



Part of the giant crowd of 100,000 persons that demonstrated in London October 27 against the war in Vietnam. See page 984.

Johnson 'Halts' Bombing —But the War Goes On

War Crimes Tribunal Charges Moscow with Aggression

JOHNSON EXTENDS BOMBING "HALT" -- BUT THE WAR GOES ON

By Joseph Hansen

President Johnson's announcement Thursday, October 31, that he had issued orders "that all air, naval and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease as of 8 A.M., Washington time, Friday morning," was intended primarily to affect the outcome of the U.S. presidential election on the following Tuesday, November 5.

The objective was to help give Humphrey the aura of a "peace" candidate and thus make him appear as a "lesser evil."

Nixon's campaign strategy of saying nothing about Vietnam and seeking to win on the single issue of "law and order" finally began to tell against him. Although Nixon owed his strong early showing to popular revulsion over Vietnam, he increasingly gave the impression that he stood closer to Johnson on this question than Johnson's handpicked heir.

Nixon began slipping in the polls and Humphrey began moving up. Johnson's announcement that he was halting "all" bombing of North Vietnam was designed to bolster this late trend. On the eve of

the election, most of the pundits thought that it would prove too little and too late, but this remained to be seen.

The "peace" wing of the Democratic party rallied in accordance with Johnson's calculations. Eugene J. McCarthy, undoubtedly informed as to what was being projected, had come out for Humphrey the day before Johnson made his television address. McCarthy avowed that Humphrey had shown "a better understanding" and "will to act" than Nixon on domestic needs, and that under Humphrey there "would be much greater" possibility of scaling down the arms race and "reducing military tensions."

But McCarthy, alone, was unable to deliver the votes of many of the young people who had been taken in by his show of opposition to the war in Vietnam. Dissension over his endorsement of Humphrey rose among his followers. Johnson's announcement served as a cue for other judas goats to go bleating down the path taken by McCarthy.


Paul O'Dwyer, the Democratic candidate for senator from New York, spoke for all of them when he announced November 1 that he had been won over by Johnson's speech the previous day. "...the Administration," he said, "has finally chosen to alter its discredited policies in Vietnam ...I, therefore, endorse the candidacies of Hubert Humphrey for President and Edmund Muskie for Vice President."

According to the American press, Johnson made his speech after a secret agreement had been reached with the Paris representatives of the North Vietnamese government. The exact nature of the agreement was not disclosed.

Spokesmen of the Johnson administration said that Hanoi had agreed not to "abuse" the demilitarized zone or to launch a new offensive or serious attacks on the cities of South Vietnam. In return Johnson agreed to order a complete halt to bombing of North Vietnam. Besides this, delegations from both the National Liberation Front and the Saigon puppet regime would be admitted to the talks in Paris. According to this version, the mutual "concessions" now made it possible to engage in serious negotiations for a "peace" settlement.

It was to be noted, however, that the Pentagon was of the opinion that Johnson's order made little real change in the situation.

"Most American military men feel that the allies scored a slight edge in



TOOTHsome MORSEL FOR MCCARTHY

the bombing halt agreement," Douglas Robinson reported from Saigon in the November 2 New York Times. "Hardly any think there has been an allied loss.

"'It's the same old war only under new rules,' one high-ranking officer said."

William Beecher reported from Washington in the same issue of the Times:

"The United States intends to triple the level of bombing along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos in an effort to compensate for the effects of the cessation of air strikes against North Vietnam, high Administration officials disclosed today.

"This is understood to be one of the principal reasons behind the willingness of top American military commanders to endorse President Johnson's decision to cease all raids against the north."

The truth is that a considerable sector of the American capitalist class have long held that the policy of bombing North Vietnam was a mistake to begin with and that it has become increasingly unproductive. By causing resistance in North Vietnam to stiffen, the bombing policy stood in the way of neutralizing Hanoi, making it virtually impossible to isolate and crush the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam. The bombing of North Vietnam, according to this view, made it especially difficult for Moscow to employ its "good offices" in maintaining the status quo against the growing strength of the Vietnamese revolution and the international antiwar movement.

Because of the secrecy surrounding the agreement, it is necessary to reserve judgment on its nature. The Kremlin's role is disquieting. Peter Grose hints in the November 3 New York Times that Johnson welcomed the intervention of Moscow. "Nor can it [the administration] detail the diplomatic maneuvering involved, say, by the Soviet Union, whose Ambassador was making frequent unannounced visits to Rusk during the last crucial days when the Administration says Hanoi was balking at the final agreement."

Brezhnev-Kosygin, through their control of material aid to North Vietnam, were, of course, in position to bring heavy pressure to bear against Hanoi.

Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky of the puppet Saigon government have indicated their opposition to stopping the bombing. Thieu told the National Assembly November 2 that he would boycott the Paris talks. Cao Ky was reported to have followed up by saying that "we can trust the Americans no longer -- they are just a band of crooks." While Ky spoke, Thieu



KY, THIEU WANT MORE SUGARCOATING ON PILL

was reported to have "just laughed and said nothing."

Thieu's speech put the Johnson administration in an "embarrassing position," according to unnamed "officials." No great obstacles, however, stand in the way of prompt relief for this kind of embarrassment. Grease on the palms does it.

As for the American people and the American soldiers, who want an end to the war now, they will hardly be put off by a maneuver intended to lull and deceive them and to make it possible to escalate the conflict in South Vietnam while reducing the military pressure in the north.

It is more likely that Johnson's order to halt the bombing will add fresh imperiousness to the universal demand: "Withdraw the U.S. troops now!"

Mexico City -- October 2

SLAUGHTER IN THE STREETS

[The following article, signed "Anonymous," appeared in the Los Angeles Free Press of October 25-31.]

* * *

I.

The fact that SOMETHING happened at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Mexico October 2 seems to have filtered through into American news sources; the extent of the massacre seems to have been covered up here as well as in Mexico. The following is a personal account; it conflicts, of course, with the Official Story and may have some value for that reason. But, more importantly, I would like it to give you some idea of what the kids down there are facing, and facing time and time again, continuing to go back for more -- what these kids are like, and what their government is like.

The demonstration was originally scheduled to meet at the Plaza at five and march to the Casco of Santo Tomas. The Plaza setting can be more or less made out from the TIME photograph of Oct. 4, which is taken from the Chihuahua apartment house, probably from the second balcony up. The crowd started to gather about five; by about six it was a good deal more crowded than in the photograph (if this was taken on Oct. 2 it was before about 5:30, when a delegation from the railroad syndicate arrived with an immense banner). Speakers were addressing the crowd from the first balcony of the Chihuahua building, about three floors below where the TIME picture seems to have been taken from.

Fairly early on it was announced that it had been learned provocation and repression were planned en route to Santo Tomás, and for that reason the demonstration would disband directly from the Plaza, without marching anywhere.

In this and the rest I have no idea of times. But about six, or half past, a friend and I went up to the first balcony to look out over the whole thing and see how many people were actually there. It was an immense crowd -- all the empty spaces shown in the TIME photo were completely filled. Representation by the general population was high -- lots of workers, couples, families, children. We were starting down the stairs again when it went off -- people suddenly yelling, running; it was all pretty incoherent, but it was clear that the granaderos -- or someone -- had arrived.

We started down the stairs, hoping

to get through to the outside streets and away, but saw, at about the second floor, two men in civilian clothes coming up with revolvers. We turned and climbed maybe two floors, saw an apartment door closing and ducked in. Everyone in the apartment was already on the floor, and by that time the shooting had started. We crawled to the kitchen window to look out. The crowd was running, mostly to the right and left (again in reference to the TIME photo), while soldiers were coming in from the rear, firing into them. Although it couldn't have been going on for more than, say, half a minute, there were already a good many bodies on the ground in the spaces emptied by the rest -- whether dead, wounded or getting out of the way it was impossible to tell. A couple of bullets came through the windows and we left the kitchen, hiding first behind chairs in the living room and then behind a section of hallway leading to the bedroom, the only part of the apartment where bullets were not coming through.

(The Official Account -- at least that contained in LA PRENSA -- was smuggled into the jail later, and my experience conflicts with it on at least two points. First, the police were supposed to have come in first, to clean up the demonstration -- only when they were fired upon were military reinforcements called up. But within -- at the outside -- two minutes after the first alarm, there were no policemen visible; only soldiers, advancing in attack formation and firing into the crowd and the windows of the apartment.

(Second, the time factor tells against the very existence of snipers, it seems to me: within that same time the soldiers were shooting down everything in sight -- there hardly seems time for the recognition of sniper fire; and in any case the obvious response to sniper fire would have been, I should imagine, withdrawal of troops to let the crowd clear out before going after them.)

The sound of the guns was deafening and continuous, like a waterfall. In basic training I heard three KD ranges going at once sometimes; this was ten times the noise: the rattle of rifles over everything, automatic weapons of two sorts -- one high, sharp and fast, one duller and slower -- occasional louder explosions (grenades, I thought, or cannons of some kind). This went on for about an hour, this sheet of sound. It was nightmarish. What could there be left to shoot at, for God's sake?

There were seven of us in the

apartment, all huddled on the floor in that stretch of hall. The woman who owned it and her baby, two girls, maybe 11 and 8 or 9, a boy of maybe 18 or 19, my friend and myself. The woman was having hysterics -- her husband and sister had gone downstairs before it all started -- and it was impossible to even get the key to lock the door from her.

