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DUVALIER STEPS UP REPRESSION AS SOCIAL TENSION MOUNTS IN HAITI

Haitian dictator François Duvalier has initiated a new wave of repression in an attempt to prevent mounting opposition from coalescing into a social explosion. A communiqué issued by the government June 2 claimed that a battalion of soldiers had attacked a house on Martin Luther King Avenue in Port-au-Prince said to be the headquarters of the Parti Unifié des Communistes Haïtiens [PUCH -- United Haïtian Communist party]. Twenty-two alleged party leaders were killed and two women were captured.

A month earlier some thirty-five "communists" were killed when the army leveled another house in the Haitian capital.

The government claimed that several members of the Central Committee of the PUCH were killed in the June 2 raid. These were said to include Gerald Brisson, Daniel Sansaricq, Gerard Wadestrand, Jacques Jeannot, and Niclerc Casseus.

When the government put the bodies on display June 3, however, there was strong evidence that the victims had not been killed in the raid at all, but had been murdered in prison after being kidnapped by Duvalier's secret police, the Tontons Macoutes.

H.J. Maidenberg, writing from Portau-Prince in the June 13 New York Times, described the recent disappearances of political opponents of Duvalier:

"The latest series of disappearances began May 8, when President François Duvalier, who is commonly known as Papa Doc, was stricken by an undisclosed affliction. In the weeks that followed... scores of Haitians vanished. Many of these were last seen entering a small building near the capital's waterfront --Fort Dimanche (Sunday), a political prison..."

"Those who saw the bodies [of the

"communists" allegedly killed in the June 2 raid] the next day said privately that 20 of them were badly decomposed and were the remains of those who had vanished into Fort Dimanche."

On June 4 a group of Haitian exiles based in Florida used an old four-engine plane to drop a dozen forty-gallon gasoline bombs near the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince. "An undisclosed number of people were...killed or wounded in the ensuing panic," the <u>Times</u> reporter said.

The bombing attack was led, according to the June 10 Le Monde, by Colonel René Léon, a former officer in the Haitian army. Le Monde said that Léon had collaborated with supporters of the former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in attempting to mount a similar attack in January 1967.

There has also been an increase in resistance to the government from the left. A Haitian correspondent of Le Monde described the situation in the June 18 issue of the Paris daily:

"The PUCH has inspired and led the actions of popular armed resistance in Haiti for some time....In February attacks were made on the Tontons Macoutes to take their weapons. On March 6 an armed peasant revolt broke out in Cazale.

"The Duvalier government reacted with the greatest violence against the peasants of Cazale, burning many houses and massacring a large part of the population. The repression today is terrible:

"The prisons are full, and even the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross cannot obtain authorization to visit the political prisoners. And Haitians, above all the youth returning from Europe, are arrested without exception when they arrive at the airport at Port-au-Prince."

THE CLIFFORD PLAN FOR ENDING VIETNAM "ADVENTURE"

Clark M. Clifford's personal account in the July issue of the New York quarterly Foreign Affairs of how he came to evolve from a hawk to a dove created a considerable ripple in Washington.

The former secretary of defense says that he began to change his mind after a tour in the Pacific in 1967 in which he discovered that "the other troopcontributing countries no longer shared our degree of concern about the war in

South Viet Nam."

He became "more conscious each day," too, of the "domestic unrest" in the United States. "Draft card burnings, marches in the streets, problems on school campuses, bitterness and divisiveness were rampant."

In addition, "the will of the enemy" was indomitable. "I was convinced that the military course we were pursuing

was not only endless but hopeless."

The "economic implications of a struggle to be indefinitely continued at ever-increasing cost" were "just as disturbing" to Clifford. "The dollar was already in trouble, prices were escalating far too fast and emergency controls on foreign investment imposed on New Year's Day would be only a prelude to more stringent controls..."

Another consideration was that the original premise for the escalation no longer existed. The countries in Asia that might have gone down like a row of dominoes were much stronger. Particularly heartening was the crushing of the Communist party in Indonesia.

Besides this, the Sino-Soviet conflict weakened "the two communist giants" and lowered the possibility of their "working together to spread disruption throughout the underdeveloped world." And since 1965, "relations between Russia and China have steadily worsened."

China represents no serious immediate danger. "The Cultural Revolution and the depredations of the Red Guards have created in China a situation of internal unrest that presently preoccupies China's military forces. The recent border clashes on the Ussuri River further decrease



Strange metamorphosis from hawk to dove.

the likelihood that China will, in the near future, be able to devote its attention and resources to the export of revolution."

In short, Clifford is of the opinion that the White House should now place a "numerical limit" on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. "A first step would be to inform the South Vietnamese Government that we will withdraw about 100,000 troops before the end of this year. We should also make it clear that this is not an isolated action, but the beginning of a process under which all U.S. ground combat forces will have been withdrawn from Viet Nam by the end of 1970."

Along with this, "orders should be issued to our military commanders to discontinue efforts to apply maximum military pressure on the enemy and to seek instead to reduce the level of combat."

Clifford does not propose pulling out completely. As the staged withdrawal of ground troops occurs, "we would continue to provide the armed forces of the Saigon government with logistic support and with our air resources." The purpose of this would be to strengthen Saigon sufficiently to be able to keep the puppet regime in power.

At his June 19 press conference, President Nixon was visibly irritated over Clifford's article. In reply to a question on the timetable suggested by the former head of the Defense Department, Nixon said: "I would hope that we could beat Mr. Clifford's timetable, just as I think we've done a little better than he did when he was in charge of our national defense."

Since this was a televised conference, the promise had considerable impact on the millions of viewers. The doves in Congress immediately accepted it as a firm commitment they would support.

The White House team went to work at once to get Nixon's foot out of his mouth. The president, they said, had not wavered an iota in his plan to stage only a "carefully phased troop withdrawal" -- carefully phased, that is, to the Paris talks, mutual withdrawals by Hanoi, increased strength of Saigon, and a subsiding of the military conflict.

Nixon's scheme, in short, is the same as Johnson's. Through negotiations, he hopes to win at least a stalemate, with a "solution" comparable to the one in Korea. And that is what Clifford likewise has in mind.

Meanwhile the bloodletting continues -- and the patience of the American people and the people of the entire world grows thinner and thinner.

LATIN DICTATORS WELCOME ROCKEFELLER; UNREST MOUNTS IN URUGUAY

New York's Governor Nelson Rocke-feller arrived in Brazil June 16 on the third of his trips to Latin America on a "fact-finding" mission for President Nixon. This leg of the governor's journey included the military dictatorships in Brazil and Paraguay, and a brief stop in Uruguay where he was forced to avoid the capital, Montevideo, and settle for an excursion to the small, well-guarded beach resort of Punta del Este.

The Costa e Silva regime in Brazil prepared Rockefeller's welcome by arresting as many as 1,000 political opponents of the dictatorship in an effort to prevent popular demonstrations from being held against the North American emissary. Newspapers were under orders to print only stories favorable to Rockefeller's tour -- even reports of demonstrations in other countries were screened out of the Brazilian press. Armed combat troops escorted the American delegation everywhere. Students succeeded, however, in distributing leaflets denouncing Rockefeller as the "representative of misery, exploitation, and war."

Some 300 students demonstrated in Asunción, Paraguay, June 19, as the governor arrived from Brazil. Despite fierce repression by the Stroessner dictatorship, protests from various quarters greeted the mission. Thirty groups of students, representing faculties of the National and Catholic universities, issued a declaration opposing Rockefeller's visit and blaming the Rockefeller family for its role in initiating the 1935 Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay. A major issue in that war was conflicting oil claims between the Rockefeller-owned Standard Oil Company and the Royal Dutch Shell.

Rockefeller's visit to Uruguay served to deepen the social crisis facing the government of President Jorge Pacheco Areco. A new strike wave began in the country the first week of June. Some 500,000 workers took part in a general strike June 11 called by the Convención Nacional de Trabajadores [CNT -- National Workers Convention] in solidarity with striking meat packers (the total population of Uruguay is three million, one million of whom live in Montevideo).

Workers at Onda, the country's largest bus company, staged a three-day strike June 14-16. On June 16 the municipal employees of Montevideo struck for higher pay. The next day some 220,000 government workers began a two-day strike. Central bank employees staged a twenty-four-hour strike June 18. There have been repeated clashes between meat-packers, supported by the students, and the police.



ROCKEFELLER: Combat troops provide escort.

The June 19 Le Monde reported that the government had closed all secondary schools until the end of the month because "a flu epidemic and the union agitation endanger the public order." The students accused the government of "defusing the popular mobilization against Rockefeller's visit to Uruguay."

On June 19 students occupied some twenty secondary schools. They put up banners saying, "Down with Rockefeller!" The CNT issued a joint call with the Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios [FEU --Federation of University Students] for a general strike June 21, the day of Rockefeller's arrival in Uruguay.

In addition to strikes and mass demonstrations, small groups of activists carried out fire-bombings of various government and industrial buildings. On June 20 a group reportedly dressed as policemen set fire to the main administration building of the General Motors plant in Montevideo, causing damage estimated at \$1 million. The attack was attributed to the clandestine Tupamaros.

Mounted police patrolled the capital June 21 during Rockefeller's brief sojourn at nearby Punta del Este. Widespread demonstrations were reported.

NEW STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN ARGENTINA

A thirty-seven-hour general strike in the Argentinian automotive center of Córdoba June 17-18 was reported 100 percent effective. Even the merchants closed their stores in a massive new demonstration of popular opposition to the military dictatorship of General Juan Carlos Onganía.

The strike in Córdoba had three objectives: to protest against the sentences meted out by military tribunals to the strikers and demonstrators arrested in the city during the nationwide oneday general strike May 30; to honor the workers and demonstrators killed by the police and military during the fighting that erupted in Córdoba during the May 30 strike; and to demand a 40 percent general wage increase

In the evening of the first day of the new strike, thousands of students clashed violently with the police in demonstrations. Two students were wounded when police opened fire on the demonstrators, and sixty were reported arrested. The second day of the strike was marked by a police assault on students who tried to build barricades in one neighborhood of the city. The regime took special precautions to prevent a recurrence of the virtual insurrection that swept Córdoba during the May 29-30 strike.

June 17 was declared a holiday and large numbers of people left Córdoba for the countryside, fearing a repetition of the battles that devastated the city and left an estimated thirty persons dead. On June 16 army rule was established throughout the province of Córdoba. Paratroop commander General Jorge Carcagno was appointed military governor. A massive array of military and police forces were concentrated in the city.

Moreover, in contrast to the brutal repression that ignited the city May 29 and 30, the government's response this time was carefully measured. No attacks on union headquarters or arrests of union officials were reported. During the preceding strike, police shot their way into the automobile union headquarters to arrest local union officials. Many of the arrested officials were sentenced to long prison terms.

In the wake of the latest strike, General Carcagno admitted publicly that "the strike has been a success." He said: "In striking, the workers are exercising a legitimate right." He stressed that "the authorities are prepared for dialogue with the workers and the students."

Demonstrations and clashes were reported in several other Argentinian cities

June 17 and 18. In the city of Tucumán, students from all over the province gathered in front of the national university and declared a twenty-four-hour general strike in solidarity with the workers and students of Córdoba.

In Rosario more than 300 students held an assembly in front of the School of Philosophy. After a rally in which speakers denounced the government's attacks on students, the demonstrators marched through the center of the city to the spot where one of their comrades was shot to death by the police May 17. The authorities did not try to interfere with the demonstration and no violence occurred.

In La Plata, near Buenos Aires, several hundred students built barricades in the streets and stoned the windows of the conservative daily La Prensa.

On June 19 General Ongania announced a cabinet shake-up amid rumors that sections of the armed forces were plotting a new coup in hope of producing a government capable of winning a modicum of popular support.

Le Monde's special correspondent in Buenos Aires described the political speculation in the Argentine capital June 18: "Most observers consider, in any case, that General Ongania is 'doomed' and that the armed forces have already begun the 'countdown.' However, they are said to be divided. One section of the high command is rumored to be ready to accept a provisional government to prepare a return to democracy. Another section, the officers who are usually called 'Nasserites,' want to continue the promised 'revolution' but without Ongania."

Le Monde's correspondent reported that the rumors of an impending coup were increasing the disunity and vacillations of the trade-union bureaucrats, who were said to be bargaining for deals with different sections of the military. However, a combative spirit in the union ranks and the mass of the people appears to be keeping considerable pressure on the union apparatuses to organize militant resistance to the dictatorship.

Following the events in Córdoba, the leaders of the CGT "Rebelde" [the "Rebel" Confederación General de Trabajadores -- General Confederation of Labor], one of the main factions in the Argentinian labor movement, announced that they had definitely decided to call another nationwide general strike June 27. They also announced that they would organize protest demonstrations against Rockefeller's visit scheduled for June 29.

