

# Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 6, No. 39

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November 18, 1968

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## Who Is Lying About the Bombing 'Halt'?

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A Discussion of  
Socialist Democracy

London 'Times' Tries to  
Whitewash Witch-Hunt

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## The Meaning of the U.S. Elections

From Johnson to Nixon

THE MEANING OF THE U.S. ELECTIONS

By Joseph Hansen

As the returns in the U.S. election were processed in the electronic computers in the studios of the Columbia Broadcasting System on the night of November 5-6, the Italian author Luigi Barzini dropped in to take a look. The commentators interviewed him for a few minutes to get a "foreign" impression of the election.

Barzini professed surprise that there should be any excitement in America over the contest between Nixon and Humphrey. The difference in their platforms, judged by European standards, was not more than a "nuance," he said.

Barzini likewise professed complete inability to understand the American political scene, although he is a member of parliament in Italy and therefore hardly an innocent in politics, one would imagine.

Perhaps Barzini would have spoken even more emphatically in this vein the following morning when the outcome still remained in doubt, or several days later when it was clear that Nixon had won by only a "nuance" in the number of votes. To extract any meaning from an election of this type would seem to be a rather hazardous undertaking.

The pundits of the American capitalist system have found it quite easy, nonetheless, to draw many lessons from the outcome, most of them rather comforting. They are particularly relieved that two possibilities, which kept them sweating up to the last moment, were not realized. Wallace did not get as high a percentage of the ballots as the public opinion polls some weeks before election day indicated would go to him; and the election was not thrown into the Electoral College or the House of Representatives, although this was averted but narrowly.

The main conclusion drawn by the pundits is that after all the two-party system is still in good shape. It weathered the storm.

Some efforts have been made, of course, to analyze the reasons for the poor position in which the Democratic party found itself after the Chicago convention, and for the volatility of the voters, who shifted within weeks away from Wallace toward Nixon and Humphrey, and from Nixon toward Humphrey, so that the Democratic nominee, who seemed headed for certain defeat came within a hair of win-

ning. But in general the questions asked are superficial: Did Nixon "peak" too soon? Wasn't Humphrey late in getting his show on the road? If either of them had altered their timing and tactics, would this have changed things? Did the pollsters have a bad effect?

Certain facts which really ought to be given more careful consideration even on this level seem to be avoided. Take, for instance, the difference between the vote in 1964 and in 1968.

Our of a total vote of 70,638,975 in 1964, Johnson got 43,126,506 votes; Goldwater, 27,176,799. Johnson received the largest plurality in American history.

Four years later the situation was reversed. As of November 9, with some ballots still to be counted, Humphrey was credited with 30,602,098 votes, Nixon with 30,957,072. The vote for Wallace was 9,747,764. (The votes for the minority parties are not yet known; but they will probably amount to several hundred thousand.\*)

In 1964 Johnson won some 61% of the total vote. In 1968 Nixon and Wallace together won around 57% of the vote. The Democratic candidate was cut down to 43% or less.

This fact alone shows what a shift occurred. The reversal in standing is all the more notable since in the tradition of the American two-party system, Johnson's landslide victory ought to have assured him a second term. Yet he felt compelled to withdraw from the race as early as last March. Moreover, out of the candidates likely to be nominated by the Republicans, Nixon was precisely the one whom the Democrats thought they had the best chance of beating! Their judgment in this was, of course, accurate.

Besides the dramatic turn in the electoral arena on the presidential level, the third-party bid made by Wallace like-

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\* Revolutionary socialists in the United States do not consider the vote they win to be of primary significance. They are interested above all in the platform an election provides for expounding their program and reaching new circles. The Young Socialist Alliance doubled its membership during the campaign. This is the best gauge of the success of their work.

wise would seem to deserve closer inspection.

Whatever the final assessment may be of this challenge from the ultraright, it aroused foreboding if not panic in some circles. The New York Times even suggested that those capitalists who were pouring millions of dollars into Wallace's campaign ought to remember the unfortunate experience with Hitler and withdraw the support they were giving this racist demagogue.

But if the New York Times was not merely seeking to scare people into voting for Humphrey, whom the paper favored, the editors ought to have probed into the economic and social forces that had nurtured the appearance on the American political scene of what they considered to be a Hitler-like figure. Germany was racked by the Great Depression; America is prosperous. How, then, was the Wallace danger to be explained?\*

The Times has not returned to the subject since the election, contenting itself with declaring that Wallace, having failed to extend his electoral base beyond the Deep South strongly enough to win even in the border states, was successfully contained, that his American Independent party (AIP) proved to be only a regional phenomenon, and that his national pretensions can now be dismissed.

Some questions nevertheless remain. What did the Times see in the American scene that could lead to the apprehension that a fascist movement was beginning in the United States? What kind of arguments were going on in the country's ruling circles where the Times gets its line? Did Nixon's victory really spell the end for Wallace?

To find satisfactory answers to these and related questions, it is necessary to weigh the election in relation to the play of class forces in the United States and internationally. These forces, however, find only distorted reflection in the electoral mirror. Even in a country like France, where the class struggle and class differentiations tend to cast their counterpart in a rather direct way in electoral shifts and shadings, this occurs only with delay. Electoral politics has its own logic -- more properly, inertia. In the United States, where the

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\* It should be noted -- and noted well -- that if the danger seen by the Times had actually been imminent, voting for a Democrat or a Republican would have helped pave the way for a Wallace take-over. This is one of the main lessons to be drawn from the German experience. A fascist movement gains its main strength outside the electoral process.

two-party system tends to block and to blur the expression of class contradictions, the electoral distortions must be weighed all the more carefully. On top of this, there is the tendency of the capitalist system internationally to narrow down the role of parliaments and to shift decision-making powers to the executive and even the military. In the United States, this new phenomenon is becoming more and more significant.

Striking proof of the importance of keeping all this in mind is provided by what happened in relation to the key issue in the election -- the Vietnam war.

First of all, the decision to intervene in the civil war in Vietnam was never made by the electorate. No national referendum was held on the question. Congress was not even consulted, aside from the maneuver that resulted in the notorious "Tonkin Bay" resolution. The troops were sent abroad and the war was escalated through decisions taken outside of the electoral arena.

Insofar as the question came up as an issue in the 1964 election, the voters sought to express their opposition to involving the United States in any adventure in Vietnam. This is the true explanation for the huge vote given to Johnson. People voted for him as the "peace" candidate in opposition to the bomb-rattling Goldwater.

The serious opposition to the war in Vietnam likewise appeared and developed largely outside of the electoral arena. In face of the common front maintained by both Democrats and Republicans against even a referendum on the war, people began taking to the streets.

A series of demonstrations, involving hundreds of thousands of participants, flared across the country. The slogans became increasingly militant, tending more and more to center around the demand for immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

This was a political development of first-rate importance and it began to register in the electoral arena.

Johnson had to give up any idea of a second term. He simply could not campaign before live audiences in view of the vigorous means of expression developed by the antiwar movement. He even had to refrain from campaigning for Humphrey. Without any vote being taken on it, Johnson was done in politically by the antiwar movement in the streets.

The rise of the antiwar movement outside of electoral channels posed a formidable problem for the ruling class. Figures like Robert F. Kennedy, Eugene J.

McCarthy and their hangers-on sought to win leadership of it in order to divert it from independent political expression and to contain it within the two-party system.

Both the Democratic and Republican machines, however, proved unwilling to grant the concessions required for full success in this endeavor. What was needed was a plank condemning at least by implication the administration's role in Vietnam, a promise to end the war and bring the GI's home, and a candidate relatively free from the Johnson contamination. Neither of the two-party machines were ready to concede this because of their Vietnam record, their commitment to the aims of American imperialism, and their ties with business circles interested in war production.

Consequently, despite all the grandiloquent oratory about the American way of settling differences at the ballot box, neither the Democratic nor Republican machines included a plank offering even demagogic opposition to Johnson's course in Vietnam. Both of them throttled the currents that wanted a "dove" candidate. And the Democrats even put on a repulsive show at their convention, repudiating McCarthy and his followers.

In short, they did their best to avoid giving any electoral expression whatsoever to the most important issue in the campaign -- the war in Vietnam.

The differences between the two parties thus appeared so infinitesimal, their similarities so great -- and so repellent -- that the two-party system came under questioning to a degree never before seen.

In some areas this led to greater abstentionism than usual. Despite the population increase, the total 1968 vote was only 71,306,934 (the figure is incomplete) compared to 70,638,975 in 1964.

More significantly, it led to considerably greater ticket splitting, a phenomenon of increasing importance in recent elections.

And it led to longer hesitation than usual in reaching a final decision on whom to vote for and greater readiness to make a sudden switch. Even within the straitjacket of a choice between Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace, the voters sought to find hairline shadings through which to register their feelings about the war.

Thus Nixon was riding high on the revulsion to Johnson because of the war. But he began to slip as he studiously avoided taking an antiwar stand. Humphrey, on the other hand, began as a beaten candidate cursed with the mantle of Johnson.

His stock began to rise as he tentatively indicated that he might differ with Johnson on the war. Johnson's announcement of the bombing "halt" altered the situation abruptly. Even Nixon began to fear that he had lost the election as Humphrey changed his image from a hawk to a dove.

The decline in Wallace's rating in the pre-election polls began, significantly, when the AIP leader announced that he had selected General Curtis E. LeMay as his running mate. People opposed to the war in Vietnam saw no reason to salute this atavistic militarist whose idea of ending the war in Vietnam is to bomb the country back to the Stone Age.

The volatility of the voters in 1968 was quite uncharacteristic of the American scene. In the 1960 contest between Nixon and Kennedy, which was likewise a narrow one, there was little last-minute shifting. In 1968 millions of voters found it difficult to make a hard choice between "the two bums."

Besides seeking to maintain a common front on the war in Vietnam, the two big parties, along with their third-party rival, also united in a common effort to divert attention to the issue of "law and order." On this they staged a show of opposition to each other worthy of the wrestling exhibitions which at one time constituted television's main contribution to the theater.

The attempt to draw attention away from the war offered a new twist to the customary practice of rulers who seek to divert attention from domestic troubles by pointing to a foreign "enemy." Now, to divert attention from Vietnam, in a sly, Aesopian way, perfectly understood by the initiates, they turned up a domestic "enemy" -- whose skin happens to be black.

It is clear that the clamor about "crime in the streets" reflected in a certain way the weightiest single development in the American class struggle in recent years -- the upsurge of the black freedom struggle. Of course, it is necessary to add at once that the issue was utterly distorted by the three capitalist rivals. What they expressed most of all was the racism of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois layers and the determination of these benighted layers not to give way to the rising Afro-American insistence on achieving genuine equality. The case for the black people was not voiced on a major scale in the election because of the absence of a mass revolutionary party or a mass black nationalist party or even a labor party.\*

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\* The candidates of the Socialist Workers party were outstanding in the efforts they devoted to bringing clarity into this question.

The uprisings in the ghettos testified to the failure of the parliamentary and judicial machinery in the United States to meet the demands of the black people and to the increasing difficulty of containing their struggle within electoral channels.

In response to this, the Democratic and Republican machines have increasingly resorted to clubs, tear gas, rifles, bayonets, and tanks. They thus nurtured a climate of violence propitious to the formation and expansion of the most reactionary groups.

George C. Wallace, the Southern racist demagogue, became a rallying center for these tendencies.

The Wallace movement warrants extended treatment. Suffice it here to note that while its principal base is in the Deep South, it marshaled sufficient strength to put a presidential slate on the ballot in all fifty states. Those aware of the arbitrary requirements in many states can appreciate the amount of money, influence, and energy required for this. The vote obtained by Wallace in a first try was also not to be dismissed as inconsequential.

While Wallace claimed, particularly toward the end when he was slipping, that he was going to win the election, it can hardly be doubted that he set himself only limited goals. These included establishing himself as a national figure, setting the pace on the "law and order" issue, throwing the election into the Electoral College if possible, and winning cadres for future projects.

His selection of General LeMay as a running mate was a first-rate error so far as his immediate demagogic needs were concerned; but no doubt the appointment had a favorable effect in one of the most reactionary layers in American society today -- the officer caste.

Many a policeman's heart probably beat faster, too, at the recognition given by their racist hero to a uniform.

After the election, Wallace boasted about how he had compelled the Republicans and Democrats to echo his demagoguery on "law and order." The platforms and speeches of the three capitalist candidates were, indeed, strikingly alike. But many voters thought they could detect nuances in the appeals.

The vigilante-minded scum responded ecstatically to Wallace, interpreting the speech he gave over and over again as an exciting expression of their own thirst for violence.

