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TRIAL OPENS FOR HUGO BLANCO

As feared by the defense, the Peruvian government opened the trial for Hugo Blanco Galdós, the well-known Trotskyist peasant leader, without adequate notice; and selected a court in Tacna, a small town, where even routine press coverage is difficult.

August 29 was set as the opening day for the trial. But the three Lima defense attorneys, Dr. Alfredo Batillano Maggiolo, Doctora Laura Caller Ibérica and Marcial Chalco Reyes, were not registered in Tacna. Proceedings were held up while provisions were made to register the three attorneys locally.

Twenty-eight defendants were brought into court August 30. (Two days later, the number was increased to 29.) Nine others were named in the indictment but have not been apprehended.

The two leading figures in the case are Hugo Blanco, who is being defended by Dr. Batillano; and Pedro Candela Santillana, who is being defended by Dra. Caller. The latter attorney, together with Marcial Chalco, is also defending the 27 other defendants. Their names were listed by the press as follows:

Aniceto Muñoz Piñares	José Pereyra Paucar
Tiburcio Bolaños Dávalos	Luis Aguilar Villacorta
Fortunato Vargas Guzmán	Gerardo Carpio Molina
José Zuñiga Letona	Humberto Caraza Moscoso
Vicente Ortiz Quispe	Leonidas Carpio Jordán
Fidel Orué Ortiz	Marcelino Rosa
Bernardino Zárate Ramírez	Pascual Zárate Ramírez
Crisólogo Gordillo Almandoz	Lucio Bengolea Torres
Moisés Paz Huacac	Fortunato Torres Paniagua
Emiliano Semordes Ojeda	Andrés González Tejada
Francisco Cayo Palomino	Antonio Huaccoc León
Nemesio Bocángel Zavala	Gregorio Surco Quispe
Juan Pando Páucar	Bernardino Quispe Lavilla
Basilio Alvarez	

The prosecuting attorney, Lt. Col. Oswaldo Paulinich, demanded 25 years in prison for Hugo Blanco, 22 years for Pedro Candela and from 2 to 20 years for the others.

The demand was not without sinister implications. The press had freely predicted in advance that the prosecution would demand 25 years for Hugo Blanco but that the judges would hand down the death sentence. The press prediction proved to be accurate as to the opening moves of the prosecution, giving rise to forebodings that the trial will end with martyrdom for Hugo Blanco.

Dr. Batillana objected to the trial being held in Tacna because it "lacked the necessary guarantees" for a fair hearing. He also charged that the defendants were brought to Tacna hastily and without previous notice.

The defense also filed objections over a series of legal "omissions and errors" in the case. They argued for dismissal of the case; and, when this was denied, demanded its postponement. This was denied inasmuch as the Military Code does not provide for postponements.

In addition to all the other difficulties facing the defense, the government placed the case under the Code of Military Justice although the alleged crimes actually come under civil law.

The defense also charged that the trial was unfair, since eighty percent of the defendants speak only Quechua, yet the trial is being conducted in Spanish. When the court read the charges to

the defendants in Spanish, Dra. Laura Caller objected. She pointed out that the Military Code provides in such instances for an interpreter.

The head of the military tribunal, Col. Roberto Acosta, said that after the charges were read in Spanish a copy translated into Quechua would be handed to the defendants.

When Hugo Blanco was brought into the small crowded courtroom at 8:30 a.m., he shouted the slogans of the peasants whom he had led in the valley of La Convención in the heroic struggles of 1961 and 1962.

The presiding judge became very angry and ordered silence on penalty of being sent out.

Hugo Blanco remained seated until 12:30 p.m. when the hearing was suspended. He then rose to shout again, "Tierra o Muerte!" [Land or Death.] Pedro Candela and the other 26 loudly echoed the slogan before the appreciative spectators who had jammed into the courtroom.

Hugo Blanco was dressed in a simple black leather jacket. Apparently he let his beard grow during the more than three years he was held incomunicado in prison in Arequipa.

The charges against Hugo Blanco include involvement in the death of three members of the armed forces, killed during the struggles initiated by the government to suppress the peasant movement. He is charged in addition with "treason," dissemination of "red literature" and involvement in the training of peasants in the use of arms.

The highly political nature of the trial is revealed by the mere fact that the second day of the hearings (August 31) was spent largely with the prosecution reading extracts from the literature distributed to the peasants in La Convención. The main point of the prosecution was that this "red literature" openly "incited" the land-hungry peasants to "rebellion."

On September 1, the number of defendants was increased to 29 when the peasant Basilio Alvarez, who had been sick, was brought in. The day was spent with the prosecution reading into the record depositions of witnesses concerning guerrilla incidents in which Hugo Blanco was allegedly involved. The session of September 2 was spent in a similar way.

On September 3, the prosecution's reading of the depositions of the defendants began. Hugo Blanco spent six hours and a half listening to the prosecution's version of what he had allegedly said during the investigative process. In the key case of Hernán Briceño Minauro, who was killed in a gun battle, Hugo Blanco described how he had fired in self-defense against the civil guard.

According to the press, the trial, which is proceeding in drumhead fashion in accordance with the usual procedure of Peruvian courts-martial, might last another six days.

400 SOCIALIST SCHOLARS IN NEW YORK PLEAD FOR HUGO BLANCO

Almost 400 participants in the second Socialist Scholars Conference, held in New York September 9-11, signed a petition to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry for amnesty for peasant leader Hugo Blanco and his twenty-seven co-defendants now on trial in Tacna, Peru.

The list was headed by the two main guest speakers of the conference, Isaac Deutscher, world-famous historian, and Professor Conor Cruise O'Brien, Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities, New York University.

The signers included such distinguished academic figures and left American intellectuals as the newly elected president of the conference, Professor Eugene Genovese of Rutgers University, New Jersey; Paul Booth, a leader of Students for a Democratic Society; Herbert Aptheker, historian and leading theorist of the American Communist party; Harvey Swados, novelist; Paul Sweezy, editor of Monthly Review; Professor Franz Schurmann, University of California, Berkeley; Professor Andres Gunder Frank, Sir George Williams University, Montreal, Canada; James Petras, University of California, Berkeley, student of Latin-American affairs; Professor Marvin Gettleman, Columbia University, New York; James O'Connor, economist and writer on Latin-American affairs, San José State College, California; Professor Nathan Hare, Howard University, Washington, D.C.; Professor Robert S. Brown, Fairleigh Dickenson University, New Jersey.

Also, Ruth Gage Colby, Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom; Professor Oliver Loud, Antioch College, Ohio; Joseph Hansen, editor of The Militant; Victor Rabinowitz, civil-liberties attorney; William Ash, philosopher; Alfred Evenitsky, editor, Science & Society; Emile Capouya, literary critic; Alex Munsell, publisher; Joseph M. Gilman, economist; Professor Aileen Kraditor, Rhode Island University; Dr. Annette Rubenstein, author and literary critic; George Novack, Marxist theoretician.

Also, Frank Kofsky, historian, University of Pittsburgh; Professor David Herreshoff, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan; Lew Jones, National Chairman, Young Socialist Alliance; Manuela Schleicher, Columbia University; Saul Landau, writer; Bettina Aptheker, Berkeley student leader.

This group asked the Peruvian president to exercise clemency and immediately liberate Hugo Blanco and his co-defendants. Their voices lent support to the appeal made by the national Pro-Amnesty Committee of Peru to free all the political prisoners now behind bars in that country.

AN APPEAL FROM JAPAN FOR HUGO BLANCO

The Japanese Revolutionary Communist League, the Japanese section of the Fourth International, addressed an appeal August 31 to Fernando Belaúnde Terry, president of Peru, asking him to halt the trial of Hugo Blanco and his co-defendants and release them at once.

