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Castro Challenges Moscow Line at OLAS

●
**Carmichael On Black Power
At Havana Press Conference**
●

- **The Wuhan "Kidnapping"**
- **Mexican Witch-Hunt Case**
- **Evolution of the China Crisis**

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CASTRO CHALLENGES MOSCOW LINE ON LATIN-AMERICAN REVOLUTION

By George Novack

Standing under a gigantic portrait of Che Guevara in the Chaplin Theater in Havana, August 10, Fidel Castro upheld the revolutionary line of armed struggle for power in Latin America in opposition to the conciliatory course predicated on "peaceful coexistence" pursued by the pro-Moscow Communist parties. His momentous address climaxed the historic sessions of the First Conference of the Latin American Organization of Solidarity (OLAS) held July 31 to August 11.

The conference adopted a general resolution holding that armed struggle is the main means of combatting imperialism and making the revolution. It was submitted by Comandante Nestor Valle of the Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala.

Castro declared on this point that although some revolutionary movements had erred through impatience or inadequate preparations, "armed struggle is fundamental. This does not mean that a rifle has to be taken up immediately regardless of place and circumstance. We are convinced that armed struggle is inevitable, even in countries where it is not now possible. It is only a question of order in time."

Castro ruled out the possibility of a peaceful, parliamentary road to power in the Americas. "We have heard a lot of discussion on the value of peaceful and non-peaceful means," he said. "I say this is a Byzantine argument. It is a dialogue between deaf people. We believe that power in Latin America cannot be peacefully conquered. How could that be possible when the possessing classes control the entire apparatus of power?"

According to Marcel Niedergang, correspondent for the French newspaper Le Monde in Havana, Castro was reported in private conversation to have compared the right-wing Communist parties to Olympic teams which were trained for the 1924 games but have to enter the competition in 1967.

The Cuban Premier appealed for a "living Marxism." He remarked, "It must be said that even Marxist literature will have to be renovated. There is a 'Marxist' phraseology which can barely be distinguished from the rosary and catechism of the Church."

Castro castigated those so-called revolutionists who continue to prate about an allegedly revolutionary role of the national bourgeoisie.

He also criticized the agreements

on economic and technical aid recently concluded by the Soviet Union and other East European governments with certain counterrevolutionary anti-Cuban oligarchic regimes in Latin America. "We are not opposed to commercial relations between socialist and capitalist countries. But if solidarity is not an empty word, the least that we can ask the countries of the socialist camp is that they do not give assistance to those nations which are accomplices to the American blockade of Cuba.

"The Venezuelan CP would like to provoke a rupture between the Cuban revolution and the countries of the socialist bloc. We will not submit to blackmail. We will go forward prudently, without abandoning our revolutionary integrity, for, confronted by a powerful enemy, interdependence is important."

With Stokely Carmichael by his side, the Cuban leader asserted that the uprising of the black victims of oppression betokened the revival of the revolutionary movement in the United States. A coming together of the revolutionary currents among the blacks and the Cuban revolutionists was wholly "logical and natural," he said. The conference set aside August 18 as "a day of solidarity with the black people of America" to commemorate the 1965 uprising in Watts.

In speeches at the conference, delegates from the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam gave wholehearted support to the Cuban positions and particularly hailed their decision to make armed struggle the axis of revolutionary strategy for Latin America.

A structure was set up for more efficient coordination of the anti-imperialist struggle on a continental scale.

The OLAS resolutions and the Cuban Premier's uncompromising declarations stand out in sharp contrast with the less consistent positions taken eighteen months ago at the Tricontinental congress and with the unwarranted attack on Trotskyism Castro made at that time.

The explicit and decisive demarcation of the Cuban leadership from the opportunist policies championed by the Kremlin and its followers opens up bright new prospects for the more vigorous promotion of the struggle against imperialist domination and capitalist-landlord-gorilla rule in the Western Hemisphere. It should accelerate the regroupment of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America.

CARMICHAEL DISCUSSES BLACK POWER IN HAVANA PRESS CONFERENCE

On August 2, Stokely Carmichael held a press conference in Havana from which all U.S. correspondents were excluded.

However, many of Carmichael's remarks and those of two other members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee who went with him -- Julius Lester and George Ware -- have become available through Latin-American publications.

The August 11 issue of Marcha, the radical Uruguayan weekly, contained an article by Carlos Maria Gutierrez which reports on an interview Gutierrez held with the three SNCC members as well as the August 2 news conference.

Gutierrez asked Carmichael to define black power. "Carmichael pronounced the sentence slowly," Gutierrez writes.

"Black power seeks to unite the American black people so that joining forces with the oppressed abroad they may undertake the struggle against capitalism."

Carmichael then explained, "In the last analysis, if the black people are going to run their own lives, they must shake the economic structures of the country to their foundation. The colonies of the United States must be liberated, including naturally the black ghettos of the North and South..."

"Politically, black power means what it has always meant for SNCC: organizing blacks to elect representatives and forcing these representatives to become spokesmen for their needs."

Carmichael noted the difference between this position and that of the "equalizers": "We don't believe in classical integration. There can be no integration before the abolition of capitalist exploitation makes people equal."

Carmichael then explained that black power meant political power. "Control of wealth is power... We want the people -- black and white -- to control the wealth of the country in a real way. And in this position, legal means, non-violence and gradualism, are of no use to us."

"There is no sense in our going before white courts, with white judges and white law. That would be playing their game. We must prepare new games. Our game is guerrilla warfare."

Carmichael strongly attacked the Vietnam war, both in his interview with Gutierrez and at the Havana press confer-

ence. "We will not take up arms to shoot at the people of Vietnam," he told the Marcha correspondent. "Our enemies are the whites of the United States. The people of Vietnam are our brothers in arms. Forty percent of the soldiers are blacks. That is the only good thing about Vietnam."

"The whites are teaching us how to kill there and when the blacks return from Asia, they will put this apprenticeship to use in American cities."

Ware broke in at this point and stated: "We are the majority in the big industrial cities and the whites cannot use the repressive tactics they are using in Vietnam there. They are using napalm and fragmentation bombs in Vietnam but what will they do in their own cities? The whites are cowards in general."

"Unless they want to destroy themselves, the arms they are using in Vietnam will be of no use to them in our urban guerrilla war, as we are already seeing in Newark and Detroit. There they will have to fight us man to man and we will sweep them away."

Gutierrez reports that Carmichael was asked at the news conference about support given by the U.S. Communist party to the struggle for black power.

"The Communist party," he answered, "is full of rich people who enjoy the fruits of the capitalist system and have no problems. Every time I have visited a white Communist in his home, I have been impressed by his manner of living, even including servants. When they show me an American proletarian Communist, I will believe in the American Communists."

"They themselves are trying to convince themselves that they are revolutionaries. But they are not in the street and they have good relations with the power structures. Their meetings number less than fifty persons and are made up of the white bourgeoisie. They are communists in name only."

Lester is reported to have added:

"In 1964 the Communist party supported the candidacy of Lyndon B. Johnson for the presidency. Today it supports non-violence, it supports a negotiated peace in Vietnam."

"Any revolutionary knows that the peace question is also a moral question. What they propose for Vietnam is the same as if I were in my living room and a man came in and beat my wife and then proposed to negotiate the situation. This is the CP's position."

THE WUHAN "KIDNAPPING" AND THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Dick Roberts

The detention and possible harassment of two high Peking officials in Wuhan July 20 and 21 underscores the continuing inability of the Mao faction to consolidate power in China although the "Cultural Revolution" is almost two years old.

According to the Agence France-Presse correspondent in Peking, the Wuhan "kidnapping" went something like this: On July 14 two leading Maoists, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li, were sent to Wuhan to arrange a possible truce in the street fighting in that city reported in recent months.

(The New York Times, July 30, states, "By late June at least 250 'bloody' clashes were reported, in which some 350 persons were said to have died and 1,500 were believed injured.")

Wang Li, July 20, and Hsieh Fu-chih, July 21, were "kidnapped, encircled and beaten." July 22 both returned to Peking where they were given a gala welcome at the airfield by Premier Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, among others.

The following day the army staged a demonstration in Peking attacking Chen Tsai-tao, head of the Wuhan military district.

Agence France-Press continued to report disturbances in Wuhan for the following week. The Peking radio was said to broadcast appeals to Wuhan soldiers to desert the anti-Mao faction. July 31, AFP noted that the "'reactionary group in Wuhan,' a faction opposed to the regime of Mao Tse-tung...was receiving support from other groups around China.

"Large posters [in Peking] said the local leadership in Nanning, in the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region, in the south, had adopted a resolution siding with the Wuhan group, and demonstrators here today linked leaders in the Manchurian province of Kirin with Chen Tsai-tao, the military commander for Hupeh province and the leader of the Wuhan faction."

The Wuhan "kidnapping" is by no means a minor incident. Wuhan, the capital of Hupeh province, at the junction of the Han and Yangtze rivers, has a population of one and a half million. It is an industrial center and represents a major point of resistance to the Mao leadership.

And the two officials who were detained are key figures in Mao's bureaucracy. Hsieh Fu-chih is the Minister of Security (i.e., the head of the secret

police), who was supposed to have been appointed the head of the Peking "Paris Commune" in February (see World Outlook, February 24). Wang Li is a central committee member and leader of the "Cultural Revolution."

What is most significant about the "kidnapping," however, is that it brings to the fore deep rifts in the Chinese army itself. Although certain military figures like Lo Jui-ching, former chief of the general staff, have been attacked since the early period of the "Cultural Revolution," it appears that the Mao faction has been forced into a direct struggle for control of key sections of the army.

Aside from the Wuhan events, there has been considerable attention in the official propaganda press to the power of the Liu faction in the army. A typical polemic of this type was a July 30 editorial in Red Flag, entitled "The Proletariat Must Take a Firm Hold of the Gun," excerpted in Hsinhua August 1.

The article begins with a slight revision of history in order to place Mao Tse-tung at the command of the August 1, 1927, Nanchang troop rebellion, the date which has been selected for celebrating the fortieth anniversary of Mao's founding of the "People's Liberation Army." Actually, Mao was not present at this event. Nevertheless, according to Red Flag, "the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries" was "guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought."

