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
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## Too Little and Too Late?



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## **Grigorenko's Denunciation of the KGB**

ONGANIA TRIES TO REPRESS ARGENTINE STUDENT-WORKER UPSURGE

By Gerry Foley

In reply to massive demonstrations of popular opposition, the Onganía dictatorship is sharply stepping up the repression in Argentina. Police and military brutality have reached new levels since the general strike that paralyzed the nation May 30.

Special military tribunals have taken over from civilian courts in cases involving opposition to the regime. Hundreds of demonstrators and labor leaders have been arrested and many have already been sentenced to long prison terms in summary military trials.

A sweeping new "anti-Communist" law was decreed June 4. Under the provisions of this act, as cited in the New York Times June 5, "anyone holding an indubitable Communist ideology" can be jailed up to six years. Moreover, these sentences can be increased by one-third, if the court deems that advocacy of such views involved incitement to violence.

Other provisions set penalties for persons having ideological or economic links with any foreign organizations or governments.

In the realm of pure trade-union activity, the law decrees punishment of persons "hindering production, distribution or marketing of consumer goods."

Aside from their severity, these restrictions are so vaguely defined that they might be applied to crush any resistance to the regime of political dictatorship and economic superexploitation that exists in Argentina.

Even defense of persons railroaded under the new law would, in effect, be proscribed, since punishment is to be imposed on all those "publicly supporting" such persons.

A harsh anti-Communist law was already on the books. When the junta seized power in 1966, it barred alleged Communists from teaching, holding government jobs, speaking in public, or working for the communications media.

Even before the confrontation between the popular masses and the dictatorship reached its height May 30-31, Rosario, the country's second largest city, had been put under martial law. The Buenos Aires daily La Nación reported May 28 that military tribunals had already sentenced a number of persons for participating in the protests that swept Rosario May 22 against police brutality and murder.

Miguel Vivas, twenty-four years old, and his wife Alicia del Valle Gorosito, twenty-three years old, received terms of one year and ten months and four months respectively. Pablo Pavich, thirty-three years old, received one year and four months.

On the eve of the May 30 general strike, military tribunals were set up throughout the country and empowered to hand out heavy sentences for a wide range of vaguely defined offenses.

These tribunals have been hard at work since the strike and the demonstrations that accompanied it. The most massive victimizations are taking place in the city of Córdoba, where an estimated 500 persons were arrested in clashes with the repressive forces May 30-31, clashes which some sources report left thirty dead.

The most well-known local leaders sentenced so far are Agustín Tosco, head of the Córdoba light and power union, and Elpidio Torres, the head of the local machinists union. Tosco was given eight years and three months for "intimidating the public and inspiring rebellion." Torres was given four years and eight months for "public instigation and inspiring rebellion."

Le Monde's special correspondent in Argentina reported June 5 that military courts had taken over political cases in the provinces of Mendoza, San Juan, Salta, and Santa Fe:

"Either the civilian courts declare themselves incompetent or they are forced to turn over their dossiers to the military, who have already sentenced eighteen persons to prison terms [in these provinces]."

The Buenos Aires daily Clarín reported June 1 that during the day and night of May 30-31, 103 persons had been arrested in the city of Salta, the capital of the province of the same name; 65 in Santa Fe, the capital of the province of that name; 11 in Bahía Blanca; and 40 student demonstrators in La Plata, the capital of Buenos Aires province.

In the province of Mendoza, the following persons were reported arrested: Luis Eduardo Riveros, Angel Santiago Flores, Humberto Vaneria and Enrique Bernardo Segui, Juan Domingo Citón, Antonio Roberto Porreta, and Francisco Roberto Magis.

On June 1 the government arrested

Raimundo Ongaro, the head of the "rebel" faction of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo -- General Confederation of Labor] for the third time since the development of the latest upsurge. He was released June 6.

The arrest came after Ongaro denounced the regime as "tyrannical and dictatorial." He called for a national day of mourning June 11 for the victims of the repression and for setting a time then for a new general strike. He was charged with "inciting to rebellion and disobedience of laws."

The opposition seems to have coalesced around the unions and the student movement. Le Monde's correspondent wrote June 7 that the traditional political parties had been bypassed:

"In the events of the last two weeks neither the Radicals, nor the Christian Democrats, nor the Peronists, nor the Communists have intervened as such."

It may be expected that the dictatorship will try various tactics to break up the united union front that has formed. This is indicated by its cat-and-mouse game of arresting and releasing Ongaro. But it is probable that it will rely most heavily on repression.

The regime seems unable to offer any major economic concession. The pressure of the worker-student radicalization has made it very difficult for even the most opportunistic union bureaucrats to temporize with the military.

The so-called "participationist" CGT, which was prepared to collaborate with the government, joined the "rebel" CGT in calling the general strike. Conservative leaderships like those of the light and power unions supported the action. The servile "new current of opinion" leaderships in the building trades and textile unions did oppose the strike. But the rank and file of these organizations struck in defiance of their leaders.

In Rosario, where the two rival factions of the CGT have united, the union movement has made militant statements. A communiqué printed in Clarín June 1 declared:

"...our 'poverty towns,' our 'occupied' and 'militarized' fatherland, our children victimized by the forces of repression or struck down by illnesses caused by 'institutionalized' poverty, the total war that has been unleashed against the people -- all these are rooted in the colonial and capitalist system to which this country is subjected....The national strike had nothing to do with 'coup d'etat adventures,' with 'electoral

pacts' or with the 'restoration of pseudo-democratic minorities.' We want to carry through an authentic national and social revolution and no one can stop us -- neither prison nor death. Because they cannot imprison or kill an entire people."

The student-worker front of opposition to the government has won substantial middle-class support. Before the national strike, statements defending the student protesters had come from high Catholic church officials, including Msgr. Juan Carlos Aramburu, the auxiliary bishop of Buenos Aires.

Middle-class support of the struggle against the dictatorship has been shown by small businesses closing their doors in support of the demonstrations and strikes against police excesses that led up to the May 30 national strike.

In Mendoza, the La Franco Andino store, a branch of a nationwide drug chain, was bombed when it remained open. The heightened repression following the strike seems to have further broadened middle-class opposition to the regime.

In Salta a civil judge ordered the release of eleven persons being held for trial before a military tribunal. When the police and military authorities refused to obey his order, he announced that he would charge them with contempt of court.

Indicative of the mood in middle-class circles was the denunciation of the regime voiced by former president Arturo Frondizi. "The popular violence," he declared, "is the response to the violence from above -- ever more inadequate wages, enormous pressure of taxes, the 'denationalization' of the economy, attacks on the university. Therefore, there can be no peace except through ending the violence which the present economic situation engenders. A million and a half students and almost six million wage earners have mobilized."

In face of such widespread opposition, the military may strike out blindly. Even before the current upsurge, the repressive forces in Argentina showed signs of becoming trigger happy.

For example, on December 7, 1968, New York Times correspondent Malcolm Browne reported an incident in Buenos Aires in which police pursued a kitten suspected of having rabies. They used tear gas and submachine guns, killing a bystander in the process.

During the "pacification" of Córdoba, Clarín reported a "lamentable incident" in which an army patrol machine-gunned a police bus, badly wounding seven cops.

## Nixon Makes a Concession

### TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE?

Nixon's announcement June 8 that he was ordering "the immediate redeployment from Vietnam of the divisional equivalent of approximately 25,000 men" was intended for effect on public opinion in the United States.

Nixon gained the White House because a substantial number of voters hoped that unimpressive as he was, still he would have sense enough to draw the conclusion from what happened to Johnson that he had no alternative but to get the United States out of the war in Vietnam and without any procrastination.

Johnson's successor, however, decided to stall for time. He stretched out the "honeymoon" period traditionally accorded newly elected officials as long as possible.

But his "do-nothing" policy amounted in reality to doing nothing about changing the course that had been followed by Johnson. Since the "halt" in bombing of North Vietnam, this meant stepping up the fighting in South Vietnam in order to exert "maximum military pressure" while talking about peace.

Thus the dirty war with its steady bloodletting continued.

Fresh grumbling began to be heard in the United States. In the first week of April, the antiwar movement succeeded in staging demonstrations of mass proportions in key cities from coast to coast. Within the armed forces, opposition to the war became more vocal. A number of congressmen became restive under the rising pressure and started engaging in sallies against the new administration.

Johnson's war was rapidly becoming Nixon's war.

Nixon, it appears, was not overly concerned about this. In fact, from the standpoint of attracting and consolidating the support of the most reactionary circles, there was a certain advantage to be gained from clearly appearing as Johnson's heir in conducting a war "against Communism."

A particularly bloody incident, the assault on Hamburger Hill, precipitated a new round of sharp criticism in Congress and compelled Johnson's heir to shift from his "do-nothing" stance.

His spokesmen sought to parry the outcries over the assault on Hamburger Hill by disclaiming that anything new was involved. Nixon, they said, was only following the course initiated by Johnson.

But this was tantamount to announcing that Johnson's war had become Nixon's war. Some differentiation was required; otherwise Nixon very shortly could become an even more hated target than Johnson.

It had become time to toss a bone to the wolves.

This was done with all the requisite fanfare. In the pattern that never failed to go over big on television when used by Johnson, Nixon flew half way across the Pacific to meet with the puppet president Thieu in a "conference" at Midway Island.

For the benefit of the American audience, Thieu recited his lines about how the "strengthening of the Vietnamese armed forces" has made it "possible for me to inform President Nixon that the armed forces of Vietnam are now able to start the process of the replacement of American forces."

Nixon in the same way recited his script about redeploying 25,000 men "by the end of August."

It was straight corn. Two hours to decide what comes next in the war. Break for lunch. Then "consultation" with advisers. Last item, a "joint communiqué." The planes took off within six hours after landing.

