

A POLITICAL DISASTER FOR THE KREMLIN

End the Soviet Occupation!

**Che's Diary: Experiences and Perspectives
of the Armed Struggle in Bolivia**

Fidel Castro's Stand on Czechoslovakia

A POLITICAL DISASTER FOR THE KREMLIN

By Joseph Hansen

AUGUST 27 -- Moscow's decision to release the top leaders of the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic today constitutes a damning admission of the flimsiness of the excuses utilized to justify the Soviet military intervention, no matter what concessions were wrung from Svoboda and Dubček while they were held under duress and faced with the prospect of being executed as in the case of the Hungarian leaders in 1956.

The Czechoslovak people will undoubtedly consider the release of their leaders to be a notable victory in their struggle for socialist democracy against Stalinist bureaucratism, a victory clearly due to the solidarity displayed by the working class in particular in facing the invasion. It can be expected that they will not be long in moving forward again with fresh boldness.

By the same token, even though the number of Soviet troops occupying Czechoslovakia now stands at 350,000 -- a force comparable to the number of American troops in Vietnam! -- and they have not been challenged in battle, the outcome of the operation at this point already constitutes a major political disaster for the Brezhnev-Kosygin team, the consequences of which, it can confidently be predicted, will soon be manifest in the Soviet Union itself.

When the Kremlin pulled its blitzkrieg on August 21, the justification advanced was that a "counterrevolution," inspired by Western imperialist circles, had broken out in Czechoslovakia and that top figures in the Czechoslovak government itself had "appealed" for help.

Brezhnev and Kosygin obviously counted on some prominent pro-Moscow figures stepping forward as candidates for the role of puppet government. These figures would be recognized as the legitimate government; they could confirm the Kremlin's story and bolster it, while the populace, cowed by the troops, would subside into silence. Sectors of the workers, properly guided and inspired by the bureaucrats charged with looking after their interests, could be counted on to pass the usual resolutions hailing the aid and assistance advanced by Moscow to crush the "counterrevolution."

But no one of prominence dared to step forward to accept the posts offered under protection of Moscow's tanks and machine guns.

The Kremlin could not even name the model Czechoslovak "patriots" who had

allegedly appealed for Soviet armies to invade their country. To this day they remain completely anonymous -- if they exist at all.

Brezhnev-Kosygin were thus left without even a fiction to cover up their decision to intervene militarily and reconstitute the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic according to strict Stalinist specifications.

The story about a "counterrevolution" fell to pieces in similar fashion. If the story had really been true, then no conclusion is possible but that Brezhnev and Kosygin sold out to the "counterrevolution" themselves; for after arresting the leaders of the "counterrevolution," Brezhnev and Kosygin opened up negotiations with them, and finally made a deal with them. Not a small one either. If the latest dispatches are accurate, instead of shooting these "counterrevolutionaries," they put them back in charge of the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Brezhnev and Kosygin must therefore have betrayed the model "patriots" who appealed for Stalinist troops to save socialism in Czechoslovakia. What happened to these "patriots"? Were they, as a small concession, turned over to the "counterrevolutionary" leaders to be duly awarded? Or did Brezhnev and Kosygin themselves order these heroes summarily shot? According to the logic of the Kremlin's propaganda, are not the Soviet armies now upholding the "counterrevolutionary" leaders?

The truth is, of course, as the rank-and-file Soviet troops found out from firsthand experience, there was no counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia. Quite the contrary. The Czechoslovak people had won big concessions in the way of freedom of expression. They were moving, not toward destroying the anticapitalist economic structure and its achievements but toward changing the political structure in the direction of socialist democracy. The logic of this movement was toward a political revolution that would institute genuine socialist democracy as conceived by the Bolsheviks in the days of Lenin and Trotsky. This is what Brezhnev and Kosygin wanted to stop at all costs.

The Kremlin premised the invasion on the effectiveness of sheer military force. It left out of account the political side. In short, the Kremlin committed the same error in Czechoslovakia that the Johnson administration committed in Viet-

nam. The will of the people -- their hopes, aspirations, self-confidence, and militancy were disregarded.

Likewise brushed aside was the international context and the probable repercussions. Or perhaps the Kremlin strategists, having at their disposal accurate information on how the freedoms won in Czechoslovakia were inspiring the forces of socialist democracy in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, decided that they had no alternative, in the interest of their privileged bureaucratic position, but to pay the price internationally, trying to reduce the cost as much as possible by the swiftness and completeness of the blow in Czechoslovakia.

These calculations were upset by the resistance of the Czechoslovak people which was remarkable in its speed, breadth, solidity and cool-headedness.

The most notable feature of the resistance was the way the Czechoslovaks met military force with political weapons.

The first action, spearheaded by the youth, was to fraternize with the Soviet troops. This consisted of approaching the troops as comrades who had been misinformed about the situation in Czechoslovakia. The truth was explained. There was no counterrevolution. Gains had been made in the struggle for socialist democracy. The Kremlin wanted to end these. The troops ought to go home and fight for socialist democracy there.

These were powerful political appeals, for they echoed the deepest feelings of the Soviet troops themselves.

Their effectiveness can be judged by the report in today's dispatches that Moscow found it necessary to fly at least 200 secret police to Prague to deal "mainly with problems within the Soviet military." The Kremlin may be suddenly concerned lest its 350,000 missionaries with bayonets prove unduly receptive to conversion into countermissionaries.

A spectacular political thrust against the Brezhnev-Kosygin team was the emergency congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party. It met August 21-22, under the very guns of the occupation troops, to elect a new underground 160-man Central Committee. The new committee, in turn, elected a 24-member Presidium.

The 1,200 delegates expressed complete solidarity against the invasion and in favor of socialist democracy.

The congress offered the strongest testimony as to the sentiments of the Czechoslovak working class. It was held in an industrial plant in the Prague area.

The delegates, wearing workers' clothes, entered with the workers on the midnight and 6 a.m. shifts. The people's militia protected the congress, their weapons at the ready. They even had an antitank gun in position in case the Soviet generals got wind of the congress and ordered tanks into action.

On the international front, the most immediate result of the Kremlin's invasion of Czechoslovakia was to shatter the ranks of Moscow's camp followers. Within hours on August 21, the French Communist party leaders denounced the action. This was a historic first. Up to now the French CP bureaucrats have always been the most dependable supporters of all the tortuous twists and turns of the Kremlin, including such crimes as the crushing of the Hungarian political revolution in 1956.

The Italian Communist party leaders took a similar position.

Public denunciations were likewise issued by a series of smaller Communist parties.

The American CP, which is headed by a bureaucracy that epitomizes servility rallied to the Kremlin's cause. However, such prominent leaders as Gil Green and Dorothy Healey publicly dissociated themselves from the shameful stand taken by the central leadership around Gus Hall.

Hanoi quickly issued a public statement favoring the invasion, a move that was universally interpreted as reflecting fear that unless this was done Moscow would cut its material aid to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the American invasion.

Fidel Castro similarly supported the sending of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia; but he accompanied this with such biting criticisms that his speech drew no cheers in Moscow.

Moreover, Castro premised his stand, basically, on the actual existence of a counterrevolutionary danger, a danger so grave that it led a group of Czechoslovak Communist "personalities" to appeal for Soviet troops. In view of this, it is dubious that Castro's speech will be published in the Soviet Union or any of the East European countries.

Perhaps the cruelest blow was struck by Peking. In 1956, Chou En-lai traveled to Europe to help justify and cover up the Kremlin's invasion of Hungary. On August 23, 1968, an article in Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist party's official paper, called the invasion of Czechoslovakia "a shameless act" comparable to Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland and the U.S. invasion of Vietnam.

END THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA!

[The following statement was issued August 22 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the World Party of the Socialist Revolution founded by Leon Trotsky.]

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The United Secretariat of the Fourth International condemns the military occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the nations of the Warsaw Pact.

The pretexts are cynical: "Statesmen," it is claimed, whose identity is yet to be revealed forty-eight hours after the event, appealed for the troops to be sent in. The entry of the troops, it is pretended, was approved by the majority of the Communist leaders at the very same time as the emergency congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party -- composed of delegates elected under the influence of the rank and file -- condemned the intervention by an overwhelming majority.

The attempted justification is no less cynical. The truth is that the "counterrevolutionary danger" cited by the Kremlin did not exist. What did unquestionably exist was a right-wing course of the Czech leaders similar fundamentally to that practiced by the Soviet leaders themselves. However, their brutal intervention is not to be explained by the right-wing course of the Czechs but by their fear when they saw how the first beginnings of workers democracy, which had been timidly introduced in Czechoslovakia, stimulated the struggle of the young vanguard, intellectuals and workers in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and above all the Soviet Union itself. The intervention discloses the fundamental weakness of the bureaucratic leadership.

What the Soviet bureaucracy demonstrated in fact by its military intervention in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is the incompatibility of its dictatorship, power and privileges with any form of workers democracy. The bureaucracy is mortally afraid of the resumption of Leninist norms in the internal life of the Communist parties.

The abolition of the censorship, the revival of open political discussion, the participation of the working masses in political life, the proposed adoption of statutes in the Czech Communist party sustaining the right of minorities to present their platforms to the party congress and to defend their positions in-

side the party -- this is danger No. 1 to the Kremlin. The bureaucrats know only too well that when the workers win these rights, they have started down the road to workers councils democracy, the road to power of the true soviet type projected in State and Revolution.

By intervening militarily in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet bureaucracy trampled underfoot the elementary principles of proletarian internationalism. The Soviet constitution affirms the right of national minorities to separate even from the USSR, if they so desire, but the Czechoslovak people have been denied the right to choose their own Communist leadership.