There follows a brief history of Mao's other contributions to the army. Then the editorial gets down to the main point:

"During the whole period of socialism, class struggle finds concentrated expression in the struggle between the bourgeois for restoration and the proletariat against restoration. In striving for restoration the bourgeoisie certainly seeks to control the army and grasp the gun. In order to consolidate their proletarian dictatorship and smash the bourgeoisie's conspiracy for staging a comeback, it is imperative for the proletariat too to take a firm hold of the gun and keep firm hold of the army."

"Bourgeoisie" in this statement, of course, is Mao double-talk for the Liu Shao-chi faction. What is interesting is the trepidation of the Mao-Lin propagandists about the position of Liu's followers in the army. The editorial continues:

"Peng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ching, backed by the top party person in authority taking the capitalist road [Liu], cultivated their own private influence within the army, built up personal reputations, recruited deserters and accepted mutineers, formed factions in pursuit of private interests, maintained illicit relations with foreign countries and carried out conspiracies to usurp control of the party and the army.

"To form an anti-party bloc and a counterrevolutionary 'military club' Peng Teh-huai mustered a handful of monsters and demons which had wormed their way into the party, and which were alien class elements, speculators, counterrevolutionaries, and old-type army officers who had not yet remoulded themselves."

And so forth. The point is, even though some members of the "anti-party" Liu faction may have been removed, they still have followers. In Mao's words: "The serpents infesting most of China, big or small, black or white, baring their poisonous fangs or assuming the guise of beautiful girls, are not yet frozen by the cold, although they already sense the threat of winter." (Hsinhua, Selected News Items, July 31. But just in case the reader still missed the point, Hsinhua adds, "Though some of the counterrevolutionary revisionists are 'dead' organisationally, they are not 'dead' politically and ideologically. They are 'wounded tigers' or are 'playing possum.' Some are not even 'dead' organisationally, and are still pouncing out at people.")

The July 30 Red Flag editorial concludes by insisting it is necessary to bring the "Cultural Revolution" into the army. "We must expose the handful of people in authority taking the capitalist road in the party and overthrow and discredit them politically and ideologically. The same must be done with regard to the handful of people in authority taking the capitalist road in the army."

If it is by no means certain what taking the "Cultural Revolution" into the army will actually mean, these new diatribes show clearly how little the Mao group has accomplished since it launched its purge against Chinese intellectuals in October 1965.

Mao has not succeeded in increasing his support among the top leaders. Liu and his associates have not been formally overthrown. Like Chen Tsai-tao, in Wuhan, many Mao opponents still hold high positions in the provincial bureaucracies.

The Red Guard movement, which Mao attempted to mobilize against the "anti-party" sections, has subsided. The party apparatus is hopelessly divided and now the army, which had been the surest support of the Mao faction, has become, at best, unreliable in significant sections.

As the "Cultural Revolution" has unfolded, Mao's grip on the regime has been gravely weakened instead of becoming stronger. Today, its objectives appear to be more distant than ever.

CANADIAN STUDENTS ENDORSE OCTOBER 21 MOBILIZATION

Canada's largest student antiwar organization has voted to support the massive demonstration against American aggression in Vietnam scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C., October 21.

The Student Association to End the War in Vietnam voted at its council meeting July 2 to endorse the call of the National and Student Mobilization Committees in the U.S. for international demonstrations to coincide with the confrontation in Washington.

The SAEWV was founded March 12, 1967, at a conference attended by representatives of 15 student committees to end the war in Vietnam, from Vancouver to Montréal, with a total membership of more than 1,000.

The SAEWV demands the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and calls for an end to the Canadian government's complicity in the war.

The council statement, published in the July 22 number of the SAEWV Bulletin, declares:

"The present antiwar movement has shown that where people suffer injustice, the peoples of the world come to the defense of their rights, forgetting which nation they come from. It was in this spirit that the Student Association to End the War in Vietnam endorsed the call of the American National Mobilization Committee for an International Day of Protest October 21."

The statement pointed out that "Concerted international efforts such as the October 21 demonstration can have a very great effect in determining the global strategy of American imperialism.

"October 21," the statement concluded, "is the ideal day for a united action by all the sectors of the Canadian antiwar movement in solidarity with the Vietnamese and American peoples."

SPLIT IN THE PRO-PEKING COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA

By Kailas Chandra

The Politbureau of the CPI(M) [Communist party of India (Marxist) -- pro-Peking Left CP] which met in Calcutta in the last week of June considered the situation arising out of the "large scale dissensions" inside the party, especially in West Bengal, and authorised the state committee to expel about 32 members. Among those who were subsequently expelled by the West Bengal leadership were Sushital Roy-Chowdhury, a state committee member and Parimal Dasgupta, a member of the Calcutta district committee, for their allegedly "anti-party behaviour."

Although a section of the bourgeois press has cynically suggested that the expulsions were a "sham move" to consolidate the control of the leading faction in the West Bengal party it is obvious that internal dissensions have assumed serious proportions with the dissidents accusing the leadership of following "a revisionist line." A leader of the dissidents told Link weekly (July 2) "We are the majority in the party...we shall be able to take control of the party as a whole."

The dissidents, however, are subdivided into several tendencies. They are trying to regroup themselves under the banner of the "Committee of Support to the Naxalbari Peasant Struggle." [See World Outlook, July 28, 1967.] Before the expulsions these tendencies had started a series of journals to voice their differences with the leadership which had bureaucratically stifled all internal discussion.

The Peoples Democracy, official organ of the CPI(M), has named at least five of these journals as "anti-party" including Commune, Bidroh [Revolt], Santrash, Dakshin Desh [Left Land] Chhatra Fauj [Students Army] and Chinta [Thought]. These tendencies have uniformly opposed the class-collaborationist coalition politics of the leadership and tried to develop militant struggles of workers and peasants in their own limited manner. One important organisational problem has been the scope of inner-party democracy and democratic centralism governing the functioning of a Marxist-Leninist party.

The Commune, which has been vocal in its criticism of the leadership, wrote recently: "Whenever there was an ideological fight inside the party Promode Babu (Promode Dasgupta, secretary of the West Bengal unit) and Ramamurthi (member of the Politbureau) described it as CIA activity. We want to make it clear that these people are trying to transform the party into a tail of the bourgeoisie and

imperialists by expelling persons who are engaged in a real ideological fight inside the party."

Expulsions of militant dissidents are not confined only to West Bengal. Disciplinary action is being used against such elements in every state. The Bombay Council of the CPI(M), for example, has recently expelled some active members including K. Ramachandran, a former secretary of the Bombay committee and a prominent trade-union worker. He is associated with a number of unions including those of central government employees. Not even the constitutional procedures of the party were followed in expelling him.

The charges against him included that he did not work for a party candidate in the last general elections and that he attended a meeting of trade-union cadres of the Right and Left CPIs (along with some "centrists" not belonging to either party) to explore the possibilities of united action by the working class. He is supposed to have degenerated into a "revisionist" because of his talks of joint action with the Right CPI cadres!

On the political plane he has been accused of holding "a pseudo-left Trotskyist position." The charge against him is that he had criticised the CPI(M) programme of the so-called "peoples democratic front" from "a 'left' angle and had opposed the inclusion of the national bourgeois in" it. (In fact Ramachandran was one of the delegates to the Maharashtra state conference in 1963 who, it would seem, moved an amendment to the official programme of a "peoples democratic front" suggesting that the character of the Indian revolution is socialist and not peoples democratic.)

Ramachandran is also said to have opposed the participation of the CPI(M) in the opportunist electoral front with the Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti, noted for its regional chauvinist character, along with reactionary bourgeois parties like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League.

Issues posed by Ramachandran and the action taken against him have provoked a major controversy inside the Bombay unit of the CPI(M).

Meanwhile B.T. Ranadive, a leading theoretician of the CPI(M), has launched a broadside against the so-called "anti-party tendencies" in the party's weekly Peoples Democracy, edited by him. In an article entitled "Behind the Revolutionary Phrases, Disorganising Struggle

Against Imperialism" in the latest issue of the journal [July 2], Ranadive, true to his Stalinist past, has invoked the bogey of Trotskyism while replying to the charge made by the dissidents that the Left CPI lacked inner-party democracy.

He says: "The demand for the right to form factions inside the party has international but bad precedents." Here Ranadive quotes what Stalin, of all persons, had said about Trotskyism in his report to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), in a highly slanderous manner. Stalin has been quoted by Ranadive saying:

"The essence of Trotskyism is lastly a denial of the necessity for iron discipline in the party, recognition of freedom for factional groupings in the party ...According to Trotskyism the CPSU(B) must not be a single united militant party, but a collection of groups and factions, each with its own centre, its own discipline, its own press, and so forth."

Apart from the distortion of Trotsky's views on the Marxist-Leninist concept of democratic centralism governing a proletarian party, the inference is obvious. Ranadive is trying to scare the dissidents (who in West Bengal are considerably influenced by Maoist ideas) away from authentic Marxism-Leninism as enunciated by the Trotskyist Fourth International, by telling them in effect that they are following a Trotskyist line on organisational and political questions by their "disruptive attacks" on the leadership and through their methods of "sticking denunciatory bulletins in public."

He forgets, however, that the dissidents have been driven to the stage of "sticking denunciatory bulletins" mainly as a protest against the bureaucratic practices of the leadership and absence of inner-party democracy inside the party.

The dissidents "many of whom" (even according to Ranadive) "might be upright and honest people" have also relied on Lenin's ideas of democratic centralism. They have cited Lenin's views on the subject:

"The elaboration of a common programme for the party should not, of course, put an end to polemics; it will firmly establish these basic views on the character, the aims and tasks of our movement which must serve as the banner of a fighting party, a party that remains consolidated despite partial differences of opinion among its members on partial questions." (Collected Works, Vol.4, page 231.)

While conceding these views of Lenin, Ranadive seeks to make a subtle

distinction between the polemics on the "basic party line" once "firmly established" and the "polemics" on "partial differences on partial questions." In his opinion the dissidents have exceeded the limit laid down by Lenin. In fact he thinks that they have no place in the party since they "reject the Party line from A to Z."

An important difference he has discovered with the dissidents is about their characterisation of the present Indian state. The dissidents describe the state in India as "a neo-colonial state" or a "state of neo-colonial powers" as against the official party definition as "a state of the bourgeoisie and landlords led by the big bourgeoisie who are increasingly collaborating with foreign finance capital in pursuit of the capitalist path of development."