How cut-and-dried the performance was can be judged from the dispatch sent by New York Times correspondent Terence Smith from Saigon two days before. He reported that Thieu's advisers expected "little of consequence" in the communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the Midway meeting. "A draft of the communiqué was being reviewed at the Presidential Palace on Thursday and sources said that it contained nothing startling."

Smith added: "It is taken for granted here that about 50,000 American soldiers will be withdrawn by the end of this year."

This figure was "taken for granted," it should be noted, because the U.S. command in Saigon has held for some time that 50,000 troops could be withdrawn from the force of 540,000 men at their disposal without affecting the military situation at all.

The only surprise at the Midway conference, if surprise it was, was Nixon's conclusion that he could get away with announcing the withdrawal of only half the number which the top brass under the Johnson administration conceded would make no difference.

LATIN AMERICANS LINE UP TO GIVE ROCKEFELLER THE BUM'S RUSH

The government of Chile on June 4 added its voice to the growing chorus asking Governor Nelson Rockefeller to stay home and forget his special "fact-finding mission" for President Nixon in Latin America.

Chile's President Frei, who is as pro-American as they come, made his decision after widespread student demonstrations and the threat of strikes if Rockefeller set foot in the country.

The cancellation brought to three the number of countries that have refused outright to play host to the Rockefeller mission: Peru announced May 23 that the billionaire would not be welcome. This was in reply to Washington's refusal to sell arms to the junta that seized power in October 1968. Venezuela's President Rafael Caldera told the New York governor that he should postpone his visit to a "more propitious moment."

In Bolivia, Rockefeller was not permitted to leave La Paz airport.

Militant student demonstrations greeted the governor in the first countries he visited, particularly Honduras, Colombia, and Ecuador. Some ten students were killed by police during Rockefeller's Latin-American tour.

In Chile, a June 3 Reuters dispatch from Santiago reported:

"The police today used tear gas to break up a crowd of 400 stone-throwing students protesting a forthcoming visit by Governor Rockefeller. First reports indicated that at least seven students had been injured in clashes outside the United States Consulate....

"The Chilean students, on a 24-hour strike, also were protesting the Government's refusal to nationalize the United States-owned Anaconda Company, which accounts for about half of Chile's vital copper production."

The following day more than 1,000 university students clashed with riot police in downtown Santiago for several hours in front of the U.S. and Argentine consulates. Reuters said: "The students gathered near the walled consulate, set several United States flags afire and tried to storm the building. Police units guarding the area intercepted the students with barrages of tear gas while the demonstrators used stones and truncheons."

In face of the demonstrations staged by students and workers, the officials who met with Rockefeller voiced complaints about U.S. neglect of their re-

gimes. The June 3 New York Times said:

"Mr. Rockefeller, during his visits, has heard constant complaints about trade restrictions by the United States on Latin-American exports, high interest rates on development loans and the United States' use of aid money to promote sales of uncompetitive United States goods in Latin America."

There appeared to be some confusion in Washington on how to explain away the widespread anti-American demonstrations in so many Latin-American countries.

At a June 1 news conference in Trinidad, Rockefeller claimed that the demonstrations resulted from a coordinated effort by highly organized and militant forces receiving direction from "inside and outside the hemisphere."

This line proved to be too implausible to promote without inciting ridicule. Galo Plaza, secretary general of the Organization of American States, personally met with Rockefeller June 2 to warn him that popular discontent in Latin America ran very deep and that it was the better part of wisdom not to provoke it by hunting for "conspiracies."

Plaza also put in a bid for a few concessions to Latin-American governments to help stem the unrest. "There is a deep feeling," he said, "throughout Latin America at all levels of society that relations with the United States need a change."

At a press conference in New York June 3, Rockefeller changed his tune. Now he warned against blaming "outside forces" for the demonstrations. "There is strong evidence," he confessed, "that there is some popular support for these demonstrations."

Nixon's entourage refused to go along with this. Secretary of State William P. Rogers told reporters June 5 that student demonstrations in Latin America did not represent "any deep-seated feelings on the part of the public generally ...or on the part of Government officials."

The New York Times did not put much store in Rogers' assurances. "The rising tempo of Latin student and leftist protests had produced more gloom in Administration circles than showed in Mr. Rogers' words," the Times said June 6. "Mr. Rockefeller has had to cancel the three scheduled stopovers and there are growing doubts that he can visit Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil without risk of violent public clashes."

USE OF FORCED LABOR IN DOMINICAN CANE FIELDS AROUSES PROTEST

Santo Domingo

On May 8-9 this country experienced a phenomenon rare in the world even under military dictatorships. Hundreds of men were rounded up in the country's major cities and shipped off to cut cane on the state-owned sugar plantations.

For the most part, these roundups were carried out in the slums of Santo Domingo and other Dominican cities such as San Pedro de Macoris, San Cristóbal, Santiago, Puerto Plata, Moca, San Francisco de Macoris, Salcedo, and Tenares. Men were herded together at machine-gun point by troops and police and threatened with beatings if they refused to go along.

The population of this city was alarmed by the impress gangs' massive and indiscriminate arrests of all who happened to be on the streets as they went through. Señora Antonia Mojica, the mother of two boys shipped off to cut cane, suffered a nervous collapse when the soldiers beat one of her sons with their gun butts.

"Come chop cane or we'll beat your head in," a soldier told Danilo Severino, a machinist, ordering him into a truck used in the roundup in a slum neighborhood of this city. Lino Primitivo Moreno, twenty-three years old and a resident of a slum here, was shot five times when he refused to go along with the roundup squad.

Despite the high rate of unemployment in the Dominican Republic, most Dominicans cannot be induced to work in the cane fields because of the conditions prevailing there. A cane cutter makes .90 pesos [1 peso = US\$1] per ton of cane. A good cane cutter averages only two tons a day or a little more. On top of this the weighers cheat the cutters. Living conditions and sanitation on the plantations are primitive.

Laborers have generally been imported from Haiti. This is a modern-day slave trade. These field workers are "sold" at so much a head. High Dominican army officers are involved in this trade in collusion with the Haitian government. Also involved in the purchase of field hands are two privately owned companies that run sugar plantations -- El Central

Romana, which is American owned, and the Casa Vicini.

These extraordinary practices, however, are now insufficient to meet the labor needs of the sugar industry, and therefore more drastic means have been employed.

The roundups of forced labor drew widespread condemnation. The conservative daily El Caribe protested against them in a front-page editorial: "Today, last night, and all day yesterday, complaints have been received from many persons impressed by troops and police to go to the southern cane fields and do forced labor there cutting cane.

"This clearly totalitarian procedure is in violation of all civilized norms and contrary to the constitution of the republic itself -- which guarantees the right of all to dispose freely of their labor. This practice throws a cloud over the efforts of both civilian and military authorities to find a solution to the problem of the extreme shortage of field laborers.

"This odious practice must cease. It is reminiscent of the grim times that we all thought were behind us, when 'va-grants' were impressed into working for the benefit of privileged interests."

Here El Caribe is referring to the Trujillo era when laborers were also impressed, but not as massively and brazenly as by the Balaguer regime.

"Get the cane cut," El Caribe continued, "but do not violate the constitutional norms in order to do it. This simply cannot be done. It is not only illegal but stupid."

Popular protests forced the government to drop its experiment in forced labor. With typical cynicism, President Balaguer, whom the American imperialists imposed on the Dominican people and continue to prop up,\* disclaimed any knowledge of the affair.

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\* Balaguer was elected in rigged elections after Washington crushed the revolution of April 1965 by massive armed intervention. -- I.P.

SOUTH KOREA'S WAR ON COMMUNISM

A South Korean businessman was arrested in Seoul June 7 on suspicion of violating dictator Park's law banning

praise for "Communists or their causes." It seems he sold watercolors and crayons under the trademark "Picasso Paints."

THE MEANING OF THE FIRST-ROUND VOTE IN FRANCE

By Pierre Frank

Paris

JUNE 2 -- This article will be essentially a commentary on the results of yesterday's presidential election. I will wait until after the runoff election June 15 to examine the political situation in France and its perspectives.

In the first presidential election minus de Gaulle, we were faced with a mode of election introduced by him and designed primarily for his purposes. This type of election has the aspect of a plebiscite. It favors first of all reaction and secondarily incumbents and candidates with a machine behind them, as was well verified yesterday.

In the first place, the fight was primarily between two bourgeois candidates -- Pompidou and Poher -- both of whom got votes from a spectrum ranging from the reactionary and protofascist extreme right to that part of the left composed of the Radicals\* and Socialists. In the runoff election, according to the constitution, the two bourgeois candidates will confront each other.

This result clarifies the meaning of the May 27 referendum. The "no" vote was not a victory by the workers or the so-called left. It was a crafty operation by the capitalists to put in a new, more dynamic figure to replace de Gaulle, whose credit was worn out and who was becoming more and more uncontrollable. In the first round, Pompidou succeeded in garnering 44 percent of the vote, outdistancing Poher by more than 20 percent. As a result, he starts the runoff race with a substantial advantage because it seems quite unlikely that his rival will be able to win the votes of all the other candidates.

What was the reason for this outcome? Right after the referendum, Poher, who had been a champion of the "no" vote, seemed to have a serious chance of edging out Pompidou. But a section of the bourgeois politicians who advocated a "no" vote were frightened by the perspective that the election of Poher would lead in a short time to the dissolution of the National Assembly, which now has a large Gaullist majority, and to the election of a new National Assembly lacking a stable majority. In face of that, they preferred to keep the present assembly, which plays no great political role. And at the same time Pompidou seemed to be more reason-

able than de Gaulle was.

Let us stop here a minute. We will discover after the second round that the likely victory of the "Gaullist" Pompidou will not mean that France has returned to its previous situation with nothing changed but the president. In a Bonapartist regime, you need a Bonaparte. And you are not magically transformed into a Bonaparte just by the miracle of an electoral majority. Let me add another word, however, about Poher. During his campaign preceding the first round election, he turned more toward the right. For the second round, he will try to win the votes of the left.

