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CHARLES DE GAULLE: Joins the has-beens.

#### THE GENERAL STEPS DOWN

By Les Evans

Eleven years of Gaullist rule came to an end April 28 when the general, caught in a trap of his own making, resigned as president of France.

In face of mounting social unrest, de Gaulle had decided to try for a new mandate by turning a proposed referendum on constitutional changes into a plebiscite on his rule -- although his term of office was not due to expire until 1972. This decision was described by his critics as an act of authoritarian bravado. The voters called his bluff.

On the eve of the balloting, de Gaulle tried to scale down the conditions that he would regard as a victory. On previous occasions he had threatened to resign if he did not receive massive support. This time, he said, he was prepared to go only if he was "disavowed by a majority."

But when the votes were counted, he had indeed been disavowed by a majority. The government's bill was rejected by 52.87 percent of those voting. At 11 p.m., April 27, Premier Couve de Murville appeared on national television to announce:

"A majority of the French people has pronounced itself against the reforms that were submitted to it, with all the political consequences that this rejection entails. Beginning tomorrow a new page will be turned in our history."

De Gaulle's own comment was even briefer:

"I cease to exercise my functions as President of the Republic. This decision takes effect today [April 28] at noon."

Charles de Gaulle will be best remembered for his role in the liquidation of the old-style French empire. Faced with the upsurge of the colonial revolution following World War II, the French imperialists fought with blind ferocity to hang on. Even after they suffered a stunning defeat at Dienbienphu at the hands of the Vietnamese in 1954, they refused to draw the obvious lesson. While withdrawing from Southeast Asia, they sought all the more desperately to maintain their empire in Africa.

In 1958 when de Gaulle seized power, the French army was hopelessly mired in Algeria, and France itself was wracked by domestic strife as opposition to the

"dirty" colonial war rose.

To block Algerian independence, the ultrarightists, headed by Algerian colons, threatened to bring a fascist-type regime to power. De Gaulle came to power with the backing of these ultrarightists. He turned against them, however, in order to extricate the French army from Algeria, facilitate a neocolonialist solution there and in the rest of Africa, and restore stability at home.

De Gaulle was installed as premier on June 1, 1958. For the first six months he ruled by decree, having abolished the constitution. His new constitution effectively eliminated the power of the National Assembly and the Senate, concentrating virtually all power in the hands of the president, to which office he was promptly elected. The new Fifth Republic became the model in Europe for the so-called strong state. De Gaulle's authoritarian regime repressed the right-wing terrorists -- and the working class as well.

He saw the need to extricate France from debilitating and unwinnable colonial wars. In 1962 he granted independence to Algeria, in reality merely recognizing the French defeat. In place of armed force, de Gaulle followed an adroit policy that succeeded in blocking Algeria from following the Cuban path to a socialist revolution. This marked a conscious decision on the part of French imperialism to forego traditional colonial rule in favor of what could be salvaged through neocolonialist economic and political agreements.

On the basis of social peace at home and neocolonialism abroad, de Gaulle sought to reestablish French prestige and cast himself for a key role in European politics. This stability was gradually undermined by France's inability to modernize its economic plant during the years. Ultimately French goods could remain competitive on the world market only by a massive renewal of equipment or by squeezing the living standards of the French workers. De Gaulle opted for the latter course.

One of the central purposes of the Gaullist "strong state" was to restrict the working class. This repressive and authoritarian regime created mounting social tensions that exploded in the May-June 1968 upheaval, destroying the basis of de Gaulle's rule. In fact, it was only the timidity and the hidebound reformism of the French Communist party that saved de Gaulle from being toppled in May 1968. The

betrayal by the CP when confronted with the specter of a socialist revolution momentarily permitted a political shift favoring de Gaulle. The government granted sizable wage increases and made promises that it knew it could not keep in regard to workers and students' "participation" in the management of society. Primarily through the concerted intervention of the Communist party, the workers were persuaded to accept these purely economic gains and defer any fundamental political changes.

But once the immediate danger of a socialist revolution seemed to be past, capitalist policy was to take back the concessions made in May. Spiraling prices and taxes eroded the pay increases won by the general strike. At the beginning of March the government refused to negotiate new wage increases with the major union federations, insisting that wage increases not rise more than 4 percent in 1969. This move provoked the massive general strike of March 11, which, while still closely controlled by the CP-led unions, demonstrated once again the tremendous potential power of the working class in action.

By the time of the referendum, many illusions about the capacity of the Gaullist regime to institute meaningful reforms had been dispelled.

What was most significant in the voting was the large sector of the middle class, traditional Gaullists, that voted "no." This sector -- which at first supported the May revolt and then responded to de Gaulle's demagogy about the prospect of "anarchy" -- decided that the evils of Gaullism had become weightier than the "dangers" of living without the general. As one Parisian bartender told a reporter: "France is not made for a dictatorship. It's Monsieur Moi who is going."

It should also be noted, as a symptom of the depth of the popular discontent, that de Gaulle was defeated in a plebiscite, a favorite device of authoritarian rulers because there are no opposing candidates and the voting is automatically weighted to the most conservative and backward sectors of the population. The plebiscite was initiated into French politics by Napoleon III. It is fitting that it should have brought down de Gaulle, who patterned his politics so closely on those developed by Napoleon Bonaparte's nephew.

The main effect of de Gaulle's defeat will be to give new impetus to the forces set in motion last May-June. There is no figure comparable to de Gaulle who can weld together the heterogeneous bourgeois parties under monolithic presidential rule. The leading contenders for the presidency, particularly Georges Pompidou, can be expected to carry on the broad outline of Gaullist policy. But there will

be an inevitable centrifugal process among the bourgeois parties and politicians that will make for a more fluid political situation.

There will be important new openings for the left, since de Gaulle's successor will inherit his problems, along with the lack of means for solving them.

The capitalist centers of the world are worried over the stability of the franc following de Gaulle's resignation. The New York Times commented April 28:

"The resignation of President de Gaulle was expected to lead to renewed pressure on the French franc and perhaps a devaluation that would touch off general currency realignments throughout Western Europe." But what worried the Times even more was the prospect of new struggles by the workers in the absence of any figure with the authority of a de Gaulle to unite the repressive forces:

"New wage agreements still have to be negotiated, and there is some concern whether these can be held down to the modest levels the Government thinks necessary without a new round of general strikes."

Of key importance in the developments that lie ahead is the role of the youth vanguard. The departure of de Gaulle will give the young revolutionaries new room for maneuver and the opportunity to reach out to new layers of the working class. Especially important in this respect is the formation at the beginning of March of the Communist League by supporters of the left-Communist paper Rouge -- including former members of the now-banned Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire [Revolutionary Communist Youth] and the Parti Communiste Internationaliste [Internationalist Communist party -- the French section of the Fourth International].

The youth were not slow to take to the streets after the results of the referendum were announced. Minutes after de Gaulle's resignation was reported, thousands of students and young workers gathered in the Latin Quarter, where they marched up the Boulevard St.-Germain shouting, "It's only the beginning — the struggle continues." Police attacked the marchers and it was reported that seventy were arrested and more than fifty demonstrators were hospitalized.

Especially infuriating to the police was the song the students chanted, the song first heard last May. It goes:

"Adieu, de Gaulle; adieu, de Gaulle; adieu, adieu, adieu."

#### NIXON'S FIRST NINETY DAYS

By George Novack

As Nixon was preparing to take over the reins of power in January, an article in <u>Intercontinental Press</u> described his projected course as follows: "The sailing orders of the Nixon administration at the beginning of its voyage are much more modest [than Johnson's]: 'Don't rock the boat.' The constituency that put him in office yearns most of all for an end to convulsions at home and abroad and the restoration of capitalist 'law and order.'

"Nixon would prefer to reproduce the sedative conservatism that prevailed during the latter years of Eisenhower's tenure by reducing military action in Vietnam as the General did in Korea and proceeding with a cautious domestic policy that will keep his supporters happy and discontent under control." [See "Nixon Inherits Johnson's Headaches," Intercontinental Press, January 13, 1969, page 3.]

Three months after inauguration there is no need to revise the above appraisal, which has been confirmed by the record registered during this whole initial period.

Up to now Nixon has given priority to foreign affairs. Vietnam remains the most pressing problem in this area and the one fraught with the greatest difficulties. The president would like to extricate the United States from its entanglement in that country. The hope of military victory having been eclipsed, even Washington must recognize that the relationship of political and moral force is far too disadvantageous for its armed might to overcome.

However, Nixon and his advisers have yet to find either the will or the way to liquidate this disastrous and costly venture. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stubbornly resist pulling out any sizable segment of the armed forces stationed in South Vietnam; some war hawks even look for a magical reversal of the situation. But the Saigon government is far more likely to crumble than the National Liberation Front to collapse or Hanoi to truckle to the American demands.

The U.S. envoys have yet to display any readiness to measurably scale down the fighting or go even a quarter of the way in meeting the conditions set forth by the Vietnamese. Despite propaganda about de-Americanizing the conflict, Nixon has so far refused to reduce military operations. The result is a protracted deadlock which is being paid for by several hundred deaths a week while

ground combat and air raids continue at undiminished levels. Almost a third of the American troops killed in action have died since Washington's "peace offensive" began on March 31, 1968.

The shooting down of a U.S. spy plane by the North Koreans has placed Nixon in the same predicament that Johnson faced over the seizure of the Pueblo. What sort of retaliation is the mightiest military power in the world going to attempt? Nixon has gone further than Johnson, whom he castigated for yielding to a "fourth-rate power," by announcing that the aerial espionage missions would continue and by sending an armada of twenty-three warships into the Sea of Japan to back up his commitment. But so far he is trying to settle the matter through negotiation without creating a war-crisis atmosphere.

