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KOSYGIN: "Useful for both sides. . ."

Kosygin in Peking:

Reconciliation? Confrontation?



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A First:

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- **Kidnapping of C. Burke Elbrick**

From Czechoslovakia:

- **220 Days and Their End**

CHOU: A "frank" conversation. . .

Cheese of All Nations

Cheese makers have run into a tough one in getting their product into the United States.

The Food and Drug Administration has impounded 1,782,000 pounds of cheese, valued at \$2,500,000, since the beginning of the year. The principal countries affected are France, Italy, Rumania, and Argentina.

The reason is the large amount of benzene hexachloride, a pesticide similar to DDT, found in the cheese.

The Cheese Importers Association of America, Inc., claims that the action is ascribable to the U. S. cheese makers' lobby which has been pressuring Congress to help them meet foreign competition. But the cheese inspectors swear that is not so at all.

The fact is, they claim, that the condemned foreign cheeses were running more than 0.4 parts per million of the poisonous ingredient.

According to U. S. law no pesticide residues whatever are permissible in cheese, foreign or domestic.

Of course, in view of modern conditions this law is no longer very practical unless all cheeses are to be barred from the market. Consequently, officials have not been enforcing the law against domestic cheese makers, who have managed to keep the level of pesticide at 0.3 parts per million or under.

Cheese retailers in New York take a gloomy view of what the activities of the inspectors will do to sales. Already many kinds of foreign cheeses are in short supply in New York and prices are soaring.

Said the manager of Cheese of All Nations: "It's going to be rough about Christmas. By then everyone will be aware of it."

The manager of Cheese Unlimited also felt pessimistic: "I know a salesman who has an order for 30,000 pounds of provolone and can't find any; it's like gold. You know what the commission is on 30,000 pounds? It's more than your salary and mine for a year."

Our prediction: A higher "permissible" level for pesticides. On the insect front, humans are winning the battles — and losing the war.

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Reconciliation or Confrontation?

The meeting of Chou En-lai with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin at the airport in Peking September 11 touched off a wave of speculation that the two giant workers states were about to compose their differences and seek at least some limited unity in face of the continued depredations of American imperialism in Vietnam. On close examination there seemed to be little to support this view, although it would be premature to discount it entirely.

The meeting evidently took place on the initiative of Moscow, although both the Rumanians and North Vietnamese are said to have acted as intermediaries.

Chou En-lai, who had visited Hanoi immediately after Ho Chi Minh's death, left the North Vietnamese capital on the eve of the arrival of the Soviet delegation and pointedly did not return for the funeral. The Chinese delegation that did attend, headed by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, was said to have avoided a meeting with Kosygin in Hanoi.

The agreement for the meeting seemed to have been confirmed only hours before it took place, inasmuch as Kosygin's plane had already touched down at Dushanbe, the capital of Soviet Tadzhikistan in central Asia, on his way home to Moscow, before turning back to fly to Peking.

According to the reports available, the meeting lasted for less than an hour. Kosygin was accompanied by Konstantin Katushev, Communist party secretary for relations with foreign parties, and Mikhail Yasnov, a Soviet vice-premier.

The Maoists were represented by Premier Chou En-lai, who was accompanied by vice-premiers Li Hsien-nien and Hsien Fu-chin.

Each side's press coverage of the event gave some indication of how it was regarded in the respective capitals. Peking devoted eight lines of an inside page of *Renmin Ribao*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, to describing the meeting. It was the first time top Chinese and Soviet officials have met since February 1965.

The dispatch in Hsinhua—the same eight lines—simply noted that the two premiers had held a "frank" conversation. It avoided referring to Kosygin or other members of his delegation by their party positions, suggesting that the Chinese chose to regard them as mere representatives of the Soviet government and not of a tendency in the world Communist movement.

In Moscow the meeting was given wide play. Tass, the Soviet news agency, said Kosygin and Chou "frankly made known their positions and had a conversation useful for both sides."

Except for the announcement that the meeting was "useful," however, the Kremlin was as secretive in regard to what was said as was Peking.

One thing further to be noted is that in the days immediately following the meeting the press in Moscow refrained from any criticism of the Maoists. Attacks on the Soviet bureaucrats continued at their usual rate in the publications of the Mao regime.

There are several possible interpretations that can be put on the discussion between Kosygin and Chou.

1. Fearing the imminent explosion of a major border war, the meeting was called to avert a crisis.

2. With no immediate crisis pending, the Soviets, perhaps with Chinese agreement, sought to decrease tensions and forge some limited area of joint cooperation.

3. Kosygin, wishing to impress the Communist parties of other countries with the "reasonableness" of the Kremlin's position, sought the meeting as a propaganda gesture, but no real effort was made to compose the differences.

It must be said that the third variant appears to be the most likely, although the first two cannot be completely excluded.

The positions are so hardened that even a story put out by the CIA that the Soviet Union is preparing a preemptive strike against China's nuclear installations in Sinkiang province can-

not be discounted—the Chinese take it seriously enough to have begun moving their nuclear plants to positions in Tibet.

Calculating that neither the Soviet Union nor China will increase their aid to the Vietnamese, and that they will most certainly not attempt to set up new fronts, American imperialism has sought to take full advantage of the division between the two giants to press its criminal war in Vietnam.

The fact that the topics discussed by Kosygin and Chou En-lai remain a closely guarded secret is not an encouraging sign. There has been no move to withdraw the troops sent into frontier regions during the summer months. The Maoists have given only the barest official recognition to the fact that the meeting took place at all—which suggests that in their estimate the whole thing was a maneuver initiated by the Kremlin.

Most important of all, there has been no common declaration on the question of Vietnam, the one area where common action is most needed, and where it could be had without necessarily resolving the other questions in dispute. Formally both sides claim to be supporters of the Vietnamese.

The most elementary responsibility to the Vietnamese, who are struggling to defend their revolution against the American assault, is a joint public call for an international united front in defense of Vietnam.

This does not mean that the Chinese and the Soviets must give up their differences. The debate on these questions could continue between the two governments and parties, and with other tendencies in the world Communist movement. Lenin's conception of the united front was to bring together for specific aims all tendencies in the working-class movement, despite fundamental disagreements on other questions.

It would be criminal to engage in diplomatic maneuvers or sectarian denunciations when what is needed is common action.

Guerrilla Fighters Seized in Nationwide Raids

La Paz

The political tension which has never subsided in Bolivia rose again in July and August. Despite the almost complete silence of the big international press, important events occurred. The Bolivian government is now trying to exploit to the full certain blows it succeeded in dealing the revolutionary movement, especially its militant vanguard represented by the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Army—the guerrilla army led by Che Guevara in 1967] and the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario—Revolutionary Workers party—the Bolivian section of the Fourth International]. The strategies of these two organizations had moved closer and closer together during the past year.

The morning of July 14 marked the resumption of armed struggle activity with the punishment of a traitor who had helped by his informing to bring about the failure of Che Guevara's guerrilla movement. A team of fighters executed Honorato Rojas in the city of Santa Cruz and distributed leaflets explaining the significance of the action.

Rojas had initially participated in Che's guerrilla movement. In concert with the repressive forces, he prepared the way for the Vado del Yeso ambush, where Tanya and ten other guerrillas fell and which was the first severe blow suffered by the guerrilla movement. In payment for his treachery, Rojas received a military decoration and a 1,000-acre farm in Santa Cruz, where he was executed.

On the same day, around midnight, another team of fighters clashed with forces of the secret police [Dirección de Investigación Criminal—Criminal Investigation Bureau]. A few hours later, in the dawn of July 15, armed police and soldiers surrounded and attacked a house on Lanza street in Cochabamba, in which Enrique Ortega (Victor Guerra) and Rita Emilia Valdivia (Maya) were staying. These two militants defended themselves with the utmost determination until they ran out of ammunition.

Maya fell in combat, while Victor,

seriously wounded, fell into the hands of the police. According to the reports in the Bolivian papers, which played up these events sensationally for weeks, the house attacked was an underground headquarters of the ELN where the police found important documents.

Victor Guerra was a geological engineer who had worked until recently for the Bolivian Institute of Geology, which is connected with the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. Maya, still a very young woman—she was only twenty-three years old—was a painter who had studied in Europe. Her body was first taken to the hospital morgue but later removed by the DIC which buried her in secret out of fear of student demonstrations and public protests.

After the clash in Cochabamba and the discovery of Victor and Maya, the government made a rapid series of moves. Concretely, arrests occurred in a chain throughout the country and stores of arms and ammunition were confiscated belonging to the ELN and the POR, the two organizations accused of being engaged in preparing a guerrilla war and against which the repression was launched.

On the afternoon of July 15 in Cochabamba, Antonio Moreno (Braulio) and Victor Córdova (Huascar) were arrested after a street battle. The two militants were flown to La Paz, presented to the press, and accused of having organized actions in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz.

In front of the reporters, they openly declared that they were members of the POR and the Fourth International, that they recognized Hugo González Moscoso as the leader of their party, and that they accepted Che Guevara's concepts on armed struggle and supported Inti Peredo and the ELN. Two students, Mario Bustamente and Beatriz Guardia, were also arrested and accused of associating with Braulio.

Beatriz was tortured. She declared that she was a member of the ELN, but that she would say absolutely nothing, even if they killed her. (Beatriz is eighteen years old and a student of economics and finance.) The two brothers Mario Ocampo Escalante and René

Campos Escalante were also caught.

José Antonio Moreno (Braulio) was a railroad worker and later a philosophy student. He is accused of being a guerrilla warfare instructor. Victor Córdova is a peasant leader who speaks Quechua and Aymara and also has connections in the mining area. The Campos brothers are law students.

In the city of Oruro the two brothers Felipe and Elio Vásquez were arrested. Before he was thrown into the police dungeons, Felipe was taken outside the city with his wife and three children, stripped and beaten. Then he was taken to La Paz half dead. The two brothers are accused of organizing terrorist activities in the mines and recruiting miners for military instruction.

Felipe Vásquez is a miner, a former union leader in Huanuni, a founder and leader of the underground unions since the military occupation of the mines. Elio is also a miner, a former leader of the union at Catavi and one of the leaders of the miners in the battle against the army at Sora Sora in the last days of the Paz Estenssoro regime. Both Felipe and Elio are very well known as POR mine-workers leaders and members of the Fourth International.

Bertha Porcel, a university professor and member of the POR, and King Palenque, a university employee, also fell victim to the repression in Oruro. At the same time Benigno Ojeda, a member of the POR and the general secretary of the student federation, as well as the professor Felipe Iniguez, who follows a pro-Moscow Communist orientation, were accused of being linked to the Vásquez brothers. Iniguez denied the accusations. Ojeda managed to escape.

In La Paz the repression has been still more violent and hundreds of uniformed and plainclothes police have been mobilized. The following POR militants have been arrested: Tomás Chambi, an Aymara peasant leader from Camacho province; Anselmo Herrera López, a Huanuni youth leader; Gabriel Guzmán Illanes, a leader of railway workers, whose health is very poor; Cecilio Alcón and Victor Alcón,

students who are charged with setting up a "special laboratory" for preparing time bombs, fire bombs, and other explosives.

A short while later, the students Alberto Romano and José Unzategui were arrested and accused of playing the role of couriers. The press made a great commotion over the arrest of the painter Luis Zilveti, whom the police consider the "kingpin." However, Zilveti managed to escape and take refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy thanks to the assistance of the editor of the La Paz daily *El Diario*.

In La Paz the police also arrested a high functionary in Comibol [Corporación Minera de Bolivia—the state mine combine], Gonzalo Oroza Bellido; Oroza's wife Tertu Tuulikki, a Finnish national; and Jorge Schutt, the assistant dean of the industrial engineering school. Other persons whose arrests were announced included an Argentinian named Trucco, two Frenchmen whose names have not yet been revealed; and F. Melgar who declared himself to be a member of the PRIN [Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista—Revolutionary party of the Nationalist Left], who is supposed to have visited Cuba and to have joined the ELN there.

Despite the ferocious repression and the employment of large repressive forces, the government has not succeeded in arresting the main leaders. Hugo González Moscoso, the secretary of the POR, has been actively sought but he has not been found. The police invaded the home of some members of his family in the Miraflores district and his apartment on the Avenida Montes, which the minister of the interior claims was the general headquarters, where military instruction was also given!