The most striking result of the June 1 election was the debacle -- and that is not too strong a word -- suffered by the Socialist candidate Defferre. He barely got the 5 percent necessary to recover his deposit. What were the causes of this debacle?

Personally, Defferre is one of a breed of Socialist and Radical politicians, numerous in the South of France, who maintain themselves on a local level with the support of a personal clientele won by petty favors, but who have no serious weight in national politics. He has been in control of the government of Marseilles, France's second largest city, for many years. But yesterday he only placed fourth, after Pompidou, Poher, and even Duclos.

He has grandiose personal ambitions. He tried to get himself nominated in 1965 by undertaking an "American-style" campaign two years earlier. At that time, Guy Mollet openly torpedoed him in the Socialist party. This time the campaign was kicked off precipitously by de Gaulle's resignation.

The start of the campaign came at a bad time for the Socialists, who were in the course of reorganizing, replacing the old SFIO [Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière -- French Section of the Workers (Second) International] with a new party whose potential components showed scant enthusiasm for the projected "renewal."

And in this situation, Defferre forced the party's hand, getting himself nominated in questionable circumstances at a congress whose legitimacy was challenged by many Socialist federations. So Defferre started with a serious handicap among the Socialists themselves. And, far from trying to smooth things over, he largely ignored the party in conducting his campaign (and he got the same consid-

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\* Petty-bourgeois liberals in the French political tradition. -- I.P.



eration in return -- Mollet did not speak once on his behalf). His only partner was Mendès France, who has never had a personal base and in the past has never had any chance except when the bourgeoisie might have need of a "Bonaparte of the left."

Finally, Defferre's constant policy for years has been to extend the following of the Socialist party to the right, to build a "broad federation," encompassing not only the Radicals but even certain Centrist\* figures. His objective has been to reverse the situation that has existed in France since the end of the second world war, that is, the PCF's [Parti Communiste Français -- French Communist party] preponderance over the Socialist party on the electoral front.

All these factors could not help but repel the Socialist voters. One group preferred to vote for Poher in the first round, and the others -- who were far more numerous -- gave their votes to Duclos or to the PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié -- United Socialist party -- left Social Democrats] candidate, Rocard. And that is how such a debacle, almost unprecedented for a Socialist candidate, came about. Defferre is probably finished in the Socialist party. It remains to be seen what a Guy Mollet or a Mitterrand will do to straighten out the situation.

The PCF seemed to emerge as a big winner from the June 1 election, its candidate Jacques Duclos winning 21.4 percent of the vote. For several years now the PCF has considered it a great victory when it has kept its vote at a level only a few percentage points below what it won right after the war. The PCF militants worked very hard, and also more enthusiastically, because this time they were working for a party member and not the candidate of some other party.

Duclos got quite a few votes from Social Democrats who were fed up with Defferre and who could only welcome the PCF's reformism. As these Socialists saw it, there was no chance for Duclos to be elected or even to come in second, and therefore voting for him was only a way of registering a more effective protest vote.

The PSU candidate Rocard got 3.6 percent of the vote. In his postelection statement, Rocard expressed his gratification over his vote relative to that of Defferre, promising that he would do much better next time. Anyone who had any doubts about his parliamentary cretinism should now be enlightened. Certainly, the debacle suffered by Defferre makes the vote won by the PSU appear "honorable"

from an electoral standpoint. But we should reserve judgment on whether the PSU has now begun to take over from the old Socialist party.

During the campaign, Rocard neglected the leftist language that attracts militants standing to the left of the PCF. He even neglected to bring in the other members of the PSU leadership. He waged a personal campaign over radio and television, whose political content was very right wing. He was supported in particular by progressive Christians like the Témoignage Chrétien [Christian Witness] people.

Our comrade Alain Krivine got about 239,000 votes, or a little more than 1 percent.\* This figure was well above what we were expecting (we figured on 100,000 to 200,000 votes). But clearly these votes were by no means the objective of this candidacy and the campaign that was waged. Our aim was to use the provisions of the electoral law -- which the bourgeoisie will now certainly amend -- to wage a revolutionary propaganda campaign based primarily on the May 1968 crisis in order to prepare the way for tomorrow's inevitable battles.

This campaign had an impact that obviously could not be reflected in the voting outcome. Mass meetings were held throughout the provinces and the Paris region. They were well attended not only by youth but also by adult workers. And the impressiveness of the mass meeting in the Palais des Sports in Paris cannot be overemphasized. More than 10,000 persons were present. The spirit of the meeting was such that it reminded Le Monde of the atmosphere of May. Moreover, the campaign enabled the Communist League [Ligue Communiste -- the French section of the Fourth International] to draw new activist forces around itself and to penetrate into cities and regions where it had no contacts before. Nor should it be overlooked that the Communist League demonstrated in action to the young vanguard of today, in which the influence of ultraleftism ought not to be underestimated, that there is no incompatibility between a revolutionary program and participating in elections.

I will end these few notes here. The vote must be examined in greater detail, giving careful consideration to the local and not just the general results. But one last remark should be made.

With May 1968 France entered a situation in which anyone with the slightest understanding knows that great changes

\* Pro-American "modernist" bourgeois moderates. -- I.P.

\* The official final total was 239,104 votes, amounting to 1.05 percent of the 22,898,960 cast. -- I.P.



have taken place with a good many more to come. The political, economic, and social situation is unstable in the highest degree. And, at the same time, with the exception of the case of the Socialist par-

ty, the vote showed considerable stability, differing little from the 1963-65 figures.

It can be seen how deceptive the electoral barometer can be.

#### FRENCH CP CALLS FOR BOYCOTT OF SECOND ROUND OF ELECTIONS

Paris

JUNE 3 -- Yesterday evening the Central Committee of the PCF [French Communist party] decided to call on the voters to abstain in the second round of the presidential election. The PCF's argument is that no matter whether Pompidou or Pöher is elected the same policy will be followed.

This is something of a simplification but it is true that on quite a few important points the future president of the republic and the bourgeois government he heads have no alternatives. Economic, financial, and social problems leave French capitalism less room for maneuver than in the past. Even if by some miracle there were a victory of the very dis-united "left," which the PCF is always urging to unite, this left would inevitably carry out a similar if not identical program -- given its determination not to strike the least blow against the capitalist system.

The PCF's decision to call for abstention was designed to get the party out of an embarrassing dilemma. On the one hand, Moscow and the bureaucratic leaderships in the workers states have made no secret of their sympathy for Pompidou, hoping that despite some campaign statements that were more pro-NATO than in the past he will continue de Gaulle's foreign policy.

On the other hand, the popular masses -- and thus a large part of the Communist electorate -- are profoundly hostile to Pompidou, whom they consider to be de Gaulle's stooge and a continuer of the Gaullist regime. And these voters might be inclined to vote for Pöher in order to block Pompidou.

But the PCF's decision to call for abstention poses a very important politi-

cal problem. When a small revolutionary organization, whose influence in the electoral arena is weak, calls for boycotting elections or a referendum, its aim is primarily to make a propaganda gesture aimed at educating the workers, at showing them the inanity, in specific circumstances, of an election or a referendum and to counterpose methods of revolutionary struggle.

But how can an appeal for abstention be accepted from a party which has hegemony in the working class and which just got 4,800,000 votes on June 1? Right after such a vote, when there is a national election coming up in which millions of workers will want to participate, including the 4,800,000 Communist voters, how can the PCF tell its supporters to stay home or go fishing? If the constitution makes the second round a still more grotesque farce than the first, if it prevents the workers from making their weight felt, could a party which still has the majority of the working class behind it be so devoid of imagination that it could not find ways and means through which the working class could make itself heard on that day?

In reality, the PCF thought that by deciding to call for abstention it could escape the dilemma in which it had been placed. But the fact is it could not evade the logic of the policy of a "peaceful and parliamentary road" which it is following, the parliamentary cretinism it suffers from. Facing a rigged electoral law, a mass party has two alternatives -- to remain passive or to summon the workers to a higher form of struggle than the ballot. The PCF has chosen passivity and inaction.

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\* The official final vote for Duclos was 4,808,285; i.e., 21.27 percent of the total. -- I.P.

#### URUGUAYAN PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS GIVE STRIKEBREAKING POLICE A HOT TIME

Workers and students clashed sharply with police in Montevideo, Uruguay, June 5 after the government sent in troops to operate the struck meat-packing industry. The workers cut down trees to build barricades reinforced with barbed

wire. Groups of students set up impromptu "toll zones" throughout the city and forced well-to-do motorists to contribute to the strike fund. The packinghouse workers had been on strike for more than forty days when the battle occurred.

KRIVINE CALLS FOR MARKING BLANK BALLOTS IN RED

[Before returning to his base at Verdun June 2, Private Second Class Alain Krivine, the Communist League's candidate for president of France, gave a final news conference explaining his position on the second round in the French presidential elections as well as his evaluation of some of the first-round results.

[Krivine called on the other left parties, in particular the Communist party and the PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié -- United Socialist party), to join with the Communist League in campaigning for a blank vote in the second round.

[He suggested that the blank ballots could be marked in red in order to give the government a clear demonstration of the nature of the abstentionist vote. If the other left parties were unwilling to support such a campaign, Krivine indicated that his organization would call for a boycott of the election.

[In analyzing the meaning of the 239,000 votes he had won, Krivine said: "The youth voted for us and we also succeeded in developing a base among the workers. This will be something for the bourgeoisie and the Communist party to contend with."

[Krivine's views on other aspects of the election were reported in the June 4 issue of Le Monde as follows.]

\* \* \*

The first round was a victory for the right. The right has also successfully engineered a personnel turnover in the

government, first by forcing de Gaulle to step down, and then by preparing the way for the probable election of Pompidou two weeks from now. Pompidou is backed by the most dynamic strata of the capitalist class. He offers the bourgeoisie all the advantages of General de Gaulle and none of the disadvantages. Poher is supported by less important, more outmoded and spent forces.