It was impossible to throw more inflammable fuel on the flames of anti-Communist demagogy, to provide more effective material for the propaganda machine of imperialism. To justify the intervention, the Kremlin has not even hesitated to invoke "the balance of power" in Europe, that is, the Yalta agreement, thus underwriting the excuse invoked by American imperialism for counterrevolutionary intervention in its own "zone of influence."

The occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the Warsaw Pact troops was a blow to the cause of communism, to the socialist revolution, throughout the world.

The first effect of Moscow's move was to disintegrate the international Communist movement that adheres to the Kremlin. In the beginning this will favor the further evolution of several large Communist parties in the imperialist countries toward the social-democratic pattern. Eventually it will bring the world crisis of Stalinism to its culmination, out of which will emerge new forces to help reconstruct an authentic revolutionary Leninist vanguard on a world scale.

The outcome of this counterrevolutionary act will thus be different from what the rulers in Washington expect.

The world of 1968 is not the world of 1956. The heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people against the imperialist aggression has fostered the revival of revolutionary struggles throughout the world.

While condemning the crimes of the Kremlin, the workers must not forget for one moment the bloodier crimes committed

by imperialism every day in Vietnam. Let us tear away the hypocritical mask worn by imperialism. The imperialists are shedding crocodile tears over the violation of the right of the Czechoslovak people to determine their own destiny, but they rain napalm and poison gas on the Vietnamese people to prevent them from setting up the kind of government and social regime they want.

The revolutionary uprising in France in May encouraged the working-class vanguard in Czechoslovakia to struggle for true socialist democracy. The May uprising opened up the perspective of a European Socialist Federation, a Socialist United States of Europe, within which the Czechoslovak workers will be able to construct their society and their socialist economy under much more auspicious conditions.

The Czechoslovak masses face the military occupation in a context and with organizations and perspectives that are much more favorable than those at the disposal of the Hungarian workers in their isolated struggle in November 1956.

The local and regional Communist party committees, which were basically renewed in recent months, and the action committees that are forming spontaneously could constitute the backbone of mass resistance.

This resistance, beginning with a general strike and street demonstrations, could become prolonged. It could utilize many different forms of action, harassing the occupation troops through steady propaganda in their own languages, reminding them of Lenin's teachings on the right to self-determination, on socialist democracy, on freedom of discussion and the rights of minorities in Communist parties.

The resistance must ostracize the collaborators and Quislings of the occupation forces. It could use the weapon of unannounced demonstrations, surprise strikes, constant refusal by the proletariat and the working masses of the Czechoslovak Republic to accept the regime of bureaucratic dictatorship which the Kremlin seeks to impose with foreign bayonets.

By conducting this struggle in the spirit of proletarian internationalism; by creating in the course of this resistance the committees that will become the organs of free workers and peasants power of Czechoslovak socialism, the proletariat of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will not only gain its own liberation; it will also make an exceptional contribution to the struggle for soviet democracy in the USSR, Poland, and Hungary, as well as touch off the socialist revolution in capitalist Europe.

The Fourth International appeals to the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and East German troops to immediately leave the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as the Czechoslovak working masses ask them to do. Socialism is not endangered in Czechoslovakia except by the crimes of the bureaucracy.

The Fourth International demands the immediate liberation of Dubček, of Cisar, of Smrkovsky, of all the Czechoslovak Communist leaders, journalists, intellectuals, and militants who have been arrested. Woe to the henchmen of the Soviet bureaucracy who imprison Communists whose only crime is that they took into account the opinion of the workers of their country.

The Fourth International recalls the treachery of the Kremlin in the case of Imre Nagy, who left the Yugoslav embassy under a guarantee of safe conduct issued by the Soviet leaders and who was nevertheless arrested and later executed by the agents of the Soviet bureaucracy. The repetition of such a crime with respect to the Czech leaders must not be permitted to happen.

The Fourth International calls on all communists, all the Czechoslovak workers, to resist. Do not give the occupiers and their agents a single day of peace.

The Fourth International appeals to the workers, the intellectuals, and the students of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany to support with all their strength the Czechoslovak mass struggle for the right to socialist democracy.

The Fourth International reminds the workers of all the capitalist countries that the best help they can give to the struggle of their Czech brothers is to redouble their efforts to overthrow the regime of capitalism, and to commit themselves even more wholeheartedly to the road of socialist revolution.

Withdraw all occupation troops from Czechoslovakia!

Send Soviet tanks to Vietnam!

Down with the Soviet bureaucracy which usurped power in the USSR and from whose hands the Soviet proletariat will wrench the flag of communism.

Long live the Socialist World Revolution!

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH ON THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I.

[The position of the Cuban government on the Soviet occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was explained by Fidel Castro in a speech August 23 that received considerable attention in the world press although little of it was quoted and a simplistic interpretation was generally placed on its meaning. The Cuban position can be characterized as "critical support" of the Kremlin's action.

[Below we are publishing the first installment of the full text of Castro's speech. We plan to publish the balance in next week's issue. We also project the publication at an early date of some critical observations on the position of the Cuban government on this issue.

[The translation follows the official one with some modifications made by Intercontinental Press.]

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As was announced today, we are appearing here tonight to analyze the situation in Czechoslovakia. We are going to make this analysis in the light of the revolutionary positions and international policy upheld by our revolution and our party.

Some of the things that we are going to state here will be, in some cases, in contradiction with the emotions of many; in other cases, in contradiction with our own interests; and in others, they will constitute serious risks for our country.

However, this is a moment of great importance for the revolutionary movement throughout the world. And it is our duty to analyze the facts objectively and to express the opinion of our political leadership, the opinion that represents the judgment of the members of our Central Committee, of the leaders of our mass organizations, of the members of our government, and that we are sure is profoundly compatible with the tradition and sentiments of our people.

It seems to us necessary, in the first place, to make a brief analysis of our position in relation to events that have been taking place in Czechoslovakia.

Our people have a good deal of information about these events and although no, as we may say, official exposition of the position of our party regarding those events has ever been presented -- among other reasons because the events were still in progress, and we are not obliged

to analyze everything going on in the world every day -- we were observing developments in the political process in that country.

A whole series of changes began taking place in Czechoslovakia at approximately the beginning of this year. It began with talk of, or rather the actual resignation of Mr. Novotny as secretary of the party, although he continued on as president of the republic. This was followed by the desertion of an important military figure to the United States. Then a series of demands arose that he (Novotny) also abandon his post as president of the republic. And a series of events and happenings followed.

A process of what was termed "democratization" began. The imperialist press invented another word: the word "liberalization," and they began to differentiate between progressives and conservatives -- calling those who supported a whole series of political reforms "progressives," and those who supported the former leadership "conservatives."

It was evident -- and we must give our opinion about both: the conservatives and the liberals...it rather reminds us of the past history of Cuba, that division between conservatives and liberals, a situation which, of course, was not to be expected in the political processes of socialist revolutions.

This had a series of repercussions throughout the world. Some began to sympathize with the so-called liberals or proponents of democratization. And we watched events unfold.

And, for example, on April 24, 1968, the paper Rudé Právo, organ of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, published an article entitled "The Favorable Reaction of the U.S. Press Toward Events in Czechoslovakia."

"Rudé Právo, organ of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, today pointed out that the United States expects a more intelligent foreign policy from the new orientation adopted by Prague."

It seems that the continuation of this is missing, but this news dispatch reported the reaction of the U.S. press to the changes in Czechoslovakia with considerable delight, and, there is no question that the U.S. press, the capitalist press, the imperialist press reacted most favorably to the changes in Czechoslovakia. Of course, in our opinion, anything that begins to receive the praise, the support,

the enthusiastic applause of the imperialist press, naturally begins to arouse our suspicions.

Later, on May 2, 1968, the following appeared: "Czechoslovakia reiterates its request that the United States return Czechoslovak gold.

"The Prague government repeated its demand that Washington return Czechoslovak gold being held by the U.S. government without delay.

"In a note delivered today to the U.S. embassy, the Czechoslovak government described the U.S. attitude as lacking in seriousness and urged that Washington promptly remit an advance on the 18,433 kilos of gold which it holds and which rightfully belong to Czechoslovakia and which was confiscated by the United States to guarantee a settling of accounts between the two countries."

Later, on June 11, 1968: "Possible U.S. loan to Czechoslovakia." And the article said:

"The possibility of a U.S. loan to Czechoslovakia was proposed today, according to reliable sources, by the vice-president of the National Bank of New York during a conversation with Czechoslovak banking leaders.

"The vice-president of the American banking firm, Miroslava Kriz, stated that Poland and Yugoslavia have also received large loans from U.S. banks without thereby having to alter the socialist principles of their societies."

So here, to defend the idea of the loan, we find the argument being offered that another country -- Poland, in this instance, one of the countries that sent troops to Czechoslovakia -- had received large loans from U.S. banks. A detail in itself noteworthy, is it not?

And on June 18, 1968: "A German magazine affirms that Czechoslovakia solicited credits from the GFR.

"The weekly Spiegel revealed today that Prague, fearing economic reprisals from Moscow, turned recently to Bonn for credits.

"The federal government, however," according to the weekly, "in order to avoid increased tensions with the USSR, preferred to bar any direct ties with Czechoslovakia and the Council of Ministers therefore approved the idea put forth by Minister of the Economy Schiller to guarantee a World Bank loan to Prague.

"Spiegel says that, in exchange, Czechoslovakia has promised to grant a wider range of action to the West German

commercial mission in Prague and has included, as well, to the possibility of normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries at the beginning of next year."

"Economic Conference Between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. June 27."

It says: "A two-day conference between Czechoslovakia and West Germany on present economic problems got under way today.

"The conference was organized by the Bonn Foreign Policy Society and the International Political and Economic Institute of Prague.

