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WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL HOLDS FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE

The International War Crimes Tribunal, which was initiated by the noted philosopher Bertrand Russell, held a news conference in London November 16, following several days of sessions taken up with preparations for the inquiries which the tribunal has announced it will undertake in relation to the war in Vietnam.

Bertrand Russell explained to newsmen the aims and scope of the tribunal and what it hoped to accomplish. A number of documents, providing further information on this were given to the press.

The tribunal will seek to find answers to five questions: Has the United States committed acts of aggression as defined by international law? Have the American armed forces used or experimented with new weapons or weapons forbidden under international law? Have Vietnamese prisoners taken by Saigon or the U.S. armed forces been subjected to inhumane treatment in violation of international law? Have purely civilian targets been bombed? Have forced labor camps, deportations of population or other acts of this nature tending to genocide been resorted to?

Bertrand Russell told the news conference that the evidence already supplied by Western newsmen in reporting the war made it "clear that we enter our inquiry with considerable prima facie evidence of crimes reported not by the victims but by media favorable to the policies responsible."

Both the National Liberation Front and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pledged to cooperate with the tribunal which wishes to send investigators to make inquiries in Vietnam.

An appeal has been made to the Johnson administration to cooperate with the tribunal in its efforts to establish the truth about the war.

Washington has responded with studied silence to the appeal while at the same time mounting all possible pressure to block the tribunal and to cut away support among those vulnerable to pressure.

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CANADIAN JOURNALIST INTERVIEWS YON SOSA

[The Toronto Daily Star ran a series of articles, beginning November 5, about the guerrilla movement in Guatemala. Written by Norman Gall, they are of unusual interest because of the evident concern of the journalist to present an accurate account of the social unrest in the Central American country. In addition, Gall was able to visit one of the camps of the MR-13 (Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre) fighters and interview their leader, Yon Sosa. Little publicity has appeared about MR-13 in the last year, one of the reasons being the way a rival group, the FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes) has been favored by the Cuban leaders.

[Below we have reproduced extracts from the series, confining the material largely to the MR-13, although Gall also deals with the FAR. His reportage on the FAR is interesting and fair but contains little that is not available from other sources. We have indicated omissions by asterisks.]

* * *

The journey was climaxed by an eight-day visit with the MR-13 guerrillas, commanded by Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, 37, a former army officer of Chinese descent who received U.S. anti-guerrilla training in Panama.

"Right now the government does not command in the Guatemalan Oriente," Yon Sosa told me during four days at his improvised camp in a small tropical rain forest between the lands of the United Fruit Co. and the Honduran frontier.

"The government can control a village only when it sends in large quantities of troops, enough to prevent an ambush by our peasant militias. We believe the North Americans eventually will intervene as they did in Santo Domingo, and we are preparing for this," Yon Sosa said.

"The war in Viet Nam may be a determining factor. If the U.S. loses there or withdraws, the victory of socialist revolutions in Latin America could come much sooner.

"Meanwhile, we are working with peasants, making fighters of them, teaching them political theory and organizing village committees of peasant self-government. We plan to gain control of Guatemala gradually, from the bottom up."

The confused, halting response of the inexperienced Mendez government to the stepped-up insurrection has worried many in Guatemala City.

Upon taking power, the new president offered amnesty to the rebels if they laid down their arms within 30 days.

When this offer was brusquely refused by both FAR and MR-13, Mendez' interior minister, Hector Mansilla Pinto, announced that "the government does not propose to adopt war-like attitudes. We want peace in the Guatemalan family."

What has concerned U.S. officials here even more has been the apparent inability -- and unwillingness -- of the Guatemalan army to find and fight the guerrillas, although roughly half of its officers have received special counter-insurgency training in the United States and Panama.

Nearly all the army's weapons were donated by the U.S. Instead of probing for the guerrillas in their Sierra de las Minas retreats, the army largely has limited itself to jailing, torturing and killing peasants and thus winning many new converts to the guerrilla cause.

* * *

There is something special about the hillbillies of the Guatemalan Oriente.

They are descendants of derailed white men, early Spanish settlers who fared badly and became primitive subsistence farmers, lightly mixing with Indians and Negroes, becoming violent as well as poor. Their houses are filled with talk of death.

* * *

"They make excellent guerrilla fighters," Marco Antonio Yon Sosa told me as we talked in his guerrilla camp hidden in the rain forest near the Honduras border.

Yon Sosa, the surprisingly jovial, moon-faced son of a Chinese merchant, is commander of the November 13th Revolutionary Movement (MR-13).

"The rich in Guatemala frighten easily and run away," he said. "The peasant has nowhere to go and accepts death when it comes. His farming tool is a digging stick, but each campesino carries a 26-inch machete in a leather scabbard for 'self-defence.' He will buy a shotgun or a pistol before he will buy a pair of shoes.

"Our peasants are nomads," Yon Sosa went on. "They cut and burn the mountainsides to clear stony land that gives only one or two crops and then have to move on.

"Our university students who become guerrilleros are used to corn flakes and milk in the morning. They cannot keep up with our campesinos, who can live for days, walking all day in the heat without tiring, eating little food but tortillas and salt.

"Our campesinos like to fight and have relatives all over the Oriente, which is making it easier to extend the guerrillas to other zones.

"A few of our peasants have gotten drunk and molested some women in the villages, but these men have been thrown out of the movement. Now we send only those with great political clarity to talk with the peasants."

The MR-13 guerrillas have been operating, with many ups and downs, for roughly four years on either side of the lifeline Atlantic highway connecting the capital, Guatemala City, with the country's only major port area.

Guerrillas have often ambushed army patrols on the 170-mile highway and harassed traffic of the major trucking companies.

But their main work has been in the towns and villages fringing the highway, in the workers quarters on the United Fruit Co. plantations and, most of all, in the "other world" that begins just a few hundred feet from the asphalt highway.

There, one very rarely sees a road or a church or a school and Western civilization apparently has never arrived.

The tropical hillsides, denuded by the slashing and burning of subsistence farming, seem at a distance as if they were wounded by the shaving strokes of a wildly capricious barber.

In these hills it is possible to interview a group of 35 peasants, as I did, and find not one who can read.

"We are scarce of all means to live," they tell you. "We have no land, no medicine, no schools. The only way to get these is through the guerrillas, by fighting for a government of workers and peasants.

"We want to live like in the socialist countries, where there is food. We don't get anything from elections, only bourgeois governments defending the interests of the rich and the imperialists."

* * *

The November 13th Revolutionary Movement is named for a frustrated 1960 barracks revolt, mainly of younger army officers who professed to be disgusted at wild corruption within the military and in the government of Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes.

When rebellious army bases in the Oriente fell to government forces, a number of the rebels fled across the border.