The election marked a crisis for the Social Democracy from which the SFIO [Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière -- French Section of the Workers (Second) International -- the traditional and main party of the French Social Democracy] will not recover. The Social Democracy is split between the partisans of electoral alliances with the Communist party (like Mitterrand) and Pierre Mendès France, who has a longer-term perspective of a center-left government. The PSU is also split. It is divided between followers of Mitterrand, like Michel Rocard, and those who want to give concrete expression to the May movement.

The CP at bottom is responsible for the victory of the right because it has not been able to bring the working-class vote to bear behind a truly communist policy. It got only 5,000,000 votes out of the 10,000,000 workers on strike last year. It is in difficulty, moreover, because it is going to have to explain to its members why a boycott of the second-round election is necessary after attacking us when we boycotted elections in the past. Then it said that revolutionists never boycott elections.

WILSON'S POPULARITY HITS NEW LOW

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson has never been so little liked by the electorate, including members of the Labour party, according to an Opinion Research Centre poll published in the May 25 London Sunday Times.

Since June 1968 the percentage of voters who hold Wilson responsible for "all," "most," or "quite a lot" of the government's failures has risen from 48 to 56 percent. Among Labour voters it has gone from 16 to 28 percent.

Some 68 percent of the voters would like to see an immediate general election, while only 17 percent would prefer to see Wilson continue in office. Some 29 percent supported the Wilson government in a similar poll in November 1967.

The number of persons who say they have "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the ability of the present government to handle problems facing the country has dropped from 32 percent in 1967 to 21 percent in the present poll.

When questioned about Wilson's personal qualities as a leader, participants in the present poll indicated a general decline in those qualities thought of as positive and an increase in those considered negative in comparison with a similar poll taken in June 1968. Persons who regard Wilson as sensible, for example, have declined from 72 percent in June 1968 to 59 percent in May 1969. On the other hand, those viewing the prime minister as "dishonest" have risen from 12 percent to 27 percent in the same period.

WHAT NEXT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

By Pierre Gousset

The April 17 plenum of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party marked a new stage in the capitulation of this party's leaders to the Soviet bureaucracy. The capitulation began when Dubček and his team bowed to the Kremlin diktat immediately following the occupation of their country in August 1968. It continued when, in violation of the promises they made after their return from Moscow in August 1968, these leaders began to turn their fire against the student, intellectual, and trade-union left. Now Dubček has been eliminated. His place has been taken by Husák, who is more disposed to apply repression and to consolidate the power of the bureaucracy than a vacillating Dubček.

The Kremlin's Essential Aim --  
To Demobilize the Czechoslovak Masses

Thus, the Kremlin's strategic line, formulated when the occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) turned into a colossal political defeat for the bureaucracy, is beginning to bear fruit.

Instinctively, the Kremlin understood that the No. 1 danger to the survival of bureaucratic power in the CSSR -- and the No. 1 danger to the rule of the Soviet bureaucracy in the rest of Eastern Europe and the USSR itself -- was the political action of the Czechoslovak masses. This action had to be ended whatever the cost.

The bureaucracy's rule can only be maintained on the basis of a monopoly of political power. Masses of workers, taking an active interest in the administration of their factories, cities, the press, as well as in social and economic problems, and national and international policy, struck at the very roots of bureaucratic rule -- i.e., bureaucratic usurpation of the power which after the overthrow of capitalism should normally be exercised by the mass of workers in the cities and the countryside organized in their councils.

But the Kremlin learned that this growing politicalization of the masses could not be suppressed by a foreign intervention. It was precisely in the aftermath of such an intervention that this process reached its height last August! Therefore, the Kremlin had to provoke a disillusionment and demoralization of the masses to bring about a rapid decline in their independent activity. To achieve this, it had to do the following things:

1. Separate the popular masses

from the leaders elected at the Fourteenth Congress of the party in the midst of the occupation who had regained the confidence of the people.

2. Force the CP leaders themselves to apply by stages the measures restricting workers democracy that Moscow was howling for.

3. Divide the popular masses by breaking the more hesitant sections away from the more dynamic vanguard, playing off the workers against the students, the manual workers against the intellectual workers, etc.

4. Begin repression, which would give the masses the impression that the post-January 1968 orientation was ended and that all further political activity would entail increasing risks.

The Kremlin's strategy had excellent chances of success because it deliberately based itself on the ambivalence that prevailed for an entire stage in the relations between the masses and the Czechoslovak CP leadership.

As a result of the initial resistance to the Kremlin's pressure demonstrated by this leadership in the period from May to the beginning of August 1968, the Czechoslovak masses acquired the illusion that the Dubček-Svoboda-Cerník-Smrkovský team had identified itself with the interests and aspirations of the Czechoslovak workers. In reality, this group represented a wing of the bureaucracy engaged in a risky -- and in the last analysis inept -- balancing act between the masses of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet leaders.

Incapable by education, temperament, and social interests of directing a real popular resistance by the Czechoslovak workers and displaying all the characteristic signs of centrist vacillation, this team was foredoomed to capitulation. But precisely because of the masses' mistaken belief that the leadership had come over to their side, this capitulation threatened to have repercussions on the combativity, dynamism, and political involvement of the Czechoslovak workers.

From the January Mobilizations  
to the April Plenum

For six months the Kremlin seemed to be failing to achieve the successes expected from this maneuver.

The political involvement and consciousness of the masses remained at a

high level.

The demonstrations that developed after the suicide of the student Jan Palach; the embryonic workers control which the typographers exercised over the daily press in January 1969; the discussion at the trade-union congress in March 1969, where the right to strike was officially proclaimed (although the union leaders had by no means committed themselves on this question after August 1968!) and where the government's draft law on workers' codetermination in the factories was severely criticized as too moderate -- these are some of the indicators that point to an absence of demoralization among the broad masses.

Then came the provocation of the "night of the ice hockey game." In Prague, everyone is convinced that this was nothing more than a crude provocation. Three significant facts are cited to back up this opinion: the attack on the Aeroflot offices occurred after the end of a demonstration of several hundred thousand persons which had proceeded in an entirely peaceful manner. As if by chance, the police, who since August had normally guarded the Aeroflot offices, had disappeared that night. Aeroflot's files had been removed the night before the attack.

Whatever the truth may be, the provocation provided Marshal Grechko with a pretext for tightening the screws on the leading team of the Czechoslovak CP and for exacting a new capitulation. This team was already far enough removed from the people so that it could no longer dream of appealing for passive resistance as in August 1968.

Confronted with a clear ultimatum -- "Carry out the repression yourselves or we intervene with our tanks" -- these leaders chose the first alternative. In the Presidium the majority shifted, primarily it seems as a result of a change in attitude by Premier Cernik. A Central Committee plenum was called, where the majority was overwhelmingly reversed. Husak was put in Dubcek's place.

The apologists for the Kremlin are doing their utmost everywhere to maintain that this change does not at all represent a new interference by the Soviet bureaucracy in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak CP and the CSSR. Some of the Western observers and journalists are echoing them, saying that no marked change, certainly no qualitative change, has occurred in the CSSR since Husak was elected to the post of first secretary of the CC of the Czechoslovak CP. In Czechoslovakia itself, the liberal collaborators of the Dubcek team cannot help but sow illusions of the same sort in order to justify their leader's capitulation.

### A Marked Deterioration of the Situation from the Standpoint of the Masses

In reality, Dubcek's fall represented a considerable deterioration in the situation from the standpoint of the interests of the Czechoslovak working masses. It was an important step on the road to political counterrevolution -- a counterrevolution which, moreover, need only be partial since the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic experienced only the embryonic beginnings of revolutionary politics, of real workers power and real socialist democracy based on the collective ownership of the means of production.

This deterioration is apparent in three areas: First of all, freedom of the press for the workers and the various communist and socialist currents is being progressively strangled. The Czechoslovak CP leadership is "reasserting its influence" over the major information media, not by intensifying the ideological debate or by lifting it to a higher political level but simply by eliminating through administrative means all the newspaper editors and journalists considered to be oppositionists or just too independent-minded to suit the bureaucrats in power.

Thus the Czechoslovak masses again find themselves deprived of the minimum freedom of press and information, without which it becomes more and more difficult for them to consult together and to rally and centralize their forces.

Secondly, control over most of the ministries has been restored to Stalinist "experts" and "technicians" from the Novotny period, who are often Soviet citizens. The most serious consequence of this development threatens to be the reestablishment of control by these "experts" over the Ministry of the Interior. Husak, like Dubcek before him, pledges that "socialist legality" will be respected and that there will be no return to the rule of the secret police. But there is little reason to trust these promises.

Finally, one of the first acts of the Husak era was the announcement of a series of sharp price hikes which went into effect May 14: 39 percent for coffee, 41 percent for canned goods, 19 percent for imported cigarettes, 18 percent for bedding, 53 percent for washing machines. While the press claims that these rises represent only a one percent average increase in the cost of living, the workers take a completely different view.

Since the Czechoslovak CP justifies these measures on the basis of the inflation that has developed in the country -- without mentioning one of the primary causes of this inflation, the occupation and its consequences -- the gap between

the party and the masses has widened in a few days time much more markedly than in August 1968 and when Dubček was eliminated.

In these three areas, disillusionment and disarray threaten to spread palpably among the Czechoslovak masses, and in this way a demobilization will certainly be promoted.

We must, however, avoid falling into another error, that of speaking of a "Kadarization" of Czechoslovakia already in progress and of comparing the situation in the CSSR to that of Hungary in 1957 and the following years. The differences are striking.

#### There Is Still No "Kadarization"

The Hungarian working class was beaten by the Soviet armies in November 1956. Its vanguard was decapitated. The terror atomized it.