The police, whose quarry evaded them, revenged themselves in their own way. They destroyed or carried off everything they found in the apartment on the Avenida Montes—furniture, books, kitchenware, dishes, glasses, clothing, pictures, etc. This harassment was courageously denounced by González's wife and by the Human Rights Committee, which is chaired by the priest, Prats. A score of armed policemen, who wore masks so as not to be recognized, took part in the operation. González's family was brutally treated and they were told that if the POR

"Inti" Peredo Reported Killed

Guido "Inti" Peredo, leader of the Bolivian Army of National Liberation, was reported to have been killed in a battle with police in La Paz September 9. The announcement was made by Colonel Eufronio Padilla, minister of the interior.

Padilla said Peredo was surrounded together with two companions in a house in the Bolivian capital. According to Padilla, Peredo was killed when a grenade he had thrown exploded prematurely. The two men with him were wounded and both were captured. One was said to be Fernando Martínez, described as a representative of the Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina.

The September 11 Paris daily *Le Monde* seemed to credit the report as accurate. It printed a biographical note describing Peredo as one of the last surviving comrades of Che Guevara. Peredo refused to go

into exile with the rest of the survivors of Che's guerrilla organization in 1967 when Che was killed. *Le Monde* gave Peredo's age as forty-two. It said that he had decided to shift to a tactic of urban guerrilla warfare and that American-trained special units had been used to track him down.

In a recent declaration made public only a week before the report of his death, Peredo acknowledged setbacks to the guerrilla movement, but called for intensification of the struggle:

"The guerrillas will renew the struggle," he said, "which will be long and cruel and even more violent than in 1967."

Bolivian President Adolfo Siles Salinas issued a reply September 5 saying that the Bolivian army would "respond blow for blow to the guerrillas."

leader were found he would be "sent to talk with Saint Peter."

All of the prisoners are "incomunicado" and under strict guard. Victor Guerra, who was seriously wounded, is surrounded by a score of policemen in his hospital room. The others, according to their families, have been savagely tortured by means of the most diverse methods (electric shock, blows on the testicles, suffocation, etc.). The government disputes this version.

One aspect of the affair which both the police and the press have greatly stressed is the discovery of seven particularly well-stocked caches of equipment. Arms, ammunition, hammocks, knapsacks, photographic equipment, medicines, surgical tools, etc., were found. Some papers have published big pictures of these caches.

The government is trying to give the impression that it has succeeded in stamping out an attempt to start urban guerrilla warfare. For his part, Victor Guerra declared from his hospital bed that the ELN was preparing for rural guerrilla warfare in accordance with the concept of the guerrilla nucleus ("foco") and that the situation was not favorable for urban guerrilla warfare,

which was being organized by other groups.

Despite the death of Maya—who, according to some versions, asked her comrade to kill her rather than be arrested—and his own arrest, Guerra said that the struggle would continue. Antonio Moreno also declared that the struggle would continue.

The comments which are circulating in journalistic circles and especially in left political circles can be summed up as follows. The government in fact has dealt a blow to the revolutionary movement, but exaggeration was used to justify sweeping repressive measures. Military circles, especially the group around Ovando, have an interest in magnifying the affair as advance justification for a military coup.

On the other hand, the prevailing opinion is that the revolutionary movement is far from having been destroyed and that it is continuing its preparation for armed struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare, which is the only possible road in Bolivia. No secrets were revealed as a result of the arrests. The preparation of a new phase of struggle was announced on several occasions by the revolutionary vanguard, and

Inti Peredo himself did not in any way hide his intentions in his manifesto "We Will Return to the Mountains."

According to certain reports, the biggest loss for the fighters was the seizure of large quantities of valuable matériel which it will be difficult to replace rapidly without very extensive solidarity from the Bolivian people and the revolutionary movements throughout the world.

Finally with respect to the positions of the left organizations or movements: The pro-Soviet CP has reiterated its orientation opposing armed struggle and guerrilla warfare. The ex-Trotskyist Lora group has published a communiqué, signed by Lora himself, in which he disclaims all responsibility

for the activities of the persons arrested and declares himself opposed to "terrorism and guerrilla warfare." The pro-Chinese CP has seized the occasion to denounce an imperialist plot with the purported aim of assassinating its main leader Oscar Zamora (although there are no pro-Chinese among those arrested).

Voices in favor of guerrilla warfare have been raised in Christian Democratic youth circles and among the followers of Camillo Torres. The student federations in La Paz, Oruro, and Cochabamba have condemned the tortures inflicted on the persons arrested and have demanded their release. They have also demanded that any trials be con-

ducted in the regular courts. The same position has been taken by the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, which seeks to organize a worldwide campaign.

The ELN and the POR have made no official statement on the arrests. According to very widespread reports, the Trotskyists of the POR have begun to reorganize among the workers, peasants, and students, above all with the aim of starting up a campaign of solidarity with those imprisoned. Given the party's international connections, this campaign should acquire the scope of the campaigns on behalf of Hugo Blanco and Régis Debray.

August 1969

Palestine

In the Light of the Blazing Mosque

By J. Bauduin

[The following article was published in the August 30 issue of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly *La Gauche*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The fire in the Mosque of Al Aksa will probably be the most conspicuous event in a new hot summer in the Near East. This development was notable not only because of its emotionally provocative aspect—arson in one of the great sanctuaries of Islam. It was notable above all for the insight it provided into the evolution of the situation in the Near East, revealing a sharpening in the confrontation.

The most recent months have been marked by the (definitive?) failure of attempts to find a diplomatic compromise that would assure a status quo in the region respecting the existing balance of forces and arresting the rising Arab revolution. The consultations among the great powers are at an impasse. And the intransigence of the Israeli government, which rejects letting the Big Four formulate a solution, does not facilitate unjamming the diplomatic machinery.

Moreover, the prospect of elections is

raising the stakes in Israel. The recent debates in the ruling Labor party have testified to this. The Labor party's electoral platform calls for the government to accelerate the development of "permanent Jewish aggregations and security centers" in the occupied territories and for close coordination of the economies of the occupied territories and Israel. Once again the "left socialists" of Mapam have capitulated and aligned themselves with Dayan's theses.

On the other hand, it has been clear since the Karamah victory (March 1968) that the independent Palestinian movement was taking root. It has grown steadily stronger since then, winning the support of the Arab masses, who see it as the vanguard of their revolution. This development has reduced the margin for maneuver of the reactionary petty-bourgeois Arab leaderships which were tempted to capitulate on the terms of the principles laid down in the November 22, 1967, Security Council Resolution.

For these regimes, the Palestinian resistance is only a tactical tool against Israel, a reserve bargaining card which in addition enables the Arab leaders to present themselves to the masses as

patriotic heroes and serves as a diversion from the internal contradictions undermining these states.

Nasser was ready for a separate peace with Israel in the months following the 1967 defeat. But he switched toward a harder line June 16 when Gromyko visited Cairo, coming to present the latest American proposals to him. This switch was concretized in his July 23 speech with the proposal for an Arab summit and in the program the Arab Socialist Union adopted at its last congress.

Priority was given to the military aspect of the conflict. Support for negotiations was made *conditional*. "If the international efforts do not lead to a peaceful settlement of the crisis, the position of the UAR will be that of any country whose territory is occupied—combat to death or victory," the resolution of the congress of Egypt's sole political party declared.

Nasser's appeals for strengthening the military effort constitute a new tactical turn. In the face of Israel's intransigence, this turn was made under the pressure of the masses and the new wave of young Egyptian officers. It confirmed the total failure of Nasser's policy since the end of the Six Day War. By this switch Nasser is trying to re-

store his own luster. But the Egyptian "war of attrition" is still conceived as a means of pressuring Israel, as an instrument of diplomatic compromises for better days.

In no respect does this turn constitute a strategic or overall revision by a repentant Nasser who, in accord with the Fidayeen, has assumed the task of leading the Palestinian struggle to victory. The Arab summit and the preparatory contacts for it which preceded the mosque fire (the meeting between Nasser and Atassi, the president of Syria) have the same general significance.

The dynamic of the Palestinian revolution and of the Arab revolution is being expressed concretely by the guerrilla movement in Iraq, while Palestinian activity is intensifying in Israel itself. This increased activity can be measured by the renewal of commando operations and by the number of resistance networks dismantled by the Israelis.

Today the Palestinian organizations are in between the phase of struggle centered on commando actions and the beginning of guerrilla warfare proper. The essential objective of the commando phase was to toughen the morale of the population in the occupied territories and to win this population over to the resistance (the success of this objective could be tested by the massive strike which followed the mosque fire).

The functions of guerrilla warfare proper are to organize the masses politically and destroy the enemy's economic and financial base. The capacity of the guerrillas in Fatah or under the aegis of the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command to undertake limited confrontations with the Israeli army is shown by a raid of more than three hours which 150 guerrillas carried out against Israeli positions in the northern part of the Jordan Valley August 7.

Dayan's calling up the reserves testifies to a certain disarray on the part of the Israelis. In fact, the engagements on the Suez Canal and above all the Fidayeen operations are throwing Israeli military strategy totally out of kilter, since this strategy is based on blitzkrieg tactics and is ineffective in the long run against a people's war such as is shaping up in the Near East.

King Hussein of Jordan himself seems have now been drawn into the Palestinian game. His appointment of his uncle Sharif Nasser Ben Samil as com-

mander of the Jordanian troops in early July could be interpreted as evidence of a harder line toward the Palestinian organizations. However, the situation of military dual power which exists in Jordan, the breakdown of the Jordanian army—more and more undermined by the Fidayeen—and above all the massive support of the population for the Palestinians, hamstring the Hashimite regime.

The regime will find it increasingly difficult to rid itself of a Palestinian movement which is eating more and more into its vitals. Thus Hussein has been led to multiplying his verbal concessions while at the same time trying to maintain his freedom of action toward the Palestinian organizations.

Recognizing the right to self-determination of the Palestinian population on the west bank of the Jordan (annexed by King Abdullah of Transjordan in 1948 and now occupied by Israel) did confirm a certain abandoning of Hashimite "rights" to the region. But in reality this was a formality that represented a maneuver aimed at preserving the chances for a peaceful settlement, which Hussein needs to retain his throne and exercise a brake on the process of the Arab revolution.

Hussein's new strategy is to try to coordinate the Palestinian commandos and the Jordanian armed forces in the framework of a plan which seeks to assign the combat organizations the role of an auxiliary, and instrument of the classical Arab armies. These regular armies would again undertake the task

of waging the war of liberation "at the opportune moment."

In line with this, Hussein probably used the repercussions of the fire in the Al Aksa Mosque to try to internationalize this plan and get the other Arab leaderships to accept it.

The fire in the mosque, which was taken by the Arab masses as a logical continuation of the Israeli policy, the criminal effects of which they experience daily, seems to have shown that the Arab population's potential for mobilization remained intact. But this arousal of feelings has permitted a new attempt by the discredited Arab leaderships to regain the initiative and *resume the political leadership of the struggle.*

On the capacity of the Palestinian organizations to avoid being led into a trap by the Arab leaderships depends the future of the Palestinian revolution and also that of the Arab revolution.

In any case, the PDFLP (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), which is the organization most conscious of the dangers that threaten the Palestinian revolution, has warned the commandos against a conference of Arab heads of state, whose objective would be to bring the Palestinian movement under their control.

And the PDFLP has called on the commandos to reject the plan of the Arab leaderships—the Fidayeen must not become a "faction" of the Arab armies but preserve their independence with regard to the Arab governments.

Japan

Black GIs Clash with MPs in Okinawa

More than 250 black GIs clashed with military police in the Okinawan town of Koza August 30. The town supplies a U. S. base on the American-ruled island.

At least one black soldier was arrested and scores were injured—including three MPs and two agents of the army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

The August 31 *Mainichi Daily News* said the riot began about midnight when black GIs refused to be searched during a spot check of public bars by CID men looking for narcotics. Black GIs

surrounded a seven-man CID squad at one bar. The agents fired blank cartridges into the crowd. They were rescued by a group of MPs.

"Within minutes," the *Mainichi Daily News* said, "Negroes streamed out of the bars into the street until their number swelled to about 250. The mob overturned two MP patrol cars and set two others on fire, fighting a running battle with military police with stones and bottles."

U. S. military authorities called on the Ryukyu police as reinforcements to suppress the fighting.

Moscow Purge on Way?

By Les Evans

Those men are back again. The names are only vaguely familiar outside of Czechoslovakia, and the faces even less so, but there they are. Bilák, Indra, Kolder, Vilem Novy, Milos Jakes—figures that slid out of sight when Antonin Novotny was tumbled out of his bureaucratic roost in January 1968 at the beginning of the Czechoslovak spring.