"The Czech group is headed by the director of the aforementioned institute, Dr. Antonin Anejdarek, while the German representation is headed by the chairman of the Foreign Policy Society of Bonn, Ambassador Von Walther, who was the Federal Republic's ambassador to Moscow until the end of last year.

"Von Walther stressed that the German participants wished to know Czechoslovakia's economic needs and possibilities. He intimated that West Germany is prepared to expand its economic relations with Czechoslovakia substantially.

"Dr. Anejdarek stated that the conference will serve to clarify possibilities and aid concretely the future development of economic relations between the two countries," etc., etc.

You all recall that, following our recognition of the German Democratic Republic, the German Federal Republic promptly broke relations with us, and that situation has continued up to the present day.

We know how all those governments behave and, above all, how the German Federal Republic behaves, being, as it is, the principal pawn of Yankee imperialism. Here you see a whole series of things -- the beginning of a "honeymoon" in the relations between the liberals and imperialism. I have simply referred to certain incidents of an economic nature occurring on different dates because throughout that entire process a whole series of events of a political nature took place.

A real liberal fury was unleashed: A whole series of political slogans in favor of the formation of opposition parties began to develop, in favor of openly anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist theses, such as the thesis that the party should cease to play the role which the party plays within socialist society and begin to play the role there of a guide, supervising some things; but above all exerting a sort of spiritual leadership, in short, that the reins of power should

cease to be in the hands of the Communist party. The revision of certain fundamental postulates to the effect that a socialist regime is a transitional regime from socialism to communism, a governmental form known as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This means a government where power is wielded in behalf of one class and against the former exploiting classes by virtue of which in a revolutionary process political rights, the right to carry on political activities cannot be granted to the former exploiters, whose objective is precisely to struggle against the essence and very object of socialism.

A series of slogans began to be put forward and in fact certain norms were adopted such as the establishment of bourgeois "freedom" of the press. This means that the counterrevolution and the exploiters, the very enemies of socialism, were granted the right to speak and write freely against socialism. As a matter of fact, a process of seizure of the principal information media by the reactionary elements began to develop. As regards foreign policy, a whole series of slogans of open rapprochement toward capitalist concepts and theses and of rapprochement towards the West appeared.

Of course, all of this was linked to a series of unquestionably correct slogans. It was some of these slogans which won a certain amount of sympathy for the liberalization or democratization movement. Even some European Communist parties, in the face of their own problems and contradictions, began to express their sympathy for the liberalization movement.

It was a situation in which everyone was trying to turn things to his own advantage -- problems related to incorrect methods of government, bureaucratic policy, separation from the masses and in short, a whole series of problems for which they held the former leadership responsible. There was also talk about the need to create their own forms for the development of the socialist revolution and the socialist system in Czechoslovakia.

Thus these tendencies were developing simultaneously -- some which justified the change and others which turned that change toward an openly reactionary policy. And this divided opinion.

We, on the other hand, were convinced -- and this is very important -- that the Czechoslovak regime was dangerously inclined toward a substantial change in the system. In short, we were convinced that the Czechoslovak regime was heading toward capitalism and was inexorably heading toward imperialism. Of

that we did not have the slightest doubt.

We must begin by saying this because we also want to say certain things about other matters related to the situation there.

On this question, there are some people in the world who do not share these opinions. Many considered that this danger did not exist. Many tendencies favored certain freedom of artistic expression and some of those things. Because, naturally, there are many people in the world who are sensitive to these problems. Many mistakes, many blunders, have been made along these lines. And, naturally, certain concepts exist in relation to how to approach this problem.

The intellectuals are especially concerned over these questions. Intellectuals are also concerned over other problems. They have been very preoccupied over Vietnam and all those questions, although it must also be said that part of the progressive thought of the world, in the face of its own problems, the problems of Europe in general, the problems of the developed world, the problems of the developed societies, is more concerned with all these questions which are of less concern to the greater part of the world than it is with the problems of the world which lives under imperialist oppression, under neocolonialism and under the exploitation of capitalism in the underdeveloped regions of the world. And for the thousands of millions of human beings, who for all intents and purposes are living without hope under conditions of starvation and extreme want, there are questions in which they are more interested than the problem of whether or not to let their hair grow.

This might be a very controversial issue, but these are not the things that worry people who are faced with the problem of whether they will have the possibility or hope of eating or not.

Thus some welcomed the positive aspects of that change and others were concerned over its negative aspects: some were in favor of the new form arising from that situation and had a certain faith in it, and others had none.

Provisionally, we reached this conclusion: we had no doubt that the political situation in Czechoslovakia was deteriorating and going downhill on its way back to capitalism and that it was inexorably going to fall into the arms of imperialism.

This is very important. I believe that this opinion which we honestly held and still hold is very important in determining our position in relation to these events.

Naturally, the imperialist world enthusiastically welcomed this situation. The imperialist world encouraged it in every way, and without a doubt the imperialists rubbed their hands with glee in thinking about the disaster which, in one way or another, this would constitute for the socialist world.

On many occasions the imperialists have publicly stated what their policy is in relation to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. And in Congress, in the press, they always talk about encouraging the liberal tendencies and even about promoting, of making available, some selective economic aid and of using every means of contributing to creating discontent and opposition to socialism there.

The imperialists are carrying out a campaign, not only in Czechoslovakia, but in all the countries of Eastern Europe, even in the Soviet Union. They are trying in every way to conduct a publicity campaign in favor of the way of life of developed industrial society, in favor of the tastes and the consumer habits of the developed bourgeois societies. Over the radio and through what they call cultural exchange, very subtly they try to awaken among the masses admiration and desire for those tastes and for those consumer habits, understanding full well that these feelings will develop in inverse ratio to the revolutionary sentiments of the masses and the spirit of sacrifice among the masses.

The imperialists make a lot of use of the bourgeois façade, all the luxury of a class society which has greatly developed the art of refinement in consumption and luxury, but under no circumstances can these be the aspirations of the socialist societies or of the peoples who are striving toward communism.

And they exploit -- they do it everywhere -- their kitchen equipment and appliances, their cars, their refrigerators, their laces and their luxury of all kinds. This is a weapon which they constantly use in their magazines, their propaganda.

They have a policy, which they call their policy for Eastern Europe, by virtue of which they manipulate their resources, their trade and things of that nature.

They do not do this with Cuba. Cuba is the victim of incessant persecution in all markets to prevent us from buying, to prevent us from selling, to prevent us from getting a single seed, to prevent us from buying anything. And they implacably carry out this policy against Cuba.

Why? The question must be raised.

They know they do not have the slightest chance of infiltrating our country through these maneuvers. This is known by the imperialists, they are well aware of it. They don't have the slightest chance of using these maneuvers here to break or weaken the revolutionary spirit of the Cuban people.

That is why they wage a constant and implacable war against us, always trying to push us into the worst position. This has been their policy all the time.

It is well known that no type of trade between Cuba and the United States is going on -- to the contrary! -- because, although in their measures they always left in a stipulation about medicine and all that, this has served merely as a fig leaf because not even medicine can be bought. In fact, they have prohibited selling medicines to our country.

The imperialists have obliged us to spend much more money for all the things we have needed. The blockade has made it difficult for us to acquire many of the most essential things that cost us more, and created all those problems we have spoken of on other occasions.

And right here, I wish to make the first important affirmation: we considered that Czechoslovakia was moving toward a counterrevolutionary situation. Toward capitalism and into the arms of imperialism.

So this defines our primary position in relation to the specific fact of the action taken by a group of socialist countries. That is, we consider that it was absolutely necessary, at all cost, in one way or another, to prevent this eventuality from taking place.

Bear with me, because I plan to analyze this in the light of our ideas.

Discussion of the form is not, in the final analysis, the most fundamental factor. The essential point to be accepted, or not accepted, is whether or not the socialist camp could allow a political situation to develop which would lead to the breaking away of a socialist country, to its falling into the arms of imperialism. And our point of view is that it is not permissible and that the socialist camp has a right to prevent this in one way or another. I would like to begin by making it clear that we look upon this fact as the essence of the matter.

Nevertheless, it is not enough to simply accept the fact and nothing more -- that Czechoslovakia was headed toward a counterrevolutionary situation and that

it was necessary to prevent it. It is not enough to simply come to the conclusion that there was no alternative there but to prevent this, and nothing more.

We must analyze the causes and ask what factors made this possible and created the necessity for such a dramatic, drastic and painful measure. What are the factors that created the necessity for a step which unquestionably entailed a violation of legal principles and international norms that, having often served as a shield for the peoples against injustice, are highly esteemed by the world?

Because what cannot be denied here is that the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was violated. To say that it was not would be a fiction, an untruth. And the violation was, in fact, of a flagrant nature.

And I am going to refer to this point, to our concept of sovereignty, to legal principles and political principles.

From a legal point of view, it cannot be justified. This is very clear. In our opinion, the decision concerning Czechoslovakia can only be explained from a political point of view and not from a legal point of view. Not the slightest trace of legality exists. Frankly, none whatever.

What are the circumstances that led to a remedy of this kind, a remedy that places the revolutionary movement the world over in a most difficult situation; a remedy that constitutes a truly traumatic situation for an entire people -- as the present situation in Czechoslovakia is? For this measure means that an entire people must endure the highly disagreeable circumstance of seeing their country occupied by armies of other countries, even though they are armies of socialist countries, a situation in which millions of citizens of a country must today face the tragedy of making a decision between remaining passive in these circumstances -- a fact so reminiscent of episodes of the past -- or of choosing to struggle in consort with pro-Yankee spies and agents, in consort with the enemies of socialism, in consort with the agents of West Germany and all that fascist and reactionary rabble, with all those who, under the cloak of the situation, will try to pass themselves off as patriotic banner bearers of the sovereignty and freedom of Czechoslovakia.