The reactions of the White House are constrained by its awareness of the people's opposition to being dragged into further military encounters in the Far East while the Vietnam war festers. The mounting antimilitarist mood in the country is evidenced not only in the outburst of student demonstrations to drive the Reserve Officers Training Corps off the campuses but also in the surprisingly strong opposition in Congress to the exorbitant military appropriations requested by the Pentagon and to the antiballistic missile system Nixon is determined to push for. The Pentagonists have not encountered so much criticism on Capitol Hill since the start of the cold war.

After mending his fences in NATO through his visit to Europe, Nixon is steadily promoting his projected entente with Moscow. As the New York Times editors pointed out April 20: "The President has staked much of the success of his Administration upon his dealings with the leaders of the Soviet Union. He counts upon their cooperation to help ease the way to a mutually satisfactory settlement in Vietnam."

Washington has openly acknowledged the Kremlin's assistance in smoothing the way to the Paris talks and banks on more such aid in the months ahead. It has not allowed Czechoslovakia, Berlin, the Middle East, or any other trouble spot to divert it from pursuing this objective.

Nixon has been fortunate in the fact that since January no revolutionary uprisings on the order of the Dominican Republic or Vietnam have required him to protect imperialist interests through

another large-scale repressive intervention by American military arms. But his luck on this score may run out long before his term is over.

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Nixon's lethargy is most conspicuous on the domestic front, where a swarm of problems clamor for solution or alleviation. The press and other media keep calling attention to the unsatisfied grievances of the Afro-Americans, the rebelliousness of the youth, zooming rents and the dearth of low-cost housing, the deepening decay and financial stringency of the urban centers, the expanding relief rolls, the expensiveness of medical care, the effects of inflation on fixed and low-income groups, and so on.

The administration presents piddling measures designed to "tidy up" the mess rather than come to grips with the major problems of the people. The tenpoint program that the president finally submitted to Congress in mid-April addressed itself to peripheral issues. The same was true of his tax reform plan.

Apart from the suggested repeal of the 7 percent tax credit on business investments as an anti-inflation measure, the recommended modifications at the lowest and highest levels of the tax structure will do nothing to redistribute national income in favor of the poor and do not compensate for the drastic reductions already made in social welfare benefits. In any event, the proposals have yet to run the Congressional gauntlet.

Nixon's domestic policies are dominated by the intention to slow down inflation without substantial cuts in the \$80

billion for military expenditures or damage to the bountiful profiteering of the monopolies. Thus social benefits have been the first and most serious casualties of his budgetary adjustments. Similar slashes in social services are being instituted by state governors and legislatures.

The rich and the suburbanite set, who are the principal patrons and props of the Republican administration, are too lulled by the prolonged prosperity and too removed from reality to sense the extent of the discontent and unrest that is building up in the depths of American society. They view the protests of black and white students that have been breaking out repeatedly this spring as the antics of anarchistic adolescents rather than as harbingers of a broader revulsion against the way things are.

Nixon's immobilism reflects this complacency of America's upper crust. Kennedy and Johnson, although the results of their actions often differed from what they bargained for, were capable of new departures, or at least of promising change. Nixon is a politician of a different caliber. He feels at ease with the status quo. He wishes to avoid disturbances, minimize risks, and wait until he is jolted into action by the onset of events.

With the greatest of resources at his command, the man in the White House displays a poverty of initiative. None-theless, the problems he prefers to ignore will not go away or solve themselves. The passivity of his administration in respect to them should pave the way for some explosive consequences later on in his term of office.

#### MORE STUDENTS SENTENCED TO PRISON IN POLAND

Three young women were sentenced to prison for eighteen months each by a Warsaw court April 23 for their part in Polish student demonstrations in March 1968.

Irena Lasota, Irena Grudzinska, and Teresa Kinga Bogucka were specifically accused of belonging to a "clandestine" organization, the Commandos. This was the student group said to have been led by Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, the left Communist student leaders sentenced to long prison terms last January.

(Kuron and Modzelewski were also charged with collaborating with the world Trotskyist movement, but the Gomulka regime found them not guilty of this "crime," which carries a mandatory sentence of five years in prison in Poland.)

The trial of the three coeds opened April 14. They were charged with having helped to plan and organize the student demonstrations which followed the closing of the classic anticzarist play <u>Dziady</u> in February 1968.

Irena Lasota was charged with having publicly read a student resolution in the courtyard of Warsaw University protesting the removal of a number of professors. All three of the defendants were arrested in March 1968. They were released in August and appeared before the court on their own recognizance. They were convicted under Article 36 of the Small Penal Code, which prohibits any organization of a "clandestine" character.

Many students are still in prison awaiting trial on similar charges.

#### CRISIS DEEPENS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

By Gerry Foley

The conflict bubbling for half a year in the English-ruled enclave of Northern Ireland boiled over again April 19, producing the hottest crisis yet for the pro-English Unionist regime that has ruled the area for fifty years.

A series of violent provocations by ultraright Unionist forces began immediately after the announcement that Bernadette Devlin, a twenty-one-year-old student civil rights fighter, had won her race for the Mid-Ulster seat in the English House of Commons.

Miss Devlin is a member of the Belfast student group People's Democracy [PD], which has been the militant driving force in the civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland. PD has been fighting the communalist oppression of Catholics in Northern Ireland by pushing for democratic political and economic reforms throughout all of Ireland. Ten days before the Mid-Ulster election, a civil rights procession headed by Michael Farrell, the leader of PD, crossed the border and marched to Dublin to protest against clericalist laws in the Catholic-dominated South of Ireland.

Miss Devlin waged a radical campaign calling for economic reforms that would benefit Catholic and Protestant alike and raising the slogan of a united socialist Ireland. She succeeded in uniting all the anti-Unionist parties behind her and apparently won over many Protestant workers. Her victory was a new high point in the anticommunalist campaign which over the last half year has threatened the basis of imperialist rule in both parts of Ireland. It threw all the reactionary forces in Ireland and England into a panic.

On April 19, the day after the election results were announced, Bernadette Devlin's opponent led a march of 10,000 fanatical Unionists through the victor's hometown of Cookstown, County Tyrone. Within the context of communal antagonisms and oppression in Northern Ireland, such a march of Protestant bigots could only have been intended as a provocation.

The Unionist party is the party of the Protestant landlords and bourgeois interests, which throughout its history has been able to get the support of the mass of the Protestant population by fostering communalist feeling. The Protestants were originally settled in Northern Ireland as a garrison colony to hold the country for England. They became a kind of upper caste with respect to the older Catholic

Irish population. Membership in one community or the other is a matter of tradition and not religious belief.

The same day that this provocative march was staged in Cookstown, Northern Irish Minister of Home Affairs Robert Porter banned a civil rights demonstration that was scheduled to march into Derry City from the outlying Burntollet Bridge, claiming that he had information that Unionists armed with deadly weapons were preparing to intercept the march.

Despite the ban and an announcement by the civil rights movement that the march was postponed, a crowd of ultrarightist followers of the rabble-rousing Protestant preacher Ian Paisley showed up at the bridge to meet any civil rights activists who might still attempt to march.

Once the Unionists found themselves in undisputed control of the highway, the April 20 issue of the Dublin Sunday Press reported, they began to march on Derry City, waving the English flag and singing "God Save the Queen."

When the Unionist marchers entered Derry, they found a group of civil rights activists staging a sit-down demonstration in protest against the ban on the scheduled civil rights parade. The demonstrators were surrounded by a crowd of civil rights supporters. A car driven by a Unionist speeded toward the group sitting down, while Unionist marchers heaved rocks at the procivil rights crowd. When people in the crowd began to defend themselves, the police intervened to protect the Unionists, touching off a rebellion throughout the city. For the second time this year, barricades went up around the Catholic ghetto of Bogside.

John Hume, a moderate civil rights leader and member of the Northern Irish parliament for Mid-Derry, warned the police that they would start a civil war if they tried to invade the Catholic area. His warnings were ignored. At 12:30 a.m., April 20, police stormed through the barricades. Hume himself was arrested when he tried to rescue a boy being dragged off by the police.

Bernadette Devlin, who was a participant in this battle, described the final police assault in her maiden speech before the House of Commons three days later:

"I was not strutting around with my hands behind my back touring the area and examining the damage and tut-tutting every time a policeman had his head



MICHAEL FARRELL

scratched. I was building barricades to keep the police out of Bogside because I knew it was not safe for them to come in.

"I saw that night on the Bogside with my own eyes, 1,000 policemen come in a military formation to that economically and socially depressed area, 6 then 12 abreast, like wild Indians screaming their heads off to terrorize the inhabitants..."

A series of bombings of government and municipal buildings and installations also began April 19. The Northern Irish government attributed these to the Irish Republican Army [IRA]. Civil rights spokesmen, however, have ridiculed this charge, and it has been suggested that these bombings were also rightist provocations.

When young civil rights demonstrators attacked and burned police buses at Newry in January, the <u>United Irishman</u>, organ of the Republican movement, expressed the strongest disapproval of any action that could alienate important sections of the civil rights campaign. It wrote:

"The Republicans in the North have to-date been the most disciplined element

in the mass Civil Rights marches. They must continue to be so."

Using the pretext of the bombings, Northern Irish Prime Minister Terence O'Neill appealed for English troops, which were promptly sent. Subsequently it was announced that members of the ill-famed, fanatically anti-Catholic B-Special auxiliary police were being called up to man motorized patrols. Clashes continued between Unionists and Catholics in several places during the week following the Derry riots.

The shipment of troops to Northern Ireland represented a big step for the English government and reflected deep worry on its part about the developments there. London has always sought to maintain the fiction that Northern Ireland is a natural community that has chosen to associate itself with the United Kingdom and that English troops could be used there only against foreign enemies. In this way, English imperialism has tried to avoid the embarrassment of having to accept responsibility for the Unionist police state.

After reinforcing his repressive apparatus, O'Neill moved swiftly to force his Unionist parliamentary fraction to accept giving minimum concessions to the Catholic population. By a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-two, the Unionists agreed to the principle of one-man one-vote in local elections. Up till now voting in local elections has been based on property qualifications that gave multiple votes to the rich, and disfranchised the mostly Catholic poor.

