different kind. What was anticipated was an exit either by a faction similar to the SUF [Sosialistisk Ungdoms Forum—Socialist Youth Forum, the former youth group of the SF which was captured by a Maoist grouping and then expelled] in the youth league (Vänsterns Ungdomsförbund—VUF [Left Youth League]), or by the Soviet loyalist circles around the newspaper *Norrskensflamman* published in the northeastern part of the country.

This did not take place. An overwhelming majority wanted to avoid a confrontation at almost any price. And Hermansson gave no signs of settling the scores that most thought he might. So the congress solved none of the internal conflicts in the party.

The conflicts within the party are major. Most of the members are veterans of many years. They got their political education in the Stalin period under Hagberg's leadership. Some of them have learned nothing since. These unreconstructed elements are grouped around *Norrskensflamman* in Lulea and dominate some party districts in the far north where "backwoods Communism" is strong. For a long time they have conducted a rabid campaign against the youth in the party and against Hermansson, demanding that the party return to being what it was—a Communist party of the 1950s type.

They are unrestrained in their attacks. When Hermansson advocated that the party chairman be elected by the congress instead of by the leadership as in Hagberg's time, they claimed that this meant that he had challenged the "leadership principle." But this faction included probably only fifty of the 250-delegates.

The majority has the same background as the *Norrskensflamman* group, but they understand that Hagberg's time is over for good and that the party has no alternative to Hermansson if it is to play any role in Swedish politics. For this reason, Hermansson was reelected without opposition. As long as Hermansson went from electoral victory to electoral victory, the majority closed ranks behind his work of renewing the party politically and organizationally. But since the defeat in the last election, they have put obstacles in his way. This turn marked the congress, which moved away sharply from the new generation in the party.

When Hermansson became party leader early in the sixties, he strongly advocated turning the party toward the "new left," achieved a lively party debate, and made the VPK into a pole of attraction for the radical youth. In Stockholm this course succeeded quite well, while in most of the country virtually the only thing that changed was the language.

An organ for this new line was founded, the weekly *Tidsignal*, which

was to be an independent organ for differing opinions and was to direct itself to nonparty people, especially the youth. *Norrskensflamman* waged an intense struggle against *Tidsignal* and at this congress it won a majority for withdrawing all party support from the paper.

Against this background, the spokesmen for the "new left," the youth at the congress, refused to sit in the party leadership. This refusal was also motivated by the fact that some of the Moscow loyalists were elected to the leadership. They thought they would be wasting their time in fighting such fossils in the party leadership. They were also angry with Hermansson, who did nothing to settle things with *Norrskensflamman* and did nothing to support the youth.

Thus, the party came in conflict not only with more or less Maoist groups in the youth league but with the entire body of youth which Hermansson's new line had brought into the party and which could have renewed it.

The party leadership is now dominated by the center; old, reliable working people who have labored their entire lives in the party. Their efforts can be admired, but they hardly have any special ability for making contacts with new groups. The continual defeats Communism has suffered has stamped them. Politically they are "daydreamers," dreaming a bit about old times.

The circles around *Tidsignal* have no plans for leaving the party but they will probably devote most of their energies to other areas. The new leadership will probably have less internal difficulties than the old, but whether this will inspire the members to make a great effort only time will tell.

And great exertions are necessary. The general elections are next year. Sweden is getting a new parliamentary system. Instead of a two-house parliament, a single assembly is being established, as in Norway. Some 350 members of parliament are to be elected. The parties are allotted seats in accordance with the percentage of their vote—if they get over 4 percent. If they get less than that, they will get no man in parliament and none of the considerable public funds which go to support the parties in parliament. In the 1968 elections, the Swed-

ish Communist vote fell from 6 percent to 3 percent. It was a worse defeat than the one the SF suffered this fall.

After the defeat, a debate developed which was a mixed blessing for the VPK. The Moscow loyalists sharpened their knives for a campaign against Hermansson and the youth, while sections of the youth league slipped further and further into dogmatic theorizing and away from the chilly Swedish electorate.

The national convention thus produced a kind of consolidation in the center. Perhaps that increases the chances for getting over 4 percent in the election but it hardly points the way out of isolation in the long run.

Hermansson opened the congress with a brilliant address on Swedish society and the tasks of the VPK. Aside from the NATO policy, the problems in Swedish society are about the same as in ours—structural rationalization; increasing physical and mental pressure on the workers; increasing internationalization of capital; a close alliance between big capital and the Social Democracy, which more and more makes the state into a tool of the direct interests of capitalism; the demand for joining the European Economic Community; the depopulation of the outlying areas; and pressing problems with pollution, long distances between home and work, housing, etc., in the centers.

Hermansson's analysis of these problems and his answer to these challenges corresponds entirely with the Norwegian SF's policy down to the details and the formulations. This held true for his criticism of the Social Democracy toward which the VPK has followed a somewhat changeable course; that was true for the Nordek\* plan and the decentralization questions in which the VPK earlier had stood close to the Social Democracy. The district concept which is dominant in the SF is now winning ground in Sweden also.

The formulation of viewpoints was often so alike that one might wonder who wrote it and where, but the background was rather that the socialist ideological debate that has gone on in recent years has been largely an

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\* The Nordic customs union proposed an alternative to membership in the Common Market.—IP.

all-Scandinavian debate and that both parties have worked in the same ideological atmosphere and faced the same problem.

Even though there are features in the VPK's organization and structure that we may not like, the similarity in our situation, social analysis, and policy are so great that the SF will gain from further contacts and ex-

changes of views. Such contact has existed before and it will probably be increased in the period to come. For many in the VPK, such cooperation is more natural than cooperation with many Communist parties. "Now you are almost the only ones left," Hermansson said. The reply was correctly not meant for the world press.

its to remain in Libya instead of being drained away overseas.

Nationalization of the oil fields is not an immediate objective. This, undoubtedly, leaves a strong residue of power in the hands of imperialism, but Libya, with its small and backward population, is not equipped to cope with the technical aspects of the oil industry.

Nationalization could only be contemplated within the framework of a united, socialist Arab Federation, and this is a transitional slogan which Libyan socialists must inscribe on their banners.

The marketing of the oil is also a key problem, not only for Libya but for all the oil-producing countries in the Third World. All the outlets for tankers, refineries, retail distribution, etc., are firmly in the hands of the giant oil corporations. Only a united stand of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South America could fight this monopoly.

Libya's revolutionary leaders talk of an "Arab Socialism" based on the primitive collectivism of certain sections of the Koran. They see socialism in a narrow, nationalist context. But the tasks of the revolution pose immediately issues which transcend the national frontiers. Unless the Libyan revolution makes the transition from nationalism to internationalism, even its national program could not be carried to full fruition.

This is a perspective which can only be realized through the building of a vanguard party based on the principles of scientific socialism and conscious of its historic role. At the moment Libya has no such party but, as in Cuba, the problems of the revolution will rapidly establish its need and the need for a transitional program which will lead the Libyan people and the whole of the Middle East into the decisive battle with imperialism.

November 20.

#### Recession Under Way

"Some two months ago, the Argus Research Corp. maintained that 'the odds are better than 50-50 that a business downturn began in August.'

"Well, this highly regarded Wall Street firm now points out that the statistical evidence currently in hand seems to support the proposition that some kind of recession is in fact under way."—November 19 *New York Post*.

## Libyan Arab Republic

# A Step Forward for the Arab Revolution

By Ali El Fezzan

Tripoli

The leaders of the Libyan revolution of September 1 are continually disavowing Marxism and the class struggle. But the laws of uneven and combined development operate irrespective of the ambitions and desires of politicians.

In the process of consolidating the revolution, of carrying out its declared objectives—socialism, freedom and unity—the revolutionary leadership finds itself forced into open conflict with imperialism and with the local outposts of capitalism.

The result is that Libya, once the most backward of Arab states, now, only two months after the revolutionary seizure of power, finds itself in the vanguard of the Arab revolution.

Measures adopted by the revolutionary regime are far more radical and advanced than that of any other Arab country. One of its first acts, after seizing power, was to issue a decree doubling the minimum wage for the lowest paid workers from 50 piastres a day to 100 piastres [100 piastres equals US\$2.80].