These were the men long suspected of being the "Czechoslovak leaders" who appealed for the invasion a year ago, according to the Kremlin—although none of them ever dared to identify themselves. They spent the postinvasion months at the Soviet embassy, or in quiet diplomatic posts abroad.

The ouster of Alexander Dubcek as Communist party first secretary last April marked their reemergence, as the silent partners of the Husák regime. Now they are riding high.

With Soviet tanks in the wings to lend weight, they are preparing to gag the Czech masses. In the process, they have made clear that they intend to purge the party and government of even "moderate" figures who were known to have supported the mass movement for socialist democracy last year.

During the summer, the directors of state radio and television networks were purged. New editors were appointed to almost all the newspapers.

On August 27 Premier Oldrich Cerník opened an attack on Alexander Dubcek in an interview in the party weekly *Tribuna*. Dubcek, Cerník said, had ignored a Presidium directive that he go on television to denounce the "2,000 Words" manifesto, issued in June 1968 by party reformers.

One little-known party functionary, Frantisek Bedrna, publicly called on Dubcek and Joseph Smrkovsky to withdraw from public life for having "endangered" Czechoslovakia's "alliance" with the Soviet Union. His statement was quoted by the new managers of Prague radio.

On September 3 Vasil Bilák, an ossified Stalinist bureaucrat and a member of the party Presidium, called on Dub-

cek to engage in "self-criticism." Dubcek, although demoted, is still a member of the eleven-man Presidium and chairman of the Federal Assembly.

Bilák, in an interview in the party daily *Rudé Právo*, said:

"There is no doubt that part of the Presidium and a group of dishonest people misused and influenced Comrade Dubcek. I trust that he himself will help clarify these questions more thoroughly, and that he himself will say what pressures were exerted on him, and who advised him, and what he was being advised."

The "confession" that might be of real interest from Dubcek, although it might not please Bilák, is a description of what pressures "were exerted" on him when he was handcuffed and flown at gunpoint to the Kremlin along with the other top leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and what concessions involving the democratic rights of the Czechoslovak workers he was "advised" to make by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

A day before Bilák's interview, another Stalinist zealot, Vilem Novy, called for Dubcek's removal from party and government posts.

At the same time, there were unofficial reports in Prague that a plenum of the Central Committee, scheduled for an unannounced date in September, would begin within a few days. Rumors were rife that the Central Committee would undertake a sweeping purge reaching as high as Dubcek himself. Some fears were expressed that arrests might follow expulsions from the party.

Instead of the Central Committee, it was the Control and Audit Commission that met on September 5.

"Antisocialist forces," the commission said, would be "called to account." Milos Jakes, Stalinist chairman of the commission, signed a communiqué ordering disciplinary proceedings against nineteen unidentified party members who "have grossly infringed the discipline and the statutes of the party and acted out of right-wing and opportunist positions."

The commission added that "all the responsible members who have not fulfilled their tasks" would be "called to account" as well.

In an ominous note, the communiqué said, "the commission thinks it necessary to implement legal measures consistently." This was taken to mean that criminal prosecutions might be leveled against those expelled from the party.

This view was given weight by a September 6 announcement by the Czechoslovak press agency CTK that Prosecutor General Jan Fejes and his two deputies had just returned from two days of consultations with the Soviet prosecutor general in Moscow. "The visit to the Soviet Union," CTK said, "will help solve topical problems awaiting the Czechoslovak prosecution system."

On September 8 the Husák regime dissolved the leadership of the Czech Union of Journalists, and an anonymous thirty-member commission was appointed to control the union.

The date of the upcoming Central Committee plenum still remains a secret. Eric Bourne, writing from Prague in the September 8 *Christian Science Monitor*, suggested that the Control Commission meeting had been substituted for the CC plenum at the last minute because of an internal disagreement between "moderates" and Stalinists as to the fate of Alexander Dubcek.

"A deadlock in the top party apparatus here has given leading 'reformers' a breather," he wrote. "The Central Committee session, which was expected to adopt tough disciplinary action against the reformers, was postponed late last week. . . . The hitch occurred, according to unofficial but reliable information, at a meeting of the party Presidium Sept. 1."

Bourne suggested that the delay would not be longer than three weeks.

The tempo of attacks on Dubcek and his supporters has reached a new peak since the Control Commission sessions.

On September 10 Premier Cerník came under attack from Drahomir Kolder, current economic adviser to the Czechoslovak embassy in Bulgaria. Kolder charged that Cerník had failed to take a "tough" attitude toward the "2,000 Words" manifesto.

The sharpest attack came in the weekly *Kvety*, where Stalinist Borivoj Horač virtually accused Dubcek of treason.

Horak listed the former first secretary along with twelve others whom he said were responsible for "lies, half-truths, fantastic untruths, legends and fairy tales."

"I have heard mention of treason," Horak claimed, "and what else can we call the various 'errors,' the intentional keeping secret of the views of other partners, the organized undermining of the security services, the army, and the [creation] of anti-Communist gangs?"

"How can one avoid the word treason?" Horak asked.

Rudé Právo joined the chorus

September 12, demanding, for the first time from an official party source, that Dubcek engage in "self-criticism."

In preparing to rid themselves of those persons in the party and government who at least partially conceded to the aspirations of the Czechoslovak masses, the quislings who now rule that occupied country are only widening the gulf between the regime and the people. The impending purges may prove to be a short-run victory for the bureaucrats, but they spell disaster for the Kremlin in the long run.

the man in the other direction without any legal proceeding."

TWA sought to shift the blame to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and on September 10 an airline official claimed that the decision not to transport Williams was based on "information" received from the FBI that "a civil disturbance could be anticipated on his arrival in Detroit."

Finally on September 11 TWA agreed to provide a "special charter flight" to bring Robert F. Williams home.

Williams was arrested on his arrival in Detroit on a warrant issued by the North Carolina state government. He was released on \$10,000 bond.

"I'm back here to serve the cause of justice and freedom," he told reporters, "to help black people in whatever way possible."

Williams is charged with having "kidnapped" a white couple in his hometown of Monroe, North Carolina, during a riot instigated by the Ku Klux Klan on August 27, 1961. Williams, who was an official of the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was one of the first black leaders to advocate the right of black people to defend themselves against racist violence.

Several times the black community in Monroe had to defend itself against armed bands of white racists.

On this occasion, Klansmen had attacked a group of civil-rights marchers in downtown Monroe, and had threatened to stage a raid against the black community. A crowd of angry Afro-Americans stopped a car driven by a white couple that had entered the black community. According to some reports, the couple were known supporters of the Klan. Williams rescued the pair and allowed them to remain in his home for several hours until things had calmed down.

During his September 12 news conference in Detroit, Williams described the incident:

"Some men were actually crying, 'Let me kill them, let me kill them,' and I had to fight the crowd to keep them from killing the couple."

Williams plans to fight extradition to North Carolina.

Nuclear Age Bookworm

A six-foot boa constrictor, missing inside Toronto's Royal Ontario Museum for three weeks, was finally found sleeping soundly on a bookshelf.

U.S.A.

End of Williams' Exile

Robert F. Williams returned to the United States after eight years of exile September 12. The black revolutionary's eight-year hegira had taken him and his family to Cuba, China, North Vietnam, and Tanzania. When he returned, the government seemed as little anxious to have him back as it had been to see him leave when a nationwide police dragnet sought to capture him "dead or alive" after he fled a frame-up kidnapping charge in 1961.

Considering that Williams was supposedly a "fugitive," there seemed to be a virtual conspiracy to prevent him from surrendering to the police to face trial. Williams secured a one-way travel permit from the State Department for return to the U.S. He purchased an airline ticket, and on September 5 flew to London on a United Arab Airlines flight, to connect with a Trans World Airlines plane to Detroit, Michigan.

At the London airport Williams was stopped and searched by detectives, then held in a detention block. At the same time Trans World Airlines said it would not honor his ticket. Three other airlines, including BOAC and Air India, also announced that they would not carry Williams as a passenger.

The militant black leader was taken to Pentonville Prison in London, where he was held for several days without being permitted to contact his attorney in the U.S.

The British Home Office announced that it was "not considered desirable"

to allow Williams to remain in England—even in prison. He was to be placed, it seems, on a plane to Cairo, a city he had only been in for a few minutes during a stopover on his flight from Dar es Salaam.

On September 7 police and government officials tried to force Williams to board a plane to Cairo, but the plane collided with a truck and the flight was canceled.

The next day they tried again, but Williams refused to board the plane. By this time the case had received international attention in the press and two lawyers were on hand, as well as a representative of a civil-liberties organization.

Anthony Lewis wrote a column on the case in the September 10 *New York Times* entitled, "The Airline, by Franz Kafka." Lewis suggested there was reason to believe the American CIA was involved in the affair.

"One unhysterical Englishman who is trying to help him [Williams] maintains that there are signs of C. I. A. interference.

"Those who instinctively reject the conspiratorial view of life will discount the C. I. A. charge. The trouble is that the alternative is not very pleasant either. It is that the airlines flying the Atlantic have somehow simultaneously decided not to fly a particular passenger back to his own country, with the result that he cannot get there. And Britain, at the same time, does its best to send

220 Days and Their End

By L. C. Hartmuth

[This article was written by a Czech oppositionist in Prague last May. Although it is a detailed account of the events of last March and April when the Kremlin ousted Dubcek, we think it still remains timely. It contains valuable

background material for better appreciating the current situation and the moves now under way for the purge predicted by the author.

[The translation is by *Intercontinental Press.*]

I. Introduction

In these last seven months, Czechoslovakia has constituted a remarkable phenomenon. It was an occupied country. All its strategic points were held by an army determined to intervene, no matter what, in every aspect of the national life (even in naming the squares in Prague). The press was able to express itself more freely than in any other country in the Eastern bloc (including Yugoslavia) and the question of workers self-management was at the top of the political agenda. Still the fate of the country was largely dependent on the decisions of one of the most reactionary cliques in the world, a clique that represents a veritable "new right."

And all the while the occupation was going on, the propaganda machine was keyed to the theme of the necessity of "fraternal friendship" (note the absurdity of this phrase) with the Soviet Union. And I could go on and on listing the absurd aspects of the situation.

To sum it up, the occupation seemed unreal and the political and cultural life of the country which ignored it seemed like the reality, although the converse was more the case. Naturally this idyll could not continue for long. It lasted only seven months. The political crisis that erupted March 29 shattered it.

II. Reflections

Now, at some distance from the events, we can establish rather precisely the chronological sequence of the developments which culminated April 17 at the Central Committee plenum of the Czechoslovak CP in the displacement of the former power group that bore "the August halo."

I have only unofficial information from Czech sources at my disposal, but it is of rather good quality (i.e., not suppositions but the approximate facts). According to this information, the situation developed in the following way.

On the night of March 28-29 there were street demonstrations in almost all cities, the anti-Soviet character of which was evident from the start. The demonstrations ended in the destruction and stoning of Soviet trade and tourist offices and the barracks of the Soviet

occupation forces. The next day the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs transmitted a note of official protest from the Soviet government to the Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow.

At the same time, under the name of "Operation Vesna" ("Vesna" means "spring"), open military pressure began. As a result, Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia (the so-called Central Group of Warsaw Pact forces) were increased by 130,000 men, the total rising to 200,000 troops. Part of these units reinforced the permanent Soviet garrisons; others moved into various strategic locations. This pressure culminated on the night of April 1-2 when a powerful Red Army tank division moved toward Prague.

On the morning of Monday, March 31, Konstantin Semyonov arrived in Prague. He came officially as deputy

minister of foreign affairs, in reality as a special envoy from the Politburo in the Kremlin. Here the reports are contradictory. According to some sources, he brought the note of protest; according to others, he wanted to exacerbate the situation by personally repeating what the note said.

Since all of the Czechoslovak leaders were in Cheb, he could not reach these representatives. So he did something very symptomatic in the Czechoslovak situation. In a few hours, Semyonov, a Russian, ordered the most active personalities of the Novotny period—Mamula, Kudrna, and Hendrych—brought back into the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP. For the time being, they were not assigned any definite functions, which gave them more freedom of action.

In the afternoon of the same day, Marshal Grechko landed at the military airport in Milovice in an unscheduled Soviet military plane. Grechko—no one but Svoboda could have prevented it—was received by the military strongmen, Generals Mucha, Stangl, and Lux (deputy ministers of defense), Rusov (chief of the general staff), Smeldas (the inspector general of the Czechoslovak army, the successor of the famous Sejna), Bedrich (chief political commissar of the Czechoslovak army), and others.

