WORLD OUTLOOK

PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

Un service de presse ouvrier

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 21 rue d'Aboukir, Paris 2, France NEW YORK OFFICE: World Outlook, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

Vol. 4, No. 40

December 16, 1966

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CAMPAIGN FOR HUGO BLANCO GAINS IN MOMENTUM

Lima

DECEMBER l -- A temporary respite was gained in Hugo Blanco's appeal now before the Supreme Council of Military Justice, when an additional two weeks was granted the defense to argue the legal points involved in the case. This postponement is scheduled to come to an end next week.

Meanwhile the widespread international campaign in behalf of Hugo Blanco appears to be having an effect on the authorities although the Peruvian press is maintaining a conspiracy of silence about everything connected with it.

In Lima itself a number of actions have been taken to increase the pressure in support of Hugo Blanco.

Tomorrow a rally is scheduled to be held in the main square of the city, the

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Plaza San Martín, under the auspices of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights. The list of speakers includes Jacqueline de Lobatón, the widow of the martyred Guillermo Lobatón; the peasant leader Wladimiro Valer; Genaro Ledesma, a member of parliament; Manuel Aller, a student; Manuel Díaz Salazar, a worker; and Luchi Blanco, the sister of Hugo Blanco, who has herself been arrested and imprisoned because of her political views and her activities in helping to organize landless peasants.

The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, it should be remarked, is backed by liberal figures and by the entire left with the exception of the pro-Peking Communist party.

On November 24, the militant Federación de Construcción Civil sponsored a street meeting in opposition to the death penalty which hangs over Hugo Blanco. It was held in the Parque Universitario where the most militant demonstrations of the Peruvian students and workers have always been staged. One of the speakers was Rolando Riega, defense secretary of the Federación de Pescadores, whose strike is paralyzing the fish industry.

In face of huge obstacles, including the witch-hunt atmosphere fostered by the government, lack of funds and limited personnel (many leaders are still in prison), Hugo Blanco's partisans in Peru are working on an emergency basis to build up the biggest possible protest movement.

The movement here is very grateful for what is being done internationally and asks that it be continued and extended. Send telegrams and letters of protest, asking for an immediate amnesty for Hugo Blanco and the other political prisoners. Attention should be called to these by demonstrations at Peruvian consulates and embassies.

The appeals should be sent to the Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar, Lima, Peru.

Similar appeals should be cabled to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, Lima, Peru. Copies of these should be airmailed to Hugo Blanco's attorney, Dr. Alfredo Battilana, Av. Nicola de Pierola, 966; Oficina 215, Lima, Peru.

[$\underline{\text{World Outlook}}$, too, would appreciate receiving copies of these appeals by airmail.]

"LE MONDE" OUTLINES HUGO BLANCO CASE

[The following is a translation by $\underline{\text{World Outlook}}$ of an article which appeared in the Paris daily $\underline{\text{Le Monde}}$ of December 7. The author is $\underline{\text{Marcel Niedergang}}$, the well-known specialist in Latin-American affairs who contributes regularly to the influential French newspaper. The headline on the article reads, "Already Condemned to 25 Years in Prison -- the Peruvian Union Leader Hugo Blanco Is Threatened with the Death Penalty."]

Already condemned to twenty-five years in prison, incarcerated in a dungeon in the fortress-prison El Frontón in Peru, Hugo Blanco, young peasant union leader and head of the FIR (Revolutionary Left Front), is threatened, as we have previously reported, with a new trial and the death sentence.

Following his being sentenced to twenty-five years in prison by a military tribunal at Surena-de-Tacna, Hugo Blanco filed an appeal. After examining the dossier, the prosecuting attorney Ruiz de Somocursio held that "the crimes of premeditation, perfidy and cruelty" charged against the peasant leader deserved "capital punishment." At the same time, the prosecuting attorney demanded an increase in the sentence of twenty-two years in prison already imposed during the same trial on Pedro Candela, who is considered by the authorities to be a "lieutenant of Hugo Blanco."

Of what "perfidy" and "cruelty" were these men guilty to make them subject to sentences that are so obviously excessive that they have begun to arouse indignation in broad sectors of public opinion in the United States and Europe, where even the military tribunals of the most authoritarian countries no longer venture to practice such extreme harshness?

In 1961, Hugo Blanco, a student of agronomy, a generous idealist, revolted by the immense misery of the Indian peasants in the high Andean valleys, who are subjected to feudalistic exploitation, decided to help these serfs try to win a better life. He ran up against the two main obstacles that have blocked and continue to block all those

who cannot acquiesce, out of regard for dignity and justice, in the Peru of the mountains living in the Middle Ages while the Peru of the coast lives, at least for the privileged classes, in the twentieth century: First of all, the instinctive distrust of the rough and simple men of the altiplano toward "strangers" from Lima. Next, and above all, the archaic but powerful structures of a "slave-like" social system in which the "gamonal," the foreman, is the executive and repressive agent of a big landholder, living most often far from his lands.

However, very quickly, Hugo Blanco succeeded in organizing in the Cuzco region, a "Federation of Peasants of the Valley of la Convención." Located in Quillabamba, surrounded by dynamic "advisers," explaining to the peasants how, concretely, they had the possibility of exercizing the rights denied them for four centuries, Hugo Blanco succeeded in building -- something never before seen in these desolate highlands -- schools and dispensaries. The movement widened and took over the entire valley.

Headed by a banner bearing the national emblem of Peru, escorted by women and children, columns of thousands of peasants, their cheeks burned by the cutting winds of the sierra, started out on "peaceful marches" from their villages toward abandoned land or land notoriously uncultivated by the "hacenderos." Utilizing titles going back to the "ayllus," the Indian communities of the period preceding the Spanish conquest, the peasants installed themselves on the lands which they held belonged to them and waited for the authorities to recognize their "rights."

No violence occurred at the beginning of this movement of revolt which caught the landowners and the government by surprise. But incidents inevitably flared up and multiplied between the hated "gamonales" and the landless peasants. An order was issued to arrest Hugo Blanco. On November 14, 1962, two policemen fired at the union leader. He fired back, killing a policeman and wounding another. In flight, he still succeeded in organizing mass meetings on the theme, "Land or Death." Abandoned and betrayed, he was captured on May 30, 1963.

"Then," wrote Hugo Neira, a young student of Lima who witnessed the "peaceful marches" of the peasants, "the police took Blanco to Quillabamba like a martyr, barefooted and naked from the waist up, wounded, looking like a dying man. I saw people crying..."

The arrest did not immediately stop the movement to "take possession of the land." Almost three hundred haciendas were occupied before the end of 1963, and in December the unions staged a demonstration to win Hugo Blanco's release that was unsuccessful.

It was in this same region of La Convención that a "guerrilla focal center" appeared in the spring of 1965. Luis de la Puente Uceda, leader of the MIR (Revolution-ary Left Movement) and his friends Guillermo Labatón (who did postgraduate work in France and married a French girl), Héctor Béjar, Elio Portocarrero and other militants of the MIR, unleashed an armed insurrectional movement in hope of creating "a revolutionary situation." Eight months later an offensive of the Peruvian "special forces," having at their disposal unlimited means had crushed the main centers of the insurrection

In April 1964, while incarcerated in Arequipa, Hugo Blanco, in a letter to his friends, had prophetically indicated the reasons for the defeat of an insurrection, the unleashing of which he could not foresee at the time. "A great number of peasants are ready to lay down their lives, but not to leave the land they live on. They approve the slogan: 'Land or death!'...Out of one hundred peasants ready to struggle, ninety-nine are willing to be militiamen, only one a guerrilla. I don't want to go into details, but you can believe me: I know from experience..."

Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobatón are dead. Héctor Béjar and Ricardo Gadea are threatened with capital punishment. Walter Palacios, a student leader of Lima, is in prison and has been tortured, according to the Peruvian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Man. The life of Hugo Blanco, a nonviolent man driven to violence by the repression, is at stake...

FRENCH CATHOLIC STUDENTS APPEAL FOR HUGO BLANCO

The Catholic group of the School of Higher Education and the Standing Board of the Student Mission wired President Belaunde in behalf of Hugo Blanco, according to the December 6 Le Monde. "In the name of our friendship for Peru," the cable read, "we appeal to you to grant an amnesty for Hugo Blanco. His execution would shock the Christian students of France, particularly the many who, responding to the appeal of the Church to build a more just society, sympathize with the present effort to develop Latin America."



CONTINENTAL-WIDE MOBILIZATION URGED TO SAVE HUGO BLANCO

A continental-wide mobilization to prevent the judicial murder of Hugo Blanco has been suggested by the Argentine weekly <u>Nuestra Palabra</u>, according to the November 27 English-language edition of <u>Granma</u>, the official organ of the Cuban Communist party.

The Argentine paper charges that Hugo Blanco's death is being plotted by the Peruvian government and U.S. imperialists.

YON SOSA REPORTED WOUNDED

Agence France Presse reported December 1 that the Guatemalan government claimed that Yon Sosa, the leader of the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre, was wounded during a skirmish with government forces and two of his guerrilla followers killed. The report has not yet been confirmed by the MR-13.

LEFTISTS GAIN IN CHILEAN UNION

Santiago, Chile

In the middle of November, the Trabajadores de la Salud [Health Workers], which has a membership of about 38,000, held their third national congress. The rank-and-file delegates proposed a general strike but the bureaucratic leadership, which is dominated by the Communist party, did everything possible to block it.

The culmination of the bureaucratic maneuvers came when the CP barred the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria] and the PSR [Partido Socialista Revolucionaria] from presenting a joint slate of candidates for the National Board. The MIR and PSR ran a complete slate of 15 out of which they would probably have won 2, since the slate was backed by 45 delegates.