There is no literature available so far to explain the real positions of the dissidents on these basic questions apart from the interpretations doled out by Ranadive, or by the bourgeois press for that matter. The whole controversy raised by the dissidents in the Left CPI needs to be discussed more fully. But it would suffice here to mention that Ranadive's criticism of the dissidents is that they are in effect "disorganising the struggle against imperialism" by their insistence on a line of class struggle, which alienates the coalition partners of the Left CPI in the so-called "peoples democratic fronts."

This is a negation of the official strategy of an alliance with the "progressive national bourgeoisie"! Says Ranadive: "To agree to their formulation is to agree to disorganise the struggle against American imperialism, against the surrenderist policy of the Government and help the worst reactionaries in India."

Ranadive's logic is simple. The main struggle of the Indian masses is against imperialism and feudalism to complete the democratic tasks of the Indian revolution. Any struggle against the Indian bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, which it thinks can pursue "an anti-imperialist position under certain favourable conditions," disrupts the "anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist peoples democratic front" and therefore helps the "worst reactionaries in India."

The dissidents rightly reject this concept as "class collaborationism" and "revisionism." That is the genesis of the present split in the Left CPI although it is still not clear whether the dissidents link the present opportunist policies of the leadership with their basic theory -- essentially a Stalinist and Maoist theory of a four class-bloc in the so-called "peoples democratic front."!

RAMACHANDRAN EXPLAINS HIS EXPULSION

[The following statement was issued by K. Ramachandran, former secretary of the Bombay Committee of the pro-Peking Communist party of India (Marxist), on his expulsion from the party, at a press conference in Bombay, August 7, 1967.

[Ramachandran had been a member of the Communist party of India for more than twelve years. He was an active leader of railway employees. He was dismissed from services in the railways in 1960 in connection with a general strike of the central government employees in India.

[Presently, Ramachandran is the regional secretary of the Confederation of the Central Government Employees Unions and Associations.]

* * *

The Maharashtra Committee of the Communist party of India (Marxist) has expelled several members from the party on various charges including inactivity, indiscipline, antiparty activity, collaboration with "revisionist" CPI "sectarianism" and "ultra-leftism." Among those expelled or removed from the party rolls, are about ten members holding positions in the various district and branch committees in the city and at least four from the districts including Satara, Sholapur and Bhir. The Poona district committee of the party has been dissolved and a few other district and local committees have been threatened with similar action by the state committee.

These extraordinarily bureaucratic steps taken by the state leadership without recourse to the procedures laid down in the party constitution have come as a shock to many members of the CPI(M) who rallied behind its banner with great hopes when the split in the United CPI took place. It is difficult to explain this strange behaviour of the leadership.

I was secretary of the Bombay Committee of the party for some time and had remained a member of the Bombay Committee till my recent expulsion. I have been expelled on the following charges: (1) that I collaborated with the revisionists of the CPI(R) [Right Communist party of India along with some members of my party and of the "centrist" group, to discuss united trade-union action in the city; (2) that I adopted a "pseudo-left Trotskyist position" in that I opposed the party's programme of including the national bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry, in the so-called People's Democratic Front; (3) that I was opposed to the participation of the CPI(M) in the Sampoorna Maharashtra Samiti, a front created on the eve of the general elections in al-

liance with reactionary parties and (4) that I did not participate actively in the election campaign on behalf of a particular candidate set up by the party for the state legislature.

Obviously these are highly distorted charges. Some minor lapses here and there have been exaggerated out of proportion to justify the undemocratic action against me. I have already replied to these charges in my oral and written statements made to the appropriate party committees.

All those who know me are aware that I have been an active worker in the trade-union field and as such I have to work with trade unionists belonging to various left political parties. I have no doubt in my mind that I did not violate any party discipline by attending a meeting convened by trade unionists belonging to the CPI(R) and the centrist group to consider joint action, since they also are our class allies, in spite of our political differences with them. In fact it has been a policy of the CPI(M) to seek joint action with all left parties on the trade-union and other mass fronts.

As far as the party's programme of Peoples Democratic Front, it was known that along with several other members I had also opposed the theory of a "four-class bloc" as defined by the CPI(M) since its very inception. I am one of those who has held the view that the concept of an alliance of the working class with the national bourgeoisie (the so-called anti-monopoly bourgeoisie) and the rich peasantry is erroneous and that the capitalist class in India cannot be considered as progressive in any sense of the term. I have also held the view that the democratic tasks of the Indian revolution, of liquidating the vestiges of imperialism and feudalism in the country, can be accomplished only as a part of the socialist revolution led by the working class. The national bourgeoisie, which is basically subservient to the needs of imperialism, cannot accomplish these tasks. In fact it is clear now that there is no fundamental difference between the concept of a "National Democratic Front" as advocated by the CPI(R) and the "Peoples Democratic Front" of the CPI(M) except on the question of the leadership of such a front. Both positions lead to a policy of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie.

Along with some other members I had raised this issue at the first Bombay conference of the CPI(M) and later at the state conference held in Talasari by moving specific amendments to the programme of the party. Although we were defeated,

we agreed to remain as loyal members of the party in the belief that we shall have freedom to advocate our views within the party. It appears that the party leadership now wants to penalise me for holding a viewpoint which is different from that of the leadership which I consider utterly suicidal. This only proves the charge that the leadership does not want to permit any individual member or a tendency within the party that does not conform blindly to the line laid down by the leadership. This is a total negation of the Leninist principles of democratic centralism that should govern the functioning of every working-class party.

I have now come to the conclusion that the opportunist policies of the leaders of the CPI(M) in different states to enter into multiclass coalitions with the capitalist parties basically emerges from such a programme, of building what is considered as a "Peoples Democracy" in India. The CPI(R) also follows a similar course of action. Unless this line is changed, I believe that the CPI(M) will be discredited in the eyes of the masses as defender of capitalist property relations and rejected as a revolutionary leadership of the workers and peasants. The ministers belonging to the CPI(M) in Kerala and West Bengal, the recent experiences have proved, only help the capitalist class in suppressing the mass movements instead of leading them.

Judging from my own experience I can well understand the circumstances in which the so-called extremists have been expelled by the party leadership in West Bengal, Kerala and other states. I was one of those communist workers who actively participated in the democratic movement for the creation of a linguistic state of Maharashtra. As members of the United CPI we functioned as constituents of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, despite its grave political limitations. We thought it was permissible for us to remain in such a multiclass united front although it was clear that the leadership of the United CPI committed the serious error of subordinating its role as a working-class party to the needs of a multiclass united front instead of developing independent class struggles of workers and peasants. This policy has only strengthened the capitalist Congress and regional chauvinist forces in Maharashtra.

The creation of the so-called Sampoorna Maharashtra Samiti on the eve of the general elections, in my opinion, was an utterly opportunist move by the traditional left parties to revive linguistic chauvinism to gain petty electoral advantages. There were many members like me in the CPI(M) who were opposed to the participation of the party in the proposed electoral front with reactionary parties like the Hindu Mahasabha, Muslim League,

etc. In fact the Bombay Committee had unanimously adopted a resolution, rejecting the move to join the Sampoorna Maharashtra Samiti. But this resolution was later set aside by a decision of the Maharashtra Committee of the party.

Experience has shown that as a result of its opportunist electoral alliance the CPI(M) has lost its prestige as a Marxist-Leninist party of the working class. Today it has become a tail of other so-called left and even the regional chauvinist parties in Maharashtra. Its role during the recent Bombay Bandh move showed that it has completely abdicated its role as an independent party of the working class.

In spite of my differences with the electoral tactics adopted by the CPI(M), I, along with friends who thought like me, carried out all the instructions of the party during the elections. Therefore the charge levelled against me by the leadership in this connection is utterly frivolous and baseless. Indeed several members who were once active have lapsed into inactivity, disgusted as they are, with the opportunist policies of the leadership and its bureaucratic organisational methods. There is a sense of political apathy growing among them as a result of their frustration. The working-class movement will lose many devoted cadres if this danger is not combatted by providing them with a genuine Marxist-Leninist alternative in place of the present opportunist politics of the CPI(M) leadership.

Much has been made of the fact that I did not appeal to the higher committees of the party against my expulsion. My experience is that the higher committees invariably endorse the decisions taken by the bureaucrats at the lower level. I thought I would only be wasting my time appealing to higher bodies. I had an occasion to bring all these developments to the notice of the General Secretary of the CPI(M), Comrade Sundarayya in person. Although he agreed with my criticism of the local leaders he admonished me for not obeying the "senior leaders" of the party.

I was indeed shocked by this attitude of the topmost executive of the party. I do not think that a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party can be built on the basis of paternalism, of junior members obeying senior members because of their age or seniority in the party. It is precisely this paternalist attitude of the leadership in the absence of inner-party democracy that has led to the emergence of a bureaucracy in the party.

I believe that India has entered a prerevolutionary situation with a major crisis having overtaken the economy. The present crisis is the outcome of the policies pursued by the capitalist Congress to

build capitalism masquerading it as socialism. It is obvious that this crisis cannot be resolved by the leaders of the capitalist parties within the present capitalist framework.

A revolutionary transformation of the existing property relations alone can unleash the present stagnant productive forces in the country and meet the challenge of the crisis. Nor are the so-called Non-Congress Governments, even those led by the left parties as in Kerala and West Bengal, an answer to the crisis.

The traditional left parties including the CPI(M) by their policy of coalitions with the reactionary capitalist parties like the Muslim League, Bangla Congress, etc., are in fact helping the bourgeois rulers to buy unpopular discontent. They create illusions among the masses that their problems (of food, shelter, security, etc.) can be solved within the present capitalist framework. The CPI(R) along with the PSP [Praja Socialist party] and SSP [Samyukta Socialist party] has gone to the extent of coalescing with the reactionary capitalist parties like the Jan Sangh and Swatantra party. They are not even prepared to utilize their positions in the various state governments to implement bold anticapitalist and antilandlord measures, backed up by mass movements outside. In West Bengal the CPI(M), along with other "left" parties is actually helping the United Front government to suppress a heroic peasant movement of Naxalbari by the armed might

of the capitalist state.

A time has come when the honest militants within the CPI(M) have to seriously think about combatting the opportunistic politics of the leadership. They should assert to prevent the dangerous drift of the party. I fear that the leadership instead of permitting the ranks to freely reassess their present political tasks might resort to a bureaucratic suppression of all inner party discussions. There is need to create a new revolutionary leadership to fill the present vacuum in the workers and peasant movement, with honest militants within the CPI(M) collaborating with like-minded people outside.