In the first days of the revolution, feeling its way cautiously, the new regime gave the impression that the American and British military bases would be left alone at least till the end of the current agreements. Now, sure of the support of the Libyan people, and conscious that a foreign military presence is inconsistent with national freedom and provides a base for the counterrevolution, they have even Britain and America notice to quit as quickly as possible.

"If they don't go peacefully," said Colonel Quathafi, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, "every Libyan will fight and give their lives to drive them from our soil."

Britain, the junior partner in world imperialism, has already accepted, and preparations are under way to evacuate the British garrisons in Cyrenaica. Negotiations with America, the senior partner, have begun.

Meanwhile, Libyan troops and customs have moved into the bases and are checking all incoming and outgoing traffic. Nowhere else in the world have the Americans permitted this sort of "indignity."

On the home front, the government has moved against the landlords and profiteers. Rigorous price control has been enforced since the first days of the revolution.

Now the government has issued a decree drastically cutting rents from 10 percent to 30 percent, bringing to an end the speculation in real estate which brought fortunes to a few and sent the cost of living soaring for the many.

This week the government took over a 51 percent holding in all foreign-owned banks, thus gaining control of a key segment of the national economy. The British-owned Barclay's Bank is now the Bank of the Revolution; the Italian Bank of Napoli has become Independence Bank. Insurance, almost entirely foreign-owned, is next in line for Libyanization.

Negotiations are under way for a higher percentage of the huge oil prof-

# Vote Swings to Labor on Vietnam War Issue

Sydney

The final returns in the October 25 federal election show this to be one of the closest on record. The present conservative government was returned, its majority reduced to 7 seats compared to its previous 40 in the 125-member House of Representatives.

The swing to the Australian Labor party, which has been in opposition for more than twenty years, was unprecedented. Previously the ALP had increased its vote by no more than 5%. This time a swing of 8% from an electorate of 6,600,000, 90% of whom voted, was recorded. An overall 48% voted for the ALP.

The increases for the ALP varied considerably, ranging from 1.5% in Tasmania to 14% in South Australia. In the strong working-class areas where the Labor seats are very safe, the swing was 10% to 12%.

Although the Liberal-Country party coalition now in power only obtained 42.5% of the national vote, it still managed to retain enough seats to form a majority. The swing to the ALP was not large enough to take some of the marginal seats.

All the other parties lost votes to the ALP. The Liberal party vote fell by 7%. The vote for the extreme right-wing Democratic Labor party [DLP] dropped from 7.3% to 5.8%.

The forces in opposition to the war in Vietnam scored impressively. Even Prime Minister John G. Gorton admitted that probably one of the reasons for this extremely large swing to the ALP was their attractive policy of withdrawal of all Australian troops from Vietnam by June next, and complete abolition of conscription.

Gorton's main plank in the election was aptly summarized in his declaration backing Nixon's course in Vietnam: "We do not propose to cut and run and be the first to leave our allies in the lurch."

The leader of the ALP, Edward Gough Whitlam, was quoted as saying, "The swing to Labor has served notice on the United States that the Australian people would not support a prolongation of the Vietnam War."



GORTON: Happy to serve Nixon no matter what the cost to Australian people.

He said that the government had set out to exploit and dramatize these two issues in the election campaign but the electorate had overwhelmingly rejected them.

The response from the bourgeois press has been the opposite. Hoping to cloud the issue, they tended to indicate that the Labor policies were acceptable except for the defence and foreign affairs issues. This was illustrated by an editorial in the October 27 *Sydney Morning Herald* declaring, "The Labor Party would have won if only it had been able to impose a more responsible foreign defence policy on the Left Wing of [the] party."

This has emphasized the contradictions in Australian society where the interventionist policy imposed by the ruling circles is increasingly being rejected by the population. Also Gallup polls have shown percentages of 52% and 54% support the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam.

This election result, although forecast by public opinion polls just pri-

or to the election, was something new in Australian historic experience. It did not take place in a time of economic crisis or defence peril as in the case of preceding Labor victories.

It is a further indication of the deepening process of radicalization of which the obvious political revolt among the youth is only the top of the iceberg, as they say.

## Antiwar Rally December 15

Sydney

Plans have been laid here for a mass antiwar demonstration on December 15. This is in response to a call for international protests made by the Student Mobilization Committee in the United States.

The protest is being sponsored by a broad coalition antiwar movement spearheaded by the militant left-wing organizations "Resistance," the "Vietnam Action Campaign," and "High School Students Against the War in Vietnam."

A city march is projected, followed by a rally in Sydney Town Hall.

## Unrest in Pakistan

One person was killed in Karachi November 21 when police opened fire on demonstrating workers. A number of mills and factories have been closed by strikes and lockouts in Karachi and in Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city.

The military government of General Yahya Khan has moved to crack down on labor and political unrest. The November 23 *New York Times* reported that a summary military court in Karachi had sentenced thirteen workers to terms at hard labor for holding a parade.

Seventy-eight persons, including local political leaders, were arrested in Hyderabad, according to the *Times*, for going on a hunger strike to demand administrative reforms and the printing of voters' lists in the Sindhi language.

## European Trotskyists Discuss Labor Developments

Rome

At the end of October a meeting was held in Turin of European Fourth International activists involved in the workers struggles now developing in most of the countries in West Europe.

Delegations from the following countries attended the meeting: France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, and Belgium. The Italian delegation was composed of militants from a dozen cities. Many workers were present, either as members of the delegations or as invited guests.

The first part of the conference — which lasted two days — was devoted to six reports on the political situation and tendencies in the workers struggle in the various countries at the present stage. The general picture presented was one of profound political and social crisis nearly everywhere on the continent.

In particular, the reporter on France, a member of the Political Bureau of the Ligue Communiste [Communist League, the French section of the Fourth International], was strongly of the opinion that in his country tension has not decreased and that the combativity of the working class has in no way diminished.

The recent struggles in France have clearly demonstrated this. Although kept under control by the unions, they are the result of considerable pressure from below, and have often begun behind the backs of the union bureaucrats.

As for Italy, there exists a veritable prerevolutionary situation, as the reporter, Moscato, a member of the Political Bureau of the Italian section, brought out.

A symptomatic fact is that even in a country like Denmark, wildcat strikes have developed, according to the Danish reporter.

The German reporter, for his part, stressed the significance of the wildcat strikes in certain regions in recent months and the problem of the relations between the worker and student movements.

The reporter on Belgium spoke of the quiescence of the Belgian working class for several years. But, at the

same time, he stressed some symptoms of a revival.

While noting that his country has still not emerged from a half century of social stability (the last strike was in 1918), the Swiss reporter analyzed the economic contradictions in Switzerland in the present stage.

The second part of the conference was marked by reports on particular experiences. A member of the Central Committee of the Ligue Communiste spoke about the situation in the Renault plants, especially in Cléon and Le Mans, and described his organization's work there. Another French delegate reported on the experience at Rhodiacéta.

A member of the Turin Trotskyist group, a young worker in the FIAT plant, gave a graphic sketch of the struggles in the big automobile factory during recent months. He explained the orientation adopted in the activities of the revolutionary Marxists who support the grouping *Iniziativa Operaia* (Workers Initiative). Other Italian comrades reported on the situation at Pirelli in Milan and in other industrial centers on the peninsula.

For Belgium there was one report on the orientation in the Walloon part of the country and another on the first experiences of this type in the activity of the revolutionary students in Flanders.

The third part of the conference consisted of an examination of the orientations followed by the various European sections, especially in France and Italy. In France the stress at this stage is on working through the Trotskyist organization's factory nuclei and on the construction of *Rouge* [Red, the name of the weekly paper of the Ligue Communiste] fractions in the unions, essentially at the plant level.

In Italy, while staying in the unions and fighting the ultraleft conceptions equating the unions and the bosses, the Trotskyists operate independently of the unions and participate in the so-called movement of rank-and-file committees, which have recently begun to establish their first linkups on a national scale (these were estab-

lished by workers in several important plants in certain important working-class centers, including Turin, Milan, Rome, Venice, Bari-Taranto, etc.).