Nothing of the sort has happened so far in the CSSR. The Czechoslovak working class still has a feeling of power won since the change in shop stewards, since workers councils started to be elected, and since the reestablishment of partial workers democracy in the unions.

What this working class lacks primarily is a political leadership. The "liberal" intellectuals' lack of a clear ideological orientation has made them unfitted to fulfill this role. The illusions about Smrkovský have vanished. The hopes of the workers are now transferred to some union leaders, like the heads of the Metal Workers and Typographers union.

These are centrist elements, which are unquestionably further to the left than Dubček and company, more sensitive to direct pressure from the workers, and less integrated in the bureaucratic apparatus. But they are nonetheless centrists whose ability to lead a consistent defensive struggle against the bureaucracy -- to say nothing of an offensive one! -- is highly questionable.

When the news of Dubček's ouster was spreading, the students immediately organized a counterattack. They appealed to the metal workers in the big Prague factories to join them. The workers turned to their leaders. The leaders squirmed, declaring that it would be preferable to wait until the immediate rights of the workers were attacked before countering.

Thus they helped the bureaucracy accomplish another of its cherished aims, dividing the students from the worker

vanguard -- in spite of the fact that unity between these two forces had been steadily consolidated since August 1968. The students remained isolated in their struggle.

Since that time, the threats against the partial trade-union democracy which the Czechoslovak workers consider one of the essential gains of 1968 are multiplying.

The Husák leadership has appointed a new editor for the union paper Prace. What will happen now to the right of the factory locals to get their resolutions printed in Prace, even when they are displeasing to the ruling faction? How will it be possible in practice to reassert the right to strike against the resistance of a reconstituted secret police, which will reintroduce informers into the factories and the unions?

If Strougal, a staunch Stalinist, replaces Husák, who in spite of everything remains suspect in Brezhnev's eyes, how can the government be prevented from housebreaking the unions, from replacing the freely elected factory delegates with delegates appointed from above? These questions are being raised with a growing concern by the vanguard Czechoslovak workers.

Nonetheless, the fact that they raise these questions in this way means that they retain capacities for answering them. As long as these reserves of combativity remain, the Czechoslovak case will not be closed. And this is true no matter what may be in the minds of some European CP leaders, who, hiding behind endorsements forced from the new Prague leaders, talk about a "normalization" and support Brezhnev, who is trying to eliminate all discussion of the Czechoslovak question from the Moscow conference of CPs.

Undoubtedly some initiative by the progressive and revolutionary forces in neighboring countries, or in the USSR itself, would be needed to reinspire the Czechoslovak workers and bring their combativity toward a new height. But nonetheless these workers are still capable of waging powerful defensive struggles.

The very nature of the present skirmishes, as well as the nature of the battles that loom on the horizon, confirm for anyone who might still doubt it, that the object of the struggle in the CSSR was not and is not a "restoration of capitalism." (Husák is being allowed to pursue the new economic policy without any restrictions.) They show that what the fight was really over was workers democracy and the establishment of democratic rights for the workers within the framework of the socialized economy.

CZECHOSLOVAK WRITERS AND ARTISTS DEFEND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

[The following manifesto was issued May 22 by 274 elected union representatives of the Czech scholars, artists, and writers at a joint meeting in Prague. This appeal to defend freedom of thought against the deepening Stalinist reaction under the Husák regime has been suppressed in Czechoslovakia. Our translation is from the text published by the West German weekly Der Spiegel June 2.]

\* \* \*

We turn first of all to our own ranks with a report on the decline of scholarship, culture, and journalism in our country. We scholars, artists, and publicists would like to make clear what we want to do and what we propose to defend.

We belong to a cultured nation, to which we are inseparably bound by our common work and history and our common mother tongue. On this basis, we appeal also to our fellow citizens to assure you that we, along with you, are motivated by our concern for freedom and the fate and meaning of socialism.

The task of culture is to teach and to create, to bring benefits and happiness. We will remain faithful to this duty -- under both favorable and unfavorable conditions. Culture is the lifeblood of a nation; and a body whose arteries are blocked must die. We seek the truth, we will not go against the clear truth; we consider it our duty to serve the truth.

To seek and fight for the truth and to live in its light, to our way of thinking, means seeking and fighting for freedom. For us, freedom and truth are inseparably bound together. Freedom cannot be given. It is not a gift but a duty.

The freedom of creative expression and the independence of scholarship and public opinion have always had to be re-won again and again. Our duty is constantly to overcome the barriers that are put in our way by power interests and blindness. The greater the barriers seem, the greater the moral challenge to us.

At present, the essential cultural freedoms are restricted. Culture is denied possibilities that were long taken for granted. False goals are forced on us.

We are witnesses to a misrepresentation of events in the past and the present. Shamelessly, people are raising their heads again who in the past showed not loyalty but rather a readiness to accommodate. They showed not abilities

but rather a lack of competence. They served not the truth but those in power.

It is not only culture that is in danger. The denial of freedom of opinion means a denial of all human rights and all freedom.

If the administration of public affairs falls into the hands of people who for years were incapable of solving the political and economic problems of this country, then we see no guarantee for the dignity and security of the future generations.

We are told that scholarship, the arts, and journalism belong to the state and that the state must direct them. But just as the land belongs to the farmers and the factories to the workers, the newspapers belong to their readers, the radio to the listeners, movies and television to the viewers, and the arts to all who enjoy them. Culture is not the property of the state -- culture is the property of the people.

The present situation means a severe test for us. It is a test of our courage, our steadfastness, and our intelligence. In this test we want to prove our honor, for our fellow citizens and for the questioning and uncompromising eyes of our children.

The measures aimed against cultural life are increasing. We will oppose this development as best we can. As long as our duly elected representatives head our organizations, they will not acquiesce in the suppression of values it is their responsibility to defend. None of us will betray his colleagues and thereby betray himself.

We can be forced into silence. But no one will ever force us to say what we do not believe.

They can rob us of our freedom of opinion, but no one can rob us of our freedom of intellect and thought, of our dignity. Reason remains the measure of action; honor and good faith the measure of a person.

The Czech cultural community is and remains true to its ideals and all that it has achieved through truth and knowledge -- true to its language, its national traditions, and its people. Because it wants to continue to create, it will continue to defend its responsibility and develop cultural values, in spite of the difficulty of the times.

We say this openly and with the greatest emphasis.

GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN IN CURACAO

The threat of a new general strike in Curaçao forced Premier Ciro de Kroon to agree June 3 to dissolve parliament and call new elections, "in a few days."

Thousands of striking oil workers had led a general strike on the island May 29. When a workers' march was fired on by police May 30, groups of unemployed youths joined the strikers in burning white-owned businesses in the capital city of Willemstad.

De Kroon called in Dutch marines to suppress the predominantly black workers movement. But the threat of a new general strike compelled him to meet with union leaders for the first time in the current crisis.

H.L. Spencer, president of the Trades Union Center and head of the oil workers' union, met with de Kroon and

Curaçao Governor Nicolaas Debrot on the afternoon of June 3.

The parliament, representing primarily white business interests, had just voted to support the government by giving de Kroon a "reasonable time" to call new elections. Spencer refused to accept this ruling and de Kroon and Debrot were forced to concede.

Spencer told the press after his conference with de Kroon: "We have the Government's promise not only of the dissolution of the present Government but were also assured that we will be able to use the state radio and television in the future to make our views known." The union leader said his organization had not decided whether to support an existing party in the forthcoming elections or to form its own party based on the unions.

IVORY COAST BREAKS RELATIONS WITH USSR AFTER STUDENT STRIKE

Usher Assouan, foreign minister of the Ivory Coast, notified the Soviet chargé d'affaires May 30 that the Houphouët-Boigny government was breaking relations with the USSR and that all Soviet diplomatic personnel would have to leave Abidjan by June 1. The Ivory Coast's diplomatic mission in Moscow had been recalled a week earlier.

The government gave no reason for the move, but the Paris daily Le Monde in a front-page editorial in its June 1-2 issue said the action was a result of student strikes at the University of Abidjan which began May 21.

President of the National Assembly Yace, who is also general secretary of the ruling Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire [Democratic party of the Ivory Coast], accused "certain foreigners" of having led Ivory Coast students into er-

ror. "We deny to anyone the right," Yace was quoted by Le Monde as saying, "to seek to inculcate in our children any doctrine accepted somewhere else than here and contrary to the realities here."

Le Monde commented that in taking the initiative in the rupture, "the Ivory Coast leaders have, without doubt, sought to find a scapegoat for the tensions that have torn their country for more than a year. Like Senegal, like Dahomey, muffled opposition currents exist in the Ivory Coast which Mr. Houphouët-Boigny has been able to deal with but which he has been unable to totally defeat."

The government had closed the University of Abidjan May 24 for an indefinite period to break the student strike that was spreading to nearby high schools in the country's capital.

STUDENTS KILLED BY TROOPS IN CONGO

At least six students were killed by General Mobutu's troops in Kinshasa June 3 during a demonstration for higher government grants. A June 4 Reuters dispatch said the government-controlled radio had blamed "foreign embassies and troublemakers" for the demonstration. The government claimed that four soldiers were wounded and that two officers were missing. The students were said to have defended themselves with Molotov cock-

tails when attacked by the troops.

According to one report, nine students from Lovanium University were killed when troops opened fire on a silent demonstration.

The students had commandeered buses to come to Kinshasa from their university, which is south of the Congolese capital.



GRIGORENKO'S DENUNCIATION OF THE KGB

[The following is the text of a letter to A.R. Rudenko, the attorney general of the USSR, from former Soviet Major General Pyotr G. Grigorenko, one of the best known left-Communist dissidents, protesting the search of his apartment by the secret police on November 19, 1968. Grigorenko was subsequently arrested -- on May 7, 1969 -- in Tashkent, where he had gone at the request of imprisoned leaders of the Crimean Tatars to appear as a nonprofessional defense counsel on their behalf.