Members of the CPI(M) rightly pose the problem of their loyalty to the party which they have built up. But they must not forget that their loyalty to the movement is greater especially now when the leadership of the CPI(M) is betraying the working class.

On our part, those who have been expelled from the CPI(M) shall try to regroup ourselves on the basis of a correct Marxist-Leninist programme of a socialist revaluation in India. We shall seek the cooperation of all parties, groups and individuals who are prepared to cooperate with us in the realisation of this objective. We have no need to despair. History is with us. The opportunist policies of the leadership trying to persecute us stand exposed.

A NEW SPLIT IN THE MAOIST PARTY IN BELGIUM

By Pascal Lubra

On June 20, La Voix du Peuple, the Belgian Communist party (Maoist) weekly, announced that the central committee had "unmasked" and expelled a group of party members, the "Trifaux-Hauwaert group."

The central committee "communiqué" described them in the following words: "a small group of people, members of the Communist Party of Belgium, who had for some months been repeatedly and precisely criticized for opportunist and sectarian political deviations of the utmost seriousness, as well as for faults in their personal conduct. Faced with the legitimate and binding demand to account for their machinations, to undertake self-criticism before the regular meeting of the Party Central Committee on June 21, 1965, Desiré Trifaux, Pierre Schrayen, and Arnold Hauwaert, though members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Belgium, chose flight in a shameful attempt to avoid their responsibility,

launching an attack on the Party, the Central Committee, and the Party's political line.

The same day La Voix du Peuple appeared, the expelled members published a mimeographed newspaper, l'Exploité [The Exploited], taking the name of the post-World War I left opposition paper in the Belgian Workers party which was founded by Jacquemotte.

There are thus three papers in Belgium which bear the legend "founded by J. Jacquemotte": Drapeau Rouge [Red Flag], the organ of the pro-Moscow Communist party, with the same name as the organ of the Belgian section of the Communist International following 1921; the Maoist La Voix du Peuple, taking the name of the Communist party daily published from 1936 to 1939; and finally l'Exploité.

But here is how the group expelled

described the situation in the July-August issue of the monthly Action pour la Paix et l'Indépendance des Peuples (Action for Peace and Independence of the Peoples, the organ of an anti-imperialist front organization of the Grippa group, but where a majority went over to the group expelled):

"For some time now, some members of the group which Jacques Grippa pretentiously calls the 'Communist Party of Belgium' have been trying to introduce their methods and practices into our association. Though it has existed for several years and has considerable financial resources, this small sect is today limited to a handful of paid officials. At present this group has about sixty members."

L'Action pour la Paix et l'Indépendance des Peuples adds "the sectarianism of this little group has benefited only the adversaries of the anti-imperialist struggle." Thus Grippa finds himself accused of "objectively serving imperialism."

In the first issue of l'Exploité (June 30, 1967), Grippa is accused of a still more serious crime: waiting "to choose between the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the stand of those who support the highest official who, although in the party, has taken the capitalist road." The reference is clear: Grippa is a partisan of Liu Shao-chi!

One can only conclude, however, that these accusations have not been heeded in the right places, since the July-August issue of l'Action pour la Paix et l'Indépendance des Peuples says: "The means at his disposal (Grippa) will doubtless enable him to subsist artificially yet some time and to deceive many foreign friends."

SECRET U.S. CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM?

The U.S. government has been accused of using "deceptive bookkeeping" to keep secret "indirect" casualties of the Vietnam war which must number in the thousands.

Congressman Bob Wilson (Republican from California) speaking in the House of Representatives August 7 pointed to the listing by the Defense Department of "Casualties not the result of actions by hostile forces" which numbered 2,291 dead as of July 27.

Wilson declared that in addition to this misleading category, "The administration conveniently neglects to list the casualties involving men injured in

This is the fifth split in the Maoist "Communist party" since its founding.

To put it in the words used by La Voix du Peuple, there was first "the attacks of the group of the adventurist-police agent Frisque," a section of the party in the town of Drogenbos in the Brussels suburbs, which split in 1964 and published a newsletter called Dés-mystifications [Let Us Expose], for some time before its disappearance from the political scene. Second, the group of the "CIA agent Maurice Massoz" was expelled (Massoz had been the principal leader after Grippa).

Then came the expulsion of the leadership of Jeunesse Communiste [Communist Youth] in Brussels, which was called the "petty-bourgeois provocateur careerist group of Albert Faust."

Fourth came the "Delogne-Moerenhout group, marked by the influence of modern and Trotskyist revisionism," which was expelled in 1964 for "consistent opportunism."

In the present instance, Grippa accuses the expelled group primarily of opportunism while it in turn accuses his party of sectarianism.

There is an unconscious irony in the anti-imperialist journal which I have just quoted: less space is devoted to the very successful attack of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on the Da-Nang base than to the "aggressive intrusion of members of the Grippa group into the office of Action pour la Paix et l'Indépendance des Peuples, an incursion which of course was defeated and served as the occasion for victory bulletins.

the line of duty in accidents involving military vehicles, shot by mistake, accidentally wounded by our own or allied forces, victims of disease incurred during swamp and jungle operations, and so forth."

The numbers involved are a closely guarded secret, but Wilson charges that "The total must be in the thousands."

The total U.S. deaths in action in Vietnam are listed in the July 27 report as 12,155. Wounded are totaled at 73,925. "Noncombat" deaths are put at 2,291. If the proportions between dead and wounded are running about the same in both areas, secret casualties may run to 14,000.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN TANZANIA

[The following article has been translated by World Outlook from the June 15-30 issue of IV Internazionale, the biweekly informational bulletin of the Fourth International in Italy.]

* * *

On February 5, Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, read the Declaration of Arusha before 100,000 people at a meeting held in Dar es Salaam; it had been adopted a week previously by the National Executive Committee of TANU (Tanzania African National Union) in the town of Arusha in the north of the country near the Kenyan border. The object of the Declaration of Arusha was to "define the bases of a socialist state and the measures necessary to establish it." It was followed by a series of nationalizations in the primary sectors of the Tanzanian economy.

This declaration goes a great deal further than a great many similar documents adopted in the other African states which have taken anti-imperialist and even anticapitalist measures in the past. The preamble of the Declaration of Arusha states:

"Every person in a leadership position in TANU and the government must be a peasant or a worker and cannot participate in any way in capitalist or feudal activity.

"No person in a leadership position in TANU or the government can own stock in a company.

"No person in a leadership position in TANU can draw two or more salaries.

"No person in a leadership position in TANU or the government can hold a leading position in a private enterprise.

"No person in a leadership position in TANU or the government can own a house rented to a third party.

"The designation 'persons in a leadership position' used in the resolution comprises: the members of the National Executive Committee of TANU, the ministers, the members of parliament, other paid officials of organizations affiliated to TANU, high functionaries of state enterprises, all those nominated or elected within the framework of the TANU statutes, the council members, the intermediate and higher functionaries (in this context 'person in a leadership position' means a man, or a man and his wife; a woman, or a woman and her husband).

"(The National Executive Committee) together with the government takes pride in the measures taken up till now in the realization of our socialist policy.

"It appeals to the government to take new steps to realize our socialist policy as laid out in the second part of this document, without waiting for the opinion of the Presidential Commission on Socialism."

The second part of the Declaration, which is devoted to the "policy of socialism," states that the principal means of production are to be "owned and controlled by the peasants and the workers themselves through their government and their cooperatives" and adds that a state "cannot be called socialist just because all the principal means of production are controlled or owned by the government. The government must be elected and guided by the peasants and workers."

The Nationalizations

The Declaration of Arusha was followed by the nationalization, announced in a February 6 Ministry of Finance communiqué, of all the commercial banks in the country. These banks include the Barclays Bank, the Standard Bank, National and Grindleys Banks, the National Bank of Pakistan, and the Bank of India.

Shortly thereafter, the Tanzanian government announced the nationalization of eight large food-producing concerns, five of which were owned by citizens of Asian countries; moreover, the insurance companies are to be merged into a single nationalized concern and, finally, seven additional industrial concerns were also nationalized: three breweries, the British-American Tobacco Company, the Bata Shoe Company, the Metal Box Company, and the Tanganyika Extract Company.

The sweeping character of these important measures poses a series of questions which must be answered: Are key sectors of the economy involved (we have already answered this in the affirmative)? Are these real expropriations (i.e., without compensation)? How will the imperialists react? Finally, what is the character of the Tanzanian state? Is it a capitalist state or a socialist state? In other words, has Tanzania as a whole set out on the road taken by Zanzibar in 1964?

The influence of the Zanzibari revolution has indeed been the subject of much discussion. Zanzibar joined Tanganyika a few months after its revolution. However, in Tanganyika, the Tanganyikan African National Union, a movement founded in 1955, initially supported by the Cath-

olic missions in Tanganyika, and led by Mawalum Julius Nyerere from its inception, was primarily distinguished by its moderate character up till the time of the Tanganyika troop mutiny of 1964.

But in January 1964, scarcely a month after independence, revolution broke out in Zanzibar. It was led by John Okello and directed against the Arab feudalists on the island. It installed a Revolutionary Council which included Sheik Abdullah Hanga, pro-Soviet in orientation, and the pro-Chinese Mohamed Babu.

A few days after the Zanzibari revolution, while Nyerere in Dar es Salaam was still declaring his opposition to hasty "Africanization," the army in Tanganyika mutined against its British officers. The revolt was crushed by British troops shipped in from Aden. Chou En-lai cancelled his scheduled visit to Dar es Salaam. A single unified trade union was established, led by the Minister of Labor in person. In brief, three years ago there seemed to be nothing to indicate these subsequent developments.

On April 26, 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (later called Tanzania) was created and five Zanzibari ministers entered the unified cabinet. Relations with Peoples China improved. On the other hand, relations with Great Britain were broken off in December 1965 as a consequence of the evolution of the Rhodesian question. Internally, however, the Zanzibari revolution seemed to be at a standstill. But the status quo could not be maintained indefinitely: either Tanganyika would dominate Zanzibar, or Tanzania as a whole would follow the road of Zanzibar where the most important concern, Clove Growers, was nationalized.