Worker members of the Fourth International are members of the coordinating committee. On this basis, there is collaboration between the Trotskyist current and some currents in *Potere Operaio* [Workers Power]. Although these currents can in general be characterized as spontanéist, they understand the necessity of a serious organization of the rank-and-file committees.

The conclusion that the delegates drew from this discussion was that existing tactical differences do not involve divergences in general conceptions but derive fundamentally from different objective situations and different relationships of forces at the organizational level.

The conference concluded with a summary by Comrade Livio Maitan, a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, which will be published shortly in an abridged form. This speech ended with an appeal for stepping up the campaign of solidarity and aid for the Bolivian Trotskyists, both for those imprisoned and those who are continuing their struggle in very difficult conditions.

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### Phones for Whites Only

Nonwhites in fascist-like South Africa have been banned by the Posts and Telegraphs department from using rural party telephones.

According to J. F. van Rooyen, assistant director of Telephones, nonwhites left in charge by absent white farmers were apt to use the telephone. Party-line subscribers often complained, he said, that their conversations were disrupted by abusive language.

He did not report whether telephone conversations between blacks were disrupted by abusive language from whites.

The Vorster government generously conceded that it would not be a criminal act for a nonwhite to use a telephone in an emergency or in the normal course of a day's duties.

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### Air Pollution a Growing Hazard

In New York City, the American Public Health Association says, polluted air frequently causes 10 to 20 deaths a day.

# The Shape of Things Under Chung Hee Park

By Wataru Yakushiji

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) is now experiencing a season of great political tension, highlighted by Chung Hee Park's proposed amendments to the national constitution to enable himself to be elected president for a third term.

President Park began his political offensive July 25, calling for a national referendum on the amendments as a "vote of confidence" in his regime. He has imposed his will with merciless suppression of any significant opposition.

The National Assembly is now discussing the "National Referendum Law,"<sup>1</sup> which is scheduled to pass in the middle of September so as to make it possible to hold the referendum at the beginning of October.\*

The law now under discussion is to ban every kind of street demonstration and impose strict regulations upon outdoor meetings (especially those of university and high-school students). In other words, the law is only a ratification of the severe repression of student struggles. In fact, almost all the students' attempts to stage street demonstrations have been crushed by the police, particularly after the universities in Seoul were closed early for the vacation period, to "save the situation on campus."

The new election held August 14 in a region of Posong-gun constituency in Cholla-namdo showed that the opposition party campaign against changing the constitution to permit a third term failed to win mass support although it did receive a favorable echo.<sup>2</sup>

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1. The next presidential election is scheduled in the spring of 1971. President Park, who has been in office for two consecutive four-year terms, cannot stand as a candidate under the constitution. Evasion is possible through a national referendum to amend the constitution. The national referendum law was a temporary measure enacted to make possible the amendments of December 1962.

\* The National Assembly passed Park's amendment September 14 at a secret meeting in the middle of the night to which only members of Park's Democratic Republican party were admitted. The referendum was then staged on October 17. As announced by the Park regime the results were 7,553,589 votes "for" and 3,636,369 "against."—*IP*.

2. The opposition New People's party candidate was defeated in the August 14 special election, although he still won the seat on a technicality. In the June 1967 general election, the Democratic Republican candidate carried the constituency. The election was subsequently declared invalid because the winner was shown to have accumulated more than 10,000 votes by illegal means in one region. The new election was held in only this one region and the results were added to the 1967 totals from the other regions in the constituency. Although the New People's party candidate trailed the Democratic Republican by 2,167 votes in the new balloting, he had cut the lead of his opponent by a sufficient margin to win the constituency as a whole. The region has an electorate of about 17,000.

The Park regime won the support of rich farmers and landowners by recognizing a latifundium system in the agricultural reform law of last year. The opposition party campaign was unable to shake the traditional bondage of the poor peasantry to the rural bourgeoisie.

What must be understood about the ROK situation is that the general population regards "amendments" to the constitution as a traditional maneuver of the dictatorship. The present proposed amendments are reminiscent of those passed by Syngman Rhee in 1954.

Rhee was then in his second term as president, two years before elections—the same situation that now faces Park. In order to make himself a "life-time president," Rhee did whatever he could to amend the constitution of that time.

When Rhee found himself one vote short of the required two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, he simply redefined what "two-thirds" meant. This was not the only time the constitution was "amended" to suit dictatorial needs.<sup>3</sup>

Park has been preparing the current attempt since the end of last year. The most significant measures were the strengthening of the police (especially the riot police) and the introduction of severe restrictions on the opposition.

Park used the fight with Northern guerrillas in Seoul on January 21, 1968, as an excuse to tighten law and order. The lightning organization of the nationwide Provincial Reserve Corps was the first step.<sup>4</sup> All government administrative bodies have intensified their control over the civilian population at the local level. Stricter watch was imposed upon residents, more hours of military education upon university students, etc. These measures, of course, are designed to suppress the growing popular discontent, not to counter a guerrilla invasion from the North.

## I. The Park Regime and the Economy

After repeated political crises, the Park regime succeeded in 1965-66 in building a social base among the national bourgeoisie and the landowners. Previously the South Korean government had been little more than an appendage of the U.S. military occupation. It went through a significant change during this period.

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3. The constitution, which was established in July 1948, was amended twice under President Rhee and once more in December 1962 when Park converted his government into a "civil" regime.

4. The Provincial Reserve Corps Law, promulgated in 1961, was not utilized until March 1, 1968. Then, in one month's time, the Park government organized a corps of 2,250,000 men.

## A. Economic Development of the ROK

The economic development of South Korea can be divided into two periods. The first was one of reconstruction after the end of the Korean War in 1953. Little was left of the national economy, and a whole period was devoted to rebuilding with U. S. grants. This chapter ended with Park's military coup in May 1961 and the establishment of the "Third Republic" in 1962.

The second period is characterized by an infusion of foreign capital and the initiation of five-year plans.

The first five-year plan (1962-66) achieved an annual average gross national product (GNP) growth of 8.3% in real terms and raised the export level from next to nothing to a little under \$200 million a year.

The rapprochement of the Park regime with Japan, consummated in the ROK-Japan Treaty in December 1965, marked the beginning of an era of "marvelous economic growth," spurred by an increasing amount of foreign investments and loans. (See Table A.)

**TABLE A**  
Real GNP Growth\* (%)

1966	13.4
1967	8.9
1968	13.1
1969	11.7 (estimate)
1970	10.0 ( " )

\* Japanese embassy to the ROK: **The Present Stage of the Korean Economic Development, 1969.**

The economic development has been accompanied by widespread chronic inflation. This is caused (1) by an insufficient supply of consumer goods, and by agricultural stagnation resulting from a shortage of social overhead capital (transportation, electricity, irrigation systems, etc.); and (2) by the enormous volume of foreign loans and investments.

According to a research report by the Great Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, wholesale prices in the nation's major cities were 20% higher in the first quarter of this year than in the same quarter last year.<sup>5</sup> (See Table B.)

The rapid rise in prices this year is mainly caused by increases in the prices of rice, fuel, and services (see Table C), as well as by the devaluation of the won.

Two consecutive years of drought in Cholla-namdo caused a serious shortage of provisions, and people have been suffering from skyrocketing rice prices, especially

5. *Tong-il Choseon Shinmoon* (Newspaper for Korean Unification), May 24, 1969. This is a weekly Japanese-language newspaper published in Japan by Koreans of the United Korean Movement. Members of this group have been arrested and tried by the ROK government. About six months ago the group split and the left wing now publishes its own newspaper, *Minzoku-Toitsu-Shimbun* (News for the United Korean People's Movement). One issue in the split was the organization's attitude toward the North Korean regime. The *Tong-il Choseon* faction is of a rather "anti-Communist" inclination.

**TABLE B**

Rate of Wholesale Price Increase\* (%)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Grain	10.0	8.8	6.4	8.1
Production goods	-6.3	5.0	14.2	11.1
Consumer goods	17.7	8.0	1.0	5.2

\* *Tong-il Choseon*, March 15, 1969.