From Czechoslovakia

CZECH UNIONS STIFFEN RESISTANCE AGAINST REGIME

[The following declaration was adopted June 6 by an assembly of elected Czechoslovak union delegates and smuggled out of Czechoslovakia. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

* * *

In view of the fact that the present development of the political situation is coming into sharp conflict with the moral convictions of the overwhelming majority of the working people of our country and thus with the duty of the trade-union organizations to defend the interests of the workers, we appeal urgently to you, our democratically elected officials.

- 1. The independent role of the unions has been attacked in the recent period in the declarations of some leading figures in our public and political life. the ZO [Zavódní Organisace -- Factory Organization] is making it impossible for us to conduct independent [illegible]. Our will and our trade-union work in the factories are being blocked; our opinions are not considered.
- 2. We see no hope for solving our politically bedeviled economic situation by raising the prices of necessities. To the contrary, we think that the road to solving the problems of our economy lies in a consistent and undistorted implementation of our new economic system. We think that the way to solve our economic problems lies in putting into practice the laws on socialist enterprises and management and on workers' councils, whose implementation is continually delayed.
- 3. We are disturbed by the fact that in a socialist state the Ceskoslovenská Spolecnost pro Lidská Práva [Czechoslovak Society for Human Rights] was dissolved by administrative means. We are disturbed, moreover, that although we signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to this day we have not ratified it. In the present conditions under which we are living, the basic articles of the declaration are not respected. It is a paradoxical fact that we have constantly to struggle for our basic rights.
- 4. We are gravely concerned by the results of the censorship that has been imposed on our union press and in the internal life of our unions. We are opposed to censorship as such. The suspension of several periodicals has exceeded the limits of normalization and marks a regression far back before January 1968.
 - 5. We are opposed to any suppres-

sion of our contacts with the unions of the students, creative workers, and scholars. We consider this a flagrant violation of our rights. We are convinced that precisely these contacts will consolidate the unity between our workers and our intellectuals.

- 6. It astonishes us that the leading union bodies did not protest against the statement by Comrade Strougal on April 21, 1969, about the "so-called autonomy of social and professional organizations." We are not familiar with any "so-called autonomy"; we are familiar only with "so-called leaders."
- 7. We consider it improper that Comrade Polaček* holds two important posts. It is our judgment that Comrade Polaček's membership in the Central Committee of the KSC [Comunistická Strana Ceskoslovenska -- Communist party of Czechoslovakia] represents an improper concentration of authority in his hands and does not promote independent trade-union work.
- 8. We regard rapid holding of elections for our representative bodies as the primary prerequisite for solving our country's economic and social problems. The present provisional officials have no authority to enact important political documents. The only role for these authorities is to assure democratic elections.
- 9. We demand that the Central Committee of the KSC make an analysis of the causes and obstacles which are preventing it from implementing its own resolution and inform the primary organizations of the ROH [Revolucni Odborove Hnuti -- Revolutionary Union Movement] of this.

In conclusion, we stress that we do not intend just to state our positions endlessly. In agreement with our union congresses, we are firmly determined to use all means appropriate to trade-union action to get satisfaction for the just demands of our working people.

[Signed:] The ROH Factory Committees of NHKG [Nová Hut' Klementa Gottwalda -- Klement Gottwald New Metallurgical Factories], Ostrava, Factory No. 3; SONP [Spojené Ocelarny Národní Podnik -- United Steel Works, National Enterprise], Kladno; the Králuv Dvur Iron Works; the May 1 Steel Works in Most; the Cenkov Iron Works; the ZBC in Hradek; the VTZ in Chomutov; the Povrly Metal Foundry; the CKD Casting Factory in Prague.

^{*} Karel Polaček, chairman of the central council of the Czech trade unions. -- I.P.

From the Greek Underground

THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IS MORE ISOLATED THAN EVER

[The following editorial has been taken from the May issue of <u>Ergatike Pale</u> (Workers Struggle), the organ of the Kommounistiko Diethnistiko Komma Tes Hellados (the Internationalist Communist party of Greece), the Greek section of the Fourth International.

[Like all publications critical of the military dictatorship, <u>Ergatike Pale</u> must be published and distributed clandestinely.]

* * *

The military dictatorship in Greece has concluded a second year in the dreary cycle of tyranny which it has imposed on the people since the night of April 21, 1967. The dictatorship's noisy celebrations cannot conceal the fact that today it is still more isolated than at the start, still more hated by the people. And it could not be otherwise.

The entire Greek people are gagged, crushed, and humiliated under the boot of the dictatorship. They are deprived of the most elementary democratic freedoms; they are squeezed dry by taxes and prostrated by superexploitation and superoppression.

Thousands of militants continue to rot in the concentration camps. Dozens are taken before tribunals every day for sentencing (in most cases to long prison terms). Hundreds every day are dragged into police stations and the jails of the Asphalia [the secret police], where the intimidations and tortures practiced have surpassed all precedents in Greek history.

Big capital, both native and foreign, is rubbing its hands in glee over the ideal conditions for exploiting the labor power and resources of the country which the dictatorship has assured it. The officer caste is enjoying the fruits of power with its characteristic greed.

In contrast, the living conditions of the workers, peasants, and broad toiling masses are becoming ever more tragic. Unemployment is assuming major proportions. The numbers of people emigrating in search of work increased by about 20 percent in 1968 with respect to 1967.

The youth graduating from high school are hard hit by the lack of opportunities. A typical example is that in a recent competition held by the DEE [Demosia Epikheiresis Elektrismou -- the Public Electric Company] to fill eighty-five of the lowest-level financial and admin-

istrative clerks' jobs, the number of candidates exceeded 8,000.

The cost of living is rising slowly but steadily. Manifold taxes have over-burdened every workingman and above all the professionals and craftworkers. The obscurantism in education has become so oppressive that it arouses the outrage of thinking educators, parents, and highschool and university students.

The anecdotes against the dictatorship, the rumors that are circulating, ineffective as they are as a substitute for mass demonstrations (nonexistent today), nonetheless constitute a barometer of the mute hostility of the broad popular masses toward the dictatorial regime.

Sooner or later and in one way or another, these bottled-up feelings of outrage and hatred among the people will find an outlet for more active expression.

Neither American imperialism (which is determinedly continuing to support the dictatorship, while the State Department officials' "democratic" declarations serve as soporifics for Greek, American, and international "public opinion"), nor native big capital, nor the military caste will be able to prevent the collapse of the dictatorship once the workers and the popular masses move onto the battlefield of class struggle.

The inevitable coming struggles must be developed on the proper foundations, must be correctly oriented. Always incorrigible, the EDA [United Democratic Left] paper Auge [Dawn] and the papers of the two contending factions of the KKE [Kommounistikon Komma Hellados -- Communist party of Greece], both of which are called Rizospastes [Radical], advocate a "Patriotic Front" and the formation of a government "of all parties" which would lead to "national democratic change." That is, they advocate collaboration with those who yesterday were the hangmen of the people, today are their deceivers, and tomorrow again will be the hangmen of the masses. This is a mortal danger.

We call for a socialist solution to the crisis. We call for Committees of Class Antidictatorial Action, a Front of Antidictatorial Class Struggle of the Workers, Peasants, and Students (which would be at once anticapitalist and antiimperialist).

We call for a National Constituent Assembly, and a Government of the Working People Based on Councils.

JOSE REVUELTAS WINS HUNGER STRIKE IN LECUMBERRI PRISON

[The following statement by the well-known Mexican novelist José Revueltas appeared in the June 12 issue of the Mexico City daily El Día. Revueltas, whom the Díaz Ordaz regime charges with being the "intellectual inspirer" of the Mexican student movement, was arrested on October 2, 1968, the day of the massacre of the students and their supporters in Tlatelolco. He has been confined since that time, along with numerous other political prisoners in the Lecumberri preventive prison in Mexico City.

[Revueltas went on a hunger strike June 11 to protest the conditions he describes in the statement below.

[He had barely begun his action when the prison administration conceded to his demand and transferred him to Ward M. The concession could hardly have been granted without the approval of Mexico's supreme authority.]

* * *

On May 8 I appealed officially in writing to General Mario Cedillo Granados, the warden of this preventive prison, to transfer me from Ward I, where I am presently confined, to Ward C, M, or N, where the rest of my companions are being held -- my companions not only in their revolutionary ideas but in this unjust and arbitrary imprisonment. Until now General Cedillo has not even acknowledged receipt of this request.

The reasons which motivated my attempt to end my confinement in Ward I, and which still do, are, moreover, evident. I have the legitimate right to be confined together with those who are accused of the same political crimes as I am and to whom I am bound by ties of ideological solidarity and agreement. Moreover, my imprisonment in Ward I results in a veiled form of solitary confinement. Furthermore, since the time I made my request, new factors have developed which make the isolation in which I have been placed considerably worse. These factors are the following:

1. I am being subjected to constant surveillance and spying which includes intercepting and reading the written materials (of various kinds, literary, ideological, philosophical in character but which can by no means be considered illegitimate) which I exchange, for lack of other means of communication, with my student and teacher companions, particularly in wards M and N. I am not permitted to see them and some of them are colleagues or students of mine. This surveillance is being directed and carried out by the chief of the ward, the prisoner

Juan Lemus, and the head trusty Julio Martinez. Martinez is being tried for the first-degree murder of a young student whom Martinez, as a police patrolman, caught with a container of paint being used to paint a political slogan on a wall. The murderer Martinez shot the student in the back.

- 2. These two trusties, especially Juan Lemus, are maintaining a regime of violence and permanent fear in Ward I, which has already become intolerable for all the prisoners. As an example, with Juan Lemus's authorization, a prisoner charged with manslaughter, Lupercio Bastar Mendoza (in prison for his second time as a result of his duties as a professional gunman in the service of certain politicians), entered the cell of another prisoner, Carlos Bustamante. He beat and kicked Bustamante, who did not dare to make a complaint about this attack or the fact that the malefactor was acting in complicity with the chief of the ward, Juan Lemus.
- 3. Yesterday, in my presence and over my protests, Juan Lemus and Julio Martinez forcibly subdued the prisoner Maximino Diaz, whom they kicked brutally into a cell. There they beat him, seizing and tearing to pieces a letter in which the victim complained to the prison authorities about the arbitrariness and harassment that reign in Ward I, where we are.
- 4. For more than a month, our American compañero Bernard Phillips, who is being tried for purported acts of political violence, has been deprived of his right to visits as well as to confer with his lawyers. The fact that this American youth (eighteen years old) cannot express himself in Spanish makes Bernard Phillip's case still more painful. He is in the same ward as I am.

It is quite understandable why both Bernard Phillips and I find the situation we are being subjected to in Ward I truly intolerable -- quite aside from what it means to be imprisoned and unjustly deprived of liberty.

I accuse and blame for this situation primarily the high government authorities who are responsible for jailing all the political prisoners who are in Lecumberri prison. But I hold directly and immediately responsible the warden of the preventive prison, General Mario Cedillo Granados.

As for the prison authorities' stooges, Juan Lemus (who besides is a helper and confidant of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad [Federal Bureau of

Security], which would seem to clarify the essence of the problem) and Julio Martinez, General Cedillo Granados appointed them as the material executors of the criminal and arbitrary policy to which we are being subjected. I hold him responsible, whether or not he knows the details of this situation, because he is the warden of the prison and he knew of my request to be transferred to another ward. In view of all this, I ask the following:

First: My immediate transfer, as well as that of Bernard Phillips, to any one of the three wards C, M, or N, along with all our belongings and proper respect for the instruments of our work --books, papers, typewriter, etc.

Second: The immediate ouster of the prisoners Juan Lemus and Julio Martinez as chief of the ward and first trusty.

Lacking any other means to press this protest and the demands contained within it, I must resort to the only means a political prisoner in my circumstances has to defend his human dignity and integrity. I declare that I am beginning a hunger strike today, June 11, 2 p.m., in Cell No. 38 in Ward I. By my own decision, I will remain in seclusion there without taking any form of nourishment, except water, until my demands are met.

"Ever Onward Until Victory!"

José Revueltas

THE WITCH-HUNT CONTINUES IN MEXICO

Mexico City

The revolutionary student movement in Mexico City has entered an organizing phase in which it is evaluating its experiences and mapping new actions. This has produced a temporary lull in the struggle. Despite this, however, the government has not let up any in its witch-hunt and is systematically pursuing its repression against all the revolutionary militants who played a prominent role in last year's movement, or who are presumed by the government to have done so.

The following constitutes a mere listing of assaults made by the authorities on the vestiges of individual rights:

1. In February Dr. Fausto Trejo was arrested. He is a teacher at the Instituto Politécnico [Polytechnic Institute] and a leading member of the Coalición Pro-Libertades Democráticas de los Maestros de Enseñanza Media y Superior [High-School and University Teachers Coalition for Democratic Freedoms], an organization which the teachers created to support the student movement. Dr. Trejo was accused, among other things, of having made trips to Cuba, of having attended innumerable meetings in support of democratic freedoms, etc.