The Zanzibari Road

The Declaration of Arusha is unquestionably a step along the Zanzibari road, the road of socialism, since it pronounces itself in favor of control over the nationalized means of production by the worker and peasant masses.

The nationalizations have hit the European and Indian sectors of the economy, the eight important export-import concerns, the mills, and all the foreign banks. Moreover, the government controls more than half the stock in many concerns (cement factories, canning plants, insecticide factories, breweries, etc.). In a speech recently made in Dar es Salaam and reported in the April issue of Africa and the World, President Nyerere stated a choice must be made "between foreign private ownership and collective native ownership."

But at the same time, the president of the poorest republic in the world, a country continually neglected by the occupying powers while it was under colonial rule, first by the Germans and then by the English, promised to respect all current contracts and to pay compensation to the companies whose holdings were nationalized.

"Full compensation has been promised," commented Africa and the World in its March issue.

In general, comment in the capitalist press has been moderate. The London Economist, for example, made the following observation:

"President Nyerere still hopes to attract private investment to Tanganyika in the sectors untouched by collectivization. But this cannot be achieved immediately. In order to cut short the period of suspicion, he must see to it that the indemnity is fixed as soon as possible and that it is just and full compensation!"

Thus the imperialists have taken an attitude of cautious waiting.

In the speech cited above, Nyerere declared that there would be no further nationalizations. Also, in a press conference following the TANU congress, Press Secretary F.S. Masha stated that cooperation with Kenya and Uganda would in no way be interrupted. Moreover, the private sector, which as Robert Cornevin indicated in Le Monde Diplomatique (April 1967), is to furnish more than half of the investment in the development plan, holds the trumps. Thus the most important struggle has not yet taken place; but it must take place.

The future will show whether TANU and the Green Guards, which have more than a half million formal members, can serve as the instrument for effectively mobilizing the masses. This question still has not been answered (there was talk of transforming TANU into a "workers and peasants party" at the annual congress last February). The congress confined itself to amending its statutes "in the light of the Declaration of Arusha," which states that "it must always be remembered that TANU is a workers and peasants party," without making any important changes.

Only the broadest mass mobilization can guarantee that the Declaration of Arusha, and especially its preamble against the privileges of the ruling stratum, will be put into practice. Only such a mobilization will guarantee that a revolution will be carried out. The first steps of such a revolution would merit support, "critical"

of course, but at the same time concrete, and the workers movement in the imperial-

ist countries would have to give it their attention and sympathy.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL DEFENDS MEXICAN WITCH-HUNT VICTIMS

On the eve of the opening of the Latin American Solidarity Conference in Havana 13 persons (11 Mexican citizens and two foreign residents) were seized by secret police agents and subjected to a week of unspeakable brutality and torture.

Threatened with death they were forced to sign prepared "confessions" about a conspiracy to overthrow the Díaz Ordaz government. Finally brought to a preliminary court hearing they repudiated these "confessions" and gave statements and evidence on the torture used against them.

In the Mexican press accounts, the prisoners are identified as coming from various political tendencies including the pro-Maoist and Trotskyist.

Others are linked by the press to Cuban connections of a somewhat vague nature, and even a "Russian automobile" owned by one of the defendants is cited in the press so the reader may draw his own conclusions.

The sensational press coverage, the dramatic press conferences of the police and attorney general's office testify to a "plot" of a different order and a consequent grave threat to the 13 victims selected by the police.

Two of the defendants are described in the press as Trotskyist. One Adán Nieto Castillo is said to be a former member of the Mexican Communist party who "today wears the Trotskyist ribbons."

The other, Daniel Camejo Guanche, was referred to by the assistant attorney general as "a prominent Trotskyist" and again as "a Venezuelan, a Trotskyist, who promised aid, medicine and propaganda" for the conspiracy. Peking's contribution is said to have been \$1,600 a month.

The principal evidence as displayed by the press and the police is described variously as 12, 17 or 20 tons of printed literature seized in a pro-Maoist bookshop together with photographs of Mao, Marx, Lenin and Stalin; and two 16-mm. cinema films on Vietnam and Venezuela with English soundtracks taken from Camejo's apartment.

These films have been widely shown in the United States and Europe as well as the University of Mexico. They are similar to much that has appeared on television in those countries.

Also some of the defendants are linked by the police to an incident in a small town on Mexico's west coast. Seven persons were said to have attempted unsuccessfully to dynamite a troop transport vehicle on the open highway.

The timing of this "police sensation," the brutal extraction of "confessions," the tailored construction of the case itself, the careful inclusion of men purporting to adhere to all the various tendencies on the far left and not least of all the public posturing of the assistant attorney general himself gives the whole business a bad stench even at a distance.

We can understand the eagerness of the Mexican prosecutor's office and the police to demonstrate their zeal to the Johnson administration in this time of trouble for the latter. But do they really expect to bamboozle Mexican and world public opinion about the real nature of their witch-hunting?

We call upon all workers organizations and to all concerned with civil liberties to express their solidarity with the victims in Mexico City and their contempt for the reactionary organizers of this McCarthyite frame-up. Cable protests to:

Lic. Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, President de la República, Palacio Nacional, México 1, D.F., México; or Lic. Jesus Paron Vasconcelos, Juez Segundo de Distrito en Material Pena, Bucareli 22, México 1, D.F., México.

Names of prisoners (listed by the assistant attorney general in the following order):

Adán Nieto Castillo, José Luis Calva Téllez, Pablo Alvarado Barrera, Hugo David Uriarte y Bonilla, Silvestre Enrique Marengo Martínez, Raúl Contreras Alcántara, Miguel Angel Flores Bernal, Eduardo Fuentes de la Fuente, César Catalán Sanchez, Enrique Escudero Mastache, Manuel Méndez Prado, Adrián Campos Díaz, Daniel Camejo Guanche. Date of preliminary hearing: July 21. Bail denied.

United Secretariat
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Send copies of all protests to:
Pierre Frank, 64 rue de Richelieu, Paris 2, France.

THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION WILL FIGHT AND WIN
UNDER THE REVOLUTIONARY BANNER OF TAN MALAKKA

By Fernand Charlier

The February 1967 issue of the magazine Indonesian Tribune, which presents "news and views" on Indonesian current affairs and which has been published since November 1966 in Tirana, Albania, contains a slanderous attack on Trotskyism and in particular on Tan Malakka, the founder of the Indonesian Communist and Trotskyist movements.

This attack is contained in an article by M. Alamsjah devoted to "The First Heroic National Insurrection in Indonesia (1926)."

Indonesian Tribune reflects the opinions of the leading group in the Indonesian Communist party which is still subject to persecution in Indonesia itself.

Tan Malakka, like many of the militants in the PKI [Partai Komunis Indonesia] today, was persecuted, arrested and eventually murdered by the troops of the Indonesian government, in the beginning of the fifties. The exact moment of his arrest and death is not even known today.

Why does the Indonesian Communist party leadership, or at least its representatives in Albania, feel compelled to attack and to slander the memory of a militant to whom they should, on the contrary, pay tribute? Malakka fell as a victim of the same type of reactionary forces which torture and kill members of the Indonesian Communist party today.

Before answering this question, it is necessary to give a brief summary of the attack on Tan Malakka, pages 10, 11 and 12 of Volume I, No. 4, of the Indonesian Tribune:

The article begins by describing the possibilities for revolution caused by the rising tide of the struggle of the workers and peasants against Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, resulting from the economic conditions prevailing during and after the economic crisis of the early twenties, and under the influence of the 1925-27 Chinese revolution.

At the end of 1925, the PKI leadership organized a national party conference called the "conference of Prambanan" which decided to launch an armed revolutionary action.

A date for the revolution was even decided: It should start approximately in June 1926. A special committee was set up to prepare the insurrection. The two

principal leaders, Musso and Alimin, were sent to consult the Far Eastern Executive Committee of the Communist International.

But, according to the article, "one of the leading members of the central committee, Tan Malakka, who was found out later to be a Trotskyite who had wormed his way into the leadership of the PKI, did not agree with the plan to stage the insurrection."

Thus Tan Malakka is depicted as a right-wing communist -- in the same way that Chen Tu-hsiu, the founder of Chinese Trotskyism, was attacked as a right-wing opportunist by the ultra-left leadership at the time of the adventurist Canton insurrection in China in 1927. According to Alamsjah's article, "the armed insurrection scheduled for June, 1926, could not be realized as originally planned...because of Tan Malakka's treacherous attitude that split the concentration of energy of the central committee." The insurrection was postponed until November 1926.

On November 12, the insurrection broke out in Djakarta and other places. It was drowned in blood. No less than 20,000 were arrested. In many places, as a result of difficult communications, the insurrection was launched long afterwards when the movement had already ended in the places it had begun earlier. The armed insurrection ended, for instance, November 14 in Djakarta, lasted until mid-December in the Bantam region, and could not be begun until early 1927 in Sumatra. In many places the colonialists took precautionary actions which prevented the uprising from being carried out.

The insurrection was a complete defeat. But the author of "The First Heroic National Insurrection in Indonesia" devotes just one line to explain that the insurrection "was suppressed," without any explanation. Of course, he also does not give the reasons why Tan Malakka had been opposed to the insurrection.

If he had done so, Alamsjah would have been obliged to admit that the reasons for Malakka's opposition were that the insurrection was doomed to defeat. Instead, Alamsjah seems to imply that the defeat was due to Malakka's opposition, although he never says so in so many words. He says, "since the very beginning, Tan Malakka, who had wormed his way into the leading body of the PKI, opposed the launching of an armed struggle, decided by the Prambanan conference. By adopting such an attitude, Tan Malakka had betrayed the revolutionary ranks of the Indonesian

people."

True, at the end of his article, Alamsjah admits that the PKI "put forward leftist slogans," but he doesn't explain which slogans he means. Rather, he quotes Mao Tse-tung on the "Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society" to the effect that "one has to distinguish his friends from his enemies" and that one must not resolve "all problems at once." And this passes for a concrete analysis of the Indonesian situation...

Now what were Tan Malakka's actual positions? Far from being a betrayer who had "wormed his way" into the PKI leadership, Tan Malakka had been, and, remained until his death, an uncompromising revolutionary fighter. He did not "worm his way" into the PKI. He was one of its first members.

In 1914 he participated in the first activities of the Indonesian Social-Democratic Association founded by Brandsteder, H.W.Kekker and Henk Sneevliet, the last, the Dutch revolutionary leader who was assassinated 25 years ago, in 1942, by the Nazis.