**TABLE C**

Rate of Consumer Price Increase in Seoul\* (%)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Food	8.5	7.5	7.8	9.5
Rent	12.6	18.5	19.8	5.8
Fuel & light	21.4	16.9	18.2	11.0
Clothes	22.0	12.6	10.0	4.3
Others	22.5	17.4	11.2	14.2

\* *Tong-il Choseon*, March 15, 1969.

since the beginning of this year. On February 1 the government instituted a control ordinance on the price of rice in Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu; but a thriving black market has simply created dual prices in these cities. The difference between official and blackmarket prices has grown from 300-400 won per bag at the beginning of February to 800 won [US\$2.82] in the middle of March.

The last three years have seen the following average annual rise in prices: milk, 100%; medical service fee, 110.4%; public bath fee, 57.8%; hair dressing, 104.8%; bus and taxi fare, 82.1%; and laundry, 400.0%.

The service price index rose from 100 in 1965 to 165.9 in 1968, and is still rising rapidly. (See Table D.)

The won declined in value some 2.9% during the seven months prior to March 1969 [as of March 13, the won stood at 283.2 to the U. S. dollar—up from 268 in 1967], which has pushed up the prices of imported goods.

## B. Changing Agricultural Structure and Urbanization

Agriculture in the ROK has never recovered from the damage done in the Korean War. The food problem has become worse each year because of the increasing demand and the failure to expand food production. (See Table E.)

The population has been increasing 2.5-2.8% a year (2.8% during the period 1960-65), and the total population is now over thirty million.

Urbanization has developed, and about 50% of the population now live in cities. What is significant about the urbanization is that it has been caused by the stagnation,

TABLE D

## Rate of Service Price Increase in Seoul\* (%)

	1966	1967	1968
Electricity & water	9.4	5.1	9.2
Transportation & communication	46.3	9.5	15.1
Medical & sanitary service	13.2	24.4	34.7
Clothes **	2.6	35.6	26.5
Housing ***	12.2	21.3	18.5
Education & administration	9.4	16.6	35.3
Amusement	13.2	10.0	21.5
Aggregate	15.2	17.1	23.0

\* Tong-il Choseon, April 19, 1969.

\*\* Laundry, tailoring, dressmaking, and other services relating to clothes.

\*\*\* Carpenters' fees, roofing, work, etc.

TABLE E

## Food Production (in thousands of tons)\*

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Food (as a whole)	7,006	7,568	6,836	6,857	6,961**
Percent of increase	-0.8	8.0	-9.7	0.3	1.5
Rice	3,501	3,919	3,603	3,195	3,223**
Percent of increase	-11.5	11.9	-8.1	-11.3	1.2**

\* Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

\*\* Estimated.

natural and artificial, in the nation's agriculture. The phenomenon is "urbanization without employment," which has resulted in a labor shortage in the rural areas on the one hand, and masses of unemployed and underemployed in the cities on the other.

Urbanization has been caused by (1) wealth concentrated in the cities; (2) agricultural stagnation; and (3) a much lower average income in the rural areas than in the cities.<sup>6</sup>

Agriculture remains small-scale "subsistence farming," with low productivity. The main product is rice.

The rural depression has been caused by:

1. Small farming: The 1949 land reform failed to over-

6. According to a report released August 11 by the Bank of the ROK, quoted in the August 16 *Tong-il Choseon*, the average real income of rural families decreased from 117,693 won in 1967 to 117,581 won in 1968. In 1963 the average rural family income was 16% higher than that of an urban family. The position was reversed last year and the average urban worker's family income was 37% higher than the rural one.

come the nation's semifeudal production relations and small-farming structure. Families with less than 5 tan (1.225 acres), for whom enlarged reproduction is impossible, occupy 35.5% of the total arable land. Families with less than 1 chobu (2.45 acres), for whom only simple reproduction can be expected, occupy 32.1% of the land. (See Table F.)

TABLE F

Number of Farming Families by Size  
(1967 - in thousands)

Less than 0.5 chobu (1.225 acres)	919	35.5%
0.5-1.0 chobu	829	32.1
1.0-2.0 chobu (2.45-4.9 acres)	665	25.7
More than 2.0 chobu	173	6.7

2. Insufficient production basis: Irrigation is possible on only 6% of the total cultivated land. Acid soil and a lot of depleted land cost a great deal to improve or to rehabilitate after natural disasters.

3. A capital offensive: The government dumps foodstuffs imported from or donated by other countries on the market at harvest time in order to purchase the harvest at low prices. The peasantry is then exploited by usurers, and the incentive to produce declines.

4. Relatively small investment in agriculture: Only about 7% of all public investment and finance goes into agriculture. This amount is usually reduced by half by the time it reaches the level of production.

5. Difficulty small farmers face in obtaining capital: The only source of loans open to the peasants is through usurers.

The two consecutive years of drought caused serious disasters in Cholla-namdo, the granary of the ROK. Between 21% and 33% of the total number of families engaged in farming maintain a hand-to-mouth existence with no stores of provisions. Violent disputes over water rights are often reported, as are the selling of women and children, and even cases of the suicide of whole families.

Thus a considerable section of the agricultural population has been leaving the villages for the city slums. In 1968 about 120,000 people, constituting some 20,000 farming families, left the villages. The villages are more and more composed of rich farmers and the extremely poor. Middle-class farmers are falling into the status of sharecroppers or agricultural laborers. (See Table G.)

### C. Foreign Capital and the Growth of Financial Combines

While U.S. aid (AID and PL480)<sup>7</sup> has been cut during the two five-year plans, and the grants (from the U.S. and Japan) are expected to stop in 1971, a major in-

7. PL 480—surplus food grant under U.S. Public Law 480.



TABLE G

Dynamics by Farming Size \*  
(October '67-October '68)

	Number of families	% Increase
Less than 1 chobu	1,735,447	-0.8
1-1.5 chobu	453,529	1.6
1.5-3.0 chobu	348,924	-1.2
More than 3 chobu	406,625	5.1

\* Tong-il Choseon, March 15, 1969.

crease in foreign capital investment and loans has been employed by the Park government to power its "Rapid Growth Policy." Foreign loans, introduced in 1962, were greatly expanded in 1966. (See Tables H and I.)

TABLE H

Foreign Loans Achieved\*  
(as of August 1, 1968 — in thousands of dollars)

	Public	Private	Total
1962	7,349	--	7,349
1963	42,613	23,627	66,240
1964	11,588	11,904	23,492
1965	5,653	36,107	41,760
1966	12,831	111,040	182,871
1967	106,155	122,594	228,749
1968**	43,255	148,471	192,026
Total	289,444	463,043	742,487

\* Japanese embassy to the ROK: *The Present Stage of the Korean Economic Development, 1969*. The figures in this table are taken from the source indicated, although there are some discrepancies in the totals in the original.

\*\* January-July.

The government has authorized foreign loans in accordance with the size of the commission and the personal gain involved for high government officials. The loans have served to stimulate the growth of Zaibatsu.<sup>8</sup> They have been concentrated in monopoly or semimonopoly enterprises (i.e., cement, oil refineries, fertilizer, textiles, etc.).

The intertwined interests of government officials and plutocrats have sometimes resulted in setting up small-scale factories of such low productivity that it is impossible to export the goods produced.

8. Three major Zaibatsu are said to control the major portion of foreign capital loans. The three monopolies, created under U.S. grants, hold a privileged position through close ties to high government officials.

TABLE I

American and Japanese Grants\*  
(in millions of dollars)

	U.S.	Japan**	Total
1962	232.3	--	232.3
1963	216.4	--	216.4
1964	149.3	--	149.3
1965	131.4	--	131.4
1966	103.2	26.8	130.0
1967	97.0	41.0	138.0
1968	102.0	21.5	123.5
1969	69.2	n.a.	

\* *One Korea Year Book 1967-68 and The Present Stage of the Korean Economic Development, 1969*.

\*\* War compensation to South Korea was agreed upon with passage of the ROK-Japan Treaty in December 1965. The compensation amounted to a \$300 million grant and a \$200 million public loan.

A good part of the foreign loans are sometimes channeled into the production of consumer goods such as soft drinks or alcoholic beverages, undercutting the attempt to build up a real national industry.