"When I arrived in Honduras," Yon Sosa said, "my mother sent me \$3,000 to buy a truck and begin working. Most of the 1960 rebels had accepted an amnesty, but we stayed. Instead of buying a truck we bought guns and boots with the \$3,000.

"In March 1961, 24 of us entered Guatemala armed with six pistols and 18 machetes. Guerrilla warfare is a spontaneous revolutionary process. You don't need 200 machine guns at the beginning. History is full of examples that prove this.

"When we came to Guatemala the democratic political parties called us to the capital to get into another military plot against Ydigoras.

"We were still golpistas (coup-plotters), not revolutionaries. We hid in Guate-

mala City for almost a year, talking with army officers who were interested at first, but then backed out, one by one, when they heard the revolution might be bloody.

"We gave up and went to fight as guerrillas in the Oriente. We attacked a few small army posts and got more weapons, but we were still afraid of the peasants. We hid from them in cornfields because we were afraid they would betray us to the army.

"It was not until December 1964 that we began to feel more confident with them. We began then to appear regularly in the villages, making revolutionary speeches and holding discussions at night of revolutionary doctrine. The campesinos began to freely give us food and information.

"Before then the army had attacked us a few times in our camps. Since then we have never been surprised by the army. Until then we knew nothing of revolution. Now we know a guerrillero must be a peasant from the zone."

On the night before I was taken to the MR-13 camp, a woman storekeeper in the town of Quirigua was taken from her house and shot by the guerrillas for allegedly acting as an army informant. A year before her husband was killed for the same reason.

On our way to the guerrilla camp we stopped and talked with peasants about the 'fiesta' the night before in Quirigua.

My guides were four youths of a village "militia" who were allowed to wear their olive green uniforms for the occasion. As we paraded through the hill country in the 100-degree heat, we were stopped by a peasant who said a small army patrol entered the area after the Quirigua woman's death but that "they aren't bothering anyone."

This was comforting in view of the miserable weapons the militiamen carried -- ancient rifles and a shotgun and a tiny pistol which a 16-year-old boy pointed at me from behind until I told him to put it in his pocket.

The only good weapon was a shiny revolver taken in a MR-13 "revolutionary confiscation" holdup the previous week which cleaned out the Bison gun store in downtown Guatemala City.

As we marched through the midday heat a little peasant girl stopped us to wish us well and donate an armful of oranges. Then we descended to bottomland across an open valley and, under forest cover, slogged through a foot of mud and water for two hours.

Compared with hiking in the sun, the shaded jungle is pleasant and cool; the only discomforts are insects and diarrhea.

"We killed the woman only after we warned her to stop informing the army about our people," said Yon Sosa, himself a native of Quirigua. "But she went the next day to the army base at Puerto Barrios and gave a long list of names.

"We generally don't like to carry out executions. But often there is a great deal of pressure from the campesinos for justice when someone has injured them.

"This kind of justice is usually reserved for bad men -- military constables and policemen who have killed people and burned their houses, and planters who have unjustly thrown peasants off the land."

The guerrilla camp, an improvised array of tumbled trees and hammocks protected from the rain by colorful plastic sheets, was in commotion with the recent arrival of a guerrilla patrol of 10 men and the comings and goings of peasant supporters.

It was impressive to see how many peasants entered and left without any apparent restriction. There were delegations from village committees and peasant women who made donations of fruits and vegetables.

There were always three or four boys in their early 'teens, running messages, standing guard duty, going to the nearest country store and, when there was nothing for them to do, hanging around the campfire and begging for guns.

"I know that in Guatemala City they say we don't exist anymore," said Yon Sosa.

"Some say I am dead. The official Communists of the PGT (the pro-Soviet Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, with which the Maoist MR-13 has been carrying on a bitter

ideological controversy)* say I have a low political development.

"But the PGT itself is deeply divided between those who favor peaceful co-existence and those who want to intensify the armed struggle. At least we are decided on this matter. Unfortunately, the PGT responds more to the wishes of Moscow than to the masses of Guatemala."

Yon Sosa insisted that MR-13 has not been inactive, despite the lack of publicity about it in recent months. "We held up the Bison gun store last week because we needed shotguns for our peasant militias and small arms to carry under our clothing on missions when we have to use the railroad and buses.

"On March 18 we ambushed three army patrols in the same day, two of them on the railroad near the Aztec plantation of United Fruit, the third on Km. 216 of the Atlantic Highway at 5.10 p.m. against an army truck convoy. In the three ambushes we killed at least 10 soldiers and wounded several more without suffering a single loss ourselves."

He stressed that "we have superseded the period of propaganda strikes for their own sake. For many months now we have been engaged in organizing our peasant bases. We carry out no military action that has no definite political objective.

"The peasant committees are growing stronger and we have opened a new guerrilla front in the Department of Chiquimula. We are much better organized than we were a year ago, and can bring together hundreds of men now for a major action. Our people have much greater political clarity now, and that's what is most important."

During my eight days with the MR-13 guerrillas, there was ample opportunity to talk with scores of peasants -- nearly all illiterate -- who spoke with great conviction in the jargon of Latin American Marxism.

* * *

"We have 500 families organized into peasant committees to fight for a government of workers and peasants," said one militiaman in a group that surrounded me.

"When a child dies there is not even the seven dollars needed to buy a wood box to bury him. We have to use a burlap bag or wrap the body in palm leaves. We once built a school ourselves, but the government never sent a teacher and the building finally fell down."

Said a dark-skinned peasant in a faded blue workshirt and rubber shoes propped up on the log where we sat: "Our village militia has two sub-machine guns, three grenades, eight shotguns and pistols. We don't need authorization from above to ambush an army patrol.

"We never sell the army food when they come to our village because the soldiers abuse our women and steal our radios.

"Two months ago a 15-man army patrol came toward our village, so we laid an ambush. We killed three of them and wounded two, but we couldn't get their weapons because they retreated too quickly.

"The army returned in three days with a thousand men," he continued, "but all the men had fled from our village and hid in the mountains. So they took all the women and children prisoner and kept them 28 days at the army base in Puerto Barrios.

"They tortured three of our women by beating them with a rubber hose and putting a plastic bag filled with DDT over their heads. After we returned to the village we organized a night watch so the army could not catch us by surprise."

* * *

The velocity of change within the Guatemalan guerrilla movement is indicated by

* Up to now the MR-13 has not been generally labeled "Maoist," but "Castroist" or even "Trotskyist," the latter being applied because of the MR-13 program, which is strongly in favor of socialist revolution and because for a time some of its leading figures, particularly those in charge of publications, were followers of J. Posadas, an ultra-leftist who falsely claims to represent the Fourth International. Norman Gall's references to "Trotskyists" further on are really to the followers of Posadas. -- World Outlook.

what has happened to the five leaders who signed the "Declaration of the Sierra de las Minas," issued Dec. 20, 1964, as the principal theoretical document of the MR-13.