The acceptance of universal adult suffrage by the Unionist parliamentary fraction brought the resignation of O'Neill's Minister of Agriculture, Major Chichester-Clark. Right-wing Unionists sought to appeal the fraction's decision to higher bodies of the party, where it seemed likely O'Neill would lose.

At the same time, civil rights leaders representing the full spectrum of the movement denounced O'Neill's concessions as too little and too late, since the harshest aspect of the Unionist system is economic discrimination against Catholics.

Even if O'Neill is able to put down the right-wing rebellion in his own party and carry through his reforms, which is by no means certain, it will be extremely difficult for him to moderate, much less resolve the crisis. Having maintained its rule for fifty years on the basis of religious bigotry and hysteria, the Unionist regime cannot help but have a very difficult time in accommodating to democratic reforms.

#### THE REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE IN BRAZIL

By Armando Gomes

[The following article is taken from the March issue of Quatrième Internationale, the official magazine of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

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The putschist generals presented the December 14 "coup d'etat" as a mere replay of the coup that overthrew Goulart in 1964. But a lot of water has gone under the bridge in these last five years.

In Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart's time, the phase of "accelerated development," based on foreign investment and "permanent inflation," allowed the government to conduct a populist and demagogic policy. In fact, the workers did get some benefits from this period of capitalist expansion; and this enabled the government to enjoy a certain basis of popular support.

This policy could not, however, be maintained over the long run, and it was precisely because this cycle of expansion had exhausted itself that the bourgeoisie staged the 1964 coup d'etat. Its primary objective was to stabilize the financial situation. It was no longer possible to effect a stabilization on a populist basis; therefore it was necessary to change the political system.

What we are seeing now is simply the logical development flowing from this option taken by the ruling classes. There has been, in fact, a "stabilization" by comparison with the dizzy inflation that raged in the Goulart period. At that time prices rose 100 percent a year; now they rise by about 30 percent a year. This is undoubtedly a success in the conditions of an underdeveloped capitalist economy.

The other side of the stabilization policy has been a wage "stabilization" involving a roughly 50 percent decline in buying power since 1964. The "austerity" measures have also affected small and middle-sized industry and small and middle-sized commerce, inasmuch as serious credit restrictions have been imposed. Agriculture has also suffered from governmental pressures, since the government has prodded it to produce certain commodities and has set the price for them at a very low level.

The sole aim of all these measures is to promote the concentration of capital, which is the only solution for an underdeveloped capitalist country suffering from an early but final crisis of

markets.

This kind of economic solution precludes all hope of solid popular support for the government in the immediate future. To the contrary, it arouses popular opposition. This explains the wave of more or less "spontaneous" strikes last year.

The first important strikes since 1964 broke out in April 1968 in Minas Gerais. A series of strikes in the São Paulo automobile industry followed shortly thereafter. The "great taboo" of the Brazilian left was dispelled overnight. The automobile workers had been cited as the most nearly perfect example of "an aristocracy of the working class," as the most "privileged" and the most "bourgeoisified" workers aristocracy in Latin America.

Since no representative trade-union organization existed, the strikes were organized on the spot in the factory.

In July 1968 the workers movement took a leap forward. Several foundries in Osasco, a workers' suburb of São Paulo, were occupied in succession by the workers, and the managers were held as hostages. The workers demanded a sliding scale of wages to compensate for inflation with increases every three months, as well as collective bargaining.

The strikes were organized by factory committees entirely free of control by the police-dominated trade unions. Coordination was established among the various factory committees. The average age of the factory committee members was 24, and in these committees the influence of the new revolutionary vanguards was felt concretely for the first time.

The absence of traditions of full-fledged working-class struggles and the heritage of so many years of reformism and populism closely identified with the state apparatus and "official" trade unionism all explain why discontent did not come to the surface earlier in the form of mushrooming workers struggles.

Discontent emerged first indirectly through a certain number of intermediary forms -- the student revolt, the conflicts in the church, the opposition in parliament, etc. Besides the qualitative change these strikes represented in the development of working-class consciousness, they all brought unforeseen pressure to bear on the budget and on the government's economic policy.

The student movement took an extraordinary jump, going over into a phase of general offensive. It ceased waiting to react to the government's moves. It imposed changes in the universities by bringing the weight of its force to bear. It went into the streets and to the factories to give active support to the mass movement and the factory occupations. It was not uncommon to see student militants openly recognized as leaders by the workers.

Obviously, this student influence reflected local conditions -- the absence of a strong reformist union -- and does not represent an end in itself. But it symbolized in a certain way the role of the student movement as a substitute for a vanguard.

To fill out this picture of the prevailing "agitation," a whole series of bold holdups of banks and various reactionary newspapers should also be mentioned. It must be noted that these actions did not have great repercussions among the people. Nonetheless, they did help to heat up the crisis within the army and the ruling classes.

All this background serves to indicate how highly "charged" the political situation was as a result of the upsurge of struggles in 1968. Not only was it increasingly difficult for the bourgeoisie to find a more or less "popular" formula of rule but the government's economic policy itself was threatened.

It must be added that the crystallization of the crisis in the clergy in the last weeks before the putsch also helped topple what had been one of the ideological supports of the bourgeoisie in 1964 -- the "Christian and Western values" in whose name it mobilized the petty bourgeoisie in 1964 to overthrow Goulart.

The ruling classes were left with only two alternatives. They could retreat and abandon wage and credit restrictions so as to create a broader popular base for the regime. But in that case they would have to run the risk of aggravating the economic crisis and the inner contradictions of underdeveloped capitalism.

The other alternative was to respond to an increasingly well organized and politically conscious mass movement by tightening up the political structures, taking the risk of a shrinking base of popular support. This would have the advantage of enabling the bourgeoisie to step up their "austerity" policy, and the disadvantage of exposing the class nature of the government more clearly than ever.

"Civilian" Government and Military Government

The ruling classes evidently chose the second alternative on December 14. But we must not interpret this latest "coup d'etat within the coup d'etat" in a mechanical way. It did not necessarily correspond to the immediate interests of the bourgeoisie. Of course, in the long run, the military dictatorship is still a bourgeois dictatorship which will defend the interests of the big monopolies, the big rural landowners, and the big commercial interests.

However, this military dictatorship is an indirect form of bourgeois dictatorship exercised through the intermediary of the military apparatus. Its indirect character reduces the opportunity the representatives of the bourgeoisie normally have to exercise pressure on behalf of their immediate interests — the parliament, the courts, etc. As a result of the dissolution of all these authorities and a rigorous censorship of the bourgeois press, the military officers enjoy considerable autonomy with respect to the class which they ultimately represent.

It must be noted, moreover, that for a large part of the bourgeoisie, the military have already accomplished the mission assigned to them in 1964 -- that is, to crush the mass movement that existed at the time of Goulart and to shift the weight of the economic crisis onto the back of the workers.

The economic conjuncture is far less threatening now for the bourgeoisie than in the years immediately after the 1964 putsch. There was even a certain revival of economic expansion in 1968, although it obviously was entirely insufficient to absorb the enormous productive reserves left outside the market—with labor power heading the list of these unutilized reserves.

In these conditions, the bourgeoisie sought to reassert a much more direct control over political power, which it had "ceded" to its military apparatus in 1964. We saw a frenetic campaign by members of parliament and some bourgeois papers for a "civilian" candidate for the presidency, which limited still more the political bases of military rule. The bourgeois oppositions proposed "liberalizing" the regime as the only remedy that could neutralize worker and student agitation.

The mass movement had taken a leap forward in 1968, and that had great importance for the future. But the mass movement did not yet represent a sufficient threat to the regime to justify the December coup. Quite to the contrary, the climate of instability created by the emergency measures, the wave of repression, etc., threatened to provoke a slow-

down in investment and, above all, in the entry of foreign capital.

On the one hand, the coup d'etat was the specific expression of a military government and of the determination on the part of the military officers not to relinquish any of the caste prerogatives they seized by force in 1964. It must not be forgotten that since 1964 practically all the administrative functionaries (from the ministers and judges to the trade-union leaders...) have been replaced by military officers.

But on the other hand, this contradiction between the bourgeoisie and its military representatives reflects the vacillation of the ruling classes over what is the best tactic for containing the reviving mass movement of 1968. There has been no change, then, in the class content of the regime in Brazil. The "civilian" bourgeois have no other choice but to rally behind the "bourgeois in uniform."

In any case, revolutionary militants must explain to the workers in a clear way the nature of the political crises within the bourgeois regime. The ruling class's weaknesses must serve as an opportunity for action by the working class, which alone is capable of raising the crisis to a higher level.

#### The Revolutionary Response

The present repression will not change the conditions of the struggle a great deal, since most work was already clandestine. It will be necessary more and more to defend mass demonstrations by violent means and to organize reprisals against the hangmen and murderers in the pay of the dictatorship. But this must always be done in close harmony with the needs of the mass movement.

The rise of struggles in 1968 produced a clarification of perspectives within the revolutionary left. It "tested" the various organizations in a certain way as well as their line and their capacity for intervention.

It is no longer worth talking about the old reformist Communist party. It has totally collapsed, remaining on the sidelines of all mass struggle. Its influence has declined steadily to the advantage of the young vanguards, in which, moreover, most of the former Communist party members have regrouped.

Within the left (we need not use the term "far left"; who would lay claim to this title after the disintegration of the reformist CP?), there are essentially two poles, the line of demarcation being the role assigned to the proletariat in the revolution. The whole past of re-

formist empiricism, allied with the conditions of economic and cultural "underdevelopment," had produced an indescribable "theoretical underdevelopment" within the left in Brazil.

We find a reflection of this situation in the juxtaposition that has been made between an abstract category of "armed struggle" (made synonymous with revolution) and the "peaceful road" (synonymous with reformism). This antithesis leaves no room for considering the role of the various classes in the revolutionary process. If revolutionary strategy is equated with a strategy of armed struggle, the proletariat is automatically condemned to reformism whenever guerrilla warfare is not on the order of the day.