Quite logically this experience and this action constitute a bitter and tragic situation for the people of Czechoslovakia. That is why it is not enough to simply come to the conclusion that it was an inexorable necessity or even an unquestionable obligation, if you like, of

the socialist countries to prevent such eventualities from occurring. We must analyze the causes, the factors and the circumstances that made possible a situation in which, after twenty years of communism in Czechoslovakia, a group of personalities -- whose names, incidentally, do not appear anywhere -- found it necessary to appeal to other countries of the socialist camp to send their armies to prevent the triumph of the counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia and the triumph of the intrigues and conspiracies of the imperialist countries interested in tearing Czechoslovakia away from the community of socialist nations.

Gentlemen, is it conceivable that a situation could occur, under any circumstances, after twenty years of communism in our country, of communist revolution, of socialist revolution, in which a group of honest revolutionaries, in this country, horrified by the prospect of an advance -- or rather a retrogression -- to counterrevolutionary positions and toward imperialism, could find themselves obliged to request the aid of friendly armies to prevent such a retrogression from occurring? What would have happened to the communist consciousness of this people? What would have happened to the revolutionary consciousness of this people? To the dignity of this people? To the revolutionary morale of this people? If such a situation could arise some day, what would be left of all these things which, for us, constitute in essence the revolution?

Of course, in our country nothing like this will ever happen. First of all, because we believe that it is a fundamental duty and responsibility of the leaders of a revolution to avert the development of deformations capable of producing such circumstances.

And secondly, gentlemen, for an unquestionably practical reason. Not only for a basic moral reason -- because we would have to ask ourselves if it was worth the effort if a revolution, after twenty years, had to resort to such procedures in order to survive -- but also for this very simple practical reason: to whom could the top leaders of this country direct a request that armies be sent? Because the only armies in our vicinity are the Yankee army and the armies of the puppets allied to the Yankee imperialists, and we're too isolated in this part of the world for there ever to exist even the remotest possibility of asking for help from allied armies in order to save this revolution. And it must be said that I know of no one capable of enduring such shame even if he had the need and the possibility of doing so.

What kind of communists would we be and what kind of communist revolution would this be, if, at the end of twenty years, we were to find ourselves forced to do such a thing in order to save it?

Whenever we have thought of outside help, the only idea that has ever come into our minds was that of outside help to fight against imperialist troops and against imperialist armies.

I am analyzing these circumstances simply because I know that, logically, our people must be concerned over the clarification of this problem.

We cannot conceive of such things within the revolution.

I do not believe that justification can be found in the appeal made by the top personalities; the only justification is the simple political fact that Czechoslovakia was moving toward a counterrevolutionary situation and that this seriously affected the entire socialist community.

And, beyond this, no "fig leaves" of any kind are necessary. It is a straightforward political fact, with all its consequences and all its far-reaching implications.

But we have been asking ourselves if it is enough to simply recognize this fact and nothing more or if it is an elementary obligation to seek out all of the political consequences of this extremely bitter experience.

And, we repeat, how were these circumstances possible? An analysis of the factors involved must be undertaken. And it behooves the Communist movement as an unavoidable duty to undertake a profound study of the causes that gave rise to such a situation which is inconceivable to us, the Cuban revolutionaries, a situation which is impossible for us, the Cuban revolutionaries, who, obliged to carry out our revolution here, ninety miles from the imperialists, know that we cannot permit ourselves to fall into such a situation, because it would mean the end, pure and simple, of the revolution and our finding ourselves in the worst condition of slavery at the hands of our implacable enemies.

Obviously, this is not the time to make or pretend to make that profound analysis. But we can cite some facts and

ideas. Bureaucratic methods in the leadership of the country, lack of contact with the masses -- a decisive question for every true revolutionary movement -- neglect of communist ideals. And what do we mean by neglect of communist ideals? We mean forgetting that men in a class society, the exploited in a class society, the enslaved, struggle for a whole series of ideals, and when they speak of socialism and communism they are not only speaking of a society where exploitation does actually disappear and the poverty resulting from that exploitation disappears, but they are speaking also of all those beautiful aspirations that constitute the communist ideal of a classless society, a society free from selfishness, a society in which man is no longer a miserable slave to money, in which society no longer works for personal gain, and all of society begins to work for the satisfaction of all needs and for the establishment among men of the rule of justice, fraternity, equality and all those ideals of human society and of the peoples who have always aspired to achieving these objectives. And these objectives are possible, as we have explained on other occasions, as we explained amply last July 26.

In future stages it will be necessary for our revolutionary people to go deeply into the concepts of what they understand by a communist society. The ideal of the communist society cannot, under any circumstances, be the ideal of a bourgeois capitalist consumer society.

The communist ideal cannot, for a single moment, exist without internationalism. Those who struggle for communism in any country in the world can never forget the rest of the world. They can never forget the suffering, underdevelopment, poverty, ignorance and exploitation that exist in a part of the world or how much poverty and destitution have accumulated there. They can never forget, for a single moment, the needs of that part of the world, and we believe that it is impossible to instill into the masses a truly internationalist outlook, a truly communist outlook, if they are allowed to forget the realities of the world; the dangers of confrontation with imperialism which these realities entail and the dangers of growing soft when the people are made to forget these real problems and when the attempt is made to move the masses through material incentives and the promises of more consumer goods alone.

[To be continued.]

DEMOCRATS SCORE HISTORIC FIRST WITH DECOR AT CONVENTION

Credit for the perfect décor provided for the Democratic National Convention in Chicago has been ascribed to no one less than President Johnson himself. But perhaps a good share of the credit should go to Mayor Richard J. ("Shoot-to-Kill") Daley, whose years of training in Chicago politics made him the obvious choice to serve as host to the Democratic machine in this year of unprecedented election hazards.

The preparations included mobilization of Chicago's entire 11,900-man police force. They were ordered to work twelve-hour shifts throughout the week. This huge pack of uniformed bulldogs was beefed up with 6,000 national guardsmen, ordered to serve "round-the-clock." And just in case these forces proved insufficient, 6,000 regular army troops were put on standby.

Mayor Daley, or perhaps Johnson himself, did not forget the need to provide accommodations for the "demonstrators" who might turn up at the convention with ideas about reforming the party or swerving it away from its war policies. Space was reserved in Chicago's jails to hold 10,000 prisoners.

No details were overlooked. "Two thousand Chicago police have been assigned to duty on the convention hall grounds at all times, along with multitudinous Secret Service agents, FBI men and 200 firemen who number a good many bomb experts among them," reported Newsweek.

"Air Force RF-4 Phantom II photo reconnaissance planes," continued the same source, "have been flying over the city preparing a giant aerial map which now hangs in the Army's command post on the second floor of the Pentagon, from which divisions stationed in Colorado, Texas, and North Carolina could all be ordered into instant action."

The planning was carried out with all the efficiency and know-how for which America has justly become famed. Tanks and machine guns were assembled at armories throughout the city. Bullet-proof panels were installed at the entrance to the hall. A chain-link fence, topped with a triple strand of barbed wire, was stretched around most of the hall and the nearby parking lot.

Inside the hall itself, security guards armed with rifles, binoculars and walkie-talkies were assigned to stalk a catwalk stretching 95 feet above the floor of the convention.

Scores of firemen, hoses in hand, were ordered to stand by during the momentous work of checking credentials, writ-



MAYOR RICHARD J. ("SHOOT-TO-KILL") DALEY

ing a platform and screening out challengers to the machine's choice of who to run against Nixon.

A touch that would occur, perhaps, to only a Chicago mayor, or a great president like Johnson, was the sealing of all manhole covers in the area with tar, thus preventing any demonstrators from popping up out of the sewers.

Elaborate as all this may seem, we have not yet come to the end of the preparations for this historic Democratic convention. Television stations were prohibited from setting up cameras on streets and rooftops, or even in hotel windows in the convention area. The chieftains of the Democratic machine didn't want any scenes on American television screens of cops clubbing down demonstrators.

Further to keep the enemy at bay,

the main street leading to the site was ordered closed to all traffic during the week. "Checkpoints as complex as those along the Berlin Wall have been set up to screen out gate-crashers and troublemakers," said the New York Post.

Newsweek put it still more graphically: "The convention site itself was, in fact, beginning to take on an eerie resemblance to the redoubt at Khe Sanh."

In addition to the military details, other measures were instituted to bolster the defenses of the Democratic party's Chicago redoubt.

Rally and march permits were denied to both the National Mobilization Committee and the Coalition for an Open Convention, an organization that wants McCarthy as presidential candidate of the Democratic party. This move was intended to provide a legal cover for the most brutal police repression of any projected demonstrations no matter how peacefully intended.

Besides this, Daley escalated the orders issued last April to his cops to "shoot to kill" at the sight of "arsonists" and to "shoot to maim" at the sight of "looters."

National guardsmen were given orders to "shoot to kill" both arsonists and looters, or anyone committing a "forcible felony," a classification that includes something as vague as "assaulting" a member of the police or national guard.

Guardsmen were also authorized to use "deadly force" to "prevent the escape" of anyone believed by them to have committed a "forcible felony."

The enemy against whom the Democratic high command took these measures consisted largely of dissidents within the party itself or in its orbit, who hoped that by imaginative demonstrations they could break through to the better nature of the Democratic ward heelers and political bosses and thus get them to shift on Vietnam. Committed to the two-party system, the political horizon of most of the would-be demonstrators did not go beyond wishing that both the Republicans and Democrats would put up a more palatable choice for the White House than Nixon and Humphrey.