The appeal was signed by T. Furusato for the International Department and Y. Takamine for the Kansai Regional Committee of the JRCL.

The Japanese Trotskyists wrote the appeal in excellent Spanish and sent a copy to World Outlook, from which we have made the following translation:

"The Japanese Revolutionary Communist League (Japanese section of the Fourth International) recently learned through the United Secretariat of its world organization that your government has decided to hold a military trial of our Peruvian comrade Hugo Blanco, heroic leader of the Peruvian peasants and a martyr of the inhuman repression of the reactionary forces and Yankee imperialism.

"The FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario], peasant movement of Peru, which Hugo Blanco, together with his guerrilla comrades, led, enjoys the popular support of almost all people in Peru and the world. The actions of Hugo Blanco, for which your government is trying him, represent the fundamental interests of the landless Peruvian peasants who live under miserable conditions, brutally oppressed by the reactionary Peruvian regime. Your government never had the right to bring the revolutionary Hugo Blanco to trial. History will absolve him.

"We know that the Peruvian bourgeoisie and latifundists and their agents, who are in power, are resisting the inevitable course of history, utilizing in Ayacucho reactionary Cuban forces along with Yankee imperialism. The reactionary Cubans constitute ghosts of Cuba's past. It is the Peruvian bourgeoisie and latifundists and their agents who cooperate with Yankee imperialism who should be sentenced to death.

"We, voicing the feeling of profound sympathy which the revolutionary Japanese people feel for the Peruvian guerrillas, state our militant solidarity with Hugo Blanco and his co-defendants, and we make the following demand of you:

"Stop the military trial of Hugo Blanco and immediately release the prisoners!"

"Long live the Peruvian socialist revolution of the workers and peasants!"

"Long live solidarity between the revolutionary militants of Peru and Japan!"

JAPANESE UNIONS ORGANIZING PROTEST AGAINST WAR IN VIETNAM

Tokyo

A one-day nationwide general protest action in October against the U.S. imperialist escalation of the war in Vietnam is being organized by SOHYO [Japan General Federation of Trade Unions]. The decision was taken at a national conference at the end of July after the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

The following actions have been decided on in conjunction with the strike:

(1) A campaign for 40,000,000 signatures in support of the antiwar movement. A goal was set of at least 20,000,000 by the end of August.

(2) Collection of funds to help the National Liberation Front and similar Vietnamese organizations. Each unionist is counted on to pledge more than 100 yen [362 yen = US\$1] by the end of the year.

(3) Meetings throughout the country were scheduled for August 15. All the various unions were asked to undertake activities on the job.

(4) Intellectuals and writers were asked to prepare speeches for delivery in every city at the end of August and beginning of September, explaining the issues at stake. Discussion meetings were also scheduled in the plants under the guidance of SOHYO.

The nationwide strike action at the beginning of October is expected to bring out more people in demonstrations than the huge rallies in 1960 in opposition to the Japan-U.S. pact.

OGANIA PREPARES TO MOVE AGAINST ARGENTINE WORKERS

[The following article has been translated from the August 22 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly La Verdad, a labor news bulletin. Before the new military junta in Argentina banned all political parties, La Verdad was the official organ of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores.]

* * *

A famous French writer described Napoleon as "Robespierre on horseback." Artistic intuition enabled him to see that in many ways Napoleon was following the same bourgeois policies as Robespierre, but with other methods, authoritarian, bureaucratic, military, instead of appealing for a popular mobilization like the head of the Jacobins.

We can describe the Onganía government in a similar way: "Frondizi-Alsogaray with tanks." It is following essentially the same policies as the Frondizi government, especially in its Alsogaray stage -- but in place of bothering about elections and the possible support or winning of the popular sectors, it does everything in a bureaucratic, direct, authoritarian way. A deep Alsogarayan winter will be upon us until the workers overcome this government.

The regime is the best agent which the big industrial concerns and imperialist consortiums and monopolies have had up to now. The coup d'état signified a colossal triumph for these bourgeois sectors against the working class and the toiling people as a whole. It has not yet fully revealed its true character because its recent victory was political. Now, as the agent of the big monopolies, the government will move into the economic arena to capitalize on its political triumph. We have entered the stage in which the bourgeoisie will try to convert the political victory it won over the workers into gains in the field of economic and labor relations.

Thus, in a different historical period, is being repeated another transitional stage much like the one following the triumph of the liberating revolution. [Peron's downfall.] Lonardi had scarcely gained power when a transitional stage opened in which the oligarchy and the middle class began to seek the fruits of their political victory at the union and plant level.

This stage lasted three months, up to the big strike of November 1955, which was followed by the triumph of reaction in the trade-union field. The workers movement had to accept defeat; that is, intervention in the trade-union movement.

Today we have entered a similar stage. The government and the big bourgeoisie are hastening to translate their political victory against the working class into the whole social and economic arena.

This offensive against all the toilers, beginning with the working class, is being carried forward on various levels.

First, carte blanche has been given to the companies to rationalize their plants and increase the speed up. Onganía's declaration to the national press clearly indicates that he is authorizing an increase in productivity in the plants.

Second, the plan to increase productivity will be accompanied by a similar policy in the state enterprises. They will rationalize and increase production, firing everyone considered superfluous under this plan of superexploitation. Parallel with this they will authorize such increases in social services as may be necessary to convert the state enterprises into profitable affairs.

Third, in order to impose the productivity plan on the plant level, they will open an offensive up and down the line against the shop stewards, seeking to prevent them from intervening in production problems, in order to speed up production and the profits that go with it.

Fourth, on the trade-union level they will press a policy including various points. Above all they will try to win the trade-union bureaucracy itself, respecting its privileges in order to get its help in applying the plan of superexploitation. As a concession, so as not to completely destroy their prestige, they will concede wage increases of thirty percent to various unions under condition that no strikes are engaged in for a year or more. These increases will rapidly be wiped out with the general increase in prices. At the same time they will try to transform the bureaucracy into an administrative agency for some social services, mainly the building of homes; while the government, to pacify the labor movement, will try to directly furnish other social services, such as unemployment insurance, public health, etc.

Any resistance from the labor bureaucracy or the unions is to be smashed through compulsory bargaining and intervention in the unions. In combination with the bureaucracy, the government plans an all-out offensive to oust the best activists from the plants and unions, mainly the leftists. They will open a witch-hunt in the trade unions with the collaboration of the bureaucracy. This tactic of the government and the bosses will run up against the bureaucratic structure itself, since many locals have plant leaders hated by the bosses who belong to the union apparatus.

Fifth, the process of an offensive against the working class, including rationalization of the plants and superexploitation, can be carried out with much greater facility than before by the big monopolies and companies. As a consequence of this, the same big outfits can upset the market in carrying out a commercial offensive against the lower layers of the bourgeoisie itself and the middle class.

Indirectly the offensive against the workers will likewise signify an offensive against the middle class by the big concerns. For the first time in the past twenty years, the two popular classes will confront the national government, considering it as an enemy and the agent of the big monopolies.

The present sympathy of sectors of the labor movement for the student movement is symptomatic of this process. The government has overcome the historic alienation and enmity between the urban middle class and the working class, uniting them in fact into a single front against the reactionary and dictatorial government.

In short, a stage is opening in which the working class will suffer in an immediate way: superexploitation in the plants, loss of jobs and unemployment, a high cost of living; the union activists

and the leftists will be targets of a real witch-hunt by the bosses, the government and the union bureaucracy or a sector of it; the middle class will be hit by a brutal offensive on the part of the big companies, provoking unemployment and growing misery.

But this will not be the last word. The government and the big bosses have not yet defeated the working class in this new transitional stage. The big task of our party is to prevent this defeat, or, if it occurs, to be in the vanguard of the defensive struggles in order to prepare a new rise of the labor movement.