Grechko left immediately for Prague and arrived at about 6:30 p.m. at the Prague Castle, having stopped before at the general staff headquarters of the Soviet forces. At Prague Castle, Grechko was greeted by Svoboda, who had returned to the city (Grechko refused to negotiate with Dubcek). He presented an oral protest in a very arrogant manner, which contained the following points:

- Anti-Soviet provocations were becoming more and more frequent, as well as attacks on the diplomatic organs and barracks of the Soviet army.

- This situation was prepared and provoked by extremist forces, among whom Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik, and



SVOBODA: Blocked military coup.

other members of the federal government also figured.

- The fact that no section of the apparatus intervened against the demonstrations was considered a violation of the Moscow protocol.

- The indecisiveness shown thus far by the CP leadership was inadmissible. An example of this lack of decisiveness was the fact that the CP organ *Rudé Právo* had not denounced the antisocialist provocations, a failure which violated the agreements on normalization.

- Grechko had been sent to analyze the situation and had the authority to order the cities occupied a second time.

(The April 3 *Rudé Právo* concluded its report of Grechko's visit to the military units as follows: "The Marshal expressed his conviction that the units of the Central Group of the military forces would always be ready to fulfill their patriotic duty." In connection with the anticipated intervention there was even talk of alerting the troops of the Ukrainian Front.)

In conclusion, Grechko offered the embarrassed Czechoslovak representatives three possible solutions: (a) The Czechoslovak leadership could resolve their internal situation in accordance with the Soviet's views; (b) If they could not manage this, they could appeal for

aid from the Warsaw Pact forces; (c) If they could not achieve the desired results and did not appeal for help, the Soviet army would resolve the situation without Czechoslovak assistance.

To these distasteful declarations, he added his own personal comment that, in his opinion, a mistake had been made in August because the Soviets did not try then to resolve "the question" once and for all (that is, they compromised by concluding the Moscow accords with the Dubček leadership), and that "this situation" would not be repeated. The counterrevolution was supposed to have manifested itself as an organized force in the demonstrations of Friday, March 28, and the party and the government were supposed to have aided it.

On the evening of the same day the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP met and decided to accept variant "a" of the Soviet ultimatum, but to oppose any immediate changes in party personnel. They did not do this out of any mutual affection but because they knew that Grechko had no confidence in any of them and showed an aversion toward the Presidium as a whole. And since the demonstrations had occurred everywhere, even in "Kadarized" Slovakia, they all found themselves in the same boat.

On Wednesday, April 1, Grechko decided to change his tactic and turned to the Czechoslovak generals. He negotiated with Lieutenant General Martin Dzúr, the minister of defense, offering him this proposal:

1. The two armies (the Czechoslovak and the Soviet) would take responsibility for "preserving order" in the following manner: In cities with Soviet garrisons, the Soviet "commands" would be reestablished. The Soviet commanders would be responsible for maintaining order and would have the right to intervene in politics. In localities where there were as yet no Soviet forces, the Czechoslovak army would maintain order. It would get the support of Soviet helicopters.

2. Censorship would be introduced.

3. There would be changes of personnel in the top posts.

Dzúr adopted a rather negative position and avoided responding to these propositions, declaring that such orders could be given only by the supreme commander of the Czechoslovak army, President Svoboda. A whole se-

ries of other generals (most of whom had greeted Grechko the preceding day) were (and still are) of the opinion that the orders of the Warsaw Pact general staff take precedence—that is, that their superior is Grechko or Lieutenant General Mayorov, the chief of the Central Group of Warsaw Pact troops.

At 8:30 p.m. the military council of the Ministry of Defense met. The exact proceedings of this meeting are not known. The only certain fact is that Generals Mucha, Rytír, Bedrich, Dvorák, Rusov, and others attempted a coup d'état. A part of the army, the police, and the People's Militias were alerted and a section of these forces concentrated in the area of Slany and Rakovník to move within about fifteen to seven miles of Prague.

In the meantime the Presidium reconvened its session at 9:00 p.m. At the same time, there was a joint meeting of the three governments.* This meeting, however, could not influence the decisions to be made because the most authoritative figures in the three governments were members of the Central Committee Presidium.

It was decided at the Presidium meeting to draw up a declaration which would constitute a response to the Soviet note. This was done. This declaration repeated all the opinions, arguments, and points of view of the Soviet leadership (the language is full of Russianisms)—that is, the existence in Czechoslovakia of "extreme right-opportunist forces," the connection of these forces with the West, the need for a change in political conception (so-called consistent application of the Moscow accords), the need for repressive measures, etc. A stubborn struggle was waged to defend Joseph Smrkovsky, who was personally criticized in the declaration. Dubček, Slavík, Kabrna, and others voted against this section.

On the other hand, all the members of the Presidium together did everything possible to liquidate the military coup. This proves that the putschist generals rose up against the Presidium in its entirety—that is, that the top military chiefs are still further to the right than politicians like G. Husák or L. Strougal. Thanks to their efforts and the authority of President Svoboda,

*The governments of the Czech lands, Slovakia, and the federal government of Czechoslovakia. — *IP*.

who is unquestionably highly esteemed in the army, and thanks also to the indifference of the subordinate officers and the opposition of the ranks (except in some police and People's Militia formations), the Presidium was able to defuse the coup.

Next morning, Tuesday, April 2, the regional and district committees of the Czechoslovak CP were informed of the



HUSAK: Old hand at Stalinist factionalism.

text of the Presidium declaration and at 11:00 a.m. it was disseminated by the communications media. During the day negotiations continued in the Prague Castle. The Czechoslovak side was represented by President Svoboda, Dubček, and Premier Cerník; the Soviet side by Grechko, Semyonov, Chervonyenko (the ambassador) and Mayorov.

The result of these negotiations was that the Soviet delegation agreed to let the Czechoslovak leaders settle the crisis. (On Monday Grechko still maintained that there was no certainty that Svoboda and Dubček would satisfy the Soviet demands.) In practice this meant that Soviet army forces would not maintain order in Prague, Brno, and Bratislava as had originally been anticipated.

In the evening the federal government met and adopted measures resembling

those provided for in the West German emergency powers laws—the establishment of a special body to maintain "order" made up of the premiers of the three governments, the three ministers of the interior, and the minister of defense; the drawing up of a plan for employing the Czechoslovak army in intervention within the country; beefing up the equipment of the police (the police now have tanks); the introduction of prepublication censorship, etc.

On Thursday the Soviet delegation negotiated with Strougal, probably on matters pertaining to purging the party. The Czech leaders Svoboda, Husák, Cerník, Rázl, and several generals visited the Vyskov military academy in Moravia to dispel the last echoes of the attempted coup d'état. Their trip to southern Bohemia the next day had the same objective. In the evening Dubček spoke a few words on radio and television about the gravity of the situation and the necessity of resolving it. At the time no one suspected that this would be his last speech as first secretary of the party.

On Friday, April 4, the Presidium of the Federal Parliament went into action in a role very characteristic of the mechanism of the crisis—not as part of the power elite but as the instrument of the hierarchically superior power group. The negotiations which took place in Bratislava between Husák and Grechko the same day were infinitely more important than the proceedings in parliament. It was probably in the Grechko-Husák meeting that the two sides first began to come together and that the first signs of a desire to conclude an agreement were shown. At this point the crisis entered a new phase. After that the crisis was sustained by its own momentum.

The same evening the so-called progressive wing of the Central Committee met in a caucus to prepare for the Presidium meeting of Wednesday, April 8, and to examine the situation created by the split in the top CP body. The caucus meeting revealed the absolute incapacity and political atomization of the so-called progressive majority of the Central Committee. The only slogan it could produce was "Let's play ice hockey with the Soviets, we have to gain time."

Knowing that the other faction of the Presidium was preparing a document approving the August military inter-

vention, they formulated an alternative proposal, the essence of which was not to approve the military intervention publicly but to declare officially that the stationing of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia was necessary for strategic reasons. They could find no defense against the castling move that had been prepared following the customary model of struggles within power elites in totalitarian regimes. In accordance with this chess ploy, Cerník was to move into Dubček's spot, Dubček into Colotka's (the chairman of the Federal Assembly), Colotka into Smrkovsky's spot on the Presidium, and Smrkovsky was to be demoted to a subordinate position, retaining nothing more than his rank as a member of the government (he is chairman of one of the houses of parliament).

Over the Easter holiday there were feverish backroom conversations marked by the fact that since no one knew who was on which side any longer, there were no secrets. For example, on Sunday the progressives already were familiar with the complete program of



DUBCEK: Didn't know it was his last speech as first secretary of Communist party.

the dogmatists and vice versa. Several "progressives" went through remarkable metamorphoses in a few days, transforming themselves from democrats into faithful servants of the apparatus. Cestmír Císar can serve as an example for all of them. He argued that they should sign anything the Russians asked, even if they said Prague Castle no longer existed, and that hereafter reforms should be carried out discreetly.

However, this polarization produced a certain equilibrium which a third force could turn to its own advantage—and this third force was Doctor Gustáv Husák. Husák paid little attention to the Presidium meeting Tuesday and concentrated on the Central Committee plenary session called for April 17. In the period preceding this date, he doubtlessly—and the result of the Central Committee vote confirms it—came to an agreement with the dogmatists of the Bilák faction and probably also with the Russians. It would be illusory to think otherwise.

His course of action proved very effective. Bilák and the apparatus which follows him assumed the role of an anti-Dubcek pressure group. They forced Dubcek, despite several refusals, to read a speech—although in a milder form than the original version—which they had written for him. The original version spoke of "anarchistic right-opportunist forces led by Samalík, Liehm, and L. Vaculík" and "right forces led by Smrkovsky and Slavík." Dubcek did not read this version to the session, but he prepared a self-criticism of a similar content in case the plenum refused to accept his resignation.

At the same time, the progressives assured Husák that Bilák's ambitions would be blocked. Another consequence of Husák's operation was that the other candidate for first secretary, Cerník, lost all support and was ruled out of the game. And to save the best for last, right at the plenum Husák signed an agreement with the leaders of the progressives, Simon and Hübl, the first secretary of the Prague City Committee of the CP, and Hübl, the rector of Central Committee's Institute of Political Studies, which contained the following provisions:

On condition that the Prague City Committee would not be dissolved or the signers of the "2,000 Words" manifesto expelled from the Central Com-

mittee, the progressives would throw their votes to Husák. Thus a tragicomic situation was created when Simon and Hübl announced to the "progressive" members from the provinces, most of whom were co-opted, how they had to cast their votes.

The plenum was completely rigged—especially if you note that preceding it, Dubcek and maybe even Husák visited Moscow. According to the statutes, the members of the Central Committee should have received the working documents several days in advance. This time they received only an invitation two or three days before which strictly limited the agenda to three points—the internal situation, the international situation, and economic questions.


In his opening speech, Cerník announced that the situation was grave and did not lend itself to long speeches. Then Dubcek took the floor, described the situation in terms close to those used by the Soviets, announced his resignation, and proposed Gustáv Husák as his successor. Then Cerník announced that no better candidate could be found and withdrew his own candidacy. And then the vote took place on the composition of the new "homogeneous" Presidium and for the new first secretary of the party.

Out of the 178 present, twenty-two—mostly "progressives" unconvinced by Simon and Hübl—voted against Husák for first secretary. Five—probably ultra-Stalinists—voted against his presence on the Presidium. On the other hand, Bilák was barely elected over sixty-five opposing votes. Also appearing on the new Presidium were Poláček, the chief of the unions, apparently put there to neutralize the unions; and the chairman of the National Front, Erban. It has been traditional for the chairman of the National Front to sit on the Presidium. Before 1968 this post was held by Novotny.

A few days later, on April 22, Husák left for Moscow. He went there to present himself—this is a feudal vestige that survives in the Eastern European states—but he also went to appeal for money. The reception he got in Moscow was colder than he expected. The Soviet leaders decided to wait and see what Husák would do before making any loan—the amount in question was a half million korun [7.2 korun equal US\$1] in gold. The Soviets' experiences with the Czechoslovak first secre-

taries during the past year made them cautious.