Nixon was attractive above all to

the petty-bourgeois layers, who cling to the past, who are worried by the challenge of the ghettos to their prejudices and their property holdings, and who would like to see a re-run of the Eisenhower decade in color television.

The vote in the ghettos went solidly for Humphrey, although abstentions were to be noted.

Workers who were taken in by Wallace because of his challenge to the two-party system, or because of their own prejudices, tended to swing back to the Democrats on election day. Inroads made by Wallace in the workers' ranks before he showed his love for LeMay had led some observers to conclude that sectors of the working class had become affected by "white backlash" and would provide a base for Wallace in the North. This interpretation proved to be unfounded. The workers, whatever their prejudices, were moved by opposition to the war and to the two-party fraud.

As a consequence of the votes of the workers and the black people, the big industrial areas returned Democratic majorities. Nixon's majorities were in the suburbs and rural areas by and large.

Nixon also made inroads in the South, particularly in the border states, and some commentators held that this signified the end of the coalition put together by Roosevelt between the labor leaders of the North and the Southern bourbons. Roosevelt himself considered the New Deal dead at the beginning of his third term in 1940. The labor leaders did not take him at his word and have followed the suicidal course ever since of continuing to serve the Democratic machine. Their reactionary stand on the Vietnam war lost them the final shreds of political influence. They were prodded into action against Wallace but made little impact in the election because of their abysmal record in the black freedom struggle, including support of the Wallace machine in Alabama.

Nixon's gains in the South were ascribable in part to his meeting Wallace on his own level of demagoguery and appealing to his followers not to waste their votes on a sure loser. (In the U.S., part of the glue holding the two-party system together is the shibboleth that a vote is wasted unless it is cast for a "winner.")

What does the outcome of the election portend for the future?

While the spokesmen of the capitalist class have recovered from their fright at the prospect of a "constitutional crisis" over an inconclusive popular vote, they still appear worried over the capacity of Nixon to "govern" the country in view of the narrowness of the vote and the fact

that he is a minority president. Nixon has fed these worries somewhat by hinting about a "coalition" government, implying that he needs Democratic support to govern. It might seem that this is a very realistic approach inasmuch as the Democrats hold a majority in Congress.

The truth is that a reactionary coalition of Democrats and Republicans, of which Nixon is a part, is entrenched in Washington -- as it was in the Johnson administration and in the preceding administrations. The talk about a "coalition" can be put down as a variation of the usual appeals for "national unity" made by a Democratic or Republican president on winning the White House.

Nevertheless the two-party system bears the marks of the storm that hit it. One of its main foundations -- the illusion that the Democrats and Republicans represent genuine alternatives -- was battered as never before.

The illusion that it is impossible to get a third party on the ballot was deeply undermined by the success of the Wallace movement.

Most important of all, the capacity of street demonstrations to affect the course of political life was imprinted indelibly on the minds of an entire new generation.

An attempt at repression would not alter these results. In fact, it could prove to be what the global strategists in Washington call "counterproductive."

It would be a mistake, incidentally, to assume that Nixon, being a Republican, will be more inclined to use repression than Humphrey had the latter won the election. After all, Humphrey, with Mayor Daley's assistance, put on quite a demonstration in Chicago of the capacities of the Democrats in this respect.

The course of the class struggle will have a bearing on this. The more powerful the opposition is to both the Democrats and Republicans, the more militantly it masses in struggles over economic and social issues, the more cautious will the ruling class be about resorting to clubs.

The outcome of the election will affect the next stage of the class struggle but will hardly alter its dynamics.

The prime source of the increasingly sharp contradictions affecting American society lies in the growing power of the world revolution and the decreasing capacity of the international capitalist system to turn it back. The disaster that befell U.S. imperialism in Vietnam offers the most incontrovertible proof of this.

The prospect on the world scene is for still greater and more reverberating struggles of similar nature. It is only necessary to conceive of two or three more situations like the one in Vietnam to grasp what convulsions this would lead to inside the United States.

The prospects inside the United States do not point at all to a dampening of the class struggle.

The black people are on the march and will not be turned back. Thousands of young people have already learned the rudiments of political techniques that can be applied 365 days of the year -- and before they are of voting age. They will become more insistent than ever on an end to the dirty war in Vietnam; and the soldiers are beginning to evidence increasingly open sympathy with this view.

The working class in all its massive strength has not yet moved. When it does move, however, it is reasonable to expect that it will follow along the path already blazed by the black people and the youth of the antiwar movement and the student rebellion.

A deep polarization has occurred in American political life. The prognosis for the coming period is that this polarization will become intensified.

Instead of pouring fresh life into the two-party system, the next big turn will in all likelihood see the working class and its allies beginning to coalesce around a nucleus that can swiftly become a mass revolutionary party.

#### DEARBORN ANTIWAR REFERENDUM CARRIES BY A BIG MAJORITY

A referendum in Dearborn, Michigan, the home of the Ford Motor Co., calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, carried by a vote of 19,557 to 14,676 in the November 5 election. A similar referendum in 1966 failed to carry 14,134 to 20,626.

Mayor Orville Hubbard said the result was "not too surprising." Five weekly polls showed that while "the Presidential choice changed drastically from an early Wallace sentiment to a preference for Humphrey this week, the voters' heavy 2-to-1 opposition to the war remained constant."

AFTER THE MASSACRE -- 10,000 STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE IN MEXICO CITY

An estimated 10,000 students met on the rectory esplanade of the University of Mexico October 31 and pledged to continue and extend their struggle, defying the murderous repression of the Díaz Ordaz government, which reached its height in the massacre in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas on October 2.

The mass meeting, which began at 7:30 p.m., was preceded by a two-and-one-half-hour demonstration by students from the National Polytechnic Institute, the National Teachers College, the National Agricultural School of Chapingo, the pre-vocational schools, and Vocational School No. 7 -- which was the most combative school in the clashes with police and the army from July 26 to October 2. The students carried signs and banners and draped a big red and black flag (the Mexican strike symbol) over one of the walls along the rectory esplanade.

Organized by the Consejo Nacional de Huelga (CNH) [National Strike Council], the leadership of the student movement, the rally was attended by delegations from several other organizations and appeared to mark a significant widening of the struggle.

Speakers at the meeting reported the formation of a Comité Coordinador de Comités de Lucha [Coordinating Committee of Struggle Committees] to organize the elementary school teachers in the Federal District. Representatives of this new committee declared their full support of the student movement and were seconded in this by spokesmen for the Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio [Revolutionary Teachers' Movement], said to represent up to 30,000 teachers in the Federal District.

The teachers' representatives announced a national elementary school strike for the near future, according to El Universal of November 1.

Also announced at this rally was the formation of Comités de Lucha [Struggle Committees] in most of the towns south of Mexico City, including Xochimilco, Tláhuac, Milpa Alta, and Tlalpan. These committees, it was reported, would organize the peasants to fight against exploitation and to defend their land.

Delegations from various neighborhoods in Mexico City, such as the Olivar Del Conde district, came to the rally and described their problems.

This mass united rally was the kickoff for general assemblies in all the striking schools called for Monday, November 4. To prepare the way for the discus-

sion and strike votes to be held in these assemblies, student representatives reported on the negotiations between the CNH and the government following the massacre and mass arrests of October 2.

According to El Universal of November 1, the student speakers summed up the recent decisions of the CNH as follows: (1) No street demonstrations would be held for the time being to avoid repression. (2) The CNH alone will determine when to end the strike. (3) The CNH will not negotiate with the government on the students' six demands\* because this discussion must be a public one. It will negotiate only the release of prisoners. (4) All prisoners must be released without exception.

The speakers at the rally also declared their determination to resist the government's plans to tear down some of the schools which have been most prominent in the struggle or have served as organizational centers for the movement, such as the National Agricultural School of Chapingo, Vocational School No. 7, and the School of Music.

All of the speakers reiterated that the three immediate demands raised by the CNH after the October 2 massacre -- cessation of the repression, withdrawal of troops from the occupied schools, and release of the political prisoners jailed as a result of the student movement -- were only preliminary to discussion of the list of six demands.

The government has made some concessions recently on the three demands. The schools have been evacuated -- with the exception of Vocational School No. 7 and Preparatory School No. 4. The government has called on the courts to release sixty-five students. The Mexican papers are full of rumors that most of those recently arrested will soon be released. (The government claims there are about 200 political prisoners. The students estimate many times this number.)

However, Roberto Escudero, the

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\* The student movement raised the following basic demands after the clashes of July 26: (1) Release of all political prisoners. (2) Repeal of the law designating "social dissolution" as a crime. (3) Removal of the main heads of the police in the Federal District. (4) Dissolution of the granaderos as a repressive police force. (5) Payment of indemnities to the families of persons killed in the July 27 repression and in other assaults mounted by the police. (6) Fixing the responsibility of the public officials involved in the repression.

principal spokesman for the CNH at the rally, made it clear that the government has not yet made any definitive concessions on the students' three preliminary demands. He stressed, moreover, that the six demands themselves were "only the first step in democratizing the country." The goal of the student struggle, he said, was to "transform the political life of Mexico."

The militant and determined tone of the October 31 rally was continued in the general assemblies of November 4. All the schools voted to continue the strike by overwhelming majorities. The schools which have led the struggle, the University of Mexico schools of philosophy, economics, and political science, did not even need to take formal votes.

As for the rest of the schools of the University of Mexico, Le Monde's correspondent Claude Kiejman wrote on November 5 that only about twenty students out of about 400 in the schools of medicine and chemistry voted to return to class, "for academic reasons." This pattern, he noted, held for the other schools.

The various general assemblies also elected new delegates to the CNH to replace those still imprisoned. And in addition, the law school voted the following five-point resolution unanimously: (1) To demand that the government resolve the conflict within eight days. To resume demonstrations if it did not. (2) To join with the intellectuals to form a tribunal which would condemn the repression publicly. (3) To prevent the abolition of Vocational School No. 7 and Preparatory School No. 4. (4) To prevent the closing of the rural schools. (5) To organize "round tables," political discussions, and propaganda brigades.

In the school of philosophy, the CNH delegate, Rufino Perdomo, called for sending propaganda teams to the provinces to explain the progress of the struggle.

Although the students and their allies have momentarily suspended street demonstrations, their propaganda teams are continuing their work, and various forms of public pressure are still being brought to bear against the government.

The Mexican Día de los Muertos [Day of the Dead], November 2, served as the occasion for several actions denouncing the massacre in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas.

On this day when all the dead are honored in Mexico, a ceremony was held at the scene of the massacre in memory of those gunned down there by troops and police on October 2.

According to El Universal of Novem-

ber 3, a crowd of about 500 persons, including many relatives of the victims, gathered in the plaza with flowers and candles. A wreath bearing the slogan "History Will Judge Them" was laid near the large church on the plaza. The ceremony ended with a prayer in memory of those fallen in the slaughter, while the participants in the memorial held up their fingers in the "V" sign for victory.

The crowd consisted largely of older people. The CNH instructed the students not to attend out of fear of a government provocation. The plaza was ringed with heavy concentrations of security troops.

La Prensa piously complained November 3, "Both in Santo Tomás and Zacatenco, the strikers took advantage of the Día de los Muertos to write foolish sayings on the walls about the army, the police, Cueto, and Cerecero" [police officials hated by the students].

Moreover, despite the decision of the students in the Federal District to forego public demonstrations, Excelsior reported November 1 that students had been holding "lightning" meetings in the streets of Puebla, well to the southeast of Mexico City.

El Día reported November 1 that a very prominent group of Mexican intellectuals had sent a protest to the government demanding the release of Rina Lazo, a Guatemalan painter, picked up in the wave of arrests following the October 2 massacre.

Among the signers of the protest were: Carlos Pellicer, an internationally famous poet; Armando Zayas, the director of the University of Mexico Symphony Orchestra; Alberto Dallal, coordinator of cultural services of the University of Mexico, and Elena Olachea, director of the Gallery of Arts.

It is clear that the resistance to the repression is giving pause to at least some sections of the government and the ruling class. The fact that the events since July 26 have actually provoked debates in the torpid and servile Mexican parliament is an eloquent sign of nervousness in the ruling circles.

But more significant is the fact that even the venal press is beginning to discuss reform of the police forces. The editorial in the November 2 Excelsior is notable for its frankness:

"The insecurity in which the inhabitants of our capital live -- there are cases when they do not know whom to fear more, the criminals or certain policemen...."