It is on the basis of this confusion that the "pure Debrayist" currents have avoided discussing the character of the revolution. In fact, such a discussion would require that it be determined which classes are the motive force of the revolution and what the nature of the tasks of the vanguard is.

There is a "military deviation" that consists in conceiving the guerrilla movement as a substitute for the revolutionary party and armed struggle as a substitute for class struggle (which is supposed to intervene only at the last moment in order to give the coup de grace to the regime).

Understandably this voluntarist conception passes over the socialist character of the revolution and takes refuge in the easier formulations of "people's revolution," "anti-imperialist struggle," etc. In fact, if the essential task is not to mobilize the workers against the regime, it is possible to get by without proposing a revolution-ary program attacking the interests of the bourgeoisie. But how can you fight imperialism without fighting the bourgeoisie, since the concrete existence of imperialism in every country is inseparably bound up with bourgeois rule?

#### The Perspectives of the Left

Those tendencies which underestimated the struggles of the working class were outdistanced by the events of 1968. This was reflected in the student movement by a decline in the influence of AP [Ação Popular -- People's Action] and a corresponding increase in that of the opposition currents in the CP youth, and the POC [Partido Operário Comunista -- Communist Workers party].\*

<sup>\*</sup> The product of a fusion between various dissident currents in the CP and the revolutionary Marxist organization Politica

The populist orientation represented by AP was dominant in the student movement up until 1967. It called on the "people" to struggle against the dictatorship but made no effort to distinguish class differences within the people and the dictatorship. The revival of working-class struggles in 1968 gave a concrete content to the slogan of a worker-student alliance. This threw organizations like the AP, the PCBR, the pro-Chinese CP, and some dissident tendencies in the CP that were more or less influenced by "Debrayism" into confusion.

There have been numerous splits and regroupments, reflecting a more or less acute awareness of the need for a revolutionary strategy effectively tied to the development of the class struggle. In this area, the role played by the POC has been extremely important. It has been able to become an important pole of regroupment, inasmuch as its program was the first to postulate the necessity of a revolutionary policy for the proletariat, for a strategy strictly subordinating armed struggle to class warfare.

The guerrillas must not wait until a mass movement breaks out spontaneously,

Operária [Workers Politics].

to "crown" (in a certain sense), their military victory over the army. Without an insurrection by the workers, there will be no seizure of power.

The Brazilian revolution will be proletarian or it will not be a revolution. And the proletariat cannot play its role in this process, it cannot be mobilized and coordinated with the rural workers, without a revolutionary party to lead its struggles and to serve as an instrument for taking power. The formation of the POC was an important step toward the development of such a party.

The economic outlook for 1969 cannot help but encourage the development of the working-class struggles. The relative revival of expansion will necessarily be accompanied by a general price rise. This will exercise a stronger and stronger pressure on the bourgeoisie to "stabilize" wages so as to hold inflation to "tolerable" levels. The economic struggles must be led by factory committees and closely linked to the work of political agitation and revolutionary organization in the working class. The struggles of the past year must be resumed and the strikes organized in such a way as to prepare the class to act on a higher political level in the coming crises.

#### STUDENT STRUGGLES ON THE RISE IN SENEGAL AND MALI

Striking high-school and college students clashed with police in Dakar, the Senegalese capital, April 21-22. The students have been on strike for more than a month.

On April 21 striking students at Van-Vollenhoven High School in the center of Dakar forced nonstriking students to leave their classrooms. Police, who were stationed nearby, forced the strikers to evacuate the school, using tear-gas grenades against the students. There were a number of arrests.

At a women's college, a group of young people tried to block the entrances, but they were driven off by tear-gas grenades. The incidents began at Pikiné, in the suburbs of Dakar, where young "commandos" sought to close down a number of high schools. The police intervened there also, and several students were injured.

The students are demanding the reinstatement of eighteen of their comrades, expelled during a student strike in February at the rural cadre school of Bamby, and of others expelled in the struggles that followed. The government has refused.

On April 18 the National Assembly

adopted bills granting the president the right to declare a state of emergency and a state of siege. Under these laws, the government has wide powers to restrict individual liberty. The state of siege, which can be invoked by presidential decree, would give the military jurisdiction in all matters of public order. Authorities would have the power to jail persons without trial "whose activity presents a danger for public security."

Major student strikes in Senegal, a former French colony, were first touched off in the aftermath of the May-June 1968 upheaval in France. They have continued intermittently ever since. The government expected the current strike to die out during the school break over Easter vacation. The sharp renewal of student action when the vacation ended evidently prompted the government to adopt the new repressive legislation.

In neighboring Mali, more than 3,000 high-school and college students went on strike April 17 in the capital, Bamako. The striking students are opposed to a reform project backed by the minister of education. They have voted to stay out of classes until their demands are met.

#### REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

By Tariq Ali

[The following article was written by Tariq Ali, the Pakistani-born British antiwar leader, for the radical newspaper Black Dwarf, of which he is an editor. Tariq Ali is a member of the International Marxist Group, the British affiliate of the Fourth International.]

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During my recent visit to Pakistan I made as thorough a study as circum-stances permitted of the prevailing polit-ical situation. I visited some of the storm centres of the recent upsurge at the invitation of militants who had spearheaded the struggle. I spoke to representatives of some of the political parties and spent just over three weeks in both West and East Pakistan, though unfortunately my visit to Dacca was too short and I was unable to visit the countryside. At the end of this period one could understand clearly the problems which faced the revolutionary movement in Pakistan and also appreciate its needs. This, however, is not the place for a specialised report. A more general picture is necessary in order to demystify some of the ideas fostered by the British press.

#### A Dictator Falls

By a strange coincidence I arrived in Pakistan on the morning of February 21, 1969. That same evening Ayub was scheduled to broadcast to the nation. He had been unable to meet the needs of a mass movement which had been active since November 1968. He had offered too little too late and political activists waited anxiously for his broadcast.

The atmosphere was reminiscent of Paris last June with students and workers waiting for de Gaulle to appear on the small screen. In the evening he announced his "irrevocable" decision to retire from politics. His voice was distraught. He spoke in simple Urdu of his deep love for Pakistan. (Cynics speculated as to which of his two favourite civil servants — Altaf Gauhar or Q. Shahab — could have written the speech. A few private bets were placed.)

Ayub is down, but is he out? Excitement ran high in the streets of the main cities. Crowds danced with pleasure. Few ponder about the future. The present is more important. The struggle has been victorious.

The workers and students are aware of their strength. Yet few realise how close they were to a bloodbath on February 21. The original decision had been to



GENERAL YAHYA KHAN

impose martial law on February 21. Ayub had been consulting with the chiefs of the armed services and they had stated their willingness to impose direct military rule. What changed Ayub's mind at the last minute was the situation in East Pakistan.

There a bogus frame-up, the Agarthala conspiracy case, was in progress, in which Mujibur Rahman, leader of the centrist Awami League, and several others were being tried for "conspiring with India." One of the accused was an East Pakistani army sergeant, Zahirul Haq.

During the course of his imprisonment Zahirul Haq was shot dead by his West Pakistani army guard "while trying to escape." It was obvious that there had been no escape attempt and that Sgt. Zahirul Haq had been murdered after a petty altercation.

A military curfew was imposed in Dacca, where the authorities feared popular demonstrations. The curfew was defied by over 100,000 workers, students, and intellectuals. The general commanding the

Dacca garrison had two alternatives: he could start shooting them down or he could accept defeat. He wisely chose the second alternative.

The leaders of the demonstration then defied the army to open fire:

"Whenever there's a cyclone in East Pakistan thousands of peasants die. If you open fire it will be equivalent to four cyclones but we'll get you in the end."

The message was not lost on Ayub Khan. He realised that imposing martial law on February 21 would have meant a virtual civil war in East Pakistan. So the generals were asked to be patient. The orders which had been printed were, however, not put in cold storage. The army decided to wait a few weeks.

#### Round Tables and Conferences

All the opposition leaders were invited to Rawalpindi to meet Ayub and discuss the constitutional future of the country. The Agarthala conspiracy case was withdrawn and Mujibur Rahman arrived.

Maulana Bhashani, the 86-year-old left-wing peasant leader, refused to participate. "When the oppressed sit at the same table as the oppressor," he told a British TV team, "the oppressor usually wins."

Mr. Zulfiqar Bhutto and his People's party refused to participate unless Ayub was removed.

The only leftish party that participated was the pro-Moscow wing of Bhashani's National Awami party, but even they felt uneasy sitting at the same table with the neofascist Jamaat-i-Islami. It is clear that if the pro-Moscow NAP had not participated and had instead collaborated with the progressive forces outside, there would have been a united left opposition to the right-wing politics of both Ayub and those who were talking to him about "constitutional procedures" which were no solution to the problems facing the country.

It soon became obvious that Ayub's supporters, in collusion with the neofascists, were deliberately creating a situation where the only alternative visible to the frightened middle-class and big business and feudal interests was the army.

An indication that the reports of "anarchy," etc., were grossly exaggerated was provided by The Economist (April 5, 1969), which maintained that "reports of the losses in industrial production and exports caused by lockouts, strikes and gheraos have been grossly exaggerated."

The movement which swept across Pakistan embraced virtually every layer of society except, significantly, the peasantry in West Pakistan, who comprise 75 percent of the latter province's population. The struggle was sparked off exclusively by the student community of West Pakistan; it was taken up by students in East Pakistan, and there it rested for some months before workers and other layers came out in open support.

#### Students -- the Vanguard

The role of the students in the upsurge has been of the utmost importance. They have acted as a conscious vanguard and their main demands have from the very beginning been political demands not really concerned with university reforms. The amazing thing is that the student revolt embraced parts of the country which had been considered completely nonpolitical. Rawalpindi, the interim capital, has never had any militant tradition. If anything, the city has been notorious for being politically dead, and yet it was in Rawalpindi where students first took to the streets to inspire a struggle that was finally to overthrow Ayub. It was here that the first student was killed.