This overall view of the political crisis shows that the second phase of the revolutionary process, which began in March 1968 (March marked the begin-



NOVOTNY: In all of Czechoslovakia can Moscow find another jewel like him?

ning of the political reactivation of the masses), is definitively concluded. As we have seen, this crisis was provoked by the Soviet Politburo. A section of the local reactionaries also probably played a role in precipitating the crisis. The editorial entitled "The Time Is Ripe," published in *Zprávy* just before March 28, would indicate this.

Another indicative symptom was the institutionalization of the "extreme right" in the Czech lands—the creation of the Youth League, the activities of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, the more and more frequent meetings by the Jodas fanatics (pro-Soviet activists) both in the Czech lands and in Slovakia. In recent months, the party apparatus has shown increasingly vigorous resistance and, in part with Russian financial aid, it tried to make up for lost time.

The same is true for the State Security forces (the secret police), the traditional conservative bastion, who fear that one day they will have to pay for hundreds of political murders. (Five months ago some police were sentenced for murders going back to 1949.) This went so far that some Security agents spent their spare time keeping watch on the move-

ments of the country's leaders for the benefit of the Kremlin mandarins. This said, it is clear that the March demonstrations were only a pretext. On the other hand, they do not seem to have been provoked by Soviet agents.

The crisis was settled "à la Novotny." In the first place, all possibility of intervention by the representative national bodies—the parliament and the Czech and Slovak national councils (most of which were constituted after January 1968)—was excluded. Everything was settled at the top level of the party, by the classical power elite of bureaucratic regimes (a part of the Presidium of the Central Committee, a few secretaries and ministers). All the other political forces in the government and in the country, from the unions and the students to the man on the street, were excluded from the game and were nothing more than spectators. The foreign visitors who came to Czechoslovakia for Easter probably retain only an idyllic view of a sunbathed country where lovers regale each other with flowers. This atmosphere is typical for crises in totalitarian regimes. The narrow group of power holders is frantically active, those who are in the know worry, and the public plays no role.

If the Czechoslovak situation after August represented an exceptional case, the evolution of the crisis was a supreme example of a power shift based on an alliance between several cliques for the purpose of suppressing another clique. This said, it must be understood that the ousted politicians (Slavík, Smrkovsky, Kabrna, and others) are not of the same caliber as, for example, Husák or Indra. Their departure unquestionably narrowed the possibilities for activity by the radical-democratic left and reinforced the dogmatic right.

It would be ridiculous to gloss over this fact just as it would be ridiculous to fail to understand the limits of these politicians. Our Western comrades probably understand our alliance with the liberals. First of all, the problem of liberalism does not seem all that simple—although this may be because our view from Prague is not penetrating enough. And secondly, we, like Trotsky, think that Social Democrats are more acceptable than Hitler. This by no means signifies that we have any illusions about the Czechoslovak progressives, above all, about their political capacities.

Thus I pass on to the other part of my reflections, from "how it happened" to "why it happened." If we leave aside the economic problems, the ideological barrier, and the social position of the progressives in the party and look only at the political aspect of the question, we can conclude that one of the principal causes of the progressives' defeat lies in the fact that they forgot a fundamental maxim of politics—the argument is always won by the person who organizes.

Opposing the heterogeneous group of so-called progressives, who were in the majority in the Central Committee, was a perfectly organized faction of dogmatists, who continued to hold key positions in the party apparatus even after January 1968. Moreover, the progressives were divided into two sections, the old members and the eighty who were co-opted at the celebrated Fourteenth Congress during the famous eight days in August.

Aside from that, there was Gustáv Husák, a man of unquestionable abilities. He was the only one who knew how to turn the "transmission belt" against the center which it was meant to serve. I am thinking about how Husák used the Central Committee of the Slovak CP. He made it into a legal platform for factional activity and for organizing a homogeneous Slovak bloc. While the other groups had to meet in a more or less clandestine fashion, the Husák group—under the name of a session of the Slovak Central Committee—could very carefully formulate the tactics, the course of action, and prepare the votes of the Slovak part of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP.

This phenomenon is also interesting from another point of view. If it was possible to reverse a transmission belt only in the way Husák did—and all the other attempts to reverse other "transmission belts," such as the unions, the artists' associations, the CP university and city committees, failed—it probably means that the reason for the failure lies in the method. Or more precisely that the method of basing yourself on public opinion, pressure from below, etc., proved ineffective. Thus, one must conclude that despite the storms of the Prague spring nothing was changed but the mechanism of the pre-January political system, and its

laws remained intact. I will come back to this at another point further on.

The progressive forces in the Central Committee went from one debacle to another despite the fact that they applied the November resolution and the other "compromise" documents in accordance with their own desires. The reason for these debacles lay in the progressives' political incapacity and, secondly, essentially in their ambivalent and even negative attitude toward all signs of a popular movement.

If you look at the student strike in November, the activity of the mechanics in December, and the death of Jan Palach and the activities connected with it, you find the same response from the progressives in all these cases—they attempted to avert "the catastrophic consequences." And there is one point around which all this turned. If at the time of Jan Palach's death there was a real threat of a coup d'etat, if the way was really being prepared for seizure of power by a "worker-peasant" government like the operation in Hungary in 1956—all this came about because the progressives* had created a fiction of this danger earlier and because they had capitulated to this fiction.

Another of their errors arose from the fact that behind all their thinking lay the idea that the Soviet Politburo could do anything it wanted to do no matter

*The word "progressive" is used to designate political representatives (in the elected bodies of the CP for example) of the humanist intellectuals (writers, journalists, artists, professors, doctors, etc.). This social layer can be called liberal.

A section of the "liberals" went beyond the limits of their social role and began to orient toward the people, the working class, self-management, etc. Another section of the "liberals" was linked rather to the technocratic tendencies in the bureaucracy.

The "technocrats" were also represented in the CP organs but much less so. For example, Cerník represented the moderate technocrats who had much in common with the ossified bureaucracy. Mlynár represented the more flexible technocrats linked to the liberals. And Sik represented those technocrats who—through the formula of workers' "participation"—flirted with self-management.

Generally, in speaking of the old bureaucracy, the term "conservatives" is used, while the technocratic wing of the bureaucracy are called "progressives."

It must not be forgotten that the "progressives" were primarily inspired by the "liberals," that is, the intelligentsia, which—in its majority—is not part of the bureaucracy.

what the circumstances. The lack of any insight into, and real comprehension of, the capacities and goals of the Soviet Union made it practically impossible for the Czechoslovak leadership to achieve the objective it may have set itself after August—to take advantage of the international situation to get Moscow to grant Czechoslovakia the status of an unoccupied country.

(In the first half of 1968 this uncritical attitude was prompted by the old, blind, sentimental admiration of Communists for the Soviet Union. Later, in certain cases, this attitude was promoted by fear. One example will serve as an illustration. During a meeting of the Central Committee in the fall of 1968, Cerník found himself in a distressing situation. After he emphasized the necessity of cooperating in good faith with the Soviet Union in his introductory speech, one of those attending the plenum responded that it was absurd to call for this since there was no longer any friendship between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and that Cerník should remember how he was shipped off to Moscow in handcuffs. The premier of the Czechoslovak republic replied this way: It is true, he said, that he was handcuffed but they did not beat him.)

And it must also be admitted that all the factions on the political scene—and not only the centrists—had similar faults, the radical democratic left as well as the dogmatic right, each in their own way.

If we look at the reaction of the objectively oppositionist forces to the turn to the right, we find that it was extraordinarily weak. All the institutional centers of opposition—the unions, the coordinating committee of creative workers unions, the Presidium of the Czech journalists union, the Presidium of the university students union—in substance approved the declaration of the CP Central Committee.

There were two reasons for this. With the exception of the Presidium of the students union, all these bodies were "transmission belts that had been won by the progressives," and the logic of the system in which they operated excluded any possibility whatever that the Communists of the reformist tendency could turn these belts against the center. And this orientation also prevented them from playing a substantially revolutionary role, that is, from

initiating any genuinely radical action that might resolve the situation.

But let us be fair, and openly acknowledge that an informal organization—I am referring to the meeting of workers and students which took place April 16 and the horizontal coordination network set up—likewise was not able to accomplish its mission, primarily because of a lack of revolutionary consciousness on the part of the workers. In fact, just because one revolutionary doctrine is completely discredited in the eyes of the workers does not mean that it will automatically be re-

III. Conclusion (Perspectives)

It is rather difficult to predict future developments. Moreover, I think there is no necessity for such an attempt. However, I believe that it will be useful to indicate certain phenomena which will unquestionably be constants in the future.

I think it is a very important fact that from Moscow's point of view Husák is still not "the right man in the right place." Husák is neither a Kádár, a Novotny, nor a Gomulka (he is, however, closest to the latter). His position is not an enviable one. He has inherited an economically ruined country in which anything might happen if the political and economic crises were to converge. He will have to raise the prices of manufactured goods and food while at the same time freezing wages because there really is an imminent danger of inflation. It is clear that these measures will provoke social tensions.

If Husák makes concessions to domestic pressures (the demand for elections, for a party congress, and the demands of the economists who call for economic rationality—who, by the way, are rather unjustly called "technocrats" in the West), he will be replaced by a government led by Vasil Bilák and Alois Indra or perhaps even by a military junta. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that Husák is not a Dubcek. He will never attempt to repeat Dubcek's course. He will never fall into the illusion that he represents a people demanding freedom and he will not make concessions to the popular movement to divert it from its original goals.

Husák in contrast to Dubcek was

placed by another due to the fact that the workers are exploited.

The only even slightly energetic form of protest was the strike of the students in Prague and České Budejovice. The strike ended in a debacle, or rather in internal dissolution. If I tried to explain the reasons why the strike ended this way, I would have to go into an overly long explanation of the situation in the student movement in Bohemia and Moravia and its problems and peculiarities. And that would require a whole new article rather than an explanatory note.

elects as a "strong man." Husák had to fight for the post of general secretary in April 1969 while Dubcek—more or less without any effort on his part—was chosen as an acceptable compromise between Lenárt and Cerník. Husák will never change either the political system or the economic structure. He will fight very energetically not against those who are supposed to talk about the existence of "a narrow group of bureaucrats within the party"—which is how *Rudé Právo* wrote about the causes of the caricature of socialism that existed before January 1968—but against those who denounce the essential character of the system. He will be compelled to do so. It is in his own interest, in the interest of the Kremlin, and finally in the interest of the official Communist party. I will come back to this later.

As regards the Communist party and its progressive wing, I think that they have just lost their last battle. The official Communist party has shown that it is in a blind alley. It has proved its incapacity to combat the regressive forces that have arisen within it. In no other European country has theoretical criticism of Stalinism and bureaucratic totalitarianism gone as deep as it did in Czechoslovakia. But the logic of the "Leninist" model of the party, which has already led the official Communist parties into isolation and grave errors, is once again in operation.

This drama has its traditional symbols: ("the principal danger," "right opportunism"—I would stress that in the pragmatic use that is made of these terms, they have no definable mean-

ing), its rules ("the quest for the guilty one," "destruction of the enemy within our own ranks"), its own theme ("just retribution"), and naturally its conclusion ("making a just criticism of the preceding period in such a way that the positive gains of the working class are not endangered").

In 1927 a Czech Communist wrote the following: "In the Czech Communist party the situation is similar. There are a few bureaucrats, each surrounded by a gang of hangers-on, who slander and denigrate their rivals, declaring that they are 'traitors' and 'enemies of unity.' They search for their rivals' 'deviations' and, using Lenin's words, 'demonstrate' that they are scoundrels. They conduct a struggle against their rivals and occupy their fortresses, the party administrative and editorial offices. They transform the entire party into a battlefield for their own personal expeditions. Behind all this they lower a curtain with Lenin's image. Behind stage they play a battle song, and people sincerely believe that all this is a campaign against the bourgeoisie."

After a few rehearsals, people naturally stop believing in this pretense. But, unfortunately, the phenomena described are the "Parkinson's laws" of the Communist parties, laws that were foreseen in their time by two persons—by Lenin, with worry; by Stalin, with hope. In all its history there was only one week when the Communist party of Czechoslovakia played the role for which it was built and organized—the role of an organization leading the people. Afterwards, it docilely submitted to its leaders.

The purge which will certainly take place in the party will complete its transformation once and for all from an ideological alliance into a chemically pure instrument of power, which like the other institutions will have its roots in the status quo. This was what I had in mind when I referred to the interests of the official Communist party.

This will change the situation substantially for the progressive wing of the party. After the purges and still more after the voluntary departure of certain members, the membership of the Czech CP (1,640,000 at the end of 1968) will decline considerably, which will reduce the possibilities open to the progressives to win influence. The transformation of the party's character which I have just indicated (or rather the

final phase of this transformation, a process that began in 1923-27) will lessen any opportunities they might have and may even eliminate them completely.