Confronted with this bureaucratic move and not wanting to seem to go along with a fraudulent election, the MIR and the PSR left the congress. They were backed by 80 delegates who also left as a demonstration of disapproval of the bureaucratic violation of union democracy. At the close of the congress, the Communist party had 105 votes, the Socialist party 102 and the Radical party 34. This shows the relative strength of the MIR and PSR which ended up with 80 delegates.

The delegates who left the congress stated that they are not leaving the federation. They will continue to stay, struggling for unity, but will organize a revolutionary tendency.

This new revolutionary current has sponsored two union newspapers, Adelante [Forward] and La Jeringa [The Syringe], which have been well received by the rank and file of the Trabajadores de la Salud, which is one of the most militant unions in Chile.

FACING PAGE: Sketches based on snapshots taken in the courtroom at Hugo Blanco's trial in Tacna at the beginning of September. Top left: Police try to restrain Hugo Blanco as he shouts, "Tierra o muerte!" [Land or death]. Top right: Part of the crowd that packed into the courtroom. Within a few sessions they were echoing Hugo Blanco's shout of "Tierra o muerte!" Some brought food for the prisoners and one donated his leather jacket to Hugo Blanco, who then wore it until the trial ended. Second row: the military judges who handed down the sentences. Third row: A side view of Hugo Blanco as he listens to the proceedings. Center right: Under questioning by his judges, Hugo Blanco turns the tables and accuses them of their guilt as representatives of Peru's ruling oligarchy. Bottom left: Hugo Blanco listening to his sentence — twenty-five years, to be served in the notorious fortress-prison El Frontón. When Hugo Blanco appealed this savage sentence, the prosecution countered by asking for the death penalty. Bottom right: Pedro Candela, comrade of Hugo Blanco, who was sentenced in the same trial to twenty-two years in El Frontón. When Candela joined Hugo Blanco in appealing to the Supreme Council of Military Justice, the prosecution demanded that he, too, be given a still heavier sentence.

KOREANS RAISE QUESTION OF VIETNAM AT BULGARIAN CP CONGRESS

The Ninth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist party, which was held in Sofia November 14-19, was a rather cut-and-dried affair that stirred little interest among Communist circles. However, a militant note in relation to the war in Vietnam was sounded by Huh Suk Sun, the head of a fraternal delegation from the Korean Workers party.

The escalation of American aggression in Asia, he declared, has transcended the immediate struggle in Vietnam itself. He cited a number of new moves by the Pentagon in Korea. In face of the mounting danger, he appealed for more effective aid to the Vietnamese freedom fighters and the beleaguered Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The speech by Huh Suk Sun was of special interest as an expression of a "third" tendency in the official international Communist movement, a grouping including the leaders of Cuba, Korea and to some degree Vietnam. They are pressing for a resolute stand, coupled with a united front in action, among all the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist forces in order to put a speedy halt to American aggression.

In the first part of his speech, Huh Suk Sun gave high praise to the Bulgarian Communist party and the achievements registered in Bulgaria since capitalism was overturned there. He then went on to present the Korean view on the war in Vietnam. This part of his speech was as follows:

"Comrades,

"Of late the U.S.-led imperialists are gravely harassing peace everywhere in the world, while opposing the socialist countries and suppressing the national liberation movement.

"The U.S. imperialists are further escalating their war of aggression in Vietnam.

"They have already drawn into South Vietnam over 350,000 U.S. aggressor troops and scores of thousands of satellite and puppet troops, and are carrying on barbarous 'scorched earth' operations and sending reinforcements continuously.

"They are intensifying brigandish bombing of the Vietnam Democratic Republic and have recently expanded the range of bombing to the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.

"The 'peace negotiations' chanted by the U.S. imperialists are nothing but a fraud for diverting elsewhere the attention of the world's people and camouflaging their intrigues for expanding the war.

"The 'Manila Conference' held some time ago was a war conference of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges for expanding their aggressive war in Vietnam to a new scale.

"The U.S. imperialists are intensifying aggression and provocations in Korea, too.

"They have already converted South Korea into their atomic-rocket base. Of late, they are aggravating tension ceaselessly by equipping the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and the puppet army with new-type weapons, readjusting and expanding the military setups and perpetrating armed attacks against the northern part of Korea along the military demarcation line.

"Stepping up Asian aggression, the U.S. imperialists are driving out Japanese militarism as the 'shock brigade' and converting Japan into a new war base of aggression.

"The obtaining situation makes it incumbent upon the anti-imperialist forces of the world to unite close and further intensify the struggle against imperialism, U.S. imperialism in particular.

"All the socialist countries should take a colder and tougher attitude toward U.S. imperialism and thoroughly expose and condemn its policy of aggression everywhere.

"As the U.S. imperialists are escalating the war of aggression in Vietnam so the socialist countries and all the progressive peoples of the world should escalate their struggle to oppose U.S. imperialism and aid Vietnam.

"Only through a staunch struggle against U.S. imperialism can its policies of

aggression and war be frustrated and peace safeguarded.

"Today it is very important to defend the cohesion of the Socialist camp and solidarity of the international communist movement.

"To this end, all the communist and workers' parties should abide by the norms governing the relations between fraternal parties such as equality, independency, mutual respect, noninterference in each other's internal affairs and comradely cooperation.

"The Korean people always value their friendship and solidarity with the Bulgarian people. We are convinced that the relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Korea and Bulgaria will develop in the interests of the two peoples on the principle of proletarian internationalism.

"In conclusion, I wish the Bulgarian people new success in fulfilling the tasks of socialist construction set by this Congress."

LAURENT SCHWARTZ DISCUSSES HOW FRENCH CAN HELP VIETNAM

[The following interview with Professor Laurent Schwartz, chairman of the French Committee for the Support of the Vietnamese People, was published by Le Nouvel Observateur November 16. The translation is by World Outlook.]

* * *

Question: What response do you expect from the appeal that you launched together with Henri Bartoli, Alfred Kastler and Jean-Paul Sartre?

Answer: Local and national committees already exist, but they are scattered. We hope for the formation of a national committee for Vietnam that will centralize all the efforts. We are not thinking of direct coordination but rather of all of them adhering to the national committee -- possibly with a dual status for the committees that want to retain a certain autonomy. We are asking the members of the committees and all those who have not yet joined any organization, to rejoin the national committee and set up rankand-file committees. There would be no federation of existing committees -- that would pose complicated political problems.

In a certain sense we want to start again from zero.

Q: What are your concrete objectives?

A: We are supporting what has already been initiated: the campaign for a Million [francs] for Vietnam, the International Day Against the War on December 10, the tribunal organized by Bertrand Russell to judge the war crimes of the American government, the campaign to recruit a body of civilian volunteers -- nurses, doctors, who would place themselves at the disposition of North Vietnam...But we are looking farther ahead. We could consider effectively boycotting American products in France. Of course, since many products contain American ingredients, it would be necessary to take several companies; let's say Coca Cola, Ford, some brands of cigarettes...The question must be thought out carefully. The members of the rank-and-file committees can debate their ideas and work out something in common. We are likewise thinking of a magazine.

Q: How is the November 28 demonstration shaping up?

A: This will be the first "public showing" of the National Committee for Vietnam. It is projected for the Palais des Sports. Max Ernst is getting up a poster. Sartre is to speak on the war in Vietnam. We will have a first showing of a film by Wilfred Burchett. Last May the demonstration "Six Hours for Vietnam," at the Mutualité, was limited to the Paris region. On November 28 we would like similar demonstrations to be organized in other cities in order to give the day the character of a national rather than simply Parisian effort.

The problem is to set the entire public in motion. Many people are discouraged. They say, "You are working for nothing; nothing will come of it..." It should not be forgotten that since 1945, public opinion and mass ideological movements have often won against pure force. Remember, when Tito resisted Stalin, everywhere at the beginning all you could find was skepticism. He held out. The way Cuba held out against the American military threat. After the war in Algeria, many French intellectuals engaged in a kind of self-flagellation: "We lost our time; we accomplished nothing." This is false,

we accomplished calling the attention of public opinion to the problems of the war in Algeria. Due to this opinion, the government could not intervene massively, it could not "wrap up the package"...The manifesto of the 121 led to the big October 27 demonstration of the UNEF [Union Nationale des Etudiants de France]. That touched off a movement of public opinion. This movement led de Gaulle to make his trip to Algeria, a trip during which the Algerian masses entered into the scene in a spectacular way.

- Q: Just how much is the French left "blocked" with regard to the war in Vietnam because the government appears to be following an oppositional policy?
- $\underline{\mathtt{A}}$: Internationally, the gaullist regime is following a leftist policy. The third world recognizes it. The actions that we can undertake appear to some ineffective in comparison with the gaullist action. But we could surpass gaullism. De Gaulle does not follow his international policy on a domestic level.

Gaullism wants action at a summit level with regard to Vietnam. De Gaulle says to us: "Have confidence in me." We want something quite different -- to think and to act politically. This difference is fundamental.