In the past it has always been the East Pakistani students who have been in the forefront of the struggle, and too often they have waited in vain for corresponding actions of solidarity from their West Pakistani comrades. This time it was West Pakistan that exploded. It was to take another month for the movement to grip East Pakistan as well.

However, there are basic differences between the student movement in East and West Pakistan. The students in the West were acting spontaneously; there was no single organisation to give the movement any coherent direction and no real efforts were made to set one up. Their main demand was the overthrow of Ayub and repeal of the hated University Ordinances. Beyond that there was a vacuum.

Of course there were isolated examples of left-wing student activists who were quite clear insofar as they wanted a socialist Pakistan, but their numbers were limited and they were hampered by the lack of a province-wide organisation. The government made full use of the absence of a recognizable left-wing student organisation to set up fake organisations to confuse the movement even further. This, coupled with the fact that the liberal and right-wing student leaders were more worried about their personal "leaderships" than with the need of building a viable organisation, led to the fragmentation of the West Pakistan student movement.

Admittedly there were left organi-

sations set up in Multan, Lyallpur, Karachi, etc., but they had not yet contacted each other.

In East Pakistan the students were united. Obviously a result of years of experience. In Dacca a Student Action Committee was virtually running the city for several weeks and the students had worked out an eleven-point manifesto which demanded regional autonomy.

However, in order to emphasize that it did not want to replace West Pakistani capitalists with indigenous ones, the manifesto's two important points were: nationalisation of the banks, insurance companies and major industrial units; and — to stress anti-imperialism — an immediate withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO.

The strength of the Student Action Committee was such that all the major political parties in East Pakistan had pledged their respective support to the students' demands. Not to have done so would have been tantamount to political self-immolation. Some of the largest public meetings organised in Dacca were under the aegis of the students, and no political gathering was complete unless the student representatives were present.

Powerful the students undoubtedly were but there were limits to what they could achieve. In a period where the government was deliberately fomenting chaos the students on their own could not run the city. The workers were unfortunately not sufficiently organised to make dual power a living reality.

To a certain extent, therefore, it was easy for government-hired hoodlums to operate with impunity. The Dacca police refused to act on the grounds that since the Student Action Committee controlled everything else, they could also solve murders and apprehend those who had committed them.

The aim of the government was quite clearly to frighten the middle classes in both East and West Pakistan, and this they succeeded in doing. But it is necessary to stress that, weak though the structures of Ayub's regime were, the students on their own would not have been able to down them. For that they needed the help of the working class.

#### Workers Support Students

For some weeks the students of West Pakistan struggled on their own. They fought pitched battles with the police, defied the army, and emerged bloody but unbowed. The workers, inspired by the student struggle, began to support them in increasing numbers.

Throughout the province, workers

in every industry came out on strike, and a steady escalation of strikes and militant demonstrations by the workers further weakened a tottering government.

In Lahore, 50,000 railway workers marched with red flags and chanted "Smash capitalism," "Keep religion out of politics," "Down with U.S. imperialism."

Some days later a puppet (government-paid) trade-union leader was sent to provoke the railway workers. He went to address a meeting accompanied by two thuggish bodyguards armed with knives. His provocative antisocialist remarks resulted in loud heckling, whereupon one of his bodyguards stabbed one of the hecklers.

The provocation was successful. The workers beat the offending bodyguard to death, fractured the arms and legs of the stooge trade-union leader, and burnt his car. It was a costly provocation but it had served its purpose. The news was widely reported and publicised and helped to create the atmosphere that would convince the middle classes of the need for an army take-over in order to protect them from "extremists."

In East Pakistan there was a similar situation, and the workers "gheraoed" many a factory to win wage increases. Here too the workers linked arms with the students and helped swell the already massive demonstrations.

Unfortunately in both East and West Pakistan there was and is no coherent, disciplined workers organisation. If it had existed we would have seen dual power being exercised in East Pakistani cities.

The workers successes emboldened certain other layers to join the strike movement. In successive weeks we were to see postal workers, bank clerks, doctors, engineers, veterinary surgeons, coming out on strike. The ten-year wage freeze imposed by the Ayub regime was over.

What was lacking was an organisation which could have coordinated the different strikes into a powerful general strike throughout the country and impressed on the worker an understanding of his own strength.

In the industrial field, too, the government instructed its own trade-union organisations and its paid hirelings to join the movement to sow confusion, and in many industries workers were amazed to see their "leaders," who for years had acted as strikebreakers and police spies, now making lunatic demands. The stage was being prepared well. All that was needed in East Pakistan was to involve another powerful social force -- the peasantry.

### <u>Peasants -- Inactive in West...</u> <u>Militant in East</u>

The main weakness of the movement in West Pakistan was that it did not involve the 75 percent of the population who do not live in the cities. The peasants remained unaffected except for isolated pockets in Multan, Sargodha, and sections of the old North-West Frontier. One reason for this was that most of the peasants were still under the control of the landlords, who because of their economic hold, could manipulate them politically almost at will.

Another reason was the fact that very little serious political work has been done among the peasantry. The left NAP has done some work, but by no means enough and mainly in isolated pockets. As a result, the upsurge in the Western province completely bypassed the peasantry, which explains to a certain extent the comparative ease with which martial law could be reimposed.

In East Pakistan the situation was radically different. Here too the mass of the people lived in the countryside, but there were two basic differences. Most of the peasants were peasant proprietors, because the landlords, who had largely been Hindus, had left in 1947; also, patient political work had been carried out by Maulana Bhashani and other peasant leaders. As a consequence the peasant was faced mainly by government oppression in the form of rent collectors and West Pakistani civil servants.

When the movement got under way the peasants seized and burnt a number of police stations, expelled a few rent collectors, and set up their own administration. The reports that were, however, prepared and distributed by the government and spoke of "murders" and "rivers of blood" have no foundation in reality.

If more than a few people had been killed, we would have expected to see grisly photographs or ceremonial burials of the victims at any rate. This has not happened, and there can be little doubt that the reports were wild exaggerations used to justify an army take-over.

But even if the peasants were on a rampage, it would have been the duty of every revolutionary to support them. In fact the situation in East Pakistan did resemble to a certain extent the situation in the Chinese countryside in the twenties and thirties. Even then, so-called peasant excesses used to frighten the middle classes and sometimes even those who were part of the revolutionary movement. Commenting on this, Mao remarked in his celebrated report on the peasant movement in Hunan (1927): that

"The peasants' revolt disturbed the gentry's sweet dreams. When the news from the countryside reached the cities, it caused immediate uproar among the gentry...From the middle social-strata upward to the Kuomintang right-wingers, there was not a single person who did not sum up the whole business in the phrase, 'It's terrible.' Under the impact of the views of the 'It is terrible!' school then flooding the city, even quite revolutionary minded people became downhearted as they pictured the events in the countryside in their mind's eye; and they were unable to deny the word 'terrible'...But as already mentioned, the fact is that the great peasant masses have risen to fulfil their historic mission and that the forces of rural democracy have risen to overthrow the forces of rural feudalism...It's fine. It is not 'terrible' at all. It is anything but terrible. No revolutionary comrade should echo this nonsense..." (Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp. 26-27.)

Considering the similarities, it is inexcusable that the Chinese leader-ship have not issued any statement on the situation in Pakistan and that there has not been any mention of the Pakistani upsurge in the Chinese press.

#### Conclusions and Lessons

The strength of the upsurge (its immediate and spontaneous character) was also its chief weakness. It is obvious that the intensity of the struggle took all the political parties by surprise. Their leaderships decided to emerge on the streets only after the struggle was well under way, but what is interesting is that even right-wing parties like the Council Muslim League realised what the masses were shouting for, and accordingly their latest party manifesto talks of nationalisation of industries, antimperialist foreign policy, and -- wonder of wonders -- thoroughgoing land reforms in West Pakistan, which would, in fact, entail a liquidation of the party's only social base!

The manifesto in places is much more radical than the election manifestos of the British and French Communist parties.

The Council Muslim League is not alone in its newfound radicalism. Most of the political forces, excepting the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistan army, and the Civil Service of Pakistan, are posing radical alternatives.

The only existing left party is the National Awami party. It is, as Maulana Bhashani himself acknowledges, a broad-based social-democratic party with members of the defunct Pakistan Communist party dispersed inside it. (The Pakistan CP was banned in 1951 after an attempted putsch.) The division of the party into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking wings is based not so much on political as on personality differences. In the Pakistani context it is an unfortunate division because the fascists bent on liquidating the left are not going to distinguish between pro-Peking and pro-Moscow sympathisers.

Some form of unity is therefore essential between the two factions. Their internecine squabbling has crippled the Pakistani left and also kept out some excellent cadres who are prepared for solid political work but who are disgusted with the petty and vindictive backbiting which characterises left politics in Pakistan. Though in some parts of the country (particularly in the North-West Frontier) the leadership of the pro-Moscow NAP would prefer alliances with right-wing parties, there still exist cadres in both factions who would prefer some form of unity.

However, what is really needed in Pakistan today is a well-disciplined, organised Socialist Workers and Peasants party which can build a strong force of cadres who are prepared to do some serious grass-roots political work, who will formulate their policies keeping the specific situation in Pakistan in mind, and who see the struggle for a socialist Pakistan in the context of the worldwide struggle against U.S. imperialism. It is only by working towards building such a party that we will be able to struggle against the exploitation of the worker, the peasant, and the student in Pakistan.

The recent struggle has brought the masses of East and West Pakistan clos-

er together. West Pakistanis have begun to realise that the enemy which oppresses the East oppresses them as well, and the East Pakistanis have realised that the West, too, is prepared to struggle. However, the imposition of martial law for a second time will be regarded by the East as a gesture designed to curb their demands for regional autonomy. And demands for an independent East Pakistan are bound to increase. For this the army is to blame and they are the ones who should be held responsible.

(It is interesting to note that the Indian government, while denying the Soviet Union the right to send planes loaded with arms for North Vietnam over Indian territory, have recently allowed Pakistan to fly troops across India to East Pakistan.)

