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## 25 YEARS IN EL FRONTON FOR HUGO BLANCO

The Peruvian military authorities, acting as both prosecution and judge, sentenced Hugo Blanco, the Trotskyist peasant leader, to 25 years in El Frontón, the grim prison in the harbor of Lima. His comrade and co-defendant Pedro Candela was given 22 years, likewise in El Frontón. Six others in the case were given sentences ranging up to five years in prison. Besides the sentences the court levied damages and fines amounting to 160,000 soles [almost US\$6,000].

Up to the final moment on September 8, it was feared that the military might carry out the plan they had reportedly envisaged

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-- giving Hugo Blanco the death sentence. Evidently they reconsidered in view of the reaction that was visible even in the small town of Tacna where people lined up for admission into the large hall where the court was held and where the audience clearly favored the prisoners, at times expressing such sympathy that the judge had to clear the court.

Despite the fierce repression in Peru and all the efforts to railroad the trial through in a hurry in the remote town of Tacna, near the border of Chile, it was clearly evident that nationwide sympathy for the prisoners was rapidly building up. Each day of the trial was featured in sensational headlines in the Lima press. Despite the garbled accounts, the heroic stand of the defendants broke through and some of the things they said echoed throughout the country.

In addition, expressions of international sympathy were mounting. If Hugo Blanco were condemned to death these could rise to a storm of protest. Evidently the military decided that it was better to give him a long sentence in the notorious dungeons of El Frontón. After the first flurry of protest, perhaps the military believes it can dispose of him in a quiet way.

In Peru, where students and unionists were mobilizing support for the defendants, the reaction to the illegal trial and long sentences was immediate.

The Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Agraria placed an advertisement in the Lima daily Expreso September 11 demanding annulment of Hugo Blanco's sentence and petitioning parliament to throw out the Military Code which is being used to try political prisoners. A similar advertisement appeared two days later in the same paper under the sponsorship of the Federated Center of Law of the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos making a similar appeal.

Abroad, meanwhile, it was reported that Bertrand Russell and Jean Paul-Sartre had joined the list of distinguished figures appealing to President Belaúnde for an immediate amnesty for Hugo Blanco and his co-defendants.

The final days of the trial, as gathered from often contradictory newspaper clippings sent to World Outlook, went as follows:

On September 3, as reported last week, the day began with the reading of depositions allegedly made by the defendants during the investigation conducted by the military tribunal. The court then decided to question eight of the Quechua-speaking prisoners. These were Andrés Gonzalez Tejada, Francisco Cayo Palomino, Octavio Antonio Huancao, Nemesio Bocángel Zavala, Juan Pando Paucar, Basilio Alvarez Sacca, Gregorio Surco Quispe and Emilio Fernández Ojeda, all of them from Quillabamba and all members of the peasant union organized under the leadership of Hugo Blanco. Three interpreters were brought in so that the judge could cross-examine them.

As reported by the Tacna correspondent of the Lima daily La Cronica (September 4), the eight declared:

"Because of the misdeeds committed by the hacendados of Quillabamba, Hugo Blanco organized the peasant union and when the guard Briceño on November 9, 1962, killed a boy 15 years old and shot at two other peasants, Blanco realized he should pay for his misdeeds." It was the killing of the youth, they added, that set off a peasant rebellion.

"We were brought into the trial," they also declared, "because the police forced us to make declarations under torture and the military judge [Juez Instructor Militar] threatened us and we did not have any attorneys to defend us."

"We joined the peasant union [Sindicatos de Campesinos]," they added, "in order to stand up against the misdeeds of the hacendados, especially Romainville, who paid us 20 centavos a day."

They stated that they brought food from Quillabamba to Hugo Blanco at Ipala. This was a hideout where the group led by Hugo Blanco and Pedro Candela Santillana went after the skirmish at the Pucyura police post where the guard Hernán Briceño was killed and some arms were seized. On the way to Ipala, Blanco's group ambushed pursuing troops at Mesacancha, killing two soldiers, Aníbel Valencia and Americo Carter.

These incidents constituted the basis for the formal charge lodged against the defendants of stealing arms and killing three members of the armed forces. And this was the basis, too, for the prosecution denying the political nature of the trial.

During the hearing September 3, the most dramatic moment came when Jesús Fernández, the "auditor" of the War Council, a kind of consulting judge in the military tribunal, demanded the death penalty for Hugo Blanco. It was an ominous development, for it fit in with the many predictions in the press that while the prosecution would demand a 25-year sentence, the judges would make it death.

On September 4, the defense attorneys filed vigorous protests against the prosecution's use of the term "murderers" in referring to the defendants. Doctora Laura Caller cited the Declaration of Human Rights which calls for respect for human dignity.

The judge submitted four defendants to cross-examination. He questioned Fortunato Torres for two hours. Torres, who spoke only Quechua, responded to every question with the same word, "Manan" [no].

Defense Attorney Dr. Marcial Chalco asked that Torres be given a psychiatric examination, stating that he had suffered a nervous breakdown due to the mistreatment and torture he had been submitted to during the three years he had been held in prison.

Moisés Paz Huaca, another of the four, categorically denied any participation whatsoever in the Pucyura skirmish. He said he had known Hugo Blanco only through hearsay and through "the actions he carried out in the mountains in favor of the rights of the peasants." He said that when the police tortured him, they broke his collar bone and his leg.

It is not clear from the newspaper accounts what occurred on September 5 as the case continued.

On September 6, the judge questioned Pedro Candela. The defendant said that he was with Hugo Blanco for nine months but in the skirmish in which Briceño was killed, he was posted 800 meters away and only heard the shots.

Hugo Blanco was then placed on the stand. He was questioned for two hours but very little of what he said concerning his political views and aims in the peasant struggle appeared in the biased Peruvian press. Among the reported highlights was his declaration that he was not going to "finger" anyone and that he assumed full personal responsibility for the deaths of the three civil guards.

He indignantly denied that he had committed any crime and said that he was guilty only of initiating an agrarian reform. "I am contented with everything I have done for the peasants and I can die now tranquilly."

At one point before the packed courtroom, Hugo Blanco leveled an accusing finger at the consulting judge who had demanded the death penalty. "If the death penalty is going to be applied against me," he said, "then don't let a guard be the one to have to fire the shot, but the auditor Fernández -- with his own hand!"

In face of the tumultuous response of the audience and Hugo Blanco's shouts of "Tierra o muerte!" [land or death], the judge suspended the hearing.

On September 7, the hearing opened with crowds at the door and a big police detail. For the prosecution, Comandante Oswaldo Paulinich demanded 25 years for Hugo Blanco, 22 years for Pedro Candela, various prison sentences for the 39 named in the indictment (of whom 29 were in the courtroom), and damages of 150,000 soles [26.82 soles = US\$1] for the three families of the civil guards, plus a fine of 15,000 soles.

The prosecutor recommended the release of two defendants who were not present, Doroteo and Andrés Aguilar, and two in the docket, Fortunato Vargas and Bernardino Quispe. In the latter instance, the prosecutor admitted, it was a case of mistaken identity. It was really "Teodoro Quispe" who was wanted.

Speaking for the defense, Dr. Alfredo Batillana sought to bring out the humanitarian aims of the defendants as well as their

political views. He also challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that the charges should have been brought before a civil court. The military, he said, not only acted as the prosecution but also as the judge. If the defendants were found guilty, he said, he would take the case clear to the supreme court.

The next day, Pedro Candela's attorney, Doctora Laura Caller continued the line of argument advanced by Dr. Batillana. She was followed by Dr. Marcial Chalco who contended that on the specific charges the majority of the defendants were completely innocent and ought to be released. He ended by saying, "If the tribunal does not absolve them, history will absolve them."

A lawyer appointed by the court for some of those absent, said they could not be properly tried in their absence and the charges should be dropped.

After recessing for eight hours, the judge opened the final session of the court. As the big crowd filtered in, the police searched them thoroughly, even making them open match boxes.

The judge said that some of the defendants, although guilty, were "illiterate and semicivilized." Therefore he dismissed the charges against them.

In the cases of Juan Pando, Gregorio Surco, Andrés Gonzáles, Francisco Cayo, Octavio [Antonio?] Huantac, Fortunato Torres, Moisés Paz, Crisólogo Gordillo, Pascual Zárate, Fidel Orue, Bernardino Quispe, Leonidas Carpio, José Pereyra and Tiburcio Bolaños, the judge held that they had already served sufficient time and he ordered their release.

As for José Zuñiga, Basilio Alvarez and Emiliano Fernández, they were condemned to serve two years in the penitentiary. Lucio Bengolea was given four years. Aniceto Muñoz, Luis Carpio and Humberto Carazas each got five years.

Pedro Candela was given 22 years, his sentence terminating February 15, 1985. Upon hearing the sentence, Candela shouted, "Viva la revolución!"

Hugo Blanco was sentenced to 25 years, his sentence terminating June 5, 1988. He rose to his feet and said, "Tacna has passed down its sentence. The people will soon hand down theirs. Tierra o muerte!"

The other defendants echoed the cry, "Tierra o muerte!" The audience responded with such fervor that the judge ordered the courtroom cleared.

Both Hugo Blanco and Pedro Candela at once stated that they would appeal the savage sentences passed against them.

LUDWIG HASS REPORTED FREED

The Gomulka regime has freed Ludwig Hass, an old Polish Trotskyist, according to Huw Price, writing in the September 10 issue of Freedom, the British anarchist weekly.