"HERBERT MARCUSE AND MARXISM"

Robert Langston, in an article entitled "Herbert Marcuse and Marxism" in the November-December issue of the International Socialist Review, offers some cogent criticisms of the views of the major theoretician of the "New Left."

Langston traces the development of Marcuse's thought from the time he was a disciple of the German existentialist Martin Heidegger. He notes the valuable contributions made by Marcuse in his Marxist period in the 1930's and 1940's, and then takes up his current pessimistic view of the possibility of a revolutionary overturn of capitalist society.

Langston attributes the somber conclusions reached by Marcuse to his shifting away from the Marxist method of social analysis. Marcuse, Langston argues, instead of probing deeply into class relations, has become caught in the surface of things and become unduly influenced by the undeniable fact that the industrial working class has been largely quiescent in the postwar period. By limiting his field of study to such a narrow area, Marcuse excludes data indicating that the workers can again take up the cause of social change. He reduces his criticism of

capitalism to counterposing a blueprint of what society might be like if the evils of capitalism did not exist. Thus, Langston writes, "He relapses from scientific sociology to pre-Marxist utopianism."

Langston considers Marcuse's economic views in the light of economic reality. Marcuse's contention that a "total centralized administration" in capitalist society is capable of eliminating all serious social conflicts does not correspond with the facts, Langston maintains.

Finally, Langston takes up some of the philosopher's political positions. He points to Marcuse's support of Eugene McCarthy within one of the two parties of America's ruling class: "Thus the very 'radicalism' of his theory...served to 'free' the critical theorist for the most opportunistic kind of practical politics."

Again, the mass working-class revolt in France refuted Marcuse's theories on a key point. Langston concludes: "Marcuseanism offers no reliable guide either to understanding or making history, above all, the history of our own time. Marxism does."



HERBERT MARCUSE: Does the "new left" philosopher end up in a unidimensional impasse?

KOLIGIANNIS LEADERSHIP REPUDIATED BY GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY

A significant group of imprisoned leaders and cadres of the Communist party of Greece [KKE -- Kommounistikó Koma tes Ellados], claiming to represent a majority of the party's ranks in the country, have issued a public statement denying the legitimacy of the KKE's pro-Moscow Political Bureau -- headed by General Secretary Kostas Koligiannis -- in exile in Eastern Europe.

The statement appeared in the left-wing Greek weekly Eleftheri Patriða, published in Rome, and was reported in the October 20-21 issue of the Paris daily Le Monde.

The political prisoners declared that the only legitimate leadership of the KKE was the Bureau of the Interior of the party's Central Committee, which is based in Greece. According to Eleftheri Patriða, 70 percent of the deportees on the island of Leros, 95 percent of the women deportees at Yaros, as well as the prisoners at Averoff, Aegina and Salonika have condemned the Koligiannis group and announced their support for the Bureau of the Interior.

The signers of the statement include Manolis Glezos, the well-known Resistance hero and Lenin peace prize winner, who is a member of the executive committee of the Enosis tes Demokratikes Aristeras [Union of the Democratic Left], and seven other members of the EDA executive committee; 14 members of the leading committee of the EDA; C. Filinis, a leader of the Patriotic Front; two members of the presidium of the Lambrakis youth, and the secretaries of the Communist party branches in Salonika, Thessaly and Attika.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to have been an important factor in precipitating the denunciation of the Koligiannis group. Koligiannis, in a statement broadcast by Radio Moscow shortly after the invasion, gave uncritical support to the Kremlin's action -- in the name of the Greek party. Ninety Greek political prisoners, including many of the signers of the above statement, condemned the invasion [see Intercontinental Press, October 21, p. 894], calling for the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops to "allow the Czechoslovak people to freely determine their own destiny."

Another group of KKE leaders in exile, headed by Mitsos Partsalidis and also claiming to speak in the name of the party, denounced the Soviet invasion on August 23 on behalf of the "United Central Committee" of the KKE.

This three-way split in the Greek Communist party goes back to the Twelfth

Plenum of the party's Central Committee last February. This meeting was discussed in an important article in the April issue of Ergatike Pale [Workers Struggle], the organ of the Internationalist Communist party of Greece, the Greek section of the Fourth International.

"The crisis which has broken out in the KKE," Ergatike Pale said, "is without any doubt one of the most serious this party has known in its fifty-year history. Let us review the events.

"From February 3 to 14, the Twelfth Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE, the first since the establishment of the April dictatorship [April 21, 1967], met in Bucharest, Rumania. Not a single cadre from the party inside the country participated, however.

"In the course of this plenum, the KKE leadership split two ways. On the one side were K. Koligiannis and three other members of the Political Bureau -- Grosos, Mauromatis, and Stringos; on the other were the trio of Partsalidis, Zographos and Dimitriou, also members of the Political Bureau. Taking advantage of a slim majority -- fourteen votes against eleven -- the Koligiannis faction expelled Partsalidis from the Political Bureau and reconstituted this body with Koligiannis partisans."

Partsalidis and his supporters refused to accept the authority of the new Central Committee. Ergatike Pale continued:

"On February 17, the radio station 'The Voice of Truth' in Rumania broadcast a communiqué in which these three denounced the Twelfth Plenum for the following reasons:

"(1) The required quorum was not obtained; less than half of the regular members of the Central Committee participated.

"(2) The plenum had no validity because no Central Committee member or party cadre from inside Greece attended.

"(3) With fallacious arguments and slanderous accusations, this plenum took arbitrary and unconstitutional measures against certain members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee."

Partsalidis' communiqué accused Koligiannis of "conservatism and dogmatic rigidity," and of "moving away from the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of 1956 and of returning to the irregular regime of the past."

The Sixth Plenum had repudiated the Zachariadis leadership which led the party

through the Greek civil war. It condemned the civil-war experience as an "ultraleft adventure" and set a parliamentary and "democratic" line.

The basic means for carrying out this line was to be through work in the EDA [Union of the Democratic Left], a broad "progressive" electoral formation which the CP helped to establish. In effect the Greek Communist party dissolved itself into the EDA, which in turn lent support to formations further to the right, such as the Center Union [Enosis tou Kentrou], the liberal bourgeois party in the period prior to the April coup.

Koligiannis responded to the communiqué by "expelling" Partsalidis and his supporters from the party.

On February 22, Partsalidis announced the formation of the "United Central Committee of the KKE." He said the majority of KKE emigrés in Western Europe "are on the side of the Partsalidis team."

The same day, however, a statement was signed in Greece by twenty-two KKE cadres held in the island prisons in the Aegean Sea which repudiated the split that had taken place abroad and denounced the irregular form and decisions of the Twelfth Plenum. They stressed that the KKE leadership could be composed only of Central Committee members and party cadres inside Greece.

All the Communists in Greece, the statement said, "are united under the party's real leadership, that is under the leadership of the Central Committee members and party cadres in Greece."

The Greek Trotskyists commented on this declaration in April, "The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the KKE is divided both organizationally and politically not merely into two parts but three -- the Koligiannis faction, the United Central Committee of Partsalidis, and the team of cadres in Greece -- each of which claims the leadership of the par-

ty for itself."

In August, veteran KKE leader Marikos Vafeiadis circulated a letter sharply critical of Koligiannis. A portion of the text which appeared in the September 9 issue of the Christian Science Monitor said, "Koligiannis and his group talk about a strong party so they can cover up their criminal policies which finalized on April 21, 1967."

One Greek Communist, angry at Koligiannis' claim that the KKE backed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, told the London Times August 28, "Outside Greece his [Koligiannis] following among Greek communists is no more than 10-15 percent. Inside it is virtually none at all -- especially after the statement supporting the Russian invasion."

Signers of the statement denouncing Koligiannis' Political Bureau that appeared in Eleftheri Patrida included Manolis Glezos, L. Kyrkos, P. Katerinis, G. Lotsis, P. Paraskevopoulos, G. Sterghiou, V. Nefeloudis, and V. Sakelaris, all members of the Executive Committee of the EDA; Hélène Bena, Maria Karaghiorghi, Angelos Diamantopoulos, Sp. Linardatos, D. Keltemlidis, C. Proveleghios, Ch. Angelakos, G. Priftis, A. Tsellos, L. Tzakos, A. Tsoouparopoulos, Y. Michalopoulos (Orion), Chr. Michalopoulos, and A. Papalexioi, members of the leading committee of the EDA; C. Filinis, leader of the Patriotic Front; and A. Manolakos and A. Ledakis, members of the Presidium of the Lambrakis youth.

A statement by the Bureau of the Interior of the KKE issued clandestinely in Greece at the end of October described the Koligiannis Political Bureau as "illegal" and called for a new plenum of the Central Committee, saying the decision had been made by "the majority of the members of the legal Central Committee who are still at liberty and by the three members of the Control Commission." If the Koligiannis group were to fail to attend the new plenum, it would formalize the split.

#### FRENCH GROUPS PLAN CAMPAIGN OF SOLIDARITY WITH MEXICAN STUDENTS

Two thousand people, meeting in the Mutualité Hall in Paris November 5, discussed plans for a campaign of solidarity with the Mexican student struggle.

A wide range of organizations sponsored the gathering. Along with leaflets, they distributed the "Appeal to the Youth of the World" issued by the Consejo Nacional de Huelga [National Strike Council], the Mexican students leading body.

Among the sponsors and supporters

of the meeting were the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur [National Union of University Teachers], the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France [National French Student Union], the Syndicat National des Chercheurs Scientifiques [National Union of Scientific Researchers], the Comités d'Action Lycéens [High-School Action Committees], the Comités d'Action [Action Committees], and the Etats Généraux du Cinéma [the General Assembly of the Motion Picture Industry].

300,000 IN ATHENS PROTEST PAPADOPOULOS DICTATORSHIP

The first massive demonstration against the Papadopoulos regime since the junta seized power in April 1967 occurred in Athens November 3. An Agence France-Presse dispatch from Athens the next day reported that an estimated 300,000 persons turned out for the funeral of former premier George Papandreou. Despite threats by the government and a large force of police, the crowd repeatedly broke through the police lines, shouting slogans against the junta:

"The people don't want you!"; "Today, you are the corpse!"; and "Where are our noes?" referring to the rigged "yes" vote for Papadopoulos' constitution in September.

The giant crowd sang the Greek national anthem, giving special emphasis to the famous verse, "Slavery oppressed them."

Papandreou, 80, died November 1 after undergoing surgery for an ulcer. His family refused an offer of a military funeral, and he was buried in the Athens cemetery.

In Constitution Square on the funeral route, a crowd of more than 50,000 chanted "okhi" [no], registering their uncounted votes in the September 29 referendum. "You've got your figures mixed," they shouted. Police attacked one section of the crowd that chanted, "Out with the junta!" and "Down with tyranny!" Forty demonstrators were arrested. The crowd applauded those arrested and cried, "Shame!" at the police.

Although he did not dare move against the massive demonstration, Papadopoulos took reprisals against those who were arrested. The forty were put on trial the day after the demonstration and sentenced November 5 by a military tribunal. Constantin Tzouvalis, a 26-year-old businessman, and Dimitrios Trianbelas, 40, a lawyer, were sentenced to four and a half years in prison for "insulting the authorities" and "antinational propaganda." Twenty-six others received sentences ranging from three and a half to one and a half years. The rest were acquitted or,

in the case of minors, paroled in the custody of their parents.

On November 4 another military trial opened. Fifteen defendants were accused of taking part in an attempt to kill Premier Papadopoulos August 13. The chief defendant, Alexandros Panagoulis, 30, a member of the Center Youth, testified that he had been tortured after being arrested.

The first day of the trial Panagoulis was sentenced to two years for contempt of court for saying to the prosecutor, "You lie. The indictment is full of lies, and I never signed the deposition you attribute to me."

He told the tribunal that he had been brutally tortured by police lieutenant Evangelos Mallios and another police officer. He said they had kept him in handcuffs for twenty-four days, beat him, stomped on one of his hands, and cut a tendon.

Panagoulis was accused of having planted two bombs on the highway from Sounion to Athens, which went off only seconds after Papadopoulos' car passed the spot.

The military tribunal alleged that the bombing was part of a plot organized by former Cypriote cabinet minister Polycarpos Georghiadis and "morally instigated" by Andreas Papandreou, exiled son of George Papandreou.

According to the November 9 New York Times, Panagoulis admitted having set the bombs, but denied there was any plot or that anyone else was involved.

"This regime will be toppled by violent means, because this is the only way to end it," he reportedly declared to the court. "We have failed. But others will follow. I ask for no clemency. For me, the best swan song is the death rattle before the firing squad of a tyranny."

Panagoulis faces the death penalty if found guilty. The others face up to twenty years imprisonment.