Calling for establishment through guerrilla warfare of a "workers and peasants government," the document urged "extension of the guerrillas; multiplying of peasant militias; organization of hacienda workers' committees and of farm workers' unions, first clandestinely but later openly, in the great estates of the south and west and on the properties of the United Fruit Co., then the unification of these unions with the guerrilla struggle."

The five signers of the Declaration were:

MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA: 37-year-old former army officer of Chinese descent (trained at the U.S. army jungle warfare school in Panama), survivor of the abortive barracks revolt of young officers of Nov. 13, 1960, leader of MR-13 since 1961, was in Cuba at the time of the 1962 missile crisis, where he met with Ernesto Che Guevara several times. At last January's Tri-Continental Conference, Yon Sosa was denounced by Fidel Castro for letting his movement come under Trotskyite domination because he "was ignorant of the profound problems of politics and of the history of revolutionary thought."

LT. LUIS AUGUST TURCIOS LIMA: Precocious 24-year-old former army officer, trained by U.S. Rangers at Ft. Benning, Ga., Guatemala's delegate to the Tri-Continental Conference, praised there by Castro for having "divorced himself from MR-13" and for having "snatched the revolutionary banners of Guatemala from the dirty hands of these mercenaries (the Trotskyites) at the service of Yankee imperialism." Turcios, who organized the guerrilla front in Zacapa Department in February, 1964, and under PGT influence, broke with Yon Sosa, was the major public figure of the FAR until he was reported killed in an auto crash Oct. 2.

J. EVARISTO ALDANA: Leader of a small group of Mexican Trotskyites who infiltrated the MR-13 guerrilla movement in 1964 and became its ideological guide. The Trotskyites were expelled from the guerrillas last April for allegedly having quarreled repeatedly with peasants in the movement and for "subtracting" about \$40,000 from kid-napping ransoms to finance Trotskyite activities elsewhere. The bitter polemics between MR-13 and FAR ended shortly after the Trotskyites' expulsion.*

LT. COL. AUGUSTO VICENTE LOARCA: Leader of the barracks uprising of young officers at the Cacapa army base in November, 1960, chief of the MR-13 underground in Guatemala City until killed by police July, 1965.

FRANCISCO AMADO GRANADOS: A young Guatemalan Trotskyite who was among the top-ranking leftist leaders killed by police after some 28 persons disappeared in February and March.

Other leading figures among the missing are Victor Manuel Gutierrez, former PGT Secretary-General; Leonardo Castillo Flores, chief of the Guatemalan Peasants Confederation in the Arbenz regime; Mexican Trotskyite leader David Aguilar Mora and Fernando Arce Behrens, who abandoned his law studies at the University of Mexico to succeed Loarca as head of the MR-13 urban underground.

The death of Turcios and the inner turmoil of the guerrilla movement over the past 15 months has left only one of the original guerrilla leaders -- Yon Sosa -- alive and fighting. However, as a result of the denunciation by Fidel Castro and the ideological quarrel with the pro-Soviet PGT, the Maoist MR-13 guerrillas of Yon Sosa have fallen from the international spotlight and have become more of a regional peasant movement.

The FAR has a classic Communist cell system in both its urban and rural organizations, while MR-13 is based largely in peasant committees and village militias. The PGT-oriented FAR is based principally in Guatemala City, according to Communist sources. The FAR, moreover, commands the services of many disciplined Communists who have received advanced revolutionary training in Soviet-bloc countries since the pro-Communist Arbenz regime was toppled in 1954. MR-13 still depends largely on untrained peasants and students.

Interviewed in his guerrilla camp in the Department of Izabal, Yon Sosa recalled

* For an English translation of the key documents issued by the various groups concerned with this dispute -- which involved followers of Posadas and not members of the Fourth International founded by Leon Trotsky -- see World Outlook, July 15 and 29.

the 1962 trip to Cuba.

"I remember five of us went to Havana in September 1962: Turcios, Francisco Amado, an officer from the 1960 revolt named Oscar Trejos, myself and a student I cannot name," Yon Sosa said. "It was arranged through a lawyer in Guatemala City who summoned us and said Che Guevara wanted to see us. We met with Che four or five times and with Fidel in one long session that lasted from 3 p.m. to 2 a.m. the next morning.

"What I remember most was our visits with Col. Arbenz (the pro-Communist President ousted in 1954),* who was teaching in the Cuban war college. Once he wept as he told us he wanted to return to Guatemala. He said: 'When you think it convenient for me to join your movement as just another soldier, I will do so gladly because I want to live again in Guatemala.'

"They put us in a small house and we went on the usual tour of schools and hospitals and state farms and military bases all over the island," Yon Sosa continued. "Then one day Che Guevara walked into our house unannounced. We didn't know who he was. He came in without any fanfare or pretensions and just started chatting. When one of his aides finally introduced us, we started asking him about how to organize our movement and what would be the best part of Guatemala to start guerrilla operations. He refused to answer these questions, saying Guatemalans should know these answers best.

"At the end of one of our talks we asked Che for money to finance our operations. He said many people would have to join in deciding on such a request but that it would be considered. We stayed in Cuba through the October 1962 missile crisis, and left shortly thereafter. When we left, the Cubans gave us a lump sum of money. It was the only material help we ever got from them." Yon Sosa refused to reveal the amount of money given.

"Shortly after that the Cubans stopped giving out money so freely. There were many fake revolutionaries living high in Havana and throughout Latin America on the money of the workers and peasants of Cuba. We knew some Hondurans like that in Havana when we were there."

Fidel Castro's sudden, damaging denunciation of the Yon Sosa movement last January may have paved the way for a reconciliation between the two feuding guerrilla organizations. Communist sources said FAR did not feel strong enough at any time to send rival guerrilla units into the MR-13 territory. The FAR-MR-13 polemics subsided sharply after the expulsion of the Trotskyites last April, for which Yon Sosa's movement was publicly congratulated by the old-line Communists.

* The legally elected Arbenz government was overthrown by a counterrevolutionary coup d'état largely plotted by the CIA, as has been boasted often enough in Washington. Arbenz granted timid concessions to the land-hungry peasants. This infuriated the Guatemalan oligarchy, the United Fruit Co., and the Eisenhower administration. -- W.O.

FREEDOM FIGHTERS REPORT PROGRESS IN MOZAMBIQUE

The guerrilla fighters struggling against Portuguese imperialism in Mozambique report that they have made considerable gains in the past two years.

Since September 1964, FRELIMO [Frente de Libertação de Moçambique -- Mozambique Liberation Front] has extended its activities from a few districts until they now cover two provinces and parts of two others. From barely "a couple of hundred well-trained, poorly equipped guerrillas," the organization declares, the fighting force has grown "to more than 7,000 well-trained, thoroughly politicised and fairly well-equipped freedom fighters."