In essence the list of Dr. Trejo's supposed crimes can be reduced to the fact that he has been a prominent political figure in the world of the left opposition to the government. His extensive fraternal participation in the student movement made him a dangerous "criminal" in the eyes of the government.

2. Ramón Danzós Palomino was arrested in April as he was traveling to a small village in central Mexico to take part in a meeting in honor of Zapata.

He is a member of the Central Committee of the PCM [Partido Comunista Mexicano --Mexican Communist party] and the leader of the PCM-controlled caucus in the Central Campesina Independiente [Independent Peasant Union]. He played an entirely secondary role in the student movement.

3. Dr. Estrada Villa also had little to do with the student movement. He is a former dissident PPS* deputy. In December 1967 he attended the OLAS conference as a member of the Mexican delegation. In the same year, he split from the PPS and founded the Organización Nacional Revolucionaria (ONAR) [National Revolutionary organization].

Since he was still a deputy, the government did not want to initiate proceedings against him while he was abroad. But when he returned from Havana he was subjected to constant persecution. When his term as deputy was up in December 1967 he had to go into hiding. He remained in hiding through 1968 and did not participate in the student movement.

Later, at the beginning of this year, Dr. Estrada Villa discreetly resumed practicing his profession as a physician and had apparently decided to retire from politics. The ONAR had long since ceased to function. The government, however, paid no attention to Dr. Estrada Villa's intentions and arrested him in April. Among other "crimes," Dr. Estrada Villa is accused of having connections with the guerrillas in the state of Guerrero led by Vázquez Rojas. The fact that Estrada Villa was a deputy from Guerrero is enough evi-

^{*} Partido Popular Socialista -- Socialist People's party headed by the late Vicente Lombardo Toledano, an electoralist formation influenced by the CP. -- $\underline{\text{I.P}}$.

dence of this connection in the mind of the federal prosecutor.

4. On May 9 the bourgeois dailies announced the arrest of the engineer Heberto Castillo. Castillo, a university teacher, was one of the most prominent leaders of the teachers who aligned themselves with the student movement. The government accused him of "being the main instigator and organizer of the student movement."

Thus Castillo joins a long list of "main organizers" of the "student movement," whom he will have as his companions in Lecumberri. The government has included on this list the novelist and revolutionist José Revueltas; the philosopher Elf de Gortari; Fausto Trejo; and the teachers Carlos Sevilla, Nicolás Molina Flores, Martín Dosal; student leaders like José Luis González de Alba, Luis Cervantes Cabeza de Vaca, Gilberto Guevara, Raúl Alvarez, and dozens of others.

Since 1961 Castillo has been a leader of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Movement], which was founded by Lázaro Cárdenas* and his followers under the influence of the Cuban revolution Among the charges against him are: (1) that he belonged to the previously mentioned Coalición de Maestros; (2) that he headed the Mexican delegation to the Tricontinental Conference in 1966 and to the OLAS Conference in 1967; and (3) that he participated in demonstrations organized by the Consejo Nacional de Huelga [National Strike Council — the leading body of last year's student movement]. Of course, all these charges are in violation of the most elementary constitutional rights.

When Castillo and Dr. de Gortari were called to testify again on June 11, the servile press itself noted that they "were accompanied by thirty policemen armed with Mausers." (El Dia, June 12.) Even the notoriously corrupt Mexican press admitted that the lawyers for the two accused were not informed of the hearing and that therefore the two were forced to testify without benefit of counsel.

5. Finally, in early June, after being held incommunicado two weeks, twelve student, worker, and peasant militants were turned over to the court (which formally charged them). They were charged among other things with inciting to rebellion, conspiracy, sedition, destruction of property, attacking public means of communication, stockpiling arms, and assaulting and murdering government agents.

In addition, two of them were charged with responsibility for the dynamite attacks on the buildings of PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional -- Institutional Revolutionary party -- the government party] and of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México [Labor Confederation of Mexico -- the government-run union federation].

The twelve are: Federico Emery Ulloa, Carlos Medina, Pedro Estrada Vega, Raymundo Aranda, Miguel Bejarano Garcés, Nicolás López Martínez, Alejandro Ortíz Camacho, Ignacio Plata Díaz, José Manuel Irán Téllez, José León Pámenes Gónzales, Mariano Zamorano, and Ernesto Olvera.

According to the "statements" published by the press, which are bound to be full of falsehoods injected by the police and which must be regarded with all due reserve, the group arrested were members of two organizations of the revolutionary left—the Movimiento Marxista Leninista [Marxist-Leninist Movement—an orthodox Maoist group] and the minority of the Liga Comunista Espartaco [Spartacist Communist League—also Maoist but not as unconditional followers of Mao's thought as the first group].

The activity of this group was centered around the Comité Obrero-Popular [The Workers and People's Committee]. This group of prisoners is also accused of collaborating with Genaro Vázquez Rojas, who is leading an armed uprising in the mountains of Guerrero.

Federico Emery Ulloa was a frequent contributor to the popular magazine <u>Porqué?</u> He wrote commentaries on the student movement primarily. Raymundo Aranda was an assistant of the peasant leader Rubén Jaramillo, who along with his pregnant wife and his three sons, was murdered in cold blood in 1962 near his home in Morelos.

But even after they are in Lecumberri, the political prisoners continue to be subjected to humiliating treatment. In a public manifesto published in <u>El Día</u> April 17, fifty prisoners complained of the following outrages, among others:

- 1. Total corruption reigns in Lecumberri despite the fact that it is a "preventive jail," that is, a house of detention for citizens being held for trial and whose guilt has not been proved. The "internees" (the bureaucratic term for "prisoners") are treated worse than the most hardened criminals.
- 2. Insults, indignities, and blows are the customary "treatment" for prisoners. Thus they are plunged into the most abject kind of life.
- 3. Any prisoner who dares protest is threatened by the authorities directly.

^{*} Cárdenas was president of Mexico in the thirties during an upsurge in the anti-imperialist struggle. -- <u>I.P.</u>

Such prisoners are beaten and given the dirtiest jobs. In reality, no one knows what the regulations are governing relations between the prisoners and the authorities, and this leaves the door open for arbitrary rule. The prisoners have no rights.

4. Food is of the worst quality, since the money budgeted for provisions comes to line the pockets of the authorities. For example, the prison menu is supposed to include eggs but the prisoners noted: "We haven't seen any in all the months we have spent in prison." They demanded a public inspection of the food served in the prison.

The prisoners find themselves forced to get food from the outside. But there are no regulations on bringing food into the prison. The guards decide according to whim what kind of food can be brought in.

5. Prisoners are allowed only three visitors every Sunday and sometimes not even that. But the worst thing is that visitors, contrary to the constitution, are subjected to searches and humil-

iating treatment. Women especially are subjected to endless harassments.

Moreover, the prisoners are forced to draw up lists ahead of time of the persons who want to visit them. And copies are made (up to ten!) for the different police forces, who use them to maintain surveillance over the prisoners' friends and relatives, intimidate them and spy on them.

6. Books are not allowed to enter freely. As a result, teachers and students whose professional lives are bound up with culture lose touch with the world of thought, and their intellectual skills deteriorate. This censorship reached the height of the ridiculous when a policeman refused to permit Stendhal's novel The Red and the Black to be brought in, saying that it was subversive. Lenin's works and books dealing with communism are banned on principle.

Finally, the prisoners noted in their manifesto that they had been appealing to speak to the warden since January but that he had refused to grant them an interview.

IF ROCKEFELLER GOES BACK TO MEXICO

When Rockefeller visited Mexico on his Latin-American "fact-finding tour," he was given a royal, red-carpet reception. This was in accordance with the "special relationship" which his bourgeois hosts felt they enjoyed with their masters north of the Rio Grande. Rockefeller responded by assuring his hosts he was "convinced that economic relations between Mexico and the United States would be more dynamic and just in the future."

Two weeks after he left, Washington cut imports of Mexican tomatoes by 40 percent. This meant a loss of \$2,000,-000 to Mexico in the current season.

It is reported that feelings toward Rockefeller have now altered to such a degree among his Mexican valets that if he were to return he would be greeted with a lavish shower of missiles matching the color of the welcoming carpet.

PROGRESS IN RECOGNIZING REALITY

In the new rites for baptism, published June 20 by the Roman Catholic Church, the infant will no longer be asked whether he renounces Satan and all his works.

The question, instead, will be addressed to the parents or godparents, who

will answer in behalf of the infant, as they have previously.

The underlying assumption, apparently, is that in later years the infant will approve the answer given by the sophisticated humans who appreciated his need for a sprinkling of holy water.

TOUCHY DICTATORSHIP

The Turkish writer Ali Nevzat Hatko was sentenced by a criminal court in Istanbul to thirteen months in prison June 14 after being found guilty of outraging national feelings and insulting

the Islamic religion.

His crime was to have translated a book by the Greek author Nikos Kazantzakis entitled Liberty or Death.

A PRE-MAY SITUATION IN ITALY?

By Pierre Gousset

[The following article is translated from the June 14 issue of the Belgian revolutionary socialist weekly <u>La Gauche</u>.]

A New Explosion in Southern Italy

After the explosion in Battipaglia last April, the anger of the southern population has just boiled over again impressively in Caserta in the Naples region. Once again, this explosion had all the features of a virtual local insurrection. The workers occupied the city hall and the center of the city, and battled the police and riot troops furiously. The government was compelled to send a veritable occupation force from outside into the rebellious town.

The cause of the explosion in Caserta must be sought in a lag in the development of jobs, accumulating unemployment, and the very low incomes of agricultural workers, who are employed only part of the year.

La Gauche has already pointed out how mythical was the pretended reconversion of the southern Italian economy on the initiative of the public holding companies (see the article by Ernest Mandel in the May 24 issue). La Gauche cited the statistics on this for one of the main provinces [compartimenti] of southern Italy, Compania. Here are the corresponding figures for the province of Apulia.

- The number of unemployed went from 100,000 in 1951 to 181,000 in 1961, to 214,000 in 1965 and 400,000 in 1968.
- Some 20 percent of the workers in the region are forced to emigrate.
- Some 344,000 agricultural wage earners have an average annual income of 18,500 Belgian francs [US\$362.50] and can get work on the average of only 104 days out of the year.
- Of 890,000 dwellings in the region, 457,000 -- or more than half -- have neither running nor potable water.

In these conditions, it is by no means surprising that explosions of popular anger should occur. On May 23 more than 30,000 workers gathered in Foggia, the capital of the province, to protest against the declining number of jobs. It is certain that the workers will not be satisfied with just demonstrating. Moreover, it must be pointed out that examples of factory occupations are multiplying in secondary industrial centers.



AMENDOLA: Thinks leftism is danger No. 1.

Struggle for Workers Control Begun by the Ranks

In the big northern Italian factories the class struggle, which has been intensifying for more than a year, is taking new and more radical forms. The example of the Pirelli factory in Milan, where the workers changed the tempo of the production lines on their own initiative, has been widely reported abroad. But a no less significant battle has just developed in the FIAT automobile plants in Turin, the biggest industrial complex in Europe. For twenty years no general meetings of personnel have been held inside the FIAT plants. But since April and May a new type of movement has emerged in these plants. This movement originated in the general strike that took place throughout Italy last April 11 in solidarity with the workers killed at Battipaglia.

In the Auxiliaries section of FIAT, an assembly of 1,500 workers was held which listened to a fellow worker explain the reasons for the strike. The management immediately shifted this comrade into another sector where he was isolated.

But the workers in the Auxiliaries fought back. A new general assembly was held in the cafeteria, which demanded the return of the transferred comrade and added a series of demands formulated at the previous meeting.

For the first time, the boss had to permit a transferred comrade to return to his post. The boss gave way in the face of the evident combativity of the workers. The struggle shifted over to the demands that had been formulated. In the Auxiliaries the workers revived the most advanced tradition of the struggles at the beginning of the twenties, electing group and shop delegates. These delegates began to challenge the authority of the foremen and straw bosses in head-on fashion. They did not accept any form of collaboration with the management, considering themselves responsible solely to the workers, who gave them their instructions in general assemblies.

In this way a power, challenging the power of the employer, began to develop from the ranks. The movement in the Auxiliaries department joined in the organization of a staggered strike which successively halted different departments of the factory toward the middle of May.

Public Service Employees in Motion

Simultaneously, the public service workers unleashed a series of spectacular actions which drew layers as "marginal" as the magistrates into the fight! By "work-to-the-rule" strikes, in which they observed all bureaucratic regulations to the letter, customs officials blocked traffic at the frontier posts. Sections of the personnel in education struck. The railway workers carried on a campaign that led to a twenty-four-hour general strike.

The most spectacular of these actions, however, was the postmen's strike. It assumed such proportions that regular mail delivery was halted for several weeks and enormous pileups of letters and packages developed in the central post offices. The big commercial firms began to use special couriers to take their foreign correspondence to the French, Swiss, and Austrian border posts.