After that first hour there came occasional lulls in the steady firing, scattered shots and bursts. We could hear small-arms fire in the building, and soldiers -- or someone -- yelling back and forth about walkie-talkies and things. Twice we heard people laughing. I am not kidding. And then the outside firing would start up again, maybe ten or twenty minutes more of that mindless roar.

Once, during a lull, I got my nerve up to go to the picture window (or windowframe, by that time): the Plaza was littered with bodies, like leaves, the soldiers stationed among them everywhere with guns on tripods and so on, tanks. And then it started again.

Water started coming in; the boy thought maybe from the kitchen; I believe he went out to investigate and came back shot in the leg. We made a tourniquet of his belt and tried to remember that it should be loosened periodically. Soon the water was three or four inches deep. The boy was lying in it, going into shock, I guess. There was nothing we could do.

It was two hours or so before the firing died down. It had become dark. Two men with white gloves on their left hands came into the room, in civilian clothes.

"There's one," one said. "Come here."

"There's a boy wounded," I said.

"Come here."

I started to crawl across the room toward them. They told me to stand up. I stood up. They threw me out of the room onto the landing. There was another man outside, a fat man. He threw me at the stairs and told me to go on up. I was passed up the stairs like that, from person to person on each landing. Somewhere along the line the Spanish-English dictionary I was carrying, together with my tourist card and so on, was taken. Sometimes they hit me, but only to keep me moving. "Another blanco," they kept saying; I didn't know whether they meant a white person or gringo or something or whether they meant a target; the word can mean both. I assumed I was going to be killed; there was still an occasional shot from upstairs.

I was searched, beaten a bit (this

was a more deliberate job) and thrown into a room with maybe twenty-five or so others, lining the walls. The whole scene was strange: whatever had happened with the water in the apartment had happened all over the 20-odd story building; water was pouring down the stairs -- not just running down them, but POURING down, like Victoria Falls. Everyone was drenched. The lights had been shot out, and there was no illumination but flashlights. It was very like hell, I imagine.

Then we just waited. They let us go to the bathroom and even smoke. The guards all wore white gloves on their left hands and carried guns -- revolvers and sub-machine guns. (The students told me the white gloves were the signs of the provocateurs; when the trouble was to start they would take the white gloves from their pockets and put them on, as a way of recognizing one another.) They were all dressed in sweatshirts and levis and the like. A couple of soldiers came in at one time and another; apart from that I saw no one in uniform.

Eventually we were lined up by twos and told to put our hands behind our necks, then passed down from landing to landing as we'd been passed up, with intervals of time between each pair. At some landings they hit us, at some searched us, at some both. At one landing one of the guantes blancos asked me for a cigarette; I was shaking all over from being soaked and being terrified, fumbling with the package until the one on the next landing down yelled "What the fuck's happening?"; he kicked me the rest of the way down.

When we came out in back of the building we were photographed, then assigned guards. These were also in civilian clothes but without white gloves; each prisoner was assigned two. One held me by the back of the pants, one by the collar, hands still behind neck. Each had a revolver. We were walked down a sidewalk lined with soldiers on both sides, a kind of gauntlet; the soldiers would kick or hit us, sometimes with their rifles -- in my case, they pulled my beard a lot.

Then we were kept standing again, and then started off again. We seemed to have some destination. We were crossing a more or less empty space when an odd thing happened; I still haven't figured it out. Suddenly there was more firing. You couldn't tell where it was coming from, but you could hear the bullets whining through the air and off the concrete buildings. They ran us until we were between two buildings.

The firing went on. Our guards -- we were in a line of about twenty, I guess -- seemed to be scared shitless; I

was almost amused. I'd never been on the other side of being afraid of death before, and it seemed funny that they were still Over There. There was a good deal of discussion among the guards. First we all squatted down; then the prisoners were made to stand up (I suppose to draw fire) while the guards squatted down; then some soldiers came along and smashed the glass door on a building and we all were taken inside and made to lie down on the floor. Somewhere in here my billfold and loose change were stolen.

The firing died down. We were taken outside and walked through more lines of troops. These were nastier, going mostly for the balls and the pit of the stomach. I could feel the blood on my face and thought they might feel I'd had enough, but it didn't work like that. I was thrown into a sort of pickup truck with a canvas top; there were four soldiers in it who hit me with rifles some more, telling me to take off my clothes. Then they tied my hands behind my back. (It was the same thing but funnier with some who were taken in tanks; a 13-year-old boy later told me: "The two of us were thrown in the tank; and then they bolted down the top and made us take our clothes off and tied our hands behind our backs; and then five soldiers got in and pointed their rifles at us and said: 'Make one move to escape and we kill you.'")

And then there was a lot of waiting around, and finally they took us (three prisoners, six soldiers) off to Military Camp No. 1 (we learned later). From then on it was just basic training all over again, except at Fort Dix you figure if they kill you it will be by accident, on the grenade range or the infiltration course, not on purpose. A lot of harassment, inefficiency and what the Readers' Digest calls "Humor in Uniform." There was a week of that, incomunicado. More joined us during the week; everyone looking at all young (say under 25) was being automatically arrested, beaten and imprisoned. The city jails were standing room only.

II.

The papers say 20-odd or 30-odd were killed. No one who heard that two hours of continuous firing, I think, could believe that; certainly no one who saw the soldiers wading into the crowd shooting from the hip, as though they were watering a lawn. But statistics are impossible; reporters and photographers were arrested and held incomunicado along with everyone else. Apparently no one was permitted to see the Plaza after the action. I have only a few points on which to base any conclusion:

a) One of the soldiers who was

guarding me in the truck mentioned (I guess as an explanation for why he was beating me): "You bastards killed my buddies. I saw thirty of my buddies dead."

b) A lieutenant-colonel told me, later, in jail: "We went in with orders to fire at discretion. Later we were ordered to take ten for one, and we did it."

Putting these two together would make it roughly 330 dead; I don't know where the soldier was stationed, of course.

c) A first lieutenant -- again in jail -- gave me a figure of "about 500 of you communists."

d) A South American student, who'd spent the entire two hours face down in the middle of the Plaza, trying to cover his body with the bodies of an old man and a lady, told me, when he got up and looked around, that "there were hundreds of dead people."

The question of snipers is as difficult, at least. As I said before, there hardly seemed time to recognize and deal with their existence; the fire seemed to be directed less at "snipers" than the crowd at large, together with saturation fire at the entire building. The soldiers I saw initially were advancing across the plaza, not taking cover; those I saw later were stationed -- again -- in the open.

On the other hand, the only significant member of the student movement I spoke to during my time in jail said, when I asked him whether there had in fact been snipers: "I guess there might have been. But they weren't our people. We had the University back."

We talked a lot about it in jail. One idea kept coming up over and over again: there had been so many units involved -- granaderos, police, traffic police, soldiers, secret service guantes blancos. Within a few seconds of the initial warning a number of us, myself included, had seen either guantes blancos or secret service people heading up the stairs for the balcony from which the speeches were being given, and these people had been firing guns (the testimony on this was unanimous). So although it was fairly evident that the whole thing was working according to a rigid timetable -- the assumption being that at the heart of it was an attempt to cut off and capture the leaders of the student movement on precisely the balcony where we were -- there was a good possibility that the various groups had been shooting at each other. One student, at least, saw a guante blanco on the balcony emptying his

revolver into the crowd: if there was much of this, they might easily have been taken for "snipers."

Several of us remembered one peculiar detail: in a heavily inhabited apartment building of some twenty stories, the two elevators were out of order. The stairs could be controlled by a very few armed men. Everyone actually in the building, that is to say, could be trapped there -- and were, I should imagine, intended to be though this would necessarily include a large number of

residents who were, in fact, arrested along with everyone else.

Whether the slaughter was planned (and it would make a Díaz Ordaz kind of sense; an attempt to insure that no one, ever, would go NEAR another demonstration) or a result of nerves or accident, I suppose no one will ever be able to say. Myself, considering only the brief time between the first alarm and the onset of that murderous field of fire, I am very much afraid it was planned to happen as it happened.

DIAZ ORDAZ RELEASES 63 POLITICAL PRISONERS

The Díaz Ordaz regime dropped its charges against 63 students and released them from Lecumberri October 26.

Held since they were seized during the massacre committed by federal troops in Mexico City on October 2, they came out of the grim prison arms lifted, fingers in a "V" for victory sign.

According to vague reports emanating from the government, another 100 students were to be released soon.

The release of the 63 and the rumors about more to come were sops granted by Díaz Ordaz in hope of stilling student unrest. The universities were scheduled to open November 4.

It was noted in student circles, however, that none of the members of the CNH [Consejo Nacional de Huelga -- National Strike Council] were released.

The members of the CNH still at large printed an advertisement in the Mexico City daily El Día October 28 again calling attention to the student demands that must be met by the government if the turmoil on the campus is to be allayed.

The demands are: (1) Immediate release of all prisoners held in connection with the events that began July 23. (2) An immediate and complete end to the repression. (3) Withdrawal of the police and troops from all educational centers.

While the government released a token number of the hundreds of political prisoners packing Mexico's jails, fresh arrests were being made of "subversives."

In Monterrey, among those arrested was Roberto Ramírez Pérez, a professor at the University of Monterrey. He was charged with "associating with malefactors" and with "incitement to rebellion."

In Puebla, Joel Anaya Navarro, a

full professor at the University of Puebla, and two students, José Luis Martínez Pérez and Jesús Morales Tapia, were likewise charged with "associating with malefactors" and with "incitement to rebellion." The circumstances of these cases remained obscure.