Having tolerated a military dictatorship for the last ten years, the workers, students, and peasants will not tolerate the present military rulers for long. It is to be hoped that General Yahya Khan realises this, because if he thinks that the lack of an active opposition to martial law implies its nonexistence, he is bound to be sadly disillusioned in the not too distant future.

Already the coal miners in Baluchistan have defied martial law regulations and come out on strike; their leader has been shot dead and others arrested, but this is only the beginning.

The longer the country is ruled by medieval laws, the more vicious will be the revenge of the people. One hopes that the generals will take note of this before trying to pull Pakistan back to the Dark Ages.

#### BOMB ATTACK ON SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY OFFICE IN NEW YORK

Terrorist bombers hurled a live hand grenade at the national headquarters of the Socialist Workers party in New York City at 10:30 p.m. April 23. The grenade, which had been thrown at a second-story window, fell back into the street before exploding. Shrapnel from the explosion pierced the windows of the party headquarters, and a car parked on the street was damaged.

No one was injured in the attack, but the assault was plainly aimed at taking lives. Lights were on in the hall at the time and fifteen party members and supporters were present when the grenade was thrown. If the explosion had taken place inside instead of outside, serious injuries or deaths would certainly have resulted.

The right-wing Spanish-language

daily <u>El Tiempo</u> on April 25 credited the attack to counterrevolutionary Cubans belonging to a group called Acción Revolucionaria [Revolutionary Action].

In addition to the SWP national office, the building at 873 Broadway also houses the party's New York office, the editorial offices of the revolutionary socialist weekly The Militant, and the party's campaign headquarters for the New York mayoralty election. Paul Boutelle, the SWP's candidate for mayor of New York, told a press conference April 24 that the terrorist act "will not deter us from our election campaign."

"On the contrary," Boutelle declared, "we feel even more strongly the need to fight for a society free of exploitation, racism and violence."

#### ON THE ROAD TO THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION

By Leon Trotsky

[Continued from last issue.]

#### The "Labour" Government in England

We must say a few words at this point about Great Britain with its new experience of a so-called Labour government on parliamentary, "democratic" bases, that is, the most ideal and sacred, so it would seem, for every right-thinking Menshevik.

What has this experience given us thus far? You know that the so-called Labour party does not have an absolute majority in Parliament. Why? Because a significant section of the English workers to this day tag along at the tail of liberalism: These workers are by far not the most obtuse; they simply don't see much difference between liberalism and MacDonald. They say: "What's the sense of our changing quarters and going to the expense of moving when the only difference is the landlord's last name?"

So none of the parties in Parliament has an absolute majority. The Liberals and Conservatives have stepped back and said to the Labour party: "Oh sirs, you are the most powerful party. Oh please, come rule and be master over us." The English are great humorists, as you know. This is testified to by Dickens, that great representative of English humor.

And MacDonald took the government. Now we ask: What next? How will the "Labour" government proceed? If it does not have a majority in Parliament, that does not mean its situation is totally hopeless. There is a way out; one need only have the will to find it.

Suppose MacDonald said this: "To our shame, our country has to this day a kind of august dynasty that stands above democracy and that we have no need for." If he added that those sitting in the House of Lords and in other state institutions were all the titled heirs of bloodsuckers and robbers and that it was necessary to take a broom and sweep them out — if he said that, wouldn't the hearts of English workers quicken with joy?

What if he added, "We are going to take their lands, mines, and railroads and nationalize their banks." And there's surely more to be found in the English banks than we found in ours. (Stormy applause.) If he added: "With the resources freed from the control of the monarchy

and the House of Lords we are going to undertake the construction of housing for the workers," he would unleash tremendous enthusiasm.

In England three-quarters of the population is working class. It is pure-proletarian country. It has a small handful of landlords and capitalists -- they are very rich and powerful, it is true, but still they are only a handful.

If MacDonald walked into Parliament, laid his program on the table, tapped lightly with his knuckles, and said, "Accept it or I'll drive you all out" (saying it more politely than I've phrased it here) -- if he did this, England would be unrecognizable in two weeks. MacDonald would receive an overwhelming majority in any election. The English working class would break out of the shell of conservatism with which it has been so cleverly surrounded; it would discard that slavish reverence for the law of the bourgeoisie, the propertied classes, the church and monarchy.

But MacDonald will not do that. He is afraid to. He is conservative -- for the monarchy, for private property, for the church.

You know that the English bourgeoisie has created a variety of churches, religious associations, and sects for the people's needs. As in a big clothing store, everyone can find a church for his own size and shape. This is no accident; it is quite expedient from the ruling-class point of view. This splintering and varied adaptation of the church provides greater flexibility and, consequently, a more successful beclouding of the consciousness of the oppressed class.

In our country the dominant church was the embodiment of the most officious bureaucratism. It did not overly concern itself with the soul. But in England there are subtler methods and devices. In England there is a superflexible, conciliatory, I might even say Menshevik, church. In addition, English Menshevism is thoroughly imbued with the priestly spirit. All this is merely the church's way of adapting to the different groups and layers of the proletariat, a complex division of labor in the service of the bourgeois order.

Comrades, there is no need to mention that even before the "Labour" government I did not have a high opinion either of the Second International or of MacDonald. But you know, and this is something I said earlier today in speaking

with some friends, each time you encounter Menshevism in a new situation, you have to conclude that it is even more rotten and worthless than you had supposed.

This so-called Labour government is weighed down totally, to the very limit, with the worst petty-bourgeois prejudices and most disgraceful cowardice in relation to the big bourgeoisie. MacDonald's ministers reek of piety, and make a show of it in every possible way. MacDonald himself is a Puritan; he looks at political questions, if you can call it looking, through the glass of the religion that inspired the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie of the seventeenth century. His colleague, Home Minister Henderson, is the president or vice-president, or something of the sort, of the Christian evangelical societies. Every Sunday the home minister of the Labour government pronounces a devout sermon.

This is not a joke, comrades, not something from the English version of Krokodil; this is a fact. And this fact is tied in the most intimate way with the whole English conservative tradition, the clever, skillful, sustained ideological work of the English bourgeoisie. It has created an unbelievable terrorism of public opinion against anyone who dares declare that he is a materialist or atheist. England has a glorious history in science. It gave us Darwin, that Marx of biology. But Darwin did not dare to call himself an atheist.

The English big bourgeoisie is a handful, and no police repressions would help if the political influence of the church did not exist. Lloyd George once said, not without reason, that the church was the central power station of all the parties. To clarify this for you more specifically, let me cite one example that I mentioned in speaking privately with some friends. In 1902, that is, twenty-two years ago, I was in England and, with Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin], attended a Social Democratic meeting in a church. The meeting proceeded in the following fashion: a worker in the printing trades who had returned from Australia gave a speech that for those times was fairly revolutionary, against the ruling classes, for revolution, etc.; then everyone rose and sang a hymn or psalm on the theme: Merciful God, grant that there be neither rich nor kings nor oppressors. (Laughter.) All this is an important constituent feature of English political mores. The English bourgeoisie is the stronger for it, and the English proletariat weaker.

In recent days I read, I forget in which paper, a speech by MacDonald himself to an evangelical society. He spoke with indignation of the class struggle,

preaching that society can save itself only through Christian morality, etc. Isn't it hard to imagine him speaking of the Soviet Republic with indignation? But what happened? This Puritan, pacifist preacher of Christian morality no sooner entered the government than he confirmed a proposal to build five new cruisers. His colleague declared that in the field of military aircraft the plans of the preceding Conservative government would remain unchanged.

Moreover, even after the Labour government came to power in England, the production of light tanks continued at full steam. You see what Christian pacifism looks like in practice. And it is not surprising that the same MacDonald declares that in the field of politics, continuity is necessary, that is, whatever the Conservatives did, we will too.

In a letter to Poincaré he writes that the alliance between England and France is the basis of European peace and order. Why? How does this follow? Modernday France is the personification of militarism and reaction. Why should this Labour government of England find itself in alliance with the vile French plutocracy?

Why couldn't a Labour government, an actual Labour government, make an alliance with us? Would this be a bad alliance — one between the working class of England and the working class of the Soviet Republic? Between czarist Russia and capitalist England a long struggle went on. Czarist Russia wanted to infringe on England's colonies, above all India, while England denied Russia access to the Dardanelles. Bismarck called this struggle between Russia and England the battle of the elephant and the whale.

But now, with the great new change in history, cannot the whale of Labour England conclude a friendly alliance with the Soviet elephant? Would not such an alliance represent the greatest advantages for both sides? English industry and the English people need our fields, our forests, our bread, our raw materials, and we need their capital and technology. The alliance of Labour England with us would be a strong check on bourgeois France; it would not dare commit further outrages and ravages in Europe.

Together with England we would help Europe reduce the burden of armaments; we would draw closer to the creation of a workers and peasants United States of Europe, without which Europe is threatened with unavoidable economic and political decline.

But what does MacDonald do? This devout pacifist tells Poincaré, the most ferocious representative of stock-market

France, that he wishes to remain in alliance with him of all people -- and consequently in opposition to us and the laboring masses of Europe. There you have real Menshevism, not the pocket edition, like you had here with Zhordania, but Menshevism of world proportions, placed in power in a country that encompasses hundreds of millions of colonial slaves.

In the few weeks of its rule, English Menshevism has become hated in the colonies, in both India and Egypt, where revolutionary nationalist aspirations have won out under the slogan of full separation from England. The Mensheviks will start complaining that English industry can't get along without Indian and Egyptian cotton and colonial raw materials in general. As if that were the question! If MacDonald tried to reach agreement with the Indians and Egyptians on the basis of their full independence, England would have cotton in exchange for machines, would have economic ties, and these ties would develop. But here too MacDonald acts as a Menshevik steward for the English imperialists.