Some enterprises take out further foreign cash loans to repay earlier debts to foreign creditors. In a number of cases the government or city banks, which have guaranteed these loans, have to repay them when the com-

TABLE J

Debt Service  
and Foreign Exchange Reserves  
(in millions of dollars)

	Debt Servicing	Reserves
1967 (Achieved)	33.0	350.5
1968 ( " )	50.0	367.4
1969 (Expected)	87.0	
1970 ( " )	131.0	
1971 ( " )	145.0	

panies are unable to do so. The result is a more severe tax upon the nation.

The remittances of Korean soldiers in Vietnam to their families are expected to stop in the near future, which will surely increase the deficit in the balance of payments.

Since the repayment of debts is to amount to about one-third of the nation's foreign exchange reserves after 1970, the Park regime will inevitably resort to harsher exploitation of the masses. (See Table J.) At the same time it

will have to deepen its dependency on U. S. and Japanese imperialism.

#### D. ROK Under Neocolonialism

During the period 1965-66 the ROK was converted from a U. S. military colony to a neocolonialist state with a relatively independent sphere of economy under U. S. and Japanese domination. The Park government before this period was supported only by the army, backed by U. S. imperialism.

But the ROK-Japan Treaty, concluded under pressure from Johnson in the wake of the dollar crisis, has forced the Park regime to stand relatively independent from the U. S. military forces. This has only been possible because of the infusion of U. S. and Japanese capital, which has achieved a certain economic growth, at the cost of furthering social and economic distortion of the country. (See Table K.)

Now the Park government is going to establish its neocolonialist rule and drop the mask of bourgeois democracy. All opposition forces will be suppressed under cover of anti-Communist slogans. The ROK is now going to be integrated into imperialist rule in Asia more and more.

Park's intentions in inviting the storage of nuclear weapons on Cheju-do (Quelpart Island), voiced in an interview published in *U. S. News and World Report*, was a clear indication of the regime's orientation toward neocolonialism.

The government decided August 13 to create a littoral free-trade territory at Masan in Keongsang-namdo. The area is to be opened to foreign enterprises (especially Japanese) to build factories—electronics, optical instruments, medical equipment, furniture, machinery, toys, sporting goods, musical instruments, handicraft goods, etc. The enterprises are to be exempt from customs, commodity taxes, and even income taxes for a certain period.

Products made at Masan will all be exported; none are to be sold on the national market. Thus a foundation is being consolidated for a new U. S. and Japanese (and British, German, Italian, Canadian, etc.) anti-Communist colony in the south of the peninsula—where cheap labor can be exploited by monopoly capital.

## II. Upsurge of the Labor Movement

The Nojo (General Federation of ROK Trade Unions) has reported that as of November 1968 the average income of a manufacturing industry worker is 7,730 won [US\$27] a month, while the minimum living cost of an urban family of five is no less than 23,080 won. In fact the number of workers struggles has increased since 1966, despite the small proportion of the working class that is organized.

On March 24, some 4,500 longshoremen in Pusan and 2,400 in Incheon struck for a 60% wage increase. There are about 25,000 longshoremen in the ROK. The great

Nationalities	1966	1967	1968 (Jan.-June)	Total
U. S. A.	8.0 (13.4)	20.1 (10.4)	6.1 (5.7)	62.3 (41.2)
Japan	4.7 (1.0)	2.4 (.5)	5.7 (.4)	14.0 (1.9)
Other countries	.4 (.1)	.6 (.4)	1.3 (.4)	3.1 (1.4)
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.0 (14.5)</b>	<b>23.1 (11.3)</b>	<b>13.1 (6.5)</b>	<b>79.3 (44.5)</b>
<b>Industries</b>				
Manufacturing	12.8 (14.4)	15.2 (10.6)	6.5 (5.0)	63.9 (42.2)
Food processing	3.4 (.1)	-- (--)	.1 (--)	3.5 (--)
Textiles	.5 (.9)	.5 (.3)	3.8 (.6)	6.1 (2.4)
Fertilizer	1.4 (12.4)	-- (4.3)	-- (--)	22.6 (22.4)
Oil refinery	-- (--)	2.9 (.6)	-- (.6)	7.7 (6.0)
Electronics	5.1 (.6)	8.5 (3.9)	.3 (2.5)	14.3 (7.1)
Others	2.4 (.5)	3.3 (1.5)	2.3 (1.2)	9.6 (4.2)
Transportation & sight-seeing	.2 (--)	6.7 (.6)	.2 (.7)	7.6 (1.3)
Others	.1 (--)	1.3 (--)	6.4 (.8)	7.9 (1.0)
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.0 (14.5)</b>	<b>23.1 (11.3)</b>	<b>13.1 (6.5)</b>	<b>79.3 (44.5)</b>

\* The ROK Year Book, 1969. Discrepancies in the totals appear in the original. These are in part due to rounding off approximate figures. The table shows projected investments. Figures in parentheses are actual investments. The totals in the right-hand column are for all investments to date, not just for the three years listed.

majority of them average less than 5,000 won [US\$17.65] a month for heavy labor.

The longshoremen average about ten strikes a year, all for wage increases. This level of strike action is very high; it is exceeded only by the workers in textiles, foreign institutions, and automobile plants. (See Table L.)

Beginning in May, the Textile Union staged a militant three-month struggle for higher wages. Silk enterprises have imposed very low wages upon workers in order to export their products at competitive prices.

The government and monopoly capital are now seeking

TABLE I

Number of Workers Strikes\*

1965	79
1966	130
1967	130
1968	112

\* Tong-il Choseon, March 22, 1969.

to freeze wages by means of a "productivity wage system" (a kind of incomes policy), and they have been scheming to amend the labor laws. They are now going to extend working hours beyond the eight-hour day, shorten annual vacations and maternity leaves, and cut down overtime pay.

The Nojo, in opposing the offensive of the government and capital, has declared that it will fight to the end. The stage is certainly set for all-out struggles of "the whole working class against capital as a whole." (*Tong-il Choseon*, March 22, 1969.)

### III. The Student Struggles

The student struggle against Park's constitutional amendment for a third presidential term began with a militant declaration at the anniversary rally for the April 19 revolution.<sup>9</sup> Other meetings followed at Seoul University on June 12 and Koryo University on June 19.

By June 27, students at ten universities, including Yeonse and Kyongyon universities, had held rallies, and about 1,000 students in Seoul staged the first street demonstration on that date.

The police countered the students in a high-handed manner from the very beginning, and clashes occurred between student demonstrators and riot police.

Koryo University students played the leading role in building a mass meeting of 4,000 students from five universities in Seoul June 30. The student struggle began to involve high-school students and even some adults, including workers.

During street demonstrations on July 3, involving 6,000 students from eighteen universities, students from Yeonse University battled police on an elevated railway, destroying several police cars during the fighting. The situation took on an antiregime character when the students occupied a railway station near the university July 7.

The Park government managed to control the upsurge in Seoul by closing the universities early for the summer vacation. But student struggles continued to develop in other major cities even after July 10, when the police in-

The declarations of the Nojo must be weighed, however, against the fundamental character and origins of this organization. The Nojo was created by Syngman Rhee as the only anti-Communist confederation of labor unions, under the slogans, "Friendly relations between the employers and the employees," and "National unity of labor front."

It now has 404,000 workers in sixteen industrial unions. But only 14% of the nation's workers are unionized. There are several reasons for this:

(1) Restrictive political and legal regulations for organizing trade unions; (2) the absence of a proper system in the Nojo to organize workers from below; (3) the weakness of secondary industry—only 15.3% of the entire working population of 8,408,000 are in manufacturing industries and they contribute only 22.3% to the GNP; (4) the prevalence of small-scale enterprises.

Despite the small percentage of workers that are unionized in the ROK, the working class at present has no other vehicle to develop militant struggles against capital. What is most necessary now is a revolutionary leadership of the working masses able to go beyond the anti-Communist, reformist, and class-collaborationist structure of the Nojo.

stituted a policy of severe repression against all street demonstrations.

Though the students' struggle has a traditionally anti-regime character, it is by no means anticapitalist in its orientation. A typical view held by the student demonstrators is that the third-term amendment is aimed at destroying "democracy" but President Park has made worthwhile achievements in ROK economic development.