- Q: In face of the war in Vietnam, the French left seems to be, if not divided, at least not very well united. Why hasn't any Communist figure signed the appeal for the creation of a National Committee for Vietnam?
- A: Yes, the present formations of the left, in facing the war in Vietnam, are not very effective. We have solicited Communist signatures. We are still ready to take them. A united movement cannot be organized without the Communists. But, for the moment, they don't want to become engaged along these lines. We hope that they will turn out massively for the demonstration on the twenty-eighth, that they will join the committee for Vietnam in a massive way.
- Q: What, in your opinion, does the National Liberation Front expect from the French?
- $\underline{\mathtt{A}}$: Many things. They would like to see us help bring their case before international public opinion. The North Vietnamese came to the "Six Hours for Vietnam." They attach great importance to all the demonstrations of solidarity.
- Q: Do certain things that have been undertaken, like the Russell tribunal, attract the complete support of the Vietnamese?
- $\underline{\mathtt{A}}$: Most certainly! The Vietnamese are very much interested in the tribunal, but perhaps they wish it could be effective immediately, that it would quickly condemn the American government. I think instead that the tribunal has a role of historic importance. The heads of state must understand that they are not beyond the judgment of men.
- Q: Often, "appeals" of the kind you have just launched attract primarily university people, the intellectuals, and regroup them in a kind of ghetto. How do you get out of it?
- A: That is one of our objectives. Some people would like the university circles, the intellectuals, to stay off by themselves. In fact, there are not many countries East or West in which the masses of the people are not screened from the most "thinking" part of the nation. Before 1914, there was a kind of communication between the university circles and the masses. People's universities correspond with a very democratic idea. Today a screen separates the popular masses from the intellectuals. It would seem in order, it seems to me, to organize a "teach in" with the workers in the Renault plants. The American university circles, who are fighting so courageously, feel the same kind of isolation. There is no center linking the university circles and the masses. The loss of this tradition is grave.

In the "developed" countries, the main alienation of the working class is not merely economic -- it is cultural. The masses of workers do not participate in culture. The intellectuals ought to get in touch with them -- and certain people fear the effect of this contact. In addition, the unions often struggle for economic demands, but very seldom for cultural demands. This is likewise one of the causes for the loss of interest in politics.

PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

UN delegates are wrestling with a tough one -- how to define "outer space." Is it interstellar space, interplanetary space, or the space immediately outside the earth? A still more ticklish question is "inner space"; but it is not sure that this comes within the competence of the august body.

HOW THE SOVIET PEOPLE SIZE UP MAOISM

What has been the effect on popular consciousness in the Soviet Union and China of the dispute between the Maoist and Khrushchevist regimes? Very little that might be considered reliable has appeared on this in the world press. The main reason for the lack of information is of course the absence of socialist democracy in either country. It is extremely difficult to gauge sentiment without provisions for the spontaneous expression of opinion through a free proletarian press or through polls conducted on a scientific basis. So long as such material is not available, it is necessary to rely on scattered reports, indirect evidence, deductions and the impressions of observers whose objectivity and competence are only too often subject to reservations.

An article by Claude Roy in the November 16 issue of the Paris weekly <u>Le Nouvel</u> Observateur on the popular mood in the Soviet Union is of exceptional interest in this respect. Entitled "From the Cult of Stalin to the Idolatry of Mao" [Du culte de Staline à l'idolâtrie de Mao], it compiles the views of ordinary people with whom Claude Roy talked in many parts of the Soviet Union after making a visit to China. The author specifies that he saw none of the Soviet leaders and that he is excluding the opinions of the Soviet sinologists. Moreover, his own aim in the discussions he engaged in was to counteract the split and to help bring about a better understanding of Peking's position among the Soviet people.

The article conveys two overwhelming impressions: the profound and ineradicable way in which the evils of the Stalin cult registered on popular consciousness and the way in which Mao's rehabilitation of Stalin and fostering a cult of his own personality completely blocked any possibility of the Maoists receiving a sympathetic hearing among the Soviet masses.

The universal response among all those interviewed by Roy ran as follows, he reports: "What do the Chinese propose to us in their speeches, the Russian language broadcasts of Radio Peking, Mao's newspapers? To go back to Stalin. They talk about Stalin's 'errors' for ten seconds and his 'great merits' for an hour. Their criticism of Stalin is like the pâté that's half rabbit and half horse -- one rabbit and one horse. A rabbit of condemnation and a horse of approval. If they have learned nothing from all that we suffered and endured, then it's not the uninterrupted revolution that's developing in China but the reenactment of all our misfortunes and of other peoples which were also part of the revolution."

Stalin, the purges, the camps, the terror, the Twentieth Congress -- all this, says Roy, pertains to <u>domestic politics</u>. But this nevertheless lies at the heart of the problem of foreign policy, of the big Sino-Soviet debate.

"You think you have grasped, felt, what the big Stalinist 'freeze' was like," he continues. "But it was only in the Soviet Union itself, after all the reports, secret or otherwise, of witnesses, documents, that I was able to gauge the profound silent fear of the people, the depth and the extent of the evil."

Roy says that despite everything he had had a tendency to believe that there was at least some exaggeration in the figures provided by informed Communists and the anti-Soviet Kremlinologists. He even thought that Aragon, the well-known French Stalinist intellectual, was exaggerating when he gave the fearful figure of 18,000,000 deported, of whom 3,000,000 died; and that Souvarine and Branko Lazitch were exaggerating in a still worse way when they talked of 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 deported, with 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 who disappeared.

"From Moscow to Erivan, I found hardly a single family that had not lost one or two members in the German-Russian War and that had not had one or two other members imprisoned, deported, shot or who disappeared during the big purges from 1938 to 1948.

"There is an obvious striking Soviet vitality that prevents one from advancing questionable hypotheses about biological fatigue, the exhaustion of the Russian people and their republics. But, in a fifty-year period, they have undergone three bloodlettings that have hardly any historic precedent: the civil war and the famine, a repression beyond all measure, a world war that was more savage and destructive in their land than anywhere else."

A Soviet historian told Roy: "Revisionist? If this means being a disciple of Bernstein or Karl Kautsky, no. But the weight of several million Communists sent to prison and of endless massacres -- don't you think that this perhaps compels you to revise certain ideas and assumptions? The Chinese consider us 'modern revisionists.' This is the jargon of ideological epithets. As for me, I am content to think of myself

as a critical reexaminer of the history of the Revolution."

Roy continues by telling about his findings in Georgia and Armenia concerning the decimation of the intellectuals and workers there during the great purge. A few sentences will indicate the nature of this chilling account. "Out of a dozen students in Piatigorsk whom I met one evening by chance, there were six parents or uncles killed in the war, four older brothers killed in the war and eighteen close relatives who were arrested, deported or who disappeared between 1938 and 1952."

How the Soviet people could retain their faith in socialism in face of the Stalinist terror appears almost miraculous. But Roy offers some anecdotes showing how in the very worst days faith in the socialist future survived and along with it the conviction that a regression of this kind would never occur again.

It is against this background that Roy places the interviews and arguments he had with many different individuals.

"In all the circles with whom I talked, the Chinese 'errors' were rarely discussed dispassionately. You could feel the still raw wounds, the acute sensibilities. I did not agree with much of their criticism nor all their uneasiness. It is nonetheless important to understand them, these people like a cat burned to the quick that (perhaps) fears cold water. And since the Soviet press limits itself, in general, to replying very briefly (and rather vaguely) to the Chinese attacks, it is well to listen carefully to the unauthorized voices of the 'ordinary' people.

"The Soviet people know the atrocious reality accompanying the exaltation of Stalin, the dithyrambs, the unrestrained iconography, the generalized cult, the state religion of the Father of the Peoples, the genius chief, the dazzling sun, etc., and it is understandable that the extraordinary idolizing of the figure of Mao organized by the press, the mass organizations and the official Chinese speeches evokes horrible memories among them. When Radio Peking reports that on the day when Chairman Mao went swimming in the Yangtse someone swimming in the river became so excited on finding himself nearby that he burst out shouting: 'Long live Chairman Mao! (and) swallowed several gulps of water but the taste of which seemed to him particularly delicious'; or rebroadcasts a speech that begins with: 'Oh, Chairman Mao! You are the reddest sun of the red suns of our heart!' it is agreed that the people need to have an exemplary figure whom they can admire, but as simple and rough as the masses are, it is always unhealthy to offer them the statue of a living god to adore.

"When you explain in the Soviet Union that the men who were the official spokesmen yesterday of the 'struggle against modern revisionism' -- Peng Chen who levelled his attacks in the name of the Chinese CP in 1965 from the podium of a congress in Indonesia, or Chou Yang, the Zhdanov of Chinese culture -- are 'degenerate neobourgeois elements, a hodge-podge of feudalism, capitalism and modern revisionism, a counter-revolutionary clique,' the Soviet people say that these methods remind them unfortunately of the most dangerous Stalinist methods -- transformation of critics into opponents, opponents into traitors, amalgamation, gross deformation and extremist simplication of critical positions, authoritarian smothering of tactical differences, mis-representation of nuances in thought into plotting activities."

Roy reports that a large number of persons told him: "Through the truncated quotations of the Communists who are in process of being placed under the steamroller of the Great Cultural Revolution, you can tell that there are in fact within the Chinese party, in the Central Committee and in the ministries, courageous men who do not agree with idolizing Mao, with reducing the Marxist tradition to a single 'thought,' with the blows struck against democratic centralism, with the impossibility of reestablishing the unity of the 'socialist camp.' These men are neither Johnny-come-lately. Communists nor 'agents of imperialism.' To present them as adepts in 'the restoration of capitalism,' as defenders of 'a right opportunist, antiparty and antisocialist line,' as 'the spokesmen of the reactionary classes,' is neither honest nor in conformity with the principles of a regime that seeks to explain, to educate, to persuade, to convince. This was precisely the way Stalin liquidated nine-tenths of the Old Guard Bolsheviks, by distorting their thought, by slandering them, by arresting and killing them."

To this, Roy responded, "But it seems that in China there have been neither any 'Moscow Trials,'nor summary executions, nor concentration camps. My friends K.S. Karol, Marc Riboud, and ten other Western specialists visited China without seeing anything like that."

Sample retorts ran like this: "Norentz told me, 'You stopped in 1952 at Kras-noyarsk. Did you see the camp where I was, less than a hundred kilometers north of that

city? Did a single person from the West, from 1938 to 1954, see the Soviet camps?'