[Grigorenko's letter, written December 4, 1968, is especially interesting in its description of the methods currently used by the KGB\* in dealing with political critics of the Soviet bureaucracy. The text of the letter is circulating in typewritten form in the USSR and copies have reached the West. The translation from the Russian is by Intercontinental Press.]

\* \* \*

To the attorney general of the USSR, A.R. Rudenko:

On November 19 of this year [1968], from 7:00 in the morning until 7:00 at night, a search of my apartment was conducted.

I shall leave aside for the moment the fact that the person who -- nominally -- was overseeing this operation had no conception either of procedural norms or of elementary courtesy -- having grown accustomed to dispensing at will with the lives of people entrusted to his hands. Those who, during the entire day, kept watch on the conduct and actions of Special Inspector for Priority Cases Berezovsky, of the attorney general's office of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], will write you about this.

I myself did not have to endure his boorishness that long. In protest against the unlawful actions of those who conducted the search, I refused to participate in it after the first half hour. Thus, I speak only of violations of principle -- which were not solely the responsibility of those who actually conducted the search.

1. The search was carried out on the basis of a warrant held by Special In-

spector Berezovsky of the Uzbek SSR attorney general's office. The warrant was approved by the Moscow district attorney, Malkov. In the warrant it is asserted that in the course of investigating the case of Bariev and others it was revealed that documents containing slanderous fabrications against the Soviet social and state system could be found in the apartment of P.G. Grigorenko.

I proclaim, and am ready to take full responsibility for the statement, that no proof of the likelihood of such documents in my apartment was given to Prosecutor Malkov. First, because there is no "case of Bariev and others." Second, because there never were or could be documents containing slander against the Soviet state and social system connected in any way, even indirectly, with the name of Bariev and his comrades.

What is really involved here? This is a police provocation pure and simple, against people who have entered into a struggle against the arbitrariness of the authorities. It is well known to you that on April 21 of this year, in the municipal park of Chirchik, an attack was made by the Uzbek police (who for some reason are still called militia) upon a peaceful outing of Crimean Tatars, which was dedicated to the birthday of the founder of the Soviet state and initiator of the Crimean Tatar National Autonomous Republic -- V.I. Lenin.

People who were at a peaceful outing, suspecting nothing, young people dancing, groups singing national and revolutionary songs or putting on amateur performances -- all were struck by high-pressure streams of heavily chlorinated, icy water from fire engines.

These streams swept people off their feet, ruined their clothes, and inflicted moral and psychological wounds that will not heal. Then the police clubs went into action. The calculation was that the outraged people would resort to measures of self-defense and that this could later be used to charge them with resisting the authorities.

But the people displayed the most incredible restraint, not giving in to the provocation. They began a peaceful demonstration against the humiliations permitted against them. In reply, arrests followed. More than 300 persons were arrested. Twelve of these, most of whom had not participated in the outing but were arrested in their homes, were subsequently placed on trial and condemned for "disturbing the peace."

\* Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR -- the Committee on State Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The current name of the Stalinist secret police organization.



FORMER MAJOR GENERAL PYOTR G. GRIGORENKO

tor operator -- who managed to avoid arrest, flew to Moscow on the same day and by the morning of April 22 the attorney general's office of the USSR had received his telegram bringing to light in detail the Chirchik events -- this unprecedented violation of human rights and of the norms of human morality.

Understandably, Bariev did not mince words, but simply, in the way of a workingman, called things by their proper names. He stayed on in Moscow as the empowered representative of the people who sent him, without results, haunting the threshold of the office of which you are supervisor, and other government bodies.

He and other representatives of his people sought -- using every possible means they could find -- to win the punishment of the Chirchik goons and a halt to the illegal persecution by the courts of the victims of the Chirchik pogrom.

You did not respond in any way to the personal telegrams and letters of Bariev or to the collective appeals of all the Crimean Tatar representatives then in Moscow. Neither you nor your deputies ever admitted any of these representatives, nor did you make any effort to look into their complaints. You did not choose any other approach either: you did not answer even one of their letters.

You also failed to respond to their complaints about the unjustified actions of the Moscow militia against the Crimean Tatar delegates. It did not concern you, the highest overseer of Soviet law, that they were rounding up people like wild animals on the streets of our motherland's capital and shipping them off by force, under conditions fit only for cattle, to uninhabited regions of administrative exile.\*

It did not concern you, a jurist versed in the law, that these were not simply individuals but national representatives, that is, citizens concerning whom one had no right to take decisions removing them from their assigned stations without the agreement of their constituents. You overlooked this, just as you did those tragic incidents which occurred as a result of the fact that people, trying to be true to the confidence placed in them, took desperate measures, even to jumping from windows of a speeding train, in order to escape from the militia conveying them and to continue to carry out the duty entrusted to them by their people.

Bariev had no sooner been relieved in Moscow by another person and returned to Chirchik than he was placed under arrest. The grounds for this were the above-mentioned letters of individual and group representatives of the Crimean Tatars sent to various Soviet bureaus, including the USSR attorney general's office, to public organizations, and to individual representatives of Soviet public opinion, as well as the information bulletins that the Tatar representatives regularly send from Moscow as reports to their constituents. All these documents were interpreted by people of Berezovsky's type as containing slander against the Soviet state and social system.

I will not begin here to try to

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\* On May 16, 1968, some 800 representatives of the Crimean Tatars went to Moscow to lodge protests with various government bureaus over the Chirchik pogrom and to demand the right of the Tatar people to return to their homeland in the Crimea from their long exile in Central Asia, an exile decreed by Stalin during World War II. Moscow police and militiamen began a mass roundup of Tatars. On May 18, 1968, those Tatars still free -- about 100 -- went in a body to the garden near the offices of the Central Committee of the Communist party. They were accompanied by several of the most courageous representatives of the opposition intellectuals, including General Grigorenko. The group was attacked by the police. The Tatars were arrested, beaten, then loaded on trains and forcibly sent to places of compulsory settlement. -- I.P.

demonstrate how they contrived to transform a document containing a true description of an actual event into so-called slander. I will limit myself to posing several questions for you, relating directly to the fabrication of such cases. I ask you, as the highest guardian of Soviet law, whether anyone has the right to make a person answer in court for having sent you a complaint that you never took the time to examine, and when you never investigated the facts recounted in it.

I ask you -- could anyone, even in their wildest imaginings, refer to the bloody encounter in Chirchik as disturbance of the peace rather than as a crude police provocation against the Crimean Tatar people, having as its aim the creation of a pretext for suppressing the just movement of this people for their national resurrection?!

I believe that if the questions raised here were answered justly, there would be no question but that everything following after the Chirchik events has been a realization of the provocative aim I have indicated.

And if that is so, then how could the Uzbek "guardians of order" show District Attorney Malkov proof of the existence of the documents mentioned (unless, of course, Malkov himself was participating quite consciously in the provocation himself)?

Such is the state of affairs concerning the legal basis for conducting a search of my apartment. With that, one might be done with the matter. But I cannot avoid speaking about something that is not clear to me, indeed, is totally obscure: your own role, both in the Chirchik affair and in the trials of Crimean Tatars -- those held since the famous September 5, 1967, decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and those still being prepared.

Their unjust and often plainly provocative character is so obvious that one is amazed that this cannot be understood by a jurist of international standing, a person who diligently instructs the whole world in the methods of fighting crimes against humanity!

2. Having thus clarified the fact that the Uzbek events are related to me and my apartment in the same way that "the elder tree in the garden" is to the uncle who appeared in Kiev, let us try to figure out why this search was actually carried out and whose purposes it served. An exhaustive answer has to explain the composition of the "investigative" group and tell which bureau sent the person who in fact led the search.

Attending the search, besides Bere-

zovsky, were seven KGB personnel and three "witnesses" -- also security agents. Thus for one person from the Uzbek Republic -- from the attorney general's office, remember -- ten Muscovites were needed, not counting those who blocked off the house at the street level. And all from the KGB.

In command of the search was also a KGB man -- Aleksei Dmitrievich Vragov. That is all I was able to find out about him through Berezovsky. Vragov himself refused to tell his rank or place of work -- whether it was the Moscow office or the central office -- although according to law he was supposed to tell me both. This semiofficial person, only partly made known to me, then, was in charge of the search. Berezovsky got his orders from him alone.

To Vragov belonged the right to decide disputed questions, to confiscate this or that document or to leave it. Moreover, he supervised the practical activities of the other KGB personnel at the search. The only thing that the nominal head of the search, Berezovsky, did was to dictate to one of the KGB men the titles of the documents gathered up by the others.

Thus the search was conducted by organs of the KGB which had chosen as a "fig leaf" the "case of Bariev and others" together with the investigator in charge of that case. This search concluded another stage in the interrelations between the KGB and myself. The first stage ended, as you know, with my being freed from the Soviet Union's most dreadful kind of prison -- the so-called special psychiatric hospital, where the KGB had me "settled" in order to get themselves out of the impasse they had fallen into as a result of my totally unfounded arrest and the impossibility of obtaining from me a "heartfelt confession."

The next stage began two or three months after my release, when the organs of the KGB, without any grounds being provided on my part, suddenly began to take an interest in me. Since then, for more than three years, I have been kept under constant surveillance: people assigned round the clock to follow me or members of my family or those who visit me; stationary surveillance of my apartment, both in plain sight and by special apparatus; tapping of telephone conversations; the perusal of my mail, with the occasional confiscation of a letter.

Twice in these years there have been secret searches of my apartment. All these actions I protested in a letter to the head of the KGB, Yu.V. Andropov. To this letter, as is customary in our country, no reply was made. They simply began to follow me more discreetly.

The search carried out was a gener-

al inspection of my "storehouses," an attempt to look over what they hadn't seen before. But that isn't the only thing, of course. Obviously, some new provocations toward me are indicated. I do not intend to wait meekly for them.