\* \* \*

What is needed in this situation is a genuine revolutionary leadership. A leadership that stands against neocolonialism and U. S. and Japanese imperialism is the only force that can tell the nation the basic truth about the country. The only course for South Korea is to unite with the North through an anti-imperialist, antineocolonialist, and anti-Stalinist revolution.

Revolutionary students and workers in the United States and Japan can play an important role through the example of their struggles in helping the Korean people, both North and South, to develop a revolutionary leadership.

Fight in solidarity with the united Korean movement!  
Down with the Park regime!

Down with U.S. and Japanese imperialism in Korea and Okinawa!

Bring home the Korean soldiers from Vietnam!  
End all U. S. military bases in Asia!

9. The so-called April 19 Student Revolution in 1960 when the Syngman Rhee regime fell after great demonstrations in Seoul. Hundreds of thousands of citizens surrounded the presidential residence April 26 and Rhee left office the next day.

# The Replacement of Siles

By Mauro Vallejos

Santa Cruz

On September 26, the civilian team headed by Siles Salinas was ousted from the Palacio de Gobierno [Government Palace] by the armed forces and replaced by a military-civilian government headed by the supreme commander of the armed forces, General Alfredo Ovando Candia.

This changing of the guard was carried out peacefully, without a shot being fired or even a knife being stuck into anybody. It was only for propagandistic purposes and in an attempt to confuse the people, or at least to create expectations of political change, that a big theatrical performance was staged with a display of military equipment, statements of support, etc., and with the protagonists of the action as a finale terming it a "revolution."

We consider it our responsibility to expose the reasons that motivated the armed forces to take this step and the concrete aims they sought, and, at the same time, to alert the people to the dangers that threaten, concealed by the demagogic postures.

Fulfilling this revolutionary obligation two days after the event, we must say categorically that what we are faced with is a change of personnel in the Palacio de Gobierno and not a social revolution. We must, therefore, contradict the official apologists, the naïve souls, and the utopians.

There is no revolution, whether with regard to the forces involved, which are the same as have monopolized political power since 1964; or with regard to the sprinkling of opportunistic intellectuals in the new cabinet who have no fixed party affiliation or ideology. Still less is a revolution to be found in the projected program, the "Mandato Revolucionario" [Revolutionary Mandate], which does not propose a single fundamental change, which lacks coherence, and which is nothing more than a salad of ambiguities and contradictions.

The "Mandato" is inferior to any trade-union minimum program of

struggle these days. These features are quite in accordance with the spirit of the middle petty bourgeoisie from which its authors come.

The changing of the team in the Palacio de Gobierno was not an attempt to make the revolution but rather to block the revolution, of a popular and proletarian nature—socialist in essence—which is on the march.

Such a move was an intelligent response under the circumstances. It was the product of the impotence of the capitalist system in face of the present unstable and threatening situation—an extremely serious attempt of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to contain a revolution arising from below by offering to carry out the revolution from above, but . . . within the bounds of law, order, and tranquility, and with respect for the private property of the monopolies.

This conclusion is based on the following considerations:

1. *The guerrilla movement and the rise of the workers movement have forced the generals to take defensive measures.*

Our judgment is confirmed by the contradictions in what the military commanders themselves say and by what can be read in the introduction to the "Mandato Revolucionario."

In fact, this introduction says that the attitude of the armed forces was provoked by the danger threatening the "institutions of the nation," due to the advance of the forces of the extreme left and the growing activity of the guerrillas, a situation which the Siles government showed itself impotent to contend with. The Siles government was especially incompetent in containing terrorism, that is, armed struggle.

These "sincere" or "precipitate" statements—inadvertently, naturally—expose the new cabinet's insistent asseverations as to their revolutionary objectives. At the same time these statements show the clear aims of the of-

ficers, which are still the same as they were in November 1964, when a developing popular insurrection was also shaking the country and endangering the institutions of capitalist society.

Today, as yesterday, the generals have come out of their staff headquarters to confront—with the methods they find most appropriate—a new ascent and mobilization of the people, of the worker, peasant, and student masses, an ascent whose most energetic and dynamic expression is the guerrilla movement.

Shortly before the ouster of Siles Salinas, the military chiefs were forced by the evidence to admit that guerrilla activities in Bolivia had not been destroyed by the blows dealt to the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional—Army of National Liberation, the guerrilla force created by Che Guevara and Inti Peredo] or by the murder of Inti Peredo. This was equivalent to a confession that the military's plans had failed. The repression had been unable to smash the revolutionists.

The destruction of the unions and their radio stations, the gag laws, the concentration camps, and the military encirclement of the mines had produced very precarious results. The contradictions and exhaustion of the regime had not been overcome.

To the contrary, they were growing more acute, provoking the ex-chancellor Medeiros to say that it was nonsense to talk about development of the country because the per capita income was continuing to fall. The annual income per inhabitant fell from \$130 in 1950 to \$80 at the present time (according to a Parliamentary report).

This objective situation stirred up the mass struggle, which is now simmering more vigorously than before, drawing in broad sectors of intellectuals and of the Catholic church, whose priests have become leaders of discontented popular masses. And this struggle has attracted the well-off university and college students, who are rising up against the capitulation to imperialism and the antidemocratic, antinational, and antilabor policy of the army.

In this context, the guerrillas were nothing more than the continuation of the revolutionary mass movement whose development was cut off and

truncated by the massacres and repression of the military circles.

While in Che's time in 1967 the guerrilla movement had broad popular support, its reappearance in 1969 with Inti Peredo occurred in a much riper situation, when the students, priests, workers, and radicalized sectors of the middle class no longer hesitated but accepted armed struggle as the only way.

This popular judgment, which accepts and endorses the road of guerrilla warfare, is what sustains and bolsters the guerrillas. Otherwise, it could not be explained how, after the defeat at Vado del Yeso, the death of Che, and the brutal blows of this July, together with the death of Inti, fighters remain in the field and a prog guerrilla spirit is sweeping the country.

This spirit is expressed in the homage of students, writers, priests, and unions to the figures of Che and Inti. The people have not been scared off, no terror gnaws at their vitals. The guerrillas seem like the early Christians, who were exterminated and devoured by the beasts in the Roman circuses but who raised up new fighters in their place, inspired by their faith and the certainty of victory.

The purely military repressive measures proved insufficient, and to continue along this road, under the conditions described, would have led to a revolutionary explosion and an extraordinary upsurge in the strength of the guerrillas. The military high command understood this. It had to let some air out of the balloon before it exploded; it had to isolate the people's guerrilla fighters.

According to Ovando's main adviser, the sociology professor Rolón Anaya, the violence had exhausted itself without provoking any changes. I would add that it ended by releasing greater potentially revolutionary forces and that it was only a question of time to organize them and propel them into the struggle.

It was for this reason that the military command decided to adopt an apparently leftist social and economic program; it decided to liberalize its regime, to give a few concessions, to give the impression of a confrontation with the imperialist concerns. It pushed for an increase in the state share in the monopolies, and even, why not?, a little statization. That is, the military wanted to

appear to be the defender of the national and popular sovereignty and the national interests. The rope and the murderer's machine gun were henceforth to be used in the name of a revolution!

Siles Salinas was not ousted because he was an obstacle to carrying forward a revolutionary policy of national and social liberation but because he was considered incompetent to contain the guerrillas and the advance of the left and because it was urgently necessary to perfect a new tactic or method the better to deal with the masses.

The antipopular essence of the Ovando regime thus shows up very clearly. The rest, the pseudo revolutionary language, the promises of trade-union and political democracy, new civilian faces in the cabinet are incidental, secondary questions which will be forgotten or altered when it suits the military command.

2. *The armed forces holding power have been converted into a political party.*

The armed forces took power in Bolivia in 1964. The traditional political parties had lost their historical validity. They had shown themselves incapable of comprehending the international and national situation and the new relationship of forces then developing. Worn-out and ossified, they became useless for defending the order established by imperialism and native capitalism against a popular, working-class revolution.

This political vacuum, as Ovando once called it, was filled by the army, which began to operate like a political party.

In fact, the entire military establishment assumed the distinctive characteristics of a political organization. All the officers, from generals to sergeants, received special political training, besides the antiguerrilla and urban counterinsurgency training they received from Yankee technicians. And this training was tied to advantages and privileges of all kinds, well-paid administrative posts, and a 300 percent salary increase.