The semiliberated areas include a population of more than 800,000 Mozambicans. In the conduct of affairs pertaining to government they now recognize FRELIMO instead of the Portuguese officials.

When the struggle began, "FRELIMO's main preoccupation was to train its many thousands of militants in clandestine political work" and to establish military units in as many parts of Mozambique as possible. Today the organization "must also worry about the day-to-day affairs of the civilian population, especially in liberated areas of the country, where hundreds of thousands of the African people look to the organization for all services normally provided by a government."

THE BEN BARKA AFFAIR

By Michel Lequenne

Paris

On October 29, 1965, Mehdi Ben Barka, exiled leader of the Moroccan National Union of Popular Forces [UNFP -- Union nationale des forces populaires] and organizer of the Havana Tricontinental Conference, was picked up for questioning by two French policemen in Paris, while he was on the way to a meeting with motion picture producer Franju, which had been arranged to discuss plans for a projected anticolonial film, Basta.

Mehdi Ben Barka was supposed to come to the meeting alone but had brought along a Moroccan history student, M. Azemmouri, whom he wanted to propose as a consultant for the film. The encounter with the police therefore had a witness and consequently did not remain a secret. Even though the student became frightened and went into hiding, the French police bureau was alerted through intermediaries, particularly by the victim's brother, Abdelkader Ben Barka.

At the same time, Philippe Bernier, leftist journalist, friend of Ben Barka, and the link between Ben Barka and Franju in production of the film, became worried about the absence of the Moroccan revolutionist, and he, too, sought to find out the reason for his disappearance and alerted the French authorities.

The fifth man of the meeting that was never held, Georges Figon, a shady figure who had made his way into leftist intellectual circles and was pretending to finance the film, was little concerned about Ben Barka's disappearance -- he had been the prime mover in bringing it about.

At first the police claimed to have no connection whatever with the disappearance of Ben Barka, and the secret services [SDECE -- Service de documentation et de counter-espionage], when questioned by the police, also stated that they were not involved -- all this through its chief Le Roy, known as Finville, the very man who had followed the operation through all its stages.

The campaign for the presidential elections in France had just begun. The kidnapping of Ben Barka came at a bad time. It was not until November 11 that the judge assigned to follow the affair learned what the police had already known since November 3 -- that it was in fact two of their agents, Souchon and Voitot, who had picked up Ben Barka, acting on orders of a member of the SDECE, Antoine Lopez, principal inspector for Air France at the Orly Airport. The two claim to have obeyed him after receiving a telephonic confirmation from the head of the police prefecture -- but the voice they describe was not the latter's. Lopez was the first to be arrested but despite the claim that he gave himself up voluntarily he dragged out his limited revelations over many days.

Finally the French presidential elections were over. De Gaulle was re-elected. He promised Mehdi Ben Barka's mother that the whole truth about her son's disappearance would be uncovered. He became a bit angry, shouted that he was being taken "for a sucker" and that he stood at the head of "anything but a government." However, all of this was quickly dropped and in February he declared at a press conference that the "French officials" involved in the affair were only "vulgar and secondary."

According to the official scenario, these were references only to the policemen Souchon and Voitot, members of the vice squad trained by Lopez, who collaborated with them on behalf of the narcotics division. But who is Lopez? An "honorable associate" (unpaid) of the SDECE. He delivered his information to a "contact officer," Le Roy-Finville, whose job was to transmit it through regular channels. And Lopez claims to have passed along all the information he obtained, and to have acted only on orders. The kidnapping of Mehdi Ben Barka was alleged to be a favor extended by the SDECE to the Moroccan monarchy, which was desirous of "restoring" Ben Barka to the national community.

The political information reaching the SDECE allegedly indicated that following the ferocious repression in the spring of 1965 (500 dead), King Hassan II was liberalizing his regime and seeking a reconciliation with the left. Even though Ben Barka was not involved in the amnesty proclaimed in Morocco, King Hassan II allegedly wanted to get his "former mathematics teacher" back and allegedly was seeking an interview with him on neutral ground. It was such an interview which the SDECE wanted to facilitate by "unorthodox" methods.

This thesis, consistently defended by the French authorities, does not, however,

correspond with the truth. In fact, it was known at the SDECE by October 22 at the latest (a week before the kidnapping) that the Moroccan leaders were preparing a criminal attack against Ben Barka. Even the names of the agents charged with the task were known. Moreover, Figon had let it be known that the Moroccans wanted to "gun down" Ben Barka, as Le Roy-Finville admitted in the course of the trial, although he pretended that he paid no attention to this piece of information because it came from a "hoodlum."

The SDECE also knew that the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Oufkir, was a sadistic killer and that he hated Ben Barka. Even if the reconciliation project between Hassan II and Ben Barka had not been a trap, an interview with Ben Barka arranged by Oufkir could only inspire the deepest apprehensions. But it was precisely to such a meeting that Lopez conducted Ben Barka without any forewarning and then telephoned from Paris to Morocco, to Oufkir, to advise him that the "package" had arrived. This bit of news Oufkir passed on to "the boss" (the king, obviously).

Isn't Lopez a double agent who acted on behalf of the Moroccans on this occasion? There can be no doubt about his being a double agent and even a triple one, since he was also an agent of the CIA, but he was not the only one. During the course of the trial it was brought out that Le Roy-Finville (another agent of both the CIA and the SDECE) had been forewarned of all phases of the affair, at least to the degree that he did not cut off information by staying away from his office. The reports in which Le Roy-Finville transmitted the information supplied by Lopez to his superiors became skimpier in the period preceding the kidnapping, then ended (or disappeared). It was impossible to learn during the course of the trial whether Le Roy-Finville was deceiving his superiors or whether he himself was only one link in a chain of officials aware of what they were doing. Nevertheless, the latter hypothesis seems the more probable, for Le Roy-Finville, after several blackmail threats, was released provisionally, and is being prosecuted only for minor misdemeanors on the level of professional misconduct. Such indulgence toward a man so deeply involved in the crime is hard to conceive unless he possesses some very compromising secrets.

It was quickly ascertained that Ben Barka had been brought to Fontenay-le-Vicomte, to a villa owned by the gangster-procurer Georges Boucheseiche, and that Oufkir and Dlimi, in turn, arrived there on October 30.

It was some two months later that the press made the crucial exposés, providing all we know today about the fate of Ben Barka. It became apparent almost immediately that a necessary cog in the kidnapping was Figon, ex-hoodlum turned producer. Moreover, everybody accused him, from Bernier -- who had been arrested even though there was no serious charge against him -- up to Lopez, who pictured him as the organizer of the operation.

Figon was sought but the police could not find him. Nevertheless, as early as November 2, he had met with Police Superintendent Caille of "General Information" at the home of his lawyer and friend, deputy Pierre Lemarchand, and had told the superintendent everything he knew about the affair. However, Caille had already heard the main elements of the story the previous evening from a police spy whom he stubbornly refused to identify, even to the tribunal, a refusal which was accepted and justified by the presiding judge Perez.