FORT HOOD THREE SET FIRM EXAMPLE AT COURT-MARTIAL

The case of the Fort Hood Three is attracting considerable attention in the United States as the first instance during the Vietnamese war of American army recruits refusing orders to go to Vietnam. Courts-martial for the three opened September 6 at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

The first to be tried was Pvt. Dennis Mora, a 25-year-old Puerto Rican. He based his refusal to obey orders on the plea that the war was illegal and immoral, violated the precepts of the International Law Commission of the United Nations and was "a crime against humanity."

The court of ten officers, presided over by Col. Robert F. Maguire, refused to hear the contention of the defense as to the illegality of Johnson's war in Vietnam, found Mora guilty, and on September 7 sentenced him to three years in prison at hard labor, plus a "dishonorable" discharge and loss of pay.

A second panel of ten officers next tried Pfc. James A. Johnson Jr., a 20-year-old Negro. He, too, charged that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was illegal and a crime against humanity. He was declared guilty and sentenced to a "dishonorable" discharge, loss of pay and five years in prison at hard labor.

In the third case, Pvt. David A. Samas, a 20-year-old draftee from Modesto, California, testified that "The Nuremberg trials established that soldiers have the obligation to use their consciences in following orders."

The ten officers who heard him immediately declared him "guilty" and handed out the same sentence as in the case of Johnson, the maximum under Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Samas was reportedly surprised at the two five-year sentences after Mora had been given three years. However, he told the press that they had thought the maximum sentence might be fifteen years if they refused to go to Vietnam. "We were prepared to serve fif-

teen years," he said.

Among the supporters of the defendants, Bertrand Russell said that the three privates "had the respect and ardent support of people throughout the world."

David Frost, who is seeking the senatorial candidacy of the Democratic party in New Jersey, said that the three "should be decorated for their courage."

The defense plans to appeal the sentences. While the army system of "justice" will probably disdain listening to the legal arguments, which are very strong, it is hoped that the case can eventually be heard in a civil court.

The ultimate court of appeal is, of course, the people of the whole world. In this court, which long ago condemned Johnson as a war criminal, the Fort Hood Three are already considered heroes.

BOMB WRECKS AMERICAN CP HEADQUARTERS

A time-bomb was exploded early in the morning of September 4 at the national headquarters of the American Communist party in New York. There were no injuries, but the explosion wrecked the offices of the party's newspaper, The Worker, destroyed the fronts of other buildings in the vicinity and shattered stained glass windows in the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral of St. Sava across the street.

This was the second bombing of the Communist party headquarters in four months. A bomb was thrown against the building last May 1. On September 7, 1964, a fire was started against the wall of the building and on October 21, 1964, a parcel was delivered to the office from Chicago containing a bomb.

Besides this, the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs in San Francisco were bombed March 6 of this year. The explosion, which occurred during the night, knocked the building off its foundation.

A similar bomb was planted a few weeks later on April 9 in the headquarters of the Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley. Five people were injured in this explosion.

On May 16 an anti-Communist gunman walked into the Detroit headquarters of the Socialist Workers party and shot down three young men who were present. Leo Bernard, 27, a Socialist Workers candidate for Congress in 1964, was killed on the spot, becoming America's first antiwar martyr. Jan Garrett, 22, and Walter Graham, 19, members of the Young Socialist Alliance were seriously wounded. They are still recuperating from the bullets fired by the political assassin.

The pattern of violence, directed against organizations that oppose the war in Vietnam, is one of the results of the war propaganda emanating from the White House. Like the Nazis in their time, the extreme rightists feel they are only performing their "patriotic" duty in engaging in action against the "reds"; and the police are strangely incompetent when it comes to either blocking or apprehending them.

STOKELEY CARMICHAEL POLITICAL PRISONER IN ATLANTA

Stokely Carmichael, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, was arrested following a black revolt September 6 in the Summerhill slum of Atlanta, Georgia. Charged with "inciting a riot," his bail was set at \$10,000.

"Mr. Carmichael is a political prisoner," James Forman, former head of SNCC, told the press. "He wants us to let him stay in jail." Carmichael was reportedly reading a book. He said he would refuse to put up bail and would remain in jail as a political prisoner.

The revolt broke out when an Atlanta cop shot a fleeing Negro whom he claimed he "suspected" of stealing an automobile. The wounded man, 25-year-old Louis Prather, was reported in "poor condition" in the hospital with two bullet wounds.

Ghetto residents began mobilizing immediately after the incident of police brutality. "Black power," they chanted. "Police brutality." They overturned a police car and smashed windows in others. When Mayor Ivan Allen, backed by squads of police, sought to calm the crowd, he was met with shouts of "White devil!"

The mood of the crowd was indicated by a bearded black speaker who mounted a police car. "The riots in Watts made people listen to their problems," he shouted. "Atlanta needs to be treated the same way. Atlanta is just a cracker town."

When Stokely Carmichael arrived on the scene where Louis Prather had been shot, he reportedly said, "We're going to be back at 4 o'clock and tear this place up."

The police sought to suppress the demonstrators by force. They used tear gas but were met with volleys of bricks and bottles. The police scored one victory when they closed in on a home and threw tear gas into it. A mother, her five small children and her grandmother were forced out. The 22-year-old mother, nearly hysterical, was taken with her family to a hospital.

The press reported that Georgia officials were going through the law books hunting for some way to bring still graver charges against the well-known advocate of black power.

AFTER THE BOLIVIAN ELECTION

La Paz

On August 6 Gen. René Barrientos Ortuño was sworn into office as president of Bolivia, the post from which he resigned December 31, 1965. The election of July 3 was nothing more than a show, put on to legalize the military dictatorship that took power through a coup November 4, 1964.

The new Barrientos government was born in fraud and disregard of the popular will. The broad masses of the country did not take part in the July 3 election. The observers of the Organization of American States and correspondents of the imperialist press invited to come to Bolivia have misrepresented the meaning of the election, seeking to present it as a model of freedom and democracy.

The OAS delegates, their pockets stuffed with dollars, saw only what the government wished them to see and listened only to the official version. They deliberately overlooked the brutal and bloody pre-electoral repression, the murder of trade-union and political leaders, the massacres. Most important, they ignored the abstentionist position taken by the majority of the popular parties and trade-union organizations as a protest against the failure to provide guarantees for an honest election. To this should be added their failure to visit the working-class districts where practically no elections were staged; and their failure to visit the countryside where army sergeants or bureaucrats paid by the military junta cast the peasants' votes.

On election day in La Paz, the workers in the poor districts staged big demonstrations and meetings led by Trotskyists at which leaders of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [POR] spoke, including Víctor Silva, Luís Liendo and Mariano Alegria. Thousands of Bolivians in the streets shouted their repudiation of the election and their refusal to recognize the fraudulent vote. Even the bourgeois press had to note these demonstrations, attacking the "PORist agitators," but the blindmen of the OAS saw only "the cleanest elections."

Despite all the propaganda, the truth is clear. The abstentionist position held by the POR and the parties composing the Democratic Council of the People [Consejo Democrático del Pueblo] carried the day July 3. The military candidate, despite the intimidation, fraud, stuffed ballot boxes in the rural towns and disregard of the popular will, was defeated.

In the previous election in 1964, according to the report made in parliament this year by the Electoral Court, and confirmed by its chairman, the number of registered voters was 1,700,000. Due to the increase in population, the number should have risen in 1966. Yet the number of registered voters fell to 1,265,754 this year, making the appreciable difference of 434,246 as compared with 1964. This can be considered to be the number who did not register,

responding to the abstentionist campaign of the Democratic Council of the People, which includes the POR, as an indication of their lack of confidence and repudiation of the election. To this can be added other categories as indicated in the following table:

Unregistered voters	434,246
Registered voters who did not vote	240,299
Blank ballots	59,451
Spoiled ballots	<u>25,571</u>
Total abstention	759,567
Total obtained by Barrientos	621,776

Thus despite all the government resources at Barrientos' disposal, the Bolivian people dealt a defeat to the military dictatorship through the only means open to them at the moment, abstention in the election. The votes cast for Barrientos represent less than thirty percent of the electorate and even much less if the frauds are taken into account, above all those in the countryside although in the cities too such things went on as military conscripts voting as many as ten times.