The Indonesian Social-Democratic Association was the forerunner of the Indonesian CP, founded on May 23, 1920. Later, Malakka participated in the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in 1922, the last congress held in Lenin's lifetime.

Tan Malakka wrote several books advancing a program for the Indonesian revolution. In one of them, Toward the Republic of Indonesia, published in 1925 shortly before the Prambanan conference, Malakka develops his ideas on the "strategy for the conquest of power." These ideas are all the more interesting, because they constitute a sharp warning against the "putschist" tendencies of a section of the Indonesian Communist party leadership. Malakka distinguishes between three successive stages in the struggle against Dutch imperialism:

(1) Winning over the majority of the advanced proletarian masses, concentrated in the Valley of Solo, on the island of Java.

(2) Destroying the most important Dutch military forces concentrated in the district of Preanger.

(3) Taking political power by destroying the state institutions of Batavia.

The leftist tendency in the party leadership, unlike Malakka, wanted to launch the insurrection before the majority of workers had been won over. In November, 1926, on the eve of the insur-

rection, Malakka warned, "We must not base ourselves on the exaggerated hopes of revolution of these leaders. First of all, we must be sure of the revolutionary spirit of the masses."

After the defeat of the 1926 putsch, Tan Malakka broke with the inept party leadership in 1927 and founded a new party, the PARI [Party of the Indonesian Republic], in Bangkok, Siam. Although Malakka stood alone in establishing this organization on the basis of his own revolutionary Marxist convictions, on many questions he arrived at conclusions approaching or identical to those of the Fourth International. Malakka's development in this direction is well known to the leadership of the PKI.

What makes the question most pertinent at the present time, however, is the disastrous course of the PKI's policies which led to the blood bath of 1965 and 1966. As these policies have been and are being reexamined by young Indonesian revolutionaries, it is inevitable that the long-standing Trotskyist criticisms of the PKI must be raised. (See, for example, "An Indonesian Communist Analyzes His Party's Defeat," by T. Soedarso, World Outlook, September 16, 1966.)

This is particularly true since the leadership of the PKI is undergoing "self-criticism" which on certain points parallels the criticisms already raised by the Fourth International.

Ironically enough, at the very time that they are attacking Tan Malakka, the PKI leadership is "criticizing" itself for errors along the same lines Malakka attacked the PKI leadership of 1926: for ultra-left adventurism!

In "Build the PKI along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia," (Indonesian Tribune, Volume I, No. 3, January 1967), the Political Bureau of the PKI states "the PKI leadership had been engaged in adventurism. Violating organizational rules they had easily involved themselves in the September 30 Movement that was not based on the high consciousness and conviction of the masses. And therefore they had caused the isolation of the Party from the masses of the people."

The September 30 Movement, led by Colonel Untung, was the desperate action of a group of left-wing officers in the Indonesian army to prevent and destroy the counterrevolutionary military coup while it was still in preparation. When the September 30 Movement was crushed, it was not possible to ascertain with certainty whether it had the support of the PKI leadership. (Apparently Harian Rakjat, the central party organ, greeted the September 30 Movement as revolutionary in the October 25, 1965, issue.)

What was certain was the opportunistic character of the September 30 adventure. The action was carried out without any preparation of the masses or any participation by the masses. They were caught completely by surprise. Taught to expect a "peaceful road" to revolution, they were unprepared for the bloody struggle which actually occurred. The slaughterous results are well known.

Today, the Political Bureau statement reveals that the party leadership of that time gave its support to the September 30 Movement. We have no reasons not to believe this. It confirms that adven-

turism is often the companion of opportunism. It by no means, however, lends credit to the "analysis" of the 1926 events by M. Alamsjah.

If anything, readers of the Indonesian Tribune will note the contradiction between the two. Malakka's warning against the ultra-left character of the 1926 putsch serves equally well for the PKI leadership's ultra-leftism in 1965.

The path of the Indonesian revolution can never be that of adventurism and opportunism. It must be that of Tan Malakka.

WIDE PUBLICATION OF TROTSKY'S BOOKS IN ITALY

Rome

A growing interest in the ideas of Leon Trotsky in Italy is indicated by the large number of Trotsky's books which have been printed here recently. Nearly all the most important works of the great revolutionary leader are now available in Italian.

There have been a number of new additions to the list. The Einaudi Publishing House has brought out Permanent Revolution, translated and introduced by Livio Maitan.

The Samonà e Savelli Publishers have printed The New Course, with an introduction by Sirio Di Giuliomaria.

The same publisher has brought out an inexpensive paperback edition of Trotsky's Lenin, which is available at bookshops and newsstands.

Even bourgeois publishers have shown interest in Trotsky's books; one of them has published an Italian translation of the book edited in France under the title Les Crimes de Staline, a title which has been kept in the Italian edition; Stalin's Crimes includes the writings on the Moscow Trials published at Coyoacán in July, 1937.

A contribution to the circulation of Trotskyist analyses has been made by a publishing house set up by the Italian Trotskyist organization itself.

This publishing house started its activity under the name of Edizioni Bandiera Rossa and has now been reorganized under the name of Nuove Edizioni Internazionali. It has so far published three books:

(1) All the documents and proceedings of the Unification Congress of the

Fourth International, which was held in 1963.

(2) Under the title From the Moscow Trials to the Fall of Khrushchev, all the documents produced by the Fourth International on Stalinism; and on various problems of the workers states (including the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the social nature of Cuba). An introduction to these two books and to each document was written by Livio Maitan.

(3) The Building of the Revolutionary Party. This book contains a chapter on "The Relationship Between the Communist Vanguard and the Mass Movement" by Livio Maitan, an illustration of the Trotskyist tactic known under the name of "entrism," by Sirio Di Giuliomaria, and the principal documents on tactics voted by the Italian section and the European Conference of the Fourth International.

A book by Ernest Germain on the theory of "state capitalism" is being prepared by this publishing house.

The Building of the Revolutionary Party [La Costruzione del Partito Rivoluzionario] is a valuable book on the practical and theoretical questions of building mass revolutionary parties in Europe, with special reference to Italy.

Maitan's essay deals with the general theoretical and historical aspects of the question outlined in its title.

Di Giuliomaria's article discusses the thought and experience of Italian revolutionary Marxists since 1956 and analyzes the progress made toward building a revolutionary party in Italy.

The book is available for about \$1.50 from Nuove Edizioni Internazionali, Casella Postale 6158, Roma Prati, Italy.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN CHINA

By Livio Maitan

[The following is the first part of the transcript of the report on the developments in China given by Livio Maitan to a recent plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International.

[It is intended as a contribution to the discussion opened in the ranks of the world Trotskyist movement on this momentous and controversial issue in world politics.

[For the opening statement by the IEC on this question, see World Outlook, May 19, 1967.]

* * *

The Origin of the Crisis and Its Initial Stages up to August 1966

It is clear that the present crisis in China was preceded by a series of conflicts, open or undercover, which had developed over a period of years. This is confirmed, among other things by: (a) frequent and explicit allusions in Chinese documents to the internal difficulties and frictions of 1959-62, when all sorts of "monsters and demons" are supposed to have been let loose, by references to the launching of the so-called socialist education campaign in 1963, and by Mao's 1965 appeals on the necessity of learning from the army, etc.; (b) by the dissemination throughout this period of themes which came to the forefront in 1966-67 (in particular, on tendencies in the countryside, on radical transformations to be introduced in the cultural realm); (c) by the tension existing at the time of the September 1962 plenum, which culminated in changes at the summit of the hierarchy; (d) by the development of public polemics in special areas (e.g., on certain conceptions of economic theory, on philosophic principles).

While we must not lose sight of these previous conflicts, it would nonetheless be a mistake to overlook or to underestimate the new, more immediate factors which precipitated the crisis and caused its development to take ever more dramatic forms.

Let us remember that Mao began his offensive virtually at once on two fronts: The article which opened the literary debate was published in Shanghai on November 10, 1965; and a week later -- on November 18 -- there was an intervention by Lin Piao in the army. This coincidence seems to demonstrate that Mao had already made the following choices: (a) to open up the battle before the opposition could

gain any more strength (this is shown by the polemics referring to the time bomb the opposition had planted in the party); (b) to start with a rectification and a struggle for his line in the army; (c) to base himself on the Shanghai leadership against the Peking group; (d) to attack certain political-intellectual groups with considerable influence and positions of strength (primarily in Peking but also in the government and the central apparatus) much more harshly and openly than in the past.

But why did he touch off the crisis? We have already explained this in the November 1966 document of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International: The policy which had been followed until that time had run into more and more serious difficulties and contradictions, and events of prime importance such as the step up of the imperialist escalation in Vietnam and the victory of the reactionary generals in Indonesia inevitably put the international line again in question.

In this context, a serious split occurred in the leading group, which, despite all the divergent tendencies and differences arising on this or that occasion, had maintained its essential unity over all the preceding years. It is clear that the conflicts arose over military problems and international questions logically involving the attitude to be taken toward Moscow. On more purely domestic questions, it is possible that the problem was again posed of how to deal with certain groups, including the Peking group (in other words, the issues debated in 1956-57, and the military problems debated in 1958-59, came up again).

In these circumstances, the particular factor which probably led Mao to touch off the crisis was fear that "new" oppositions would link up with "old." This could have led to the defeat of his line bringing about a change in orientation which he considered catastrophic.

We do not believe, however, that the Mao-Lin Piao group had a clear idea from the outset of all their allies or adversaries or of all the manifold implications of the conflict. In fact, the breaks with the different personalities and groups occurred in successive waves and over different issues. According to the information so far available to us, it was the tendency in the military represented by the chief of staff, Lo Jui-ching which was attacked in the first round. Probably Peng Chen was the only member of the leadership's inner circle who defended Lo. (We know from the offi-

cial sources that Peng Chen made an intervention at the January 1966 military conference which turned out to be a success for Lin Piao.)

Other information and indications provided by the Chinese documents, however, support the interpretation that the former mayor of Peking [Peng Chen] -- who continued to hold his position even after the military conference -- fell over the united front question or over Mao's anti-united front actions of the spring of 1966, which among other things led to the break with the Japanese Communist party. Peng Chen was also called to account for his relationships with figures like Wu Han, Teng To, Fan Chin, etc., who could scarcely have held the positions they did in Peking without his backing.(1) This would support a view that Peng Chen was relatively favorable to some "liberalization"; certain passages from his speech would also suggest this hypothesis.