The participation of high-ranking functionaries, even magistrates, in this general agitation profoundly disturbed the bourgeoisie. It saw in this -- and

correctly so! -- a disintegration of the bourgeois state, a sign of maturing conditions similar to those which led to the revolutionary explosion of May 1968 in France.

The Crisis of the Center-Left Government

In these circumstances, the centerleft government (a coalition between the Christian Democracy, the United Socialist party of Nenni and Saragat, and the small Republican party) is passing through a grave crisis. It is torn between more and more irreconcilable objectives.

Originally the center-left government, set up six years ago, was intended to strike a major blow against the combativity of the workers by breaking up the united front between the Nenni Socialist party and the CP and by splitting the most militant unions, which were affiliated to the CGIL [Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro -- Italian General Confederation of Labor. The Nenni Socialists and the Communists worked together in this federation]. The purpose of the center-left government was to "reintegrate" a section of the Socialist workers into the bourgeois state and class collaborationism.

At the start, this project seemed to have been crowned with success. The unity in action between the SP and the CP was broken (although there was no trade-union split). The Nenni Socialist party fused with the right-wing Social Democracy of Saragat. It drew a good section of the Socialist cadres into class collaborationism, not only at the national but also at the regional and local levels.

Under the pressure of this drift to the right, the CP, which sought at all cost to maintain its contact with the Nenni apparatus, also began to follow a more and more Social Democratic orientation. When the economic planning program (which involved an incomes policy) came before parliament, the CP leaders abstained from calling any trade-union actions opposing it.

The center-left policy was shaken, however, by a resurgence of mass combativity. This resurgence was sparked by the students and young workers and impelled by the workers in southern Italy and the vanguard groups in the northern Italian factories. In its first six months the revival resulted in two twenty-four-hour general strikes in which more than 15,000,000 workers participated.

The results of the growing combativity of the masses were expressed even in the electoral arena. While the CP held its ground, the PSIUP [Partito Socialista Italiano d'Unità Proletaria -- Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity --

a left Social Democratic formation] achieved significant gains at the expense of the United Socialist party, which was the major loser in the center-left operation from the electoral point of view. Immediately, voices were raised in the United Socialist party for a shift to the left in order to recoup the party's electoral losses.

As for the Christian Democracy, once it saw that the center-left had not succeeded in undermining the class consciousness of the Italian worker vanguard, it was confronted with the following alternative: It could try the same operation again on a broader basis, extending the government bloc to include the CP (which then of course would have the task of "calming" the workers). Or it could return to a more hard-line policy of repression and replace the center-left government with a center-right one.

The Crisis of the Workers Parties

The second possibility is by no means an imaginary one. In Rome, lists of prospective ministers have already been circulating for some time for such a cabinet, which might be headed up by the leader of the right wing of the Christian Democracy, former Minister of the Interior [Mario] Scelba. The government bloc would then of course include the Liberals (a conservative party like the formation in Belgium) but also the right-wing Social Democracy, which, under the leadership of its chief Tanassi, would again split off from the United Socialist party.

In fact, the SP is torn among seven tendencies. A Central Committee plenum called for June 20 is to make a last attempt at conciliation under Nenni's aegis. The right has already set up the machinery for a split. It will certainly not retreat unless the "respectful left" capitulates entirely and, despite the clear left majority, leaves control of the party apparatus in the hands of the right.

The social crisis which has convulsed Italy has not spared the Communist party. It also is deeply divided. Let us say nothing about the Maoist tendencies which broke off from the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano -- Italian Communist party] yet are divided among themselves. Let us say nothing either about the 100 percent supporters of Moscow led by D'Onofrio, who have little influence. The regular party leadership is presently split among four tendencies -- a so-called left, led by Ingrao; a so-called right led by Amendola; a so-called center led by Longo and Berlinguer; and a so-called centerright led by Paietta.

None of these tendencies -- and Ingrao's least of all -- really countenances



LONGO: Has "calm"; will take cabinet post.

any challenging of the bureaucratic centralism governing relations within the apparatus. But while Ingrao and Berlinguer show more sensitivity to militant currents among the masses and are worried that the CP may be outflanked to the left, Amendola and Paletta consider that "leftism" represents the No. 1 danger and that to fight it, the breach between Moscow and the PCI must be repaired.

The tragic side of the Italian situation lies in the fact that while all the objective conditions have coalesced for a mass assault on Italian capitalism, the necessary leadership is lacking. In the absence of a revolutionary leadership that could unify these struggles and focus them on a clear objective — a general strike with the occupation of the factories, the overthrow of capitalism, and the seizure of power — this enormous combative energy threatens to be dissipated without any tangible result.

However, the apparatus of the PCI is much weaker than that of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français -- French Communist party]. It must be anticipated that facing a much more independent Communist vanguard, one able to take the initiative, this apparatus will not have the same capacity as the PCF to canalize a spontaneous explosion like that of May 1968 toward purely reformist objectives, if it should occur.

CUBAN DOCUMENTATION ON FRENCH MAY EVENTS

By Joseph Hansen

The February-March issue of Pensamiento Critico, which has just been received in New York, is a combined number containing 352 pages devoted almost entirely to the single subject of the revolutionary events in France in May-June of last year. It is thus a book-sized issue of the Havana magazine.

At the time, the Cuban press gave little coverage to the big social explosion. This was puzzling to many friends and supporters of the Cuban revolution, leading some of them to conclude that the Fidelista team did not properly appreciate the significance of what had happened. Among critics of the carping variety it was suggested that the Cuban government was displaying an unprincipled concern over economic and diplomatic relations with France and thus had deliberately decided to say nothing.

Whatever the truth may have been, this book certainly represents a most commendable effort to make up for last year's gap in the Cuban press.

It includes a representative selection of the documents of <u>all</u> the groups that played a part in the events, extending from the extreme right to the far left, without missing the center. Moreover there are brief indications of the identity of the tendencies. (These are correct in the main although not always so in detail.)

For example, the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire is described as having been "created in 1966 by members of the Union of Communist Students expelled by this organization for having condemned the support to the candidacy of Mitterrand for president of the republic. Inspired by members of the Trotskyist Fourth International. Supported by Communists in sympathy with the line of the Italian Communist party and of Togliatti. Hence its nickname of 'the Italians.' Supports the Cuban Communist party. Participated in the creation of the CVN (Comité Viet Nam). 'Frankist' tendency in opposition to the 'Lambertists' of the FER."

The FER is described as follows: "The Federation of Revolutionary Students, constituted in April, replaced the Liaison Committee for Revolutionary Students (CLER) which was created in 1961. Trotskyist group linked with the Revolutionary Communist Organization or 'Lambert group.' Published 'Révolte.' The Révolte group formed part of this federation. It is the 'hardest' movement but

holds that violence is useful only when placed in the service of the working class. Consequently it did not participate in the barricades of May 10-11. This gained it repudiation throughout the Latin Quarter."

Similar notes are provided for the "pro-Chinese" Marxist-Leninist Communist Youth, for the <u>Voix Ouvrière</u> group, and for the Movement of the 22nd of March. The Internationalist Communist party is described as the "French section of the Fourth International, founded by Trotsky in 1938."

The most important feature of the issue, however, is the mass of documents made available for the first time to the Cuban public. Presented in chronological order, they make it possible to follow the great debate that took place between all the political tendencies as they sought to judge what was happening, to respond to the events, and to vie for leadership of the newly awakened popular forces.

A Cuban reader can now judge for himself the exact nature of the politics of the Communist party and the movements that began to outflank it from the left.

Another excellent feature is the chronological account of the events provided by the editors to make it easier to relate the documents to the turning points in the immense rise of the class struggle and the efforts of the government to repress it.

In addition to all this, interviews granted at the time by Alain Geismar, Jacques Sauvageot, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and Jean-Paul Sartre are included.

Two short items indicate the view-point of partisans of the capitalist system. These are by André Malraux and Raymond Aron.

In a thirteen-page article, the leading intellectual of the French Communist party, Roger Garaudy, gives his estimate of the overall meaning of the events.

The revolutionary-socialist view on the same subject is presented by Ernest Mandel in a thirty-page article. This is a translation of the article by him that appeared in an English translation in the November-December 1968 issue of the New Left Review.

ALGERIA: THE UNIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE STATE

By Fernand Charlier

The Third Congress of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) [General Union of Algerian Workers] was held in May in the Palais des Conférences Internationales of the Club des Pins in Algiers. All the top figures of the regime were present for the proceedings. The Algerian press covered the meeting extensively. Nonetheless, the sessions took place virtually behind closed doors. For the first time no foreign delegation was invited.

The reason was that the Third Congress was a congress of liquidation for the UGTA as a union independent of the state apparatus. It came after three years of struggle in which the union was progressively forced on the defensive on every point where the union activists thought they could maintain a measure of independence — electing their own leadership, publishing their own press, formulating their own policy, and administering their own organization...

To sum up the antecedents, perhaps too briefly, let us recall that three years ago, on May 21, 1966, the national secretariat of the UGTA had already raised an alarm over government encroachments. It was expressed in a report to the National Executive Commission of the UGTA which painted a striking picture of the difficulties the union was encountering.* The union paper Révolution et Travail [Revolution and Labor] was seized in the same period and reappeared only to be seized again. In 1968 the "FLN [Front de Libération Nationale -- National Liberation Front] party," which is the apparatus led by Kaid Ahmed, the present strong man of the regime, decided to "reorganize" the UGTA. In October 1968 it called a "trade-union conference of cadres" which accepted this reorientation and which the representatives of the local councils and regional council of greater Algiers did not attend. In January 1969 these councils were dissolved.

The simplest way to get a clear understanding of what was at stake in this confrontation between the government and the FLN "party" on one side and the union on the other is to turn to the FLN discussion bulletin "Réorganisation de l'UGTA" [Reorganization of the UGTA]

which was published by the apparatus.*

The bulletin in fact was quite clear. It consisted of a full-scale attack on the UGTA leadership elected at the Second Congress in 1965 and did not mince any words.

"The trade-union leading bodies have been under the influence of elements imbued with <u>out-of-date principles</u> based on a narrow concern with wages and working conditions and <u>class struggle</u>. Some of these elements were inexperienced. Others maintained direct or <u>mental</u> attachments to foreign bodies. They acted in practice as nihilist elements little concerned with the national imperatives and thus failed to gauge the workers' real interests."

(See p. 7. Emphasis added.) And further on the bulletin said: "The bad situation in every respect which prevails within the UGTA requires that hereafter the party take full responsibility in this matter."

The characterization the bulletin gave of the union leadership elected at the Second Congress in March 1965 was extremely harsh:

- "The members of the new leader-ship were chosen on the basis of a compromise which resulted in a heterogeneous team. This essential characteristic, in conjunction with the lack of any organizational program, has since had a very bad effect on the conduct of the new national leadership's activity." (Ibid., p. 34.)
- "The general situation of the trade-union movement can be summed up in one word -- default. Default at all levels of trade-union activity and most of all default by the leading bodies: the National Executive Commission and the Secretariat." (Ibid., p. 38.)
- "'Autonomous republics' have been set up in every organization and the leading role of the FLN has been implicitly challenged. This situation reflects the error committed in the ill-considered choice of the human components [sic] of the National Executive Commission and Secretariat." (Ibid., p. 37.)

What were the deeper reasons for

^{*} See <u>Perspective Mondiale</u>, Vol. 1, No. 5, June 25, 1966; and "Algerian Trade-Union Leaders Take Stock," in <u>World Outlook</u> (the former name of <u>Intercontinental</u> <u>Press</u>), June 17, 1966, p. 27.

^{*} The full title is "Réorganisation de l'UGTA: Projet Analytique du Développement du Syndicalisme en Algérie" [Reorganization of the UGTA: A Proposed Analysis of the Development of Trade-Unionism in Algeria]. It was submitted to the workers and union activists for discussion in 1968.

this hostility? Here too the document is extremely explicit. What the union leadership was primarily blamed for was its "centrism," i.e., ambiguous attitude in refusing to give full and unconditional support to the regime of Colonel Boumedienne. "The resolution adopted in the wake of the event of June 19 [Boumedienne's coup of June 19, 1965] was extremely significant in this regard. Since that time the union leadership's attitude toward the regime has swung back and forth like a pendulum." (Ibid., p. 39.) Following June 19 the union, in fact, did not limit itself to expressing its support of the new chief of state; it also warned against a possible dismantling of the gains in industrial and agricultural self-management.

"The union leaders," the document adds, "have not demonstrated any concern for economic development, failing to consider the question of persuading private national capital to contribute to the phase of creating jobs for the unemployed strata. To the contrary, by their inopportune and untimely declarations, they encouraged the dissipation of this capital in frenzied [sic] consumption and its flight abroad." (Ibid., p. 52.)

In other words, the union frightened "national" capital by its demands.
Furthermore, the union federation failed
to integrate itself within the framework
of a system of self-management more and
more devoid of reality. As the document
put it: "The unions must integrate themselves in this reality of Algerian selfmanagement through an Algerian tradeunion philosophy, that is, a philosophy
freed of all vestiges of the classical
schema of class struggle, which is unsuited to a sector where there is only a
class of producers, the product of whose
labor is destined for the entire people."
(Ibid., p. 56.)