I am a Communist and, as such, I hate with every fiber of my being the organs of caste lawlessness, violence and coercion. In our country this means the organization created by Stalin and now called the KGB. I hide from no one my hatred for this organization; I consider it inimical to the people and I will struggle for its rapid liquidation by all legal means available to me. Therefore I do not wish to have any relations with it and I do not recognize it as having any rights to interfere in my life or public activity.

A parasitic organization that grows fat off the inexhaustible flood of the people's wealth, that takes away the best sons of the people for this purpose, and inflicts irreparable moral damage, should disappear forever from our society, and the sooner the better.

I have long known that the courts and prosecutor's offices have a relation with the KGB that amounts to actual subordination. If examples are necessary to illustrate this, the search carried out at my apartment serves as quite an illustrative one. The prosecutor's office in this case played the role of errand boy. They can go on playing this dishonorable role, but not in relation to me.

By my life, by my participation in the defense of the motherland, by the blood I have shed for it, by my Communist convictions I have won the right to feel myself a co-owner of my country, a member with equal rights of the family of Soviet peoples. I have the right to walk around freely without being followed in my native land, to freely defend my convictions, to utilize all those rights guaranteed me as a citizen of the USSR under the Soviet constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\* And no one, least of all such an organization as the KGB, has the right to interfere with my making use of such rights.

The organs of public supervision of the law are obliged to help citizens struggling for their legal rights, not to help organizations seeking to deprive citizens of those rights.

3. After all that has been said there remains only to explain why the representatives of this organization that I respect so little arrived; what I had

that they needed; against whom they are fighting; and, of course, whom they plan to fight in the future. Let us try to deal with this by way of an analysis of the material confiscated.

Actually they confiscated materials having nothing to do with "slanderous fabrication." What was confiscated was not at all what was indicated in the official warrant for the search. They took all the typewritten and handwritten documents, letters and notes that I had. There was nothing slanderous, let alone anti-Soviet, in any of them. These were anti-Stalinist materials and public statements against the violation of Soviet laws by the authorities, against arbitrary justice, against the continuing discriminatory and genocidal acts toward the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, and other small nationalities. The following is what was taken:

- Numerous letters of the Crimean Tatars, both individual and collective, that had been sent to me -- a cry from the heart of a people worn with suffering -- as well as materials from the movement of the Volga German people for the restoration of their national rights.

- Copies of my letters to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist party of the Soviet Union], both the ones written in connection with arbitrary treatment permitted against myself (illegal expulsion from the party, reduction from the rank of general to that of private, denial of the pension I had earned) and the ones that exposed arbitrary justice and falsification of history in the interest of reviving Stalinism.

- The manuscript of Academician Sakharov's brochure and my review of it.

- All the works of that untiring fighter against Stalinism, a writer-Bolshevik, participant in the revolutionary movement since 1912, member of the Bolshevik party since 1916, with three years of czarist prison and seventeen in the Stalinist torture chambers and death camps at Kolyma -- Aleksei Evgrafovich Kosterin.

- A manuscript in which are collected and analyzed all the facts known to me indicating that after the October (1964) plenum of the Central Committee a firm course, though one quietly carried out, was adopted on the revival of Stalinism.

- Records of public criminal trials (criminal in form, political in essence) of Crimean Tatars, who are participants in a movement for national equality, and of free-thinking people in Moscow (the trials of Sinyavsky and Daniel, Khaustov, Bukovsky and others, Ginzburg, Galanskov and others).

- Biographical sketches of those

\* Adopted by the United Nations in 1948.  
-- I.P.

convicted for demonstrating on Red Square against the intervention of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and against the shedding of blood by those who are brothers, Soviet soldiers and Czechoslovak citizens.

- A manuscript of Academician Varga's work The Russian Path to Socialism.

- A copy of the letter by a group of Soviet intellectuals (Artsymovich, Kapitsa, Kataev, Leontovich, Plisetskaya, Sakharov, Chukovsky, etc.) to the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, expressing alarm in connection with the tendencies toward the rebirth of Stalinism that have appeared.

- A copy of the letter by twenty-three children of Communists who were killed in gangster fashion by Stalin (Yakir, Petrovsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Berzin, Yenukidze, Bukharin, Vavilov, Piatnitsky, and others), in which alarm was expressed regarding the tendencies toward the revival of Stalinism and the forgetting of the crimes committed by Stalin and his henchmen; in it, the resolution of the Twenty-Second Congress for the erection of a monument in Moscow to the victims of Stalinism was recalled.

- Translations from Czechoslovak newspapers (the "Two Thousand Words," a speech by Smrkovský on Czechoslovak radio, etc.).

- A list of persons subjected to repression by the party or government because they had signed one or another of various documents protesting the violation of Soviet laws and of elementary human rights -- done by the courts, the prosecutor's offices, and the KGB.

- A typewritten text, published in the USSR in an edition of insignificant size and meant only for jurists, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

- A typewritten text of two UN covenants on rights, not published in the USSR (the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both adopted by the General Assembly two years ago [1966], together with their optional protocols).

- Records of all the speeches made at the funeral of the writer A.E. Kosterin.

- Among the confiscated works of literature were: the long poem Requiem by Anna Akhmatova about her only son who, together with her, suffered in the prison cells of Stalin; several works by Marina Tsvetaeva, not published in the USSR; a powerful work on the morally degrading influence of Stalinism -- the unpublished

narrative poem by N. Korzhavin, Tanka; the manuscript of A. Marchenko's book My Confessions on present-day camps for political prisoners; a typewritten text of Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls.\*

The material listed characterizes rather fully the principles of the confiscation. I do not think I would add anything by pointing out that everything written by me was confiscated, even scraps of paper bearing only a single word in my handwriting. Thus, materials of mine that have disappeared include my scientific work, personal correspondence, drafts of various documents, both those which have received wide distribution and those that have not gone beyond my desk. In general, everything typewritten or handwritten or that has not been published in the USSR. Obviously, if they had not already been given to others, my copies of The Letters of Korolenko to A. Lunacharsky, Gorky's Uncontemporary Thoughts, and the poems of Osip Mandelstam would all have been taken as well.

I had a copy of the manuscript of a book on the opening period of the last war -- Notes of a Reconnaissance Man, the memoirs of a colonel in the reserve, B.A. Novobrantsev -- inscribed by the author. When they put this book, too, in the pile for confiscation, I protested sharply, declaring that it could in no way be included among the materials for which confiscation had been sanctioned. Then councilor of justice Berezovsky, who was conducting the confiscation, having received advance permission from Vragov -- "Confiscate it!" -- decided to demonstrate to me the book's slanderous character, in relation to the Soviet state and social system, and he read to me from the author's preface: "Stalin died, but the poisonous seeds sown by him continue to produce shoots."

After that I refused to be present at the search any longer. But they had no need of my presence anyway. Without having listed even half of what was selected for confiscation, they dumped the remainder in a bag, marked it with a stamp saying "KGB-14," and took them away...and the bag...and the stamp. Judge for yourself to what extent the inviolability of the contents of the bag is guaranteed.

What's worse, the sealing of the bag, in which I refused to participate, considering the total senselessness of such participation, took place in the presence of those "witnesses" who themselves were personnel of the government body carrying out the search. Not one of the real witnesses whom I insisted should be

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\* Banned by Stalin because of what he considered the book's unfavorable picture of the Kremlin role in the Spanish Civil War. -- I.P.

called was called.

There you have the way observance of the law was assured in a concrete case. But it is not this case alone that interests me. I wanted to clarify what the attitude of a Soviet attorney general's office is toward Soviet law! My personal experience shows that such bodies are concerned with only one thing in political cases -- choosing articles of law that will give the appearance of legality to the savage arbitrariness of the authorities.

But I naïvely thought that, even for this, it was necessary to know the law. It turns out that that is not obligatory. The necessary articles, obviously, are chosen by legal specialists. Practical workers have no interest in the law at all. They do what is ordered without looking into the case to see if it is legal or not.

Berezovsky appeared at the search without the Code of Criminal Law or the Procedural Code for Criminal Law, and when he was taken to task for violating the law, with citations from copies of these that I had, he only modified his procedure, and that in only a few cases, with ever mounting reluctance.

How burdensome the law is to him may be judged from the following incident. Toward the end of the search, my wife reproved him, declaring: "That's not according to law!" At this Berezovsky could not restrain himself. He poured out all the irritation that had built up in him through the day: "Ah, you legalists! You and your husband with his shelf full of legal books!" -- he yelled in anger. I think this outcry characterizes the attitude of the "guardians of the law" toward the law better than all their pompous scribblings that count on people being uninformed.

4. In conclusion I would like to try to clarify with your help one other question -- why has all this been done?

Perhaps an attempt to intimidate? I don't think so. The KGB and I are too well acquainted for either of us to consider such a thing.

Perhaps, then, the wish to find some peg on which to hang a "case" and put me away somewhere where my voice will no longer be heard? This is quite possible, but stupid. To stage a trial based on a frame-up nowadays is risky, and to calculate that I will actually get involved in criminal actions...No, the KGB knows me too well to count on that. I don't count on the stupidity of my opponent either.

Consequently, there remains only

one assumption -- they wanted to find out what I am working on and at the same time to put a brake on my work by depriving me of materials and "means of production." Testifying to this, in particular, is the fact that they took both typewriters (the office one and the portable), though there was no warrant for their confiscation.

Moreover, to confiscate typewriters under our conditions is such savage arbitrariness that it disturbs me even to mention it. But judge for yourself. If the typeface of the machines was needed, only a few minutes were required to take a sample. And that is supposed to be done in the presence of the owner of the machine. Then why confiscate the machines? In the best of cases, in order to deprive the owner of the use of them. And in the worst? In the worst, I'll tell you, if you don't know already, to prepare a frame-up against the owner of the machines.

When I protested the confiscation of documents not double-checked by me, Inspector Berezovsky answered: "You, what are you suspicious about?"