In exchange for his revelations, Superintendent Caille promised Figon that he would not be bothered. Fortified by this immunity, Figon saw many people, did not hide, and according to his acquaintances, tranquilly waited for a passport and money which would allow him to leave France. But when all this became delayed, he became frightened, surmised that his friends and accomplices were bent on destroying him rather than in helping him get out of France, and he began to talk in an effort to convert his secrets into money. Without success. They were published without his getting a penny. But they were to give new life and vigor to the affair.

The plan for the attack went back no further than the end of the summer. The film project was the bait and Bernier "the lure in the lion hunt." An initial attempt was made on September 2, 1965, in Cairo, where Figon had gone with Bernier. It failed, possibly because Figon wanted to enjoy himself longer and was in no hurry to kill Ben Barka and the goose with the golden eggs at the same time.

On October 29, it was Figon who fingered Ben Barka to the policemen Souchon and Voitot. Figon followed Ben Barka to Boucheseiche's villa, where the leader of the UNFP was guarded by the gangsters Le Ny, Dubail, Palisse, normally in the service of Morocco, but occasionally also in that of various French police divisions. Figon was present when Oufkir and Dlimi arrived. It was not until he saw Oufkir that Ben Barka understood the kind of trap he had fallen into. He tried to escape but was overpowered by the gangsters. Oufkir began to torture him (perhaps for questioning, perhaps solely out of

sadism) by cutting into his throat with a dagger. Figon pretended not to know the sequel but stated that Ben Barka while still alive was probably taken from Boucheseiche's villa to Lopez' at Ormoy, a neighboring spot, where he was probably tied to the central heating furnace in the cellar. No doubt it was there that he was murdered.

Figon told this complete story as early as November 2 (four days after the attack) to Superintendent Caille in the presence of Pierre Lemarchand. These two obstinately denied it but a number of witnesses, cross-checks and contradictions overwhelmed them. The reasons for their silence are unclear. Was it "loyalty to the organization" on the policeman's part? Professional secrecy on the lawyer's side? The two men were linked by friendship.

The lawyer-deputy (of the Union pour la Nouvelle République, the Gaullist party in power) is more than a suspicious character. Pierre Lemarchand is a former fascist who went over to Gaullism after May 13, 1958. Organizer of "actions" against the terrorist Organization de l'Armée Secrète [OAS] in Algeria at the end of the war, he was accused by a secret agent of having liquidated his own agents by blowing them up after he had used them (and of having appropriated their salaries and bonuses). After Algerian independence, it seems that Pierre Lemarchand preserved a "network," composed mainly of gangsters who owe innumerable "cases dismissed" to his talents as a lawyer. Figon was notoriously one of his "men."

What role can his "network" have played in the Ben Barka affair? The French press of the extreme right first accused him of being the principal organizer of the kidnapping and, thus of the murder. But this press is trying to cover up the King of Morocco and his minister, and is violently anti-Gaullist (it has not pardoned him for the anti-OAS struggle).

Lopez, too, tried to compromise Lemarchand. He declared that Lemarchand accompanied Figon to Geneva on September 20, 1965, when the latter went there to get close to Ben Barka (Lemarchand was actually in the same plane); also that Lemarchand told him, "You are the one who should have done it," after Figon introduced the lawyer to Lopez as his "cover." But Lopez recanted later. Lopez also pretended that Lemarchand was present at the kidnapping spot, which was untrue. Lopez, defended by Tixier-Vignancour, a well-known fascist lawyer, made a turnabout and abandoned his attacks against Lemarchand.

A last minute piece of written testimony, of doubtful value, published by the Nouvel Observateur claims that the Lemarchand "network" followed the affair in order to stop it at the last minute and thus compromise the anti-Gaullist fascists entrenched in the SDECE. Operation "interception" allegedly failed through a "betrayal" by Figon.

However murky Lemarchand may be, it does not appear that he and his "network" were the moving forces in the operation; and in all probability Figon was playing a personal game with money as the objective.

The latter's revelations to the press had to bring about his death. Although the official experts have called his death a suicide, the depositions of his friends in the course of the trial leave no doubt that he was assassinated just before the police arrived to arrest him at his last address, which had become "hot."

With Figon gone, a veil of silence again settled over all the unknowns in the Ben Barka affair.

What became of the body of the leader of the UNFP? Dlimi allegedly asked Lopez to find a spot to bury it. Since this was not easy in that part of France, the body was presumably brought to the Moroccan embassy, then cut into pieces and the parts sent to Morocco in diplomatic pouches.

By November 3, 1965, the police and the highest authorities of the French state, among them Minister of the Interior Roger Frey, knew everything about the crime (but not the investigating magistrate). Nevertheless, on that day Oufkir and Dlimi returned to France, attended official ceremonies and gave a reception at the embassy. Not only were they left undisturbed but on the contrary, high functionaries everywhere worked to hasten their departure. The powers that be did not want them arrested. On the same day, Lopez' confessions were held up in the police department. The official report of his deposition was signed only after the Moroccan dignitaries were on a plane taking them out of France and far away.

The day after they left, de Gaulle again cut loose. The Moroccan authorities responded insolently and refused his request to extradite the French gangsters, the hired kidnapers, who had taken refuge in their land.

The French opposition made only meager use of the Ben Barka affair against the government, both at the time it broke into the open, when the presidential election was in full swing, and afterward. This is probably due to the fact that despite the obvious and well-established Moroccan responsibility, it is easy to discern the fine American hand of the CIA in the plot. To the heads of the CIA, Ben Barka was perhaps an even more frightening adversary than he was to the head of the Moroccan reaction. And the French opposition is more "Atlantic-minded" than the de Gaulle regime.

In September and October of this year, the trial dragged through more than forty confusing sessions, under the direction of a presiding judge whose leitmotif was: "the question cannot be asked," and who refused to give the affair its proper political dimensions.

Finally, at the very moment when the verdict was to be rendered and the accused in the dock sentenced -- probably to ridiculous penalties -- a sensational development stopped everything. Commander Dlimi, chief of Moroccan Security, and assistant assassin, came to France to "give himself up," after having written Hassan II a letter stating that he was doing so voluntarily in order to "clear his name."

But no sooner was he in Paris than instead of "clearing his name" by replying to the accusation hanging over him, he appealed for a reversal of judgment, invoking the Franco-Moroccan juridical agreement, under which refugees from one country arrested on the territory of the other, must be returned to their own national authorities for judgment by their own courts (an agreement already twice violated by Morocco, one of the occasions being its refusal to extradite the gangsters).