Finally, the document blames the union federation not only for its attitude in regard to the regime, national capital, and the self-managed sector, but also for its attitude toward state capitalism:

- "The creation of national concerns started in 1963. In a newly independent country, the existence of a state sector of the economy makes possible a progressive disengagement from the economic tutelage of the imperialist monopolies. The national concerns which were created with this aim are becoming the instrument of the industrialization policy and the basis for the development of an independent economy organized by the state in the necessary framework of economic planning." (Ibid., p. 60.)
- "It was for this purpose that certain units, the nature of whose eco-

nomic activity corresponded to national economic needs, even if they were by no means profitable from the point of view of capitalist logic, were transformed or amalgamated into national concerns [and removed from self-management]. The UGTA, whose presence was clearly of little importance in the self-managed industrial sector, must now define a trade-union philosophy for these new concerns which represent the state economic sector." (Ibid., p. 59.)

• "It is incomprehensible, to say the least, that these national concerns are in very bad odor in certain circles within the UGTA. This at best peculiar attitude was exhibited a short while ago, in fact, in the middle of 1967." (Ibid., p. 61.)

What is the state's conception of trade unions? In a few words, it conceives of unions as transmission belts. "The National Executive Commission is not an annex of some public place. Its members all claim to be members of the FLN. This requires moral and intellectual probity." (Ibid., p. 39.) "They are first and foremost FLN activists assigned to the tradeunion front and in this capacity they are bound to observe the rules of party and union discipline." (Ibid., p. 40.) "The unions have the duty of engaging in a long campaign of explanation among the workers to combat the virus of denigration which is now being propagated by sterile and destructive criticism." In other words -- and President Boumedienne confirmed this in his speech opening the congress -the task of the unions is to support the government without reservations.

Such a transformation of the union federation into a tool of the government could not of course be carried out by the old leadership. "The human framework and the organizational structures are unsuited for work of rectifying the UGTA....In order to lay the proper [sic] groundwork for the Third National Congress of the UGTA, the organizational framework and structures as well as their human components must be changed....For this, men are needed who are politically committed to the party as the organizing and leading force of the mass organizations and all of Algerian society." (Ibid., p. 106.) "The party has the means and the capacities to achieve this primary objective by mobilizing its energies to help the UGTA hold its congress....This perspective will be attained with men who are politically convinced of the necessity of maintaining the direct link which unites the party and the unions." (Ibid., p. 107.)

The same internal document prepared for the unions by Kaid Ahmed's apparatus also established the plan for the Third Congress, which has since taken place:
"These men will be entrusted with the con-

fidence of the FLN...with the mission of laying the groundwork for the UGTA congress in a national conference of workers' representatives." (Ibid., p. 108.) This conference took place in October 1968 in Algiers according to the plan projected here.

"After ascertaining the National Executive Commission's incapacity to establish suitable conditions for holding a normal congress, the conference will declare that this body's mandate has expired. On the basis of these findings, the conference will consider the party's proposals." (Ibid., p. 109.)

This "groundwork" for the Third Congress could be compared with the brutal intervention by the apparatus of Khider, then general secretary of the FIN, in the preparations for the First Congress of the UGTA in January 1963. And this is not my comparison but that of the document itself. "The First National Congress held in January 1963 made it possible...to clarify the position of the unions with regard to the party in powerMalicious persons tried to spread the idea that the government housebroke the unions, when in fact there was nothing but general confusion and contradictory speeches.... The party had to intervene to prevent a syndicalist deviation which would have had serious consequences. In the conditions of the time, there was no democracy it was bound to respect except that based on revolutionary legitimacy and the higher interest of the nation." (Ibid., p. 27.)

Gangster methods similar to Mohamed Khider's were used to mop up pockets of resistance represented by certain local union councils like those in Algiers or Skikda. The document provided "theoretical" justification for these moves in the following manner:

"In the capitalist economic system, the revolutionary trade-union movement must accord an important place to local union councils." (Ibid., p. 74.) "The local councils fulfilled their mission with honor....To the extent that these bodies are still retained, the role that they can play is one of coordination and of inspiring cooperation among different trade unions. They must now assert themselves as real transmission belts between the leadership and the ranks." (Ibid., p. 75.)

The resolution of the Third Congress reproduced all these directives. It excluded the possibility of any conflict between the unions and the state bodies, subjecting the UGTA to FLN control.

The new general secretary of the UGTA is Abdelkader Benikous, a member of the Fédération de l'Education et de la Culture [Teachers' and Cultural Workers' Federation]. He takes the place of Mouloud Oumeziane, the former secretary.

Oumeziane remains, however, a member of the Executive Commission. Is he there as a representative of the opposition or as a hostage? The future will tell.

THE GHERAO MOVEMENT

By Sharad Jhaveri

Gujarat, India

The spectre of gheraos is once again haunting the minds of industrial-ists here. West Bengal workers are resorting to this novel weapon more and more.

A.K. Jain, president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said at a two-day tripartite state Labor Advisory Board meeting, which opened in Calcutta June 10, that during the past three months there had been more than 160 cases of gheraos. According to him, in a number of cases the gheraos were accompanied by violence and intimidation.

J.M. Parson, president of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said that tea plantations witnessed the worst type of gheraos. (<u>Indian Express</u>, June 11, 1969.)

This meeting, in which employers

and the United Front government of West Bengal talked with representatives of various trade unions, did not reach a consensus on the problem of gheraos.

"Gherao" means virtually a state of siege laid by the workers against the employers in the very premises of the factories. Economic issues are involved in most of the gheraos and the workers resort to this weapon to win immediate redress of grievances.

The significance of gheraos for the development of class consciousness among the workers can be properly assessed only in the light of a class analysis of the labor policy of the Indian bourgeoisie.

They have elaborated an intricate and time-consuming machinery involving a plethora of complex labor and industrial-dispute laws, to settle grievances and

direct the class struggle of the workers into peaceful channels and into closer and closer cooperation with the capitalist state. By law as well as by their endorsement of the Agreement to maintain industrial truce, the trade unions must function within this framework. By its very nature, the machinery engenders bureaucratism, red-tapism, and a special expertise on labor problems that is separated from the workers.

Trade-union activity in India at present demands full-timers who, when they hail from the ranks of the Communist or Socialist parties, tend to be sucked into the apparatus, increasingly pacified, and reduced to the level of business unionism.

Dissatisfied with what happens to their grievances when they are processed through this machinery, the workers are increasingly leaning toward direct action.

Gheraos have several advantages from the standpoint of the class struggle. It is a form of direct action involving many workers as against the petitioning, letter-writing, and parleying carried on by bureaucratic leaders behind the back of the rank and file.

Gheraos leave employers no alternative but to immediately consider long-standing grievances of the workers and to concede to their demands if they want to be released.

Gheraos convince the workers that direct action pays off.

Gheraos often give rise to an immediate confrontation with the bourgeoisie and their state. This can become conspicuous, especially when the police or military intervene in behalf of the employers. This raises the question of the class character of the state and direct action in relation to government power.

Gheraos teach the workers to disregard the norms of bourgeois legality, so assiduously cultivated by both the state and the trade-union apparatus.

Once again West Bengal has proved to be a breeding ground for gheraos. One need not be surprised at this. As admitted by the West Bengal labor minister, there had been no wage revision for a decade in the engineering industry. The jute workers, not without reason, were pressing for wage increases. In the tea industry, most gardens had not properly implemented the wage-board recommendations.

The Supreme Court of India has

ruled gheraos to be illegal, holding that workers who engage in them can be prosecuted under the Indian penal code.

The West Bengal unit of the Indian National Trade Union Congress, the labor organization of the Congress party, the classic party of Indian capitalism, does not support gheraos.

On the other hand, the United Trade Union Congress of the Revolutionary Socialist party, one of the members of the United Front in West Bengal, favors them.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) displays an equivocal attitude toward gheraos. The United Front government of Kerala which is dominated by the CPI(M) proposes to adopt a stern posture against gheraos in Kerala. M. Basavuapunniah, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPI(M), defines the party's attitude toward gheraos in a lead article scheduled for publication in the party's official journal People's Democracy.

He equates gheraos with other forms of struggle such as civil disobedience, satyagraha [Gandhi's passive resistance], picketing, and hunger strikes. But he hastens to add that the CPI(M) will not idealise gheraos as a miracle weapon to fight working-class battles. He admits that the gherao weapon is not used by the working class as confidently and frequently under the Congress government as under the United Front government in either West Bengal or Kerala. He attributes this to the prolabor policy of these two governments. But it can also be taken as a sign of dissatisfaction with the vacillating policy which these governments display toward labor.

The CPI(M) leader disapproves of the capitalist campaign against the workers' right to resort to gheraos. But he expresses his concern over a gherao in essential services.

The Naxalites, the so-called true Maoists, do not seem so far to have elaborated their stand on the problem of gheraos. This omission is not surprising, since in general the Naxalites have no programme worthy of the name for proletarian struggles in the cities.

In their obsession with the peasantry and encircling the cities from the villages, in their rash, adventurist, isolated, and in essence terrorist acts, they have momentarily forgotten the gheraos.

In view of the extremely volatile economic situation in India, and particularly with a professedly prolabor regime holding office in West Bengal, the incidence of gheraos is likely to increase in the near future in West Bengal.

THIRD COMMUNIST PARTY FAILS TO UNITE INDIA'S "NAXALITES"

The announcement of the formation of a third Maoist Communist party in Calcutta on May Day has apparently not succeeded in uniting the numerous Maoist groups in India. The Maoists are known collectively as "Naxalites" after the peasant revolt in Naxalbari, Darjeeling district, in West Bengal in the spring of 1967. At that time the Maoists split from the Communist party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] to form their own organizations. (The CPI(M)) had described itself as Maoist when it broke from the pro-Moscow Communist party of India [CPI] in 1964, but has since become critical of Peking.)

The new party, called the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(M-L)], was reportedly founded at a secret congress in West Bengal April 22. Its existence was first made public at a May Day rally in Calcutta by Kanu Sanyal, a Naxalite peasant leader who had recently been released from prison. The general secretary of the party is Charu Mazumdar, the best-known Indian Maoist theoretician.

The nucleus of the new party was established a year and a half ago when the All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries was established. This organization called the April 22 meeting.

The CPI(M-L) professes an orthodox Maoist line. The May 6 Calcutta Statesman quoted the CPI(M-L)'s founding declaration: The "basic task" of the Indian revolutionary movement, the party said, "is to liberate the rural areas through revolutionary armed agrarian revolution and encircle the cities and, finally, to liberate the cities and thus complete the revolution throughout the country." This perspective of a rural agrarian revolt, the party said, is the "principal task of the People's Democratic Revolution, under the banner of the thought of Chairman Mao."

The CPI(M-L) listed the enemies of the revolution as follows: "U.S. imperialism, Soviet social imperialism, the comprador-bureaucrat big bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords." In placing the Kremlin bureaucracy of the Soviet workers state on the same plane as American imperialism and in making no mention of the capitalist class as a whole (because of the perspective of an alliance with the socalled national bourgeoisie), the Naxalites were clearly hewing to the Maoist schema.

Nevertheless, significant groups of professed Maoists refused to join the new party. The three centers of strength of the Naxalites are West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala, although they have

some following in Bihar, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. The main Naxalite organizations in both Andhra Pradesh and Kerala have thus far kept their distance from the CPI(M-L).

The Andhra Pradesh Maoists are perhaps the largest of any of the Naxalite groups in India. The majority of the Andhra Maoists are led by Nagi Reddy, an expelled leader of the CPI(M). The May 8 Calcutta Statesman said that Reddy took some 9,000 of the 16,000 CPI(M) members in the state with him into the Maoist fold. The All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries had reportedly criticized Reddy for not fully supporting the revolt of Girijan tribesmen in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh. A group estimated by the bourgeois press at about 1,500 split with Reddy on this issue.

Another reported difference is the CPI(M-L)'s insistence on boycotting all elections, a position which Reddy has not shared. Reddy formed a statewide party earlier this year called the Revolutionary Communist party, but there had still been speculation that he would join the West Bengal Maoists in a common party.

He did not take part, however, in the April 22 founding congress of the CPI(M-L). It has been reported that he intends to found an All-India Maoist party in competition with the West Bengal group. The May 11 Calcutta Statesman said:

"The Andhra Pradesh Naxalites, who have so far stayed out of the newly-formed Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) have now produced a secret blueprint for the formation of yet another Maoist party....

"The blueprint which has been circulated among the top-ranking functionaries of the extremist group led by the expelled Marxist leader, Mr Nagi Reddy, is indeed a disturbing document. The immediate programme spelt out in it is not new and faithfully follows the Maoist strategy of starting a revolution in the mountains gradually coming down to the plains, and ending with the encircling of major towns and their capture."