The progressives are now declaring in fact that it is necessary to carry out



SMRKOVSKY: Slated for the skids.

an orderly retreat and very patiently prepare the way for a new January. We must note here another illusory fiction maintained by the progressive wing—the idea that January 1968 was the result of a patiently formulated and precisely executed plan. The exact opposite is the case. It is true that opposition groups had been forming in the Czech CP since 1956. Nonetheless, there was no contact among them.

The group of economists around Sik was not aware of the existence of the little group of philosophers in the School of Letters; the little group in the city committees and the university committee knew nothing about the people who were meeting in the History of Socialism Institute and nothing about

Generals Prchlik and Procházka. And none of these knew anything about the situation in Slovakia.

And if anyone thinks the situations in the coming years will be any different, he is naïve. Anyone who holds to that view forgets that Husák, too, was a member of one of these groups . . . Of course, it is possible that some special conjuncture could permit a new process of renewal. However, I am afraid that the only role the party could play in it would be to confirm the well-known thesis of Marx that when history repeats itself, the first time is tragedy and the second time is farce.

Looking toward the other social and political forces—the intellectuals, the working class, and the students—I am afraid that nothing can be said for sure about their future role. They appeared on the scene as social forces under their own power only last year after a hiatus of twenty years. Twenty years is time enough to break the visible connecting links with past traditions. And a year's time is too little to gain the ability to understand the present and predict the future by studying the past.

However, I can state one thing for certain—the group that succeeds in exposing the "Prague spring" will have a quite considerable advantage. I am not thinking about exposure in terms of a ready-made ideological schema, whether the line of Moscow, Peking, Havana, Bonn, or anywhere else, but an exposure in the sense of revealing the truth. In the Europe of today, where no one knows where he really stands nor what it's all about, in the context of a movement which for more than 100 years has made only spasmodic attempts to conform to the teachings of a certain Karl Marx, such a group will have an enormous advantage.

May 1969

Right-wing 'Commandos' Training in Turkey

The ultraright-wing National Action party (MHP) of Turkey, headed by former colonel Alpaslan Turkes, has established some thirty-four camps throughout the country where an estimated 5,000 young rightists are being trained. Their immediate aim, according to a report in the August 21 *Manchester Guardian*, is "a confrontation with Left-wingers in universities and other insti-

tutions," when schools reopen late in September. Schools were closed indefinitely in the spring after massive radical demonstrations.

"The commando camps," the *Guardian* reports, "have been set up in self-proclaimed 'restricted areas,' guarded by armed sentries and dogs." The government has been accused of protecting the camps.

Revolutionary Art and the Fourth International

By Leon Trotsky

[This is the first time the following letter has been published in English. It was sent by Trotsky to the founding congress of the Fourth International in 1938.

[The translation from the French is by Constance Weisman.]

* * *

Dear Comrades:

I deeply regret that unfavorable circumstances do not allow me to participate in your conference. The vanguard of the workers of the whole world await its answers to the most burning problems of their struggle for freedom.

I am, however, sufficiently acquainted with the discussion that is going on in different countries on the fundamental problems of the workers movement, and with the documents which have been submitted for your appraisal, to have the right to assure you of my complete solidarity with the work which you are called to do.

In the whole course of its history, the proletariat has never yet been as completely deceived and betrayed by its organizations as it is today, twenty-five years after the start of the first world war and a few years, perhaps only a few months, before the start of the second world war.

The social-democratic international, as illustrated by the last and most recent governmental experience of Leon Blum in France, is an adjunct of the bourgeois state apparatus which summons it to its aid in the most difficult periods for the most shameful work; in particular, to prepare a new imperialist war.

The role of the Third International is—if such a thing is possible—even more criminal and injurious, because it covers the services it renders to imperialism with the authority stolen from the October Revolution and Bolshevism.

On the soil of Spain, Stalinism has shown with particular clearness that it has assumed the role of international policeman against the proletarian revolution, the same role that czarism played against the bourgeois revolution.

Official anarchism, by its shameful policy in Spain, has convinced the masses of workers of the entire world that they can no longer count on it. Like the bureaucracy of the two pseudo-Marxist internationals, the anarchist bureaucracy has succeeded in making itself one with bourgeois society.

To prevent the shipwreck and rotting away of humanity, the proletariat needs a perspicacious, honest, and fearless revolutionary leadership. No one can give this leadership except the Fourth International, basing itself on the entire experience of past defeats and victories.

Permit me, nevertheless, to cast a glance at the historic mission of the Fourth International, not only with the eyes of a proletarian revolutionist but with the eyes of the artist which I am by profession. I have never separated

these two spheres of my activity. My pen has never served me as a toy for my personal diversion or that of the ruling classes. I have always forced myself to depict the sufferings, the hopes, and the struggles of the working classes because that is how I approach life, and therefore art, which is an inseparable part of it. The present unresolved crisis of capitalism carries with it a crisis of all human culture, including that of art.

In a certain way the whole world situation impels talented and sensitive artists onto the road of revolutionary creativeness. But this road, alas, is obstructed with the rotting corpses of reformism and Stalinism.

If the vanguard of the world proletariat finds its leadership, avant-garde art will find new perspectives and new hope. Meanwhile, the so-called Communist International, which brings nothing to the proletariat but defeats and humiliations, continues directing the intellectual life and the artistic activity of the left wing of the international intelligentsia.

The results of this hegemony are particularly striking in the USSR, that is to say, in the country where creative revolutionary activity should have attained its highest development. The dictatorship of the reactionary bureaucracy has stifled or prostituted the intellectual activity of a whole generation. It is impossible to look without physical repugnance at the reproductions of Soviet paintings or sculpture, in which functionaries armed with brushes, under the surveillance of functionaries armed with guns, glorify as "great" men and "geniuses" their chiefs, who in reality are without the slightest spark of genius or greatness. The art of the Stalinist epoch will go down in history as the most spectacular expression of the most abysmal decline that the proletarian revolution has ever undergone.

Only a new upsurge of the revolutionary movement can enrich art with new perspectives and possibilities. The Fourth International obviously cannot take on the task of directing art, that is to say, give orders or prescribe methods. Such an attitude towards art could only enter the skulls of Moscow bureaucrats drunk with omnipotence. Art and science do not find their fundamental nature through patrons; art, by its very existence, rejects them. Creative revolutionary activity has its own internal laws even when it consciously serves social development. Revolutionary art is incompatible with the falsehood, hypocrisy and spirit of accommodation. Poets, artists, sculptors, musicians will themselves find their paths and methods, if the revolutionary movement of the masses dissipates the clouds of skepticism and pessimism which darken humanity's horizon today. The new generation of creators must be convinced that the face of the old internationals represent the past of humanity and not its future.

June 1, 1938

The Kidnapping of Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick

By Gerry Foley

The kidnapping of U. S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick by a team of Brazilian revolutionists was significant not only as an organizational success for the clandestine resistance to the dictatorship. This action revealed the depth of the crisis of imperialist rule in Brazil and seems to have exacerbated the military regime's inner contradictions.

The commandos showed a high level of organization, and precision timing. They carried off their action in the midst of the governmental crisis following the incapacitation of President Coste e Silva.

Tensions had been apparent among the military forces backing the triumvirate of armed services ministers which has assumed rule—General Aurelio de Lyra Tavares of the army, Admiral Augusto Rademaker of the navy, and Marshal Marcio de Souza e Mello of the air force.

At 2:30 in the afternoon of September 4 a Volkswagen truck blocked off Elbrick's Cadillac, forcing it to stop. "A second later," Irénée Guimaraes, *Le Monde's* Brazilian correspondent wrote, "four armed men were inside the limousine, flanking the ambassador and his chauffeur. One of the terrorists cut the wires in the radio telephone and drove the Cadillac to a quiet street nearby. Mr. Burke Elbrick was then invited to transfer to a light van, where he would have to kneel down. Abel Da Silva [the chauffeur] stayed behind, his hands in back of his neck. The van roared away. The chauffeur remembered that he had heard them talk about chloroform. He had a second set of keys and he drove the Cadillac to the nearest store, where he telephoned the embassy. The traffic is usually so heavy in the residential section between São Clemente and Botafogo, halfway between the city center and the Copacabana beach, that at first people found it hard to believe that such an adventure could have been carried off without arousing attention."

Late that afternoon, the police found the Volkswagen used by the resistance fighters. The vehicle contained a dec-

laration by the commandos and a list of conditions which the dictatorship had to meet in order to secure Elbrick's release.

The revolutionists demanded that the regime free fifteen top political prisoners and disseminate a manifesto via all the



ELBRICK: Trapped in Cadillac limousine.

communications media denouncing military and capitalist rule in Brazil and calling attention to urban guerrilla warfare actions about which the censors had suppressed reports. The resistance team gave the government forty-eight hours to reply.

Giving in to these demands would clearly represent not only humiliation but a grave defeat for the unpopular regime which is maintained by repressive terror. But it was immediately apparent that Washington was pressuring the junta to comply with the demands.

Following the abduction, the State Department announced: "In response to our request for Brazilian Government assistance, Foreign Minister José

Magalhães Pinto expressed the deepest shock at the event and provided assurances that his Government will do everything possible."

The *New York Times* wrote: "President Nixon was reported to have expressed 'concern' at the Western White House and to be following the situation closely."

The *Times* noted that the American authorities had grounds for worry in view of the assassination of U. S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein by Guatemalan resistance fighters on August 28, 1968. Moreover, only a year ago a U. S. military officer, Charles R. Chandler, was assassinated by Brazilian revolutionists, who charged him with being a "counterinsurgency" expert and a war criminal for his role in Vietnam.

"The position of the United States was quite firm," *Le Monde's* Brazilian correspondent wrote September 6; "the ambassador was to be released safe and sound no matter what the price."

The *New York Times* said in its editorial September 6: "It is obvious why the guerrillas should pick the American Ambassador as the victim for their attempt to extort concessions from Brazil's military rulers. The kidnapping of Mr. Elbrick assured them of immediate worldwide publicity and the Rio Government of maximum embarrassment. . . ."

The *Times* did not acknowledge explicitly, however, what is also obvious to any student of Latin-American politics—the American ambassador tends to assume the status of an imperial proconsul and to be regarded as a power, equal or superior, to the indigenous rulers.

The Brazilian government's dilemma was revealed by their delay in answering the revolutionists' demands: "The tension reached its height in the middle of the afternoon," Guimaraes wrote in *Le Monde*, "when the *Jornal do Brasil* radio station broadcast the kidnappers' second manifesto, which had been left in the poor box in a church in the

Catete district along with a letter handwritten by Mr. Burke Elbrick. The revolutionists reminded the government that it had less than one hour before the deadline for responding to the demand for the release of the fifteen political prisoners. . . ."

Only a few minutes after all the radio stations in the country broadcast the manifesto, Magalhães Pinto announced that the government would grant the commandos' demands.

Late in the afternoon, the list of prisoners to be released was found in a suggestion box in a supermarket in the suburban neighborhood of Leblon on the far side of the Copacabana beach.

At 8:00 p.m., September 6, four hours and five minutes after a plane carrying the released prisoners landed in Mexico City, Elbrick returned to his home.

"But the outcome of the affair did not make anyone forget the dramatic hours they lived through on Saturday when the prisoners were to depart," Guimaraes wrote September 9. "The deadline for their release expired at 3:50 p.m. Saturday. At 3:20, the foreign minister Magalhães announced officially that the airplane had left Rio. But this was not true. The Brazilian army Hercules remained motionless on the landing field. In the United States embassy, worry turned into anguish. No one understood the reasons for this delay."

The cause of the delay was reported by UPI: "The plane was preparing to take off when two navy helicopters suddenly landed beside the craft and navy men ringed both the Air Force base and the adjoining commercial airport. A uniformed navy captain said the prisoners' release was a 'national disgrace.'"

The Brazilian military authorities apparently headed off the mutiny at the last minute, UPI reported, quoting the naval captain who led the raid: "'The navy tried to impede their [the prisoners'] departure but we received orders from above to let them leave.'"

Forty men seized the official Radio Nacional station to broadcast a violent manifesto denouncing the government's deal with the revolutionists. The broadcast was attributed to "hard-line" elements in the armed forces.

On Sunday, September 7, reporters learned that some officers in the headquarters of the First Army armored units had been arrested, according to *Le Monde*.