Three arrests in Veracruz, evidently linked to the general witch-hunt being waged by the Díaz Ordaz regime, were reported in the October 17 issue of Novedades.

According to the Mexico City daily, an Argentine muralist, Elías Svirnofky Tearchitaky, was arrested at the Hotel México in Veracruz.

He had entered the country as a tourist. However, he participated with David Alfaro Siqueiros in working on a mural at the Hotel Casino de la Selva in Cuernavaca.

Since "the immigration laws do not allow tourists to engage in remunerative labor," said Novedades, "he was trailed and the conclusion was reached that he was a Communist propagandist."

Seized with the "subversive" muralist were two students of the plastic arts from Mexico City, Federico Carrillo Vázquez and Atalo Saúl Vazquez Iturbide.

According to the police, they had six boxes filled with "Communist propaganda."

Novedades did not report whether this was a unique kind of Communist propaganda or the ordinary kind that can be found in any sizable Mexican library or bookstore.

The October 14 Mexico City daily Excelsior reported briefly that all public places in Puebla had been occupied by federal troops.

The army's objective was to prevent student demonstrations there.

THE OCTOBER 27 LONDON ANTIWAR MARCH

An estimated 100,000 people marched in London October 27 in the most massive demonstration yet held in Britain against the Vietnam war. The giant crowd showed the depth of the revulsion over Washington's criminal aggression against Vietnam -- and over the complicity of the Wilson government in the war.

The turnout was also a repudiation of the frenzied witch-hunt campaign conducted by the British press against the march and its organizers. Most major papers gave front-page publicity to anonymous threats to incite violence, lurid tales of "plots," and irresponsible innuendos against the leaders of the demonstration. Members of Parliament and police officials joined in the chorus.

In face of this provocation, the demonstrators showed a high degree of seriousness and truly remarkable discipline in staging a peaceful march. The willingness of such massive numbers to act in such a unified fashion under a radical leadership and with militant slogans was a significant milestone in Britain.

The demonstration was organized around three main slogans, "Defeat U.S. Aggression in Vietnam," "Victory to the National Liberation Front and the Vietnamese Revolution," and "End the Labour Government's Complicity in the War." In addition to these central demands, marchers carried banners and posters with many other messages. Some examples were:

"Freeze Rents, Not Wages"; "Remember Whose Violence We Are Protesting Against"; "U.K.: 51st State of the U.S."; "Free Obi Egbuna [the jailed black power militant]"; "Workers' Power"; "We Are All Foreign Scum [a Tory M.P. described the demonstrators as "foreign scum"]"; and the single word "Peace," carried by a British soldier in uniform. The International Marxist Group, affiliated with the Fourth International, carried a banner with Che Guevara's admonition, "Create 2, 3, Many Vietnams."

An on-the-spot account by Brian Gormley in the November 8 issue of the U.S. socialist weekly, The Militant, described the march:

"An hour before the 2 p.m. scheduled start of the demonstration, it totally occupied a six-lane thoroughfare for several miles from its assembly point at Charing Cross Embankment. Many thousands of people spilled out into the side streets. Across the bridges of London the waving banners of arriving contingents of demonstrators could be seen from below, making their way to the march.

"At 2:10 p.m. the demonstration moved off. As it entered Fleet Street, the home of Britain's major newspapers, it spread out completely across the road. Well-earned boos and shaking of fists were directed at the Daily Telegraph and Daily Express offices. Walking 40 and 50 abreast, the demonstrators had imposed their will by the sheer weight of their numbers; the streets were theirs.

"By the time the head of the march reached Trafalgar Square, it had so built up a mass of humanity that it was forced to a temporary pause at the entrance of Whitehall -- one of the widest streets in London and the seat of many Government offices....

"After several appeals over the loud-speaker van by Tariq Ali, one of the main leaders of the march, a path was finally cleared to allow the march to continue on its way.

"At this point several of the Maoist groups, who had received considerable publicity because of their stated aims to try to lead the demonstration to Grosvenor Square away from its planned route, attempted to divert the march. But they were isolated. Only 1,300 or so went with them, to be followed later by the anarchists."

At Grosvenor Square the breakaway groups were met by more than 1,000 police and were unable to get through the police lines to the U.S. embassy. Not trusting to the British alone for protection, the embassy had brought in a contingent of U.S. marines who were stationed inside. Scotland Yard announced October 28 that forty-two people were arrested during the entire demonstration, most of them at the Grosvenor Square action. While the Maoists made the confrontation in front of the American embassy a point of honor (and probably publicity in Peking), the organizers of the main march saw the aims of the antiwar movement differently.

"We want October 27 to be a disciplined, controlled march," they were quoted as saying in the October 26 issue of the London Sun, "We want any new marchers who have never been with us before to realise that they are in an organisation which means business, is well organised and will win in the end. Getting into futile punch-ups won't help anybody."

In accomplishing these aims, the main march was an immense success. Brian Gormley described the march after the departure of the Maoist groups:

"It was only in Whitehall, which

has a slight down-hill grade going towards Westminster, that one got some idea of the immensity of the turn-out. From building to building on each side of the street, stretching as far as the eye could see right up to Trafalgar Square, the street was a sea of faces right down to Parliament Square. Many marched with arms linked, others shoulder to shoulder.

"Not since the Suez crisis of 1956 has Whitehall seen such a mass of humanity. Shouts of exultation went up. Ultra-right elements who had strategically placed themselves to provoke the marchers made a few noises but fell into silence under the huge mass....

"Some people jump on walls and on the many statues and look back. Cheers go up when a report is brought back that the tail-end of the demonstration has yet to pass Australia House at the Alwich several miles away."

A number of trade unions carried their own signs. There were banners from the Hull and District Trades Council; the Draughtsmen's and Allied Technicians' Association, and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers.

"Seen in the front of the march," Gormley wrote, "were figures from the trade unions. Many dockers were out, spontaneously giving a hand with the marshaling. Here and there could be seen an occasional Labour M.P. All had come unannounced, and unlike at other times, unheralded. They were there simply to express their solidarity.

"But it was a march of the youth. Immediately in front were the very young -- some in their early teens. Every major university and college had its banner out, with the loudest applause going to the London School of Economics contingent, which had done much to ensure the success of the march -- the students there had occupied the school to place it at the disposal of the organizers of the march.

"The banners of just about every left grouping (except the ultrasectarian Socialist Labour League) could be seen on the demonstration. At the head of the march was the huge lead banner: 'October 27th Ad-hoc Committee.' The Ad-hoc Committee is a broad coalition of left-wing forces initiated by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and comprised of the Young Communist League, the Communist Party, the Independent Labour Party, the Young Liberals, the International Marxist Group (Fourth International) and the International Socialism group, plus some Labour Party and Young Socialist branches and various other organizations."

The demonstration reached Hyde Park at 4 p.m. where a mass rally was

held. Speakers included author Felix Greene; Jim Higgins of International Socialism; Pat Jordan and Ernest Tate of the International Marxist Group; Fergus Nicolson of the Communist Party; Eamon McCann of the Irish Workers Group; Barney Davis of the Young Communist League, and speakers from the Young Liberals. The rally was chaired by Tariq Ali.

Messages of solidarity were read from the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and the National Mobilization Committee of the United States. Antiwar GI's from San Francisco, California, also sent a message, as did leaders of the former Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire of France and Jean-Pierre Vigier of the French National Vietnam Committee.

The London papers the next day found themselves in a very embarrassing position, having almost unanimously predicted a very small turnout and a wild riot. Although all gave front-page coverage to the events of the day in some fashion, practically nothing was said about the march itself. Even more curious, papers that had no difficulty in gazing in a crystal ball and predicting that only 20,000 people would take part, found themselves unable to count the real march when it took place. Most of the papers gave no estimate whatsoever afterwards of how big the demonstration had been! Others, like the Evening Standard and the Daily Mirror, brazenly claimed that only 30,000 had marched.

A police motorcyclist at the site of the rally told demonstrators that police estimates over his shortwave radio put the crowd size at 105,000. Tariq Ali announced that stewards had counted 80,000 marchers as they entered Hyde Park. Thousands more joined the rally. The Sun put the crowd at between 75,000 and 100,000.

Most London papers devoted the bulk of their coverage to detailed descriptions of a few isolated clashes between demonstrators and police. All unctuously praised the police for their "restraint," still trying to make something of their pre-march charges that the purpose of the demonstration was to incite a riot and that the march organizers were foiled by the wisdom of the police.

Tariq Ali told the Sun afterwards, "We told the police not to provoke us. They didn't. And therefore there were no incidents."

When the reporter asked Ali if he would like to "pay the police a small tribute for their patience," the antiwar leader replied, "I think they might like to pay a little tribute to us."

HOW THE PANICMONGERS PREPARED FOR "OCTOBER 27 REVOLUTION" IN LONDON

By Susan Williams and Alan Harris

London

When Vietnam Solidarity Campaign members and other antiwar activists met in London and other major cities during the summer to plan the October 27 demonstration, few anticipated that 100,000 persons would take to the streets to show their opposition to American aggression in Vietnam. Even fewer anticipated the hysterical witch-hunting campaign that was soon to be launched against them.

The witch-hunt, begun in September, aimed to limit the turnout on October 27, and to discredit, intimidate, and -- if possible -- break up the October 27 Ad-hoc Committee. It failed on both counts.

During the week prior to the march, the press and government and police officials worked themselves up to such a point that anyone taking the "news" at face value would have thought the country was on the verge of civil war.