"A Tass correspondent who had returned from China said: 'China doesn't have any camps. Let's say it's so. But when a Chinese "revisionist" intellectual is taken under heavy guard to a people's commune 800 kilometers from Peking and handed over to the peasants with the words, "Here's an enemy of the people; he hates you; look at his soft hands! He's yours; make him work hard; do with him what you want"; what shape do you think he will be in a few months later?'

"A Russian writer who had traveled in China told me: 'When the ministry of State Security said in a report -- two years later -- that there had been only (sic) two million persons executed between 1949 and 1952 was there a single person from the Soviet Union or the West who witnessed a single one of these executions? No. If Stalin could murder millions of Soviet citizens without this creating much reaction outside of Russia at the time, this could occur much easier still in China.'"

The debates on specific points which Roy engaged in fill in the picture he paints of the feelings of ordinary people in the Soviet Union:

"If you reply to them that they are saying that an inclination, a tendency is under way in China, they nod. They saw Stalin's <u>tendency</u> to see 'enemies of the people' at every step at too close range to have any confidence or optimism.

"If you tell them that China is a besieged fortress, excluded from the UN, denied the bomb by Russia, which America promises to destroy, encircling China meantime, that a country in a virtual state of war cannot 'afford the luxury' of a generalized democracy, that the true law for China in 1966 is martial law, that the results already obtained are considerable, justifying the means employed, they reply:

"'It was in preparation for the war that Stalin decapitated the general staff of the Soviet army, piling up errors that enabled the Germans to penetrate to the very heart of Russia; that he undermined the revolutionary faith of our people. Read the new historical book just published in Moscow under the title '21 June 1941' and you will see if the Stalinist terror, the dismantling of the Old (and the Young) Guard Bolsheviks, the destruction of all the former democracy in the party prepared our country so well to undergo and repulse Hitler's attack! It is not by 'painting up' reality, by mobilizing children in the streets in place of getting the militants in the party's mass organizations to think, by sending fifteen-year-old Red Guards to break the windows in the federations of the party whose leaders displease one that you prepare a people to win a war that threatens the country! It is not by shouting betrayal the moment anyone expresses a critical view, by slandering 'opponents' before dropping them through a trap door, by simplifying everything in the most grotesque way, by creating a living Buddha in a pea jacket, that you strengthen the masses, even if they are primitive, backward, ignorant and enthusiastic.'

"And when you try, with informed people, to weigh the pros and cons of the Chinese Revolution, to measure who is right and who is wrong in the issues in dispute in the big split, they finally say:

"'You make us laugh, you people of the left in the West, who split hairs as if it were a political round table or a comparison of economic balance sheets! Yes, Vietnam is bleeding under the imperialist bombs; yes, the hungry peoples look toward the USSR and China to learn what road to take in order to free themselves. Meanwhile we are arguing with madmen who want us at any cost to plunge into a swamp where we would be immobilized without any gain; and you talk as if it were a matter of an Olympic match between two contestants. Russia has greater weight but the Yellow men have very clever holds. The Chinese have learned nothing from our errors; nothing can make us forget Stalinism. The revolutionary spirit today, the defense of the oppressed or bombed peoples, does not consist of shouting slogans, of tripping up allies, of stifling revolutionary thought as under the Komsomols of Stalin's time who learned in school to denounce their parents and to demand that their father be shot or today under the ravings of the Red Guards, who are repeating it. We are neither perfect nor infallible; but we are now in a position to understand and to make our friends understand the causes of our success and the roots of our errors.

"'For the immediate future, it is not by preventing us from furnishing Vietnam with matérial, arms, technicians, and in having Red Guards march under the windows of our embassy in Peking booing us, that you can help the Vietnamese to conquer. More distantly, it is not by converting the socialist revolution into a caricature, by repeating the lies of Stalin with Mao's sauce, Stalin's crimes in a Chinese style, the cult and the terror of Stalin camouflaged behind silken curtains, that you will inspire the peoples of the third world to break the yoke of neocolonialism and of imperialism. The

Chinese policy is not only Vietnam martyrized, it is Indonesia bleeding, it is Southeast Asia handed over to the Americans, it is the Japanese Communists correctly aghast, it is the Mongols and the Koreans taking their distance from Peking, it is Cuba breaking with China. The Chinese say that America is a paper tiger. But China, right now, what should it be called? A silk tiger...!

Roy says that he would have liked to have left the Soviet Union reassured, again comforted and optimistic as to the perspectives for a possible, if not even early reconciliation between the "heirs of October and the heroes of the Long March." However, he left much more pessimistic than when he went there. In fact he despairs that anything can be done. "Despair, I know," he says in conclusion, "is not a political attitude. But unfortunately it is the only thing I believe today is realistic."

BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN SERVE AN INDONESIAN GUEST AN HORS D'OEUVRE

Adam Malik, the foreign minister of the counterrevolutionary Indonesian government, stopped off in the Soviet Union on the way back from a visit to the United States, and was wined and dined there from October 17 to October 22.

It is unavoidable for a workers state to maintain diplomatic relations with bourgeois governments, even those that have just engaged in the mass murder of Communists and revolutionary workers. The government headed by Lenin was forced to adhere to this pattern; and Lenin explained why it had to conform as long as the world revolution still remained to be completed.

Of course, in Lenin's time Communist parties never automatically shaped their policies in accordance with the diplomatic needs of the Soviet government. Lenin's government in particular never confused normal diplomatic relations between states with opportunistic adaptation or even approval of the bourgeois policies of governments with which the Soviet Union was forced to maintain relations.

Things changed radically in Stalin's time. Khrushchev continued the pattern of gross opportunism established by Stalin. And Brezhnev-Kosygin are following the same path.

Thus, in preparation for Malik's stopover in Moscow, M.D. Sytenko, the Soviet ambassador in Djakarta, went out of his way to laud the counterrevolutionary Indonesian government. According to a dispatch released September 18 by Antara, the Indonesian press agency, Sytenko declared that Indonesia was "continuing her anti-imperialist and anticolonialist policy" and that "the attitude of the Soviet government towards Indonesia remains unchanged."

In Moscow October 18, Malik was the guest of honor at a banquet at which he delivered a lengthy speech. The Soviet press kept this speech under wraps, but Antara reported it extensively October 19. On reading this report, one can readily understand why the Soviet press found silence to be highly appropriate.

At the banquet, Malik violently attacked the Indonesian Communist party and defended his government's decision to smash it. He further warned his hosts not to comment on what he was saying, since the suppression of the Indonesian Communist party was an "internal problem" of concern only to Indonesia. His compliant hosts dutifully adhered to his strictures.

But the worst act of betrayal was committed by Stalin's heirs just before Malik arrived in Moscow. Answar Dharmar, correspondent of <u>Harian Rakjat</u>, the official organ of the Indonesian Communist party, was expelled from the Soviet Union!

The counterrevolutionary Indonesian government stands in the blood of 500,000 murdered Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants. The murderers are free to travel as they will. The statesmen of imperialism and the political leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy vie in fêting them at banquets. And in this repulsive competition, it took Brezhnev-Kosygin to conceive of the idea of presenting Malik with the head of a representative of the witch-hunted Indonesian Communist party as an hors d'oeuvre.

WHERE DID WE HEAR THAT BEFORE?

The State Department admitted December 7 that U.S. helicopters were flying Thai troops for antiguerrilla operations in northeast Thailand. But, said a department spokesman, the helicopters and crews are "unarmed" and "not engaged in any combat."

MASS RALLY IN PARIS BACKS WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

By Ken Coates

Outside the great hall of the Mutualité in Paris November 28, thousands of young people were milling around every entrance. The hall was full, jammed with at least 6,000 people, standing in every corridor, craning their necks over the stairways. Once you were in, it was impossible to move, and quite impossible to get out through the seething thousands who were straining to get in. Altogether, perhaps 10,000, perhaps 15,000 had mustered.

The occasion was not a visit from the Beatles. It was altogether more serious: a rally, "Six Hours for Vietnam,"* organised under the honorary presidency of Bertrand Russell, at which, alongside other eminent spokesmen of the independent left in France, appeared a whole galaxy of international figures, centred around a group of members of the War Crimes Tribunal.

The meeting was chaired by Laurent Schwartz, himself a member of the tribunal, and amongst his colleagues speaking were Jean-Paul Sartre, Vladimir Dedijer, Dave Dellinger, Courtland Cox (representing the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Stokely Carmichael), and Ralph Schoenman, who brought a personal message from Bertrand Russell.

Other speakers included the Nobel prizewinner, Professor Alfred Kastler; the secretary of the Moroccan Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, Abderamane Youssefi; Paul Vergès, leader of the independence movement in Reúnion; and Lawrence Daly, secretary of the Scottish Miners' Union.

The meeting was big in every sense of the word. After a plenary session, which included a film in which Fidel Castro spoke in defense of the Vietnamese Revolution and which lasted in all for some three hours, the rally broke up into a number of seminars, some of which contained well over 1,000 people, to discuss various aspects of aid to the Vietnamese people's struggle.

Among the participants in these seminars, besides those already named, were André Gorz, Jean Baby, Jean-Marie Vincent, John Baker from the Australian trade-union movement, P. Vidal-Naquet, Claude Cadart, the Brazilian peasant leader Francisco Julião, spokesmen for various movements in Algeria, Germany, Martinique, Italy, Holland and, of course, Vietnam itself.

But with all its vast size and marathon organisation, the thing that was most inspiring about the rally was its enormous enthusiasm. Time and again the youthful audience cheered militant speakers to the echo.

Sartre, who went out of his way to appeal on behalf of the Peruvian revolutionary, Hugo Blanco, who is in imminent danger of being judicially murdered in prison, was given a standing ovation.