DID GREEK RESISTANCE LEADER JUMP FROM WINDOW OR WAS HE THROWN?

Alexandros Iosifidis, a lawyer and former municipal councilor held by the Greek dictatorship for "Communist subversive activities," jumped out of a third-floor window in the secret police headquarters in Salonika in a "suicide attempt" October 7, according to a report

from Greece published in the October 9 Le Monde.

The Paris daily said that Iosifidis was taken to a hospital in very serious condition. No information was given on why Iosifidis would want to resort to

such an unusual method of suicide. Or how he evaded the protection of the police.

The story in émigré circles is different from the police version. On October 10, M.A. Brillakis, the representative abroad of the executive committee of the EDA [Enosis tes Demokratikes Aristeras -- Union of the Democratic Left], gave what he said were the true facts.

The secret police subjected their

prisoner to "medieval torture" for forty days, Brillakis said. Then they threw him out of a window.

Two other EDA leaders, Brillakis noted, had been murdered by the Papadopoulos regime, George Tsarouchas and J. Chalkidis.

Brillakis is appealing to various international organizations to send commissions of inquiry to Greece.

### SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNALISTS GO ON TRIAL

The long-postponed trial of Rand Daily Mail editor Laurence Gandar and reporter Benjamin Pogrund began in Johannesburg November 1. Gandar and Pogrund have been under indictment by the South African government since 1965 when their paper printed a series of exposés of the inhuman conditions inflicted on political prisoners in that country's concentration camp-prisons.

In the summer of 1965 the Rand Daily Mail published three installments of a lengthy interview with Robert Harold Strachan, 40, a white political prisoner who had recently been released after serving a three-year sentence. Strachan's revelations shocked even racist-minded whites and a judicial inquiry was demanded. Minister of Justice Vorster (now prime minister) announced that the charges raised by Strachan would be "thrashed out thoroughly."

On July 1, 1965, after publication of the second in the series, police raided the offices of the Rand Daily Mail and seized the notes and text of the third article; but the type had already been set and the paper was brought out anyway. The next day Strachan was put under partial house arrest and "banned," making it illegal to quote him in the press. Later he was sentenced to two and a half years in jail under the Prisons Act of 1959 which makes it a crime to circulate "false" information about prison conditions -- with the burden of proof lying with the publisher.

The paper ran a second series of interviews with two white prison guards and three African ex-prisoners which described the torture of prisoners through electric-shock treatment, continual beatings by guards, and denial of food, clothing and medical care. The guards and the ex-prisoners were subsequently jailed under the Prisons Act. The government seized Gandar's and Pogrund's passports so they could not go abroad. (Gandar was allowed to make a brief trip to Britain and the United States, after which his passport was confiscated).

What Vorster was trying to cover up can be seen from the following brief excerpt from the Strachan interview:

"I saw one man...dragged out of the hospital by a warder, Kruger....He dragged out this prisoner who was wearing the hospital grey robe and forced him to kneel down on all fours, stripped naked, in front of all the other patients....

"(He) forced him to kneel while the African prisoner who acted as hospital orderly stood with an enema can of soap and water. The enema was administered. The prisoner stood up. Blood was dripping down his legs. He was not allowed to get rid of this soapy water...He had to stand with his buttocks clenched together with his hands.

"He was then forced to jump around from leg to leg, doing a sort of quick march, a sort of knees up to a horizontal position but still clutching his buttocks....The burly warder kicked him as he jumped in this way, kicked him on his arms, his back, his hips and his belly. Until finally a pot was brought out by one of the African prisoners."

Under the fascist-like Vorster regime some of South Africa's finest men are held indefinitely in these kinds of prisons. It is estimated that there are more than 8,000 political prisoners in South Africa. Robert Sobukwe has been held at the Robben Island concentration camp with no legal charges against him since he completed serving a three-year sentence in 1963.

Nelson Mandela, the well-known liberation leader, is serving a life sentence on Robben Island on frame-up charges of "sabotage" and subversion. He was even denied permission to attend the funeral of his mother October 6.

The noted scholar, Dr. Neville Alexander, is serving a ten-year sentence on Robben Island along with ten codefendants. They were sentenced in April 1964 for "sabotage." The only evidence introduced

at the trial was the fact that the defendants possessed Marxist books. Dr. Alexander was the first nonwhite to receive an Alexander Humboldt fellowship. He received his doctorate at Tübingen University in West Germany, and is the author of a critical study of the German dramatist Gerhart Hauptmann entitled, Studien zum Stilwandel im dramatischen Werk Gerhart Hauptmanns. Alexander turned down

several lucrative academic positions to return to his native country to struggle against the apartheid regime.

The trial of Gandar and Pogrund is expected to be dragged out by the government for as long as six months. It is scheduled to recess December 13, to be resumed next February.

PEDRO CANDELA HAILS RISE IN PERUVIAN PEASANT MOVEMENT

[The following excerpts from an article by Pedro Candela, Hugo Blanco's chief lieutenant in the peasant struggles of La Convención in 1963, describe the present situation of the peasant movement in the Andes and the new forms of struggle that are developing.

[Candela was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison for his fight for the rights of the Peruvian poor peasants. The excerpts given below, written in the prison of El Sexto, were printed in the August-September issue of Solidarité de Pérou, the monthly bulletin of the French Committee for Solidarity with the Victims of the Repression in Peru. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

\* \* \*

The logic of things imposes the dynamics of insurrection on the peasant movement, and naturally that is occurring also in La Convención. Most of the arrendires, a layer of peasants traditionally considered "petty bourgeois," which exists in La Convención, are giving drive to this movement.

It must not be forgotten that the peasant movement in the valley of La Convención is composed of two social groups or strata -- the arrendires, who have direct contracts with the landowners by which they exchange fees or services (work in the fields or on the ranches, etc.) for the right to use the land; and the allegados, who are bound to the arrendires by similar contracts.

Although these two strata are obviously destined to clash at some still undetermined future time, they are united in their struggle against the big landowners. Against their contradictions, which could be called "contradictions among the people," stands this basic contradiction -- the landed against the landless. And this is the contradiction which is dominant in the process.

Now, for example, a movement beginning at Manamura of rejecting the Agrarian Reform as practiced by the government has spread to the entire valley of La Con-



*Copain*  
PEDRO CANDELA

vención.

Today the arrendires -- the social strata which was to benefit from this reform and which had shown a "petty-bourgeois" attitude, taking a position far in the wake of the insurrectionary movement -- are not satisfied with the five or eight hectares allowed them instead of the thirty decreed by law. They are not accepting the delay in turning over the land titles to them or going along with the attempts to make them pay 7,800 soles [38.46 soles = US\$1] a hectare. They will not let the state speculate at their expense by selling them fertilizer at 500 soles [a ton] in cash plus 60 percent more on credit. They also feel cheated by the Consumers Cooperative which is administered by the state and which charges them much higher prices than the going rate....

The "innocence" of the social workers must also be noted. Backed up by the authorities, they are trying to impose forms of family life and economy completely out of line with the objective circumstances and culture of the people.

Thus, there are numerous causes of

discontent. And this discontent mounts when the peasants, and especially the allegados, find themselves treated as "trespassers and criminals" when they want to start working uncultivated lands.

The "Agrarian Reform" has been reduced to a financial scheme to sell off the lands which the peasants occupied and which it had become practically impossible or at least very difficult for the landlords, with the support of the repressive forces, to recover.

Facing this situation, the arrendires and the allegados again united in a common front for "Land or Death." And they began an intense campaign to drive out the Agrarian Reform functionaries. Lacking a clear and consistent line, they reacted spontaneously, but along the right lines....

So now we see two opposing fronts -- on one side the repressive forces, the landowners, the imperialist agencies, etc., who are blocking the insurrectionary thrust and trying to divert it with palliatives; and on the other side the peasants, overcoming their contradictions under the impetus of their vital need for land. The process is developing without a qualified leadership, but this movement is consistent in its general line.

The methods in this struggle stand at the level of elementary, basic organization -- mass meetings, "nonviolent marches," and a continual campaign for a general amnesty for those who have been

imprisoned. The higher forms of struggle cannot develop fully because the classical subjective instrument is lacking. Despite this, the possibility exists for creating an authentic peasant movement, even if the political parties do not assume this task.

But it is clear that the peasant process continues to achieve its highest level in La Convención. Therefore, no one should be surprised that on their own momentum, without the guidance of the classical "subjective instrument," the peasants are already finding paths toward the inevitable confrontation with the repressive forces.

For the moment, their radical decisiveness is expressed in their counter-proposals to the government on land acquisition. Instead of 7,800 soles per hectare they have offered 100 soles for land in the valley and 50 for land in the mountains. That is, the peasants are opposing the government deal. And since this is the case, it is logical to suppose that other higher forms of struggle for enforcement of real agrarian reform are ripening.


I do not want to idealize spontaneity here. But I think that in view of the high level attained, in view of the past experiences, of the spread of up-to-date forms of revolutionary struggle, and the ripening subjective conditions, this movement can lead to specific forms of organization which can be embodied in a national process, beginning here in La Convención or any other part of the country.

#### LEO HUBERMAN

Leo Huberman, coeditor of the independent socialist magazine, Monthly Review, died in Paris November 8 of a heart attack. He was 65 years old.

Together with Paul Sweezy, Huberman founded the widely read left-wing journal in 1949. The prolific team added a successful publishing operation, Monthly Review Press, to complement their periodical in 1952. Leo Huberman wrote or co-authored eleven books, including Man's Worldly Goods, a popularization of Marxist economics that sold more than 500,000 copies in the United States and was translated into many languages. With Paul Sweezy he wrote Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution in 1960, which became an important reference work for defenders of the Cuban revolution in the English-speaking world.

At the time of his death, Huberman had just completed a new book, Socialism in Cuba, also in collaboration with Paul Sweezy. The book will be published in the spring of 1969.



BEHIND THE BOMBING "HALT"

In the final days of the presidential campaign in the U.S., the Vietnam war became a major preoccupation of the Democratic party bosses, bringing Johnson, in hope of appeasing the American voters, to extend the bombing halt to all parts of North Vietnam and to agree to include representatives of the South Vietnam freedom fighters in the Paris talks.

Johnson's last-minute attempt at a "dove" stance came too late and had too little substance to save the White House for the Democrats. It did succeed, however, in complicating the "orderly transfer of power" to the bosses of the Republican party. Even as the last votes were being counted, Nixon was compelled to pick up where Johnson had left off.

The initiative in this was taken by Nguyen Van Thieu, who, up to that moment, had been one of Johnson's favorite puppets. Thieu had sought to sabotage his master's final election maneuver by announcing that Saigon would not partici-

pate in the Paris talks. This forced the State Department to cancel the opening conference, scheduled for November 6 under the provisions of the agreement reached with Hanoi.

Thieu followed this up by sending a cablegram to Nixon November 7, congratulating him on his victory and buttering him up as a "staunch defender of freedom."

The message included the following invitation, which at once made headlines in the U.S.: "In the days ahead, you will be most welcome in Vietnam if you wish to make an on-the-spot assessment of the war and the situation in Vietnam."

In the context of Saigon's boycott of the Paris talks, Thieu's invitation constituted an appeal over the head of Johnson to Nixon, asking him in effect to disavow Johnson's "peace" concessions to Hanoi. This amounted to a call to Nixon to begin running the war now, even before he formally replaced Johnson as commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces.

Nixon had little choice but to give the fowl Saigon "president" a public brush-off. Ronald Ziegler, Nixon's press aide, announced within hours that Nixon "plans no foreign trip and will make no such trip unless President Johnson suggests that it would be helpful in furthering the negotiations towards peace."

With this diplomatic formula, Nixon turned down the invitation to celebrate his election victory by joining publicly in Thieu's game. As the new president of the United States, Nixon may not want a puppet who has been had by Johnson. More important, Nixon wants to gain time before having to assume direct responsibility for conducting the U.S. aggression in Vietnam. He sought to accomplish this by bouncing the ball back to the Democrats, saying he was leaving it up to Johnson to decide whether he should take a "foreign trip."

Meanwhile, details are filtering out of Saigon on how Johnson maneuvered things so as to appear in the final days of the U.S. election as a "peacemaker." The main sources for the inside story are Thieu and Ky, who are in position to know the facts and interested in making them public for purposes of blackmail.

After his November 2 speech to the National Assembly announcing his decision to boycott the Paris talks, Thieu held a reception at the palace for more than 150 members of the legislature. In an account from Saigon, published in the November 8 Christian Science Monitor, Beverly Deepe reports that at the reception Thieu and



GEN. ABRAMS: Was he kept in ignorance?