I fear that you too may answer the same way. Thus, I reply as I did to Berezovsky: "I am not suspicious about anything. I am stating the logical possibilities flowing from the violation of procedural norms. And what in fact will be made out of these possibilities the future will show."

But I do not wish to wait impassively for what will come. I intend to demand the correction of all violations of the law made in regard to myself.

Therefore, I demand: (1) The immediate return of all documents taken from me and both typewriters. (2) An end to all illegal acts toward me or my family -- from the assignment of persons to follow us; to the surveillance of my apartment, either directly or by special apparatus; to the application of listening devices to the apartment and tapping of telephone conversations; to the opening and reading or confiscation of my mail.

I contend that your powers and rights are sufficient (going by the law, of course) to force those involved to comply and to have my demands carried out. In expectation of this, I await your reply.

I hope that you will give due consideration to the fact that I held off making my complaint for fourteen days, giving these "searchers" that time to find out what they had confiscated. In the hope that you will take that into account, I will expect to receive your reply no later than in the time allotted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR -- two weeks.

APPEAL OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

[The appeal by fifty-four Soviet citizens published below was reportedly drafted on May 20 and sent abroad by way of foreign correspondents in Moscow. Most of its initiators and signers have figured prominently in the struggles for political rights in recent years in the Soviet Union, struggles impressively summarized in this document. The translation from the Russian is by Intercontinental Press.

[Noteworthy in the statement is the insistence on the right to hold and impart political ideas -- a direct challenge to the monopoly of political power exercised by the Stalinist bureaucracy. Similarly noteworthy is the deliberateness with which the signers decided to make an international appeal.

[That the document is directed to the United Nations reveals, no doubt, that the signers -- or at least some of them -- have illusions about the United Nations, particularly concerning its role as an instrument of imperialist policy. The appeal would have been much better directed to worker and radical organizations abroad.

[However, the Soviet government played a decisive role in creating the United Nations and was a signatory to its key documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Perhaps the signers of the document had this legal situation in mind.

[The layer of activists represented by this letter clearly view with the utmost seriousness the recent redoubled repressions. Secret police activity is obviously on the upswing; old, dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists are back at their posts; public political trials and widespread arrests are again in vogue.

[It is to be hoped that this appeal will meet with a response among working-class and revolutionary-minded organizations internationally.]

\* \* \*

1. We the undersigned, deeply disturbed by the unceasing political repressions in the Soviet Union, and seeing in this a return to Stalinist times when our entire country found itself in the grip of terror, appeal to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations to defend the human rights being trampled on in our country.

2. We appeal to the UN because we have had no response to the protests and complaints that we have sent for quite a number of years to the highest government

and judicial offices of the Soviet Union. The hope that our voice might be heard, that the authorities would cease their illegal actions, which we have repeatedly called attention to, this hope has died.

3. Therefore we are appealing to the UN, assuming that the defense of human rights is a sacred obligation of that organization.

4. In this document we shall speak of the violation of one of the most basic human rights -- the right to hold one's own opinions and to impart them by any legal means.

5. At political trials in the Soviet Union one often hears the statement, "You are not being tried for your opinions."

6. This is totally untrue. We are tried precisely for our opinions. When they tell us they are not trying us for our opinions, they are in fact saying: "You can have any opinions you want, but if you contradict the official political doctrine, then don't you dare impart them."

And in truth, arrests and trials, of which we shall speak, have occurred whenever people with opposition views have begun to impart those views.

7. But the imparting of opinions is the natural consequence of holding opinions. Therefore in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it says:

"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

8. Thus while the formal basis for the repression is the imparting of opinions, in fact people are being tried for the opinions themselves.

9. They are tried on charges of slandering the Soviet state and social system, whether with the intention of subverting the Soviet order (Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic) or without such intent (Articles 190 and 191 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic). None of the people convicted at the political trials known to us set as their goal the slandering of the Soviet system, let alone acting to subvert it. Thus at all these trials people were convicted on fictitious charges.

10. We shall cite several examples, which have been the object of broad pub-



licity both in the Soviet Union and beyond its borders.

11. The trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, who were convicted for publishing outside the country literary works critical of Soviet reality.

12. The trial of Ginzburg, Galanskov, and others, who were tried for publishing the literary journal Phoenix-67 and a white book on the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial.

13. The trial of Khaustov and Bukovsky, who organized a demonstration against the arrest of Ginzburg and Galanskov.

14. The trial of Litvinov, Larisa Daniel, and others for demonstrating against the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. An important feature of the two last-mentioned trials was the fact that the participants were charged in relation to the content of their slogans.

15. The trial of Marchenko, formally convicted of violating passport regulations, a charge, incidentally, that was not proved at the trial; actually he was condemned for his book My Confessions, which is about the conditions of prisoners in the post-Stalin years.

16. The trial of I. Belogorodskaya for trying to distribute her letter in defense of Marchenko.

17. The trial of Gendler, Kravchevsky, and others in Leningrad, who were sentenced for distributing the books of foreign publishers.

18. The trials of people who advocated national equality and preservation of national culture.

19. In the Ukraine -- the trial in Kiev in 1966 at which over ten persons were convicted; the trial of Chornovil in Lwow, convicted for his book on the political trials; and many other trials.

20. The trials of the Crimean Tatars who are struggling to be returned to their native land of Crimea; in recent years some twenty political trials took place, at which more than a hundred persons were convicted; in the near future in Tashkent the most recent and biggest trial is to take place, at which ten representatives of the Crimean Tatars will be placed on the stand.

21. The trials in the Baltic republics, in particular the trial of Kalninish and others.

22. The trials of Soviet Jews desiring the right to emigrate to Israel;

at the recent trial in Kiev, the engineer B. Koshubiyevsky was sentenced to three years.

23. The trials of religious believers demanding the right to freedom of religion.

24. All these political trials, as a result of their illegality, were accompanied by the crudest violations of procedural norms, above all, not being open to the public, but likewise not providing an impartial hearing.

25. We wish also to call your attention to that particularly inhuman form of repression -- the confinement of normal persons in mental hospitals because of their political beliefs.

26. Recently a series of new arrests has occurred. At the end of April, the artist V. Kuznetsov of the city of Pushkin in the Moscow region was arrested on charges of distributing samizdat -- that is, literature not published by state publishing houses.

27. In the recent past, in Riga, I. Yakhimovich, former chairman of a collective farm in Larvia, was arrested and charged for having written letters protesting political repression in the Soviet Union.

28. At the beginning of May former Major General P.G. Grigorenko was arrested; one of the best-known participants in the movement for civil rights in the Soviet Union, he had gone to Tashkent on the request of some two thousand Crimean Tatars as a public defender at the coming trial of the ten Tatars.

29. And lastly, on May 19, in Moscow, Ilya Gabai, a teacher of Russian literature, was arrested several days after his home had been searched and documents confiscated that contain protests by Soviet citizens against the political repressions in the Soviet Union. (In the spring of 1967, Gabai spent four months under surveillance for having participated in the demonstration of Khaustov and Bukovsky.)

30. These recent arrests have compelled us to conclude that the Soviet punitive organs have decided to suppress once for all the activity of persons protesting arbitrariness in our country.

31. We judge that the freedom to hold and spread opinions is being critically imperiled.

32. We hope that what we have said in our letter will give the Human Rights Commission a basis for reviewing the question of the violation of basic civil rights in the Soviet Union.

33. The Initiating Group for Defense of Human Rights in the USSR:

G. Altunyan, engineer (Kharkov); V. Borisov, worker (Leningrad); T. Velikanova, mathematician; N. Gorbanevskaya, poet; M.D. Djemilev, worker (Tashkent); S. Kovalev, biologist; V. Krasin, economist; A. Lavut, biologist; A. Levitin-Krasnov, religious writer; Yu. Maltsev, translator; L. Pliushch, mathematician (Liev); T. Podyapolsky, scientific worker; Tam Khordorovich, linguist; P. Yakir, historian; A. Yakobson, translator.

34. The appeal is supported by:

Z. Azanova, doctor (Begovat, Uzbek Republic); T. Bayeva, office worker; S. Bernshtein, writer; L. Vasilyev, lawyer; Yu. Vishnevskaya, poet; A. Volpin, mathematician; O. Vorobyev, worker (Perm);

G.Z.M. Gabai, teacher; E. Yegaidukov, mathematician; V. Gershuni, bricklayer; Z.M. Grigorenko, pensioner; A. Grigorenko, student-technician; R. Djemilev, worker (Krasnodar region); N. Yemelkin, office worker; L. Zigikov, worker; A. Kalinovskiy, engineer (Kharkov); A. Kaplan, physicist; S. Karasik, engineer (Kharkov); L. Kats, office worker; Yu. Kim, teacher; Yu. Kiselev, artist; A. Levin, engineer (Kharkov); V. Kozharinov, worker; L. Kornilov, engineer; V. Lapin, writer; T. Levin, engineer (Kharkov); D. Lifshitz, engineer (Kharkov); S. Mauge, biologist; V. Nedobora, engineer (Kharkov); L. Petrovsky, historian; S. Podolsky, engineer (Kharkov); V. Ponomarev, engineer (Kharkov); V. Rokitiatsky, physicist; I. Rudakov; L. Terpovsky, doctor; Iu. Shtein, movie director; V. Chornovil, journalist (Lwow); M. Yakir, office worker; and S. Vintovsky, student.

JAPANESE STUDENTS PROTEST MEETING OF ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE

More than 2,000 students battled some 7,000 riot police in Ito, Japan, June 8 during a protest against the opening of a June 9-11 meeting of the nine-nation Asian and Pacific Council [ASPAC]. The anti-Communist alliance is composed of representatives from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thai-

land, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Japan. At least thirty-five persons were injured in the demonstrations and more than 300 students were arrested. The 186 employees at the hotel where the meeting is to take place voted to oppose the ASPAC gathering, which they said would increase militarism in Japan.

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