[The November 30 Le Monde reported him as saying, "We want peace in Vietnam, but not just any kind of peace. Peace must consist of recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam. But we don't want peace solely because of moral reasons. Morality is not a sufficient justification. Our theme, the themes of our struggle, must be political... This is the way we must show our solidarity with the Vietnamese people. Their struggle is our struggle. It is our struggle against American hegemony, against American imperialism." Sartre ended by declaring, "A defeat for the Vietnamese people would be a political defeat for us, a defeat for all the free peoples. Because Vietnam is fighting for us."]

Similar ovations were given the spokesman of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, and Dave Dellinger, who appealed for aid to the American people -- not of money ("We've got too much of that already," he said.) but of solidarity in the struggle for peace.

Courtland Cox, who has been working in the field for SNCC, in the heart of the most bitterly racialist areas of the southern states, said that the oppression of the black people at home in the USA, and of the Vietnamese people abroad, were part of one and the same struggle. "You won't get us to fight the people of Vietnam; not if hell

^{*&}quot;In six hours, 600 tons of bombs fell on Vietnamese huts," read the advertisement for the meeting. Max Ernst contributed a specially executed painting for the poster.

freezes over," he said. "We are brothers."

Lawrence Daly also received deafening applause when he put the case for solidarity with the Vietnamese people and described the struggle in Britain.

Not every speech was received so warmly. Kastler's call for a United Nations neutral force of peace-keepers was received with mounting unease, turning into boos and catcalls.

The Algerian spokesman, Mahmoud Guennez, was strongly heckled with loud cries of "Free Ben Bella" and "Free Harbi," and protests, "What about torture?" These turned into loud chanting at the end of his speech.

But on the other hand a most moving demonstration of solidarity took place when Abderamane Youssefi, the Moroccan speaker and a colleague of the murdered Ben Barka, took the rostrum.

The remarkable thing about the whole meeting is the way in which it was assembled entirely by the independent socialist forces, the Parti Socialiste Unifié and the numerous left groupings of Paris. In spite of every appeal, the French Communist party stayed aloof, and l'Humanité, the official CP daily, even went so far as to report a rightist attack upon the organisers' officer, which took place the night before the rally, without mentioning a word about the very demonstration which had aroused this hostile action from the right. But this remote attitude will not be tenable for very much longer, if the response to this rally is anything to go by.

FUROR IN YUGOSLAVIA OVER INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Vladimir Dedijer, the Yugoslav historian and author of the book $\underline{\text{Tito Speaks}}$, has been subjected to heavy pressure because of his participation in the International War Crimes Tribunal initiated by Bertrand Russell, according to a report in the November 16 issue of the Paris weekly $\underline{\text{Le Nouvel Observateur}}$.

Dedijer fell into disfavor with the Tito regime in 1955 when he expressed solidarity with Milovan Djilas. He was sentenced to prison for "disseminating news in the American press prejudicial to his own country." His sentence was commuted and he was permitted to go abroad. After teaching history at Manchester, Harvard and Cornell, he finally returned to Yugoslavia about a year ago.

Russell knew of his reputation for integrity and considered him particularly well-qualified to serve on the tribunal. Dedijer accepted, becoming the sole member on the tribunal from any of the workers states.

From Belgrade, Piotr Sardej reported to <u>Le Nouvel Observateur</u> what happened next:

"Dedijer explained in the Belgrade newspaper <u>Politika</u> why he had accepted this invitation. A little later he was attacked by Josip Vidmar, chairman of the Academy of Sciences of Slovenia, close friend of Edvard Kardelj and former president of the Slovene Republic. According to Vidmar, Yugoslavia did not need to participate in Bertrand Russell's enterprise nor conduct propaganda for him. Vidmar's theses on the war in Vietnam strangely resembled those of the Americans, indicating the political confusion reigning in certain leading circles of the Yugoslav Communist League.

"A newspaper of the students of Ljubljana, <u>Trubuna</u>, took up Dedijer's defense and even formed a committee to support the Bertrand Russell tribunal. The author did not hesitate to accuse the Yugoslav government of furnishing shoes for the American army right during the war in Vietnam. It was to be hoped that this courageous move would be made the occasion for opening a free discussion on the war in Asia. The poet Matej Bor, chairman of the Writers Union of Yugoslavia, and several other figures wrote an open letter in which they solidarized with Dedijer. The authorities intervened and barred it from being published.

"It is not known yet whether the Yugoslav authorities envisage taking measures against Dedijer. If they do so, Dedijer, sentenced ten years ago on charges of 'Americanism,' would now be condemned for the opposite -- which would be truly paradoxical."

PABLO NERUDA SUPPORTS INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

The Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda, has announced his support of the International War Crimes Tribunal initiated by Bertrand Russell, according to the November 27 English language edition of $\frac{Granma}{G}$, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party.

The world-famous poet wrote to the English philosopher approving holding a public trial to judge Johnson's guilt in the crimes being committed against the Vietnamese people.

HO CHI MINH HAILS FORMATION OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

In striking contrast to the Johnson administration, which is trying to hamstring the International War Crimes Tribunal, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is supporting its efforts. Thus on November 17 Ho Chi Minh sent the following message to Bertrand Russell:

"On the occasion of the setting up on your initiative of the International Tribunal to condemn the U.S. war crimes, I wish to send to you my best congratulations. The U.S. imperialists are expanding their war against national independence and peace in Vietnam. Monstrous atrocities and crimes more odious than those perpetrated by the Hitlerite fascists are being committed by the U.S. of America. The solemn condemnation of these crimes by the International Tribunal will arouse universal indignation against the U.S. aggressors and intensify the movement of protest of the peoples of all countries demanding the cessation of this criminal war and the withdrawal of the troops of the U.S. and its satellites from Vietnam.

"This is an act of international importance for the defense of justice and the right of self-determination of the peoples. The Tribunal will contribute to awakening the conscience of the world people who are opposing U.S. imperialists, the enemy No. 1 of mankind and world peace. Our people, who are determined to struggle till the final victory of their cause, highly value and wholeheartedly support your noble initiative. We would like to convey to you our warmest thanks. I wish also to send my most cordial greetings to all friends, members of the Tribunal. I wish the Tribunal great success.

"Cordially yours, "Ho Chi Minh"

JOHNSON'S SLIP OF THE FINGER

The American press, which always tries to convert small things into big sensations, was filled with headlines, editorials and ponderous think columns for several days after the Texas White House admitted December 6 that a mistake had been made in the bill for the war in Vietnam. Instead of \$10,000,000,000 a year, it is running about \$20,000,000,000. It appears that Johnson's finger slipped when he was totting up a column of figures.

Actually the error was only too human. Johnson, it seems, was at the adding machine during the excitement of the election campaign.

There are those, however, who are trying to read something deeper into it than a mere slip of the finger. Edwin L. Dale Jr., in a December 7 dispatch from Washington to the New York Times, said: "There is a widespread view here that the original understatement of expenditure was largely political, to make the war seem cheaper than it was, particularly before the election."

Stuff and nonsense! Anyone with any experience at all knows how easy it is to hit the wrong key on an adding machine or cash register. Usually the errors are on the side of management, due to the fact that the law of averages happens to favor the profit—making system. But occasionally an error does occur that makes the customer feel temporarily richer than he is.

Of course, all patriotic Americans -- an easy-come-easy-go lot -- will laugh off this error as a big joke on Johnson and dig up the change so their well-meaning and usually nimble-fingered president won't be stuck with it.

"TO HOLD, AS 'TWERE, THE MIRROR UP TO NATURE"

By Arthur Maglin

MacBird, by Barbara Garson. Grassy Knoll Press, P.O. Box 2273, Grand Central Station, New York, N.Y. 10017. \$1.

MacBird, an as yet unproduced play which burlesques President Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy and several other important figures in the American government, has received an unusual amount of critical attention and praise in important American journals and from well-known critics.

MacBird, written by Barbara Garson, parodies Shakespeare's Macbeth. Lyndon Johnson is cast in the role of Macbeth and renamed MacBird. Lady Bird Johnson becomes Lady MacBird.

Robert Brustein, Dean of the Yale Drama School, writing in the September 25, 1966

New York Times Sunday Magazine, comments: "Although the play is bound to start a storm of protest (not all of it unjustified) and may even be suppressed by some government agency, it will very probably go down as one of the brutally provocative works in the American theater, as well as one of the most grimly amusing."

The famous American poet, Robert Lowell, has said of $\underline{\text{MacBird}}$: "I have nothing to say about the political truth of this play, but I am sure a kind of genius has gone into the writing."

Eric Bentley, a well-known theater critic and Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia University, writes: "If I were a producer, I would produce <u>MacBird</u> at once in as many American cities as possible. I would then sell it for production abroad so that the rest of the world might (a) be warned against the 'American way of life' and (b) take note that the warning came from an American writer."

The December 1 issue of <u>The New York Review of Books</u> carries a featured review of <u>MacBird</u> by the well-known critic <u>Dwight Macdonald</u>. Macdonald opens his review with these words:

"The funniest, toughest-minded, and most ingenious political satire I've read in years is Barbara Garson's MacBird. A veteran of the Berkeley student wars, Miss Garson has had the excellent and obvious notion — obvious after she did it — of savaging our political Establishment with a burlesque Macbeth, all in Elizabethan blank verse at times — and enriched by tags from other Shakespeare plays skewed to suit her purpose. It works surprisingly well, whether as sharply pointed satire or as sheer — or if you prefer, mere — high-spirited low-comedy fooling around; most commonly, as a peculiar mixture of both. That Shakespeare is Universal is well known, but, to Garsonize Lady Macbeth: Who would have thought the old bard had so much blood in him?