Ky gave the legislators "a blow-by-blow description of all the secret proceedings." Varying accounts of what had been revealed soon became public knowledge in Saigon. In addition, one Vietnamese, who had been in touch with the secret negotiations, kept a diary which became available. Besides this, diplomats and American embassy officials in Saigon talked off the record, revealing what they knew.

"According to these sources," the special correspondent of the Monitor reports, "American chief negotiator in Paris Ambassador W. Averell Harriman made a major concession to Hanoi in the now famous secret peace package deal. But in Saigon, American Ambassador Ellsworth S. Bunker explained the package deal to President Thieu and the South Vietnamese government in such a way that this major concession was glossed over.

"This American concession was the seating of the National Liberation Front (NLF) as a separate delegation at Paris -- meaning that the expanded peace talks would be a four-power conference. Hanoi has consistently wanted such a conference but Saigon has vowed officially for years that it would never negotiate with the Viet Cong as a separate entity."


What Bunker did, the account goes on, was to get Thieu to agree to a three-power conference. This would consist of delegations for the U.S., Saigon, and Hanoi. The National Liberation Front would be permitted to sit as part of the Hanoi delegation. Bunker reportedly told Thieu that this had been agreed to by both Washington and Hanoi.

Thieu and Ky were dead set against independent representation for the National Liberation Front because, in their opinion, this "would probably pave the way for a coalition government and eventual Communist take-over in South Vietnam."

Thus Harriman was telling the Hanoi representatives in Paris one thing while Bunker was telling Thieu and Ky something quite different.

Apparently Harriman spilled the beans by telling the South Vietnamese ambassador in Paris, Pham Dang Lam, that a four-power conference had been scheduled, that the National Liberation Front would have its own representation, and that the Thieu regime in Saigon knew all about it.

"On Sunday, Oct. 27," continues Beverly Deepe, "Hanoi gave its final agreement to Mr. Harriman's package peace proposal. Then, on Oct. 29, the American representatives, having already secured agreement from the Thieu government to go to a three-power conference, began pressing the South Vietnamese to send their



BUNKER: Did he do a job on Thieu?

delegation to Paris by Nov. 2."

Ky was scheduled to head this delegation. But the Saigon crew got into an argument with Bunker. At a palace meeting with Johnson's representative, they maintained that they couldn't get a delegation to Paris on five days' notice without looking ridiculous.

While the argument was going on, an aide came in and handed Thieu a cable from Ambassador Lam in Paris. The cable said that Harriman had told him that a four-way conference was shaping up and that Saigon's formula had not even been considered by Washington and Hanoi.

"Sheer pandemonium broke out among the Vietnamese at the palace. Mr. Bunker was asked to leave the room while they discussed it privately among themselves.

"Even mild-mannered Premier Tran Van Huong said there must be 'blatant duplicity' on the part of the Americans in this. President Thieu reportedly said: 'Obviously someone was lying.'

"Then the Vietnamese confronted Mr. Bunker with the Paris cable. Being unable to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy, Mr. Bunker and his party left in silence, one source said."

Bunker returned an hour and a half later with a letter said to have been dictated by Johnson himself over the phone to the American embassy in Saigon.

"The gist of it said that there had been a misunderstanding, that Mr. Bunker -- not Mr. Harriman in Paris -- had been right, and that what Mr. Bunker had said in Saigon was the American policy -- meaning that the National Liberation Front would not be independently represented."

If this version is correct, then it can only be concluded that Harriman was lying to Hanoi's representatives in Paris, was misled himself by Johnson, or displayed symptoms of senility which his staff failed to note and to report back to the State Department and the CIA.


In Saigon, Beverly Deepe reports, "serious observers" suggest various possibilities.

One is that Bunker, Harriman, and Johnson misled Thieu by getting him to agree to a three-power conference while they arranged one of four powers. The idea was that once Saigon's delegation reached Paris it would find itself trapped and unable to withdraw.

Another possibility is that "American top-level communication and coordination got tangled up and Mr. Bunker himself knew only about 80 percent of the peace package that Mr. Harriman had proposed in Paris." Both Harriman and Bunker were acting in good faith, according to this version, and the snafu was due to a set of clumsy fingers that have not yet been identified. Maybe all the messages weren't read.

"In Saigon," we are told, "only Mr. Bunker and Deputy Ambassador Samuel Berger were authorized to read all the message traffic regarding the matter. Even the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and Gen Creighton Abrams, American commander, were largely uninformed about written messages." That's the CIA and the top commander in Vietnam they're talking about.

Bunker is in there pitching with true professional skill. "Informed sources report that Ambassador Bunker's



HARRIMAN: Could he have lied to Hanoi?

position is that there was not any misunderstanding, lack of communication, or coordination between himself, the White House, and Mr. Harriman." But he does not explain what was being coordinated.

Still another possibility suggested by "knowledgeable sources" in Saigon is that "the Vietnamese Government knew all along that the National Liberation Front would be separately seated in Paris, but that the Saigon officials started getting 'apprehensive' about sitting with the NLF and simply backed out on Mr. Bunker."

If this is accurate, it is only possible to conclude that Thieu and Ky are not without qualification as expert liars themselves -- a supposition that is not without a certain plausibility.

Still another possibility -- not reported by Beverly Deepe -- is that Thieu and Ky were assigned the role of going along with Johnson's maneuver so as

to facilitate his grandstand play at the end of the election and then, like the good loyal puppets they are, to start balking. In this den of footpads, confidence men, and butchers, who can believe anything that is said?

The simple truth is that if Johnson had genuinely wanted to end the war in Vietnam, he could have done so at any time by merely issuing an order that all U.S. forces be withdrawn at once. That was how they got there in the first place -- on his order.

Let it be added that inasmuch as Johnson remains commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces, a post he will hold until next January, he still has the power to end the war at once by issuing an order withdrawing U.S. troops forthwith from Vietnam.

Johnson, of course, has quite different intentions. While the diplomats continued to ply their skills, the Pentagon escalated military operations in South Vietnam.

On November 9, the U.S. command in Saigon announced that it had moved an 18,000-man division from the northern frontier to the Cambodian border. The reason for the shift, as explained to the press by a spokesman of Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, was that the general felt that "the enemy threat along the northern frontier had lessened, while the threat in the border provinces remained substantial."

It was further explained that Abrams was planning to apply "relentless pressure along the Cambodian border with mobile type infantry operations and massive use of B52 bombers."

The American general's goal is "to crush" North Vietnamese forces said to be holding a stretch 100 miles long. The same sources said that Abrams "wants to push them out with heavy losses, keep them out, then smash the Viet Cong guerilla forces."

#### IS THE PRESIDENCY WORTH THE PRICE?

A president of the U.S. draws a salary of \$100,000 a year (taxable), plus \$50,000 for expenses (taxable), and \$40,000 for expenses and entertainment (non-taxable). For four years in office, the gross take is thus \$760,000.

Seeking this prize, McCarthy reportedly spent \$6,000,000 in 1968. Wallace likewise gambled \$6,000,000. Humphrey spent about \$10,000,000. Nixon laid out \$7,000,000 to get himself nominated and



"HONEST LBJ": Capable of skulduggery?

On November 8 and 9, squadrons of B52 bombers dropped 750 tons of bombs along the border.

Ground fighting was also mounting in South Vietnam as the Pentagon sought to take maximum advantage of the work accomplished by their State Department and White House collaborators through the channels of secret diplomacy.

another \$21,000,000 in the campaign.

Besides this, huge sums were spent that can hardly be traced because they were not "direct" contributions.

Why are some people willing to pay so much for such a low-paying job? Perhaps it's the lifetime pension of \$25,000 a year, plus free mailing privileges, free office space, and \$65,000 a year for office help. It figures.

WHAT NEXT FOR THE ACTION COMMITTEES IN FRANCE?

[The following article appeared in the October 16 issue of Rouge, a "Communist action paper" published in Paris. The original title was "Les taches des militants révolutionnaires dans les comités d'action" (Tasks of the revolutionary militants in the action committees). The translation is by Intercontinental Press. Subheadings appear in the original.]

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The impression might have been created because of the united way in which the CA's [Comités d'Action -- Action Committees] acted last May that it would be possible to bring them together in a united movement. Realization of the possibility, however, required confirmation and concretization in real, effective political coordination; and that is where the CA's have always fallen down.

In fact, with the ebb of the mass movement which had united them around the strike, they became diversified in accordance with their extremely varied functions. In addition, they have remained unclear in political configuration. What is still involved is a heterogeneous combination of militants whose common ideology has not gone beyond a vague rejection of imperialism and Stalinism.

The difficulties the CA's are running into today confirm what could have been suspected after May. There is no room to the left of the Communist party for a national movement of CA's; that is, for a successful Mouvement Révolutionnaire.\*

The magnitude of the tasks incumbent on the revolutionists today requires a clear line, an organizational discipline, and a political homogeneity which the CA's can never provide. However, it should not be concluded that because a unified and centralized movement of the CA's is inconceivable they have no useful role to play. To the contrary, we must understand the specific character of each type of CA and determine their perspectives accordingly.

The Plant CA's

The most militant workers, both inside and outside the unions, who came to the student movement in May seeking the revolutionary leadership which they lacked, organized themselves into CA's. After May, when the ebb of the struggle broke up the

embryonic organs of dual power (rank-and-file committees and strike committees thrown up by the strike but which were doomed once they were no longer sustained by the balance of forces) in most of the factories which had attempted this experiment, the most active and conscious militants regrouped in the CA's.

Finally some city and neighborhood interplant commissions gained strength through their educational work and mushroomed, creating new CA's in plants which they coordinated.

The role of the plant CA's was first developed empirically. Opposition trade-union militants suffer from the segregation produced by the division of labor within the plants. They cannot expect to extend their influence beyond their immediate environment -- the little group of workers in their own shops. They only catch a glimpse of the thousands of other workers in the factory in the incoming rush, or by chance in the locker rooms.

If they do not accept confining themselves to such a small audience, if they want to move out from their shop to make new contacts, create new nuclei, they have to knuckle under to running for shop stewards' posts, which alone would permit them to move around in the factory.

But as soon as an oppositionist comes to be recognized for what he is, he has to shift his stance. Union elections in big plants do not hinge on the individual prestige of this or that militant, known only to his immediate co-workers, but on the labels of the union federations, which run only their most trusted members.

A union militant who disagrees with his leadership is immediately presented with the alternative of resigning himself to seeing his influence permanently curtailed or searching for some means of action which would enable him to break out of the isolation imposed by the organization of work and reinforced by his exclusion from the union hierarchy.

The plant CA's must serve to partially solve this problem. They are the activist bodies which counter the employers' maneuvers and the unions' evasions. The papers they publish make it possible to circulate information in the plants (hand-to-hand distribution in the locker rooms, at the work benches). If the plant CA's are strong enough, with the help of the neighborhood and student CA's, they can circulate their papers at the gate and show a public face to all the workers.

Furthermore, the CA's break through the separation of tasks between the union

\* This refers to an unsuccessful attempt at the height of the May-June events to set up a broad action movement to the left of the Communist party. -- I.P.

and the party which strictly limits the unions to economic struggles while the CP keeps a monopoly on political struggles...restricted of course to the parliamentary arena. The République-Bastille demonstrations\* were a living example of this. The long lines of marchers were nothing but a carefully controlled instrument of maneuver.

The CA's make it possible to express both the political and trade-union aspects of struggles. Although they are too weak to substitute themselves for the unions, to hold on to their members they must take over trade-union demands such as the sliding scale of wages in order to advance these demands, strengthen them, explain their consequences, how they lead toward workers' control, and to place these plant struggles in the context of the overall social struggles. From this standpoint, the CA's must be the means for breaking down the old arbitrary division between political and trade-union struggles.

Finally, the CA's can serve as the instrument for breaking down the traditional system of trade-union struggles. In this system, to get a fifteen-minute coffee break you stage a warning strike, you negotiate, and if you do not get what you want, then you start another strike a week later, and so on. You never risk going outside the legality recognized by the bosses.

Since May, however, we have seen many CA militants take the needed fifteen minutes on their own, presenting the employers with an accomplished fact. This was the way it was at Billancourt in the strike against the speedup and in Rouen where the postmen refused to work Saturdays to make up for the days lost in the strike. The logic of this "do-it-yourself" method is workers' control over the tempos and organization of work.