Finally, there is another fact that has a direct symbolic significance for history: it concerns Turkey. Turkey, as you know, has done away with the caliphate. This is a progressive liberal-bourgeois measure. Nationalist Turkey throws off the feudal vestments of the caliph and sultan and becomes a more or less bourgeois-democratic country. This is a step forward.

What does the MacDonald government do, this Menshevik "Labour" government? It crowns a new caliph in Hejaz, the so-called "sheik of Mecca and Medina," in order to have, in his person, a weapon for colonial enslavement.

I read in the <u>Times</u> -- although it is a Conservative organ, in foreign policy it always expresses the official line of the existing government, whether bourgeois, Liberal, or MacDonaldite -- I read there that in Turkey, alas, the age-old, sacred, majestic foundations are cracking and that we have the profound misfortune to see it happening before our eyes. And MacDonald subsidizes this very same newly cooked-up caliph in Hejaz, because for majestic institutions a majestic establishment is necessary, and a corresponding budget.

In particular, the entourage of the caliph is linked with a rather vast harem, which as we have read, was recently expelled from Constantinople. With the unemployment existing in England and the difficulties of the English budget, it is necessary, obviously, for MacDonald to cut unemployment payments slightly in order to cover the additional expenses of the caliph's new harem. This all seems

like a humorous anecdote but it is fact, which cannot be erased from history...

Just think! This "humane" and "civilized" England, in the person of Gladstone, threatened Turkey because of its backwardness and barbarity. And now, when Turkey has got on its feet and chased out caliph and sultan, parliamentary England, crowned with the Menshevik government of MacDonald, establishes a caliph under its protectorate. There you have the full measure of the decline of bourgeois democracy!

If in regard to all this you should ask, What will be the fate of our further discussions with the new English government regarding possible loans, joint covering of claims, etc., I would find it hard to give even an approximate answer. How can one know what MacDonald will decide to do, and what his Liberal and Conservative controllers will allow him to do?

And here I should correct the second inaccuracy in the interview published in Zarya Vostoka. It said there that Trotsky had indicated the possibility that these talks would serve as a lever to overthrow the so-called Labour government of MacDonald. No more, no less! Comrades, if I were to say something like that, comrades Chicherin and Rakovsky\* would take stern measures against me, and they would be right.

Imagine the situation: we have sent a delegation for talks and at the same time I declare that we have sent this delegation in order, in passing, to overthrow MacDonald. How? What for? To have Baldwin or Lloyd-George in his place? Nonsense. I said nothing of the kind. On the contrary, our delegation is one of the levers that may immensely strengthen the English government. Under what conditions? Those of daring and decisive action by that government.

In England there is unemployment; it could be reduced by granting us credits, by increasing our purchasing power. The Soviet Union could serve as a truly vast market for English goods. No colonial plunder could give the English economy the advantages that a solid alliance with us could. Credit is not philanthropy. We pay the going interest rates. There are obvious mutual advantages in such an arrangement.

What are the obstacles? The capitalists demand, by way of MacDonald, that

<sup>\*</sup> Christian Georgievich Rakovsky, a veteran revolutionist, later prominent in the Left Opposition, was a well-known Soviet diplomat; he played a leading role in the delegation holding talks with the British Labour government.

we pay back the czarist debts. When did the victim ever, after breaking free of the ropes that had bound him, pay the robber for the ropes? Well, we broke out of the czarist bonds. And do you think we are going to pay the English stock exchange for them? No, never!

Our own obligations we will rigorously fulfill. We openly and triumphantly avowed in the first Soviet, in 1905, that we would not pay the czarist debts, and we will fulfill that international obligation of ours. (Stormy applause.) If we now deem it necessary to enter into one or another business agreement with the bourgeoisie, we will fulfill our new obligations most rigorously.

Bankers of England, if you give us a loan, then as long as you remain the bankers of England, that is, as long as the English proletariat endures you, we will pay it back promptly and exactly. And when the English proletariat overthrows you, it will disinherit you of our debts to you as well. There you have a clear, businesslike, and irrefutable statement of the situation.

The surest guarantee of our fulfilling international obligations is our own self-interest! If MacDonald would make a broad agreement with us, he would strengthen himself. Of that I have not the slightest doubt. In general, he can win the hearts of the millions of workers only by a courageous policy, and then no one could turn him out by parliamentary tricks. As you can see, this is not at all what was ascribed to me in the newspaper interview. It was a hasty conversation, in a railroad coach, before the train pulled out; the comrade was jotting things down quickly with his pencil. I am not trying to reproach him, but merely to rehabilitate myself. (Laughter.)

That MacDonald will, with all his strength, help to overthrow himself, to me is absolutely clear, as it is to all of you. The Liberals, as I gather from a quick glance at the paper today, left MacDonald in a minority in Parliament on the question of workers' housing, and he felt obliged to accept the Liberal bill. What does this mean? The worker will say, "Why get a Liberal bill via MacDonald when I can get it directly from a Liberal?" From this it is clear not only that the Liberal party will remove MacDonald as prime minister whenever it wants to; it is also undermining the authority that the Labour party has in the workers' ranks.

A section of the workers, the more aristocratic, the better off, who voted in the last election for the Labour party, will probably vote for the Liberals in the next election. They will say, "This is a solid, established firm; why fool around with the middleman?" But the

broad mass of workers will make a turn to the left. At what rate I do not know, but there is no doubt that as a result of the temporary splendor of having even a Menshevik government, a very significant strengthening of the left wing in the working class will take place. MacDonald is working for the Communists. Yes, from the viewpoint of the international revolution, he is working for us.

However, I certainly don't intend to send him a note of thanks for that. He is working in this direction not only unselfishly but even unconsciously. Pushed by the Liberals and Conservatives, who intentionally compromise him, revealing that he is only a toy in their hands, MacDonald in turn pushes the English workers toward the revolutionary road. Such will be the final result of this historical experiment, the advent to power of the English Labour party.

Because of insufficient time I will not pause on Italy. Moreover, the situation there is clear. Italian fascism, continuing its desperate gamble, is preparing the greatest revolutionary vengeance by the Italian proletariat — of that we cannot have the slightest doubt.

#### Our International Position

Such are the basic elements of the European situation as I understand them. How is this reflected in our international stance? It seems to me the answer is clear from all that has been said. We have grown stronger. We have been recognized by several countries. The price placed as a condition for such recognition we all know. We are revolutionists not jurists, but we do not deny the weight of <u>de jure</u>. Recognition has significance. What kind? It makes it difficult for the bourgeoisie to open up a new struggle against us by military means. It does not, of course, make war impossible -- it's ridiculous even to speak of that -- there will be wars. But surprise attacks, as in 1918 and 1919, when expeditions were landing everywhere, when open support for insurrections went on, that kind of thing has now become much more difficult.

As a result of being recognized by both great and small, sudden war does not threaten us; which is to say, our international position has become more secure. This is a big plus factor, and we will enter this plus in our book in the credit column. But no more than that. For the rest, the struggle of the capitalist states against us continues full force, and the bourgeoisie's hatred of us, like wine, grows stronger with time, becomes more restrained, cautious, and shrewd.

Moreover, not all of the bourgeoisie by far have reached the point of granting us legal recognition. France still has not recognized us, and France is the strongest military power in Europe; it has the mightiest army. Also not recognizing us is the United States of America. This is no small country, and it has concentrated in its hands the wealth of the entire world.

I spoke yesterday with some Red Army men of the Sukhum regiment and reminded them of the well-known verses, "I'll buy everything, says gold./I'll seize everything, says dagger." In the United States the richest gold of the bourgeoisie is gathered; and in France, there is the strongest capitalist dagger; and these two countries have not recognized us.

In her relations with us France carries on furious blackmail, putting its hangers-on, such as Rumania and Poland, up to no good, and trying to do the same with Turkey. It is true that in France, as a result of the upcoming elections one may expect the advent to power of the so-called Left Front. Its foreign policy, however, will differ from that of Poincaré hardly more than MacDonald's has from the policy of Baldwin. At the same time, France's insoluble financial difficulties are preparing a revolutionary denouement.

The United States continues to digest in its enormous belly the riches it stole from Europe during the imperialist war. The United States, too, is an arch democratic country. Its intervention in the recent imperialist war arose out of purely idealistic motives — to help democracy against militarism. We remember all that. Having robbed Europe, weakened it, and bled it dry, the United States has become a colossal tower of Babel of bourgeois might.

While digesting what it has stolen, it is staying out of European affairs. But at the same time, it is diligently preparing for the war of the future. Aviation and poison gas have first priority. The United States, that enormous world factory, becomes more and more the world poison gas factory. These preparations are not only meant for weakened Japan, but for Europe as well. You see reports in the press to the effect that the enlightened Americans consider the old methods of war too barbaric, outdated, and medieval, and feel it is necessary to apply new methods, more subtle, chemical, and humane, which will not cause death but merely induce sleep, and even inspire pleasant dreams.

You comrades know the importance of laughing gas in certain operations; as far as I know, dentists frequently pull

teeth with the aid of such gas. But when American capital prepares laughing gas in order to pull the revolutionary teeth of Europe, should the need arise, we have to be very, very much on guard.

For the time being, enlightened America is trying out its gases only on its own criminals, who are no longer electrocuted there — a backward method!— but are subjected to the action of "laughing" gas. It's the latest thing in technology and Quaker humaneness! The Americans promise to subject whole cities, regions, and provinces to the action of their gases. Imagine the prospect: rich and sated America sends hungry, revolutionary Europe squadrons of planes and spills its laughing gas on our heads. This is not something out of a fantasy!

Poison gas was even used on a large scale in the past imperialist war. The old methods of extermination are no longer adequate. Military chemistry is now divided into two spheres: explosives and poisons. I would find it hard to say which is more humane.

In Leningrad we have a museum of military chemistry, an unavoidable military institution. But I read yesterday that there is a poster in this museum to the effect that the thing to do is not to destroy the enemy's forces but to paralyze them with gas. Here it seems we are beginning to echo the bourgeois hypocrites. This doesn't suit us! It's not true that gas is more "humane."