The Ad-hoc Committee, it was alleged, was somehow behind the fire-bombing of the Imperial War Museum October 13; was plotting to dislocate London's underground; was manufacturing Molotov cocktails; was conspiring to seize various government buildings; had sent students to Cuba by chartered plane "to learn the techniques of insurrection and sabotage"; and was, perhaps, planning to take over London by force and violence on October 27. As if this were not enough, all of these nefarious schemes had been hatched, it was charged, by "foreign agitators" who would appear by the thousands on the day of the demonstration to take direct charge of the "revolution."

Tom Iremonger, Tory M.P. for Ilford North, submitted a bill to jail and deport foreign radicals, saying, "the British people are tired of being trampled underfoot by foreign scum." Students at the London School of Economics, who occupied the school as a headquarters for the demonstration, responded to this attack by making hundreds of posters reading, "We are all foreign scum."

Home Secretary Callaghan ordered the banning from Britain of all foreign students known to have records of "violence" in their home countries. He told Parliament that some demonstration organisers would not consider the action successful unless it unleashed violence, and he contemptuously referred to the thousands who would be protesting U.S. genocide in Vietnam as "the young idiots who will be performing on Sunday." He claimed the foreign students should be kept out

of the country October 27 to prevent "hordes of marauding bands" from provoking "violence either against the police or other institutions."

News of the World, a large-circulation Sunday newspaper well known for its gutter press journalism, devoted two full pages of its October 27 issue to an article entitled, "The Great Student Plot." Reporter Simon Regan claimed to have spent the previous six months disguised as a student "agitator," "infiltrating" all the left-wing organisations in Britain and on the continent.

This imaginative author claimed that the "October revolution" in London was "planned in July on a beach in France." It was, furthermore, "part of a giant international conspiracy to disrupt and embarrass Britain, America and other western allies. Planned to the last detail by highly professional behind-the-scenes organisations as part of the greater 'World Revolution Movement.'"

Armed with dark glasses, long sideburns, and a "cover" story about being "desperately anxious to start up a protest movement" in the Middle East, our slick sleuth claims to have gone to Paris in late spring. Regan says he met one of the "masterminds" of the world conspiracy -- Pierre Frank, one of the leaders of the Fourth International. Regan must have been deep in his cups when he sat down to compose the conversation he claims to have had with Pierre Frank:

"We are always happy to have new agents," Regan alleges Frank told him. The Trotskyist leader (who is an anti-Maoist) also confided to Regan: "I suppose that the only person fairly near to our ideals is Chairman Mao."

Regan claims that Frank then volunteered: "We have our own intelligence network which gives us up-to-the-hour reports on demonstrations all over the world. This means that we can get a picture of protests...and move forces where and when they are needed."

Steeped to the gills in their own propaganda, officials at all levels began to panic for fear there really would be an "October revolution." The police assigned 7,000 men to duty at the demonstration. A further 7,000 were available on call from stations near Whitehall. For the first time command headquarters were set up in Scotland Yard, and closed circuit television cameras were hidden at strategic points to observe the march.

The October 22 issue of the Sun reported that "a number of plain clothed policemen will be armed." More than 600 plainclothesmen were ordered to infiltrate the demonstration.

The October 26 Sun reported: "A special guard is being put on the Houses of Parliament this weekend in case of trouble from demonstrators tomorrow....In preparation for a day of tension, strong barricades have been put up outside key buildings in London.

"These include some newspaper offices, Australia House, Broadcasting House and the Hilton Hotel. The National Gallery, the National Portrait Gallery and the Tate Gallery will be closed throughout the weekend....

"The BBC are believed to be sending announcers to their regional headquarters in Birmingham and Manchester as standby news broadcasters in case there is any interference with the service from London."

Special branch agents watched ports and airports, checking arrivals against lists of "banned" students. Official documents of Scotland Yard were locked in fireproof steel cabinets, and a police guard was stationed around the building. Police stations were cleared in anticipation of hundreds of arrests. Courts were told to minimize their "business" on October 28.

By Sunday, government buildings, shops, newspaper offices and banks along the route of march -- especially in Fleet Street and Whitehall -- were prepared as if for a siege. Workmen nailed up wooden and corrugated iron boardings, and shopkeepers stripped window displays, supposedly to foil "looters."

The Sunday Telegraph reported October 27, "Police manned main roads leading into London to stop the students' coaches and carry out searches for explosives or offensive weapons. Scotland Yard yesterday repeated a warning to spectators and motorists to avoid central London."

It was reported afterward that £250,000 was spent by various companies to build barricades and hire hundreds of private security police to patrol their buildings during the demonstration.

The October 26 Evening Standard reported some of the extravagant precautions taken by the British Broadcasting Company:

"Their concern has even spread as far as Television Centre in Shepherds Bush -- some distance away from the main 'danger zone.' Since last night no one has been allowed to enter the building

without a special pass; extra commissionaires have been taken on and spot checks are being made from time to time. On top of this live programmes are being kept down to a minimum -- to prevent any demonstrators protesting in front of the camera....

"But undoubtedly the most vulnerable of the BBC's offices is their external services HQ at Bush House....all entrances but one to the building are being locked from noon today until Monday morning....And, as a final stroke of precautionary cunning, even the bronze nameplates outside the building have been discreetly removed."

One can only conclude that while the spokesmen for the status quo kept on telling everyone that Britain was not France and that the May revolution could not possibly happen here, they were themselves not at all convinced of that. They knew the Vietnam Solidarity movement had struck a responsive chord in the population and that there would be a massive mobilisation in the streets on October 27.

The Ad-hoc Committee and its supporters successfully countered the witch-hunt hysteria. At a press conference on October 21 Tariq Ali turned the whole question of "violence" back on the Wilson government. Referring to Callaghan's statement about "roving bands of political hooligans," Ali said, "I reject the use of the word hooligan. It has been planted quite deliberately to discredit the march. If there are hooligans in this country they are Prime Minister Wilson and his supporters who are condoning the large-scale violence committed in Vietnam by the U.S. government."

The high degree of discipline of the 100,000 demonstrators further refuted the red-baiting attacks. In this respect the occupation of the London School of Economics was a model. The school was used as a command post for the marchers, as well as a hospital, and sleeping quarters for out-of-town students. In addition, mass meetings and political discussions were held there throughout the weekend. The students themselves set up security squads to prevent anyone from damaging school property and showed themselves perfectly capable of operating the school. When the students evacuated the buildings after the demonstration, even the Times admitted in a headline October 28, "Occupiers leave LSE spotless."

Tariq Ali was loudly applauded by the giant crowd at Hyde Park after the march when he said this demonstration was not the end of the campaign but only the beginning: "The campaign will continue its work until the Americans are out of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people are firmly in control of their country."

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL ACCUSES MOSCOW OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[The declaration below has been issued by leading members of the International War Crimes Tribunal in relation to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

[The tribunal, it will be recalled, carried out an extensive investigation of the actions of the U.S. government in Vietnam and laid its findings before the world in hearings held in Stockholm and Copenhagen last year. The verdict of the tribunal was that the U.S. was guilty of a series of war crimes, ranging from aggression to genocide.

[The declaration on the events in Czechoslovakia was published in Paris on October 28. The members signing it were: Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, Wolfgang Abendroth, Gunther Anders, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Simone de Beauvoir, Lawrence Daly, Wladimir Didijer, Dave Dellinger, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Carl Oglesby, and Laurent Schwartz. Besides these twelve, James Baldwin, who could not attend the tribunal sessions in Stockholm and Copenhagen, associated himself with the statement.]

* * *

This Tribunal was formed because great crimes were taking place against a small nation. The hearings of our Tribunal brought forth exhaustive evidence establishing that the United States had committed war crimes in Vietnam, including the crime of aggression.

The United States Government violated the territory and sovereignty of the people of Vietnam to prevent them from effecting a social transformation which would remove U.S. control of Vietnamese political and economic life. When the people resisted, the United States' rulers despatched vast numbers of troops and began to employ experimental weapons, which proved to be genocidal in effect and by design.

Our Tribunal has its historic justification in the insistence that justice entails partiality to victims of crime and that the truth is partial when the evidence reveals an aggressor and a victim. We identified the victim, the aggressor and the social systems to which they adhered.

Now the leaders of a state which claims to oppose such aggression and to embody a social system which is the result of liberation from a criminal economic and political imperialism, have com-

mitted the crime of aggression against a small nation.

How can socialism liberate men from the capitalism which has kept them enslaved, if this socialism is without the free and full control by the people of their institutions? This would be to retreat to the deceit wherein the form and content are at variance.

Our Tribunal showed that the form of representative institutions and of sovereign leadership in Saigon was an empty one. Our Tribunal exposed the reality of oppression imposed by puppets. It is because we regard capitalism as a system which committed genocide in order to preserve control that we can never accept criminal acts by those who call dictatorship and military aggression socialist democracy and popular will.

In its session in Copenhagen, the Tribunal decided that it would "limit its activities to the war in Vietnam as long as the aggression and the genocide against Vietnam did not cease".

But, as individuals, the following members of the Tribunal declare that the leaders of the Soviet Union violated the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak nation, disgraced themselves, aided by this act of aggression the cause of United States imperialism and exposed their own fear of a socialism in which the people control their political institutions to determine their policies and representatives.

We accuse the leaders of the Soviet Union of the war crime of aggression. We call on all democrats and socialists to support the right of the Czechoslovak people to pursue socialist goals by democratic means. This declaration includes, therefore, a demand for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and a full restoration of Czechoslovak sovereignty.