"The stars are Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson as the MacBirds and the three Kennedy brothers as the Ken-O'-Duncs. The supporting cast includes the Earl of Warren, Lord MacNamara, the Wayne of Morse, and -- her finest inspiration -- the late Adlai Stevenson as the Egg of Head."

Later on Macdonald says of the play:

"Miss Garson clearly knows her way around the political scene, and she wastes no time in establishing the characteristics of the opposing chieftains: the amoral, calculating efficiency of the Ken-O'-Duncs is contrasted to that MacBird look, so familiar to us all by now: 'fat, yet hungry'. She has plenty to say about our Establishment, all of it uncomplimentary, and says it in a headlong style, full of verve and humor -- a kind of genial ferocity. At \$1.00 her burlesque is the entertainment bargain of the year.

"The most disturbing and 'controversial' aspect of $\underline{\text{MacBird}}$ is that the eponymous villain murders John Ken-O'-Dunc just as Macbeth murders $\underline{\text{Duncan.}}$ "

The December issue of Ramparts magazine carries extensive excerpts from the first half of MacBird. The play is scheduled to open shortly in an off-Broadway production in $\overline{\text{New York}}$ under the direction of Roy Levine.

Here is a sample scene from MacBird $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$ a press conference immediately after MacBird takes office:

Reporter: Your majesty, how do you view our future?

MacBird: I'm glad you asked that, Bob--I have a dream. We have an opportunity to move Not only toward the rich society, But upwards toward the Smooth Society. My Smooth Society has room for all; For each, a house, a car, a family, A private psychoanalyst, a dog, And rows of gardens, neatly trimmed and hedged. This land will be a garden carefully pruned. We'll lop off any branch that looks too tall, That seems to grow too lofty or too fast. And any weed that springs up on our soil, To choke the plants I've neatly set in rows, Gets plucked up root and all, by me, MacBird --And this I do for you, my wholesome flowers. I see a garden blooming undisturbed Where all the buds are even in their rows. An ordered garden, sweet with unity, That is my dream; my Smooth Society. (Applause from reporters which finally dies down) I thank you gentlemen. Next question, please.

Reporter: Your majesty, how do you plan to deal With rebel groups which thrive in Viet Land?

MacBird: What rebel groups? Where is this Viet Land? Who gave them folks permission to rebel?
Lord MacNamara, valiant chief of war,
What is this place I've just been asked about?

MacNamara: It's way off to the East, eight thousand miles. A little land we're trying to subdue.

MacBird: What crap is this 'we're <u>trying</u> to subdue'?
Since when do we permit an open challenge
To all the world's security and peace?
Rip out those Reds! Destroy them, root and branch!
Deploy whatever force you think we need!
Eradicate this noxious, spreading weed!

MacNamara: Your word is my command. Your will is done. That land will be subdued ere set of sun.

MAO DISPLAYS REMARKABLE IMMUNITY TO COLD

The Hsinhua News Agency reported from Peking November 26 that Chairman Mao Tsetung, "the most respected and beloved leader of the Chinese people," had reviewed a total of 11,000,000 Red Guards since August 18. In the final review before the shows are resumed next spring, Chairman Mao displayed his remarkable powers of resistance to icy weather. Despite "seven degrees of frost," Mao appeared on the gate of Tienanmen "in green uniform without an overcoat." "Disregarding the biting wind," Chairman Mao walked to both ends of the gate and "kept waving his cap to the cheering crowds."

To those who may have believed that the great cultural revolution was the result of spontaneous initiative from below, the same dispatch puts the record straight. It was "personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao."

The official title now used in the captions of photographs of the great man is "Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman of the Chinese people."

This is probably still inadequate to properly describe Mao's greatness, since it but faintly reflects the love felt for Mao, as shown for instance at the final fall review of the Red Guard. "The entire spacious Tienanmen Square and the broad thoroughfare to the east," reports Hsinhua, "were a sea of cheering people who, turning to Chairman Mao, leaped for joy at seeing him and shouted at the tops of their voices, "Long live Chairman Mao! Long, long life to Chairman Mao!"

THE INTERNAL CRISIS IN CHINA

[The following is the text of a statement issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on November 6.]

* * *

(1) The crisis that has shaken the Chinese Communist party during recent months is undoubtedly the gravest since the Mao Tse-tung group assumed leadership of the party. It has been marked by profound divisions at all levels, including the Political Bureau; by battles among tendencies in all the main fields, by an extremely violent type of struggle; by the intervention of certain sectors of the masses stimulated by the ruling group and by various efforts to curb this intervention.

It is difficult to delineate exactly the actual development of the crisis, its origin and the composition of the groups opposing each other yesterday and today. It is likewise difficult to establish whether the Mao group began with an overall tactical and strategic plan from the first or whether the leaders were largely taken by surprise in the events that ensued and made successive adaptations corresponding to the vicissitudes of the crisis.

In a general way, the following phases can be distinguished:

- (a) A first phase extending from November 1965 to the end of April 1966 in which the ruling group seemed to be feeling out the ground, provoking seemingly secondary polemics but at the same time putting across without fanfare a reorientation or rectification in certain basic sectors (army, industry).
- (b) A phase extending from May to the end of July 1966, marked by an offensive against the Peking group and some eminent intellectuals; and by the first wave of the "cultural revolution."
- (c) A phase opened by the August plenum of the Central Committee involving new conflicts at the top, the second wave of the "cultural revolution" and the formation of the so-called Red Guards.

The third phase does not yet seem to have ended and the situation remains charged with possible brusk new flare-ups and changes.

(2) In the first two phases of the crisis, the dominant theme advanced by the ruling group was affirmation of the primacy of politics in all domains. Beyond the sloganeering and ritualistic references to Mao's thought, the real content lay in the determination of the party and state bureaucracy to defend and consolidate its hegemony in relation to other sectors of the bureaucracy and to any actual or potential centrifugal tendency. The conflict became concretized in a confrontation of different specific positions on problems dealing with perspective, partly immediate, partly intermediate or long range.

In the military domain an important group -- whose spokesman was quite likely the chief of staff himself, Lo Jui Ching -- sought to secure relative autonomy, stressing the decisive significance of technique in a modern war. This group very likely also emphasized the necessity of reestablishing the alliance with the Soviet Union, the military support of which was considered irreplaceable in the event of imperialist aggression against China. The Mao-Lin Piao group upholds the idea of the primacy of politics over technique in military matters. They emphasize concretely a conception of the army more linked to the traditions and experiences of the civil war and the anti-Japanese struggle. These traditions and experiences were considered the only valuable ones in the event of a conventional type of war by imperialism on the Asian continent.

In the domain of industry, two conferences held last spring reaffirmed in the most emphatic way the idea that the guiding role in the plants must be played by the party, that any technocratic tendency must be extirpated; and, in general, anyone must be fought who sought to give primacy to the specialists and to introduce in economic management criteria like those spread during recent years in the Soviet Union and in the other European workers states.

In the field of culture, the ruling group was still more obviously intent on blocking any centrifugal tendency, any "autonomist" tendency whose success, even if only partial, could have serious implications extending to the entire political arena. In reviving arguments advanced among others by Khrushchev at the time of his last confrontation with the intellectuals, Mao's partisans continuously pointed to the danger

that critical, oppositionist movements in the cultural sphere could become the vehicle of a political opposition. It was not by accident that the adversaries of the ruling group were accused of operating like a potential opposition party and of wanting to provoke a repetition in China of the Hungarian experience with the Petöfi circle.

If the importance which such polemics have in the eyes of the Mao group is to be understood, its interpretation of Soviet developments since Stalin's death and the Twentieth Congress have to be borne in mind. According to the Maoists, the victory of revisionism dates from that time, and the breaches were opened step by step by the promulgation of a whole new series of criteria and concepts, and by the sudden appearance of multiple centrifugal tendencies within the bureaucracy itself. The ending of uncontested and absolute control by the political bureaucracy represented one of the major causes of an unfolding process which, it must be remembered, to the Chinese represents the progressive restoration of capitalism.

According to the official documents, foreign policy problems do not lie at the heart of the conflict. It is particularly symptomatic that there is not the least allusion to differences on the war in Vietnam or on the October 1965 events in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is certain that on international questions, the polemics developed with particular sharpness and intensity and the increasingly dramatic course of the crisis was determined to a large degree by the course of the situation in the Indochina peninsula, particularly following the intensification of the escalation and the increasing danger of imperialist aggression against the Chinese republic.

(3) In accordance with long-standing bureaucratic tradition, the ideas advanced by critical elements and opponents are not directly expressed by those involved, but indicated by the group that wins out. The very enormity of certain accusations, the repetition of stereotyped clichés used many times in other contexts, the positions taken in recent years by some of the main figures under fire, suffice to place in doubt the accuracy of the version offered by the Mao group. According to them the entire opposition advocated out-and-out Khrushchevist orientations and made common cause with forces seeking the restoration of capitalism. The real question at issue is most certainly not the restoration of capitalism. What is involved essentially is an intrabureaucratic conflict, affecting various layers, over what line to adopt in relation to crucial issues of the present stage and to the long-range problems of perspective confronting the bureaucratic leadership at this stage. The specific social weight of bourgeois and restorationist forces in the dynamics of Chinese society is after all negligible and any explanation of the current crisis based on the hypothesis of a dangerous upsurge on their part can be dismissed as false and tendentious. Moreover, if the ruling group had wished to strike harder at these forces, in particular, by ending their still existing privileges, they could have done so rather easily without touching off a crisis in the party.