Key radical organizations like the Students for a Democratic Society, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and the Socialist Workers party opposed demonstrating at the Demo-

cratic shindig, holding that it could be misinterpreted as acceptance of the two-party system and the hopeless illusion that it can be reformed.

The defenders of the besieged convention proved to have been well briefed on their tasks and duties. On August 23 they saw their first action. Four demonstrators -- three young women and a bearded youth -- struck at the local offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. The team painted "C.I.A." and an obscene phrase on the door in dribbly red paint.

The office, Room 2660 in the Federal Building, was listed under the name of "Mr. Simpson." It had been located by The Rat, a New York underground newspaper.

The demonstrators brought a group of newsmen to see their accomplishment. They were met by United States marshals and herded into a corner. When the young people demanded to know why they were being held, the marshals said they were acting "on orders."

A United States assistant attorney later ordered the marshals to let the demonstrators go free.

In another part of Chicago the same day, seven Yippies and a pig they planned to run for president were arrested.

The Yippies had gathered for a nomination ceremony in the downtown Civic Center Plaza. They carried signs reading "Vote Pig in '68" and "Live High on the Hog." As the heavily jeweled candidate, who might pass for Mayor Daley's twin, was brought up in a battered station wagon, the cops moved in.

One of the Yippie delegates nevertheless managed to get in at least part of a nominating speech. He said that the distinguished pig was an ideal candidate because he "was born in Montana, is 35 years old, studied law by candlelight for three years and walked five miles through the snow to school, plus the fact that he is affiliated with the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, in addition to being a Jew."

The seven rank-and-file Yippies were charged with disorderly conduct and released on \$25 bail.

The fate of the pig was not reported. Perhaps the police decided to hold the subversive Yippie candidate in "protective custody" pending the outcome of the Democratic convention.

NEWSPAPER STRIKE MARKS RISING MILITANCY OF WORKERS IN INDIA

By Kailas Chandra

Bombay

More than 15,000 employees of twenty-one major "big business" newspapers, including journalists, in the three metropolitan cities of Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta, have been on an indefinite strike since July 23. They are demanding full implementation of the recommendations of two separate wage boards set up by the central government to fix wage scales for journalist and nonjournalist employees in the industry.

The strike marks a significant development in the Indian trade-union movement, coming as it does in the midst of a new revival of militancy in the working-class movement after a prolonged period of lull.

All sections of the trade-union movement -- including various central trade-union organisations as well as national federations of central government and state government employees, railwaymen, bank and insurance employees -- have not only demonstrated their solidarity with striking newspapermen but have expressed their preparedness (despite political differences among their leaderships) to launch a nationwide strike action in support of the strike should it continue.

For one thing, this is the first national strike in any industry since 1948, i.e., since independence. Significantly enough the journalists, hitherto considered as the "brain trust" of the "official" bourgeois society, are participating in it, lending the struggle a peculiar "prestige." It heralds a new phase of common strike action between the industrial workers and "white-collared" wage earners.

The present strike affects only big newspapers with an annual gross revenue of Rs.50 lakhs [US\$660,500] and above, owned by big industrial houses -- Statesman, owned by the Tatas; the Hindustan Times of the Birlas; the Indian Express of the Goenkas; the Free Press Journal owned by the Karnanis, etc.

This is the third round of strike struggle by newspaper employees during the last six months. There was a day's nationwide strike in the entire newspaper industry covering also news agencies and smaller newspapers in state and district capitals on January 24 of this year as a warning. The token strike was a tremendous success with almost all of 40,000 employees participating.

When the newspaper proprietors

still refused to recognise the validity of wage-board recommendations, the two organisations of the newspaper employees -- the Indian Federation of Working Journalists (IFWJ) and the All India Newspaper Employees Federations (AINEF) -- launched an indefinite strike in the industry on April 23.

As the second strike commenced, proprietors represented by the Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society (IENS) initiated negotiations with the employees organisations through the mediation of the Central Labour Minister Jaisukhlal Hathi at New Delhi. A partial settlement was reached on the first day of the strike, with employees agreeing to implement 70 percent of the benefits recommended by the wage boards and to continue negotiations to settle other issues.

The strike was called off immediately in most centres, although in some provincial towns it continued for several days because of the refusal of the employers to recognise the accord reached in New Delhi.

As negotiations commenced between the employers and the employees organisations, the IENS representing the employers decided to go back on its own commitments on the plea that its agreement was "recommendatory" and not binding on individual proprietors.

Negotiations lasted for three months but did not yield any results. So the national executives of the AINEF and the IFWJ, which met at Bangalore on June 20-21, decided to launch the third round of strike action from July 23. This time, for tactical reasons, the strike call did not cover smaller newspapers in state capitals and district towns with annual revenue of less than 50 lakhs. Several of these smaller newspapers have implemented the wage-board recommendations.

The issue involved in the strike has a general appeal in the entire trade-union movement. The newspaper industry has grown rapidly since 1948. Although big industrial houses acquired control of national dailies, they paid scant respect to labour legislation.

Working conditions in the industry were chaotic. First to organise themselves as a professional-cum-trade-union organisation were the journalists. The IFWJ was founded in 1952. To assuage the feelings of the journalists, being a vocal section of the community, the central government appointed a press commission

in 1954 to inquire into the state of affairs in the newspaper industry.

One of its recommendations was the creation of a statutory wage board to determine the working conditions of journalists, who were meanwhile defined as workmen under a special legislative enactment. A statutory wage board was soon set up, but when it announced recommendations fixing minimum pay scales, etc., in 1960, the proprietors challenged its verdict in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court invalidated the wage award on some technical constitutional ground. The award was eventually enforced through an executive order of the government in a truncated form. A second wage board was set up in 1963 to rationalise the pay scales of journalists. This led to an agitation by nonjournalist employees, who got organised meanwhile, to have a wage-fixing authority set up for them also. Another nonstatutory wage board for nonjournalists was also constituted.

The two wage boards, presided over by a common high court judge and with representatives of both the employers and employees participating, sat for four years and finally evolved two separate wage awards, toward the middle of 1967.

The central government, which screened the awards, issued orders for their immediate implementation after scaling down the benefits awarded to the employees, in order to please the newspaper proprietors. But the employers promptly challenged the statutory award for journalists in the Supreme Court, while deciding to ignore the nonstatutory award for nonjournalist employees in the industry.

The main demand of the strikers has been that the wage awards to which the newspaper proprietors were a party should be fully implemented at least by big papers which have amassed huge profits during the last ten to fifteen years, and whose paying capacity is beyond dispute.

The strike also has raised another important problem. As a clever device to avert strikes in industrial establishments, in the interest of capitalist owners, the central government has appointed wage boards to fix pay scales in several major industries such as textiles, cement, engineering, steel, mining, plantations, etc., with joint participation of employers and employees.

Wherever the recommendations of the wage boards have been published, the big industrial houses have shown an attitude of defying them, taking shelter under the cover of growing economic crisis.

Thus, newspaper employees are fighting a battle on behalf of the entire working class, covered by different wage boards. This also explains the big solidarity action in support of the newspapermen's strike.

Different sections of the working class in India are moving into strike action for their own economic demands. Recently there was a strike of railway firemen in Madras, paralysing the movement of railways in the southern states. The Confederation of Central Government Employees Unions, representing more than three million employees, including one million railwaymen, has decided to go on a nationwide day's token strike on September 19, demanding fixation of a "need-based wage" for them.

There is every possibility of a nationwide general strike taking place on that day in sympathy with the central government workers. Employees of various state governments numbering about four million have also threatened to join the strike.

More than 50,000 employees of the nationalised Life Insurance Corporation are planning a nationwide strike to protest the installation of automatic computers in LIC offices, creating the prospect of large-scale unemployment without any avenues of alternate employment.

The bank employees, numbering about 150,000, went on a four-hour lighting strike recently protesting new legislation being introduced in parliament aimed at curbing their trade-union rights -- in the name of introducing social control over banking (which in effect means to regulate private banking in the interest of the capitalist class).

The trade-union movement has remained divided for some years because of the existence of several central trade-union organisations affiliated to different political parties. These range from the extreme right, like the Jan Sangh, to the extreme left. But the new strike wave is bringing the different sections of the working class closer in common action against the capitalist class and the bourgeois state.

The opportunist leaderships of traditional left parties -- the Praja Socialist party, Samyukta Socialist party, Communist party of India, etc. -- who nominally head a large number of trade unions in the city find themselves isolated from the militant current of the working-class movement. A new leadership is emerging from among the ranks of the fighting workers in every state.

In recent months, committees of joint action representing different trade

unions have been set up in cities like Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta and Madras. Attempts are being made to explore the possibilities of organising wider action on common demands of workers.

In fact, at recent workers' rallies held in Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta, calls for general strikes in support of the striking newspaper employees were given. The bourgeois press and sections of the working-class movement are discussing the prospects of a French situation being enacted in India, although on a different level.

Indeed, the newspaper strike is serving as a new catalytic agent in the Indian working-class movement. So far it has not evoked any repressive action from the bourgeois state which perhaps has its own political reasons to show restraint in dealing with a strike involving journalists. (One journalist, supposed to be a leftist, has been arrested and detained

in Calcutta. Some newspapermen arrested in New Delhi and Bombay for technical offences have been released on bail.)

The usual attempt by official circles and certain reactionary journals to "discredit" the strike as "communist-inspired" has been made to break the solidarity of the striking workers. The known political personalities among the strike leaders are S.Y. Kolhatkar, president of the AINEF, belonging to the Communist party of India (Marxists); and S.B. Kolpe, secretary-general of the IFWJ, a senior journalist and a leading member of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers party.