To break the CP's hegemony over the working class, revolutionary militants must help to create and develop plant CA's and through them stimulate discussion of workers' control, set up factory papers, and encourage direct action. Since the CA's are a skeletal structure of dual power, and since workers' power must be secured by independent class organization and not by the vanguard alone, revolutionary militants must at the same time use the CA's to sift out nuclei of revolutionary workers who understand the necessity of a national organization.

## Neighborhood and Suburban CA's\*

Embryos of dual power during the strike, the neighborhood CA's have had a difficult time adjusting to the new situation. They have been feeling their way in search of a new role. One thing, however, is clear. The task often assigned to them of politically rousing these neighborhoods has proven to be a blind alley.

When the strike was in full swing, the neighborhood committees could act, inform the district, organize collections of solidarity funds, provisioning, supervision of tradesmen, and hold meetings focused on the neighborhood. They rallied the heterogeneous petty bourgeoisie in the neighborhoods to attach it to the locomotive of the workers' strike. In the network of counterpower that was then developing, they constituted effective complements to the factory councils which were the class pivot of dual power.

But when the workers went back to their jobs after the strike, the neighborhood CA's found it difficult to sustain themselves. In periods of struggle, the motley petty bourgeoisie in these neighborhoods can rally to the side of the workers, but it does not remain mobilized en masse when the struggle recedes. Its most determined elements break individually or by groups with their class of origin to join the organized ranks of the vanguard. This is the source of the difficulties the neighborhood CA's are encountering today.

### (1) The Suburban CA's

In contrast to the neighborhood CA's, however, the suburban CA's seem relatively prosperous and secure. The reasons for this lie in the specific character of the suburbs:

-- The suburban CA's are almost always geared to the big plants located there.

-- The social base of the suburban CA's is markedly different from that of the neighborhood CA's.

-- Lastly, the suburbs unlike the neighborhoods do constitute real political entities. Whereas in Paris the CA's of various types (CAL [Comités d'Action Lycéens -- Liberal Arts High-School Action Committees], CAET [Comités d'Action Enseignement Technique -- Technical High-School Action Committees], and neighborhood CA's) tend to federate vertically, in the suburbs, because of transportation

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\* The CGT demonstrations have typically marched from the Place de la République to the Place de la Bastille or vice-versa with unvarying monotony.

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\* In Paris itself the neighborhoods tend to be petty bourgeois in social composition. The suburbs, where the big plants are located, tend to be more proletarian.

difficulties, the CA's tend to combine horizontally. As a result, the suburban CA's are often just coordinating committees for the local CAL's, the CAET's, the plant CA's, and possibly the local teachers' CA's.

Because of their real role, sustained by diversified action, the CA's in the suburbs become the focus of real political discussion and in certain suburbs are capable of competing in activity with the CP.

## (2) The Neighborhood CA's

Neighborhood CA's whose only function was to politically arouse and mobilize the variegated petty bourgeoisie in the neighborhoods would be doomed inevitably to wither away aside from the periods of intense working-class struggle. The precedent of the CVB [Comités Vietnam de Base -- Neighborhood Vietnam Committees] and the neighborhood CVN [Comités Nationaux Vietnam -- National Vietnam Committees] cannot be generalized upon. They were only an extension of well-defined vanguard groups mobilized around a single issue. Although they were capable of intervening in their own right, recruitment was limited to politically well-developed militants ready to join one or another vanguard group in the short run.

The absence of vanguard groups in the neighborhoods, caused by the banning of the vanguard organizations, has helped to keep the character of the neighborhood CA's ambiguous. In the absence of legally constituted vanguard groups, the most far-sighted CA's have tried to serve as a substitute by coordinating themselves on a well-defined political basis.

Independently existing vanguard groups would have helped to clarify this situation by absorbing those militants feeling the need to compensate for the CA's temporary difficulties through a national view of the problems, through understanding the various sectors of intervention, of their complementarity, and their perspectives.

Some CA's, consisting since the ebb almost entirely of political militants who belonged to the dissolved groups, have perceived this. These CA's define themselves consciously and explicitly as united action fronts of revolutionists of different views.

CA's having the sole mission of mobilizing the neighborhoods politically would no longer have any reason for existence. Drained on the one hand by the demobilization in the ebb of the struggle and on the other by the swelling vanguard currents, they would remain empty shells. Such CA's, however, constitute unusual cases hardly ever encountered.

In fact, most of the neighborhood CA's, even if the class nature of their recruitment is varied, have their political center of gravity elsewhere. They have no real existence except in relation to the plants on which their activity is focused.

Where the militants in the plants are too weak and too few to create and activate their own CA's, they look to the neighborhood CA as a backup and an outside center for political discussion. In these cases the CA's are sustained by a social reality outside themselves and can maintain their existence.

Following the example of the CA's in the suburbs, the neighborhood CA's can try in addition to organize their neighborhoods into political units by coordinating the local CAL's, CAET's, or neighborhood plant CA's. Such projects could dovetail with CAL attempts to find openings in local liberal arts high schools.

There is no guarantee that this will be successful, since in Paris the CAL's and CAET's tend more to combine by type -- liberal arts high schools, technical high schools -- than geographically. Still it is desirable to make the attempt.

Realizing that the neighborhood CA's have survived in greater numbers in the ebb of the struggle than the plant CA's, mostly because the CP's presence is less strong in the neighborhoods than in the factories, revolutionary militants must understand that these committees represent a historical gain. Even if they lose members and fall dormant, an event of national or international importance could revive them and make them rise out of their ashes.

Revolutionary militants must conceive of the CA's as bridges to the neighborhoods, as means for linking up the plants and tying them together via bulletins. Furthermore, the CA's must conduct anti-imperialist campaigns and campaigns against the repression and layoffs. At the same time, revolutionary militants work in an independent way in order to maintain the perspective of a national revolutionary organization combining all dimensions of the struggle.

## The Student Action Committees

In contrast to the plant and neighborhood CA's whose political perspectives are clear but for which a well-defined common political line cannot be marked out, the student movement can exist as a movement. Since May there has been a temptation to place the student CA's on the same level as the neighborhood CA's without taking into account their specific character.

In fact, although the student movement is neither a union defending the special interests of the students nor a party, the student movement can exist as a political movement on a national scale.

It is in fact united as a movement by its field of activity -- the universities. Don't they serve a definite social function? Furthermore, the universities, where bourgeoisie ideology takes its most concentrated form, provoke the most intense revolutionary ideological struggle by way of opposition.

United by its field of action and its practical work, the student movement is further unified, made into a movement, by the political forces active within it which determine its characteristics. The universities were the first front where the vanguard currents won political leadership away from the CP.

For this twofold reason -- the unification of the student milieu objectively by its social role and subjectively by the political forces activating it -- there is room for a nationally united student movement. The task of revolutionary militants is to work for the creation of such a movement, on the one hand by transforming the local organizations of the

UNEF [Union Nationale des Etudiants de France], the "corpos" [student associations], and Groupes d'Etude [Study Groups] into struggle committees, and on the other hand by explaining inside the CA's why such a movement is needed.

With the various tasks specified in this way, the role of the CA's becomes clear. The student movement is already a genuinely national movement struggling both inside and outside the universities. And the plant CA's have the mission of breaking the hegemony of the CP over the working class by bringing revolutionary trade unionism back into the forefront.

The neighborhood CA's, relying on the dual forces of the student movement and the plant CA's, seek to educate the heterogeneous strata of their neighborhoods, mobilize them around the factories, and organize them into political units.

The CA's as a whole, above and beyond their specific roles, also have the function of participating in campaigns, of which the Mexican demonstration must be viewed as only an initial effort.

CA's united in this type of action are the militant striking force we have inherited from May.

#### NEW DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE AGAINST THE SOVIET OCCUPATION

Renewed demonstrations against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia broke out in Prague November 6, on the eve of the fifty-first anniversary of the Russian revolution. Soviet flags put up for the ceremonies were torn down by crowds of angry youths as symbols of the military occupation. Czech troops armed with submachine guns were called out when the police were unable or unwilling to halt the demonstrations.

The following day saw the largest and most militant protests in the streets since the invasion in August. At least ten Soviet flags were burned and workers and students battled police in the Czech capital throughout the afternoon and evening. Troops were called out again in Wenceslas Square and at 10:30 p.m. a water cannon was turned on a crowd estimated at 2,000 demonstrators.

About eight people were said to have been arrested after a Soviet flag was pulled down from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

On November 8 the Dubček regime ordered Reporter, the critical weekly magazine of the Czechoslovak Union of Journalists, to be suspended for one month.

The Interior Ministry reported that demonstrations against the Soviet occupation took place in a number of cities.

On November 10 the demonstrations were renewed when pro-Moscow Stalinists held a rally at Lucerna Hall in Prague. The meeting, which began at 8 a.m. on Sunday, drew an estimated 2,500 elderly people to hear Vaclav David, former Czechoslovak foreign minister and a hardline Kremlin defender; Lieutenant General A. Martinosian of the Soviet army; First Secretary N.G. Sysoyev of the Soviet embassy; and Oldrich Svestka, an unreconstructed Stalinist who was recently dropped from the presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party and from his post as editor of Rudé Pravo.

Hostile crowds outside the hall threw garbage at Soviet army vehicles and castigated those going into and leaving the meeting. Heavy concentrations of police were used to guard the meeting. Fist-fights reportedly broke out in the streets nearby.

Curiously, only Soviet newsmen and television crews were allowed inside the hall. Czech reporters were barred from the meeting.

From Czechoslovakia

A DISCUSSION ON THE PARTY STATUTES AND SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

[One of the most important factors in the decision of the Kremlin bureaucrats to invade Czechoslovakia was the proposed change in the statutes of the Czech Communist party. This was slated for discussion at the fourteenth party congress scheduled to open September 9. The new statutes were to have codified many of the norms of proletarian democracy, including the legalization of socialist oppositional tendencies.

[In our last issue (Intercontinental Press, November 11, p. 992) we published an article on the proposed new rules by Jindrich Fibich, one of the authors of the draft. The following is the text of a discussion between the editors of Literární Listy, the paper of the Writers Union, and two delegates to the congress, Milos Němčanský and Karel Suchopár, both from the Prague 1 district. The discussion was printed in the August 1 issue of Literární Listy. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

\* \* \*

Literární Listy: You have both been elected delegates to the Fourteenth Party Congress. What are these elections like today? Do you think, from your own experience, that they were as democratic as could be wished?

Suchopár: This time everybody was fully satisfied with the elections. It was especially significant that the nominations came this time from the party groups. The list of candidates was chosen from these nominations and delegates were elected by secret ballot. For example, eight candidates were nominated and only three could be elected. Everyone crossed off five, or more than five of the names, since they could write other names in. A majority vote decided, but the winning candidates had to get more than 50 percent of the votes cast.

LL: What do you think about the representation of the cells in the conferences?

S: We certainly did not want small cells to be underrated, to have to band together to get at least one common delegate. We insist on the principle that every party organization, even the smallest, have at least one candidate to district conferences -- even though we have 800 organizations in the district.

Němčanský: That is why we set the rule of only one delegate to 50 members which finally got general approval. But representatives also showed up from Wagon

Lits, an organization with only three members, and they made one of the most interesting contributions.

LL: Elections to representative state bodies are by direct vote. Is something like that needed in the party?

N: The so-called back-door selection of delegates has now already been excluded. No one could be elected who was not endorsed by his factory organization. But with this exception, all in all, the principle of direct election was maintained. Direct election, however, promotes narrowly specialized candidates. And we are convinced the members of higher party bodies should most of all be men of a broad view, capable of advancing our essential interests.

LL: To what extent should the composition of the delegations reflect social composition?

N: The closer to the center, the more strict proportionality can be disregarded. We advance men to the first ranks who are capable of guaranteeing the success of the renovating process. But we are careful to make the second echelon representative of the main social groupings.

LL: Don't you think that the complications in the election of some leading functionaries at the conferences create a danger that some individuals will accumulate a number of leading posts? If the selection of the leaders is not completed in the conferences, the apparatus will try to get them chosen by some other means.

S: There may have been organizational mix-ups in those cases. However, malicious intent cannot be excluded.

LL: Is it symptomatic that it was precisely Indra and Kolder who have been involved in these election mix-ups?

N: In principle, incumbent officials should run, or if they are assured of election, wait to be nominated in some conference. The CC must make known before the conference whom it is designating and to what. Then, if he is not elected, the race is open.

S: If someone is good, he will be nominated somewhere. In Prague 1, we drew up a list of perhaps seventeen functionaries we don't want in the next CC. Our delegation made this suggestion at the city conference. And I went around through the country campaigning in our organiza-



tion for this position. Our position was successful.