The general staff of the armed forces was converted into a political committee or central committee of the army-party. There was an important qualitative change in the armed forces; they were no longer the old

armed forces and the old army. This special phenomenon consisted of a *politicalization of the officers corps and the institutionalization of its political character*. This in turn engendered a *militarization of political activity*.

The party-army, or armed political party, has monopolized political power uninterruptedly since November 1964. It has governed the country in various forms—a military junta (Barrientos-Ovando); a constitutional government (Barrientos-Siles), and now a civilian-military junta (Ovando).

These various forms have been purely a matter of appearances and have been dictated by the tactical needs of the military's domestic and international relations. Whatever the form, the same military dictatorship propped up by armed force was still behind it. Never has the capitalist state looked so much like a simple armed body than now, covered at best by a pseudodemocratic bikini.

Having absorbed all powers, the military commanders can boast that "We are the state!"

At no point did the Siles Salinas government break the continuity of the military dictatorship. In practice Siles did not govern. He was a fictitious president lacking the power to name even subordinate officials in the local administrations (e. g., Valenzuela in Cochabamba).

His unusual talent for playing a front man's role led him to tolerate such a situation. The ruling force was always the army-party, which, with its regional divisions, its air and naval forces, controlled the country and carried out its decisions behind Siles' back.

Depending on its needs, the army-party has created and dissolved civilian political groups or hitched old mini parties to its chariot, trying to give the impression that it had a base of support. They could not fool anybody this way.

The new civilian faces now in the cabinet, like Rolón Anaya, Quiroga Santa Cruz, Bailey, and Ortiz, differ in no way from Fernando Diez de Medina, Ricardo Anaya, Walter Guevara, and the like.

The fact is that, like the decadent Spanish monarchs, the army-party is surrounding itself with a class of "arbitristas," as certain royal counselors

in the Middle Ages were called who substituted necromancy for social analysis.

### 3. *The history and social character of the army-party.*

By our works we shall be known, General Ovando said. That is gospel truth. To be sure, we already know them by their works and we know what the Bolivian armed forces are capable of.

The statements of the generals would be enough to reveal what is behind the reorganization of the government. In jurisprudence "the confession of the accused is full proof." But in politics this criterion is insufficient.

What is decisive here in understanding the essence of a state, in measuring a revolutionary process and gauging the potential of its leaders, is determining its social or class nature. Such an analysis prevents errors of judgment in the face of at times contradictory and confused passing situations.

The armed forces are a component of the state. In our country they represent the ruling classes, which are tightly bound to imperialism. In this period of world war between socialism and imperialism, the Bolivian armed forces are actually part of the international army of imperialism, whose head is in the Pentagon. This truth is so elementary that even the children know it.

After it was routed by the armed people in 1952, the Bolivian army was rebuilt by imperialism. Its top military commanders as well as its middle-ranking officers have gone through special courses in Panama, where the Pentagon has its general headquarters for Latin America.

In the Miraflores fortress, alongside the Bolivian general staff offices, the American military commission carries on its work. Yankee advisers train the special antiguerrilla and urban counterinsurgency units. The armed forces of Bolivia have been built up, trained militarily, technically, and politically, and armed by the Pentagon. This is why the people say that the Bolivian army is "Made in the U. S. A."

Because of its education and training, and its overbearing attitude deriving from its privileges, the Bolivian military caste has been conservative and a defender of the "established order," an enemy of all reforms,

however minimal. Bolivian military history is a history of massacres of workers and peasants and of coups d'etat to block the advances of the masses.

Just in the period since 1964, we have to note the two massacres in the Catavi-Siglo Veinte mine in 1965, the massacre in Milluni and Alto La Paz in the same year, the Saint John's Day massacre in the Siglo Veinte in 1967, the occupations of the trade-union headquarters, the destruction of the labor-owned radio stations, as well as other such incidents.

All of these actions were carried out under the command of General Ovando, who exercised the supreme authority over the army, and the present team of military rulers.

If this is the history of the armed forces, which today are the ruling party-army, it would be strange that in the twinkling of an eye, without debates or serious internal crises, this entire institutionalized body changed its mind, cast off its past, and became progressive, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist.

I do not deny the possibility of a change in sectors of the army, primarily among its young officers who are not compromised by its oligarchic past and are influenced by the technical, scientific, and military triumphs of the socialist camp. The class struggle does not spare any organization, however monolithic, and the army will not be an exception.

But only revolution, revolutionary struggle, will disintegrate the oppressor army, freeing sectors that will go over to the people and join a new liberation army emerging from the ranks of the people.

In the tradition of Lenin, I do not believe that the army and its commanders will make an about-face as the result of simple persuasion by "arbitristas" of the stripe of Rolón Anaya or Quiroga Santa Cruz. Nor do I think that it will make such a shift as the result of any awakening of "its conscience."

The force that will divide this army, demoralize it, and win for the people any progressive sector that might exist within it will be revolutionary struggle. That is the historic lesson of all revolutions.

The populist declarations and innumerable promises that have already been made in the last few hours

represent maneuvers to confuse and deceive the masses and, above all, they represent attempts to limit radicalization of the masses so as to stop their generous support to armed struggle and the guerrillas.

An instrument such as the army party is not qualified to head a revolution leading to the national and social liberation of Bolivia. In the present period in world history of transition between two systems and modes of production, revolution means a direct struggle for socialism. The road of civilization and progress for the peoples leads through the overthrow of the capitalist classes holding power and the defeat of imperialism which is their underpinning.

In their "Mandato Revolucionario," the Bolivian armed forces do not propose putting another class in power or altering the existing structures to bring them closer to socialism. What they propose is to preserve the system of exploitation and defend it from a better tactical position.

The policy of massacres and the hangman's rope failed. This has obliged the armed forces to take up some popular slogans and present themselves as "left nationalists."

Let us remember that the triumph of the Cuban revolution forced Yankee imperialism to pose as a friend of development in the Latin-American nations with its Alliance for Progress. As a result of this policy, it had to let go its grip on a few more dollars but it did not thereby change its imperialist, exploitive, and anti-popular oppressive character.

In certain circumstances, in order to defend their interests more effectively, the oppressor classes find themselves forced to grant some concessions, which are more formal than substantive. But, retaining power in their hands precisely because of this flexibility, these oppressor classes quickly recoup these concessions and even increase their profits once the moment of difficulty is past.

### 4. *The "Mandato Revolucionario" is a farce.*

The sole significance of the program launched by the armed forces under the name "Mandato Revolucionario" was to offer a few concessions from above to save the present situation. Using the brains of its current civilian employees, the party-army made an effort at political theory. However,

this endeavor has produced only vulgar, shopworn theorizing. The traditional and social character of the armed forces are reflected in this document despite its trashy populist phrasemongering.

In fact, the document begins by proposing a "system that would be neither exclusively capitalist nor exclusively socialist, in which various kinds of ownership would persist." It advocates a "social alliance," that is, a front of classes and, finally, it presents an assortment of highly contradictory slogans, all of which have been mouthed many times over the last twenty years.

We find an eagerness to show opposition to foreign domination followed immediately by the declaration for broad guarantees for private foreign investment, which was conceded a role in social development.

The document stresses national sovereignty, but nothing is said about the network of Yankee missions and commissions that undermine this sovereignty and the right of peoples to self-determination. The air-naval base of El Alto, known as "Little Guantánamo," is forgotten.

Finally, the "Mandato Revolucionario" offers nothing not trotted out before by Barrientos or proposed with greater verve by other bourgeois movements, with the already known results of defeat for the people and a greater colonialization of the country.

In these past two decades, the Bolivian people have seen how the class struggle in its inexorable development has settled accounts with similar programs, cruelly exposing the reformist false prophets. Under the pressure and maneuvers of the monopolistic interests, soon nothing was left to these reformists but their antisocialism. They rapidly forgot their fancies about making capitalism and imperialism kind and benevolent.

Ovando's first two decrees, which were issued together with the "Mandato Revolucionario," and later complemented by broad declarations, illustrated the real range and potential of the military-civilian government.