In effect Dlimi's move meant that the French court could not find him, as well as Oufkir, guilty on the grounds of being fugitives from justice, a judgment which would have resulted in platonic, even though heavy sentences, entailing as a result great diplomatic difficulties between France and Morocco.

Hassan II wants to settle the affair in the secret channels of high diplomacy between himself and de Gaulle and to use blackmail, since the Moroccan culprits are fully conversant with the extreme degree of French culpability, even if it only involved taking a neutral position regarding the crime. De Gaulle, who sought throughout the trial to liquidate the affair before the French legislative elections next spring, is the one who is mainly hurt by "Operation Dlimi." The future will show whether he answers -- whether he can answer -- the challenge hurled at him.

In any event, at this point the Ben Barka affair, like the Dallas affair in the United States, testifies more than adequately to the proliferation of the police and the police character of these presidential regimes, whose No. 1 tool is also their major point of weakness.

MALCOLM X BOOKS PUBLISHED IN FRANCE

Paris

Le Pouvoir Noir [Black Power] is the title of a recently published French translation of Malcolm X Speaks. Its appearance October 21 was hailed at a meeting sponsored by the publisher François Maspero. More than 500 persons packed the hall. The main speakers were Claude Julien, who wrote the preface for the French edition of the book, and Daniel Guerin, who provided the preface for the French edition of The Autobiography of Malcolm X (recently released by Editions Bernard Grasset).

The speakers reviewed some of the highlights of Malcolm's life and presented a general picture of the development of his ideas. They praised both books highly and said they were necessary reading if one wished to understand the racial problem in the U.S., the feelings of the black people and the different approaches towards solving the problem.

All the speakers agreed that the assassination of Malcolm X had not only deprived the black people in the U.S. of probably their most dynamic and honest leader, but had also removed from the scene a leader with international stature.

Two films were also shown. The first was a short one produced in Cuba called "Now" which showed some of the racist violence in the U.S. The other was an Afro-American production entitled "With Malcolm X." It featured an interview with Malcolm X in English.

FOUR BITS OF FAKERY

By Henri Valin

Michel Pablo, a former leader of the Fourth International, recently(1) sharply attacked an article I wrote last summer on the crisis in Yugoslavia. It appears that I was "sectarian" and displayed "bitter hatred" for the "historic events unfolding in Yugoslavia" when I noted the massive unemployment appearing there and attributed it to the institution of "workers self-management" and not to "bureaucratic deformations" due to some "perturbations" [sic] that have appeared in the Yugoslav economy and that I launched "confusionist attacks against self-management and against the necessary reforms of the Stalinist model of a centrally directed economy," etc., etc.

It should be mentioned that our critic, generally so clairvoyant, so wise, so objective, such a master of theory, had just made a sizable discovery on the subject of this same Yugoslavia, a discovery, however, which he suddenly dropped -- this country, if we are to believe him, last summer underwent a "political revolution," neither more nor less.(2)

If Marxist categories are not to be dissolved in arbitrary subjectivism, a "political revolution" can be understood only as the passing of political power from one social layer to another, without an overturn in the existing mode of production, while a "social revolution" signifies a shift of political power from one social class to another, with a simultaneous overturn in the existing mode of production.

In a bureaucratically degenerated or deformed workers state, a "political revolution" then can only signify a shift in the exercise of political power from the bureaucracy to the proletariat; that is, the reestablishment of Soviet democracy.

But Pablo tells us that the "political revolution" which just took place in Yugoslavia is a "revolution from above." A revolution from above is a revolution conducted by the people in power. But the social layer in power in Yugoslavia was the bureaucracy; otherwise, a political revolution would never have been called for there. A "political revolution from above" is consequently the abolition of the bureaucracy's political power...by the bureaucracy itself; i.e., something completely meaningless whether from the point of view of sociology or the facts. It is clear that Pablo mixes up the victory of a certain group in the bureaucracy -- even if it be the more "liberal" group -- with the loss of political power by the bureaucracy as a whole.(3) This is the logical outcome of his revision of a fundamental concept of Trotskyism which holds that the "liberalization" undertaken by the bureaucracy is an act of self-defense (and hence the preservation of bureaucratic power) and not the self-abolition of the bureaucracy.

It is outright humbug to discover a "political revolution" in a workers state where there are no proletarian organs of political power of the Soviet type, no freedom of the press for everyone or even for a few tendencies in the workers movement, no right to strike, no independence of the trade unions, no possibility whatever for any group of workers to have their political or social opinions gain ascendancy over the ruling wing of the bureaucracy, no internal democracy even in the Communist League of Yugoslavia.

"Foreign policy is everywhere and always a continuation of domestic policy..." Trotsky wrote in The Revolution Betrayed (Pioneer Publishers edition, 1957, p. 186). He added that in the event of a political revolution, "foreign policy will return to the traditions of revolutionary internationalism." (p. 290) A strange "political revolution" in which the foreign policy of the country, far from taking even timid steps in the direction of revolutionary internationalism, stands to the right of that of Colonel

(1) In Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, No. 33-34: "L'expérience yougoslave et ses détracteurs." Pablo took exception to an article of mine that was published in the July 25 Perspective Mondiale and which appeared in an English translation in the July 29 issue of World Outlook.

(2) Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, No. 31-32: "Révolution politique en Yougoslavie."

(3) He is not the only one who calls himself a "Trotskyist" to conceive the absurd idea of a "political revolution from above" in a bureaucratically deformed workers state. The tiny group headed by Posadas speaks in the same way of a "political revolution conducted by Mao Tse-tung" which is presumably unfolding in China. Despite the fact that their ideological paths have diverged, Posadas remains, from the point of view of method, a spiritual son -- if an illegitimate one -- of Pablo.

Boumedienne, even to the right of the bourgeois imperialist de Gaulle!(4) The fathering of such a "political revolution, we leave freely and willingly to our eminent "revolutionary Marxist" critic.(5)

Pablo, who long ago lost any critical attitude whatsoever toward his own writings, and who excels in the art of affirming, always in the same smug authoritative tone, the opposite of what he said the day before, without offering the slightest explanation for the change,(6) does not seem to have noticed that in suddenly discovering a "political revolution" in Yugoslavia, he runs into new contradictions. For years he denied the necessity for such a revolution. He asserted that the situation in Yugoslavia was qualitatively different from that in the USSR and the other bureaucratically deformed or degenerated workers states. Didn't the democratic reforms succeed in Yugoslavia? Didn't they extend the "social domain of self-management" more and more? Wasn't the ruling wing of the Communist League of Yugoslavia the liberal wing to be counted on in these reforms, even taking the initiative in stimulating and propelling them forward? Clearly, no revolution was necessary to break the "resistance of the bureaucratic elements"; no revolution was necessary since these elements were in power and so deeply entrenched there that no reform could dislodge them!