The Kerala group, estimated by the <u>Statesman</u> to have 4,000 members, also stayed out of the CPI(M-L). It has not made any move to fuse with the Andhra Naxalites either.

Even in West Bengal the CPI(M-L) has not succeeded in uniting all the Maoists that split from the CPI(M). The bourgeois press puts the CPI(M-L)'s strength at 4,500. Another tendency, in opposition to the Kanu Sanyal grouping, is organized

in West Bengal under the leadership of Parimal Das Gupta, a member of the All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries.

The May 8 Statesman reported that Das Gupta claims that among those who were members of the Coordination Committee when it was first set up, six supported his group, three had become inactive, while only four joined the CPI(M-L).

Das Gupta presents himself as the purest of all the Maoists. The May 8 Statesman described Das Gupta's criticisms of the CPI(M-L):

"Since the formation of the CPI(M-L), this group of Naxalites have sought
to clearly demarcate their theoretical position from that of the new party. They
feel that in the Indian context, the CPI(M-L) policies will gradually take the
party along the path followed by the Cuban leader, Che Guevara, and not along
the course set by China's Mao. This will
have disastrous consequences.

"They do not approve of the CPI-(M-L)'s professed policy of complete negation of trade unions and other class organizations. Nor do they believe the leaders of the Communist Party of China do so, though they supported the Naxalite line, and the CPI(M-L) continues to swear by Mao. In the CPI(M-L)'s policies, therefore, they see serious deviations from Mao's principles and believe that these departures could have occurred only because of the induction of petit bourgeois elements into the movement.

"Their group wants, under the circumstances, to fight out these deviationists and re-establish Maoist principles."

Das Gupta has no immediate plans to found a fourth (or is it a fifth?) Communist party in India:

"They will prefer to maintain the old platform of the Coordination Committee for the time being and until the political and other relevant issues become crystal clear through debates..."

The CPI(M-L) has announced that it will hold its first full congress in October.

THE SUDAN -- BETWEEN NASSERISM AND SOCIALISM

By Nathan Weinstock

[The following article has been translated by <u>Intercontinental Press</u> from the June 14 issue of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist weekly <u>La Gauche</u>.]

* * *

It is still difficult to determine the exact nature of the coup d'etat which just overturned the Khartoum government.* Of course, the new leaders have issued all kinds of declarations concerning their intention to establish a "Democratic Republic," of taking "the road to freedom and socialism," and of joining the "progressive revolutionary forces." But it is well known that there is hardly a region in the Arab world where a government can dispense with professing faith in anti-imperialism and socialism.

* A group of middle-ranking officers headed by Col. Jaafar Muhammed al-Nimeiry ousted the regime of Premier Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub early in the morning of May 25. Col. al-Nimeiry set up a Revolutionary Command Council, becoming a major general as its head. He was also named minister of defense. Abubakr Awadallah, a former chief justice who was in opposition to the regime, was named premier and foreign minister. -- I.P.

What appears probable is that the seizure of power by the officers is another of the many overturns of structures in the Arab world to be ascribed to the repercussions of the developing Palestinian revolution.

It is to be noted in this regard that the junta proclaimed its adherence to Arab nationalism whereas politics in Sudan has been dominated up to now by political formations connected to the religious sects, more precisely to the descendants of the Mahdi (Umma party) and the Khatmiya (National Unionist party). The turn in the Sudanese political arena thus signifies an alignment favoring radical nationalism. As for the rest, the slogan of "Sudanese socialism" obviously echoes Cairo's "Arab socialism."

The foundering of the Sudanese regime was not unexpected. Brought to power in 1964 by an impressive popular insurrection marked by the political awakening of the students and the laboring masses, the Mahgoub government proved incapable of solving the country's economic and social problems, stemming the corruption, and, in particular, putting an end to the insurrection of the population of the South against the Arab majority.

The first measures announced by the

new governmental team are remindful in various ways of the beginning of the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the regime of General Kassem in Iraq.

The military nature of the putsch, the immediate naming of fourteen officers to key posts, the dissolving of political parties, the death penalty for strikers — all resemble the first steps taken by the Egyptian "Free Officers."

On the other hand, the collaboration of the powerful Sudanese Communist party (the main force in the 1964 uprising) with the new regime -- at least three members of the cabinet belong to the CP -- suggest comparison with the Iraqi regime of 1958. Like the late General Kassem, the new head of the government, Awadallah, is able to maintain himself thanks only to the support of the unions and the Communists.

It is to be feared that the Communist party will rapidly become a hostage in the hands of the nationalist officers, who will then get rid of it when they have consolidated a regime of the Nasser

type. One recalls in particular the massaacre of the Communists by the Ba'athist militia in Iraq.

The Sudanese Communists would be well-advised to also recall the arrests of hundreds of their cadres and of left-wing trade unionists in their own country in January 1967 under pretext of "military sedition." The bourgeoisie know how to rid themselves of their proletarian allies after the chestnuts have been raked from the fire.

For the moment, in face of the threat of a counterrevolution inspired by the traditional religious forces, the officers can hardly do without a labor base. But it can be predicted that unless they quickly put an end to the repression of the movements for autonomy of the South, the new masters of the Sudan will be caught in a hopeless war like the regime in Iraq in its persecution of the Kurds.

The Sudanese Communists must boldly advance a <u>class program</u> in order to overcome these difficulties and to mobilize for the socialist revolution.

THE NEW YORK PRIMARY -- A SWING TO THE RIGHT?

The defeat of New York's liberal Republican Mayor John Lindsay in the June 17 primary elections was taken by many observers as new proof of a strong rightward drift in American politics. The victors, who will face Lindsay in the final election in November, were the most right-wing of the choices on the ballot: John J. Marchi for the Republicans and Mario A. Procaccino for the Democrats.

There were many reasons for the vote, however. For the mass of workers, who see the conditions of city life steadily deteriorating, there is little to choose between a capitalist liberal like Lindsay and his right-wing opponents.

It is true that there is a political polarization as a result of the rising struggle for black liberation, growing antiwar sentiment, and the youth radicalization. A large portion of the youth, however, cannot vote. The traditionally high rate of abstentions in American elections is symptomatic of widespread disbelief in the efficacy of the electoral process. Hence elections are weighted in favor of the more conservative sectors of the population (in the New York primary only 35 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots June 17). The key factor is that there is no organized right-wing social movement of any size. The real social change taking place is still the massive radicalization of a new generation -- outside of the electoral process.



LINDSAY: No answer to the problem.

KEY PROBLEM FOR MAO -- "BUILDING THE NEW PARTY"

Roderick Macfarquhar, writing in the May 9 issue of the liberal New Statesmen, published in London, pays tribute to Mao Tsetung's "impressive" success in the Cultural Revolution as registered at the recent Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist party.

"He has almost wiped out the old party leadership, whose commitment to revolution he no longer trusted," says Macfarquhar. "Only one third of the old politburo members retain their seats on the new one: less than a quarter of the old central committee survives and those 40-odd members are swamped in the greatly enlarged, 279-man new body. Even if there were no ideological reasons for the purge, so considerable an infusion of new blood could be justified by the need to invigorate the party machine. To this end, the congress also passed a new constitution whose basic effect will be to destroy the old, highly bureaucratised apparat, modelled on the Soviet Communist Party, which Mao defeated."

Macfarquhar believes that "the regime will continue to emphasise ideological training in Maoism and to revolutionise the educational system."

He does not think a "full-scale new leap forward" will be attempted. "Actually economics is barely mentioned in Lin's report, a confirmation that politics still takes command. This is also reflected in the presence of only one experienced economic administrator (other than Chou En-lai) in the new politburo, compared with five in the old."

Macfarquhar wonders at the absence of anything in Lin's report concerning the problems to be faced in reconstituting the Chinese Communist party.

"More strangely," he writes, "Lin Piao also paid scant attention to what

must surely now be the order of the day -- building the new party. The importance of this operation is underlined by the emergence of the military as the major grouping in the new central committee --41 per cent as compared with the 14 per cent for 'reformed' party officials, ll per cent for surviving government of-ficials and a possible 28 per cent for cultural revolutionaries. This preponderance of soldiers in the central committee may mean little in practice since that body is, probably deliberately, too large to be effective. But almost half the military members are delegates from the provincial revolutionary committees, where they are probably the effective adminis-trators: and they have ensured that they outnumber on the central committee each of the other two groups of provincial delegates, the reformed cadres and the cultural revolutionaries."

At the provincial level, it "will take much time and tactical skill to reassert true party leadership," Macfarquhar continues. However, "Mao has dug himself securely in at the centre. The ruling politburo standing committee contains himself, Lin Piao, Premier Chou Enlai, Mao's long-time political secretary and confidant Ch'en Po-ta, and K'ang Sheng, a party official who is experienced in internal security and who rallied to Mao's banner some years ago. All but Chou could be described as 200-percent cultural revolutionaries. Cultural revolutionaries, including Mesdames Mao and Lin, are not the largest single group in the politburo as a whole: the generals just outnumber them. But all but one of the soldiers have been chosen from the former armies of Lin Piao and those of one of the marshals who has apparently agreed to support him. In this selection may lie the start of an attempt to divide the generals among themselves and so restore the party to the command of the gun."

FLEMISH COMMUNIST YOUTH ATTACK ALAIN KRIVINE AS "THE FRENCHMAN"

[In winding up his campaign in the first round of the French presidential elections, Alain Krivine spoke at two meetings organized by foreign cothinkers, one in England, the other in Belgium. By speaking in these countries, the Trotsky-ist candidate sought to give expression to the internationalist spirit shown by the new generation of French revolutionary youth in the upsurge of May 1968.

[The largest meeting was at the Free University of Brussels May 31, where Krivine spoke to an enthusiastic crowd of

2,000 persons. The French revolutionist's appearance in Belgium, however, was the target of an attack, distinguished for its narrow national chauvinism, by some Flemish Communist youth. Paraphrasing the epithet used by their French counterparts who, at the beginning of the May 1968 upsurge, referred to student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit as "the German," these Belgian "Communists" labeled Krivine as "the Frenchman."

[Below is the text of the article against Krivine, which was published in

Vonk (Spark), the newspaper of the Antwerp Young Communists. It is followed by an open letter in reply from the Executive Committee of the Antwerp section of the Socialistische Jonge Wacht (SJW -- Socialist Young Guard), the Flemish counterpart of the Jeune Garde Socialiste (Socialist Young Guard) who organized the Brussels meeting. The letter is taken from the June 13 issue of Rood, the biweekly organ of the Revolutionaire Socialisten (Revolutionary Socialists), the Flemish section of the Socialist Workers Confederation of Belgium. The translation from Flemish is by Intercontinental Press.]

"Vonk's" Position

Now that the first round of the French elections is over (with an excellent result for the Communist DUCLOS) we want to come back to the Trotskyist "show candidate" Krivine. With all sympathy for the barricade fighters of France, it would be hard to conceive a more arrogant and empty "leader" in our "far left" than this Krivine. The expression "empty phrases" is in itself too inexpressive to describe the nonsense this young man spouted during his "campaign." For one thing, he was the grateful "rat" of the reactionaries who did his bit to nibble away a piece of the massive Communist bloc. Perhaps the SJWers think there isn't enough to do in their own country against the right danger (they were certainly conspicuously absent at Stekene!). So they invited Krivine to Brussels on June 1 to speak at a "mass meeting." The Frenchman Krivine came to Belgium (on election day) to explain how to do it to a hall filled with a chummy gathering of every possible kind of left splinter group.

Come on fellows...

In Reply to "Vonk"

Comrades,

The piece that appeared in your newspaper <u>Vonk</u> on the French elections disgusted us. It disgusted us because it clearly had no intent to inform (because

if it had it would have talked about more than Duclos and Krivine). It did not even make an attempt at discussion (in that case you would not have talked about empty phrases without showing how empty they were and about the anti-Communism of Krivine and the Ligue Communiste without saying what parts of their program were really anti-Communist). The article seemed to be mostly a name-calling attack on Krivine, the Ligue Communiste, and the Socialistische Jonge Wacht (SJW).

Communist organizations have already often been known to show a preference for collaborating with tendencies to their right and demonstrating hostility toward everything on their left. In the recent period we have seen the PCF [Parti Communiste Français -- French Communist party] and Comrade Duclos organize electoral collaboration with the Social Democrat Defferre (but not with Krivine) and counterdemonstrations against Krivine (but not against the reactionaries Poher and Pompidou) -- on which side does the anti-Communism lie?

We could not help but regret that this indiscriminate attack on our tendency revealed the same attitude, coming as it does after your "positive" reaction to the attempts at unity between the Jongsocialisten [Young Socialists — the youth group of the Socialist party] and the youth of the CVP [Christelijke Volkspartij—Christian People's party— the Catholic party] (see Rode Vaan of May 29). Recently we have made regular appeals for collaboration between our organizations, and since we can hardly believe that the spirit of this article reflects the feelings of the majority of your members, it should now be possible to engage in a more serious debate on this question.