"Ludwig Hass, one of the five ex-communist Poles imprisoned after two separate trials during the last year for opposition by organisation and document to the Polish State and Communist Party, has been freed during the last week," Price reports. "This is partly due to the fear of embarrassment to the Government if he died in jail, since it is thought that he is in poor health. It is also partly due to the demonstrations in England and in America which singled out Hass as the main figure." Huw Price does not indicate his source of information.

Hass, together with Romuald Smiech and Kasimierz Badowski, were sentenced last January to three years in prison for political opposition to the regime. They were advocates of proletarian democracy.

The case was linked to the condemnation in May 1965 of two youths on similar charges. Karol Modzelewski was given three and a half years and Jacek Kuron three years in a trial that attracted international attention due to the fact that Karol Modzelewski was the son of a top government official.

Among those who protested the political trials and prison sentences was the well-known historian Isaac Deutscher. In an open letter to Gomulka and the Central Committee of the Polish Workers party, he said that he had known Hass since before World War II. He was "a member of the Communist, so-called Trotskyist, organization, of which I was one of the founders and mouthpiece. He then spent 17 years in Stalin's prisons, concentration camps, and places of deportation. Released in 1957, he returned to Poland so free from all bitterness and so strongly animated by his faith in a better Socialist future that he at once decided to join your Party; and he was accepted as member."

Deutscher said that no one asked Hass to renounce his past, "and he did not deny his old 'Trotskyist' views even for a moment -- on the contrary, he upheld them frankly and untiringly. This circumstance alone testifies to his courage and integrity."

VIETNAM PRICES "STABILIZED," SAYS WHITE HOUSE

On September 14, the Johnson administration told the press that prices had been "stabilized" in south Vietnam. The very next day in Saigon, an unofficial but authoritative source disclosed that the cost of living had shot up 16% during the previous week.

## CHINA'S ACHIEVEMENT IN THE SYNTHESIS OF INSULIN

The confirmation by West German experiments, described at a meeting of the American Chemical Society in New York September 11, that Chinese chemists had succeeded in synthesizing bovine insulin, created as big a sensation in the scientific world as the achievement of Chinese technologists in producing an atom bomb. Dr. Klaus Hofmann, director of the Protein Research Laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, said that the breakthrough was "the most complex synthesis of a biologically active natural product accomplished to date."

Writing about the feat in the New York Times (September 12 and 18), science writer Walter Sullivan pointed out that an American group at Brookhaven National Laboratory under the direction of Dr. Panayotis G. Katsoyannis recently succeeded in synthesizing human insulin. However, he said the following about "the first major scientific achievement to come out of Communist China":

"Special interest has centered on the role of the Chinese in insulin work. China has little or no tradition in biochemical research and specialists in this country...[have] been greatly impressed by their achievement. The reports from China, they say, make it clear the Chinese have not just followed in the steps of those doing such work here and in Germany. They have struck out on their own and, in at least some respects, have been in the forefront.

"The reason for the Chinese thrust in this direction is probably not a matter of government encouragement. Rather it manifests the skill and special interest of certain individuals. One or two of the group were American trained, but most of the 20 authors of the reports are unknown in this country. Dr. Ching-I Niu obtained his doctorate at the University of Texas in 1953, then spent two years at the Virus Laboratory of the University of California at Berkeley before he returned to China."

What is especially startling to Western specialists is the capacity of a country that fell far behind in technology to suddenly spurt ahead and outstrip the most advanced countries, at least in a few fields.

In this, China is demonstrating the potentialities of a planned economy. Under centralized planning, it is possible for even a poor country to allocate sufficient resources, both human and material, to certain projects so as to achieve world leadership in them. This occurred in the field of genetics in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Trotsky. (Stalin later destroyed this work, dismantling the laboratories and sending the country's top scientists in this field to die in the forced labor camps.)

Two lessons can be drawn from China's success in synthesizing bovine insulin. (1) If China can do it, why can't a country like

India, or Indonesia, score similarly impressive advances? (2) If it is possible to accomplish such things in an underdeveloped country, what couldn't be achieved in a highly developed country, or a combination of them if they pooled their resources in a single, united centrally planned economy!

### "MIRACLE" IN BRAZIL

Roberto Campos, who is dictator Castelo Branco's minister of planning, continues to talk about Brazil's "miracle of economic reconstruction."

In response to this, Politica Operaria, a weekly Brazilian underground news bulletin, points to the fact that in May alone the cost of living rose 7%, a rate significantly higher than for the same month last year. Government statisticians had projected an increase of 19.3% for the entire period from January to May.

"If this represents a 'Brazilian miracle of reconstruction,' comments Politica Operaria, it exists only in the minister's own head. For the working classes, the reality has no connection with his speeches."

### SATO FEARS "OVERHEATING" OF JAPANESE ECONOMY

In an Economic White Paper issued at the end of July, the Japanese government asserted that the recession in Japan has come to an end and the "economy has finally entered the stage of recovery."

Two weeks later Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told a press conference that there was already a need to watch out against "overheating" the economy, although only the 80% mark has been reached in the recovery.

A number of indexes bear out the government's assertion that the recession has ended, one of the main ones being production. For the mining and manufacturing industries the production index increased steadily by 3.7% from January to March and by 3.8% from April to June. Department sales were also up in July in contrast to a decline for the same period in 1965.

The stock market, however, has not yet recovered; and the number of bankruptcies is still high although the rate is declining.

As for inflation, it continued throughout the recession and the government did little about it. Thus in 1965 prices for consumers goods rose 7.4% and during the first six months of this year they rose 5.5%.



## JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES FURTHER FROM PEKING

The Japan Communist party, which had sided strongly with Peking in the Chinese-Soviet dispute, has continued in recent weeks to move away from Mao's camp. At the same time, it is cautious about once again being considered to be uncritical of Moscow. The August 9 issue of Akahata (Red Flag), for instance, criticized the Soviet leadership for "following in the footsteps of America" in connection with the visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan July 24-30.

On the previous day, Akahata voiced a veiled criticism of the Chinese leadership for rejecting a united front with the Soviet Union in the common struggle against American imperialism.

The article criticizing Gromyko's trip, which was signed by Kanichi Masuda, deputy editor in chief of the party's official organ, attacked the Sato government as "a positive and deliberate participant in American imperialism's war of aggression on Vietnam and Asia."

The efforts of the Soviet leaders to attain "peaceful coexistence" with such a government clearly indicate their "lack of thoroughness in the fight against the revival and revitalization of Japanese militarism as well as American imperialism."

The joint communiqué, which Gromyko signed with Japanese officials before his return home, promised efforts for peaceful coexistence. This, said Masuda, was a "literal reproduction of the errors of the unprincipled peaceful coexistence theory since Khrushchev and euphemization of American imperialism."

By "eulogizing" the Sato government, the article said in conclusion, the Soviet government is clearly "doublecrossing the world, Asia and the Japanese people" and "increasing the menace to peace and security of Asia and the world."

In a meeting held August 27-20, the Central Committee of the Japan Communist party officially adopted "an independent course of its own free from either Chinese or Russian influence."

As reported in the September 1 issue of Akahata, the decision will be submitted to the tenth party convention scheduled to be held for five days beginning October 24.

The Central Committee will propose the insertion of a new paragraph in the party's bylaws, reading in part: "All JCP members shall observe the principle of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and firmly adhere to a position worthy of members of an independent party responsible for Japan's revolution."

A draft report calls for further persistent pursuit of "an independent course of action free from the influence of either the Peking or Moscow line, laid down during the ninth party convention of 1964."

The draft proposes the formation of a united international front, including the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, against U.S. imperialism in Vietnam.

In obvious retaliation to these moves of the leadership of the Japan Communist party, the Mao regime expelled the representatives of three trading firms, Sanshin, Mutsumi and Haga, considered to be connected with the Japan Communist party. They are regarded in Japan as the three leading firms engaged in trade with China on a friendly basis.

Peking took this step by simply refusing to extend the period of stay permitted to the representatives. The representative of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association, reportedly also linked with the Japan Communist party, indicated he was leaving Peking in anticipation of a similar move against him.

Four Japanese promoters of a Chinese trade fair in Tokyo were criticized by Sun Pi-chi on September 3 as "uncooperative." The four were said to be connected with the Japan Communist party. Three of them were then replaced with figures believed to be under the influence of the Japan Socialist party.

One of the three deposed officials, Saburo Okamoto, who was secretary general of the National Cooperative Association for the Chinese Exposition, indignantly denied the allegations that they had been "uncooperative." There was "hardly any ground," he said, "for accusing me or the association of noncooperation."

#### JOHNSON'S ELECTORAL SIDESHOW IN SOUTH VIETNAM

According to the figures released by the Saigon puppet regime, 4,274,812 of south Vietnam's 5,289,652 "registered voters" cast ballots September 11 in choosing a 117-member constituent assembly. Both Ky and the Johnson administration are trying to paint this "80.8 per cent turnout" as a great triumph, "evident of a great upwelling of 'democratic' spirit among the Vietnamese."

Having put on this sideshow in response to pressure from the Buddhist leadership to oust Ky and hold elections, it was to be expected that Washington's propaganda experts would do their utmost to turn the outcome into a "victory," particularly on the eve of the November elections in the United States.

Several things should be noted about Johnson's latest "victory" in Vietnam. First of all, the National Liberation Front, which represents the majority of the population was excluded. The NLF, of course, opposed the "election" as fraudulent.

Secondly, all the candidates had to be approved by the Ky regime; that is, in the final analysis by the imperialist invading forces.