But then in this country marked by the "continuous development of self-management," it was discovered that for years the political power rested in large part in the hands of the...secret police, the very existence of which Pablo so prudently refrained from mentioning in the numerous laudatory studies which he devoted to Yugoslavia before July 1966! But instead of carrying out a self-criticism; of admitting that self-management, limited solely to the plant level and combined with a system of political power exercised by the bureaucracy, made possible the consolidation of this bureaucratic power, in its worst form, moreover, arbitrary police power, for a long period --

(4) See the September 16, 1966, Le Monde on the Yugoslav positions, "a little too favorable to the Americans," which the French Minister Couve de Murville encountered in Belgrade. See an Associated Press dispatch of October 12, 1966, on the cooling off between Tito and Boumedienne when the latter at the end of his visit in Belgrade wanted to include in a joint communiqué that the National Liberation Front is the only legitimate representative of the people of south Vietnam and Tito refused.

(5) Pablo accuses us of something else: We reproduce "unreservedly" the criticisms of the Cubans with regard to the Yugoslavs, although there is no essential difference between a "number of Yugoslavia's foreign policy positions" and those of the USSR and the Communist parties. The enormity of this assertion can be judged from the fact that the Cuban criticisms are directed in particular at the Yugoslav positions on the Tricontinental Conference and the war in Vietnam. Pablo, who began by unreservedly approving the Soviet position at the Tricontinental, which paid lip service to the insurrectional line adopted by that gathering, today equates that line with the explicit Yugoslav condemnation of it as a threat to world peace.

(6) Among others, here is a striking example: In the March 1965 issue of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, under the title, "Vietnam: La Leçon de la Crise," we find the following: "The Chinese, who deeply resented Kosygin's trip to Vietnam and Korea, reacted sharply to the American bombings and did not hesitate to threaten them with a new 'Korean-type defeat.' With regard to this language, the Soviets preferred to combine the effect of their presence in Hanoi and the shipment of the necessary arms for an effective [sic] defense of North Vietnam with moderate language and search for a diplomatic solution permitting the Americans to 'save face.' Is this a less 'revolutionary' attitude than that of the Chinese? The question must be posed with regard to the danger, real or otherwise, represented by an atomic [sic] war and its effects..." Eighteen months later, Pablo advanced an opposite conclusion. The danger of a nuclear war had disappeared or had become a negligible factor. Now it had become a genuine betrayal if the USSR did not intervene massively on the side of North Vietnam: "To boast of the unequalled power of Soviet rockets, planes, submarines, etc., and yet to permit the Vietnamese airspace to be violated day after day, week after week, month after month, by an increasing number of American air attacks which savagely consume cities and towns and the living substance of the Vietnamese people is equivalent in practice to the worst hypocrisy and betrayal." (Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, No. 33-34). It turns out that this "worst hypocrisy and betrayal" had appeared quite reasonable and even desirable to Pablo eighteen months earlier. It turns out also that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International had called attention since March 1965 to the danger of an increasingly brazen escalation by imperialism if the USSR did not engage in countermeasures from the beginning. But everyone knows that in contrast to Pablo, Eternity's great "revolutionary Marxist," the people of the United Secretariat are only "confusionists" foundering in "the most vulgar eclecticism"...

fifteen years! -- instead of drawing these obvious conclusions from the events of July 1966, Pablo attempted to get out of it by slipping forward and calling the purge of the police carried out by the ruling group of the bureaucracy...a political revolution!

That there was "factional resistance" on the part of the Ranković group to the domestic and economic policies of the Tito group can certainly be assumed. That the resistance was in general of a conservative nature and that the police elements upon which this group was based were in general the most detestable, can also be taken for granted.

But how can anyone seriously try to cover up the fact that Tito-Kardelj were the real rulers of the country, not only since July 1966 but since the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? If this was really so, it is obvious that the power of the secret police could not be built and maintained except with the complicity of Tito and his collaborators.(7) Under these circumstances, it is politically dishonest to accept as good coin the selection of Ranković as the scapegoat or chief culprit in the crimes committed by the police. It is a fraud equal to the one perpetrated when Beria, the "imperialist spy," was held to be the only one or the main one responsible for Stalin's crimes, when the whole ruling group of the Soviet bureaucracy shared responsibility for these crimes.

Pablo is above all an egregious simplifier. He settles the thorniest questions with the most simple alternatives: either you are "for self-management," in which case to criticize the economic policy of the Yugoslav government puts you in the category of a "defamer of the Yugoslav experiment," a "confusionist," "sectarian," and "full of hatred"; or you contend that your criticisms are well founded, in which case you automatically become an "adversary of self-management," even "partisans of the Stalinist [!] methods of centralized management of the economy." (In this alternative, Leninist methods are not posed.)

It is obviously a pure and simple slander, which Pablo continues to circulate, when he insinuates that we are "adversaries of self-management" and "partisans of Stalinist-type centralization." Let us repeat for the n'th time that we consider workers self-management to be an indispensable element of a democratic social and state structure in the transitional period between capitalism and socialism, an indispensable element in Soviet democracy. But we differ with Pablo on two precise points.

First of all, we distinguish in the sharpest way between workers self-management and mere plant autonomy. Experience has demonstrated in the USSR as well as the "people's democracies" what theory had indicated; namely, that "self-management" can be either bureaucratic or workers self-management, that a growth in the autonomy of plants without workers councils is perfectly possible, in this case being achieved through an increase in the power of the so-called "economic" or "technocratic" bureaucracy and at the expense of the central authorities and the workers (plant managers can, for example, exercise the right to lay off workers, a right they do not enjoy in the system of "centralized" management).

Next, we define workers self-management as a necessary element but insufficient in itself to assure socialist democracy, the democratization of society in the transitional period between capitalism and socialism. If this element is not combined with centralized democratic planning and with workers democracy on the political level, workers self-management can to a large degree lose all its substance; and the power of the bureaucracy can be consolidated and even reinforced. The Yugoslav experiment has just confirmed this, as its leaders themselves confess.

Todorović, the new secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, was not afraid to admit openly that the CLY is "a nondemocratic organization in its structure." (Le Monde, September 17, 1966.) On the eve of this declaration, Pablo was lost in admiration over the congress of the Socialist Alliance, in which the delegates were "seated in alphabetical order" and even portraits of Tito were missing... As for the absence of democracy, he didn't notice it!(8) After having been more Ben-

(7) A particularly scabrous detail: As late as May 12, 1964, at the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the security service, Tito decorated 3,078 members of the UDB [Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti -- Administration of State Security] "for special merit in the organization and consolidation of the people's power..."

(8) A deplorable sign of the absence of democracy that has not yet been repaired: The October 1966 plenum of the Central Committee of the CLY expelled Ranković and company for "factional activities." No one either heard the explanations of the defendants or learned what they might be. No one knew what ideas they advocated or was informed on

bellist than the Benbellists, Pablo is now more Titoist than the Titoists.