Once the attack on Peng was decided upon, the whole Peking affair became the central question for two months. Mao wanted to destroy a group which he could not rely on and to sound the alarm on the existence of a "revisionist" danger even in the high echelons of the administration and in the party apparatus itself. The occasion was also utilized to settle old scores over past differences which had probably arisen over the way to confront signs of criticism and opposition such as the literary and journalistic work of Wu Han, Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, etc. In addition, Lu Ting-yi was probably dismissed in connection with this affair.

Throughout this phase -- before the beginning of the first wave of the "Cultural Revolution" -- Mao still hoped for a firm majority in the regular leading bodies and more particularly in the standing committee of the political bureau. The rupture with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping had not yet taken place. These two figures performed their functions as usual, receiving delegations and giving important speeches. During March and April, Liu went abroad on an official trip which the press kept playing up. Teng played a conspicuous role in the May meetings with the Albanians, which culminated in the adoption of a document which Peking considered very important. On May 6, in a speech in Shanghai, Teng attacked centrist attitudes in international policy, denouncing the supporters of joint action and compromise with the revisionists. This attack was probably primarily aimed at Peng Chen.

We must not forget, moreover, that during this period the Mao group was still putting its emphasis on the primacy of the party. (We have stressed the concrete meaning of this leitmotiv enough and there is no need to go into it again in this report.)

The crisis in the state and party political apparatus deepened after June and in the weeks which preceded the central committee plenum. This was primarily the consequence of tensions which were developing in certain sectors where vigorous responses from elements and groups attacked went hand in hand with an emerging danger that the student strata, once set in motion, would go beyond the group which launched the "Cultural Revolution," and get out of control.(2) But the worsening of the conflict was also caused by international developments, especially the further U.S. escalation in Vietnam and the open break with the Japanese Communist party and North Korea.

It was probably in those weeks that Mao realized that the struggle would be a very difficult one and that he might be defeated. It is hard to know for certain in which body he found himself in a minority at any given time. The situation was confused in the political bureau and above all in the standing committee of that body, which is the real leadership, and only a minority was ready to support Mao's line all the way.

We know still less about the relationship of forces in the central committee. But the essential fact was that Mao could no longer count on the steadfast support of the leadership cadres, who had passed through all the trials of the civil war and the revolution -- the 800 Edgar Snow speaks of -- in their entirety. He must have clearly seen that diverging tendencies and oppositional currents were shaping up more and more, even in the political apparatuses which he had relied on at the start; and he must have drawn the conclusion from this that he had to go outside the regular bodies and resort to mobilizations from below.

Following this decision, the crisis reached a new stage and its character began to change. It was no longer simply an interbureaucratic conflict; sections of the masses began to get caught up in the struggle and to move in accordance with a dynamic relatively independent of the bureaucratic system.

The question is posed whether the

(1) The polemic over the play "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office" brought out clearly that this group operated as a tendency acting with definite ends.

(2) Remember that it was just at this time that the polemics started against the cadres and leaders who were supposed to have feared the masses, hesitated to take a position, did not like "big posters," etc.

crisis was caused from the outset by tensions between the bureaucracy, or certain sections of it, and the masses. It goes without saying that in the last analysis a bureaucracy is conditioned by the tendencies arising in the various social strata; but in a stricter, more direct sense, there have not been sufficient factors at work in China to date, to justify interpretations that pressures from below were decisive. The crisis arose at the top in a clash between groups within the bureaucracy and it was only when a faction of the leadership decided to appeal to the rank and file that the masses, taking advantage of the breach, began to mobilize.

In other words, social tensions did exist -- I myself have already spoken of them elsewhere -- but, to begin with, they were not of an immediate and dramatic character and, moreover, the prestige which the leadership and the cadres still enjoyed acted as a buffer. Only after the crisis of the leadership and the leadership's fragmentation became clear to everyone did the masses intervene in all their social weight. Furthermore, this did not happen in one fell swoop; the mobilization reached its height in January 1967, four months after the plenum decisions.

The Red Guard Movement and
the Period from August to November 1966

There are still several obscure points with regard to the period following the central committee plenum: The most common sources of information (the big posters) have a very doubtful value, both in and of themselves and because of the garbled translations picked up by the international press. According to some reports, another meeting of the central committee took place in October and many dismissed officials were imprisoned; but the official sources have given no word of this. There has been no mention of a second meeting of the central committee and only at a later stage do the documents mention arrests, without however mentioning any names.

This period is primarily characterized by the struggle against the group which was defeated at the plenum and by the many-sided and contradictory development of the Red Guard movement. In this regard, I will add nothing to what is said in the IEC statement.(3) [See World Outlook, May 19, 1967.]

We are witnessing, basically, very violent attacks on the apparatus, actions

often accompanied by grave excesses, occasional open clashes between the Red Guards and sections of the masses(4), and, last but not least, instances of the Red Guards getting out of hand, which have been confirmed by the most diverse sources; and in the meantime, a considerable part of the apparatus is resisting Mao's line and organizing to defend its people and positions which are being threatened.

In our November 1966 document, we stressed that the Red Guard movement's factional origin -- it was conceived as an instrument of pressure and a tool of the Mao tendency in its struggle against its adversaries -- did not exhaust the question of its full objective import.

The subsequent events and later reports have demonstrated the following points:

1. The Red Guards have often gone beyond the objectives set for them and have resisted attempts to impose strict discipline on them or even to demobilize them. Thus, their activity has acquired an objectively antibureaucratic significance.(5)

2. The Red Guards were not tightly organized and strictly controlled from above by the Mao tendency but were divided into many groups and reassembled into many groupings, sometimes in open rivalry with each other (in which cases it is probable that parallel organizations developed). The official documents themselves mention "false" Red Guards or "reactionary" Red Guards, and sometimes give figures on such groups existing in a given locality.

3. A rather well-defined tendency claiming to base itself on the thought and line of Mao developed its own line in practice and even employed its own organizational forms. In July 1966, during the first waves of the student movement, "Cultural Revolution work groups" operating independent of the orders of the Maoist leading center had already gone into action; new difficulties arose immediately after the close of the plenum.(6)

(4) See, among other things, the "Sixteen Points," pp. 6-7, Hsinhua, English edition, September 6, 1966.

(5) Sometimes the Red Guard documents have been drawn up in a style significantly different from the style of the official documents and expressed ideas which the top Maoist leadership certainly did not approve of (for example, the summary condemnations of the entire period subsequent to 1949 contained in the documents displayed at the University of Peking.)

(6) On this subject, see especially a speech by Mao Tse-tung's wife, Pékin Information, No. 50, 1966.

(3) The statement adopted is significantly different from the draft submitted by this reporter, who expressed his reservations by his abstention.

According to accusations by orthodox Maoists, this tendency was responsible for the use of coercive methods and the conflicts ensuing therefrom. It is possible these "work groups" wanted to come down harder on the oppositionists and especially those elements considered centrist. This diversity of views and activities was facilitated by a factor which would play an even greater role when the worker and peasant masses were mobilized, that is, the character of the Mao group's appeals, agitation, and ideological propaganda.

On the one hand, it could not both advance revolutionary democratic and equalitarian propaganda themes, and denounce widespread infiltration of the party and state apparatus by supporters of capitalism and, at the same time, prevent the movement which it had set in motion from striking out against the apparatus and undertaking directly anti-bureaucratic actions.

On the other hand, the vagueness of the Maoist propaganda and the lack of any precise information on the real objects of dispute at the top greatly facilitated all sorts of tactical maneuvers by the oppositionists as well as confusion within the Maoist front itself. Independent of the factional maneuvers, sections of the masses clarified their aims in action, undoubtedly striking at times where the Mao group did not want them to.

Let us remember, finally, that Mao probably intended the Red Guards to contribute to the solution of the problem of educating the new generations, which were a cause of grave worry to the leading group. They sought to give these youth some sort of substitute revolutionary mobilization by mobilizing broad sections of them in a very arduous struggle. It is significant that the Red Guards were often given military training and, for a period, were mobilized in long marches which were represented in the propaganda as a repetition of the civil war epoch.

The Ferment in Shanghai and the Other Cities

The IEC draft document says:

"The immediate cause of the events of January 1967 lay in the rupture in the leadership of the Chinese CP and in the growing disintegration of the party and state apparatus at all levels. A vacuum, a relative absence of power, was thus created. In these conditions, in which the appeals to the masses helped, the various social forces were set in motion, each impelled by its own needs and objectives."

This is the essential feature of our interpretation: From a certain point

on, the mass mobilization followed its own logic, independent of the moves at the top.(7) This does not exclude the possibility that the Mao group's propaganda and its appeals acted as a stimulus, or that oppositionists in turn strove to win the support of the masses.

In practice, all these factors were intertwined because the masses could not have had a very clear awareness of what was taking place, of the real import of their movement, since the oppositionists could not act openly but had to adopt manifold tactical expedients and the Mao group was forced to take contradictory postures. This explains, among other things, the fact that there were sections of the working class on both sides and that arguments, valid in and of themselves, were advanced both by those participating in the strikes and by the members of the so-called revolutionary rebel organizations. This also explains why the movement continued to develop after the Maoist center intervened to repress it and why, moreover, the Maoist propaganda continued its chicanery around certain revolutionary democratic themes (new soviet structures, etc.), even in the most dangerous phases of the crisis.

Both the official sources and the international bourgeois (and pro-Soviet) sources, for obviously different reasons, have advanced interpretations which coincide on the essential points: the strikes, particularly the Shanghai strikes, were organized by Mao's opponents. This thesis is weakened, however, by the fact that the Shanghai leadership had been Mao's main support when the crisis was touched off and that the city committee of the party decided unanimously to publish the famous article against Wu Han (see Hsinhua, June 12, 1966, p. 12).

Later on, Shanghai was cited as the model city of the "Cultural Revolution" (see, for example, Pékin Information, No. 22, 1966) and its economic achievements were praised as exemplary.(8) In reality, Shanghai is the clearest example of how the Maoist group became gravely split in the course of the events and of the fact that one of the basic reasons for this split was the question of what attitude to take toward the mounting mass movement.

(7) For my interpretation of the January 1967 events, see my articles in World Outlook, February 3 and March 3, 1967.