Thirdly, the "election" took place amid some of the most sickening and frightful scenes of mass slaughter in modern times -- scarcely a framework for a free election.

Fourthly, the "registered voters" had a high interest in making sure that they obtained proof of having voted. Failure to have the card showing they had voted might well mean death.

Finally, the "assembly" that was chosen has power only to draw up a constitution. It cannot pass legislation. Above all, it is powerless to exercise the only right that would prove it to be a sovereign parliament; namely, the right to end the war and request the invading imperialist troops to get out of Vietnam.

### "LIKE FLIES ON A PIECE OF MEAT"

The gruesome repression of Indonesia is still not ended. New York Times correspondent Alfred Friendly Jr. reported September 17 that anti-Communist students had begun "a new drive to find and arrest Communist agents who they say have been filtering into the capital at the rate of 200 a week since early June."

House-to-house searches were started in Djakarta's congested areas. No arrests were made the first night, but student leaders "said they expected better results after military authorities handed over lists of suspects to them at a ceremony scheduled for tomorrow." Those seized on suspicion will be turned over to paratroop headquarters for processing.

In a separate article filed the same date, the Times correspondent reported that the new regime is having great difficulty in stabilizing the economic situation. The cost of living which went up 900 times in the last eight years increased 80 percent between March and June of 1966.

The government is virtually bankrupt so far as its credit rating abroad is concerned. But the "burned moneymen" of Japan and the United States, to whom \$530,000,000 is due this year and \$629,000,000 next year, are cautious about loosening their purse strings. They want an "austerity" regime; they want their investments and profits guaranteed.

The responsive generals have drawn up a new law "regulating" foreign investments for submission to parliament. It is "reported to contain guarantees against expropriation as well as attractive foreign exchange and profit repatriation provisions." If this goes through, then the foreign moneymen are ready to take action. "A veteran European businessman in Indonesia remarked this week that if 'the risk factor were only reduced to a bearable level here, if businessmen could only trust the Government for cooperation and protection, foreign capitalists would be all over Indonesia like flies on a piece of meat.'"

WILSON'S WAGE FREEZE

By Brian Gormley

London

No one on the "left" was surprised at the latest anti-union measures of the Wilson government, placing on the backs of the working class the full financial burden of maintaining a near-bankrupt British capitalism. The real puzzlement must have been among the millions of supporters who had voted Labour only four months ago in the hope of getting a better deal but who were now face-to-face with a compulsory wage freeze and the additional prospect of being fined £500 [US\$1,400] or going to jail if they defy the freeze by striking.

The squeeze was immediate and, as such, welcomed by the ruling class. "Every hard-faced, union-hating employer in the country is delightedly breaking his deals and sanctimoniously praising Harold Wilson's brave measure," stated Clive Jenkins, head of ASSET [Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians], who was outspoken from the first in his opposition to the new laws. "Never," he continued, "have so many crocodile tears been mingled with so much money taken from so many by so few."

Having abandoned the socialist option very early in the game, the policy course of the Wilson government has long been established, if not in detail then in broad outline.

As the government explained it, they have been confronted with two choices: either induced unemployment or a wages policy that will confine incomes to a 3.8% annual rise, with increases tied to productivity growth. But with unemployment at a twelve-year low, competition among the capitalists themselves tended to bid up wages. The very fact that workers did not feel the pressure of unemployment strengthened their demands for a decent standard of living and enabled them to win important concessions. Even in those industries where poor settlements were negotiated nationally, it became possible for workers to make gains at a local level over and above the national contract, sometimes quite substantial ones.

It was this "wages drift" that an "incomes policy" was designed to stop. There was talk about raising the wage levels of lower-paid workers, but this was so much verbiage. The incomes policy became a major piece in the strategy of placing on the shoulders of the working class the main burden for taking the system out of debt. That is why from the outset, it was clear that the bill in Parliament would eventually contain strong compulsory teeth. And a necessary corollary to the bill was an increase in the unemployment level.

The policy that emerged represented a combination of two "choices" -- "deflation" implemented by a series of measures to

slow down an already "overheated" inflationary economy; and, in conjunction with it, laws making it a criminal offense to go on strike.

There was a certain inevitability about the process. The Wilson policy was no mystery -- it could clearly be observed when the Labour party first took office twenty-two months ago. Inheriting a grave balance of payments deficit from its Tory predecessor, the Wilson government was immediately confronted with a run on the pound, alleged to have been started by the promise to give increases to the old-age pensioners. Wilson, after giving the proper assurances, received the assistance of the international banking houses, primarily the Americans, to the tune of £3,000,000,000. He had put British sovereignty into pawn. This became the keystone of all ensuing policies, buying open British support for America's war of aggression against Vietnam and the systematic reversal of Labour policies in several fields.

It would be wrong, however, to try to explain the actions of the Wilson leadership as though it was merely the victim of a bad situation, of financial and economic difficulties. Rather they should be seen as flowing logically from the "premises" of modern Social Democracy: that capitalism can gradually be replaced within the framework of the state and social structure pertaining to private ownership. In Europe, from Germany at the heyday of Social Democratic influence to its present revival, it has worked out in practice thus: the Social Democrats run the "mixed economy" to the detriment of the interests of the working class, moving further and further away from the professed socialist goal and serving only as a prop for an anachronistic economic system.

This was no easy task, even for the most loyal and dedicated servants of the Queen. The British economy is regarded as one of the sickest in Europe. It has a tradition of low growth rates and its distinguishing feature is its low rate of investment. In the decade ending in 1965, average productivity growth was around the 2.5% mark, appreciably lower than most European countries. The problems of technological renovation are immense. First of all it has been delayed because of certain historic factors -- early monopolization and restrictive practices, plus "protection" from the world market, coupled with a working class unwilling to give up any of its gains. These will have to be overcome if British capitalism is to hold its own in world trade, a problem that becomes more difficult, especially when its share of that trade is decreasing and other major trading nations are struggling to increase their trade surpluses.

Labour took office in 1964 with the promise of a blueprint for maintaining an expanding economy. Out of this eventually emerged George Brown's National Plan for 4% yearly industrial growth. (The "left" in the party shot holes in it with their criticism, a criticism that has subsequently been proved correct.) Instead of redistributing wealth, the plan sought to finance welfare expenditures out of annual growth. Now Labour is confronted with a

stagnating economy. With every upsurge in investment and demand choked off by the need to protect sterling, the growth rate will be postponed indefinitely, as has now been officially admitted.

Everyone knew that the squeeze was coming. It was only a matter of time; and it was freely predicted for the coming autumn in most of the leading papers in London. Now that it has happened -- evidently close to schedule -- it is interesting to speculate on what triggered it off. The policy of the Wilson government was to maneuver one force against another, sometimes the left against the right and then vice versa, even to the extent of blackmailing the financiers a bit in order to gain time for further maneuvers and waverings. Although on major questions the government always came down on the side of capital, the waverings appeared to reflect a struggle going on at times inside the cabinet. What ended the vacillation?

The answer is to be sought in the seamen's strike. What was apparent in that experience was the total failure of the incomes policy as it had been formulated then. The workers just refused to play the game. The seamen showed that despite weak leadership, despite red-baiting by the prime minister, they were prepared to struggle.

Instead of coming out of the strike broken, or at least divided, as Wilson had hoped, the seamen ended up stronger, even though with a rather limited victory, testifying to all who would listen that the incomes policy of the Labour government could be overcome. The danger for the government in the seamen's strike lay not in the gains established by the union but in the revelation that the Wilson leadership was beginning to lose authority with the workers.

The next crisis came shortly after the seamen's strike, on July 3, three days after publication of the steel re-nationalization bill. Frank Cousins, prominent leader of the most powerful union in Britain, the Transport and General Workers Union, which covers the docks and many sections of lower-paid workers, announced that he was resigning his post as minister of Power and Technology in the Wilson cabinet to better struggle against the incomes policy.

If the Wilson leadership was unable to see the significance of this event, then certainly its special meaning was not lost on the bankers of the City of London or the Basle-Washington-Paris axis of financiers. It opened up the possibility of an early open struggle between the government and key sectors of the union movement. Not that the prospect of a struggle was excluded from the strategy of the ruling class. On the contrary, the important question was that it should take place under conditions most favorable to capitalism.

It was no doubt feared that within a couple of months, oppositional strength would increase; and the incomes policy, which

up to then had remained more of a declaration of intent than a solution being practiced, would be swept away in the tide of protest that was bound to appear at the Trades Union Congress in Blackpool early in September and at the Labour party conference in Brighton a month later when disillusioned trade unionists and Labour party members would no longer be under the Wilson spell as they had been during the past several conferences.

The time, therefore, was ripe for a ruling-class offensive. If delayed, the opportunity to squeeze the British working class would be lost for the time being or would prove more costly. The Wilson cabinet, which at first appeared to be hesitant, needed a little push.

The first sign of the crunch that was in store for the economy and the working class came in the middle of July. A major run began on an already weak pound which had been under constant pressure from speculators. This set in motion the third major financial crisis in England in less than two years. Nora Beloff, political correspondent of the Sunday Observer, reported July 31 that American pressure, and through it pressure from the "group of ten" major industrial countries, was put on the cabinet by Henry Fowler, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, who stopped over on his way back from the Hague to demand that a wage freeze and other strong measures be enforced.