The Mao group, however, was up against really critical elements and opponents of different orientations. There is no doubt that for years tendencies have existed in China that could be legitimately characterized as Khrushchevist, in the sense that they have criticized the concepts and attitudes of the present leadership on the basis of a stand analogous to that of the leaders of the Soviet CP and most of the Communist parties. But there are also some who especially denounce the bureaucratic methods of the ruling group (referring at times to the battles of ten years ago), its extreme sectarianism; and therefore probably also certain opportunist orientations on key questions of the international workers movement. The official documents themselves have alluded on a number of occasions to the existence of critical left elements ("left opportunists," according to the well-known terminology). There is no doubt either that commencing at given moments centrist tendencies developed either in relation to "intermediate" positions adopted on several political or tactical problems or in relation to a conciliatory attitude aimed at blocking a complete rupture between the opposing groups and at avoiding a fait accompli.

Under the present conditions it is impossible to evaluate with certainty the relative strength of the different opposition tendencies. But it is clear that the "Khrushchevist" tendency can be considered the most dangerous for the Mao group in the immediate period ahead, particularly because of the powerful international support it might have and which a leftist tendency, moving toward a revolutionary Marxist orientation, clearly would not have.

(4) The struggle has turned out to be probably much sharper and much longer than the ruling group counted on when it took the initiative. That is why it has raised the tenor of its harangues and conducted campaigns at a frenetic pace, culminating in the demonstrations of August-September and the actions of the Red Guards. The plenum of the Central Committee, following a battle lasting some months, was held after the elimination of Lo Jui Ching, Peng Chen and a whole series of other leading figures, and was

the scene of dramatic conflicts. The Mao group won by a very close margin after ceding some concessions, at least on paper, particularly to the centrist elements.

The explanation for this new outbreak of the struggle is to be found in two facts: on the one hand, the first wave of the "cultural revolution" ran into vigorous resistance; and on the other the isolation of the Chinese CP in the international Communist movement became greater following the estrangement of the North Koreans, the breakaway of the Japanese, and the difficulties encountered with the North Vietnamese. But once again it was the course of the war in Vietnam, with its new phases of escalation and the growing threat of an attack on China that provoked a new confrontation at the level of the top leading bodies themselves.

(5) The second wave of the "cultural revolution" and the formation of the Red Guards were the products of a situation of this nature within the party. In face of resistance and hesitation of all kinds, the group assembled around Mao and Lin Piao decided to mobilize the masses partially and to gain a new instrument of pressure, capable of being used against a part of the apparatus of the party and the state. The decision was to take a distinctly limited sector — the student masses — with which the Mao group wanted to establish close relations and which it also considered it could control and channelize more easily. It is nevertheless significant that masses were called on to intervene in intrabureaucratic conflicts and that Mao and Lin Piao, in order to mobilize the students, were obliged to use ideological themes that could have a favorable echo among more radicalized and politically conscious layers (see, for example, in the 16-point document the affirmation of the democratic rights of minorities and the reminder of the democratic revolutionary tradition of the Commune).

The Red Guard movement thus had a factional origin, and its aim as outlined in innumerable texts, was essentially to help the Mao group fight its adversaries, including those within the political sector, which was profoundly split during the course of the struggle. But the weapon of the Red Guards proved to be very dangerous and threatened to become transformed into a boomerang. As a matter of fact at least some sectors of the movement did not limit themselves to singing the praises of Mao, spreading his works and destroying foreign symbols. They sought to translate into practice certain current ideological slogans. In other words they began to act not only under the inspiration of anticapitalist and vaguely anticonservative sentiments but went so far as to attack privileges of the bureaucracy and to build a fire under some of the bureaucrats, including those who succeeded the Peng Chen group in the Peking leadership. It was difficult for the ruling group to denounce the infiltration of the enemy into the party and state at every level, and at the same time to demagogically exploit the real equalitarian aspirations of the masses, without having the movement inspired in this way hitting also at the symbols of bureaucratic power and taking on the settling of accounts with certain officials and ruling bodies of the party itself. It is of course difficult to distinguish between the spontaneous moves undertaken by the Red Guards and actions undertaken on decisions from above. But a whole series of facts emanating from various sources as well as a series of warnings and official appeals for order aimed, from all the evidence, at slowing down and channelizing the movement, testify to the fact that the students, to some extent at least, struck blows against some representatives of the bureaucracy, too, and were ready to unleash actions which the bureaucracy as a whole had good reasons to halt as quickly as possible.

(6) The issue remains wide open after the new wave of the "cultural revolution" and the ruling group does not seem to have been able to reestablish a relatively stable equilibrium within its midst. The opposition to its policies and the resistance to the actions it sponsors continue on a vast scale, even though they emanate from various sectors and from different and even opposed points of view. Dramatic changes and abrupt turns could still occur in a relatively short time.

A factor that accelerated the settling of accounts, making the crisis so dramatic is, as we have seen, the perspective of the Chinese leaders, that an imperialist aggression will probably be launched in the short run. It is precisely with this in mind that the Mao group sought to reinforce its positions, to eliminate all resistance, organizing even a psychological mobilization (this operated particularly in the formation of the Red Guards and in the choice of criteria for their organization and of the ideological themes). On their side, the adversaries of Mao and Lin Piao were drawn into a fight in order, before it was too late, to change an orientation which they considered false. If an aggression actually does take place, all the hypotheses and positions will rapidly be tested.

It is possible nevertheless that the Mao group likewise believes that the perspective of war can be avoided. Certain aspects of its polemics in recent months (particularly in the fields of industry and economic development) acquire meaning in the light of this hypothesis. If this turned out to be the case, the problems would be posed

in less dramatic and urgent terms, the tensions would not be of an explosive nature in the immediate future. But the ruling group is preoccupied with preparing a long struggle against tendencies that today are still relatively weak and with eliminating at once any incipient evolution like that in the USSR in the time of Khrushchev and his successors.

In any case, the Chinese leadership will emerge much weakened from this test. Up to now the masses saw it as homogeneous and strong, standing in the tradition of the victorious revolution. Now divisions have appeared openly and the wear and tear has proved to be serious. From now on the leadership will be judged by the cadres and activists and also by the broad masses in a much more critical and questioning spirit. This could facilitate the formation of a new vanguard.

(7) In the course of the recent crisis, some people again advanced the thesis that China is undergoing a Stalinist cycle analogous to that of the USSR after Lenin's death.

Without repeating all the arguments advanced by the resolution of our last world congress, we can note, however, that the international political orientations of the Chinese CP, however much we have criticized them, cannot be equated to the traditional Stalinist lines of policy; and as for domestic policy, particularly economic policy, the specific traits that we have emphasized many times still exist. In addition it must not be forgotten that despite the use of ideological terrorism at present, no reliable source has reported the arrest up to now of critical elements who, as a rule, appear to remain members of the party and, in certain cases, of the Central Committee. As for relations with the masses, the methods peculiar to the Maoist leadership, more inclined to bureaucratic paternalism than to measures of repression, have not been abandoned and it is particularly significant that one of the most frequent ideological themes advanced by the ruling group is the one dealing with equalitarianism which the Soviet bureaucracy has condemned since the thirties as inspired by petty-bourgeois concepts. But above all it should be noted that after Lenin's death, the bureaucracy rose victoriously, succeeding in consolidating its hegemony —— if only temporarily from the historic point of view —— against the forces that resisted it. The Chinese events of today are unfolding within the framework of the world crisis of the bureaucratic system that opened up with the break between Stalin and Yugoslavia, exploding in the Polish and Hungarian crisis of October 19, 1956, and reaching a new stage with the Sino-Soviet conflict of the six-ties and all its multiple repercussions.

(8) The current crisis has been marked up to now much more by the intrabureaucratic conflicts than by confrontations between the masses and the bureaucracy as a whole. It expresses in the final analysis the limits and contradictions in the concepts and attitudes which the Chinese leaders have adopted since the period of 1958-59, under the pressure of national and international events. It also reflects the pressure of factors which are relevant today, be it only as general tendencies, and most strongly those which characterize the present international situation; to wit, the crisis of the Communist movement and the imperialist aggression in Vietnam.

As the Fourth International stressed from the time when first indications of the conflict between Moscow and Peking became manifest, the specific objective conditions in which it occurred impelled the Chinese leadership to adopt more progressive overall positions than the concepts of the CP of the USSR, a posture more likely to get a favorable response from the left-wing currents in the international workers movement. But since the Chinese leadership remained within the framework of a bureaucratic regime, its relatively more progressive positions could not go beyond certain limits; moreover at a given moment these progressive features tended inevitably to become dissipated and the Chinese bureaucracy could not avoid growing difficulties and a genuine impasse.

In the field of international policy, it was particularly in relation to the crisis in Indonesia and the course of the war in Vietnam that the Chinese positions underwent a severe test. The maintenance, despite criticisms leveled against Khrushchevism, of out-and-out opportunist orientations with regard to certain national bourgeoisies of the colonial or ex-colonial countries, and the determination to subordinate to a large degree the needs of the anticapitalist revolutionary struggle of the masses to the diplomatic needs of the state unquestionably contributed to the tragic defeat of the Indonesian CP, the most faithful ally of the Chinese OP for a number of years. The rejection a priori of a united front with the USSR and the other workers states on the Vietnam war seriously injured the cause of the National Liberation Front and the defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and, in the final analysis, of the Chinese People's Republic itself, threatened as it likewise is by imperialist aggression. All this — together with the utilization of odious methods of pressure and even blackmail (for instance, on the matter of rice for Cuba, and the reprisals against the Japanese CP) — contributed in a decisive way to the growing isolation of the Chinese leaders in the international Communist movement, the organizations and groups that support them being

in almost all cases sects without real influence, headed by bureaucrats much more concerned about faithfully echoing the official thesis promulgated by Peking than in elaborating a new revolutionary orientation for the workers movement of their countries.