The accounts of the dispute in the military high command that were leaked to the press seemed to express the irritation U.S. diplomats felt in dealing with the rather primitive Brazilian officer caste.

"A group of Brazilian colonels argued for countering the kidnapping of the American Ambassador, C. Burke Elbrick, with a threat rather than capitulation, according to a report arriving here through diplomatic channels," *New York Times* correspondent William Beecher wrote September 9.

According to this report, the Brazilian colonels proposed publicly hanging the fifteen political prisoners whose release was demanded.

The Brazilian colonels may have reflected the ideological influence of U.S. "counterinsurgency" experts. Beecher wrote: "In one stormy session, the reports say, an advocate of this [hard-line] approach argued that the life of only one American was involved. The United States, he said, loses almost 200 lives a week in Vietnam and could end that loss of life by pulling out of the war. But it does not do so for reasons of principle and national policy, he declared, and added that important issues of principle and policy were involved for Brazil in the kidnapping incident."

Beecher did not say if the opposing side in the debate reminded the overenthusiastic colonels that the 200 men the U.S. loses in Vietnam every week are not as highly regarded by their government as Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick. In any case, the opposing side won the argument.

In addition to its political effect on the dictatorship, the kidnapping action seems to have represented a political step forward for the guerrillas themselves. Two revolutionary groups which had previously operated separately took joint responsibility for the abduction—*Acção Libertadora Nacional* [ALN—National Liberation Action] and the *Movimento Revolucionario do 8 de Outubro* (MR 8) [the October 8 Revolutionary Movement], which is named after the date of Che Guevara's murder.

The most prominent leaders among the guerrillas, according to *Le Monde's* correspondent Guimaraes, are supposed to be Carlos Marighela, a former Communist party leader who adopted the guerrilla warfare perspective advocated by the Cuban leaders; and Carlos

Lamarca, a former army captain and sharpshooter who deserted in São Paulo on January 3, 1969, with some comrades, stealing a truck loaded with arms.

The list of prisoners whose freedom was demanded appeared representative of the militant Brazilian left and revealed no apparent sectarian bias on the part of the commandos. Guimaraes wrote: "The composition of the list and the simple order of the names constituted a masterpiece of political astuteness. It included six students, a former officer, two young working-class leaders, a journalist, and socially concerned intellectuals. At the head of the list were the names of two great symbols—the oldest and the youngest representatives of the militant opposition in Brazil—Gregorio Bezerra and Wladimir Palmeira, the young student leader arrested last September in São Paulo at the time of the underground congress of the *União Nacional dos Estudantes do Brasil* [National Union of Brazilian Students]. *

Palmeira, Guimaraes explained, represented the new revolutionary generation; and Bezerra, a member of the pro-Moscow CP, represented the "old Communists." It was clear, however, from an *Agence France-Presse* dispatch of the same day that Bezerra was not typical of the Brazilian Communists, who offered no serious resistance to the military coup April 1, 1964, that installed the present regime, and who have functioned as a "tail" of the bourgeois opposition since then.

Bezerra was arrested at the time of the coup and sentenced to nineteen years in prison on the accusation of being the main subversive influence in northeast Brazil, where he was active in the peasant unions. The military in Pernambuco paraded him through the city on the back of a truck with a rope around his neck.

"At his trial," according to *Agence France-Presse*, "the military prosecutor asked Gregorio Bezerra: 'Did you have an arsenal of Czech machine guns?' The old revolutionary militant replied: 'In spite of my age [he was sixty-nine at the time], if I had a revolver you

* The bulk of the student leadership was arrested in a raid on this clandestine congress October 12, 1968. See "Brazilian Student Leadership Captured by Police," *Intercontinental Press*, October 28, 1968, p. 23.

would not be standing there in front of me because you don't deserve to live."

Palmeira, twenty-four years of age, was the leader of the June 26, 1968, student and popular demonstration in Rio de Janeiro in which an estimated 100,000 persons marched under the triple slogan "Agrarian Reform—Oust the Dictatorship—Drive Out Imperialism!"

Besides Palmeira, the student leaders included on the list were Luiz Travassos, José Dirceu de Oliveira e Silva, Maria Augusta Carneiro, Ricardo Villas Boas de Sarego, and "Xu U," a student leader from the Minas Gerais region and Brazilia. Travassos has been known as a proponent of Che Guevara's guerrilla warfare strategy; Palmeira is an exponent of mass action.

Next on the list were two working-class leaders from Osasco, a proletarian suburb of São Paulo—Joseph Ibrahim, who was arrested last May for organizing a strike; and Rolando Fratti, a leader of the Santos dock workers. They were followed by Argonauta Pacheco Da Silva, a former deputy from São Paulo, who is supposed to have joined one of the guerrilla groups, Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria [People's Revolutionary Vanguard], shortly before his arrest.

The remaining five persons were reported to be all leaders of the Revolutionary Front, which is associated with Marighela and Lamarca. The following four are from São Paulo: Onofre Pinto, a former sergeant dishonorably discharged from the army; João Leonardo Da Silva Rocha, a lawyer arrested for participating in the bank robberies staged by the guerrillas; Invens Marchetti, an architect; and Ricardo Zarattini, an engineer. Flavio Tavares, the last on the list, was an editor of *Ultima Hora* in Rio de Janeiro.

Invens Marchetti and Onofre Pinto told the press, when they arrived in Mexico City, that they had helped to organize the assassination of Captain Charles Chandler in São Paulo. They explained that he had been executed because he was doing "counter-insurgency" research in Brazil while ostensibly studying the Portuguese language and Brazilian history. Pinto said that Chandler took frequent trips to the interior of the country and was believed to be an intelligence officer.

Prior to their latest action, the Brazilian guerrilla groups were reported

to have concentrated on confiscating bank funds to amass the financial resources necessary for launching rural guerrilla warfare. According to the weekly *Veja*, published in São Paulo, there have been fifty-two bank robberies in that city since 1968, in which a total of close to \$60,000 has been taken. In the city and province of Rio de Janeiro, *Veja* reported, there have been twenty-three robberies in the same period, in which about \$30,000 has been taken.

In São Paulo armed attacks have been carried out against the offices of the daily *O Estado de São Paulo*, the U. S. Information Service, the Catholic association "Tradition-Family-Property," various railway lines, the headquarters of several progovernment unions, and a Volkswagen assembly plant. More than 200 rifles and machine guns have been taken from military bases. And on three occasions, radio stations have been occupied by commandos who broadcast revolutionary messages and slogans.

In Rio de Janeiro eighteen bombings and six cases of arson have been reported. *Veja* noted that a lesser number of such incidents had occurred in Belo Horizonte.

During the same period, the São Paulo weekly wrote, 150 revolutionary activists were arrested or identified, most of them between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. Of these, 38 percent were said to be students, 20 percent military officers or ex-military officers, 17 percent professionals, 8 percent workers, and the remainder functionaries or businessmen.

The amount the guerrillas obtained by holdups was apparently far exceeded by that embezzled by Jorge Medeiros Vale, a top Bank of Brazil executive and alleged member of MR 8. Medeiros Vale is said to have admitted transferring \$2,000,000 to a special account in Switzerland for the guerrillas. Vale was one of several dozen MR 8 members arrested in July, according to the September 7-8 issue of *Le Monde*.

After releasing the fifteen prisoners, the Brazilian junta rushed to step up its repression in order to save face. On September 9, the regime decreed a new organic law, Institutional Act No. 14, establishing the death penalty for "acts of subversion or terrorism."

Massive raids were reported in which forty persons were said to have been arrested. The police announced

September 9 that they had captured some members of the team that kidnapped Elbrick and that they had located the house where the ambassador was held, which was said to be in the Santa Teresa section of the city.

However, the fifteen refugees in Mexico City said that until the government revealed the names of the four commandos claimed to have been arrested, its assertions could be considered open to doubt. At the same time, they denounced the violent repression undertaken by the regime.

This violence, the joint communiqué said, "has become especially brutal against the workers, who have lost the right to strike and many of whose leaders have been jailed. Encouraged and legitimized by the military government, the violence of the repression has evoked natural and active resistance (in the form of well-organized movements) which is expressed in protest demonstrations of the most diverse kinds. The abduction of Ambassador Elbrick was only one form of the active resistance being waged against the jailings, tortures, and acts of violence of the dictatorial government."

The fifteen described the tortures and brutality they themselves had suffered. Onofre Pinto said that he had been "tortured by beatings and electric shocks administered to all parts of my body," and that this was standard procedure in Brazilian prisons.

Despite what they had endured, however, the ex-prisoners said that they intended to return to Brazil and not take refuge in Cuba, as had been reported. Oliveira Silva said: "They have had their revolution in Cuba. I want to go back to Brazil where we still must carry out our revolution."

The capitalist press expressed apprehensions that stepped-up repression in Brazil might only increase the isolation of the military regime. An Associated Press dispatch September 8 said: "Brazilians generally were concerned for the safety of U. S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick during the three days he was kidnapped by terrorists, but many were delighted to see Brazil's military dictatorship humiliated. . . . Look at those 20,000 soldiers and they can't do anything about a small group of terrorists," one Brazilian said as he watched the military parade for Independence Day."

Le Monde commented September 6, "It is probable that the kidnapping of

the U. S. ambassador will provide new arguments for the military and civilian leaders who advocate a strong hand. But there is no doubt either that the Brazilian leaders—weakened and divided, criticized by the liberal wing of

the church, denounced by the intellectuals and the members of the traditional political establishment—risk soon having to face an explosive situation which they will have substantially helped to create."

South Korea

A 'Victory' for Park

Dictator Chung Hee Park scored a point September 14 in his campaign to make the presidency of South Korea a lifetime job. The former general succeeded in ramming through parliament his long-sought constitutional amendment allowing him to seek a third term when his present term expires in 1971.

But the crudeness of Park's maneuver may have serious consequences for the American-supported despot. He secured the required two-thirds vote in parliament only by having his faction, the Democratic-Republicans, meet secretly in the middle of the night in a building across the street from the Assembly Chamber and carry out a hasty vote while police blocked opposition members from entering the hall.

The opposition New Democratic party has charged that the voting was illegal on the grounds that it was held outside the Assembly Chamber, and took place after the session had officially adjourned.

Besides the housebroken parliamentary opposition, Park faces a much more formidable opponent in the reawakening student movement. Universities have been closed by the government throughout the country in the wake of student protests against the proposed constitutional amendment. Clashes with the police occur almost daily.

It was a massive student revolt that toppled Syngman Rhee, the right-wing darling of the Truman and Eisenhower-Nixon administrations, in 1960. General Park seized power in May 1961 and soon restored the situation to the preferred norm of the Pentagon.

Park's main support, of course, is the 56,000 American troops that still occupy the country some sixteen years after the close of the Korean war. They provide some indication of how quickly the U. S. would get out of Vietnam if

it succeeded in propping up the Vietnamese counterpart of the Park regime, headed by Nguyen Van Thieu.

The *Los Angeles Times-Washington Post* news service commented last April 26: "Ask someone who follows these things how the U. S. can ever get safely and responsibly out of Korea, and he . . . replies, 'in the next millennium . . .' First of all, no American official will countenance even a veiled implication that the U. S. is considering any kind of withdrawal from South Korea."

Northern Ireland

Bernadette Devlin Cuts Tour Short

Bernadette Devlin's decision to cut her American tour short provoked some speculation. It could hardly be otherwise. In her appearances and interviews, Miss Devlin did an effective job of discrediting the reactionary regime maintained in Northern Ireland by British imperialism and the fanatical local ruling class it has created. She won considerable sympathy and support for her oppressed people, whose problems have been largely unknown or misunderstood in America.

When Miss Devlin left the U. S. suddenly, most people assumed that the demands of the struggle had called her back to the barricades, since the situation in Northern Ireland remains grave.

Other versions, however, are circulating. The Associated Press wire service carried a story September 7 that Miss Devlin had left the U. S. because she felt that the money she was raising for relief might be diverted to the outlawed Irish Republican Army (IRA) for the purpose of buying guns.



PARK: U. S. backing pays off again.

Why Elbrick Was Abducted

[The following is the text of the statement issued by the revolutionary groups responsible for the abduction of C. Burke Elbrick, the U. S. ambassador to Brazil, on September 4. The declaration was put on the wires by Agence France-Presse the day of the kidnapping. It appeared in a Spanish translation in the Mexico City press and it is from this version that our translation below was made.