One alternative, devaluation, was eliminated. According to the July 24 Sunday Times, a struggle over this occurred in the cabinet. George Brown, head of the Department of Economic Affairs, favored devaluation. "He wanted to get away from dependence on the Americans," the report goes. It is now clear that the struggle was sharp and resulted in Brown tendering his resignation. The temptation to devalue must have been strong; it is estimated that the perennial crises of sterling have cost the economy £1,000,000,000. But too much was at stake. The impact on world trade would have been immense, accentuating the shortage of liquidity. The dollar would have most certainly tumbled and other currencies would have rapidly followed suit, resulting possibly in a major crisis of 1929 proportions throughout the capitalist world.

During this crisis, unlike past occasions, the Basle group of bankers were slow to give assurances that they would come to the rescue. With powerful reserves at the ready, such statements in the past have served to give confidence that devaluation was excluded. The promises given by Wilson that the bank rate would be increased from 6% to 7%, that there would be restrictions on the availability of credit and "hire purchase" [installment buying], were insufficient. Headier stuff was demanded. The banks needed guarantees that Wilson was willing to come to grips with a recalcitrant working class which to date had been far from willing to obey his strictures. It was now or never. The plans had been worked out and forwarded for approval to Washington, with the announcement of a compulsory wage freeze, on the same day the British prime minister visited President Johnson. The compulsory part was to last six months, to be followed

by "severe restraint," affecting, it is estimated, approximately 12,000,000 workers out of a working population of 22,000,000. Johnson expressed his administration's approval of the policy.

No more voluntary attempts to carry out the incomes policy -- that was abandoned as had been readily predicted when it was first proposed, in favor of using the threat of jail against trade unionists. A sugar coating was provided for the bitter pill of antiworking-class legislation: the "freeze" was supposed to be extended to prices and dividends.

On this the August 6 Sun reported: "Prices of thirteen items were increased yesterday in 1,300 branches of Boots the chemists [druggists] despite the wages and price freeze. Up to 3d [US\$.035] was put on the prices of three types of medicinal sweets. The 10 per cent increase in purchase tax would have meant rises of less than 1/2d. A Boots spokesman explained: 'The purpose of the tax is to limit spending -- so we are putting the prices up. We also intend to pass on the extra cost of the payroll tax when it comes in September.'" (Our emphasis.)

On July 23 the Grocer's Gazette reported 79 increases in prices of groceries. Egg prices jumped 20%. There has been a large increase in the price of bacon. The August 15 Financial Times estimated that over 1,000 price increases have gone into effect since the beginning of the year. Rents have gone up in Birmingham and several other large city governments have stated that they plan increases in rents also.

The "freeze" on dividends was just for the record. It means that the financial institutions and corporations will be allowed to accumulate special funds to be paid out after the six-month period. Limited cuts took place in defense expenditures, but the left-wing members of Parliament have pointed out that these cuts were already on the books. They argued that the £605,000,000 spent annually on supporting British troops abroad represented more than the whole deficit abroad and could be one substantial means for its elimination.

The government's left critics have also been quick to point out that British capital has substantial reserves invested abroad, sterling assets of £5,000,000,000 and that these should be taken over to help stabilize the pound.

The pound is still weak at the moment and will probably remain so until it is more clearly determined how the present policies will fare in face of the class struggle.

The top brass of the Trades Union Congress, after some mutterings, acquiesced, but this was expected. Although there will be lots of verbal opposition from some leading unionists, with talk about fighting the legality of the "freeze" in the courts, nevertheless the bulk of the labor movement will quite likely accept the wage freeze, at least for the six months, in the hope that eventually it will be lifted, or that they will be able somehow or other to



get around it, as they have done in the past. Where the militants are in good position in local plants, an occasional wild-cat struggle can be expected.

The opposition, to be sure, will be larger than ever, but it is much more difficult to remove legislation that is already law than to prevent it from being put on the books. At the end of the six months, when the time comes to lift the ban, it is almost a foregone conclusion that there will be another run on the pound and that an attempt will be made to extend the freeze. It is then that major struggles can take place.

The bourgeoisie are not going to be satisfied with just a "standstill" on wages. They will want more blood. The Sunday Times, in a major editorial July 17, stated that the problem was not in freezing wages, but in winning back from the workers what they had gained in the past four years. The next few months will be a waiting period to get the government over the hump.

In announcing the new antiworking-class measures on television, Wilson, firm of jaw, invoked the Churchillian image of blood, sweat and tears to get "England over the hump." Nothing more clearly illustrates the utter political bankruptcy of the present Labour party leadership -- one does not have to go back twenty years, or ten, to quote them against themselves, but only to March 26, 1966 (yes 1966!) when Wilson stated at a Labour party meeting in Manchester:

"The only method the Tories knew of fighting the crisis they brought on the country was deflation leading to unemployment and short-time working.

"These financial technocrats who dominate the Tory party had no thought, no compassion for the families driven to live on Tory dole. Nor did they think of the large number of families whose standard of living fell because of the drop in their earnings caused by deliberate policies which could only lead, and did lead, to short-time working.

"The Tories faced with crisis, real or imagined, have only one remedy, ten men running after nine jobs."

It has been remarked that appealing to the "spirit of Dunkirk" in the British workers, whether done by a Tory or Labour first minister of the Queen, is poorly spent sentiment -- there is no crisis atmosphere. The workers are in an entirely different mood than during and immediately after the war when it was possible to convince them of the urgency of a particular situation. They have not just gone through a long grueling war as when a previous Labour leader, Sir Stafford Cripps, imposed a wage freeze in 1948. Instead there has been a boom, with consumer spending at its highest. This is "swinging" Britain. Under the Labour government some concessions have been won -- it is estimated that increases in money wages were 8% -- unemployment has been at its lowest in 12 years. To be now

told they will have to make sacrifices in order to save British capitalism can bring forth only well-earned contempt from the workers who have seen their "swinging" rulers wallowing in affluence.

How will the "Labour left," that large and somewhat inchoate mass in the Labour party, react to the measures that have been implemented? The Economist, usually one of the more perspicacious spokesmen for British capitalism, editorialized August 6: "A fair prophecy can be made about that: the left is in fact likely to squawk loudly and swallow softly, as it has done so many times before." This time, however, the optimism of The Economist appears to be misplaced, because if there is anything new in the present political reality in Britain, it is the development of a permanent rump of Labour MP's, who, reluctantly and with great hesitation and soul-searching, persist in opposition to Wilson. Its membership fluctuates -- both in numbers and issues. It vacillates in classical centrist fashion. But it reveals a tendency that can mature in the months ahead. On the final reading of the prices and incomes bill, there were numerous abstentions by Labour MP's, and the government's majority fell from 95 to 58. The shuffling around of cabinet posts at the recess of Parliament was universally termed "a spectacular smokescreen" to conceal the extent of the revolt.

The Blackpool and Brighton annual conferences of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour party respectively should reveal how strong this tendency is. A staging ground will be provided for the winning of support and confidence from the activists in the Labour movement, and it is a foregone conclusion that the opposition will carry over from a criticism of the "wage freeze" to British complicity in the war in Vietnam. The bulk of the resolutions before the Brighton conference of the Labour party dealing with the incomes policy are either critical or openly hostile. There are also a large number critical of the policy on Vietnam.

An important feature of the new situation inside the Labour movement is revealed in the significant reversal of roles by the various components that make it up. The crystallization of a tendency that began with the opposition of the hitherto solid right-wing Transport and General Workers Union on the question of unilateralism in 1961 has so developed that it now poses the possibility of a new left emerging in the party with strong links to the industrial working class. On the other hand, there has been a certain ossification of the constituency Labour parties, the traditional backbone of the left, especially in Bevan's time, and this perhaps can explain the capitulation of some of the most prominent leaders of the left, their emasculation via ministerial appointments by Wilson, and their acquiescence and silence in the face of the crassest betrayals of Labour party policies during the period of stalemate with the Tories after the initial victory. Most of them would complain that their support was not organized, that they were alone and vulnerable.

But now with the Cousins resignation, the possibility has opened for a new and more solid base for the left, and for this

left to grow in strength as it starts to reflect the interests of some of the lowest paid workers, those who have been hardest hit by the squeeze, and as it links up with the five white-collar unions that are under the leadership of Clive Jenkins, the most radical sector of the union movement today. The National Union of Railwaymen's executive committee, 22 out of 25, signed a letter to Cousins saying they supported his stand. The National Union of Miners is already critical of the government. If the Amalgamated Engineering Union, which under Sir William Carron supports the government, were to join the opposition, as it did last year at the party conference, it would mean a definite defeat for the government's policies.

It is here that the left will find new forces to join in struggle, with whom new perspectives can be worked out. In this new ferment it will become much easier for revolutionary socialists to work and find an audience, leading inevitably to greater democracy inside the movement. It will be possible to start to pose inside the Labour movement the only real alternative to the chronic sickness of British capitalism -- the revolutionary socialist transformation of the whole fabric of the state and the economy with the direct participation of the mass of the people.

August 20, 1966

#### PUERTO RICANS TO DRAMATIZE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE

The Puerto Rican Movimiento Pro Independencia is conducting a series of meetings throughout Puerto Rico to dramatize the struggle for the island's independence.

The actions began September 12, the birthday of Pedro Albizu Campos, Puerto Rico's martyred independence leader, and will close September 23 with a mass meeting at Lares where the "Call of Lares" was issued.

A major theme of the scheduled meetings, rallies, marches, picket lines and other demonstrations is opposition to compulsory military service under the flag of the imperialist United States.

Another theme is opposition to a plebiscite to settle the island's future.

The period from September 12 to September 23 was set aside by the delegates at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana last January as international days in support of the Puerto Rican independence struggle.