The Barrientos government that took office August 6 continues to be the same as the previous one; namely, a regime of usurpers. This is the basic truth about the July 3 elections.

The Barrientos government, with a civilian cabinet, is the "constitutionalized" version of the military dictatorship. Consequently it is not possible to hope that it will change its basic antilabor, antinational, pro-imperialist political orientation. The real ruler of Bolivia is the U.S. embassy.

First the military junta and then Barrientos won the backing of the bourgeois political sectors. The cabinet includes the Christian Democrats, represented in the Ministry of Labor by Remo Di Natali, who was congratulated by the Italian and Chilean Christian Democrats for his success. Collaborationist tendencies are evident among the ranks of the Falange Socialista Boliviana and the numerous sects into which the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario split up. If these continue, the bourgeois front will be complete.

From this it is evident that a certain strengthening of Barrientos government is occurring. His speeches about Bolivians living together, his appeals for fraternity and understanding, are aimed at strengthening the bourgeois front. Barrientos is wearing his widest smile for all the bourgeois sectors and doubling his fist against the masses and the parties of the left.

After a short wait, an aggravation of the political tension between the masses and the government can be expected. The govern-

ment will adopt a harsher attitude toward the left and the labor movement. The government no longer faces various fronts, but only the workers, since the bourgeoisie has united around it. Consequently its reactionary orientation will be concentrated against the workers.

Barrientos' first cabinet reflects developments in Bolivia and indicates what the government is preparing. Chancellor Alberto Cresto Gutiérrez of the Partido Social Demócrata is a representative of the tin barons who will carry servility to imperialism to its most abject level. Secretary of the Treasury José Romero Loza, who headed the Treasury under Urriolagoitia, is manager of the Said plant. Minister of Government Antonio Arguedas, who came out of the ranks of the pro-Moscow Communist party, is a rabid anti-Communist. Minister of Economy Rolando Pardi is director of IBEAS, a fanatical anti-Communist clerical investigative body of the Dominican order. For good measure he is head of the Partido Izquierda Revolucionario. Miguel Bonifaz is in charge of planning. He is a sub chief of the PIR and a great theoretician of the revolution by stages and the Alliance for Progress. Mendoza Nava, leader of the Partido Demócrata Cristiana and an ardent partisan of free trade unionism, is in charge of labor. And so it goes with the others -- ex-military figures who make the cabinet a rat nest of reactionaries.

This is the arena in which the Bolivian left and the workers movement must work out their tactics and organize for the coming struggles, which we are sure will break into a thousand pieces the laboriously built reactionary bourgeois front.

CHILEAN LEFTISTS DEBATE HOW TO DEFEND VIETNAMESE

By José Valdés

Santiago de Chile

Recent actions carried out in Chile in support of the Vietnamese guerrillas have served to test the policies of the Chilean leftist parties. While the Communist party has slowed down the struggles, the revolutionary Marxist militants have engaged in fighting demonstrations in the street in support of the Vietnamese guerrillas.

The paralyzing policies of the CP blocked massive demonstrations during the International Days of Protest against the war in Vietnam. No general mass rally was held August 6-9 due to the sabotage of a united front by the CP; and the various left parties conducted separate activities.

The Communist party limited itself to a passive campaign appealing for blood donations to be sent to Vietnam, which ended in a scandal. Some rank-and-file Communist cells painted slogans

on walls demanding the withdrawal of the Yankee troops from Vietnam.

In a working-class area (Aníbal Pinto), left-wing militants of the Socialist party organized an interesting exposition. Workers, students and school teachers, with only their own resources, worked up twenty panels depicting Vietnam in all its aspects, not only the imperialist massacres but the revolutionary way in which the Vietnamese masses are struggling against the aggressor and their own national bourgeoisie. Throughout the exposition, they compared Vietnam and Chile in their relationship to imperialism.

The Revolutionary Left Movement [MIR -- Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria] held several meetings in Santiago and Concepción in support of the guerrillas of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front. In Concepción, the University Brigade of the MIR organized an exposition and a mass meeting in which the speakers backed the guerrillas in their struggle for victory.

In Santiago on August 9, the Regional Committee of the MIR ended the passivity of the solidarity meetings, organizing a militant march through the main streets of the city. The demonstrators carried large banners inscribed, "The MIR Supports the Vietcong Guerrillas!" "Down with the Yankee Imperialists, Murderers of Vietnam!"

Many workers cheered the action of the MIR in the crowded business and shopping center of Santiago. Others joined the march, converting it into a solid column.

During August the Communist party staged a campaign, particularly on the campus, appealing for blood to be sent to Vietnam. On September 1 a group of high-school students in the pro-Peking "Spartacus" group (now renamed the Partido Comunista Revolucionario) distributed a leaflet at the Pedagogical Institute denouncing the campaign as a fraud, since the blood could never be sent to Vietnam. A group belonging to the Communist Youth attacked them and a fight broke out in which rocks, sticks and clubs were used. Several students were injured.

The incident broadened when Senator Jaime Barros (who broke from the CP two years ago and joined Spartacus) declared that Dr. Bahamondes, head of the Blood Bank of the Chilean Red Cross, had notified the CP of the impossibility of sending blood to Vietnam since the means were lacking in Chile to produce dry plasma. "These revisionist parliamentarians," said Barros, "told the chairman of the Red Cross that they only wanted a 'symbolic' campaign, which can only be interpreted as meaning that they are not interested in seeing that the blood actually reaches Vietnam, but only in taking advantage of the campaign and the prestige of the struggle of the Vietnamese people in order to smuggle in their opportunist political line." (Quoted in the daily La Nación.)

This denunciation was confirmed by a statement made by the Chilean Red Cross which the Communist party daily El Siglo felt

obliged to print (September 3). The statement said, "From the beginning, everyone who insisted on this matter was repeatedly told that due to material and technical difficulties, the blood could not be sent to the Red Cross of North Vietnam."

Acquiescing in insistent demands from the rank and file, the board of the Student Center of the Pedagogical Institute held an assembly September 2. It was attended by more than 500. The Communist leader Carlos Cerda took the floor.

He had to admit that it "was very difficult" to send the blood to Vietnam and that there had been "precipitate action without waiting for the reply of the Red Cross." This "explanation" was greeted with whistles and catcalls by the student ranks.

The Socialists declared that the Communists were responsible for the fraud. "We Socialists," said Urquieta, "were naive, we were taken unawares, but we are going to learn from this. It is very grave because it involves having taken advantage of the profound feelings of solidarity with the Vietnamese patriots."

Later the Communists objected to a Spartacus high-school student taking the floor. But the youth of the Socialist party and the members of the MIR, who were present in considerable numbers, insisted that the comrade of the pro-Chinese group should be permitted to speak. The Communists threatened to withdraw. The student ranks told them to go ahead and the Communists decided to remain.

A student leader of the MIR, Dantón Chelén, said, "The best help to Vietnam is to struggle to accelerate the revolution in Chile. It is not enough to carry on passive campaigns; militant demonstrations are needed which try to incorporate the workers in the anti-imperialist struggle as the only way of demanding the withdrawal of the Yankee troops in Vietnam and of helping the Vietcong guerrillas to win."