The first decree repealed the Petroleum Code of 1955. But the principle adopted in regard to the one-sided and traitorous concessions was to negotiate an increase in royalties. It is possible that if no agreement is reached, the military rulers will find

themselves forced to a nationalization, paying full compensation for all of Gulf Oil's investments as well as damages—that is, what they propose is a kind of commercial transaction.

But this step, leaving intact the structure of imperialism and, still worse, opening the door to new foreign investment which they promise to respect, will be emasculated and truncated. When it was raised to power by the masses in 1952, the MNR nationalized the mines. But shortly afterward it opened the oil fields for imperialist penetration. Who is to say whether or not this time, in return for the petroleum, they will not give radioactive minerals or the iron of Mutum?

The other decree, which concerns the freedom of the trade unions, also has a deceptive character. In the new upsurge now occurring, the trade unions had begun in practice to ignore the corporative regulations decreed by Barrientos. The repeal of this law was aimed at arousing expectations among the workers.

But in time, measures will appear, limiting trade-union operations. In the meantime, a new regulation banning politics in the unions and partisan activity in the labor movement is already being mentioned. Moreover, the trade-union headquarters, independent radio stations, and union funds remain in government trusteeship.

A taste is enough to tell, according to popular wisdom. And these two decrees are the taste that enables us already to predict the Ovando government's future course. As for democratic and political freedoms, the jails will stay filled and any revolutionist who ventures to take the official promises seriously will end up behind bars as "a guerrilla contact" or "subversive."

The state security law may be repealed; but the courts, with their judges and prosecutors converted into police agents, will still deprive citizens of their liberties on the basis of the antiquated penal code. The tactical encirclement of the mines will be changed into a strategic encirclement, with the withdrawal of the troops a few kilometers from where they are now.

There will be no reopening of the wage question and at most the miners will be given minor wage increases amounting to far less than the wage

cuts imposed on them in May 1965. The private concerns will not be expelled from the low-grade ore deposits and margins of the nationalized mines, etc. And if any companies leave, others will come in under the protection of the respect and guarantees for private foreign investment embodied in the "Mandato Revolucionario."

Thus, the program of the armed forces is a farce and an attempt to mislead the masses and to sow illusions among the more backward sectors of the middle class. It is motivated by the anxiety of the military to isolate the guerrillas.

The guerrillas are fighting for good things, the military concede; they are not rebels without a cause. But they sow violence and death, and besides, they follow foreign commands. We will struggle for as good or better program but without deaths and with liberty and social justice. Abandon the guerrillas and support the "Mandato Revolucionario" of the armed forces. This is the tactical shift represented by the September 26 maneuver. This is the thinking behind it.

##### *5. Alert the Bolivian people!*

The revolutionary Marxists, the Marxists-Leninists, have the historic mission of making the revolution in order to build socialism. We do not fall into cunningly laid snares like the present one nor do we encourage anyone's reformist illusions.

We are actors in the revolution and not simply spectators who criticize. Still less are we petitioners appealing for someone else to make a revolution that is ours by right and duty. Therefore, we draw a line of fire between ourselves and careerist opportunism and we do not abdicate our role of leading the people toward the socialist victory.

Furthermore, it is necessary to make very clear that socialism is not built with patches and crumbs begged from the imperialist oppressor. We tell any naïve elements, who, dazzled by the official verbiage, might think they see an alternative road to liberation in Ovando's path, that the system of imperialist oppression, the power of the bourgeoisie, will never be destroyed by small conquests.

In order to break this power, a real revolution is needed, a violent and brutal upheaval. Armed violence

is indispensable to destroy the bases or pillars on which the capitalist system rests.

If capitalist power is not broken and if the bourgeoisie is maintained, capitalism will always find ways and means to absorb reforms or small gains, integrating them into its workings in order later to pervert them, emasculate them, and liquidate them. Bolivian history is rich in examples that teach this lesson.

I repeat. What the present government is trying to do by ostentatiously mouthing the word "revolution" is to defuse the economic, social, and political contradictions of the system in order to halt the revolutionary action of the masses.

The dismissal of parliament and the dissolution of political parties has left only one institution in place, the army-party-state, which holds an absolute monopoly of power. This development has pushed the militarization of political activity to its ultimate extremes. In these conditions, class struggle and mass mobilizations can only take the road of armed struggle.

Against the army-party-government, which towers omnipotent, it is the duty of the revolutionists to erect a people's army, the concrete expression of the popular forces. We must not deceive ourselves. In order to overthrow the present regime and take power, we must forge an adequate instrument, which is the Revolutionary Army of the People.

Mobilizations of the workers, strikes, democratic action by the people, require such an instrument, which will be built in armed struggle, which is already being built in the guerrilla movement today. The first task of revolutionists is to rally around this developing people's army, to sustain it and defend it.

Stop the deception! Behind the pseudo-left verbiage and the civilian-military cabinet is the same "Made in the U. S. A." army that massacred the workers and took power in 1964.

September 29.

### Kwara Women Win Vote.

The military governor of Kwara State in Nigeria has announced that women will have the right to vote when the present state of "emergency" is ended. Presently the country is under military rule and no one is allowed to vote. The five other Nigerian states have yet to follow Kwara's example.

## BOOKS

### New Kremlin Fairy Tale About Trotskyism

By Gerry Foley

A new addition to the Soviet publishers' growing list of titles devoted to "the struggle against Trotskyism" received warm commendation in the November 19 issue of *Pravda*, the Communist party organ.

The book, *Bor'ba Partii Bol'shevikov Protiv Trotskizma v Posleoktiabr'skii Period* [The Struggle of the Bolsheviks Party Against Trotskyism in the Post-October Period],\* follows another full-size volume attacking Trotskyism, *Trotskizm—Vrag Leninizma* [Trotskyism—the Enemy of Leninism]\*\* published last spring.

The *Pravda* reviewer, Professor F. Ryzhenko, declared that this latest production of the Soviet academicians meets a pressing need: "In the present period when the ideological struggle of two worlds—socialism and capitalism—is sharpening, the ideology and practices of Trotskyism are widely employed by bourgeois propagandists and revisionists. . . . Participants in the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties (1969) called on Communists and all revolutionists throughout the world to step up the struggle against Trotskyism and its divisive and antisocialist activity in the workers movement."

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the "sharpening ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism" has been the Kremlin's standard formula for explaining the spread of antibureaucratic socialist ideas, and demands for workers democracy, in the area it dominates.

The reviewer gave no examples of the use of Trotskyism by bourgeois propagandists. Instead, he referred to the growth of the Fourth International and the spread of Trotskyist ideas in the Communist parties:

"In a series of countries, Trotskyist splinter groups have developed, trying to demoralize the movement

of the working class and the working masses. The Trotskyist Fourth International has stepped up its subversive work. The left revisionist elements are trying to make extensive use of the Trotskyist ideology."

The organization and contents of the book were not described in detail. The reviewer did, however, attempt to summarize the themes contained in it. If this summary is accurate, the book is not notable for originality. The standard Stalinist falsifications are rehashed.

The scope of the book, however, seems wider than similar previous productions: "With numerous facts and examples, the authors of the book show how by every means and every method the Trotskyists sought to destroy the unity of the [international Communist] movement, and what great harm the Trotskyist grouplets of splitters did at that time to the Communist parties of Germany, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia."

The reviewer indicates that this latest anti-Trotskyist book is designed to help Communists throughout the world who find themselves forced increasingly to confront Trotskyism: "In exposing 'left' opportunism, the Leninist parties widely use the lessons of the struggle of the KPSS [Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Sovetskogo Soiuza—Communist Party of the Soviet Union] against Trotskyism."

It is unlikely that the kind of bureaucratic hack work the *Pravda* reviewer describes will be of much assistance to the Kremlin's foreign defenders. This stuff may still convince some people in the Soviet Union, where it is a criminal offense to read Trotsky's replies to Stalin's frame-up charges.

But the stereotyped falsifications indicated by *Pravda* in this book would go up in smoke in a free debate. They may well prove to be embarrassing to the CPs outside the Soviet bloc, which have to face a new and critical generation of youth.

\* Published by Mysl'.

\*\* See "Catchy New Title in the Kremlin's Spring Book List," *Intercontinental Press*, June 2, 1969, page 548.