The final mass meeting in Lares will be held at the Plaza de la Revolucion. It will be addressed by leaders of the MPI. General Secretary Juan Mari Brás is scheduled to give the main speech.

THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

[The following is the text of a resolution adopted by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International at meeting held in July.]

\* \* \*

The object of this resolution is not to examine the world situation as a whole, this having already been done in the political resolution passed at the last World Congress,\* but rather to bring that resolution up to date, in the light of the events that have taken place since the World Congress and on this basis to see whether we have to modify our conclusions and our tasks.

The main question facing us arises from the present escalation of the Vietnam war by American imperialism. The escalation points dangerously towards an extension of this war in the direction of a war against the People's Republic of China. Taking into account the setbacks suffered by the colonial revolution in this last period, the most recent example of which is Ghana, we must examine whether a fundamental change in the world situation has taken place in comparison with the preceding period. More precisely the question posed is whether the colonial revolution which started after World War II, which received an enormous impulse through the victory of the Chinese revolution and which has been the main sector of the socialist revolution in the course of the past twenty years has exhausted its energy and entered a period of ebb and decline.

I.

The Colonial Revolution

The almost continuous development of the colonial revolution during a period of several years was the expression of the will of the colonial masses who wanted to put an end to foreign domination of their countries and to their poverty, all of which stem from the economic and social underdevelopment of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The weakening of the colonial powers during and after World War II, as well as the greater weight of the workers states in the world made possible almost everywhere the conquest of political independence, as imperialism retreated either immediately or after bloody colonial wars, to indirect forms of domination enabling it to maintain the essential part of its economic position.

On the other hand, the native ruling classes then exercising political power were unable to stimulate an overall economic development of their countries, which in the end stimulated the process of permanent revolution, bringing to power, after the conquest of formal independence, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nation-

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\*See International Socialist Review, Spring 1966.

alist leaders who used the aroused mass movement and the pressure it generated to obtain more or less important concessions from imperialism.

During the whole of this period the major confrontation took place between the old colonial powers and the colonial revolution. With the exception of some Latin-American countries the great sweep of colonial revolt did not come up directly against the power of American imperialism. On the contrary American policy at that time was designed to achieve an alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie. It intervened in several of the colonial wars to pressure the old colonial powers to make concessions to the revolution; it did not hesitate to side openly with Nasser against the British-French aggression during the Suez crisis. Its fundamental orientation was that of trying to canalize the colonial revolution in favor of "progressive" layers and governments which would maintain themselves within the framework of the world capitalist market with the help of American capital. Even the "neutralist" course adopted at Bandung did not cause a fundamental change in Washington's course.

The change that has occurred followed in consequence of two experiences. On one hand the development of the Cuban revolution into a socialist revolution -- something unforeseen by Washington -- has taught it the logic of permanent revolution, the danger of allowing the development of a revolution even under the leadership of liberal and petty-bourgeois forces running the risk of being overthrown by the masses. The "Johnson doctrine," proclaimed at the time of the intervention in Santo Domingo, clearly means that American imperialism will intervene militarily not only in the case where the masses led by Communist forces are advancing towards power (this decision has been theirs since the beginning of the cold war) but also where these masses are still under the leadership of non-communist "liberals."

On the other hand the incapacity of traditional nationalist leaderships that have come to power to resolve the economic and social tasks of the colonial revolution led to a progressive loss of support by the masses and therefore a loss of their usefulness in the eyes of imperialism. The latter prefer the substitution of open neocolonialist agents who claim less concessions for their services.

The direct confrontation between the colonial revolution and imperialism which was during the fifties a confrontation between the old colonial powers and this revolution has, since the experience of both the Cuban revolution and the Algerian conquest of independence, become more and more a global confrontation between American imperialism and revolution. The closeness of victory of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam (bringing the risk of a loss of all of Southeast Asia for imperialism); the tactical weakening of the position of the workers states in consequence of transferring the Sino-Soviet conflict into state relations; the shamefully weak responses of the workers states' bureaucracies before the escalation of the imperialist aggression against Vietnam

has led to a more resolutely offensive and aggressive policy on the part of Washington, a policy of support to the indigenous reactionary forces in the semicolonial countries. The succession of setbacks undergone by the colonial revolution can be fundamentally explained by this passing over to a general counteroffensive against the colonial revolution on the part of American imperialism in the face of mass movements without any international coordination, without an effective leadership or correct political orientation, without a leadership prepared to step in and replace the traditional nationalist leadership of the earlier stage which is now openly bankrupt.

The initiative during this last period has entirely favored American imperialism. What objectives has it attained? What reactions have these setbacks produced in the mass movements? In no single sector of the colonial revolution which suffered a setback has the reaction been able to establish a stable power not even where the masses received the severest blows. Moreover nowhere in the colonial or semicolonial countries have the objective causes driving the masses to action time and again been removed.

In Latin America it is in Brazil where the resistance and the revival of the mass movement is more difficult. Here the military junta passes from one crisis to another and can rely only on feeble support from the people. In Bolivia the attempt of the military junta to destroy the mass movement has ended in failure. In Chile the Christian Democratic experiment of Frei clashes with the combativity of important sections of the masses (miners strike). If the Peruvian guerrillas seemed to have received grievous blows and suffered considerable losses, and if also in Venezuela the movement has suffered serious losses, the guerrillas in Colombia and Guatemala continue their struggle with inevitable hazards, but without the governments of these countries being able to reduce considerably their capacity of action.

In Latin America the "reformist" policy of the Alliance for Progress has been exposed as bankrupt for a long time. The policy of force which has seen its greatest success in Brazil has not stabilized anything. The mass movements continue to shake the unstable social equilibrium there. Thus although American imperialism has been able to register some very limited gains at great cost it has been unable to gain a decisive victory. Signs of regrouping and a recovery of the mass movements in several countries are beginning to appear.

It is in Africa that imperialism seems to have gained the most spectacular reversals of the situation. First of all we have to underline the overthrow of Ben Bella and then of Nkrumah and the temporary suppression of the left wing in Morocco. The segregationist regimes of Smith in Rhodesia and Verwoerd in South Africa are consolidating themselves. In a big section of Africa important political changes are now possible because of the extreme fragility of the old forms of rule and the steady decomposition of the old structures without anything new taking their place. To this must

be added the big weakness of the leaderships, cadres and political movements. In general the evolution has been to the right. However, the events in Nigeria, the most important country in Africa, were first of all an attempt by the military to prevent a mass movement by attacking the feudal forces. After its initial success the new power was quickly challenged by the popular forces that continue to press their demands. In Uganda a similar attempt was made to eliminate the feudal forces. In Congo Brazzaville the attempt to eliminate the left-oriented regime failed. Moreover the fact that the revolutionary forces are far from being crushed is shown in Algeria where Boumedienne's government was forced, less than one year after the coup d'état that brought it to power, to proceed toward important nationalizations. The regime continues to be submitted to the pressure of the masses principally expressed by the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens].

The developments in the Near East show a maturing towards decisive tests in this part of the world. The struggle between the reactionary forces and the progressive forces goes on in Yemen. The struggle is gaining in intensity in Aden and in a number of emirates of South Arabia. Iraq is still unstable and the struggle of the Kurdish people continues. Finally and above all in Syria the revolutionary movement led by the Syrian Baath party, after purging its right wing, has advanced a program of struggle against imperialism that is to a certain extent anticapitalist, marked however by vacillations and conciliations bearing some similarity to the experience in Algeria at the time of the decrees of March 1963.

In Asia imperialism secured its greatest success in the victorious counterrevolution in Indonesia. We have given the reasons for this setback in the documents adopted at the last World Congress and the declaration made by the United Secretariat. The subsequent slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Communists opened up new political possibilities for the new leaders. They came to agreement with the neocolonialists of Malaysia and then turned to begging of aid from American, Japanese and West German imperialism. But despite the significance of the new overtures, the agreement with Malaysia remains secondary in face of the gigantic economic problems of unemployment, inflation and widespread misery existing in Indonesia.

On the other hand the stability of the Indian subcontinent has been shaken. The divisions within the ruling Congress party have increased steadily since Nehru's death, reflecting the pressures arising from the failure to solve any of the great problems facing India, as well as the pressure now coming from the poor peasantry raising their demands. 1966 saw the greatest mobilization of masses (Bengali movement against famine) that India has known since the struggle for independence.

Finally in that part of the world the struggle of the Vietnamese people against American imperialism is a testimony above all to the power of revolution despite the material weight of the forces thrown against it. Thanks to its intervention imperialism avoided the defeat that seemed imminent eighteen months ago. It has

no real prospects of victory and that is why the prospect of an escalation driven as far as a war against China has become an actual danger.

## II.

### The Workers States

The twenty-third Congress of the CPSU and the congresses of the other CP's in the Eastern European workers states confirmed and illustrated several points made in the resolution of the last World Congress of the Fourth International:

-- The general slowdown in economic growth in the past few years.

-- The ruling bureaucracies seeking solutions in reforms of the Liberman type; i.e., reforms that imply besides administrative adjustments, measures favorable to the bureaucracy at the managerial level of the enterprises.

-- At the same time tendencies have developed in several states for independent action separate from the other workers states both with regard to the capitalist world and to China (Rumania).

-- Not only have we not seen any further progress in "liberalization," but the twenty-third congress confirmed the line of the ruling circles of repressing even the most timid positions of the intellectuals and the university students in favor of democratic liberties.