In a speech that lifted the political level of the discussion, the representative of the MIR "appealed for a united front of student youth of the left." (Quoted in the September 3 El Clarín.) Chelén ended by saying that "in order to win the leadership of the FECH [Federación de Estudiantes de Chile] away from the bourgeois Christian Democracy, a united front of all the students of the left is necessary, including the young Communists, Socialists and others, without any political discrimination."

The leader of the MIR was given an ovation by the audience which began to work out a manifesto appealing for a united front.

Upon ending the assembly, the students organized a fighting demonstration against the U.S. embassy. According to the daily El Mercurio, "The demonstrators carried a North Vietnam flag. As they went along they picked up stones and other projectiles. Within minutes almost all the windows lacking protective screens were broken. Likewise broken was a large jardiniere standing in the

inside garden, which belonged to one of the consulate officials. A carabinero, Luis Perez, who was on guard, took out his revolver to threaten the Marxists, but did not pull the trigger. In return he received a rock in the head. In the scuffle, Sergio Perez, a student of history and geography in the Pedagogical Institute, was arrested."

The students forced the police to retreat and several of them climbed the window gratings and got inside the embassy. In a half hour police reinforcements arrived. They went to the defense of the U.S. embassy with clubs and water trucks. Besides Sergio Perez, Communists and members of the MIR were arrested.

Some conclusions can be drawn:

(1) The concrete struggle in support of the guerrillas of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front made it possible to unite in action young rank-and-file Communists together with Socialists, Trotskyists, Maoists and members of the MIR.

(2) The bureaucratic leaders of the Communist party were unmasked once more not only by means of criticism but fundamentally by means of revolutionary action.

(3) The name of the MIR was widely reported in the press and over the radio. The MIR's correct political line and militant action opened a way to initiate a united front with other tendencies of the Chilean left. On the day following the action against the U.S. embassy, the leftist students met and signed a manifesto appealing for formation of a Revolutionary United Front.

(4) Of the two opposed ways of supporting Vietnam it was shown to the students and workers that the only correct policy consists in appealing to the ranks, to assemblies, to discuss democratically and act unitedly in a fighting struggle against the main enemy, Yankee imperialism.

JAPAN'S TRADE WITH THE USSR, CHINA, ON THE RISE

In the first six months of 1966, Japanese trade with the USSR and the People's Republic of China showed increases of 41 and 30 percent over the same period last year. Customs figures showed \$320,204,000 with China and \$238,783,000 with the Soviet Union in the January-June period.

The figures represented 3.5 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively, of Japan's total trade during the period.

Trade with China amounted to \$164,080,000 in exports for Japan, an increase of 45 percent over the previous year, and \$156,124,000 in imports, a rise of 37 percent.

IMPERIALISTS WELCOMED TO CEYLON

By Edmund Samarakkody

The so-called economic development of Ceylon by capitalist governments in the nineteen years since "independence" in 1947 has ended in manifest failure. The first UNP [United National party] government's nine-year regime, followed by an eight-year SLFP [Sri Lanka Freedom party] regime, and now another year of the UNP have left a picture of economic backwardness and stagnation more alarming than ever.

This is the meaning of Finance Minister Wanninayake's lamentation that his government was "formed in the throes of an economic crisis," and that the gross national product registered a decline of 0.4% while the gross capital formation declined by 5.9% as compared with a fall of 1.7% in 1965. What this regression of the economy means in terms of human misery cannot be adequately revealed through statistics that are admittedly long out of date and based even originally on inaccurate and unreal assumptions.

The crisis in the economy complained of by the finance minister is none other than the crisis of underdevelopment. And the capitalist way of resolving such a crisis is no secret. Whatever may be the consequences to the workers and toilers, the capitalists and their apologists have repeatedly called for drastic cuts in expenditures on essential social services, and more especially the removal of subsidies on food, the reduction of consumption below even minimum needs and a still more severe wage-freeze despite the failure of all the capitalist governments to control prices of commodities. As all these measures in their totality will not help to realise a level of capital accumulation necessary for an accelerated pace of overall growth, the capitalist remedy is to obtain doses of foreign aid which must inevitably mean the continued economic dominance and stranglehold of imperialism.

In their second budget, the UNP leaders have taken the bull by the horns. What a Felix Dias Bandaranaike of the SLFP proposed in 1962, Finance Minister Wanninayake of the UNP has commenced to implement in 1966 under conditions of a continuing emergency and in the setting of a reorganised army and police force. If it is still too early to effect a cut in the rice ration, the UNP government has decided to get back into their coffers Rs. 25 million [one rupee = US\$.20] by increasing the price of flour .05 rupees a pound. They also expect to collect a further Rs. 30 million from the pockets of the workers and toilers through the turn-over tax, which is a tax that the consumer will pay whenever he buys most of his essential nonmanufactured consumer goods.

The drastic curtailment of expenditures on essential social services is revealed by the failure of the government to even mention the serious housing problem of the masses; and by their decision through the education bill, to severely restrict higher educa-

tion for the children of the workers and toilers.

That these measures of the government rarely touch the lives of the rich and well-to-do is proved by the fact that customs duties on a wide range of expensive articles have been reduced by as much as 50%. These include air conditioners, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, floor polishers and electrical goods of the type only the rich can afford to purchase. Bourgeois ladies have been especially remembered by the UNP government through a 50% reduction in duties on imported pedigreed dogs!

In the sphere of economic development, it is now a question of implementing the blueprint handout of the imperialists and especially the U.S.-controlled World Bank that is shaping the economies of most underdeveloped countries to their own needs of exploitation and world domination. While the way out of economic stagnation in Ceylon lies through speedy development of the manufacturing industries to reduce the huge volume of imports, the imperialist advisers of the UNP government must have it differently. In the words of the finance minister, "in the new development effort, primary emphasis has been placed on domestic agriculture." And despite the notoriously ineffective private sector, future industrial development is to be in charge of private capitalists, while only "the rationalisation of the public sector enterprises will take place."

While domestic agriculture through co-operative production and collectivised forms of agriculture could effectively mobilise the peasants and agricultural workers for development, the UNP government has handed over this sector of the economy also to private capitalists and big landowners. With thousands of people without land to cultivate, 35,000 acres of cultivable land have been given to some 100 private capitalist organisations. What is more, while the poor peasant is virtually without credit facilities to improve his land, big capitalists who have obtained thousands of acres of crown land will get loans on easy terms, not only for development of domestic agriculture, but to develop tea estates and to modernise their tea factories.

As all local plans for economic development remain linked to the overall plans and needs of imperialism, the question of foreign aid and foreign capital loom large in the second budget of the UNP government. As much as Rs. 125 million of foreign aid will help to meet the announced budget deficit. Foreign aid for the current year is expected to reach Rs. 500 million.

And what is significant in this connection is the "quid pro quo" for the inflow of foreign private capital. A further relaxation of the moratorium on remittances for dividends, profits and capital has been allowed. Foreign-owned companies and enterprises will be permitted to export Rs. 29 million as against 6 million in the previous year.

As a further concession to imperialist interests, the govern-

ment has already signed an "investment guarantee programme" with the USA, offering protection for new investments against nationalisation.

To complete the picture of the increasing dominance of imperialism in the Ceylon scene, the finance minister has announced his intention to repeal the restrictions imposed on the foreign banks by the 1961 finance act. In other words, foreign banks will be permitted to operate in Ceylon more or less on the level of the state-owned banks; and private foreign capital will now flow through the channel of the foreign banks and help to realise more effectively the economic stranglehold of imperialism on the country. Imperialism in Ceylon will become a reality more than ever. Political independence can soon become emptied of content.

The second budget of the UNP government proves more than ever that the only alternative before the workers and toilers is either continuation of capitalist class rule through the UNP, the SLFP or coalition of the SLFP and LSSP [Lanka Sama Samaja party], which would lead inevitably to more and more burdens for the workers and toilers, the contraction of social services, a continued wage-freeze, unemployment, hunger and a police-army regime; or economic development of the country, attainable through the overthrow of the capitalist state in Ceylon and the establishment of a workers and peasants government in the perspective of laying the foundations for socialism.