Nevertheless, barring the Swatantra party and Jan Sangh, all other parties in both houses of parliament -- including several Congress MP's -- openly justified the strike and blamed the Congress government for succumbing to the pressure of "monopoly interests" controlling the big newspapers.

FRENCH CP DISAPPROVES SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The following are excerpts from the resolution of the Central Committee of the French Communist party on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. This resolution was adopted after four and one-half hours of debate on August 22. Roughly the second half is published below. The preceding section expresses the French Communist party's opinion that "dangerous antisocialist forces" were at work in Czechoslovakia.]

* * *

As it has ceaselessly reiterated, our party holds that problems arising among the Communist parties must be examined and resolved through fraternal discussions in bilateral and multilateral meetings. It considers that such problems must be examined and resolved respecting equally the sovereignty of every country, the free self-determination of every party, and the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

It [the French Communist party] is dedicated to the principle that every Communist party must determine its own policy, types of action, and methods of struggle on the basis of Marxism-Leninism with full independence, taking into account at once the concrete conditions in which it conducts its fight, the interests of its working class and people, and the interests of the world democratic and revolutionary movement.

It therefore declares its opposition to all interference in the internal affairs of a sister party.

Based on these principles defined by the declaration of the eighty Communist and workers parties in 1960, the French Communist party took a series of initiatives: It had talks with the leaders of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia; it proposed a meeting of the European Communist and workers parties. It clearly informed the interested parties of its opposition to any outside military intervention.

For this reason, the Central Committee, adopting the August 21 declaration of the Political Bureau, expresses its disapproval of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. It was the responsibility of the Czechoslovak Communist party, taking into account its international obligations, to find within itself, in the Czechoslovak working class and people, in the support of the socialist countries, and of all the brother parties the forces necessary to safeguard and advance socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The French Communist party will not slacken its efforts to uphold the unity of the international Communist movement or to strengthen its ties of solidarity and cooperation with all the Communist and workers parties, particularly the ties of fraternal friendship which have always bound it to the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

At the same time the French Communist party will resolutely pursue its struggle for the national policy of peace, independence, democracy, and socialism whose objectives have been defined by its congresses -- particularly its Eighteenth Congress.

EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN BOLIVIA

By Livio Maitan

As was to be expected, Che's Bolivian diary is a document of very great value which will be an inexhaustible subject for study and reflection.

It is first of all a document of historical interest. All those who want to study the vicissitudes of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America will have to draw on this source; it provides the most valuable information both on the technical preparation and military operations of one of the most courageous undertakings in the history of the continent as well as on the elements, the men, and the implications involved in the conflicts shaking the anti-imperialist revolutionary movement.

It is also a gripping document for its human value, all the more remarkable since the author did not conceive it as a piece of literature but as an aid in his work. Che Guevara paints a vivid and totally realistic portrait of his comrades in struggle, whom he observes on a day-to-day basis with a penetrating eye and without the least idealization. He does not hide their faults or their weaknesses, nor even their petty side. That is why his guerrillas appear before our eyes as real men whose courage and devotion spontaneously compel our admiration.

No reader will ever forget this community of fighters of different nationalities(1), who worked with the perspective of armed struggle on a multinational scale. They did not feel themselves bound by frontiers or national sovereignty. How different they were from the miserable opportunists of the Monje clique(2), of whom Fidel justly wrote that their level of internationalism would never surpass that of the Indian tribes in the epoch of the Spanish conquest!

And finally this book is a document of unquestionable political importance which enables us to comprehend better certain of Che's conceptions and perspectives. It is also a document posing the fundamental problems of the revolution in Bolivia in very clear terms. It is this aspect, moreover, that will arouse most interest at this time, for quite obvious reasons.

(1) Besides Bolivians there were Peruvians, Argentinians, and Cubans.

(2) The secretary of the Bolivian Communist party.

The publication of Che's diary will probably have the same consequences as his death: it will give rise to polemics questioning not only this or that tactical or technical detail but an entire revolutionary strategy. It is inevitable that a new barrage will be opened up by the same people who launched a counterattack last October, the Communist parties of Latin America and their patrons in the pro-Soviet front. In fact, the most directly interested, the CP of Monje, has already taken a position; by its own statements it has confirmed the justice of Fidel's and Che's criticisms. These entrenched opportunists will not hesitate to resort to arbitrary interpretations and dishonest extrapolations to show that Che's endeavor was only an adventure condemned to failure and that OLAS's entire strategy has been shown to be incorrect.

The assessment of revolutionists, however, is that what is said in the diary does not at all change the terms of the problem as it was posed immediately after the destruction of Che's nucleus. The essential questions posed at that time were: Was Che's action an artificial attempt to impose a "Cuba" schema on Bolivia? Did the objective situation in the country justify the commencement of armed struggle? Did the guerrilla movement have favorable repercussions among the masses? The questions are the same today and the Bolivian revolutionists give the same answers.

They recall that Bolivia was shaken for several years by an extremely grave economic, social, and political crisis, that the regime was incapable of finding solutions of any viability whatever, that it could only maintain itself by appealing to imperialism and by systematic violence, that the broad worker, petty-bourgeois, urban, and even peasant masses had been driven to desperation and seized every opportunity to express their hatred of the ruling military and imperialist clique.

Therefore, even if the initiative came from outside, the guerrilla struggle was the logical culmination of the political and social situation in the country and could not be characterized as an adventure except by opportunists hostile to the armed struggle(3). The unleashing of

(3) For an analysis of the Bolivian situation in 1967, see the documents and articles published by World Outlook [now Intercontinental Press], especially the documents of the Bolivian POR [Partido Obrero

the guerrilla struggle, moreover, had immediate repercussions, deepening the political crisis on all levels and unleashing a wave of sympathy and solidarity especially in the mine regions and among the radicalized petty bourgeoisie. (I exclude here the international repercussions about which some remarks could be made.)

As for the balance sheet which emerges from the diary, it is clear that in spite of all the difficulties and the very limited duration of the experience, Che's nucleus was able to win far from negligible military successes, as Fidel does not fail to stress in his preface. Fidel also stresses another gain of the guerrilla movement, that is the training of a number, though small, of cadres who have already demonstrated their qualities. Furthermore, incipiently favorable reactions sometimes developed among peasant nuclei, which on some occasions provided concrete aid.(4) But most of all, in spite of the very serious lack of information, the impact which the opening of the struggle had in the country did not escape Che. On June 13, he noted the catalytic effect of the guerrilla movement and on July 14, the breakup of the Barrientos government.(5)

The events which have followed the defeat of the guerrillas have also, in the last analysis, confirmed Guevara's fundamental option. In spite of his military success, Barrientos has not succeeded in resolving any of the regime's problems, and the economic, social, and political crisis persists(6). Reports ar-

Revolucionario -- Revolutionary Workers party -- the Bolivian section of the Fourth International] published in July 1967 (July 14, p. 658), the article "The Struggle Continues in Bolivia" (November 10, p. 901), and the article "In Reply to the Bolivian CP" (December 8, p. 1014). In one of the POR documents, it says for example: "The guerrilla movement emerged in Bolivia as the natural culmination of the country's internal political development."

(4) See for example the remarks in Fidel's preface, the analysis at the end of the month of May, a piece of news noted on July 3, the analysis of the month of July, where Che makes the following remark: "The legend of the guerrilla is acquiring continental dimensions; Onganía closes the border and Peru takes precautions."

(5) Fidel draws attention to these notes, adding that all this shows how real the possibilities were for success.

(6) The case of Arguedas, the minister of the interior who announced that he trans-

iving from militants forced to operate in the strictest secrecy reveal that the miners, despite the raging repression, have not given up the struggle, impelled forward as they are by literally tragic material needs, and that petty-bourgeois layers have also mobilized in economic clashes with the government (as for the students, they did not hesitate to express their solidarity with Che and the guerrilla movement even right in the wake of its defeat). Significant episodes have shown, moreover, that Che's legend has spread even among the peasant strata. Courageous demonstrations have occurred on several occasions. Finally, the demonstrations which took place in a whole series of cities on May 1 of this year have again confirmed the combative spirit of the masses and the enormous prestige of Che and the Cuban revolution.(7)

This is why the Bolivian revolutionists not only defend the concepts which inspired Che's action against opportunists of all stripes but they also consider that the perspective of new armed clashes in Bolivia remains fundamental.

Given the economic and social situation within the country, the capitalist regime -- whether it is led by Barrientos or any of his possible successors -- will only be able to survive through violence of the most systematic sort. This implies that more or less legal preparatory and organizational work will be impossible for the workers and peasants movement. And, in the present context, this also excludes any perspective of the struggle taking the form of an urban insurrection at the outset. The explosive contradictions remain in the country and dramatic conflicts are still possible.

In fact, we must start from the reality that a civil war situation exists in Bolivia. All actions by the revolutionary movement must strive to achieve a dual objective: to deal hard blows against the adversary by raising the level of combativity and of political consciousness of the masses, or at least broad sectors of the masses, and at the same time to avoid exposing the revolutionary movement itself to counterattacks and reprisals which could destroy precious work and cause very painful losses.

This means, more concretely, that the method of guerrilla warfare beginning in the rural areas is still the correct

mitted Che's diary to the Cuban leadership, is a symptom of this breakdown of the regime.

(7) See in this regard the report "New Revolutionary Ferment in Bolivia" published by Intercontinental Press, June 10, p. 543.

method. Once guerrilla warfare is unleashed, even under conditions which are in several ways less favorable than was the case last year, the possibilities for political and military initiatives will multiply very rapidly.