The end of the Khrushchev period corresponded to the end of a period in which "de-Stalinization" raised new reformist hopes concerning both material welfare and the democratization of Soviet society. Khrushchev's successors are attempting to adjust the situation on the economic level, but at the same time they attempt to tighten control politically and socially. They collide and will continue to collide even more with the demands of the workers and with the more politicalized oppositional currents of intellectuals and students.

The Sino-Soviet controversy has not been taking spectacular forms during the past period, but has been developing to the advantage of the Soviet leadership (Castro's attack against the Chinese; the crisis within the Chinese leadership). But in this dispute the aspect of an "ideological conflict between parties" (which favored the decomposition of Stalinism) has tended to recede and give way to a full-blown "conflict between states" which brings grave consequences on the international level. It weakens the defense of the Vietnamese revolution and encourages American imperialism to adopt a more aggressive stance toward China.



In Cuba some serious economic problems as well as differences within the leading team have given rise to a certain bureaucratic development, of which Che Guevara's leaving and Castro's violent attack against the Fourth International at the Tricontinental Conference have been partially at least the objective expression. However both in this conference's decisions and in the subsequent behavior of the Fidelista leaders (Armando Hart's speech at the twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, Castro's speech against Frei and his speech on May 1) it has clearly appeared that the Fidelista current maintains its positions in favor of the revolutionary road and of the socialist nature of the Latin-American revolution. In practice, in almost all Latin-American countries the followers of this current differentiate themselves from the neoreformist official CP's.

In China a serious process of purge and suppression of differences appeared and has struck successively at the cadres of the army, the literary and scientific circles, the youth organizations and the party; at the present time it has culminated in the elimination of a core of leaders grouped around Peng Chen, a member of the Political Bureau. From all evidence this is an interbureaucratic struggle, but like all conflicts within the bureaucracy in workers states without workers democracy, these necessarily reflect actual social tensions in the country. Although we lack information about the actual content of the differences it is highly likely that they not only encompass problems related to internal life of the party and country (freedom of criticism for the ranks, agricultural policy, etc.) but also international policies (the tactical line toward the Soviet government; the line on the colonial revolution). The terrible defeat suffered by it in Indonesia cannot help but raise controversies within a party whose leadership shares in large part the responsibilities of the leaders of the Indonesian Communist party in this disaster. The blind sectarian refusal of a united front with the Soviet government for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution considerably weakens the positions of the Chinese CP in Asia, and at the same time Chinese diplomacy has suffered important setbacks in Latin America (Castro's attack) and in Africa. The internal struggle has been taking place in such a way as if the Chinese bureaucracy would like to be on the safe side in order to crush an opposition before it adds to its strength through the setbacks to Mao's international policy as well as setbacks in internal politics which seem imminent.

The attempt to maintain a monolithic image before the masses, the stifling of dissent by Stalinist-type violence and the frantic construction of the Mao cult make impossible the free discussion of the actual differences and the difficult problems that the Chinese revolution faces at this stage and cannot but cause grave prejudice to the interests of the revolution.

However, the propaganda of the Chinese leaders against the formation of material privileges, such as those existing in the Soviet Union during this internal struggle, testifies that despite the Mao cult and the avowal of Stalin there is not a pure and

simple reproduction of the dictatorship of Stalin and the pattern that developed in the USSR. China's objective position in the world, the aggressive preparations of American imperialism against her are in the same direction. By avoiding any declaration of solidarity with China in the face of the imperialist menace, the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy encourage this aggression, the ultraleftism of the Chinese leaders on the question of the united front with the Kremlin and their attempt at militarizing the whole of social life in China which is their bureaucratic attempt to secure the defenses of the revolution in the face of the threat from the Pentagon.

### III.

#### The Imperialist States

The economic situation in the imperialist states has not changed fundamentally during the past period. The war in Vietnam continues to strengthen the American "boom" and at the same time weakens the stability of the dollar and the pound. It has also helped to overcome the recession in Japan. Signs are now appearing of the exhaustion of the West German "boom."

In the United States the continuation of the escalation in Vietnam continues to provoke differences within the bourgeoisie and in their two major political parties. Certain important sections of the American bourgeoisie are aware of the fact that in the absence of a fundamental modification of the relations of force on a world scale, this escalation brings increasing hazards for American imperialism. While these differences are only tactical they make it difficult for the government to resort to a McCarthy-type repression against opposition at least on the scale of the fifties. The existence of this difference in turn helps encourage the growth of a popular opposition against the war in Vietnam.

In this same period the principle new element has been the NATO crisis, made public by de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French troops from the "integrated" command. This decision is taken at a time when the situation within the capitalist world after the war has been modified on one hand because of the economic recovery in capitalist Europe and on the other because of the lessening of the war danger in Europe in the immediate future. The NATO crisis may result in a certain reorganization of the forms of alliance in the capitalist world, adapting the relations of political-military force to the reality of the changed economic relations of force; but it is excluded, contrary to the wishful thinking of the workers state bureaucracies, that it will be dislocated let alone mean the creation of a "neutralist" Europe. The widespread "anti-American" feelings and moods can be used for certain political maneuvers within the different European states, but no European bourgeoisie can permit itself to "go it alone," nor can the European capitalists allow the loss of the military protection of the USA. It suffices to appraise

exactly de Gaulle's policy to see how even he stops before certain limits (maintenance of the Common Market, keeping of French troops in Germany).

The new developments in the internal situation in the various imperialist countries have been many and contradictory. In general they have helped encourage a politicalization of the young generation in a direction hostile to the reformism of the old traditional parties; this is true both in America and in Western Europe. Even though the objective effects of this new movement are still limited they have great importance for our movement and ensure its growth at this time. It is above all in the United States (and to a certain extent in Canada and Australia) that this politicalization has taken dimension with the development of a mass opposition against the war in Vietnam, an opposition that is growing and which begins to influence mass currents and essential forces of American society (antisegregation movement as well as "liberal" fringes of the trade-union movement).

We must underline the importance of the antiwar movement in the United States, which constitutes today one of the major centers of anti-imperialist struggle in the world and whose strength has grown steadily during this past period. The interconnection between the colonial revolution and the growing anti-imperialist mass force in the United States has become evident. The antiwar movement in the United States stimulates in turn anti-imperialist actions in other parts of the world and radicalizing the emancipation movement of the American Negroes threatens the stability of bourgeois society in the United States.

In the European Communist parties the tendency toward a right-wing evolution has been accentuated. In Italy, at the congress of the Italian Communist party the center grouping adopted to all intents and purposes the political position of the right wing. In France, since the Mitterrand campaign the leadership of the French Communist party has, if anything, increased the tempo of this evolution, even if it conflicts with the attitude of its expected "allies" (censure motion against de Gaulle's policy on NATO) in the field of foreign politics and on domestic issues (refusal to elaborate a common program for the 1967 elections). It comes as no surprise then when the Finnish CP carries this evolution to the point of participating in the bourgeois government, something which has not been seen in Europe since the Prague "coup" eighteen years ago.

The evolution of the situation in Europe has had contradictory effects on the Social Democracy. While the British Labour party, brought to power with a largely increased majority, is launching into a policy of renewal of British capitalism at the expense of the working class, which is beginning to show a growing resistance against such a policy (seamen's strike) the Austrian elections put the Austrian Social Democracy into opposition for the first time since the restoration of Austrian independence. This will have as a consequence the encouragement of the workers struggles despite the

resistance of their leadership which is seeking to confine and limit the class struggle to their despicable parliamentary shadow boxing. In Germany after the failure of the Bad Godesberg orientation (which envisaged accession to power through identification with the bourgeois parties) the Social Democracy has turned toward differentiation from the bourgeois parties; this can give a little more elbow room for the development of the left-wing currents which have been crushed during the past several years. Meanwhile there is the serious risk that the trade-union bureaucracy will yield without a struggle before the "emergency laws" (Nodstands-Gesetze) which would be a serious blow to the workers movements.

#### IV.

#### The Balance Sheet of World Developments

The balance sheet we can make out of the foregoing is that the colonial revolution despite the setbacks suffered in the last period is not at all exhausted and remains what it has been for the past twenty years -- the main sector of the world revolution. The defeats suffered have not been the result of the weakening of the combativity of the masses or the result of some modification of the objective conditions, but are due rather to the absence of a qualified revolutionary leadership at a time when American imperialism after some hesitation has taken a stance all the more aggressive since it has the advantage of the disunity of the two leading workers states. The increasing war danger does not come from a decisive change in the relationship of forces but rather from the limited success that capitalism has had against revolution. It is this limit and especially the victorious resistance of the Vietnamese revolution that pushes capitalism onto the road toward escalation which unfortunately to date has had no vigorous and united response.

The cumulative effect of the defeats suffered by the colonial revolution in the last period is not of such weight to neutralize the decisive influence that economic and social instability has on the mass movement. It is still in this sector where the most likely probability exists of highly explosive social and political conflicts.

However, the key to the world situation remains at present in Vietnam. It is the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people against the imperialist aggression which largely neutralizes in the eyes of the colonial masses, the demoralizing effect of the setbacks suffered by the revolution on other fronts. It is the bogging down of the mobile forces of the American army in Vietnam which make it difficult for Yankee imperialism to intervene on a large scale on other fronts.

Up to now the setbacks suffered by the colonial revolution have not at all led to a modification of the relation of forces on a world scale. But a defeat of the Vietnamese revolution by the

forces of imperialism could bring the gravest consequences. This is why the number one task of the world proletariat is the campaign to aid the Vietnamese revolution on every front and in every way.