THE ASSASSINATION OF VERWOERD

The death of Hendrik F. Verwoerd at the hand of an assassin September 6 met with little mourning. The racist-minded prime minister was one of the world's most hated figures since Hitler. However, among the nonwhites in South Africa, the feeling of satisfaction over Verwoerd's end was tempered by fear that it might be utilized by his followers for widespread reprisals against the blacks and colored people. "Thank God it wasn't one of our people who did it," a black African woman was quoted by the press as saying.

The motives of the assassin, Dimitrio Tsafendas, who had been temporarily employed as a parliamentary messenger, were not clear. However his co-workers said he had complained that Verwoerd was doing too much for nonwhites and not enough for "poor whites."

A scramble immediately broke out among Verwoerd's lieutenants over succession to the mantle of top fascist. Whatever modifications the winner might initiate in the regime, opinion was unanimous among observers that these will not be in the direction of a thaw in Verwoerd's barbarous apartheid policies. As the September 11 New York Times put it succinctly, the successor "will inherit the armed forces and police that Dr. Verwoerd built up, his most solid legacy." Only a revolution can sweep away these murderous guardians of South African racism.

LESSONS FROM A DEFEAT

By T. Soedarso

[On September 30 it will be one year since the events began in Indonesia that rapidly led to one of the greatest tragedies of our times, the decimation of the largest Communist party in the capitalist world and a nationwide slaughter in which the estimates of the number of victims range from 300,000 to more than 500,000. According to the latest reports in the press, the killings are still going on.

[Such a political debacle and mass blood-letting demand the most intensive analysis. The costly experience makes it imperative that the lessons be singled out and learned by the workers movement. In resolutions and articles the Fourth International and parties adhering to its views began this task even before the defeat by calling attention to the class-collaborationist policies followed by the Aidit leadership of the Indonesian Communist party with the approval of Moscow and the special backing of Peking. Up to now, primarily because of the ferocious repression, little has come out of Indonesia itself.

[That the Indonesian Communists are now beginning to review the bitter experience they have lived through, is well indicated by the following article. The author is a young member of the Indonesian Communist party concerned about assessing the causes and meaning of the tragic defeat suffered by his party. He is now in exile. As a reflection of the thinking going on in the most advanced sectors of the ranks of the PKI, the article is of considerable interest, in our opinion, and we are pleased to be able to offer it in World Outlook.]

* * *

"Indonesia's military student action front, KAMI, has appealed for military help in face of what it calls mounting Communist attacks in Central Java. A student delegation from Jogjakarta said here today that 35 KAMI students were wounded in clashes with Communists. A spokesman said a campaign of terror was underway and the KAMI leaders had asked for military help." This item appeared in the New York Herald Tribune [European edition] July 20, 1966.

Similar reports have appeared with increasing frequency recently, indicating that armed resistance is being mounted by the Indonesian revolutionary forces against the brutal suppressive measures of the Indonesian military-fascist regime. The armed struggle is occurring not only in Central Java, an area considered to be the stronghold of the revolutionary movement, but also in other islands of the republic.

This armed struggle, however, is still uncoordinated. It is still sporadic and anarchistic in nature. It still lacks leadership,

either political or military, capable of organizing an armed uprising. It seems that the Communist party of Indonesia [PKI, the Partai Komunis Indonesia] has not recovered from its defeat. Is the leadership still intact? Has there been a new regrouping? Where does the leadership stand in relation to this new situation? Do they still support Sukarno, as in the final statement of October 1965? Do they still maintain the old political line or have they drastically changed it?

No answers are to be found in either journals or pamphlets. The masses are acting in accordance with their own judgment and initiative, seeking to protect themselves from being massacred by the forces of the Indonesian reaction. Out of loyalty, many in the ranks have drawn the conclusion that the leadership has remained silent due to "security reasons" or as "safety measures."

Most likely we are faced with a vacuum, the leaders having been martyred during the witch-hunt, or the survivors being unable to assess the new situation. The events in Indonesia constitute a catastrophe for the PKI in particular and for the revolutionary movement in Indonesia as a whole.

It is true, of course, that the future of the Indonesian revolutionary movement has not been destroyed -- it cannot be. The movement will rise again in a mightier force that will finally end the system of exploitation of man by man in Indonesia. But it is a fact that it has suffered a serious defeat and setback.

Nevertheless there are some to be found who still do not regard it as a defeat but as a "blessing in disguise"; since now the line between friend and foe is very clear and the people really know that "it is not we who resort to violence but the reactionaries." Such people still maintain that the past policies of the party were quite correct, the recent catastrophe being merely a "routine" incident in the revolutionary struggle. "Sacrifices always occur," they say. Thus these people do not consider it necessary to analyze the previous policies, strategy and tactics of the party; they even argue that it is "premature" to attempt this or "it is very dangerous because it can lead to a split in our movement." Their advice is to "just continue the struggle in line with the past policy, only with more caution and vigilance."

This stand is not correct. We should pay tribute to the fallen heroes of the people; we should salute the martyrs of the revolution; we should prepare retribution for the brutality of the reactionary forces; we should express solidarity with all who have suffered. But can we just continue "spontaneously," merely pursuing the struggle without seeking a better road, more effective methods?

No! We must recognize that it was a setback, a big setback. We must dare to uncover the mistakes of the past that led to this failure. And we must have the courage to make the necessary corrections so that we won't fall into the same fatal errors again. Criticism and self-criticism are necessities for a healthy revolutionary

movement.

In my opinion, the following mistakes led to the present defeat.

1.

The Policy of Seeking to Achieve Socialism by Peaceful Means

This was the most fundamental error. The PKI believed that socialism in Indonesia could be achieved by peaceful means. As stated in the constitution of the PKI: "To achieve its goal, the PKI follows peaceful and democratic ways. This is what is sought by the PKI and what will be consistently pursued."(1) And the second secretary of the Central Committee of the PKI, M H. Lukman, explained this as follows:

"The constitution now mentions the possibility of a transition to socialism by peaceful means. Theoretically as well as practically, this has an important meaning...in face of the propaganda of the reactionaries, we feel it necessary to affirm the possibility of a transition to socialism by peaceful means. By emphasizing that we are going to make this possibility become a reality, we can thereby show the people that if violence does occur, it was not started by the Communists nor was due to them and it is not at all wanted by the Communists.

"From the theoretical point of view, to affirm the possibility of a transition to socialism by peaceful means, signifies affirming the truth that Marxism-Leninism does not point to absolutely the same road for socialism in all countries in different periods and in different international conditions. This also means that we Marxist-Leninists do not bind ourselves to certain forms, methods and roads of completing the revolution, because everything depends on the concrete balance of power among the existing classes, on the quality of the working-class organization and its enemy, on the ability of the working class to attract its allies to its side, especially the peasants, and on taking into account the existence of democratic institutions in each country."(2)

In the same speech, Lukman said further: "In accordance with the teachings of Marx and Lenin; namely, by taking into account the objective conditions of the world balance of power between the socialist and democratic forces on the one hand, and the imperialist forces on the other, and considering the experiences in the East European countries where the transition to socialism did not occur

(1) Constitution of the PKI. Central Committee of the Partai Komunis Indonesia, Djakarta. 1964. p. 16.

(2) M.H. Lukman, About the Constitution. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1959. pp. 26-27.

through a civil war, Comrade Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU stated the conclusion that in the present situation certain countries have a real possibility of reaching socialism in a peaceful way."