We state our conviction that the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people is the same cause as that of the Czechoslovak people: The one struggles against world imperialism; the other for the fullest development of genuine socialist norms of democratic self-expression.

In acting to destroy this democratic movement, the Soviet leaders hinder the advance of the peoples of the world to socialism and that hindrance can only strengthen the very imperialism whose crimes we came together to denounce.

"WE MUST CLOSE RANKS"

By Pierre Frank

Paris

Some months have passed since the May events rocked France and it might seem that everything is back in order. The crisis has in fact momentarily subsided but it will well up again. In the meantime the political formations have been greatly affected by what happened.

I will leave aside the Gaullists and the other right or center-right bourgeois formations. In spite of their electoral victories, they have not succeeded in moving an inch closer toward any kind of stability; and the government has been compelled to apply against the Gaullists as a whole the "bloc vote" procedure (that is, rejection of all amendments) which it used to apply against the Giscard d'Estaing group.*

On the left, as a first consequence of the defeat of the FGDS [Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste -- Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left -- an electoral combination of Social Democrats and petty-bourgeois liberals, principally the Radical party], the Radicals are no longer ready, if they ever were, to merge with the Socialist party and the Convention des Institutions Républicaines [Republican Institutions Convention] into a new "Democratic and Socialist" party. And, moreover, while Mitterrand has agreed to a Socialist-CIR fusion, he has turned down taking part in the leadership, thus keeping his options open.

But more important than this obviously is what is going on in the PCF [Parti Communiste Français -- French Communist party]. In the four months from May to August, this party, which had the majority of the working class under its control, underwent a series of highly damaging mishaps. During the student struggle and general strike in May, it was outflanked to the left by large strata of youth, who have now escaped its authority. In June this electoralist and parliamentary formation suffered a stinging defeat in the elections. And in August this party which had always been loyal to the Kremlin was forced to disapprove the military occupation of Czechoslovakia.

A Central Committee meeting was held on October 20-21, the first since August 22, that is, two months since the beginning of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Two months is a long time. During this period, differences flared in the Political Bureau and also among the rank

* "Left" Gaullists.



GARAUDY: "A relapse into Stalinism."

and file in the cells and sections. Only the body which is supposed to lead the party between congresses was not called upon to take a stand.

Immediately after the Soviet troops entered Prague, the CC disapproved the Soviet government's action. When an "accord" was signed a few days later, the Political Bureau viewed it as a "positive" step but without taking any stand, however, on the content of the agreement, without saying a word about the conditions under which it was drawn up.

Since that time certain things have come to light on the situation inside the PCF. Among the rank and file and the lower-level cadres, a sizeable sector did not approve of the position taken by the PCF leadership. This current thought that the Soviet leadership ought to know the reasons for its action better than anyone else and that the position of the French leadership was dictated by tactical con-

siderations flowing from the policy of seeking an entente with the non-Communist left (FGDS, the Socialist party), which was true.

We heard a member of the Political Bureau, Garaudy, come out in strong terms. He saw "a relapse into Stalinism" in the Kremlin's action and told the Soviet leadership that the best thing they could do for the cause of Communism was to resign. The Political Bureau disavowed his statements, seeing them as "interference" in the internal affairs of the Soviet Communist party.

And finally we learned that Jeannette Vermeersch, a member of the Political Bureau and Thorez's widow, was also a dissenter but in an opposite way from Garaudy. She did not expressly support the military occupation, but she thought that the Soviets had every reason to engage in it.

If two months had to go by before the CC met, it was because the leadership, Waldeck Rochet most of all, went to extraordinary lengths to find a solution that would meet with unanimous approval. But in vain. Thus, the CC was confronted with the reality as it was reflected in the Political Bureau.

Finally, "to the regret" of her comrades, Jeannette Vermeersch resigned from the Political Bureau and even from the CC and Garaudy was publicly censured for his public statements contrary to the line. He accepted the censure, stating he held to his views but from now on would advocate them only within the party framework, according to the rules and regulations. Despite the censure, Garaudy remained a member of the Political Bureau.

In accordance with the custom of the PCF, no summary report of the CC meeting was provided other than a sentence uttered by Duclos and quoted by Waldeck Rochet which we will return to later on. The only available materials consist of the report by Plissonnier, a Political Bureau member charged up to now with policing the party, who was assigned by the Political Bureau to report on the question; Waldeck Rochet's speech, and the resolution that was adopted. This time they also published in l'Humanité Jeannette Vermeersch's letter of resignation and Garaudy's statement, the essence of which I have indicated.

There was no difference whatsoever between Plissonnier's report, Waldeck Rochet's speech, and the resolution. All of them consisted of self-approval of the positions the leadership has taken since August 20. Not a word about the continuation of the occupation nor any characterization of the "accord."

The only point of clarification was greater stress on the fact that although there was "uncertainty" in the Czech policy, the Dubček leadership was capable of solving the difficulties because there was no counterrevolutionary danger that the Czechoslovak people themselves could not handle.

On this point it can be said that the PCF leadership has defined its position more clearly, especially on the eve of the meeting it is supposed to have with the Soviet CP leadership on November 4. From this standpoint, while seeming to take a middle-of-the-road position, the Waldeck Rochet leadership has leaned slightly more to the side of the Czechoslovaks than the Soviets. Likewise, there is no equality between Jeannette Vermeersch's departure from the Political Committee and Garaudy's retention, even if he was censured.

But the PCF leadership did not conceal the fact that while it had a "difference" with the leadership of the Soviet CP, it held it a "principle" to maintain its ties and its solidarity with the Soviet party. It declared its readiness to do everything possible to restore conditions which would permit a conference of Communist parties to be held at a later date. It had nothing whatsoever to say about the factional work conducted in the party through the heavy flow of "papers and pamphlets into France from the socialist countries." (Plissonnier.)

It thus indicated that its disapproval of the Soviet operation was purely tactical and that it could not defend this action as it had defended the intervention in Hungary in 1956. It considered itself too deeply involved in its "union of the left" ploy to take a position which would signify assuming responsibility for ending this policy.

While the leadership presents its orientation as a sign of great maturity for the international Communist movement, the PCF, and itself, it reveals some symptoms of worry. "The situation in the international Communist movement is disturbing. Since 1958-59, it has deteriorated in a distressing way," Plissonnier declared with Waldeck Rochet's approval. And in this field the sermon on "proletarian internationalism" given by the general secretary of the PCF in the style of a left Social Democrat, will not help matters any.

But both of them -- the reporter and the general secretary -- ended their speeches with an appeal for party unity. "Any breach of party unity would gravely compromise our cause and our work; we must not allow it." (Waldeck Rochet.) "It's a question of the unity of the par-

ty and its leadership in thought and action." (Plissonnier.)

Why this nervousness if, for example, "In the Département of Hauts-de-Seine, out of 1,150 section committee members, twenty-six comrades approved of the military intervention and thirty-three expressed misgivings"? Why did Waldeck Rochet stress this single sentence in Duclos' speech, "We must close ranks"? The following words in the report point the way to the explanation:

"The Political Bureau calls on the CC to draw up a major document in its next meeting to explain our program of advanced political and economic democracy and our perspectives for accomplishing the socialist ideal through democratic mobilization of the entire nation of working people."

Is there then a link between the Czechoslovak affair and the party's domestic policy? Yes, because more than one opponent of the Political Bureau's position on Czechoslovakia has said, "Our leadership is taking an opportunist line today to curry favor with the FGDS just as it did in May for the same reason." The opposition to the leadership includes not only case-hardened old Stalinists like Jeannette Vermeersch, but politically confused "leftists" as well.

The crisis in the PCF must be placed against the recent background. In the two years preceding May, its policy seemed to be paying off. Mitterrand forced de Gaulle to a run-off in the presidential elections. The FGDS and the PCF together needed only a half dozen more deputies for a majority in parliament and their votes were growing in the by-elections. Advances had been made toward an FGDS-PCF "common program." What more was needed to justify their parliamentary line?

Then came May with 10,000,000 strikers. And after that came the setback of the elections, the breakup of the FGDS, and the indefinite postponement of the "common program." Fundamentally, the PCF's entire perspective collapsed after the greatest mobilization the French working class has ever engaged in.

The PCF has known difficult moments in its history. But its cadres have been brought up on the idea that whatever

might be the situation at this or that time there was a firm bastion which held fast and which in the long run would make it possible to overcome any difficulties. Now with the Czechoslovak affair this has been broken.

So where is the party going? Is it possible after May 1968 to revive the "union of the left" policy? How is a "common program" to be arrived at? Before the elections, foreign policy was the stumbling block and the Czechoslovak affair has added a few other obstacles in this respect. The FGDS deputies, contrary to the Communists, recently voted for the fiscal measures proposed by the Gaullist government to aid the capitalists and encourage them to invest.

For the electoralists the vote losses were particularly acute. Electoral agreements between the FGDS and the PCF are no longer so easily arrived at. The PCF leadership has nothing else to offer as a policy or as a perspective. In the near future it is going to prepare a "major document" in which it will repeat its old song. This is not the sort of thing that will counter the doubts becoming rife among many members.

One can be certain that the Czechoslovak affair will not only put the May events, which are still quite fresh, on the PCF's agenda but also several other disagreeable questions which arose during the postwar period and which the party leadership settled bureaucratically. In fact, more than the policy of the party, Stalinism itself has been put in the dock.