It is a genuine hoax to speak of the need for the economy to be reoriented "in accordance with social needs," yet to leave out the social inequalities and the social differentiation that reflects these "needs." In quoting Kardelj on this subject without a word of criticism or even reservation,(9) Pablo descends to the level of a vulgar apologist of the Yugoslav reality. The truth is that the "social needs" revealed by the market do not conform to the social reality and to the proletarian socialist priorities any more than the "social needs" arbitrarily determined by an all-powerful Politbureau or general secretary. In both cases, the elementary requirements of socialist democracy and the interests of the proletariat are trampled underfoot.

To waste a part of the consumption funds to build plants out of all proportion in ostentation is obviously abominable from the standpoint of the proletariat. But to seek to impose the gauge of "profitability" in social security or the construction of homes for the people, to reorient investments in order to satisfy the need for luxury and comfort among those with high incomes while the most elementary needs remain unsatisfied, is just as abominable from this standpoint. This means that it is the needs of the bureaucracy and not the needs of the workers that determine the course of the economy. And that is what is actually happening in Yugoslavia.

In his spare time, when he occupies himself with "pure theory," Pablo vaguely recalls that there is an "antagonism" between "the law of value" (the "laws of the market") and the principle of planning according to needs. He recalls this particularly in dealing with Preobrazhensky's book. [The New Economics.] But when it comes to concretely examining the evolution of the Yugoslav economy, these elementary truths are forgotten, and Pablo reverts to his simplistic point of departure: either...or. He thus becomes in practice a defender of the ceaselessly growing social inequalities in Yugoslavia.

It is rather scandalous that a journalist, who still calls himself a "Trotskyist," deals with the "economic reforms of 1965" in Yugoslavia and says nothing at all about the fact that they entailed layoffs for hundreds of thousands of workers!

Pablo is obviously incapable of refuting a single one of our concrete statements concerning the negative effects of these reforms (unemployment, lowering of real wages, growth of inequality between nationalities, etc.). He takes refuge in an abstract assertion of the "necessity for retaining market categories in the transitional period."

No sensible person has ever disputed this necessity. Nor have we ever disputed that planning can utilize the market mechanisms. But what needs to be discussed is the constant and excessive amplification of recourse to these mechanisms in the concrete case of Yugoslavia. To reply to concrete statements on this subject with general phrases about the "necessities" of the market, is in fact to repeat what the Stalins and the Bukharins did when Trotsky and the Left Opposition analyzed the concrete contradictions which the market had introduced into the Soviet economy at the time of the New Economic Policy. But, no doubt, in doing what they did, Trotsky and the Left Opposition gave proof of congenital "confusionism" if not "paving the way for Stalinism."(10)

The final bit of humbug to which attention should be called is to repeat without criticism Kardelj's theses on the "new relations of production" presumably being born

the real aims of these "intriguers." We repeat once more. As an individual, Ranković is no more interesting than was a Molotov in the USSR. But there is no democracy in a party where a leader, no matter who he is, can be liquidated in the dark without the members knowing his views or hearing his defense.

(9) Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, No. 29, p. 18.

(10) When he was still a Trotskyist, Pablo himself wrote: "The Yugoslavs thought they could get around the difficulties faced by the bureaucratic regime by instituting 'workers councils' and by an assumed so-called 'direct democracy' thanks to self-government in the plants and communes. But the paternalism of this concept and practice was apparent to any observer at all familiar with Marxism and Yugoslav practice. What it amounted to was attempts from above to grant certain rights of self-administration to the workers and the population at the level of the plants and localities; national policy, which in the final analysis decides everything, remained the prerogative of a very restricted group of men, the Yugoslav political leadership under the circumstances." (Dictature du prolétariat, démocratie, socialisme, pp. 8-9, written in August 1957.) Without doubt, at that time, Pablo, too, was a "defamer of the Yugoslav experiment" and a "confusionist" of the worst kind.

"within self-management." Pablo imprudently goes so far as to claim that there are no longer any wage-workers under "self-management." And some Yugoslav theoreticians even claim that there is no longer a proletariat in the country but a new class of "producer-entrepreneurs."

There are no "wage-workers" any longer; the workers have become "a kind of entrepreneurs." But these "nonsalaried entrepreneurs," subjected not only to their own "self-management" but to the autonomous mechanisms of the market economy, find themselves suddenly thrown onto the streets without a cent in their pockets, whether in the form of "profit" or in the form of "wages." One must admit that to deprive workers of their wages is a quite special way of proving that they have ceased to be wage-workers!

The evidence itself shows that a system of "workers self-management" in which the workers collectives lay off their fellow workers in mass, thus shattering the internal cohesion of the working class in an even worse way than did Stakhanovism in Stalin's time, is a system that has begun to disintegrate. It is also quite evident that a system of "socialist planning" that permits plants producing raw materials to export them, thereby diverting them from the key plants of the national economy -- thereby leading to the underemployment of equipment of these plants! -- is a system that has begun to disintegrate. That Pablo, so quick to shout "betrayal," even to pillory his former comrades, has not yet seen this, obviously reflects his own ideological disintegration.

HUNDREDS OF PUERTO RICANS REJECT SERVING IN U.S. ARMED FORCES

Declarations of opposition to being drafted for service in the U.S. armed forces and being sent to Vietnam are piling up in Puerto Rico.

The October 30 issue of Claridad, the weekly publication of the Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico, listed the names of more than 600 who have signed a statement that they will not serve in the "armed forces of the United States under any circumstances."

Through this action, the statement said, the signers expressed their repudiation of "the tyrannical law of compulsory military service, which, as part of the colonial subjugation of our country, North American imperialism imposes on Puerto Rican youth."

"We affirm in addition," continues the statement, "our solidarity with and support for the heroic struggle which the National Liberation Front of south Vietnam is waging for national independence, neutrality, peace and national sovereignty.

"As evidence of our determination, we are ready to face all the consequences, sustained by the knowledge that our stand is completely principled and morally justified."

Claridad reports that many others are adding their signatures.

CORRECTION

In the text of the Joint Korean-Cuban Statement on Vietnam, published in World Outlook November 18 [Vol. 4, No. 36], a paragraph referred to in the accompanying editorial note was inadvertently omitted.

The missing paragraph should be inserted on page 23. To facilitate finding it, we have placed it in the context of the preceding and following paragraphs and have underlined it for easier identification:

"Both sides consider that the socialist countries, the communist and workers' parties, all the anti-imperialist forces in the world should unite and actively assist the Vietnamese people in their war of resistance against U.S. imperialism for national salvation and shatter the imperialist aggression.

"The socialist countries should dispatch international contingents of volunteers to aid the fighting Vietnamese people.

"The war of resistance against U.S. imperialism for national salvation waged heroically by the Vietnamese people is an example for the world people in the struggle for peace, national independence and socialism."