Among the workers states one can see the first signs of a political renewal after ten years of relative stabilization, the "de-Stalinization"; that is to say, the policy of self-defense of the bureaucracy by means of limited reforms. Finally, in the imperialist states, though the economic level and social stability have not shown any fundamental damage there can also be seen signs of political renewal which promise much for the future.

With regard to the preceding years, when the colonial revolution in particular had the most spectacular success it is the problem of leadership and of an International that show themselves as the imperative necessity, to insure victories. The Vietnamese war at present stresses this need even more in face of the single leadership of imperialism (only contested in a small and limited way) while the world's revolutionary mass movements suffer the burden and monstrous handicap of rival state leaderships in the USSR and China to say nothing of the opportunist political orientation of the traditional organizations including the mass CP's under pro-Mao leadership.

The imperative necessity to make up for this terrible lack breaks through with varying consciousness and intensity in mass movements and even in various centrist currents; this explains the origin of the Tricontinental Conference of Havana (January 1966) whose object was to find the means to coordinate the efforts and struggles of the peoples who are at present directly at grips with world imperialism.

The conference at Havana revealed the difficulties on the road towards a coordination of the struggles on an international scale, showing the weight of the state apparatus of the workers states and of the petty-bourgeois forces still leading the anti-imperialist movement in most semicolonial and colonial countries. It confirmed once more how illusory is the hope to see these state bureaucracies and petty-bourgeois forces take a correct political position "under the pressure of the masses and the objective conditions." It confirmed that the revolutionary victories snatched from the enemy by surprise thanks to objective conditions so favorable that they could accomplish this even without a revolutionary Marxist leadership represent an exception and not the rule and that the building of a new revolutionary leadership is the most important task of our epoch.

Finally, the main lesson that can be drawn from the latest vicissitudes of the world revolution confirms the message that the Fourth International has advanced since its foundation to the revolutionary vanguard; there is no lasting definitive victory against capital on an international scale without the building of a new revolutionary Marxist International.

V.

Our Tasks

The conclusions of this analysis are evident; revolutionary Marxists must concentrate their efforts at the present stage on defense of the Vietnamese revolution and on organization of maximum effective aid to this revolution. To secure the victory of this revolution; to check the aggression of American imperialism is the surest way of discouraging the most aggressive forces of this imperialism which dream of a preventive attack against the Chinese nuclear centers. It is also the surest way of giving to new revolutions in other parts of the world the possibility of consolidating without being forced immediately to face the certainty of a military intervention of Yankee imperialism.

This concentration of efforts implies in particular:

(1) The continuation of the efforts of revolutionary Marxists to involve in the struggle against the war of aggression of imperialism in Vietnam the largest possible mobilization of the workers and anti-imperialist movements on the basis of a united front without exclusion and with every organization maintaining its right of criticism within the united front.

(2) The attempt to create everywhere where they are not yet in existence ad hoc organizations of struggle against the war of aggression of American imperialism and of defense of the Vietnamese revolution, organizations able to respond immediately to new stages of the escalation as for example the recent bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

(3) The attempt to involve progressively in the struggle against the war of aggression the organized forces of the workers movement and particularly the trade-union movement on the basis of a genuine united front without any confusion of program with reformists, neoreformists, Khrushchevites, Maoists, etc., but with a concentration of effort on the part of all militant forces in the struggle against imperialist aggression.

(4) The attempt to internationalize the struggle against the imperialist war of aggression, beginning with the countries or the movements which because of the similarity of objective conditions make possible such an effective international (above all the students on a world scale and the youth organizations on a European scale).

(5) A strong denunciation of the shameful role played in the war by the workers bureaucracies; particularly a reformist bureaucracy like the British, which act as shameful agents of American imperialism; the Soviet bureaucracy which gives limited aid and cannot find it possible to respond to the escalation even with the responses of its old leader Khrushchev. They are the only ones who have the technical means that would enable the heroic Vietnamese

fighters to stop the imperialist aggression; the Chinese bureaucracy whose refusal of a united front with the USSR for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution makes the deception of the Kremlin much easier and accentuates the purely verbal character of its denunciations of the "Soviet-American plot" against the colonial revolution.

Our primary slogans today:

For a united front on a world scale of all forces of the workers and anti-imperialist movements against the American aggression in Vietnam.

For the defense of the Vietnamese revolution.

For maximum aid to this revolution.

#### Full Text of Correspondence

##### HEALY BREAKS WITH VIETNAM SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN IN BRITAIN

[Among that hardy breed who for one reason or another follow The Newsletter, the weekly organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Labour League, the June 25 issue looked like a collector's item. It featured an appeal by Bertrand Russell announcing formation of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, whose purpose was to seek "to make clear the basic issues in this struggle and to organise a series of actions in Britain supporting the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the Americans." Publication of Russell's appeal appeared to mark a decided shift in attitude on the part of the CC of the SLL, which has been following a "go it alone" policy in supporting the Vietnamese, varied with an occasional "barge in on others" tactic.

[The impression that the CC of the SLL might have decided to participate in an organized united front campaign was given a further boost in the July 9 issue of The Newsletter which reported that the Young Socialists under the influence of the SLL had participated in a demonstration called by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and had succeeded in barging in on a demonstration sponsored by the Communist party and other organizations.

[Even more out of character -- to judge solely from the columns of The Newsletter -- was the action reported in the August 13 issue, that the SLL had participated in a meeting and march sponsored by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. To those who may have wondered if the world was about to see a case of the self-reform of a bureaucracy (if only a microscopic one), two indicators suggested that premature conclusions should not be drawn. The report mentioned only one speaker -- the representative of the SLL; and a front-page bulletin signed by the "London Area Committee, Socialist Labour

League," gave notice that the SLL "is not in any way connected with this united front agreement" of the Vietnam Solidarity Committee.

[Next, the August 20 issue made public a letter from G. Healy, secretary of the SLL, to Ralph Schoenman of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, further dissociating the SLL from the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign.

[Finally, the September 3 Newsletter published excerpts from Ralph Schoenman's reply, together with a response occupying almost a page of The Newsletter. The response, signed by Michael Banda, ends with the following affirmation: "To Messrs. Schoenman and Russell we say: To hell with your rotten 'united front' of state capitalists, Pabloites, Stalinists and centrists. Your campaign stinks and will continue to do so until you learn to fight in a principled manner. The Vietnamese will win, in spite of you." This put the CC of the SLL back where it was before The Newsletter published Bertrand Russell's appeal.

[Ralph Schoenman has released the full text of the correspondence. For the sake of the record, we are making this available below and in our next issue will offer some comments by our London correspondent.

[Those who may wish to compare the texts below with what was published in The Newsletter, will note some minor discrepancies in the two texts of Healy's August 8 letter. We have followed the photostatic copy supplied by Ralph Schoenman. Where The Newsletter went so far as to substitute a word, we have noted it. Healy's August 16 letter is published here for the first time.

[To facilitate comparing the text of Schoenman's August 17 letter with the excerpts published in The Newsletter, we have underlined and enclosed in brackets what was omitted.]

\* \* \*

8th August, 1966.

Mr. R. Schoenman,  
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,  
3 Staveley [sic] Place,  
Haymarket, S.W.1.

Dear Mr. Schoenman,

May we take this opportunity to explain the position of the Socialist Labour League towards the Vietnam Solidarity Committee [changed to "Campaign" in the August 20 Newsletter], and more especially to its public meeting on Saturday, August 6th.

When we met you towards the end of July, we explained that we agreed with the Statement of the Committee [changed to "Campaign" in The Newsletter] that it proposed to campaign for the victory of



the National Liberation Front and the complete withdrawal of all American Armed Forces from Vietnam. During the course of this conversation the role of the 1954 Geneva Agreement came up and you suggested that this should not be placed in the forefront of the campaign at the present time. We in turn agreed with the proviso that this Agreement was in fact largely responsible for the present state of affairs and that this should be kept in mind, in case the Soviet bureaucracy should attempt in the future to foist another similar reactionary agreement on the Vietnamese people. We have kept to that agreement.

During our talk we made it clear that we were not affiliated to your Committee [changed to "Campaign" in The Newsletter], but that we would support your public meeting on August 6th and the torchlight procession to the American Embassy at Gosvenor Square, W.L. [sic] afterwards, on these grounds, and these grounds alone.

Subsequently, attempts were made by members of your Committee [changed to "Campaign" in The Newsletter] such as E. Taite that Mike Banda, the assistant General Secretary of the S.L.L. should not speak at the public meeting, because he was too forthright in his condemnation of the war in Vietnam, and that he might embarrass any Labour M.Ps. who would be on the platform. Naturally, we did not agree to this, since it is out of the question for anyone, apart from members of the S.L.L. to determine who should speak for our organisation at any meeting.

Then it was agreed that he should speak, so we called upon our members and supporters to attend the meeting and join the demonstration which of course they did.

At that meeting we were faced with an extraordinary situation in which you as chairman tried to determine by your control of the meeting what our people should or should not say in relation to the role of the British Communist Party and the Soviet bureaucracy. You wrongly accused the Socialist Labour League of breaking the united front of the Solidarity Committee.

We did nothing of the sort, since we were not in the first place members of the Committee and we would never under any circumstances agree not to criticise the British Communist Party and its Soviet overlords who are in our opinion betraying the Vietnamese revolution.

A united front agreement is one that relates the specific issues of agreement whilst enabling those who participate to criticise if necessary, the political shortcomings of others who subscribed to the agreement. Since neither we, the British Communist Party or the Soviet bureaucracy are members of your Committee [changed to "Campaign" by The Newsletter], how could the S.L.L. spokesman from the floor have broken any agreement.