The differences which have existed for some time were only partly revealed at the CC meeting just held. The cracks in the leadership's monolithism have become evident. The general secretary of the party noted in his speech that tendencies are forbidden in the organization. It is not very likely that they will develop quickly, since they represent a new departure in the party. But the crisis is there and it can only worsen.

"We must close ranks" is the slogan of a leadership without any alternative policy in a party becoming more and more heterogeneous politically. They will not be able to close ranks for very long.

October 24.

WHAT IT TAKES TO BECOME PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

It is estimated that by November 5 Richard Nixon had spent \$20 million on his campaign. Hubert Humphrey spent about \$10 million. Backers of George Wallace put up \$6 million -- the same amount

spent by Eugene McCarthy, who did not even make the finals. Much of the money is put up by corporations, banks and stock brokerage firms, most of whom do business with the government.

From Czechoslovakia

THE PARTY STATUTES AND SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

[Among the factors that led the top bureaucrats in Moscow to decide to occupy Czechoslovakia, one of the most important was the nature of the new statutes proposed for the KSC (Komunistická Strana Československa -- Communist party of Czechoslovakia). Scheduled for consideration at the fourteenth congress of the party to be held September 9, the statutes would have codified many of the basic principles of proletarian democracy and opened the way for establishment of freedom of thought and the press in Czechoslovakia and the legalization of socialist oppositional political tendencies.

[The article below was written by Professor Jindrich Fibich, one of the drafters of the proposed statutes. His article provides a good indication of what the members of the KSC were preoccupied with on the eve of the Soviet invasion. It was published in the August 1 issue of Literární Listy under the title, "The Party Statutes Will Determine What Kind of Democracy We Will Have."

[The translation is by Intercontinental Press. The subheadings appear in the original.]

* * *

The Crisis of the KSC's Monolithic Model

Nonparty members would be very wrong to think that the drafting of new statutes for the KSC is a mere formality of no concern to non-Communists. In fact, any discerning observer of the past twenty years of our socialist development must have recognized long before now that the conditions in our most influential political party have had broad and far-reaching implications for the state and society as a whole. Thus the operation of the basic norms of the Communist party's activity has been inseparably bound up with broader norms and conditions.

Our mildly reformed bureaucratic-statist Stalinist model of socialism remained a system of unilaterally manipulated levers and transmission belts. It was still tied to the same Stalinist model of a monolithic, blindly disciplined, and bureaucratically centralized Communist party.

As the stereotyped notions and arbitrariness of both the original and modified systems collided with the objective laws of nature and society and a changing reality, both of these systems suffered a profound crisis. And we sought a way out of this crisis in the renovating movement of democratic socialism.

First of all, it proved impossible to seek a basic change in our system of centralized economic management without a corresponding change in the overall political system. We could not change the centralized management of our economy to a system combining planning with reliance on market mechanisms without changing the system of one-party dictatorship and power monopoly to a really democratic system of equal partnership. We could not make these changes in the economic system without separation of the parties and the state, and the state and the machinery of the economy.

And now the entire post-January* development has brought us to a situation where it is obvious that this golden mean must be applied first of all to the relationships and conditions inside the KSC. At the same time consolidation of free speech and the replacement of deformed socialists and conservatives with reformers and progressives is far from enough to achieve this.

The changing of the leadership team, the rehabilitations, the action program, and legal reforms may be halted halfway or lead to unforeseeable upsets and confusion if the KSC and the entire society are not given an institutional framework combining socialism and consistent democracy. And the new KSC draft statutes and the democratic system they establish for our chief political force will be decisive in transforming the entire machinery of our socialist society.

The Stalinist model of the party embodied in the previous statutes is unviable and totally inadapted to the needs of developing democratic socialism. There are essentially two reasons for this. First, because it treats the party's principal political functions with regard to the society and all its other elements as mere objects subordinated to the party's preordained goals and intentions. Secondly, because this model accords an absolute authority and infallibility to the hierarchical heads of the party apparatus and conversely condemns the membership and lower structures of the party to powerlessness and passivity.

Thus the new party model must move toward emancipation and toward ending alienation. It must make it possible to free the majority of party members from

* The de-Stalinization which finally brought Soviet intervention was initiated at the December-January Central Committee plenum of the KSC.

their passivity and subordination and the nonparty masses from their twofold passivity and subjection.

The Theoretical Basis of the New Party Model

As a political scientist, as a socialist specializing in the theory of organization, and as a member of the group which the CC [Central Committee] of the KSC assigned to draft new statutes for consideration at the special party congress, I want to urge that the new statutes be considered from the standpoint of their broader social significance.

Along with perhaps all the other members of the team that drafted these statutes, I reject the various dogmatic conservative and bureaucratic sectarian protests that have been made. In the present situation I do not think we can be satisfied with patching up the old bureaucratic-centralist statutes. I think we must develop an entirely new democratic model for organizing the Communist party and its principal functions.

In elaborating and projecting such a model, it is both possible and necessary to use other theoretical bases than the vulgar bureaucratic Stalinist ones. We must find theoretical criteria capable of serving as tools for correct, progressive, and scientific analysis of situations and which can enable us to determine how our party must function and be organized to deal properly and effectively with these situations.

To find this theoretical basis, we must first of all turn to the authentic Marxist concept of the party. This concept calls for cooperative interaction between the party and the society and on the basis of equal rights and duties. This concept includes free democratic play for all tendencies and ideas relevant to the day-to-day life of the workers. It implies a striving in public life to unite and reconcile all the democratic forces.

Secondly, we must turn to Lenin's concept that the party's mode of organization depends on the nature and objectives of its work. We must turn to Lenin's concept that democracy is a means of struggling for socialism, that the basis of discipline is consciousness, the basis of the leadership's authority is the public's understanding of its decisions, the basis of unity in action is freedom of discussion, and the basis of centralism is the initiative of the masses.

Furthermore, Rosa Luxemburg's almost unknown observations on the October revolution, where she warns the workers' movement against the bureaucratization of the socialist system, deserve special at-

tention at this time. In these remarks she declares "Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. This is a law from which there is no exception." And the Communist party most of all is no exception either.

Finally, we cannot fail on this occasion to bring a series of essential contributions by Gramsci into our laboratory of creative Marxism. Gramsci saw the party as an instrument and form of subjective emancipation and intellectual leadership not only of the working class but of the entire national society.

According to him, bureaucracy and sectarianism, an attempt to get mechanical discipline and passive compliance from the ranks, were the greatest obstacles to raising the subordinate party members progressively to the level of their leaders. The party can only develop through a democratic interplay between the party intellectuals and the rank-and-file members, through a rational and sensitive appreciation of positions and views in which both the leadership and ranks of the party correct each other.

We do not want to take a blind sectarian attitude toward some well verified conclusions of even non-Marxist modern social science. Certain branches of non-Marxist political science and organizational theory can give us many ideas. From this standpoint, in constructing the new model of the KSC we should above all not neglect the question of this model's relationship to the broader political system. This system also is in a stage of fundamental democratic reconstruction and in search of new ways to answer the needs of the further development of the socialist economy and society.

Furthermore we should test the organizational theory regarding the advantages of democratic leadership methods over autocratic ones, the incompatibility of bureaucracy with certain democratic principles, and the greater socioeconomic effectiveness and cultural value of consultative and participatory organizational ties as against authoritarian ones.

The Basic Aims and Principles of Democratic Party Organization

On the basis of these basic theoretical and methodological criteria, we can distinguish some of the most important features of a new type of Communist party suitable to the needs of our present democratic socialist course.

In the new democratic and plural-

istic conditions, the KSC will be able to maintain and play its leading role only if it meets two basic preconditions and objectives: (1) if it possesses a deeper understanding of, and democratic sensitivity to the dialectic of collective and individual interests in the development of our society than other institutions and parties, if it is more prepared than they to find and implement a scientific solution to these conflicts. (2) If its organizational structure is the most able to reflect the whole society's problems in an open democratic way and make room for a plurality of views and interests and to shape this variety into profitable political work.

To succeed in these objectives the party must have an entirely new, creative Marxist method of envisaging its social role and the basic principles of its organization and work which are summed up under the heading of democratic centralism. If the party's capacity for action is measured by the achievement of its main programmatic goals, then party discipline and unity must be looked at only in the light of this conscious and democratically produced capacity. They cannot be considered some sort of fixed fetishistic ends in themselves.

The first prerequisite then for the party to be effective is a consistently democratic and scientific formulation of a program and political line. This program and line must emerge from a process of balancing various views and group interests against the Marxist concept of the historical mission of the working class. And in an advanced society, the workers' mission can only be to eliminate all social privileges, to establish the quantity and quality of work as the sole standard of value, and to open up the way for the free development of individuals and to social progress.

In order to guarantee the existence of alternative points of view and critical interplay in the party, we want to firmly establish in the party statutes the right of minorities to maintain their views and to express them even after the majority has democratically decided on a specific course of action for the present which all party members must follow.

In order to increase the scientific and democratic character of the formulation and implementation of party policy, there must be free circulation of information within the party both vertically and horizontally. There must be a systematic interaction between the practical experience of the ranks and the scientifically grounded theoretical views of the leaders. It must be the duty of elected bodies to utilize expert know-how and scientific research and to inform the party public of minority views.

The second basis of the party's effectiveness must be the democratic development of independent and initiating socialist activity by the largest possible number of party members and expansion of their free contacts with the broadest public. For this reason we want to establish firmly in the statutes the principle that certain forms of voluntary activity must play a vital part and have a decisive influence. The forms of voluntary activity permit the membership to participate directly in formulating and guiding party policy.