It is on this terrain, taking as the point of departure Che's analysis and reports (which coincide moreover almost entirely with the reports and analyses of the revolutionary Marxists in Bolivia), that urgent questions arise which we must seek to answer. There is no question -- that goes without saying -- of wanting or seeking to provoke academic discussions, or still less giving grist to the mill of the opponents of revolutionary strategy in Latin America. But we must understand the need of rearming the Bolivian movement on the basis of the crucial guerrilla warfare experience of 1967. Resolute defense of this fundamental strategic option does not automatically entail a positive assessment of every tactical option and particular policy pursuant to it.

For his part, Fidel speaks in his preface of an "incredible series of negative factors." In fact, the prolonged separation of a group of guerrillas -- which unfortunately proved to be an irretrievable one -- the state of Che's health as well as the discovery of the Loyola Guzman(8) network at a critical moment by the repressive forces weighed in the balance very negatively. And it must be taken into account that all this occurred at a stage when the initial nucleus still had to consolidate itself. Nonetheless, other questions arise.

First: On the basis of the experience gained, can the choice of the area for the initial operations be considered correct, from a geographical and above all political and social point of view? I am not forgetting that the needs of security necessarily get priority in the first phase. However, the diary reveals that the knowledge of the terrain on the part of the Bolivian fighters themselves was totally inadequate and their maps often proved to be incorrect. As for the social and political aspect, it is significant that, according to the reports of the survivors cited by Fidel, the guerrillas decided shortly before their defeat to move to a politically more advanced area. The problem of this shift in the zone of operations is posed precisely in the final analysis in the diary.(9)

(8) A guerrilla liaison agent murdered by the Bolivian police.

(9) The preface and analysis of the month of September, where Che writes: "The most important tasks are to escape and look for more propitious zones." As an example

Second: Did the choice of the political forces which were to support the guerrilla struggle prove correct? The diary confirms the fact that the initial nucleus was based essentially on militants who had been and in part still were linked to the Communist party (to its pro-Soviet tendency following the pro-Chinese split). The aid of the CP or certain groups within it was relied on above all to broaden the original nucleus and create what could be called the infrastructure of the guerrilla movement. I am by no means unaware of the enormous difficulties Guevara had to overcome when this undertaking entered into the phase of concrete execution. And the choice of forces with which he could collaborate was necessarily limited -- all the more because he had to confine himself to the framework of certain orientations adopted by the Cuban leadership at the time of the Tricontinental Congress (violent criticism of a part of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, an attack on the Trotskyist movement).

In any case, this choice had a certain number of repercussions. For a time at least, Che was compelled to accept political compromises which hampered his work and to lose precious time in negotiations which did not (because it could not be otherwise) lead to anything fruitful. What is worse is that even after the break with Monje the CP could still interfere with the urban contact and support network, engaging in obstructive and sabotaging maneuvers(10). Though of course Guevara expressed critical judgments of the CP and its leaders on several occasions, even months after the Monje affair he still evoked the perspective of collab-

of the use CP opportunists have made of the diary, in a revoltingly hypocritical article, l'Unità, the organ of the Italian CP, gave this distorted quotation: "The most important task is to get out." The words immediately following were left out. This is a base falsification attempting to show that Guevara himself no longer had any hope.

(10) In his analysis of the month of December, Guevara says explicitly that the break with Monje freed him from certain political compromises. On November 27 he gives an example implicitly of what sort of compromises could have been involved. Che stresses the difficulty presented by "internationalizing the struggle without having taken Estanislao into consideration" (Estanislao was the surname given to the secretary of the Bolivian CP). On the CP's sabotage, see the preface and the note for January 21 where it is written for example that the secretary of the Bolivian CP "spoke to three who came from Cuba and persuaded them not to enter the guerrilla."

oration with the party(11).

Among the other political forces in Bolivia, the guerrilla movement could rely on the support of Moises Guevara's group which had broken with both the pro-Soviet CP and the pro-Chinese CP. The results of this collaboration were not great. Moises Guevara fell heroically in combat but Che's assessment of his group seems negative.

Finally, the diary twice mentions Lechin, the former leader of the miners and lieutenant of Paz Estenssoro. Lechin, however, did not go any further than a vague expression of sympathy for the guerrilla movement, as moreover should have been expected of a man who had already given so many proofs of his centrist and profoundly opportunist character(12).

Third: Guevara explains many times that the number of guerrillas was very limited, that the nucleus was isolated, and that liaison with the cities was lacking. The need to enlarge the nucleus is constantly stressed as an essential condition for exploiting the favorable situation which was ripening(13).

An operation such as Guevara conceived, in a specific context, could only begin with a very small number of fighters. But was the almost complete isolation of this nucleus inevitable? Was the prolonged breakoff of all liaison with

(11) See on this subject the analysis for the month of May. It must be pointed out specifically that some of the Bolivians were more pessimistic from the outset about the attitude the CP leaders might take (cf. the note for November 27).

(12) This detail should be stressed: even before being totally cut off from the cities, Guevara makes no mention of the repression unleashed as early as the beginning of 1967 against many Bolivian revolutionary cadres and leaders, nor of the measures which the government took against the workers organizations in connection with the development of the guerrilla movement (however, certain militants were explicitly accused of having taken part in the preparation of the operations). Furthermore, he seems unaware of all the positions taken in sympathy with the guerrilla movement and all the demonstrations of support for it. Knowledge of these would have enabled him to draw up a more complete general balance sheet.

(13) See in particular the analysis for the month of June and the note for July 14 where Che makes this remark: "The government is disintegrating rapidly; it is too bad that we do not have 100 more men at this moment." See also the analysis for the months of July and August.

the towns inevitable? Was it objectively impossible to recruit a few dozen additional fighters in time?

The Bolivian revolutionists who know the conditions in their country and have pondered over the 1967 experience give a negative answer. Bolivia has a long and still vital revolutionary tradition. There was a situation of acute social and political crisis impelling the miners yet again into struggle despite the ferocious repression. The commencement of guerrilla warfare had gotten an immediate and very considerable response.

In these conditions, there was no inexorable fate preventing an enlargement, even at a relatively rapid pace, of the guerrilla nucleus or the maintenance of the necessary liaison. No fate prevented the guerrilla nucleus from breaking out of isolation, or even creating new "focos" in a short space of time which would have forced the adversary to disperse his forces. Far from being inevitable, the negative conditions which led in the last analysis to the temporary liquidation of the armed struggle were the result of the direct or indirect machinations of the CP.

I do not minimize the consequences of blows like the fall of Loyola and his network, the circumstances of which moreover should be examined(14). But fundamentally what happened was the result of the fact that the infrastructure which was supposed to provide support and reinforcements for the fighting nucleus remained in the hands of men who were still tied to the CP and its official center, or who, even when these ties were broken, blocked the application of the policy of revolutionary unity which Guevara advocated(15).

On the basis of the diary, Fidel

(14) The possibility of betrayal cannot be excluded. But there was also the problem of insufficient assimilation of the methods of underground struggle. Recriminations on carelessness and irresponsibility recur in the diary like a leitmotiv. This is a subject for the Latin-American revolutionary militants to ponder, who often have a tendency to underestimate the importance of observing rules of security.

(15) See his report for January 1. He wrote there: "In the afternoon, I brought everyone together and explained Monje's attitude to them, announcing that we would unite with all those who wanted to make the revolution." Everything that is written in the diary on the breakoff of liaison, particularly in the final phase, confirms that Guevara was completely uninformed of certain obstructive and sabotaging maneuvers.

cites an example of sabotage by Monje. Unfortunately this was by no means an exceptional case. In fact, the men Guevara needed, and whom he called for in his diary, existed and asked nothing more than to take part in the struggle: they were blocked by saboteurs and irresponsible sectarians. That is a tragic fact because it means that an objective possibility to save the guerrilla movement and perhaps even Guevara personally was criminally wasted.

It is possible that others would give a different answer to the questions I have raised. A confrontation of views -- on the basis of course of an acceptance of the fundamental strategy of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare -- would be very profitable, even indispensable. The struggle will begin again one day in Bolivia and a clarity of perspectives is a condition sine qua non for its success.

If the general conditions in the country undergo no substantial change -- which is by far the most likely possibility -- the essential perspective remains that of guerrilla warfare organized in the rural areas and launched from there. However, a broader and better ar-

ticulated strategy than that applied in 1967 is objectively possible.

In the countryside itself, it is possible to solve the crucial problem of linking up with the peasants and achieving the direct participation in the armed struggle of indigenous elements other than by sporadic and improvised individual attempts. Trained peasant militants and cadres still exist in the country despite the repression and the movement's relative stagnation. In the mining centers, special forms of armed struggle could be adopted with the commencement of a new upsurge. In the most important cities, finally, it will be possible to organize spectacular actions capable of demoralizing the adversary and his supporters and thus creating conditions psychologically more favorable to an extension of the struggles and for gaining support for the guerrilla nuclei.

It does without saying that a non-exclusionist policy of unity of all revolutionary forces willing to fight is one of the conditions for a victorious outcome of the future struggles.

July 17, 1968

LUIGI LONGO BACKS FRENCH CP CRITICISM OF MOSCOW

Luigi Longo, the general secretary of the Italian Communist party, was in Moscow at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Returning to Rome immediately after the announcement of the Soviet action, he stopped in Paris on August 21 to meet with Waldeck Rochet, the secretary of the French Communist party. After talking for one hour with the French CP leader, Longo made the following declaration to the press:

"In my meeting with Comrade Waldeck Rochet and other French Communist party leaders, I was able to note substantial areas of agreement between the two parties' views and assessments of the recent events in Czechoslovakia.

"This agreement emerges moreover from the communiqués issued by the political bureaus of each of our parties. In my opinion, our positions are based on a strong feeling of internationalism, on recognition of every party's independence, and on respect for the independence of all nations.