It is therefore understandable why the PKI was unprepared for armed struggle when the crisis came last October 1. The PKI concentrated activity only on the "legal" or "parliamentary democratic" platform. It completely ignored preparations for armed struggle by the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working-class party. This was well-known to the reactionary forces; consequently they launched a quick brutal action to liquidate the revolutionary forces. The only hope for the revolutionary forces was to seek safe retreats, but it was already too late. The toll was very high.

Because of this belief in a peaceful way of achieving socialism, and perhaps especially because of the advice of "Comrade" Stalin and later "Comrade" Khrushchev, the leadership of the PKI willingly, if not even faithfully, followed Sukarno's personal leadership and teachings. Sukarno was considered by the party to be a "pro-people's element" and even the "great leader of the revolution." The reactionary forces brutally massacred members of the PKI and other revolutionary forces in the name of Sukarno; yet Second Secretary Njoto still said, "The PKI recognizes only one head of the state, one supreme commander, one great leader of the revolution -- President Sukarno." Furthermore, "It is President Sukarno united with the forces of the people who will decide the destiny and future of Indonesia." In Accordance with the October 10, 1965, instructions of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI, Njoto continued, all party members should "fully support the directives of President Sukarno and pledge themselves to implement these without reserve." (The October 10 instructions have not been withdrawn to this day.) The party was still seeking to maintain the peaceful road. Njoto said, "Our party is making every effort in its power to prevent a civil war."(3)

As for the Indonesian Armed Forces, the PKI held that they constituted forces of the people, since the ranks were made up of the sons of workers and peasants. This viewpoint was maintained even after the "October 1 affair," Njoto saying: "We do not consider the Indonesian National Forces to be like the armies of imperialist countries or the army of India. When you appraise an army, you should study and take into account the history of its formation, its role in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, its composition which is mainly made up of former poor peasants or workers. It is true that there are still antipeople's elements within the National Forces of Indonesia. This is also true concerning the republic as a whole." And he stated that "our party has never had its own army."(4)

(3) These statements were made to a Japanese correspondent. See Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo. December 2, 1965.

(4) *ibid.*

Let us now examine the arguments and viewpoints indicated above.

It was argued that it was necessary to follow a policy based on the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism in order to counteract the propaganda of the reactionary forces; i.e., the propaganda that the Communists are "terrorists," "monsters," etc. But what was the result? The repudiation of the use of armed struggle in achieving revolutionary goals only demonstrated the weakness of the revolutionary forces in the eyes of the reactionaries and created a feeling of insecurity among the masses.

The propaganda of the reactionaries can be counteracted by explanations and by action. Through explanation it is possible to completely expose the real character of the reactionaries. The facts of history constitute the best source to show the people the cruelty and brutality of the reactionaries. For example, the massacre committed by the reactionary Hatta government in 1948; the brutal "August Razzia" committed by the reactionary Sukiman government in 1951; the brutal armed suppression carried out by the reactionary generals against the peasantry in Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi and other islands; the bombings carried out with planes furnished by the imperialist U.S. and the massacre committed by the reactionary rebels in 1958, etc., etc. Past experience provides the best lessons for teaching the people about the brutality of the reactionaries and the necessity to resist such brutality through armed struggle.

And the propaganda of action is still more important. The people will trust the Communists and have real confidence in the party if the Communists genuinely defend their interests and show themselves prepared through sacrifice and armed struggle to safeguard the people from oppression and suppression by the exploiting classes. The Communists must demonstrate that they are really cadres of the working class and really on the side of the exploited masses; and are not merely pleaders with the "haves" nor collaborators with the "good people." Socialism cannot be achieved by pleading but only through armed struggle by exploited masses under correct leadership provided by the working class! Aidit once said, "The development of the party, besides depending greatly on the united front, also greatly depends on armed struggle. The advance or decline of armed struggle greatly influences the advance or decline of the united front and the party." (5) But why did this remain only words which were not carried out in practice?

Let us consider the "experiences in the East European countries." Wasn't the revolution there led by the Soviet Red Army?

The Cuban Granma was quite correct when it said editorially: "We are not denying that in a given country, under certain very

(5) D.N.Aidit, Forty Years of the PKI. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1960. p. 61.

special conditions, an exception could occur in the future; nevertheless, not one case can be cited of a victorious revolution which has been able to avoid the use of violence, insurrection or armed struggle as fundamental methods. This is a universal experience and the political position of the Communist parties must be developed by taking into account what has been learned in the practical experience of revolution and by probing deeply into it."(6)

In the development of the Indonesian revolution, many opportunities arose for the PKI to mobilize the workers and peasants into revolutionary armed forces and to counteract and liquidate the reactionary elements in the "National Armed Forces of Indonesia." These opportunities were ignored.

For example, during the campaign for the liberation of West Irian from Dutch colonialism, the people were mobilized into voluntary units in anticipation of a clash with the Dutch imperialist forces. This should have been utilized by the party to mobilize the workers and peasants and to set up bases for armed struggle. The party did engage in this, but not with the objective of carrying out a socialist revolution. The movement was limited to liberating West Irian and it was disarmed after this aim was achieved.

Again during the campaign to crush the neocolonialist regime of "Malaysia," the party contributed greatly in mobilizing the masses, but without bringing in the idea of armed struggle for the socialist revolution. Thus the chance slipped by to set up bases for armed revolutionary struggle. Even worse, the party left the leadership of the voluntary units in the hands of reactionary generals.

Another excellent opportunity came during the campaign for unilateral action to take over the land belonging to the big landowners. This action was led by the PKI. Day by day hundreds of thousands of peasants took part in the action. They faced armed suppression by the feudal forces backed by the reactionary generals. But the party did not organize armed units of the peasants to counterattack. It left it up to the peasants to organize their own defense on the basis of their own courage and initiative. When this developed into a near revolutionary crisis, with many clashes between the peasants and the reactionary forces, the campaign was stopped. The "great leader of the revolution" Sukarno had given the order or "revolutionary command" to stop "any unilateral action." He gave the "command" that "every conflict or difference should be solved by consultation and agreement."

In accordance with the appeal from Sukarno in this situation, Aidit proposed the so-called "NASAKOM Code of Ethics." Among other things this laid down the following: "Among all NASAKOM or MANIPOLIST groups there must be no confrontation. Only consultation to

reach agreement."(7) And he specified: "In the present situation, if conflicts arise between the government and the people, the only correct way to solve them is to reach agreement through consultation."(8)

Blood had been shed by the people, but the action was stopped. As the slogan put it, "We should have revolutionary patience."

The PKI's repudiation of the use of armed struggle can be traced back to the beginning of the "August 1945 Revolution."(9)

During the struggle against the Japanese military occupation, the PKI was instructed or "advised," under Stalin's guidance, to cooperate with the Dutch imperialist government, to carry out "joint actions" against Japanese imperialism. (This also applied to all the other Communist parties, who were told to cooperate with their respective bourgeois governments in fighting against the Axis.) Through such cooperation, the PKI hoped to "earn" independence for Indonesia at the end of the war. The program of the PKI as well as the CPN [Communist party of the Netherlands] called for an "independent Indonesia within the Commonwealth of the Dutch Empire" as a step toward full independence. This remained a utopian dream. At the end of the war, the Dutch with the backing of the British and U.S. imperialists sent their armed divisions to reoccupy Indonesia. What attitude did the PKI take toward this?