LL: Didn't you violate the party statutes by this "factional activity"? Democratic centralism was often explained as a ban on direct contacts between subordinate party bodies, for example, on contacts between cells other than through the regional committees.

S: Of course not. I meant the organization of our enterprise which is centered in Prague. But I don't agree with that principle anyway. Say I go to Tatrovka to dinner. If I see that the people there have different views, what reasonable rule could prevent me from joining in the conversation and saying, "Boys, you are wrong. I think thus and so." Say, for example, that the report on the position of the intellectuals and the workers in our society that the writer Vrba gave at our conference interested me. That he explained this better than I could ever do, that I immediately arranged with him to take his report on a circuit through our organization. If that is against the principles of democratic centralism, then these principles should be changed.

LL: What do you think about the principle of democratic centralism in general? Isn't it a contradiction in terms?

N: It's not a matter of the term. It depends on the party statutes, on what kind of rules are established in the party. We worked out a firm position on the new statutes and the conference bound the delegates to the congress to support this position.

LL: Many people think that the principle of the secret ballot is one of the basic achievements of the democratization. If your delegates vote by secret ballot, how can they be controlled?

N: We thought about that too. We considered whether we should vote by secret ballot only on important questions, which must be specified in the statutes, or whether the plenum in question should decide in each case by open vote.

LL: The latter appeals to us.

N: Democratic centralism was distorted. It led to bureaucratic centralist practices. In the future we must guarantee participation by the broader party masses, of all Communists, in the formulation of party policy. Wherever a basic question is in dispute, the CC should refer the matter to a party referendum.

S: The most important thing is to guarantee minority rights. Minorities must have the right to maintain their views even when they are outvoted. They

have the definite right to continue to campaign for their views, even in the party press, and to submit them to discussion over and over again. Of course, in practical political work, in carrying out the party's resolutions, the minorities must submit. But they still have these rights.

LL: We don't often run into such a radical conception of party democracy. Aren't you afraid of factionalism that could weaken the party?

N: I don't know about that. But I know that the history of the Soviet Communist party during Lenin's lifetime was a history of factional struggles.

LL: Perhaps we can define factions as minorities which develop a hierarchical organizational structure in which the principle of internal discipline prevails, complete subordination of the minority to the majority within the group.

N: It's something like that. Shouldn't we say that a faction is sort of a shadow committee? How can it be controlled if it hides its structure?

LL: That's exactly what we had in mind. We can very easily imagine that the conservatives might create a minority group based on inertia and nostalgia along the lines of the "great party" they no longer have in their power. See how they talk together today in exclusive groups, while the progressive wing of the party is caught up in the democratic atmosphere and generally has not formed any such militarily disciplined groups.

S: That doesn't worry me. In spite of such entrenchment, the conservatives are bound to lose at the congress.

LL: We are not such optimists. You think that democratic-minded citizens, in your case, democratic-minded Communists, guarantee democracy. But democracy must be supported by democratic institutions. One usually fails without the other.

To some extent you may be right. In what is for all practical purposes a one-party system, the party can be more tolerant toward the activity of minorities -- factions -- than in a system of equal, competing parties. In the latter case, the parties need every vote in parliament.

But let's tackle that question. What do you think about a system of a plurality of Marxist parties?

S: We'll cross that bridge when we come to it. Such a system might be the ideal if these parties had a common goal and differed only on the means.

N: I also think that is a question for the future. Today the existence of

two workers' parties would only impede the renovating process.

LL: Perhaps you are right, but only in the present crisis situation. Today a second party would attract large numbers of malcontents, unhappy either with the ideology as a whole or with the price of cucumbers. Such a system would offer less protection than the existing institutions.

S: It is important now, however. Within ten years we must have political institutions making it possible to tell our party any time, "You did that badly, that well," to present an alternative program and finally get it adopted. If we don't achieve this, we will again become what we were before.

LL: Let's change the subject. Do you think that our foreign situation is worse than officially reported?

Both: Yes.

LL: Then the news is being blocked.

N: Yes, and you journalists are less responsible in that respect than we in the party apparatus.

LL: Let's talk now just as journalists. Perhaps that is in order. If the party leadership wants any definite self-censorship from us, it must first take us into their confidence. Quid pro quo. That's a fair exchange.

S: What's the matter with those kids on Student?\* They really want to help us, but they are going about it like fools. Today journalists must be politicians, too.

LL: You say here that our situation is worse than yours. After that, how can you expect statesmanlike judiciousness from them? And all the more so when Student goes to press fourteen days before it is read abroad. That makes it difficult for its news coverage, to say nothing of its politics.

N: But some journalists, by no means the best, want to make a name at any cost -- at the cost of cheap sensations for which we may have to pay dearly.

S: When the situation cools down, naturally we will insist that people should write about complex and delicate matters that even sensation hunters would not dream of writing about today.

N: The flow of information in the party must be unrestricted from now on. Concealing information always arouses legitimate distrust.

S: It is not just a matter of information within the party. What moral right do we have to hide anything from the people when we seek a mandate from them as leaders?

LL: And what right do you have to your own private party?

N: The party can act as a private body only in cadre policy, its internal life and statutes.

LL: All theory is gray. What do you fear most at the September congress?

N: Certain problems around the reform of the state legal code. I am almost certain that the results of this congress will be good on the other questions. The quality of the delegates guarantees that there will be no major battle between the conservatives and the progressives.

S: Just federalization. I am afraid this discussion will turn into a football match, which would be all the worse because we won't be on TV.

LL: We hope you don't find yourselves alone in that. Might not the conservatives be able to use misunderstandings between Czechs and Slovaks for their own purposes?

N: That is not excluded. They'll be looking for sore points. They have nothing to gain from an agreement. They will take advantage of every opportunity.

LL: Which members of the KSC leadership would you like to see dropped after the congress?

Both: Kolder, Indra, Svestka, and Kapek. I won't say anything about the Slovak comrades but I have reservations about some of them.

LL: Who would you like to see in the leadership and in what order?

Both: Of the present members of the leadership, Dubček, Smrkovský, Spaček, Simon, Kriegel, and -- for his statesmanlike decisiveness in recent weeks -- Cernik. Of the new members, Sik. And of the Slovaks, Peter Colotka.

LL: Who do you think may become politically prominent in the future?

N: Hanželka, Hübl.

S: I would also add Selucký.

LL: Who do you think will be most

\* The Prague students' weekly, noted for its outspokenly antibureaucratic position. Last April it began publishing Deutscher's Stalin as a serial. -- I.P.

able to play the role of progressive gadfly in the party establishment?

Both: Císař and Spaček.

S: But I would speak strongly for Professor Miroslav Kadlec from the VSE [Vysoká Skola Ekonomická -- School of Economics]. He was dropped from the party leadership at one time. Today he definitely belongs in the CC.

LL: We are surprised that the name of Secretary Mlynař was not mentioned.

N: He has only come to the fore recently. Before he was unknown to the broader public. Today, however, he is winning a considerable reputation for his undoubted abilities. I first met him in the special city conference. His speech did not make a good impression on me, however. His position on some of the progressive material the conference prepared made an especially bad impression on me.

S: I don't know him at all. His television appearance did not make a good impression on me. Today everyone stands for some program. But he doesn't stand for anything. That doesn't make him a wise man. He's neither fish nor fowl.

LL: And what about Martin Vaculík?

S: Despite everything I have more respect for him than some who have quickly changed their colors. Maybe more time is needed. I think that he has already been punished enough. From now on he will be a man to be reckoned with.

He is still a favorite in Brno. He

played things there which were forbidden in Prague, like "Král Vavra" or "September Nights." In short, he dared to think independently in what were still difficult times. I think he was a direct victim of Novotný's policy to which he finally succumbed.

LL: Do you think that it is necessary or possible to reduce the number of workers in the party apparatus?

N: The secret [security] section must be eliminated.

S: But the ideological and information divisions must be strengthened.

N: All in all, there should be a reduction in the present staff.

LL: To bring this to a close, doesn't the nervousness and general perplexity with regard to the People's Militia surprise you?

S: Both feelings are probably justified. The position of the militia has long been unclear. But in the future I think it will disappear by itself. Its members cannot be very strongly convinced that they are indispensable.

LL: So it is obvious that our guests were concerned about practical political questions, while on our side we were more concerned about the need to make room for creative ideas. When our guests went away we thought about our discussion. If people like this are elected to the Central Committee, we won't have to worry about the future of the post-January line.

#### URUGUAYAN POLITICAL POLICE RAID POSADISTA GATHERING

Headed by Chief of Staff Colonel Zina Fernández, a company of Uruguayan secret political police stormed into a large house in Montevideo October 28. They said they were after "dangerous terrorists."

They found a congress in session of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskista) [Revolutionary Workers Party (Trotskyist)], the Uruguayan contingent and main base of the tiny ultraleft group headed by Juan Posadas which split from the Fourth International some years ago but which claims to be the Fourth International.

Of the twenty-six present at the gathering, almost half were women, including one woman with an infant in arms. The theme under discussion when the police broke in was "The Place of Women and Chil-

dren in the World Socialist Revolution."

Fifteen of those present -- thirteen Argentinians, one naturalized Argentinian, and one Frenchwoman -- were deported with scant legal formalities. The eleven Uruguayans were remanded to a hearing ten days later.

The raid, arrests, and deportations aroused some attention on the left in Uruguay because of the glaring illegality of the police action.

The Posadista organization is a legally constituted party with an open headquarters in Montevideo. It has a regular program on the radio, and publishes a small newspaper devoted mainly to disseminating the discourses of Posadas. It can in no way be considered a clandestine or illegal group.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TENSIONS IN ITALY

By Livio Maitan

Rome

All who have attempted to analyze the causes and significance of the French May have had to come to one definite conclusion. Above and beyond the specific factors which influenced its timing and the forms it took, the crisis of the system in France dramatically revealed profound tendencies at work in other European countries as well.

What has happened in Italy in recent weeks entirely confirms this evaluation. In fact, it could be said that the conflicts and tensions involving the working class and the economic structures which have arisen are greater than those which characterized the months before May in France. It would of course be a simplistic and abstract judgment to conclude automatically from this that we are moving toward an outbreak of the French type. But this objective fact of this situation should be understood in good time and in its full portent.

I do not intend to go back to the economic analysis taken up, for example, at our last national conference [of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari, the Italian section of the Fourth International].\* Furthermore, certain facts and tendencies, as such, are not challenged by anyone. The problem is to understand their full significance and, above all, to define their inevitable social and political implications.

And no one denies that the political equilibrium of the regime -- an equilibrium, if only relative, obtained in the past five years through the center-left formula -- has been broken, that there are no other solutions of any broad significance, and that not even a repetition of the center-left with a new political mixture and new men could offer any guarantee of stabilization.

But basically 1968 was the year when the social equilibrium was broken. This is the fundamentally new factor which makes all comparisons with the past irrelevant and which is provoking such dismay (admitted more and more) among the political and journalistic spokesmen of the ruling class.

This fact was expressed during the early part of the year in the impetuous student mobilization and in some clearly

portentous workers' struggles. In recent weeks, despite the serious decline it has suffered in a series of university centers, the student movement has continued to make its weight felt. And, at the same time, the multiplication of strikes in plants and industries, of general strikes, of factory occupations, and of demonstrations and conflicts of various types, has definitely revealed a tense situation in very broad strata of the working class, which is having its repercussions on the working class as a whole.

I will not go back over the specific elements of this great malaise and the workers' mounting anger, arising from the collapse of the myths of the period of the so-called miracle (full employment, constant, perceptible improvement in the standard of living, etc.). I stress only that these are very deep-seated phenomena which are not fated to exhaust themselves even under the worst variant.

And what must be stressed again with special force is that more than at any other time in the last fifteen years the workers' protest -- whatever its original character or superficial expressions -- is imbued with political opposition to the system.

And no less significant is the fact that at least in its most advanced manifestations, in the most acute conflicts, the movement is tending to escape the control of the trade-union bureaucracy (there is no point in talking about the political bureaucracy which is nonexistent at the factory level). In many cases, the workers themselves have directly initiated struggles. Sometimes, groups of vanguard workers have had a decisive role; other times (as was the case of the strikes at Pirelli Bicocca in Milan), the union leaders have had no choice but to accept an accomplished fact, abandoning their original plan.

Another symptom which points the same way is that the participation by groups of students in organizing strikes and workers' demonstrations is not only no longer viewed with hostility or suspicion but is actually solicited. And, in general, initiatives by groups of revolutionary militants active around the factories are received with interest and sympathy.