As a first step, we suggest jointly organizing a public debate on the meaning of the French presidential elections and their political context. As soon as we have your agreement in principle, we can work out the remaining technical details.

Revolutionary Greetings

The Executive Committee of the Antwerp SJW

STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

According to a report in <u>Le Monde</u> June 18, officials of the police in Zurich, Switzerland, have asked the city authorities to order the removal of clubs as regular equipment of the force.

Under the laws of the canton, a

club is designated an "arm." Thus people who use a club on a victim are open to serious charges.

Recently a Zurich cop was given a seven-day sentence for using violence against a journalist.

From Argentina

FOR A REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS AND PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT

Actively Resist the Dictatorship of the Monopolies

[The following editorial has been translated by <u>Intercontinental Press</u> from the June 11 issue of <u>El Combatiente</u>, the official organ of the Argentinian Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores. The subheadings appear in the original.]

* * *

Prepare the Way of Eliminating the Regime to Establish a Revolutionary Workers and People's Government

Barely maintaining military control after the gigantic popular explosion which shook the dictatorship to its foundation and dealt it a mortal wound, the government of the monopolies is trying to activate all its instruments of repression and deception. It is seeking to disguise these instruments mainly in an effort to regain some of the respect and confidence of the oligarchy and imperialism.

This vain attempt by the dictatorship is centered on stiffening the monstrous anti-Communist laws and on denouncing the biggest popular uprising in the history of the country as caused purely and exclusively by an extremist force organized to create armed rebellion. Ongania's message Wednesday, June 4, set the tone for the chorus of the "free" press, which is in the hands of the most reactionary native and foreign exploiters, when not directly in the hands of the stockholders who function as the government's underwriters.

This reply by Onganía to the heroic awakening of a people whose patience with him is exhausted is the only answer the dictatorship can give today after three years of persistent and continued assaults on the living standard of the workers, on the economy of the country—in the true sense—and on the most elementary rights and liberties of the people.

What the May Days Represented

From May 15 to May 30 the country experienced the most gigantic spontaneous popular explosion in its history. Never before has there been such intense mobilization in the provincial capitals and many other cities, from Salta to Río Negro and from Corrientes to Córdoba, embracing the entire territory of Argentina. Never before have all the popular strata risen to their feet, united by one common feeling of repudiation for a government.

Never before has the conjunction of all these forces and regions produced such a high level of combativity and active resistance with such depth and scope.

No party, no ideology, no program, no nationally or regionally centralized leadership today can claim responsibility for this explosion. Its spontaneity has exceeded every anticipation. It left some people behind and taught others a lesson — especially those bourgeois oppositionists who, in their desire to save the regime from any real popular interference in politics, might try electoralist or golpista* maneuvers to give the government a preventive face-lifting.

The denunciation of subversive planning guided by extremists of the left is no more than a crude trick by the dictatorship, something like an attempt at subtlety by Ongania and his troglodite prosecutors. It draws smiles even from the politicians of the regime.

What really produced the explosion was a slow, continuous accumulation of acts, crimes, sellouts to imperialism, attacks, deceptions, and spoliations by which the dictatorship robbed the workers of their bread, their work and their rights; robbed the students of their universities; and robbed the middle class of their standard of living together with their democratic rights and freedoms. This culminated recently in a decree raising the price of gasoline and transportation, which immediately affected the cost of consumer goods. In this accumulating resentment, the last straw was the murder of a student demonstrator in Corrientes,** but it could have been anything.

The fact is that in the prevailing conditions the mere existence of the dictatorship of the monopolies generated a dynamic of popular resistance, which resulted finally in a feeling of unanimous determination on the part of the majority of the Argentinian people to get rid of this dictatorship once and for all.

This determination, and it alone, has been the cohesive element uniting the hun-

^{*} The practice of palace revolutions.

^{**} The medical student Juan José Cabral was shot to death by police in mid-May in the cafeteria of the Universidad del Nordeste (University of the Northeast) in Corrientes during a demonstration against higher prices for meals. -- <u>I.P</u>.

dreds of thousands of demonstrators who have poured onto the streets, torn up paving stones and built barricades, routed the police and confronted the army, defying its military edicts and its weapons of war. From miguelitos* and stones, the demonstrators escalated to slings, pistols and .22 caliber rifles with which they finally dominated the neighborhoods of Córdoba.

The May Days and Revolutionary Strategy

This spontaneous popular explosion assumed a defensive character from the strategic point of view, although employing offensive tactical means. It revealed an uneven development among the various regions of the country. It made methods of active resistance and armed struggle definitely a part of the political conflict. It lacked a well-defined, centralized leadership, a program, and the aim of taking power. It was based essentially on working-class motives and democratic aspirations in combined form.

This popular explosion had been brewing from the very moment the dictatorship took over the government. It is defensive -- in the strategic sense -- because it occurred as a specific response to the political, social, and economic aggression of the regime and as a product of accumulated discontent. The combined democratic and class motivations extended from problems like unemployment, the cost of living, the wage freeze, and generally worsening economic conditions for the majority of the population to the total denial of democratic rights and guarantees.

The uneven character of this upsurge has been revealed in the backwardness of the masses in the coastal areas, especially greater Buenos Aires, relative to those in the urban centers of the interior. Córdoba especially, with its modern, combative industrial proletariat, has provided the backbone of the mobilizations and the active resistance. The undisputed vanguard role the urban centers of the interior have played has been marked by the highest level of popular participation, political consciousness, and the use of violent methods of struggle going as far as incipient forms of open armed struggle.

The movement developed without a well-defined and centralized leadership. However, as it has proceeded, the CGT of Paseo Colón** and the main student leader-

ships especially have increased their role as mass political leaderships and made possible the emergence in local and embryonic form of new organizational instruments in the heat of the struggle, like the Juntas Coordinadoras [Coordinating Councils] in Tucumán and La Plata or the CGT Unificada [United CGT] in Rosario and Córdoba.

Understanding this characterization requires in fact not only understanding the more important lessons of the May days; it also requires realizing their limitations and arming ourselves theoretically against any illusions regarding the much discussed themes of spontaneous action by the masses, mass insurrection as a possible road to power. And it requires arming ourselves theoretically against the grandiloquent escapism which, under the pretext of pure armed struggle, ignores and underestimates mass mobilizations or considers them as a separate and walled-off aspect of the process of creating a revolutionary army.

Obviously, even if the May explosion had had a conscious insurrectional character and resulted in a conscious attempt to seize power, its real possibilities would have inevitably been limited by the lack of a party -- a leadership, organization, and program. Its possibilities would have been limited by the lack also of a revolutionary army capable of militarily defeating the capitalist army, the last resort of the system, in an all-out confrontation.

It is such a revolutionary army that will make possible a seizure of power and which unfortunately did not exist in Córdoba. We must not wait to build this army, as the promoters of spontanéism claim, until the masses go onto the street in an upsurge producing new insurrectional explosions. This army must be constructed on a steady day-to-day basis, even during periods when the class struggle is quiet. This task does not permit improvisations. Through this army, and with it, the inspiration of the barricades could support popular organizations emerging from the insurrectional process to challenge capitalist power.

of Labor) is split into two competing organizations. The more independent faction, usually referred to as the CGT "Rebelde" (the "Rebel" CGT), is led by Raimundo Ongaro. It is also called the CGT de los Argentinos (the CGT of the Argentinians) or the CGT of the Paseo Colón for the street where its offices are located. The other faction is usually referred to as the CGT "Participacionista" [the Participationist CGT]. It is also called the CGT of Azopardo, the CGT of Vandor, or the CGT de la República Argentina (the CGT of the Republic of Argentina). It is divided into several tendencies. — I.P.

^{*} Bent nails thrown in the streets to puncture the tires of government automobiles. -- I.P.

^{**} The Argentinian CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo -- General Confederation

But it would be criminal to wait for such an army to be "constructed" to promote the development of popular mobilizations and to intervene in them. On the contrary, it is necessary to accompany and orient the masses in their living, real, and concrete experience.

One mobilization is more educational than a hundred programs and, in the last analysis, to be built and to be really the army of the people, the revolutionary army must emerge from the people's struggles and nourish itself from them -- even though a revolutionary army has its own organizational and technical operational forms which are distinct from those which the people spontaneously adopt.

Revolutionists must, then, patiently explain this conception of the seizure of power to the new vanguard of the whole people which participated in the resistance in the May days and even took up arms. This vanguard will understand this concept better than anyone, because it is easier to arrive at an understanding of the necessity of a party and a revolutionary army starting from the level reached in a mobilization and from the technique learned in an armed detachment than from revolutionary periodicals or propaganda leaflets, no matter how clear or well written they may be.

A New Stage Opened in May

Once the strategic perspective for the seizure of power is clarified, which the May days proved correct, it is important to stress the fact that these days opened a new stage. They opened a new stage in the relationship among the classes and in their relationship to the dictatorship which imposes new tasks, new organizational forms, and new methods.

This change has been produced by the incorporation of the people en masse into the militant opposition to the dictatorship. This popular opposition was unshakably consolidated with the general strike of Friday, May 30, which was carried out unanimously by the workers, the students, and the most diverse layers of the middle classes.

This new stage has in turn sealed a definitive breakdown of the unity of the regime, bringing its social, economic, and political contradictions to their climax. The whole political-administrative apparatus of the state has fallen prey to crisis and attrition. No recourse can close the fissures that have opened between the dictatorship and the exploiting sectors today without provoking new fissures and splits. No measure can satisfy one sector without exasperating another. And in turn no exploiter is in a position to achieve his own "solution" at the ex-

pense of all the others.

The paradoxical base of support for the dictatorship is the incapacity of the capitalist system to replace it, since the system has been definitively discredited. In fact, the sectors of the oligarchy that are infuriated by the government's incompetence now have no other recourse but to tolerate it for the time being. They have to tolerate it in view of a greater danger threatening the system — the danger of a violent irruption of the masses into the political arena.

It is possible, therefore, that the solution of a coup d'etat, never as "justifiable" as it is now, is considered a suicidal tactic even by its prospective leaders. In fact, only a military adventurist would risk bringing tanks into the streets now when they might be commandeered by unsuspected demonstrators for their own use.

This is what the vaunted stability of the regime has been reduced to. This is why we say that with the entry of the popular masses into the struggle, the stage that opened in the May days was the stage of preparation for a revolutionary overthrow of the dictatorship.

It is not important that this stage still lacks a program and that the masses in their thinking still lack the clear aim of taking power. The dynamic of its spontaneity has not yet created this product of revolutionary consciousness which will go hand in hand inseparably with the understanding of the necessity for a revolutionary army. And, therefore, it is an inescapable task to raise the banner of a revolutionary workers' and people's government as the only possible solution for preventing the fall of the dictatorship from opening the way for a new flouting of the interests of the workers' class interests and the rights, guarantees, and liberties of the population.

But we cannot attain this revolutionary government and avoid the electoralist or golpista traps of the bourgeois opposition by any other road than the active and militant mobilization of the workers with their own forms of organization arising out of and forged in direct confrontation, and with the methods and techniques which the resistance in Córdoba has put on the order of the day.

The character of any governmental shift to meet the situation that has appeared -- a coup, electoral farce, or change in ministers -- will be determined by how this mobilization matures and develops, or, to the contrary, by the extent that it gives ground and leaves the initiative to the bourgeois leaderships in the government, who want to capitalize on the popular discontent to make alterations

only in the façade of the regime.

Directing our fire on the dictatorship today as the main and immediate enemy does not mean that we must hitch the forces of the workers and the popular masses to the electoral or golpista cart of the bourgeois oppositionists. However, in some particular and concrete episodes in the confrontation with the dictatorship, we may find ourselves fighting together with the Radicales del Pueblo [People's Radicals -- petty-bourgeois liberals]* or the opportunists of the Communist party. The essential thing today is not differentiating ourselves verbally from these forces, indulging in abstract dec-larations of principle on different objectives of class struggle. What is essential is to demonstrate these differences in acts, in methods of struggle, in forms of organization, and in different political and governmental solutions which the masses are in a position to demand as the result of their mobilization. There is no other road for preventing the overthrow of the dictatorship from being accomplished "in bourgeois style."

This is why we said that the present stage is one of preparation for the fall of the dictatorship while we at the same time call for mobilization and active and armed resistance by the people.

for the Revolutionary Defeat of the Dictatorship

It is typical of sectarians and opportunists to look at the great political battles waged by the masses primarily from the strategic viewpoint of how to strengthen their own organizations. Since they take this as their essential objective, it is logical that they make all activity subordinate to "differentiating" themselves from the other currents.

The sects try to keep the disturbing elements of obstinate and generally impure reality from infiltrating into their ranks. The opportunists in turn, resorting to grandiloquent purism and organization exclusivism, try to conceal all their political incongruities and theoretical weaknesses which are submitted to the test of fire in the class struggle.