[Another version was published in the *New York Times* September 6. There are some intriguing differences. For example, in one passage the version printed in Mexico City says "beating" and the *New York Times* version says "spanking."]

* * *

The revolutionary groups intercepted Mr. Burke Elbrick, the ambassador of the United States, today and took him to a place in the country where he is being held prisoner.

This act is one more in a series of revolutionary actions—assaults on banks to obtain funds for the revolution, confiscations of the profits the bankers make from their employees, seizures of military headquarters and arms and ammunition, which have been confiscated for the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship, breaking into prisons and freeing revolutionists so that they can participate in the struggle for the people, destruction of prisons which symbolize oppression and the justice of jailers and hangmen.

In reality, the abduction of the ambassador was only one action in the revolutionary war which is advancing every day and which this year will attain the stage of rural warfare.

By kidnapping the ambassador we have demonstrated that it is possible to defeat the dictatorship and exploitation if we arm and organize, if we show up where the enemy least expects us and then vanish, exhausting the dictatorship, sowing fear and terror among the exploiters, and inspiring hope and confidence in victory among the exploited.

In this country Mr. Burke Elbrick

represents the interests of imperialism, which is allied with the big employers, the landlords, the big national banks; in short, with the system of oppression and exploitation.

The interests held by these groups grow more profitable day by day, giving rise to starvation wages, an unjust agrarian structure, and systematic repression.

Thus the abduction of the ambassador is a clear warning that the Brazilian people will fight on unceasingly and may bring the force of their struggle to bear on the exploiting groups at any time. We know that this is a struggle without quarter, a long and hard struggle. This struggle will not end up by merely substituting one general for another, but will culminate in the end of the exploiters' rule and in the establishment of a government that will rescue the workers of the entire country from the situation in which they find themselves.

This week marks the anniversary of Brazilian independence. The people and the dictatorship are celebrating this anniversary in different ways. The dictatorship is organizing carnivals, parades, fireworks, and poster displays. Actually it is not celebrating independence at all. It is pulling the wool over the eyes of the exploited, creating a false air of festivity in order to keep them tied to a life of poverty, exploitation, and oppression.

But this smokescreen cannot hide a truth that is as clear as daylight. How can you make the people forget their poverty when they feel it to the marrow?

Independence week is being celebrated twice—by the people and by the dictatorship, by those who are holding parades and by those who kidnapped the ambassador who symbolizes exploitation. The life of the ambassador is in the hands of the dictatorship. If the dictatorship respects our demands, Elbrick will be released.

Our conditions are the following:

(a) Release of fifteen political prisoners, fifteen revolutionists among the thousands enduring torture in the jails and military headquarters throughout

the country. We do not ask the impossible. We do not ask that they bring back to life the innumerable fighters murdered in prison. These fighters cannot be released. And so, of course, one day they will be avenged.

We ask only the release of fifteen leaders of the struggle against the dictatorship. We think that any one of them is worth a hundred ambassadors, at least as far as the people are concerned. But the ambassador of the United States means a lot to the dictatorship, to the morale of the dictatorship and the exploiters.

(b) Publication of this document in all the daily papers and its broadcasting by all the radio and television stations.

If the response is negative, or if there is no response, justice will be done to Mr. Burke Elbrick. The fifteen comrades must be released, whether they have been sentenced or not.

This is an exceptional situation and in such circumstances the jurists of the dictatorship always find some means of arranging things, as we have seen with the military junta's sudden rise to power.

Negotiations will begin only after public declarations by the representatives of the dictatorship and after these representatives have accepted our conditions.

The procedure must always be public. They must always reply publicly. As for us, our way of replying will always be a surprise.

We want to remind the dictatorship that there can be no delay and that we will not hesitate to fulfill our promises.

Finally, we want to warn all those who may hunt, torture, and kill our comrades that we will not tolerate any continuation of this odious procedure.

We give them this last warning. Anyone who continues torturing, beating, or killing our comrades must be prepared to pay the price.

From now on it is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

Accção Libertadora Nacional [ALN—National Liberation Action]; Movimento Revolucionario do 8 de Outubro (MR 8) [October 8 Revolutionary Movement].

Guerrillas Killed in Skirmish

At least ten guerrillas and four peasants were reported killed in Colombia by government troops September 8.

Ask Students to Join Peasant Struggle

[The following is the text of a declaration made by the university section of the Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario (Revolutionary Left Front—the party of Hugo Blanco), which is now being circulated in the Peruvian student organizations. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Our country is now ruled by a regime which calls itself "revolutionary." By means of various measures of a "nationalist" character, the government is pursuing procapitalist objectives (that is, capitalist development of the country).

At the same time, owing to its frictions with Yankee imperialism and its own junior partners (the landholding big bourgeoisie), this regime is offering some resistance to Yankee domination.

The objective of the junta is to win concessions promoting its development plans, strengthening the weak industrial bourgeoisie which is tending to become the present regime's social base.

The working class in general and the students in particular supported the nationalization of the IPC [International Petroleum Company]. Moreover, they called on the JMG [Junta Militar de Gobierno—Government Military Junta] to wage an anti-imperialist struggle and immediately nationalize all the Yankee concerns.

No far the junta has not done this, nor does it intend to, because of its characteristics noted above.

The people as a whole support the agrarian reform law. On the one hand, this law represents an attempt to solve the pressing problem of the Peruvian peasantry. On the other hand, it fits into the development plans of the JMG, which is seeking to expand the internal market.

Once their buying power is increased, thanks to the reform, these 7,000,000 peasants, who now consume only the "necessary minimum," will be able to buy the goods produced by these capitalist industries.

But we know that this law is not going to be applied in a deepgoing way—both because of its intrinsic nature and because of the obstacles that

the big landowners will try to put in its way. The land is not going to be granted to the peasants free of charge, and technical and economic aid will be limited.

For all these reasons, we offer the following motion for discussion and implementation by the various student bodies.

Considering that:

1. The students, as a militant sector of the people, have always fought alongside the workers and peasants in their revolutionary struggles to transform the outmoded capitalist and imperialist structures.

2. The conscious and revolutionary students have attentively analyzed the course of the present regime and the tasks incumbent on us.

3. To implement, plan, and give orientation to a radical agrarian reform including confiscation of the land, all students must mobilize to go into the countryside.

4. A victorious struggle against the antiuniversity law will depend on joining the struggles of the working class, and primarily today the struggles of the peasants.

5. It is indispensable, urgent, and pressing for all the student federations in Peru to take a stand, since the present conditions make it impossible for the universities to function.

Therefore, be it resolved that:

1. This academic year be devoted to the *Peruvian peasants*. Thus, *there must be no classes*. Rather, led by our student associations and federations, we must go into the countryside to unite with the peasants.

We must force implementation of a real agrarian reform and introduction of an efficient organization of production, and participate actively in achieving all the requirements of these mobilizations.

2. In order for us to make our contribution to our peasant brothers, our FEP [Federación de Estudiantes del Perú—Student Federation of Peru] and the student associations in the universities must give top priority to drawing up plans for this mobilization. Let us wage an intensive campaign to eliminate illiteracy, to build schools,

rural clinics, irrigation canals; let us study the properties of different soils; let us improve the sanitary conditions; let us study land litigations; let us expose the innumerable injustices, bad officials, etc.

3. Let the university budget be transferred in toto to a Peasant-Student Fund to be applied first of all to solving our tasks in the countryside in accordance with the decisions of a majority of the students.

4. All of our propaganda, our economic and organizational resources, must be brought to bear on tasks systematically executed by our student commandos in the countryside.

For Worker-Peasant-Student Unity.

For implementation of a Radical Agrarian Reform with Land Confiscation.

For the Release of Hugo Blanco, a Mainstay in the Struggles for Recovery of the Land.

Greece

Four More Victims

The Pan-Hellenic Antidictatorial Union of Rhein-Wupper and Leverkusen in West Germany issued a communiqué September 3 as follows:

"Late in May, the junta's security police arrested Antonis Soterakos, Antonis Damigos, Anestis Souvatoglou, and Dantis Chrysikos.

"These persons were members of the DEA [Demokratikes Epitropes Antistases—Democratic Resistance Committees]. They were arrested first in November 1967, tortured, and given stiff terms by the military courts. They were later freed under the New Year's amnesty granted by Papadopoulos. Now they have been arrested a second time and have been tortured for two months in the New Ionia dungeons in order to force them to sign statements prepared by the police.

"Soterakos is suffering severe nervous shock. Damigos had a rib broken. Souvatoglou was savagely tortured despite the fact that he is a crippled veteran. These prisoners are now under preventive arrest, awaiting 'trial.' We appeal to international public opinion to bring pressure to bear to save them."

For the Executive Committee
Vangelis Sakkatos

'Plan 10-1'

The German magazine *Der Spiegel* recently exposed a top-secret U. S. military plan to use atomic, chemical, and biological weapons in the next major war.

Another German publication, *Stern*, which has an extremely wide circulation, followed up with further details.

That the plan was genuine could hardly be doubted. *Der Spiegel* revealed that it had been distributed by the disinformation section of the Soviet KGB.

The KGB got "Plan 10-1," as it appears to have been listed in the files of the Pentagon, from two secret agents at least four years ago. The two were sentenced by a District of Columbia court on July 30, 1965, to twenty-five years imprisonment.

The revelation of the secret plan created a sensation in Europe, particularly the part about the U. S. planning to use chemical and biological weapons. (The readiness of the U. S. to use nuclear weapons was already known from what happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and thus did not seem so novel.)

The most astonishing thing in reality was that Moscow took so long to reveal the secret and used such devious means to make it known to the world. Why the procrastination and the weaseling around? But no one commented much about this aspect of the scandal.

In the United States, the revelation was hardly news. The Pentagon's stockpiling of deadly gases happens to be fairly common knowledge.

Any enterprising camera bug can set up a tripod by a railway line and count on getting photographs of canisters of deadly war gases in transit.

Generally these are obsolete killers like phosgene that have to be cleared out of storage to make place for the modern killers. Huge quantities are sold to manufacturers of plastic; a lot is headed for dumping into the ocean.

The war gases, in fact, may not be the worst ones.

The *Washington Post* reported September 9 that "thousands of often dangerously leaky train and truck loads of poisonous chemicals" far more hazardous than phosgene "are being shipped across the country daily."

These killers include pesticides, some of them "akin to nerve gases. . ."

The source of the *Post's* information was William C. Jennings, a Department of Transportation official, who spoke at a meeting of the American Chemical Society.

Jennings described one leaky trainload that involved just "a moderately bad poison. If it gets on your hands and you don't wash it off, in a couple of hours it will kill you."

Last May his department issued a warning: "From the limited information

we have, we know that hundreds of containers of Class B poison leaked last year. This leads us to believe that thousands of leaks actually occurred during transportation. A substantial number were of the more toxic poisons."

Representative Richard D. McCarthy of New York on September 8 reported a not unusual incident.

Two flatcars of unguarded poison gas were sent by mistake to Buffalo in August. Each of them contained fifteen one-ton tanks of phosgene.

They traveled at a normal freight-car speed of sixty to seventy miles an hour over the sagging rails of the badly deteriorating U.S. railroad system.

They were left unattended in the freight yard for twenty-four hours. During that time a collision of other cars occurred only 150 feet away in which the impact was so great as to knock the body of one freight car off its wheels.

"The phosgene cars narrowly missed getting involved," McCarthy said. "Had they been hit, undoubtedly some of the tanks would have been destroyed."

And then the case of Buffalo would have made headlines.

Like the case of the 7,000 sheep (the kind that are shorn for their wool) that were hit by an ill wind carrying a new experimental gas in Skull Valley, Utah.

A secret Pentagon plan to use poison gas, etc., in the next big war? The KGB didn't need any spies to learn that. They could have asked any man in the street and saved their Moscow gold.

After all, monkeying around with exotic substances has become part of the American Way of Life.

'No Serious Health Hazard'

When a freight train jumped the tracks near Glendora, Mississippi, September 12, sixteen cars jackknifed. Four of them, containing vinyl chloride, caught fire. Under heat, vinyl chloride gives off deadly phosgene gas.

Some 30,000 residents in a 25-square-mile area were evacuated from their homes. Among them was the ultra-reactionary Senator James O. Eastland, who seemed shaken by the incident.

"Death may be riding our railways daily," he said. "Tragedy could be lurking on every train."

However, a spokesman of the Uniroyal Corp., purchaser of the shipment, said the chemical was "not lethal and presents no serious health hazard. . ."

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