(8) At the time, these economic successes were celebrated in virtually the same terms used (in March 1965) to exalt the happy consequences of the "taking of power" (Hsinhua, July 17, 1966).

When the late December-early January crisis broke out, the Shanghai leadership split: One part -- probably the majority -- opted for concessions; another (including Yao Wen Yuan, the author of the article against Wu Han) resisted the movement and began to organize the revolutionary rebels. Another proof of our interpretation is this: For four or five days -- a long period under the circumstances -- the central Maoist group took no clear position, creating concern among the orthodox Maoist group in Shanghai.(9)

I have nothing to add here to what is said in the document with regard to the workers' demands. I would only emphasize, however, that numerous organizations with the most diverse mandates were created throughout the entire period of the crisis following July 1966 and that there were also organizational developments during the mobilization of the working masses. In Shanghai, in particular, the workers formed organizations of a trade-union type which the Mao group attacked as corporative bodies; the aim of these organizations was probably to meet the needs left unsatisfied by the bureaucratized unions, which the Mao group also criticized.

As we said in the draft submitted to this plenum, the Shanghai events again enabled us to see the real nature of the Mao group's goals in practice. As soon as the movement went beyond the predetermined objectives and as soon as the masses went into motion in accordance with their own dynamic and thus introduced a factor dangerous to the bureaucratic system as a whole, Mao turned against it and appealed not just to the most loyal elements but to the army, whose role became decisive, to block the demonstrations and strikes. The facts on the significance of this intervention are clear from the official sources themselves and it is also clear that repressive measures were taken and announced in the press.

However, since it could not allow itself to be cut off from the masses or to contradict its own ideological slogans in too flagrant a way, the Mao tendency had to continue its appeals to the masses and to strive to present the "conquests of power" by its supporters as turns toward a revolutionary democratic renewal of the state apparatus.

(9) See Hsinhua, January 1, p. 25; January 13, p. 19; January 20, p. 11. The breadth of the mass mobilization and the extent of the disarray in the Maoist ranks is confirmed by the fact that there was ferment even among the Taching workers, usually cited as exemplary in official propaganda (see Hsinhua, January 20, p. 24).

To this end, it sought to link up with the most advanced sectors of the movement; but it could not keep the movement from getting out of hand again, or prevent the emergence of manifold new organizations, often jealous of their independence and their "seniority," or forestall new onslaughts on the party and state apparatus, which produced conflicts and new splits in the Maoist ranks themselves.

All these developments explain Mao's latest strategy. After the middle of January, while the battle was still in full swing, he began to advance, without much clarity at first, the theme of the "Great Alliance." He proceeded rather rapidly to define further his objective, which was to assure a balanced participation by the various elements in the new bodies being formed and to rehabilitate a majority of the cadres and leaders.

Thus, the "Triple Alliance" formula was born and became a truly central theme; it was further specified that the army was to be the "backbone," or the "keystone," of the alliance and that the cadres were indispensable because of their experience and abilities. At the same time, a campaign was initiated to unify and centralize all the groups which had been formed and against the so-called ultrademocratic, anarchist, etc., tendencies, which did not seem disposed to accept supervision, radically criticized the past, and wanted to sweep away all the old cadres.

The Shanghai and Peking "Communes" proved to be ephemeral propaganda exercises and control was invested either in persons sent from the center (Shanghai)(10) or in police officials (Peking).

Later information shows the army, which remains the most solid apparatus after both the party and the state have been shaken by the succeeding waves of the crisis, to be tightening its grip, while the official propaganda is stressing the necessity of promoting production (especially in the countryside). It is clear that the Mao group is seeking a new equilibrium, though it is still torn by contradictory needs and pressures and cannot hope to stabilize the situation in the long run.

Before concluding on this point, I would like to note especially for the benefit of partisans of certain interpretations, that at the most critical moments the Mao group has tended to turn again to the highest party and state bodies and re-invest them with their former authority. The documents considered most important

(10) For information on the role of various individuals, see Hsinhua, February 25, February 28, 1967.

in the Shanghai crisis were circulated in the name of the central committee and the authority of the state council was invoked in recognizing the new governing bodies. Later, it was again the central committee which signed the appeals to the peasants and workers for the regular resumption of production. It is significant, moreover, that even the "Urgent Memorandum" of the Shanghai Maoist organizations addressed itself to the city committee of the party and the Bureau of Public Security for the application of the envisaged measures.

The Tendencies in the Countryside

Judging from information now available, the movement did not spread throughout the peasantry but was limited chiefly to certain regions near big cities like Shanghai and Peking.(11) The reason for this was probably that contacts with the city movements were more frequent in those regions and that this resulted in a greater politicalization; it was also easier for the peasants in those regions to see the differences between their standard of living and that of the urban population. Furthermore, elimination of this inequality was in fact one of the demands attributed to the peasant movement by the official sources and, indeed, it is explained quite clearly that tensions among the peasantry arose over this issue.

We have pointed out elsewhere that there were no sources of dramatic and immediate tension in the Chinese countryside because conditions had greatly improved following the revolution, and the state had developed its relationships with the peasants on a completely different footing than the bureaucratic leadership in the USSR; this was also true because the prices paid for products delivered to the state were sufficiently profitable and the tax criteria, especially in recent years, markedly favored the peasants.(12) This situation could ex-

(11) Let us note, however, that conflicts were reported also in the Siyang region where the famous Tachai model brigade operated (see Hsinhua, March 5, 1967, pp. 12-13).

(12) It appears that the production teams distributed 60 percent (in money or in kind) of the value of what they produced among their members, after deducting production costs, taxes, the "common welfare" levy, and the contribution to the accumulation fund. The agricultural tax was set at 10 percent of 1961 production and has not changed with rising production. According to Bettelheim, private plots account for 5 percent of total land under cultivation and for 15 to 30 percent of the peasants' income. This figure of

plain why the movement in the countryside stayed within the limits described above.

Nonetheless, experience has demonstrated that as soon as a situation arose favoring "free" development of the dynamic of the different tendencies in society, the peasants' demands developed along the lines typical -- aside from specific features in one or another country -- of the transitional period (the objective basis, in the last analysis, is found in the still modest level of the development of the productive forces). Thus, even in China, despite all the special propitious conditions, despite the rectifications of the 1958-59 orientation, despite enormous ideological efforts, the peasants tended to demand greater and more direct participation in the sharing of the product, greater opportunities to operate on the "free" market, and more freedom to devote themselves to their private plots.(13)

According to rather frequent allusions in the official documents, such tendencies expressed themselves on several occasions -- for example, between 1959 and 1962 -- when some are said to have demanded that the family economy be given greater opportunity for development.(14)

This means that whatever the Chinese leadership may be when the crisis is over, it will be faced with problems which cannot be resolved by summary condemnations of "economism" or appeals against egoism.

As the element in the population comprised by the new generations grows, the peasants' relations with the regime will no longer be so much conditioned by the comparison between the prevailing conditions and those prior to the revolution; these relations will depend primarily on the ability of the regime and the cadres

5 percent of land under cultivation also appears in individual examples cited in the official sources.

(13) Moreover, it must not be forgotten that from the organizational standpoint the communes put the property of the production team and sometimes that of the brigade (i.e., basically the property of the agricultural producers' cooperative) above the more purely collective property.

(14) See Hsinhua, August 30, 1966, p. 5. Also for additional information, see Hsinhua, January 1, 1966, and Peking Information, No. 1, 1965, p. 13, for Chou En-lai's report. See also Hsinhua, February 28, 1967, p. 4, on criticisms of the cadres. There is an allusion in a recent document to a deviation, left in form but right in content, which Mao is said to have fought against in 1964 (Hsinhua, March 6, 1967, p. 5).

to resolve the basic problems of assuring the peasants a real part in decision-making in the allocation of the surplus and of creating living conditions in the countryside not too different from those in the cities (aside from purely eco-

nomie stimuli, the phenomenon of attraction to the cities, especially of the youth, appears to be shaping up in China also).

May 29, 1967

ANTIWAR DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN

The Japan Times of August 9 reports that a delegation of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) to Hanoi has agreed with its North Vietnamese counterpart to form an organization to protest or block the transport of strategic materials for use in the Vietnam war. This was disclosed August 7, the Japan Times states, by Jiichiro Koikawa, leader of the Sohyo delegation which had been on a 10-day visit to North Vietnam.

Koikawa, deputy director of Sohyo's Political Affairs Bureau, stated that the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions proposed establishing a "Pacific Congress of the Transport and Dock Workers Unions."

The Vietnam federation wanted Sohyo to take the lead in preparing for the creation of this body, according to Koikawa. He said that Sohyo would formally decide the question in a future executive meeting.

Japan is much more heavily involved in the Vietnam war than is usually recognized. In addition to the fast-growing U.S. bases employing thousands of workers, the Japanese war industry supplies over one billion dollars worth of goods to the Pentagon each year.

And a new aspect of complicity with the war, well known to college students in the United States may be developing.

According to the Japan Times, July 17, "an American graduate student has been prevented from doing research work at Tokyo University because he was in the employ of a U.S. aircraft company.

"And many schools which had been happily receiving research funds from the U.S. Army here for years suddenly shook with fright when this revelation was made and promised they would never touch another yen."

SUMMER SCHEDULE

World Outlook is now on its summer schedule. This means publication every other week on the average.

With the fall we will resume our regular weekly schedule.

In this issue

Page

Castro Challenges Moscow Line	
on Latin-American Revolution -- by George Novack	730
Carmichael Discusses Black Power in Havana Press Conference	731
The Wuhan "Kidnapping" and the "Cultural Revolution" -- by Dick Roberts	732
Canadian Students Endorse October 21 Mobilization	733
Split in the Pro-Peking Communist Party of India -- by Kailas Chandra	734
Ramachandran Explains His Expulsion	736
A New Split in the Maoist Party in Belgium -- by Pascal Lubra	738
Secret U.S. Casualties in Vietnam?	739
Political Evolution in Tanzania	740
Fourth International Defends Mexican Witch-Hunt Victims	742
The Indonesian Revolution Will Fight and Win	
Under the Revolutionary Banner of Tan Malakka -- by Fernand Charlier	743
Wide Publication of Trotsky's Books in Italy	745
Documents:	
The Evolution of the Crisis in China -- by Livio Maitan	746
Antiwar Developments in Japan	752