It is urgent -- because the class struggle in our country today demands it

-- that such erroneous conceptions not frustrate the chances that the existing organizations and mass leaderships, both in the workers movement and the student movement, have for participating in the revolutionary process at this time.

The CGT de los Argentinos [the "Rebel" CGT], although it cannot claim to be the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat, has contributed to this process by consistently applying its May 1 program. As a result of this application of its program and the impetus this section of the CGT has given to the popular mobilizations, the workers movement has achieved "unity in struggle" at the regional level in several places in the interior. This has represented an example and an objective advance whose importance the government has not failed to recognize. The regime has been alert to this development above all because this unity has been achieved in the struggle against the dictatorship and for the purpose of carrying this struggle forward.

In the student movement, on the other hand, organizations like the FUA [Federación Universitaria Argentina --Argentinian Student Federation], which claim the main leadership of the most consistent anti-imperialist struggle, have not yet shown any sign of this "unity in struggle." It is as if the exclusivism of its leadership -- which moreover is threatened with progressive isolation -- exempted it from recognizing other currents and leaderships fighting against the dictatorship. However, FEN [Frente Estudiantil Nacional -- the National Student Front of Peronist coloration], Humanismo [Humanism], and the other groupings in the student movement, if not for their program, at least for their influence and leading role among sectors of the student population, constitute an active and significant factor in the struggle.

This was shown a few days ago when the mass of students, gathered in an assembly in the School of Philosophy and Letters, saw how the major student leaderships transformed what should have been a massive principled expression of a united front against imperialism and the dictatorship into a fight for dominance. The fight had nothing to do with any strategy of impelling and advancing the class struggle through the mobilizations of the student movement. The result was demoralization.

Revolutionists who mire themselves in such wrangling today renounce in practice and in principle their orienting and leading role in the struggles which the workers and the popular masses began in Córdoba.

We are neither sectarians nor opportunists but consistent revolutionists. We will not hide our views. We will dif-

^{*} The old Radical party, the historic liberal party in Argentina, split into two sections, the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (People's Radical Civic Union) and the Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (Intransigent Radical Civic Union). The latter grouping was sponsored by Arturo Frondizi when he was president. -- I.P.

ferentiate ourselves from both sectarians and opportunists by the Leninist and Trotskyist method of common work for common objectives against a common enemy with the aim of advancing the mass mobilizations and transforming "theory" into authentic revolutionary practice.

Therefore, in the work of preparing the way for eliminating the capitalist system, we appeal for active resistance to the dictatorship by all the mass organizations of the student and workers movement -- the CGT de los Argentinos, the CGT of Azopardo, FUA, FEN, Humanismo -- and all the other movements which claim to play a vanguard role. We propose:

1. Regional or national coordination by the workers and student federations in developing and deepening active resistance by the workers, students, and other popular sectors.

- 2. The organization of resistance commando groups, self-defense groups, and armed detachments of activists to protect popular mobilizations from the repressive violence of the regime, organized violence of the people in opposition to the government's violence, and beginning to lay the bases of the future revolutionary army.
- 3. A propaganda campaign aimed at the ranks and the noncommissioned officers of the regime's repressive bodies, the police and the military forces, calling on them to fraternize with the people and not to fire on them.

<u>Down with the Dictatorship of the Monopolies.</u>

No Coup d'Etat or Electoral Farce.

For a Revolutionary Workers and People's Government.

From Argentina

A STUDENT LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS

[The following article is from the June 16 issue of the Buenos Aires revolutionary-socialist weekly <u>La Verdad</u>. Due to the military dictatorship in Argentina, <u>La Verdad</u> is published and circulated clandestinely. The translation is by <u>Intercontinental Press</u>.]

* * *

Finally on Saturday June 7 the Centro de Estudiantes de Filosofia y Letras [Student Association of the School of Philosophy and Letters] held their assembly. They held it at the cost, of course, of excluding two-thirds of the students who had attended the previous week's assembly. From 1,000 students the week before, the attendance was cut down to a little over 300. It was thus an assembly of the activists at which there were about twenty independent students in addition.

The preceding assembly adjourned after three rounds of battling for control, without the various left groups having begun discussion on the plan of action. In the June 7 meeting the activists again rehashed old polemics. Both gatherings reflected the same phenomenon — the crisis of leadership in the association and among most of its "left currents."

The Causes of the Crisis

As we predicted just recently in these pages, a profound process of revivification is now shaking our country, which is finally joining in the broader revolutionary rise being experienced throughout the world.

Concretely, and as we had predicted repeatedly, a stage has opened up in which it is possible immediately to develop great mobilizations and actions led by the workers, students, and popular movement in confrontation with the dictatorship. It has become possible to develop mobilizations and confrontations incorporating ever more forceful methods, as the malaise and the crisis of the bourgeoisie and the government itself worsen.

The student movement anticipated and expressed the present process. It could not fail to reflect the changes involved in entering a qualitatively different stage. And these changes have produced a full-scale revolution in the student movement's slogans, composition, and methods.

As a result of this phenomenon, new and ever more numerous layers of students are mobilizing or getting ready to mobilize. These students constitute the new vanguard which has emerged in the heat of the present process. But this vanguard is radically different from the one that was active in the period of retreat. It has a very low political level and almost no tradition. It is not interested in polemics or program. It wants action. This development is very progressive, because, although these students do not consciously realize it, they are reflecting precisely the best side of the process in progress. Propaganda and discussion must be subordinated to

direct action against the regime and its repressive apparatus.

This being so, the change in the reality requires also a rapid transformation of the methods by which the revolutionary tendencies intervene in this process, trying to develop it toward the ultimate perspective of a workers and popular revolution. The left currents also must overcome their propaganda-circle characteristics and their habit of commenting rather than acting on reality. They must try to develop as a leadership at the head of the mobilizations.

Here in the total incapacity of the left currents to understand this need and to answer it is the root of the crisis the "left" is experiencing. The students are clamoring for a plan of action. And the left groups answer with long pseudoprogrammatic orations which are greeted with prolonged boos and a shout that is being repeated more and more every day: "Enough poetry! What are we going to do?"

It is this complete inability to comprehend what is happening to the masses, which supposedly they should lead, that has led to a loss of respect for the student associations, going in some cases as far as outright rejection of them. It is in the total failure of the present leadership of the FUA [Federación Universitaria Argentina -- Argentinian Student Federation] and the student associations that the explanation must be sought for the increasing strength of the reformist and probourgeois currents. These groups propose a minimum program that is closer to the reality.

While the verbal ultraleftists fulminate against the reformists and the traitors, they are driving the majority of the students into the arms of the right. And, ultimately, while they recite ultrarevolutionary programs, they end up as the tail and the doormat of the bourgeoisie.

These two assemblies in the school of philosophy are lamentable and crystal-clear examples of this situation.

Why the Association Adjourned the Previous Assembly

Their total incapacity to understand which way the new masses are moving, whom they are trying to mobilize, and their still greater incapacity to orient these masses in action -- which is what the masses demand -- has led the ultralefts into holding "these apolitical masses" in contempt. Their incapacity has led tendencies on the ultraleft today,

like the PCR,* or, still better, the ever present ultrarevolutionary sects like Politica Obrera [Workers Politics], into despising the masses, when it has not thrown them plainly and simply into a panic over the necessity of having to face the masses. This is why the PCR activists shout hysterically in the meetings that it does not matter if the masses repudiate them. This is why Politica Obrera in its leaflets laments the presence of these new independent students.

This is why these "left" currents adjourned the previous assembly, because in that assembly too they were going to be repudiated, because their total collapse as a leadership was going to be clearly demonstrated to that assembly. That assembly was going to be won over to the FEN [Frente Estudiantil Nacional -- National Student Front -- Peronist in coloration] or Codovillismo [Codovilla is the leader of the pro-Moscow CP] or something else, but the "left" could never win it over.

That is why the "left" currents preferred to hold their own little assembly, excluding the "conservative" students, that is, the hundreds of newly radicalized students who want action, who want to answer the government's repressive policy with something more forceful than the firebreathing speeches of a few stale ultraleftists, the multitudes of students who shout: "Enough poetry, we want a plan of action."

Thus the second assembly in the school of philosophy was a failure before it got started. It had already defaulted and failed in the task of organizing and leading the students of the school in the struggle against the government and the repression. But that was not all.

The Second Assembly

This assembly, fathered by the impotence of the "left," was to turn out far worse than the lamentable spectacle that might have been expected. The long list of measures proposed in the plan of the FUA, one of those long plans that are put to a vote in assemblies but never put into practice, contained only one central concrete measure -- a call for a national workers' and students' strike, for which the FUA set a date (a series of Fridays). In pursuance of this call it appealed for coordination with the CGT of Ongaro.** But the plan explicitly rejected any appeal to

^{*} A splitoff from the Communist party which has dominated FUA in the recent period. -- <u>I.P.</u>

^{**} The so-called CGT "Rebelde" ("Rebel" CGT), which has assumed a critical posture toward the regime.

the CGT of Vandor* or sending student delegations to the factories, where the Vandor unions operate, to get these union locals to demand that their leaders issue a strike call. The plan rejected this because the Azopardo [another leader of the CGT "Participacionista"] CGT is not antidictatorship. In any case, together with Ongaro, the FUA would call on the workers who follow Vandor to strike without his leadership. But, of course, the FUA would do this by declarations and not by going to the factory gates. They do not agree that groups of students should go to the factories and they will wait until student "columns" can march there.

This assembly had already fallen into a grave sectarian error by excluding student currents like the "nationalists" and a great many other students. But it topped off this error with a much worse one in voting a call for a worker-student strike addressed to about 15 percent of the workers movement and in refusing to appeal to the rest. This would lead, if such a strike actually took place, to total failure and an objective triumph for the government.

This truly tragic action had, however, its picturesque note. The leadership of the student movement is incapable of organizing, mobilizing, and leading the students on its own front. It is practically incapable even of holding a joint meeting. And yet this leadership feels strong enough to call on the workers movement to mobilize behind it, going over the heads of the workers own leaderships, And to top it off, the student leadership thinks that it is strong enough to do this by a mere appeal without any direct activity among the workers. But this is not all.

These superrevolutionists are scandalized at our appeal to intervene in the present process of struggle for democracy and to challenge the bourgeoisie for control of the mobilization. They refuse to raise any democratic slogans corresponding to the situation now opened up by the bourgeoisie's call for a return to constitutional democracy. They refuse to go to the ranks of the workers movement.

But by refusing to take a stand and intervene in this process, while following in the train of the activities and mobilizations orchestrated by Ongaro, these superrevolutionists are objectively abetting the plans of the bourgeois sector which is trying to find a governmental alternative to preserve the interests of their class -- plans in which Ongaro is enlisted. These superrevolutionists are objectively promoting the plans of those who want to resolve the situation "democratically" by a coup d'etat that would return us to fraudulent parliamentary democracy.

Thus as is natural, programs, organizations, and men are tested by deeds, not only by words. In voting on these tasks, the verbal ultrarevolutionaries showed where they really stand -- at the tail of the bourgeois opposition's plans for a palace revolution to restore fraudulent elections.

RAUL CASTRO VERA REPORTED FREED

According to a report from Lima, the Bolivian authorities have freed the student Raúl Castro Vera, who disappeared in Cochabamba while en route from Peru to Argentina for medical treatment.

As reported in Intercontinental

<u>Press</u> June 2 [p. 547], the Bolivian police gave no reason for the arrest.

They may have been misled by the name into thinking that it was another case of a top organizer of guerrilla war paying a visit to Bolivia.

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC ASSIST FOR JOHNSON

Everybody knows how much it costs to move nowadays -- if you can find a place to rent. Bearing this in mind, Congress appropriated \$375,000 to help Lyndon B. Johnson cover his expenses in moving out of the White House. And knowing how hard it is to spend that much money in the six months provided by law, Con-

gress let him have nearly eighteen months.

After the initial shock of leaving the White House, it is reported that Johnson has settled down to life as a simple rancher. No doubt the thoughtful assist in covering costs helped him to make the psychological adjustment.

^{*} The more conservative rival of the CGT "Rebelde." It is usually called the CGT "Participacionista" (Participationist or Collaborationist CGT), although this is also the name of one current within it. The Vandor current specifically is called the "Dialoguistas" (supporters of "dialogue" rather than collaboration with the government). -- I.P.

STUDENTS ARRESTED IN THE CONGO

Eighty-six students were arrested at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration [National Administration School] in Kinshasa June 18 for their part in a student strike that has been in progress since June 4. The Mobutu government, which closed two schools of advanced studies for an indefinite period, said the arrested students would be expelled and prohibited from enrolling in other schools.

SUMMER SCHEDULE

With this issue <u>Intercontinental</u>
<u>Press</u> goes on its summer schedule. We
will publish biweekly in July and
will not publish in August. We will
resume on a weekly basis in September.

One of our issues in July will be a special enlarged number containing the major documents and reports discussed at the World Congress of the Fourth International held in April.

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