The Catholic revolt, finally, can no longer be considered a marginal or eccentric movement. There is no doubt that it tends at least to erode the dominance of the Christian Democratic party, which for twenty-five years has held the status

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\* The documentation on this was published in the April 1 and May 15 issues of Ban-diera Rossa.

of the only party for Catholics. And, as is becoming more evident every day, this revolt is also tending to undermine the prestige of the traditional ecclesiastical hierarchy itself.

From the social standpoint, this represents a break with the system by some plebeian sectors, above all petty-bourgeois ones. And precisely because these strata were tied to the system most immediately by the ideological and organizational network of the Catholic church, they have entered the conflict on religious issues, nurturing the seeds of "heresies" (especially the classical appeal to original spirit of the Gospel), which in the national and above all the international context are capable of producing explosions.

From a host of signs, it is clear that the shrewdest spokesmen of the ruling class and the leaders of the bureaucracies of the traditional workers' parties recognize the situation that has been developing in these last months -- if only because of the French experience. The representatives of the capitalist class for the moment have a quite limited margin for maneuver. They find themselves unable to get any stable political formula off the ground; and it would be difficult for them as well to resort to a harsh massive repression.

In the case of the bureaucratic leaderships certain distinctions must be made. The Socialists have their hands tied since they are a government party (only temporarily out of the cabinet). The Communists, however, can maneuver with much greater freedom, resorting in the famous tradition of Togliatti to the most shameless accommodations.

The draft document to be submitted to the next national congress of the party is a very clear expression of such attempts. Basically maintaining -- or even deepening in certain aspects -- the now traditional reformist-gradualist concepts and line of operation, it makes an opening toward the left, in particular toward the student movement. Thus it consummates the turn outlined early in the spring. It would be all too easy to expose the real nature of these maneuvers which cannot represent a political operation of any scope. The fact remains, however, that these maneuvers magnify one of the fundamental dangers present in today's situation.

The situation which I have described has the potential to turn rapidly toward ever more acute and generalized conflicts. It is enough -- to limit ourselves just to what is apparent on the surface of things -- to visualize the repercussions that could be produced by coordinating several provincial general strikes into a nation-

wide general strike accompanied by militant street demonstrations. We need only visualize, to go a little farther, what a linkup could mean between such a movement and a determined mobilization to get Italy out of NATO combined with a thoroughgoing exposure of all the crimes of imperialism. But for such objectively possible developments to occur, an organized political initiative centralized on a national scale is needed. In the present state of affairs, only the apparatuses of the traditional bureaucracies would be "technically" capable of taking such an initiative. But it is clear that they have no intention of doing so. The most that they can do, under pressure from the rank and file, is to organize symbolic demonstrations and strikes, or partial mobilizations for essentially diversionary or evasive purposes. Here then is the first basic danger. The traditional bureaucracies are no longer capable of dynamic action, they no longer have any vital link with the masses. But they can still bring weight to bear as a static element, as a factor of inertia which can paralyze or abort even a great mobilization.

The second danger, which is symmetrical to the first, is that the revolutionary vanguard groups which as a whole have gained much greater weight in recent years and in the latest months and have a much greater capacity to exert their influence, even on broad social forces, will fail in their mission. The danger is that they will not be able to overcome their fragmentation and disunity, that they will not be able to surmount all their spontaneity-worshipping and sectarian tendencies and will fail to take advantage in time of objective conditions which are favorable in several respects.

The following vital tasks lie before the vanguard groups in the coming months: They must offer a dynamic perspective of fundamental opposition to the system and of breaking the fetters of the traditional trade-union and political bureaucracies, and promote all the ferment and developments in this direction. They must help to achieve national coordination of the struggles and thus, in the last analysis, to construct a new revolutionary political vanguard. At the same time, they must help get the student movement out of its temporary rut, enabling it to extend its dynamic of revolt on the national scale unrestricted by the arid confines of academic group interests. And finally they must not only coordinate individual struggles but mobilize the broad political and social forces in order to throw the system off balance and continually deepen its contradictions.

Whether or not Italy moves toward a prerevolutionary situation will depend in large measure -- although of course not exclusively -- on the timely accomplishment of these tasks.

THE LONDON TIMES APPLIES THE WHITEWASH TO ITS OCTOBER 27 WITCH-HUNT

On September 5 the London Times, which like its New York counterpart publishes "All the News That's Fit to Print," gave the signal for a witch-hunt campaign against the October 27 London antiwar march. The editors placed a fabricated story on the front page, averring that "a small army of militant extremists plans to seize control of certain highly sensitive installations and buildings in central London" and that "extremists...are understood to be manufacturing 'Molotov cocktail' bombs and amassing a small arsenal of weapons."

Most of the British dailies at once fell into line, setting up a howl that rose to a crescendo the day before the demonstration. The discipline displayed by the 100,000 demonstrators gave the lie to the press concoctions of terrorist plots.

Those who believe that the Times genuinely seeks to report the truth no matter what the circumstances, felt that the editors would display embarrassment. Mervyn Jones in the October 4 New Statesman predicted the Times would live to regret the "plot" story as "the greatest boob in its history since it published the forged Parnell letters."

The Times admitted October 30 that it had received "a burst of letters critical of the press in general and The Times in particular for the way the preparations for last Sunday's demonstration in London were reported."

But those who were waiting for at least a bit of red on the faces of the editors were disappointed. These gentlemen know all the tricks of their ancient trade. They coolly granted a point to their critics:

"Certainly, in the light of what actually took place on that day, the previous expectation of serious violence and anarchist exploits, which newspapers helped to create, proved greatly exaggerated."

At the same time, the editors justified their sensation-mongering stories, alleging the existence of "two types" of evidence:

"...some officials responsible for watching the situation believed in the reality of this threat; and what we learnt from anarchist groups independently corroborated the story." The Times applies a bit of whitewash on the officials who participated in the witch-hunting: "At that time official spokesmen and most other newspapers were inclined to discount the plot."

Finally, like the traditional squid, the Times retreated in a cloud of ink, explaining away its indulgence in the worst type of gutter journalism:

"Whether the plots were real but frustrated by the precautions, whether they were contemplated but soon abandoned, or whether they were the hot air of anarchist bombast will be disputed. But it is not the case that there was no sound evidence for their existence or that journalists were alone in taking them seriously."

The liberal press took a few potshots at the Times (and at the BBC). Kenneth Tynan, who participated in the march, wrote in the November 3 Observer:

"The Times declares that the 'revolution' has been a failure, when nobody but the Times had suggested that there would be a revolution. Shopkeepers (the same newspaper complains) were inconvenienced by having to board up their windows, and the general public by the closure of art galleries. In fact, the shops shuttered their windows and the galleries closed their doors for no other reason than that the Times told them to."

The weekly Tribune said: "Nor was it the so-called popular papers which behaved in the most irresponsible fashion. The Times was by far the worst offender, and The Guardian also included its share of false alarms."

Tony Smythe, general secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, reported in the November 1 Tribune on the experiences of 200 NCCL observers who watched the demonstration. He particularly criticized the television coverage:

"London Weekend Television held an 'Olympic Grandstand' for one hour on Sunday afternoon without managing to record the main march, apart from a few stragglers in Whitehall. Instead they concentrated on a futile and comparatively minor confrontation in South Audley Street and Grosvenor Square."

The much touted "restraint" of the police, Smythe reported, did not extend to the treatment of representatives of the civil-liberties organization:

"Amid the general satisfaction a thought should be spared for some of our observers who were manhandled by the police as soon as they identified themselves. Mr Saunders of Enfield reports: 'At approximately 7.40 p.m. I positioned myself... next to the hedge which surrounds Grosvenor Square Gardens.... I had been standing there about 10 minutes when I found myself being dragged across the hedge by two police con-

stables. Two more constables snatched my notebook from my hand and I was then released....The book was handed by one of the police constables to an officer in plain clothes, who with a colleague, tore out the pages on which the notes had been made...." The NCCL general secretary reported similar incidents, including the severe beating of one observer.

Smythe also described an incident showing the lengths to which the mass media would go to get pictures that could be used to discredit the antiwar demonstrators:

"One cameraman using American equipment did his best to provoke a scene by throwing missiles at demonstrators and then filming their reaction."

Another question at issue was the size of the demonstration. The organizers counted 80,000 people marching into Hyde Park. Inasmuch as thousands more joined the rally there, they have given the figure of 100,000 as the number of participants. Most of the daily papers, with the exception of the Sun, have put the figure at between 20,000 and 30,000. Kenneth Tynan disputed the low figures in the November 3 Observer:

"I took part last Sunday in a dramatic event -- a street-wide march from the Embankment to Hyde Park, where about 75,000 people gently assembled to protest against the American war in Vietnam. (Arriving half an hour behind the head of the procession, I counted the marchers as they entered the park: after 50,000 I gave up, and I cannot believe that the preceding 30 minutes yielded less than 25,000.)...."

"Meanwhile a splinter group of

roughly 1,000 had gone to Grosvenor Square, where they jostled the police. But the march itself bore little resemblance to two rather more publicised events, neither of which took place:

"(1) The demonstration as predicted in the mass media...."

"(2) The demonstration as reported by the mass media. BBC-TV alleged that 10,000 people headed straight for Grosvenor Square, where violent assaults were made on police. This occupied all of BBC news coverage except for about 30 seconds, which was devoted to the Hyde Park marchers (estimated at 20,000 -- 'less than expected')."

The Economist said November 2 that "well over 50,000 people" attended the rally in Hyde Park.

Mervyn Jones in the November 1 New Statesman gave his impression of the marchers October 27, contradicting the image which the press sought to create of irresponsible hippies:

"Almost all the marchers were young, and most seemed to be students or friends of students. The class level was predominantly lower-middle....A very quiet, earnest march this was, as seen by an Aldermaston veteran. No guitars, no singing, no witty slogans, no home-made placards with an individual flavour, no outlandish clothes, no girls marching barefoot. Carnival of youth, doing it for kicks, they think it's fun -- such theories fell with a dull thud. This is the New Model Army of revolutionary puritanism: stern, purposeful, doctrinaire, uncompromising, contemptuous of people like Mervyn Jones."

## DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST VIETNAM WAR HELD THROUGHOUT CANADA OCTOBER 26

By Jim Whitton

### Toronto

Successful demonstrations against U.S. aggression in Vietnam and against Canadian government complicity in the war were held in all major cities across Canada October 26.

The largest rally was in Toronto where 3,000 people were confronted by a massive call-up of police unprecedented in the city's history. The demonstration was supported by many Toronto New Democratic party riding associations as well as the Ontario NDP executive. The march was led by Joe Young of the Mobilization Committee, Gerry Gallagher of the Laborers' union and Stephen Lewis, an NDP lead-

er. Despite the abstention of the old peace establishment and Communist party, and attempts by Maoist elements to build an alternative march at the same time, the infusion of new NDP and labor forces made this nearly three times as large as the April 27 march.

The march organizers were arbitrarily denied a permit to march down Yonge Street, Toronto's main artery. Police mounted a solid line of horses, and men on foot, across College Street to block the line of march. Marchers were attacked at several points when they tried to enter Yonge Street. More than a dozen people were arrested, but the march was continued

despite the police attacks.

In Vancouver almost 2,000 people, mainly youth, staged a demonstration.

In Ottawa about 250 people held a march and rally. Despite a police order to the contrary, the demonstrators marched in the street; there were no incidents.

Four hundred marchers in Winnipeg held a spirited march to the U.S. consulate where a rally took place.

Hamilton saw a march of 250 from the city hall to Gore Park along a major thoroughfare. The demonstration was joined by people from Welland, St. Catharines and Niagara Falls.

In Montréal 200 demonstrators marched down rue St.-Catherine to Parc La-Fontaine.

A rally of 350 was held in Sir Winston Churchill Square in Edmonton.

STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN LISBON

Some hundreds of students demonstrated in the heart of Lisbon October 31 just as offices were letting out and thousands of people were in the streets.

Protesting the activities of the secret political police, the students de-

manded an inquiry into the death of their comrade, Daniel Texeira, who died while in the hands of the police.

The cops went after the students, including girls, with clubs. Most of them escaped in the surrounding crowds.

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INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS

P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station,

New York, N. Y. 10010

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen. CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, George Novack, TRANSLATIONS: Gerry Foley, George Saunders. BUSINESS MANAGER: Reba Hansen. Published each Monday except last in December and first in January; biweekly in July; not published in August. TO SUBSCRIBE: For 26 issues send \$7.50 to Intercontinental Press, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N. Y. 10010. Write for rates on airmail. PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 95 rue du Faubourg Saint-

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