The most charitable conclusion we can draw is that a serious mistake was made by you due to a misunderstanding of your powers

as Chairman.

You must appreciate that the members of the Socialist Labour League are indignant over what they believe to be an unwarranted interference with the rights of their organisation.

They participated in the demonstration when others who are affiliated to your Committee [changed to "Campaign" by The Newsletter] sought refuge in a public house by Baker Street tube station, rather than march.

Before we decided as to whether or not to continue our support to your Committee [changed to "Campaign" by The Newsletter] we would appreciate your comments.

Yours truly,

G. Healy [signature]

G. HEALY  
Secretary

GH/JS

\* \* \*

16th August, 1966.

Mr. R. Schoenman,  
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation,  
3 Shaveley [sic -- it should be Shavers] Place,  
Haymarket, S.W.1.

Dear Mr. Schoenman,

Since you have not replied to our letter to you dated 8th August, 1966, we would now like to take the opportunity of breaking off all relations with the Vietnam Solidarity Committee.

We think that this Committee is not engaged in a real defence of the Vietnamese revolution but that it consists of a hodge podge of unrepresentative middle class semi-pacifist elements whose main aim is to attack and slander the Socialist Labour League as you did as Chairman of the public meeting on August 6th.

We shall presently speak out publicly in the columns of the Newsletter about the political implications of your action.

Yours truly,

G. Healy [signature]

National Secretary

GH/JS

\* \* \*

17 August, 1966.

G. Healy, Esq.,  
Secretary  
Socialist Labour League,  
186A Clapham High Street,  
London, S.W.4.

Dear Mr. Healy,

Thank you for your letter of August 8. I cannot agree with your account of our meeting last month, for it is at variance with the facts. You were asked not to attack the Geneva Agreements from the platform of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. The Solidarity Campaign supports the Vietnamese revolution and the organs of struggle leading it. It is impossible to make solidarity with the Vietnamese while they are under siege, waging a bitter struggle against their oppressors and, at the same time, attack agreements signed by their leaders as a betrayal of their revolution. The S.L.L. can do this in its own organs, as can other organisations, but the Solidarity Campaign is not a forum for attacking the National Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. You accepted this point during our discussion and agreed that the Geneva Agreements would not be attacked by you from our platform.

No proviso concerning the responsibility of the Geneva Agreements for the present crisis was entertained, and I can only repeat that this discussion is no part of the objects of the Solidarity Campaign, which is a united front of all those committed to support the Vietnamese in their struggle against aggression.

You reconstruct and misrepresent the reasons why some members of this Campaign (not Committee) expressed doubts about Mike Banda as a speaker. [No-one ever stated that Banda was "too forthright in his condemnation of the war in Vietnam" or that "he might embarrass the Labour M.P.'s who would be on the platform". This is a presentation which may suit you, but it is utterly unrelated to the truth.]\* The objections were based on something other than fear of consistent support for revolutionary positions or consistent condemnation of the war in Vietnam. The objections about Banda were based on the apprehension that he would place factional considerations before condemnation of the war in Vietnam or support for the Vietnamese revolution. Factionalism was the worry, not revolutionary consistency. If there was any concern about consistency, it was as a result of recollection that Banda and the S.L.L. condemned in print the Congolese rebels at the time of the Stanleyville invasion and that you condemned the Algerian revolution as a petit-bourgeois formation. At the time, the S.L.L. and the Newsletter supported Messali Hadj.

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\*As indicated above, portions of this letter enclosed in brackets and underlined, were omitted by The Newsletter, which confined itself to making only "excerpts" available to its readers.

[No-one denies you the right to take these views, but it is a bit much to both maintain such a position and then contend that it is your revolutionary consistency which is at issue. Needless to say, many people in this Campaign have evolved in their political thinking, and no-one is interested in demanding qualifications for supporting the Vietnamese revolution other than sincerity and willingness to place that support in the forefront of their minds. The Labour M.P.'s who were invited to speak on our platform were not being spared by us the revolutionary fervour of Mr. Banda. The point was something quite other, as you know. We asked that they should not be attacked while on our platform, speaking for solidarity. This is a bit different. The whole issue is one of what is the real interest of the organisations participating in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. Are those organisations interested in forging a united campaign in support of the Vietnamese or are they interested in using the Vietnamese revolution as a vehicle for slating everyone else? The Solidarity Campaign is predicated on the view that a united front is possible in support of Vietnam. We shall stand or fall as a Campaign on this premise.]

I should remind you that you telephoned me for a meeting and you made the suggestion that the S.L.L. should speak at our meeting and participate in our demonstrations. In response to this overture, I made three points as Chairman of the Campaign:

1. No attack on the N.L.F. and the D.R.V., whether with regard to the signing of the Geneva Agreements or anything else, for this was at variance with our *raison d'etre*.
2. No factional attacks on other participants in this Campaign, but concentration upon exposing the aggressor and supporting the victim of the aggression.
3. No further use of the neo-fascist and colonial term "Vietcong", which has been used repeatedly in the Newsletter and by the Young Socialists.

[On all these points you agreed and the Campaign was pleased that the Socialist Labour League was prepared to support a united front minimum programme of solidarity with the people of Vietnam.]

[Indeed, after Mike Banda's effective speech, I congratulated him, as Chairman, and stated that he had spoken with force and clarity, expressing the views of every serious person in this Campaign. There was no animus shown the S.L.L., nor was there any predisposition to deny you a platform.]

The turning point came with your own violation of your word, when you came on the platform to denounce the Soviet leadership, the British Communist Party and all those who work with them. You have been around long enough to know that this was an attack on all our main speakers and the principle of a united front. In fact, what you did was to give a signal, in effect, to break up our meeting.

As Chairman, I acted in support of the united front of the Solidarity Campaign. Individual views concerning the Soviet Union or revolutionary change, or the role of the Communist Party in Britain, are irrelevant to the call we have made to everyone who takes the minimum position of supporting the Vietnamese struggle against imperialism: "Unite together".

[These were the factional considerations which had given rise originally to apprehensions about your presence on our platform. It is too easy to envisage spokesmen from the Y.C.L., Communist Party in Britain or any other grouping coming on our platform, nominally in support of the Vietnamese revolution, but actually to denounce "the Healyites" as wreckers or agents of American imperialism. If anyone had done this, I should have stopped them as quickly as I stopped your own attack on members of our platform. We insist that you understand that these questions can be discussed in all the respective organisations vigorously, but to intrude them in a united front campaign is to betray a complete, total inability to understand what a united front is, how it is to be run and how it can develop.]

[You gave assurances that factionalism would not characterise your participation in our Campaign and Mr. Banda's speech conformed to those undertakings. Your own interruption was utterly destructive of this agreement and we would ask your well-disciplined supporters not to shout: "We will smash you", from the audience. We would further ask that shouting out slogans based on the term "Vietcong" should not continue, particularly as you agreed that this would be done.] There were many tendencies at that meeting and they are indignant about the tactics that you employed. [Your interest in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign was late, and I should give you two examples of your behaviour which enforce indignation about your behaviour:

- [1. In your report of our meeting in the Newsletter you excluded mention of every other speaker, of their contributions and of the activities of the Solidarity Campaign. Your entire report consisted of the text of your own speaker.]
- [2. When you were asked to participate in a demonstration against the presence in London of the Deputy Premier of the puppet government in Saigon, you sent two people to sell the Newsletter at the demonstration.]

[All these things, combined with the intolerable behaviour at the meeting, make indignant the different groupings who were present at the meeting and who were active in the Campaign. You must choose either to participate in united front activity and honour its decisions, or to stay out of the united front and attack it as opportunist, or whatever you choose. If you come in and speak on its platform, then you cannot attack its very basis, having asked to participate. Here is a very clear political principle. Your con-

tinued support is welcome, but we want support for the aims of our Campaign and with the understanding that there will be no repetition of your intolerable performance at our last meeting. We do not want you to join our ranks for the purpose of attacking imperialism, and then to concentrate all your fire on other tendencies in our Campaign. The S.L.L. can conduct that struggle outside our Campaign, but the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign was not set up for faction fighting by the S.L.L. or by those whom it attacks.

[Yours faithfully,

[Ralph Schoenman

[P.S. Your letter of August 16 calls the Campaign: "A hodge podge of unrepresentative middle-class semi-pacifist elements whose main aim is to attack and slander the Socialist Labour League..." How curious of you to notice it so late. Perhaps it is because you were unable either to take over this Campaign or wreck it. You might explain that to your supporters.]

#### JAPANESE UNIONS SCORE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM

In a declaration, issued during its convention July 31-August 4, SOHYO, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (68 unions, representing 5,670,000 members), said about the war in Vietnam:

"The American aggression in Vietnam is being intensified, and the United States is committing outrageous acts in bombing nonmilitary areas in Vietnam.

"These American actions will increase the possibility of an all-out war. The Sato government is lending active support to this American policy. Bases on Okinawa and in Japan are being used to serve America's aggressive purposes in Vietnam.

"The imperialist policy of capitalist monopoly is becoming more apparent in its designs and is reviving the prewar militarism of Japan.

"This is being demonstrated in the massive discharge of workers, and in the intensifying attacks against wage increases. The moves to establish a single-member constituency system and to amend the constitution are but a few examples of such imperialist designs.

"At this critical juncture, we must reaffirm the need for unity and solidarity and establish a national front to fight against the imperialists."