Likewise the principle of relative autonomy for cells must increase the members' direct influence on the solution of local problems and increase their direct responsibility for party policy. For actions involving more complex planning, cells should combine as may be required into higher permanent or special temporary organizational groupings. They should delegate as much of their sovereign powers and responsibility to these bodies as is necessary to enable them to function.

The authority of the higher bodies and their directives must, however, flow not only from a concentration of initiating power but also from the unshackling of all sources of political initiative. The authority of the leading bodies must develop out of a free exchange of views, ideas, common goals, and the need for coordination. Their authority must by no means result merely from their position in a bureaucratic hierarchy and their ability to settle matters by force.

The third basis for so activating the party must be the basic demand for regulation of the leading functions and checks on their monopolization and misuse. The statutes must above all guarantee the consistently democratic selection of leading bodies through a secret ballot, and the creation of new forms of division of powers and checks on them (for example, a balance among an initiating leadership, elected executive secretaries, and self-governing control commissions, all set up as mutually independent organs of the CC).

Prohibiting officials from holding more than one leading office, rotation in office, and the assignment of the apparatus to a precisely limited role of servant and executive assistant to the elected bodies and volunteer activists should establish general public control over party personnel.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the team drafting these new statutes -- which was composed of theoreticians as well as experts on the practical life of the country, including Vaculík -- were in essential agreement on the conception of the statutes which I have only roughly outlined here. At the same time,

this team was able to anticipate and take into account most of the demands and suggestions from the ranks on the statutes -- from the party organizations and conferences.

Insofar as objections arose, they were raised in the highest circles. Ob-

viously then a dogged struggle awaits us. It will determine whether we will be able at this special congress to assure the democratization of the party and our entire society by institutionalizing it in these new statutes or whether we will have to postpone this until 1970 and thus indefinitely.

LIU SHAO-CHI EXPELLED FROM CHINESE CP

Liu Shao-chi, chief of state of the People's Republic of China, was expelled from the Chinese Communist party at a meeting of the CCP Central Committee October 13 to October 31. The news was made public by Hsinhua, the government press agency, on November 1.

Although Liu has been under sharp attack from the Maoists since 1966 as the

"Khrushchev of China," this was the first time he was mentioned by name in an official party declaration. The Central Committee reportedly denounced him as a "traitor, renegade and scab" and a "lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism and the Kuomintang."

Liu has never been allowed to defend himself publicly, and his current views, therefore, remain unknown to the mass of the Chinese people and to Communists in other parts of the world.

The Central Committee meeting, which lauded the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was called with no advance publicity. It was the first plenum of that body since August 1966. Both Mao and CCP Vice Chairman Lin Biao addressed the gathering. It was announced that a full party congress will be held shortly, the first since 1956.

The Central Committee statement "expressed its deep revolutionary indignation" at Liu's "counterrevolutionary crimes." A motion was adopted "unanimously" to dismiss Liu "from all posts both inside and outside the party and to continue to settle accounts with him and his accomplices for their crimes in betraying the party and the country."

None of the other CCP leaders who have been associated with Liu Shao-chi, such as the party's general secretary, Teng Hsiao-ping, were mentioned by name. The Central Committee referred only to the "handful of other top party persons in authority following the capitalist road."

According to government statutes, the Central Committee does not have the authority to remove Liu from his position as chief of state. He was elected to the post by the National People's Congress, which last met in 1965.

The Central Committee meeting was reportedly "enlarged" by the attendance of many people who are not members of the committee, including "principal responsible comrades of the revolutionary committees of the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions" and "principal responsible comrades" of the Chinese army.



KHRUSHCHEV OF CHINA?

THE OCTOBER 21 DEMONSTRATIONS IN JAPAN

Osaka

The Asahi Evening News estimated that 800,000 workers and students took part in the International Antiwar Day, October 21, in 800 towns and cities in Japan. Almost all observers agreed that more than 500,000 took part in the protests against American aggression in Vietnam, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and for the return of Okinawa to Japan. This marked the greatest turnout since the demonstrations against the Security Treaty when it was last renewed in 1960.

Two giant union federations called work stoppages and other actions during the day. Sohyo [General Council of Trade Unions of Japan] and Churitsu-Roren [Liaison Council of Independent Unions] reported that 17 industrial unions took part in the antiwar actions, including the National Railway Workers Union [Kokuro].

Workers on the Japan National Railway [JNR] held workshop meetings for an hour or two at every important transportation center in the country, and staged strikes at about 10 important freight stations. These tactics were combined with nationwide slowdowns. Trains were stopped every time the "ATS" [Automatic Train Stop] signal sounded, throwing trains off schedule, and "work-to-rule" tactics were employed, further delaying the trains.

The October 22 Yomiuri estimated that "160,000 passengers were affected" by the slowdown. Railway workers in privately owned lines gave antiwar leaflets to passengers.

Teachers held antiwar rallies and many high-school teachers devoted an hour of class time to discussions of the Vietnam war and Okinawa. Civil-service workers also staged protests.

Students at 92 universities and colleges throughout the country boycotted classes, according to figures released by the police themselves. More than 16 schools were occupied by students and barricaded. In Tokyo classes were struck at 20 universities.

As the workday ended, multitudes of workers and students could be seen in Tokyo, Osaka, and all the other big cities, hurrying to antiwar rallies and marches.

About 55,000 workers of Sohyo and Churitsu-Roren gathered in Meiji Park near Shinjuku, Tokyo. The rally ended in a march taking two routes through the Japanese capital.

Students of various tendencies

staged demonstrations. The Tokyo city government called out 12,000 riot police, the largest police call-up since 1960.

Zengakuren students of the Chukaku [Revolutionary Communist League (Core)] and the Shagakudo ML [Marxist-Leninist faction of the Communist League], about 1,200 in number, went to Shinjuku Station, the biggest railway station in Japan. Later they were joined by the Internationalist Faction of the Socialist Youth League and the Kakumaru Zengakuren.

Some 20,000 people had gathered outside the station to watch the clash when the police tried to stop the students from entering. Shinjuku Station was chosen as a target because jet fuel for U.S. aircraft at Tachikawa air base passes through the station over the Yamate and Chuo lines of the JNR.

At 8 p.m. thousands of students broke through a sheet-iron fence directly in front of Shinjuku Station that had been put up by the management to keep demonstrators out. The students, followed by the massive crowd, occupied the station and the police were forced to retreat.

The spectators joined the students in fighting the police, who hurled tear-gas canisters into the throng. Demonstrators defended themselves with sticks and threw stones. Seats were torn out of stalled trains to use as barricades on the stairs of the station. All train service through the station was stopped until ten o'clock the next morning.

Another group of about 1,000 students of the Communist League attacked the Defense Agency headquarters near Roppongi, Minato Ward, Tokyo. They also fought the police with sticks and stones. The Kaiho faction of the Socialist Youth League tried to enter the National Diet building, suffering many arrests.

In Osaka about 35,000 Sohyo and Churitsu-Roren workers, and students, gathered at Ogimachi Park near Umeda. This giant antiwar mobilization marched on more than 30 routes through Osaka, the second largest city in the country.

Although the students of the Chukaku, Kakumaru, Communist League, and Kaiho faction of the Socialist Youth League [SYL] did not participate in the meeting at Ogimachi Park, they staged their demonstrations as well, clashing sharply with the police.

Workers and students, including the Internationalist faction of the SYL, demonstrated along Midosuji Street, where almost all the monopolistic enterprises

and big banks of the country have offices.

More than 6,800 riot police were mobilized in Osaka. The workers and students staged a sitdown on Midosuji Street, tying up traffic. Police clashed with students for five hours at several key intersections in the city.

Massive crowds of citizens on Midosuji Street showed sympathy with the demonstrators. Members of the Socialist Youth League appealed to the crowd to join them in a march to Umeda, the biggest traffic center of Osaka, where two private interurban railways, three subway lines, and the JNR have terminals.

A big rally was held on the spot in the street and then the crowd marched to Umeda, joined on the way by many spectators. The demonstration ended with everyone occupying the Osaka station of the JNR at Umeda, where another mass meeting was held.

In Kobe 10,000 teachers, students and workers held an antiwar rally and demonstration.

The Sato government responded to the massive outpouring of antiwar sentiment with police repression. On October 21, 769 were arrested in Tokyo, 92 in Osaka, 31 in Fukuoka, 18 in Aichi, 12 in Hokkaido, 11 in Hiroshima, 6 in Shizuoka, 3 in Kyoto, 3 in Hyogo, and one each in Saitama and Saga. This was the largest number of student demonstrators arrested in one day in the postwar period.

In Tokyo, police were given orders to arrest students and other demonstrators on sight, and after midnight all taxis were stopped and searched for Zengakuren students.

Police invoked the "antiriot" law against demonstrators for the first time since 1952. This police-state law, Article 106 of the Penal Code, carries penalties of up to 10 years in prison for people who assemble in large numbers with the aim of "using or threatening to use" violence. Sato and his cabinet unanimously approved the use of this law the day after the demonstrations.

With this official blessing the police began a roundup of "suspects." Education Minister Hirokichi Nadao announced that university administrators were being asked to cooperate with the police in taking the witch-hunt onto the campuses. He said the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department was sending copies of a "wanted list" to all "concerned" universities.

In Tokyo a special police unit was

set up which issued instructions to local police stations to arrest "all persons suspected of having taken part in the demonstration," as the Mainichi Daily News put it October 23.

The Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's office assigned about 60 prosecutors to try the students and workers. The popular character of the demonstrations was indicated by an admission by the prosecutors reported in the October 23 Japan Times: "Among those arrested this time, a considerable number are neither students nor labor unionists but 'ordinary citizens' who, while watching the students run wild, joined them in various acts of violence."

The police claimed that the October 21 demonstrations were "planned," and that they intend to arrest the leaders of the various Zengakuren factions.

On October 24 and 25 police searched the offices of many of the revolutionary organizations, including the Internationalist faction of the Socialist Youth League, Chukaku, Kakumaru, and the Marxist-Leninist faction of the Communist League.

The first reactions of the opposition parties to the repression were mixed. The Japan Socialist party issued a statement October 22 criticizing the government and police for invoking the "antiriot" law. The government and the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, they declared, were trying to suppress the mass movements under the pretext of curbing the student movement.

The reactionary Komeito [Clean Government party] not unexpectedly condemned the students. It nevertheless criticized the use of the "antiriot" law, expressing fear that the provision might be used to suppress other movements.

The Communist party denounced the students, claiming that the clashes with the police were due to "Trotskyites" who had "nothing to do" with the antiwar movement. The CP added that the government was taking advantage of "violence by Trotskyites" to restrict demonstrations.

It is plain that the situation here in Japan is rapidly moving to a higher stage. A significant factor was the widespread involvement of spectators and ordinary citizens in the October 21 demonstrations.

The key to success in the new stage of the student radical movement lies in organizational solidarity with workers. It is also important to unify dozens of university campus struggles.

TARUC BLAMES MACARTHUR

[The following article appeared in the October 15 issue of Laging Una, "The Voice of the Filipino People," published in Los Angeles, California.]

* * *

Giving a strange twist to the post-war history of the Philippines, former Huk Supremo Luis Taruc, following his release from prison under a presidential pardon, blamed the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur for the discontent that sparked the Huk-led agrarian uprising in the late 1940's.

Taruc was set at liberty Sept. 11 after spending 14 years behind bars following his voluntary surrender to the government. He was tried and convicted on charges of rebellion.

The former revolutionary leader stated his present view of history in an interview with United Press-International that appeared in the Manila Times of Sept. 15. Three days later he was inducted into the Christian Social Movement established by Sen. Raul S. Manglapus as cameramen recorded his formal act of apostasy.

Taruc told the UPI interviewer that while MacArthur, U.S.-Allied Commander in the Pacific, had decreed a legal existence for the Communist Party of Japan at war's end, and had initiated a program of land reform in that country, he did exactly the opposite in the Philippines. Said he:

"If MacArthur (had) only treated the Filipino people, especially the resistance fighters and the democratic militant groups, the peasant and labor groups and the Huk veterans properly...there would have been no miniature civil war. There could have been a successful land reform as early as 1946 and 1947 in the Philippines."

(The Huk movement -- Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, meaning the People's Army Against Japan -- arose during World War II and conducted guerrilla warfare against the Japanese army of occupation. It gained mass support by combining patriotic aims with a program of radical reform, especially on the land question.)

When U.S. forces freed the Philippines from Japanese control, Taruc went on, "they imprisoned the top leaders (of the Huks). They tried to divide and rule us by offering me a one-star generalship with full back pay and have a contingent as our contribution to the U.S. army to help liberate Japan, or if that were no longer necessary, to help them disarm the

Communist elements within the movement. They wanted us to expose them and help the American army and the Philippine units disarm our own comrades."

Taruc and another Huk leader, Castro Alejandrino, who later was killed, angrily refused to engage in such perfidy, so the Americans "branded us as Communist leaders or Communist tools," according to the former rebel chief. He opined that had MacArthur done in the Philippines what he did in Japan, the "Communist party here would have stagnated into a small uninfluential group."

The Huk movement under Taruc's leadership identified itself with the revolutionary class position of the Soviet Union and China, the ex-Supremo told his interviewer, but received absolutely no material assistance from outside the Philippines.

Taruc did not always believe that MacArthur personally was responsible for the Huk rebellion and that a policy of leniency toward the militants, coupled with some reforms, would have stilled the discontent of the masses.

In his autobiography, "Born of the People," published in 1953, the then Huk leader saw the bulk of the Filipino people exploited and oppressed by a coalition of landlords and capitalists backed by U.S. imperialism. This could only be ended by revolutionary struggle culminating in the overthrow of the existing order.

Taruc was pardoned by President Marcos on the basis of his pledge to help prevent another civil war. The move came amidst a revival of armed Huk activity in the landlord-ridden provinces of Central Luzon and a stepped-up drive by government forces to crush the insurgents.

Marcos "is actually using him (Taruc) in his land reform drive and in the anti-dissident campaign," Manila Times columnist Teodoro F. Valencia asserted Sept. 17.

Taruc has been quite vocal since his release, especially on the subject of land reform, which remains a vague hope five years after the passage of the Land Reform Code. In a speech Sept. 21 to students from the Ateneo University in Quezon City he said farmers were getting more and more impatient because there had been no agrarian reform.

No longer the fiery revolutionary tribune of bygone years, Taruc did not denounce the government or the exploiting landlords. He merely urged the government

to "speed up" land reform, called on Catholic schools to involve themselves in land reform activity, and appealed to the landlords for generosity.

Taruc said to his student audience: "I urge you to talk to your parents, most of whom, I was told, are landowners. Tell them not to wait for the government to come to them, but rather to take it upon themselves to give their lands to the tenants and to make use of the money the gov-

ernment will give in exchange by venturing in the canning, textile and other industries."

Landlords in the Philippines find exploitation of the land, and those who work it for them, far more profitable than investments in industry. This is the basic explanation for the fact that in this predominantly agrarian country there is virtually no capital available for industrial development.

TARUC THE RENEGADE

[Following is an editorial that appeared in the October 15 issue of Laging Una.]

* * *

Luis Taruc's formal act of apostasy in joining the Christian Social Movement a few days after his release from prison was no surprise, but the culmination of a series of steps leading away from his former life as a revolutionary leader.

By his voluntary surrender to the Philippine government fourteen years ago, the Huk Supremo broke from his comrades-in-arms in the insurgent movement, earning their scorn and hatred by his treacherous conduct while in prison.

Seeking to curry favor with the government against whose forces he had led an eight-year armed struggle, Taruc made his renegacy explicit in press interviews and letters to the newspapers. This paved the way for the presidential pardon that freed him before his prison term was up.

The government Taruc now intends to serve has not changed. Administrations come and go, but the government and the socio-economic system upon which it is erected remain the same. Can Taruc truly believe that this government, largely dominated by the landowning class is capable of carrying through a meaningful agrarian reform?

Taruc has had a change, not of heart, but of interest. Early in his ca-

reer, as a young socialist, he learned the important historic truth that privileged classes never peaceably surrender the properties that give them wealth and power. The Filipino landlords are no exception to this rule and have shown it by the savage repressions their government has directed against rebellious farmers. Taruc is well aware of this from personal experience: he spent 14 years behind bars for championing the cause of the rural poor.

Thus Taruc appeared positively silly when, on the morrow of his release, he appealed to wealthy landlords to surrender voluntarily their big estates to the government for distribution among tenants without waiting for government action under the Land Reform Code. If Taruc believes the landlords capable of any such thing, he has gone soft in the head.

Despite any errors that were made, the Huk movement was and is noble in conception and aim, a drive for social justice. Taruc as its leader played a worthy role. Now he has changed sides. Where before he stood with the people, now he stands with their oppressors.

Indications are that Taruc's new role will be to induce the landless farmers of Central Luzon to accept tame substitutes for genuine land reform. The ex-Supremo evidently thinks his authority among the rural poor, acquired when he led them in struggle, is unimpaired. As a government man, however, he can have little appeal. Besides, renegades are never popular.

NJONO, TWO OTHERS EXECUTED IN INDONESIA

Three leading members of the Indonesian Communist party [PKI] were executed October 29 by the Suharto dictatorship in Djakarta. Foremost among them was Njono, leader of the several-million-member All-Indonesian Central Organiza-

tion of Trade Unions. He was a member of the political bureau of the PKI.

Sudisman, another political bureau member, and Wirjo Martono, a provincial PKI leader, were also shot.

TARIQ ALI FOILS KIDNAP ATTEMPT

London

Tariq Ali, leader of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and editor of The Black Dwarf, was attacked by five men as he left the offices of the paper Saturday evening, the day before the giant October 27 demonstration against the war in Vietnam.

"Five men in a white car drew up as I was looking for a taxi," Ali said. "One shouted, 'There he is!' And I was pushed to the ground, punched and kicked.

"Luckily two men and a girl in the Black Dwarf offices saw what was happening and rushed down to help me.

"The men were obviously trying to drag me into their car. One shouted, 'You should have left the engine running.'"

The girl hit one of the men over the head with her shopping bag. The five ran back to their car and sped away.

The number of the car was turned over to the police, but five days later they still had nothing to report on their efforts to identify Ali's assailants.

MONTREAL SOCIALIST STUDENT RUNS AGAINST MINISTER OF EDUCATION

Montréal

The Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes [Young Socialist League] has named Michel Mill, a mathematics student at the University of Montréal, to run against Minister of Education Jean-Guy Cardinal as a candidate for parliament.

The LJS waited for the New Democratic party [the Canadian Labor party] to come out against Cardinal.

When the NDP failed to do this, Mill's candidacy was announced. His campaign has already met with a warm response on the campus.

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