In the economic field, the great leap forward was rather rapidly abandoned and even the commune movement underwent serious rectifications. But the course followed during the past five or six years, while making possible an unquestionable reorganization and a palpable recovery and even important gains in some scientific and military fields, involved quite modest rates of growth, insufficient to assure the expansion needed by the Chinese economy. The orientations of the new plan do not yet seem to be fully determined; in any case, without profound changes, multiple difficulties will arise at various stages.

In the field of culture, after the rectification following "the 100 Flowers" campaign, the Maoist leadership has oscillated between a relative and strictly limited liberalism and an absolutely rigid control, justified by Zhdanov-like arguments. The consequence was that the leadership has not been able to prevent critical concepts from emerging within the top bodies of the party and the state as well as elsewhere. In addition the leadership provoked grave tensions when it tried to fill in the breaches which it considered in various ways to be very dangerous.

All these contradictions could not help but arouse conflicts within the leader-ship itself as it sought new ways to get out from under. These conflicts and the methods which the Mao group has applied in its campaign against its adversaries, particularly in the recent phase, aggravated the crisis by further stimulating critical attitudes with regard to the leaders among broad masses of activists and cadres, creating a situation in which antibureaucratic tendencies are emerging, even if only spontaneous and incipient ones. This could be the prelude to a new stage in which the tensions between the bureaucracy and the masses would take precedence over the intrabureaucratic confrontation.

(9) The Fourth International maintains that the crisis in recent months has confirmed its estimate that the Chinese leadership, despite the positive role it played in criticizing the leadership of the CPUSSR and the majority of the Communist parties, remains a bureaucratic leadership. The struggle for proletarian democracy against such a leadership cannot bring about a qualitative change in the political regime except by means of a profound mobilization of the masses capable of breaking through the framework of the bureaucratic system, and by the action of a new Marxist revolutionary vanguard able to orient the mass movement towards establishing a democratic proletarian power.

At the present stage, the Fourth International reaffirms the need to establish a united front of all the workers states and parties on a platform of consistent struggle against the American aggression in Vietnam. While the Fourth International maintains its severe criticism of the major responsibility of the Soviet bureaucracy; while we hold that the distrust on the part of China can be explained by a whole series of positions by Moscow (extending from its passive attitude in Vietnam to its equivocal policy in Europe and from military aid to the reactionary Hindu bourgeoisie to the loan granted the militarist government of Brazil); while we believe that a Soviet leadership measuring up to its duties would reaffirm its alliance with China in the hour of danger and make clear to imperialism without any possibility of misunderstanding that a war against China would be considered an attack against the Soviet Union, it likewise condemns the outright rejection by Mao-Lin Piao of a united front and joint action.

As for the economic problems, while the Fourth International rejects any Libermantype technocratic solution, involving in reality a strengthening of various particular layers of the bureaucracy and an accentuation of inadmissible social inequality in a workers state, we likewise hold that a balanced economic growth in China is not possible except by instituting workers management, by applying the methods of democratic centralized planning, and by the democratic coordination of economic planning in the workers state.

The Fourth International maintains that a workers state must adhere to equalitarian concepts — in the concrete historic sense outlined by Marx and Lenin — and abolish all forms of privilege. With regard to the current propaganda of the Chinese CP, we denounce first of all the gap between ideological expressions and reality and call attention next to the fact that in the final analysis real communist equality cannot be established except on the basis of a very high level of the productive forces, and to the fact that in the transitional period the only means to approach this aim is by fighting against any form of bureaucratic domination and leadership and for the widest internal democracy in the party, in the unions, in the mass organizations, in the activities of the state and in the administration at all levels.

In the field of culture, the Fourth International while rejecting the deformation of the positions of Trotsky and the Trotskyists by the official organs of the Soviet bureaucracy reaffirms that the struggle against the ideology of the past and against the possible distortions emanating from the influence of the class enemy cannot be conducted effectively through administrative measures and the imposition of stereotyped slogans or ossified norms. It must be won on the basis of the autonomous development of the potentialities of the new society, from an expansion of the genuinely critical spirit and the free confrontation of varying orientations and concepts. In particular the practice of a leadership cult carried to its most grotesque expression, must be condemned in the most emphatic way, since this practice threatens to stifle any spirit of independent judgment, to cripple any collective teamwork, thereby making impossible a really democratic life in the labor movement and in the state.

With regard to the problems of the international workers movement, the Fourth International holds that a whole series of recent experiences — in the first place the catastrophe in Indonesia — must be critically probed to the bottom. Those responsible for the policy which led to the disastrous defeat must be mercilessly denounced. The renovation of the world Communist movement in a new mass international — to the formation of which the Fourth International has made and will continue to make an indispensable contribution — is not possible without the most complete internal democracy, and real equality among all sectors of the movement, without the rejection of any direct or indirect imposition of weight by the most powerful workers states. Only along this road will it be possible to develop a strategic and tactical line corresponding to the burning necessities of our times and to assure enthusiastic single-minded discipline in action.

SOME CHEEK!

[The following article has been translated by $\underline{\text{World Outlook}}$ from the November 29 issue of $\underline{\text{Voix Ouvrière}}$, a socialist newspaper published twice a month in Paris. The article deals with some incidents that occurred at a meeting in Paris November 4 at which Thomas Gerard Healy, general secretary of the Socialist Labour League was the featured speaker.

[The incidents were referred to in the November 12 issue of Healy's paper, The Newsletter, as follows: "Last Friday's meeting was not a public meeting for conflicting opinions...The Pabloites and Voix Ouvrière who, despite their differences, had united in a new anti-Trotskyist coalition, attempted to provoke incidents at the meeting. These, fortunately, did not get very far. They demanded the right to speak at 11:30, when the meeting was closed. The chairman refused them."

[Voix Ouvrière, as will be seen, offers a different account. It should be added that the Voix Ouvrière group deserve to be heard on anything concerning Healy and the Socialist Labour League. They were the recipients of nothing less than a special invitation to participate in an international conference sponsored by Healy last April. The general secretary of the SLL counted on them to constitute a basic part of an international grouping he is attempting to build. The Voix Ouvrière report on the astounding violations of democracy at that conference and why they had no choice but to walk out is included in the pamphlet Healy "Reconstructs" the Fourth International which has been placed on the list of literature that members of the SLL are apparently forbidden to read. As reported in recent issues of World Outlook, Ernest Tate was seriously beaten by a gang when he sought to sell this pamphlet and International Socialist Review in front of an SLL meeting in London.

[The original title of the article in $\underline{\text{Voix Ouvrière}}$ is "Un certain culot!" which we have translated as "Some Cheek!"]

At a recent meeting held by the OCI [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste] and Révoltes, the sergeants at arms beat and threw out a member of the JCR [Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire] who wanted to take the floor because his organization had been attacked and reviled throughout the meeting.

The sergeants at arms also set upon distributors of Voix Ouvrière.

We have not mentioned this matter up to now, although we are of the opinion that these methods can only injure the Trotskyist movement as a whole, because we felt that it involved irresponsible actions committed by young comrades who confused extremism with political intransigence and the combativity required in fighting the class enemy with bluster inside four walls and victories without any risks and therefore without any glory.

But <u>Information Ouvrière</u> [a small bulletin edited by Pierre Lambert, one of Healy's French followers] has come out with an account of this in which they accuse us of having deliberately provoked the incidents.

We already knew that these comrades took liberties with the truth, despite the fine name of their rarely printed monthly [$\underline{\text{La Verit\'e}}$ (The Truth) is notorious for the irregularity of its appearance], a name which they are really not worthy to use.

Now they have become brazen.

No, these comrades are decidedly not taking the road of reconstructing the Fourth International, whatever they may say or think.

They claim that we are in a common front with the militants of the JCR and the PCI (Fourth International) [Parti Communiste Internationaliste, the French section of the Fourth International]. This is politically stupid but that does not seem to bother them. The truth is that what we want and what we hold to is that all the Trotskyists should maintain cordial and fraternal relations even if the political polemics are extremely sharp. It is the opportunists who feel the need to express their differences by raving or resorting to blows. When you have confidence in your ideas, you don't need such exhibitions which would be disastrous for any organization having a genuine audience.

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM FRENCH TROTSKYISTS ON TATE CASE

[The following letter was made public by Farrell Dobbs, National Secretary of the Socialist Workers Party. The letter referred to in the first paragraph appeared in the December 2 World Outlook together with related correspondence.]

December 1, 1966

National Committee Socialist Workers Party New York

Dear Comrades,

We have taken cognizance of the letter which you sent to the SLL [Socialist Labour League] of Great Britain November 21 following the assault on Comrade Ernest Tate during a meeting held by that organization.

The Political Bureau of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste (French section of the Fourth International) joins in your protest against methods that are outrageous in the workers movement in general and in the Trotskyist movement in particular.

The employment of these methods is, in the case in question, the result of a deliberate policy, since it is not an isolated incident. During November, the group that calls itself the "Organisation Communiste Internationaliste," and which publishes La Verité, held a meeting in Paris at which the main speaker was G. Healy. He devoted most of his speech to attacking the Fourth International (which he claims to have unmasked as having gone over to the camp of the bourgeoisie) and the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionaire de France [Revolutionary Communist Youth of France], leveling against them slanders such as he printed in his newspaper against the majority of the participants in the demonstration at Liège. After this verbal assault, members of the JCR who were present in the hall, asked that one of them be given the floor. This was sufficient for the sergeants at arms to set upon them with blows. Members of the Voix Ouvrière, who objected to such methods, were likewise attacked. We are attaching to this letter a copy of an article which appeared in Voix Ouvrière testifying to the facts.

Those responsible for these inadmissible methods are self-styled Trotskyist leaders, who, incapable of debating ideas, hurl infamous charges and thus incite inexperienced youth to commit scandalous acts.

With our fraternal greetings,

For the Political Bureau

Pierre Frank

Michel Lequenne