If some country tomorrow discovered a gas capable of destroying entire armies, it would immediately put this into action against its enemies. War in general is a shameful and repulsive barbarity; we know this well, and we will not occupy ourselves with vile phrases about humane methods of warfare. This suits Quakers and Puritans but not us! We take facts in their natural aspect, without deceiving ourselves or others.

The thing to do is not to humanize warfare but to abolish it. How? By abolishing capitalist society. There is no other way. For that reason we have been and shall remain mortal foes of the bourgeois system. We shall maintain, as before, and with more conviction than ever, our course toward social revolution.

"You've made a mistake," cry the reformists. "Hadn't you hoped the war would pass directly over into revolution?" Yes, we hoped that. And in fact a mortal danger did threaten the European bourgeoisie at the end of the war. But the revolution was accomplished only here. In Germany and Austro-Hungary it stopped halfway. France was deeply shaken; in England mighty strikes unfolded. But matters never went so far as revolution.

In 1918 and 1919 we did in fact expect the rapid and victorious development of the European revolution. Regarding tempo we miscalculated. What was the heart of our error? Despite all our experience, we underestimated the importance of the revolutionary party. A revolutionary situation existed. Europe was rocked to its foundations. The workers and peasants came out of the trenches gnashing their teeth.

What was lacking in Europe? A Bolshevik party, that is all. We hoped that the party would be built rapidly, under fire. However, it has become clear that a certain period of time is necessary for its establishment, the inner process of selection, its becoming matured and tempered. Not so long a time as our party required for its preparation but not so short a time as we had hoped, either. Thus, in 1918-1919, everything was ready for the proletarian revolution -- except the proletarian party.

Nevertheless, in this first postwar hour, capitalist Europe underwent its first epileptic attack. It withstood the attack, righted itself, and is trying, after the fact, to give the appearance of almost total health. But we know well that it is only enjoying a historic interval — between the first and the second attack.

Last year we expected the victory of the German proletariat, which would of course have been reflected throughout Europe and the world. It turned out that, this time too, we underestimated the importance of the party's preparedness. Although the Communist party in Germany is an honest revolutionary party, it was still not prepared in actuality; it did not know how to maneuver actively, as our party did, nor how to decide at the crucial hour to put all its cards on the table, to dispel all doubt and all doubters, to hurl itself forward and see things through to the end. (Stormy applause.) That is why the second attack, the fatal one, has not yet come.

The German bourgeoisie is trying to right itself, to change the political relation of forces in its own favor. We are living in an intermediate period between the first and second revolutionary attacks, which should put an end to the European bourgeoisie. How long this period of time will last we do not know.

The capitalist organism is still a powerful one, even in its death agony: in the convulsions that precede death it is capable of dealing the most savage blows. And at whom will those blows be dealt if not at the Soviet Union? That is why, even after all those who have "recognized" us, we must be on our guard.

#### Domestic Tasks

The basic condition for our security and military preparedness is the successful development of our economy, that is, above all the development of our industry in adaptation to the needs of the peasant masses, influencing of the village economy through industry, raising the level of the village economy, strengthening the ties between industry and agriculture, and thereby strengthening our financial stability during the transition to a stable paper currency. My report is not devoted to these complex questions, which I will just mention in passing.

We have achieved a great success in the economic field by the very fact that we have moved the economic body of our country off dead center. The level of the productive forces is rising. But it is rising in two directions at once: socialist and capitalist.\* Everything depends on the relation between these. Our basic efforts are aimed at making socialist accumulation take place more rapidly than capitalist accumulation, which has its place under NEP. The international struggle that we are conducting has its direct continuation in the economic struggle within the bounds of our Soviet Union. The predominance of the accumulations of the state sector over those of the private sector is the basic determinant of our stability, both within and without.

This issue has not yet been resolved. But if we have succeeded in spite of everything in creating conditions in which the imperialist bourgeoisie has "recognized" us, that is, has been forced to reckon with our long-term existence; if we continue to preserve the political conditions internally whereby we are free to decide for ourselves up to what line or point we will permit private capital and what concessions we will make to it; if we keep in mind withal that over the past seven years we have accumulated a vast experience unrivaled in history—then we can have no reason at all to doubt that we will cope with the basic

<sup>\*</sup> Under the New Economic Policy (NEP) -- adopted on Lenin's initiative by the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist party in early 1921 -- capitalist relations were permitted considerable scope, especially in peasant agriculture and trade but also to some extent in industry, while the workers state retained control of the "commanding heights" of the economy, the nationalized key industries, state banking, and the monopoly of foreign trade. The aim was to relax the tensions that had arisen between the peasantry and the workers state and allow a breathing spell while waiting for decisive aid from the European revolution.

task of economic construction as well.

The political condition for this is the unbroken tie between the party and the class. And we have had in the recent period the most favorable and, moreover, indisputable proofs that this exists. The most important fact of recent weeks and months has been the influx of workers from the plant floors into the ranks of our party. This is the best way for the fundamental revolutionary class in our country to show its will: by raising its hand and saying, we vote our confidence in the RKP [Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia -- Russian Communist party], it is pursuing the straightforward line of struggle against the bourgeoisie; it knows when it is necessary to yield and how much to yield, but it will never yield anything essential. This vote is a reliable, sure, and unerring verification, by comparison with which parliamentary votes seem phantomlike, superficial, and, most of all, s mply charlatanistic. This free vote of proletarian confidence is the basic political guarantee not only of our existence but of our further success. On this base we can and should build.

On this base, above all, our further military development shall also rest. We should raise the level of military technique, creating a close tie between it and industry. We need a solid and powerful air force, going hand in hand with civil aviation. If we wish to protect our cities from the bourgeoisie's laughinggas and poison-gas showers, we should have squadrons of our own reconnaissance aircraft and fighter planes along the Soviet borders.

With the present technology and methods of warfare, air power becomes an effective threat only if it is multiplied by chemistry. They have chemistry, and we too shall have military chemistry. The chemistry of explosives and of poisons should become central concerns of the Soviet worker and peasant, both man and woman, for it is a matter of defending the revolution. We want to be independent; we want to live; and we will defend ourselves and make ourselves secure. We need an air force. We are building it. And we will complete it.

We have a Society of Friends of the Air Force. Now we need to build, through combined private, governmental, party, and professional initiative, a Society of Friends of Military Chemistry. We are poor, but we have a will to live, a will to struggle and to win. (Stormy applause.) They are stronger technologically, but the outcome of a war is decided not by bare technology but by the strength of morale multiplied by technology. The power of morale in a war is on our side.

Here is a fresh example. Recently by a voluntary agreement we extended the borders of Soviet Byelorussia to include twice as much. There had been one and a half million people in it, and now there are four million. What does this mean? That we have basically carried out an elementary duty: the Byelorussian has the right to live in his own Byelorussia. But from the military point of view this is equivalent to three new Red Army corps. (Stormy applause.) You may rebuke me for speaking openly of this, because Poland might learn our "secrets." Let it learn and let it try to follow our example; let it give its Byelorussians autonomy; let it try to weaken us that way!

More and more these days we are going over to a territorial militia system. Who else could afford this kind of thing? Only a country that has no contradiction or hatred between the ruling class and the people, between the commanders and the ranks of its army. Not a single bourgeois country can adopt a militia system. But we can! There you have the Red Army's strength of morale. How will the soldier of this or that country behave in the event of a European conflict? No ruling class of any bourgeois country knows the answer. But how our Red Army men and sailors will conduct themselves we know very well. (Stormy aplause.)

Comrades, every one of us today is doing some kind of personal or private work. We often say that we have to learn to trade. If someone from Mars or the moon were to read our papers they might think, Here is a race of petty traders. But no! We are learning to trade, but we will never barter away our revolutionary spirit. We will remain what we were on the night of October 24-25, 1917. (Stormy applause.)

In our economic work, in our cultural work, in our military work, we will conduct ourselves in such a way as to prepare for the eventuality that the bourgeoisie will maintain itself for a number of years to come. But if tomorrow or the day after, Europe is seized by a new revolutionary fever and the proletariat of Germany or France look to us for the support and aid of the Soviet Union, it makes no difference whether they look to Moscow or to Tiflis (voices: Make's no difference!) or to other centers of our Union, they will find us the same iron-and-steel Bolsheviks, students and heirs of Lenin's work, strengthened by stern discipline, ready to fight to the end wherever the revolution requires. (Stormy applause. The "Internationale.")

#### SOCIALIST PARTY MEMBERS ASSAULTED IN TOKYO

Three members of the Japan Socialist party were injured April 23 when more than sixty right-wing youths attacked the party headquarters in Tokyo. The hooligans belonged to the Youth Thought Study Society. They used wooden swords on their victims, one of whom was badly injured. There were no arrests.

This was the most serious rightwing attack since the assassination of a Japan Socialist party leader ten years ago. The right-wingers were "protesting" the JSP's support for the North Korean regime. The April 24 London <u>Times</u> reported:

"The Japan Socialist Party has protested to the police in Tokyo, saying that policemen who witnessed the incident failed to come to the help of the victims. The party will raise the matter in Parliament."

The <u>Times</u> added, "The main preoccupation of Tokyo police is...with the left wing....In spite of the fact that some 400 student leaders are in prison, the left-wing students are in good shape and morale is high."

#### TROOPS USED AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS IN INDONESIA

The Suharto regime in Indonesia called out troops to end a protest demonstration in West Irian, according to a report in the April 19 Christian Science Monitor, published in Boston.

"Travelers said about 200 West Irianese, carrying banners reading 'one man -- one vote' marched on the office of the United Nations representative in Djajaprua, Ortiz Sanz. Troops fired warning shots to break up the demonstration."

In another part of the country, West Sumatra, according to an April 23 Associated Press dispatch, security troops arrested 150 soldiers and government officials "on charges they were involved in the attempted Communist-led coup in 1965."

Brigadier General Widodo, military commander of West Sumatra, told reporters April 23 that those arrested included a legislator, several rural administration chiefs, four colonels, and a captain.

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