"Our meeting took place in a spirit of close collaboration between the Italian Communist party and the French Communist party. It was in that spirit, moreover, that a few weeks ago we immediately supported the proposal which the French comrades made for a meeting of the European

Communist parties.

"In conclusion, I think that we had a very useful, although brief, exchange of opinions, and I intend to remain in contact with the comrades in the French Communist party.

"For the moment, no common or joint initiative is foreseen."

Longo expanded on the above statement in answering the questions of journalists on his arrival in Rome. He declared: "I repeated frankly to the Soviet leaders that it was essential to stand behind the process of democratic development going on in Czechoslovakia. In Paris, together with the Communist party, we have for the moment excluded the proposal for a meeting of European Communist parties which had previously been envisaged."

Finally, pressed by reporters, Longo admitted that there had not been total agreement between him and Waldeck Rochet. "It is obvious that our views could not fully converge, given the different situations of our two parties. However, the important thing is that we agree on the essentials."

As to the reaction of the Soviet people to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Longo said everything seemed calm.

DEFEND THE RIGHT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
WORKERS AND PEASANTS TO SELF-DETERMINATION!

[The following is the text of a declaration issued August 1 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, three weeks before the Kremlin invaded Czechoslovakia.]

* * *

The pressure which the Kremlin and its agents have been escalating against the leading bodies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has rarely been surpassed in brutality. The insults and open threats carried by the press and radio; the ceaseless intimidation leveled by the leading spokesmen of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, Poland and the German Democratic Republic; blackmail through the threat of an economic blockade; the ban on tourism from Poland and the German Democratic Republic; the continuation of military maneuvers in Czechoslovakia itself and along its borders -- all this is aimed at compelling the present leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist party to capitulate.

The excuses advanced by the Kremlin to justify this pressure are obviously as baseless as they are cynical. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is faced with no imminent threat of "imperialist infiltration" or "aggression." There are fewer West German tourists in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic than in such workers states as Rumania and Bulgaria. There are fewer American visitors than in the Soviet Union itself.

Imperialism, caught in the wasp nest of the Vietnam war, has no intention of creating a second front in Central Europe. On the contrary, the leading spokesmen of world capitalism voice anxiety lest the "international balance of power" be upset as a result of the Czech events, an anxiety which, ironically, matches that of the Kremlin.

Trade relations with the imperialist countries and bids at collaborating with the monopolies of the West are being extended by the present regime of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, but on a more modest scale than that practiced by the regimes in Yugoslavia or Rumania. In fact the new Czech leadership has as yet proposed nothing like the agreement between the Soviet government and the FIAT monopoly in Italy.

Undoubtedly reactionary former bourgeois political forces still exist in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, although their social basis is extremely limited. If these forces meet with any response in the working population of the country, the overwhelming majority of

which consists of wage workers and salaried employees, this can be ascribed only to the tremendous discredit which Stalinism and the Novotny regime brought to socialism.

Any move in the direction of socialist democracy weakens this response. Any move reverting back to the bureaucratic dictatorship, so hated and despised by the masses, strengthens the influence of reaction among the more backward sectors of the populace. It is therefore necessary to stress that the sudden anxiety which the bureaucrats in Moscow, East Berlin, Warsaw, Sofia and Budapest display over the "counterrevolutionary danger" in Czechoslovakia has no basis whatsoever in reality. It is hypocritical through and through.

Far from favoring "imperialism," the upsurge of the Czechoslovak masses and the steps taken towards socialist democracy constitute powerful blows against the anti-Communist hysteria which the leading imperialist circles try to maintain in the West, and constitute revolutionary assistance to the anticapitalist developments there. Nothing would provide greater inspiration to the development of the socialist revolution in Western Europe than the emergence of true socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia. It is the brutal intervention of the Kremlin in Czechoslovak affairs that provides grist to the mills of imperialist propaganda.

What the Kremlin and its henchmen fear above all is not "imperialist" infiltration in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic but the infiltration of critical communist ideas into the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and the other bureaucratically deformed and degenerated workers states.

What they fear is the repercussions which the modest steps taken today in Czechoslovakia in the direction of socialist democracy might have upon the discontented students, intellectuals and workers in their own countries.

What they fear is the political revolution fermenting throughout the areas ruled by the Kremlin in Central and Eastern Europe under the influence of the Czech developments and the new rise in revolutionary possibilities in the imperialist countries as symbolized by the May 1968 revolutionary events in France.

For that reason, it is the duty of every revolutionist, of every socialist and communist, to demand the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the immediate cessation of all pressure, blackmail and threats against the Czech government and people by any outside force.

The Czechoslovak workers and peasants have the right to determine their own fate, without intervention by the Kremlin and its henchmen. They have the right to freely determine for themselves the way and the form to go forward on the road to building a socialist society.

They have the right to determine for themselves how far they are willing to extend the basic principles of working-class democracy to all the toiling layers of the population.

It is a sign of the complete degeneration of the ruling bureaucracies in the Soviet Union and the other countries allied to it, that what enrages them the most is not at all the presence of imperialist propaganda -- bourgeois newspapers are to be found in any East European capital -- but the freedom which the Czechoslovak masses have conquered for communists, socialists, revolutionary intellectuals, students, and workers to express their own critical ideas about the building of socialism. Is a more abject caricature of "communism" to be found than a Brezhnev, a Gomulka or an Ulbricht clamoring for the reimposition of censorship on the Czechoslovak communist and socialist writers, journalists, intellectuals, students, and worker militants?

We maintain the basic appreciation of the political forces inside the Communist movement of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic indicated in our declaration of April 18. [See Intercontinental Press, May 13, p. 428.] We are convinced that "liberalization" is not identical with the establishment of socialist democracy, which means political and economic power in the hands of the working class exercised through a congress of democratically elected workers councils (soviets). We do not favor a regime of "liberal" technocrats and "efficient" bureaucrats any more than a regime of politically "conservative" and "inefficient" ones.

We want to replace both by true socialist democracy in the pattern outlined by Lenin in State and Revolution -- all power to a congress of democratically elected workers councils; full freedom for all working-class tendencies that accept the socialization of the means of production; self-management of the workers on a factory, regional and national level in the framework of a democratically centralized planned economy; elaboration and application of the plan under continual control of the workers; strict limitation of inequalities in income.

We call on the workers of Czechoslovakia to remain more vigilant than ever, to defend all the conquests obtained since February 1948 against capitalism, and all the conquests obtained since January 1968 against the bureaucracy, while constantly forging ahead towards the construction of real workers power.

This vigilance is all the more necessary since a real danger exists that the "liberal" bureaucracy will try to compromise with the Kremlin by slowly whittling away freedom of speech and the exposition of the views of the left-wing revolutionary tendencies.

Faced with the threats and pressure exerted by the Kremlin and its agents, it is perfectly admissible to form a united front with all those who defend the right of the Czechoslovak workers and peasants to freely determine the way they want to build socialism.

We call upon the revolutionary students, intellectuals and workers in the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and all the other European workers states to fully support the Czechoslovak workers right to self-determination. Taking inspiration from the Czech events, they should step up the fight in their own countries for the elementary rights of socialist democracy which the Czech vanguard is already conquering: freedom of the press, of assembly, of demonstration for all working-class tendencies!

We call upon the revolutionary students, intellectuals, workers and peasants of China, Vietnam and North Korea to take a clear stand against the archrevisionists of the Kremlin and their agents such as the revisionist Communist party leaders in Latin America, who have supported Moscow's use of blackmail against the toiling masses of Czechoslovakia.

It is possible to combine a struggle against right-wing opportunist deviations from the revolutionary Marxist line and for full and total solidarity with the heroic Vietnamese people against U.S. imperialist aggression with a parallel struggle in the bureaucratically deformed workers states of eastern Europe to win full socialist democracy, a parallel struggle against the hateful political and economic monopoly which the privileged bureaucracy in these countries -- profoundly discrediting socialism and communism -- has established on the exercise of power in society. The fight to reestablish a united front between the struggle of the Czechoslovak masses and the worldwide struggle against imperialism -- a united front made difficult today because of the crimes of Stalin and Novotny -- can and will be won if the revolutionists and anti-imperialist fighters the

world over show principled solidarity with the struggle of the Czechoslovak masses for their right to self-determination.

Hands off the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic!

Long live the right of the Czechoslovak workers and peasants to self-determination!

Long live socialist democracy based on workers power exercised by a con-

gress of democratically elected workers councils!

Long live unity between the fighters for socialist democracy in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the anti-imperialist fighters in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the vanguard of the anticapitalist revolution in the imperialist countries!

Long live the socialist world revolution!

OTTAWA SOCIALISTS DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Ottawa

The Young Socialists -- Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes called a demonstration here August 21 against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The demonstration began with a rally at a downtown pedestrian mall. Some 150 to 200 people, mostly passersby, took part.

The speakers were Ian Angus, chairman of the Carleton University Young Socialists, and Gary Porter, executive secretary of the YS-LJS.

They supported the right of the Czechoslovak people to determine their own road to socialism. While demanding the withdrawal of the invading armies, they attacked Prime Minister Trudeau's hypocritical call for withdrawal, pointing out that Trudeau has consistently

supported U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

The demonstrators, carrying placards reading "Solidarity with Czechoslovakia," "Forward to Leninism, Not Back to Stalinism," "Withdraw USSR Troops Now," "Victory to Czech Socialist Democracy," and so on, marched to the Czechoslovak embassy. Officials greeted them and took photographs.

Second Secretary Jaroslav Novák accepted a letter of solidarity and told Gary Porter: "We agree with your placards. This is a very inspiring demonstration for us." In a television interview, he added: "Czechoslovakia is a socialist country, and we intend to continue to build socialism in our own way. Therefore we are very pleased to have the Young Socialists here supporting us."

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