A republic had been proclaimed under the leadership of the bourgeois Sukarno. The masses as a whole were completely ready to defend their newly proclaimed republic. But the PKI still clung to the old program of establishing Indonesia "within the Commonwealth of the Dutch Empire." Thus they followed the line of compromise in face of Dutch aggression. They supported the policy of the reactionary Sjahrir government in signing the Linggadjati Agreement, compromising with Dutch imperialism in 1947. Then, still worse, the following government under Amir Sjarifuddin (a PKI leader at the time) signed the so-called "Renville Agreement." Under this catastrophic agreement, all pockets of the guerrilla forces were to withdraw from Dutch-occupied territory. The reactionary forces used this opportunity to send in reactionary armed units (under the command of Nasution, the present co-dictator) to dominate the liberated areas. Realizing his mistake, Amir Sfarifuddin voluntarily surrendered his government back to Sukarno. This was followed by the formation of the most reactionary government; i.e., the Hatta

(7) D.N.Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, Its Historical Background and Its Future. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1964. p. 73.

(8) *ibid.* p. 81.

(9) The armed struggle against the Japanese occupation and later the British and Dutch aggressors is called the "August 1945 Revolution." It began with the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945.

regime. Under instructions from the U.S. and Dutch imperialists, this government introduced a program of "rationalizing" the Indonesian armed forces, which meant liquidating the people's armed units. The Hatta government wanted only "one type of army"; that is, the so-called "Indonesian National Armed Forces."

In 1948, Musso, who was one of the PKI leaders of the twenties and thirties, returned from abroad and called for a "new Road" for the PKI. Among other things this demanded renunciation of the old policy of compromise. The correction was accepted by the majority of the PKI leaders. But it was too late. Before the PKI could consolidate itself under the new program, the reactionary Hatta government launched a "white terror" in the so-called "Madiun Affair." Thousands of party members and most of the leaders were killed.

This affair should have been a salutary lesson for the PKI not to abandon the method of armed struggle. Yet it was not.

When a federal republic was established under the so-called "Round Table Conference" agreement, the PKI held it best to continue the struggle by "peaceful democratic" means.

Aidit explained this as follows: "Against this RTC agreement which was signed on November 2, 1949, by Hatta's government under instructions from U.S. imperialism, there were two opposing viewpoints in the party...the first group wanted to continue armed struggle against the federal republic of the RTC...while the second, who based their position on revolutionary theory...wanted to maintain the party's legality"; that is, continue the struggle by "parliamentary democratic" means.(10) Thus was a beginning provided for the repetition of the old errors.

On the question of the "Indonesian National Armed Forces," it is not correct to say that they are not "like the armies of imperialist countries or the army of India." At the beginning of the August 1945 Revolution there were no regular armed forces. Throughout the islands, the people formed their own armed units for defense against the imperialist aggression. There were many kinds of units. "The PKI built a Red Army, and had big influence on the Lasjkar Buruh [Workers Army], Lasjkar Pesindo [Army of the Socialist Youth], Lasjkar Rakjat [People's Army] and Tentara Peladjar [Students Corps]."(11) In the process of struggle, then, a regular army was built. Following the program of "rationalization" under Hatta, most of the irregular armies were liquidated. The most reactionary forces remained. After the RTC Agreement a new "National Armed Forces" was formed. This was an arithmetic combination of the previous Indonesian "National Armed Forces" plus the "Dutch East Indies Troops." These Dutch Troops (of Indonesian nationality) were much better trained. The remnants of the progres-

(10) D.N.Aidit, Forty Years of the PKI, p. 59.

(11) *ibid.*, p. 47.

sive units within the Indonesian National Armed Forces were subsequently liquidated. Of course, there were still some "pro-people's" elements within the Indonesian National Armed Forces. But as a whole they belong to the same classification as the "armies of imperialist countries or the army of India." It is a great error not to treat reactionary forces as reactionary forces.

2.

On the Question of the United Front

The PKI followed the theory of two stages to the revolution; namely, a national democratic stage followed by a socialist stage.

"To confuse the two stages of the Indonesian revolution and to say that we are already building socialism is demagogic, subjective and reactionary. The national democratic stage constitutes preparation for the socialist stage. The socialist stage cannot be achieved without first completing the national democratic stage."(12) This was the stand of the PKI. It was said that this national democratic stage constituted in essence a bourgeois democratic stage, but of a new type; namely, one led by the working class.(13)

According to the party's analysis, Indonesia at present still has a semicolonial and semifeudal system. And there are "three forces within Indonesian society; namely, first the diehards, i.e., the feudalists and compradors who collaborate with the imperialists. This is still a big force, but it is declining. Second, the progressive forces, i.e., the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals. This force is rather large and is increasing. Third, the middle-of-the-road forces, i.e., the national bourgeoisie and all other patriotic and other anticolonial forces, including the left group of landowners. This force is rather large. It stands between the reactionary and the progressive forces."(14)

"The PKI's political line in dealing with these three forces is: with all its power to tirelessly develop the progressive forces, unite with the middle-of-the-road forces and isolate the diehard forces. The implementation of this line is very important in changing the balance of forces in society."(15)

Thus, striving to achieve socialism along the peaceful road,

(12) D.N.Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, Its Historical Background and Its Future. p. 77.

(13) The Constitution of the PKI. p. 7.

(14) D.N.Aidit, Forty Years of the PKI. p. 83.

(15) D.N.Aidit, Indonesian Society and Indonesian Revolution. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1957. p. 50.

the PKI sought to form a "United National Front," consisting of the working class, the peasants, petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, "based upon an alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class." (16)

About the alleged necessity to build a united front with the national bourgeoisie, Aidit said: "...I would like to emphasize once more that although an alliance with the national bourgeoisie is not as important as an alliance with the peasants, the success and completeness of the leadership of the working class in the revolution will be determined by the success of the alliance between the workers and the national bourgeoisie. Therefore the Communists must strive with all their power to preserve and further develop the alliance with the national bourgeoisie." (Emphasis added.) (17)

Anyone in the party who opposed the alliance with the national bourgeoisie was branded a "left deviationist." In criticizing the "left deviationist" tendency of the previous period, it was stated that "the party was still completely unaware of the need for uniting with the national bourgeoisie, the party's slogan being 'socialism now,' 'Indonesian Soviets,' and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' This 'left' deviation of the party was criticized precisely by J.V. Stalin in his speech to the students at the University of the Peoples of the East on May 18, 1925, in which he said that this left deviation contained within it the danger of isolating the party from the masses and converting it into a sect."

What happened in reality? In reality, following the policy of an alliance between the working class and the national bourgeoisie, the party undermined the alliance between the working class and the peasants. The leadership of the "United National Front" was never in the hands of the working class or its party, but always in the hands of the national or comprador bourgeoisie.

In reality this line led to multiclass collaboration under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, degenerating into compromises in ideology and in action under cover of the so-called "musjawarah for mufakat" (consulting to reach agreement).

Full acceptance of the so-called "Pantja-Sila philosophy" (18) (a product of the "genius-like thinking" of Sukarno) is an example of the open ideological compromise reflecting the "success" of multiclass collaboration. According to Aidit, "Pantja-Sila is a philos-

(16) D.N. Aidit, The Birth and Growth of the PKI. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1955. p. 9.

(17) D.N. Aidit, Be a Good and a Better Communist. Jajasan Pembaruan, Djakarta. 1964. p. 57.

(18) "Pantja-Sila" is "Five Principles": belief in a single god, national unity, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice.

ophy for unity....In Indonesia one finds Catholic philosophy, Islamic philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, Protestant philosophy, Black Magic philosophy, Mystic philosophy...and Pantja-Sila unites what can be united."(19)

In the same speech he said further: "The philosophy of Pantja-Sila cannot be separated from the philosophy of Empu Tantular 'Bhin-neka Tuggal Ika' or 'Unity in Diversity.' This is very dialectical. 'Unity in Diversity' -- differences, but in unity. I do not agree with liquidation of not only these various kinds of philosophy but also political parties. In the second stage of the revolution and in the next stages...because so long as differences remain among us, 'Unity in Diversity' and also Pantja-Sila will still be applicable. And in my opinion these differences will exist forever...thus in my opinion Pantja-Sila is also everlasting." (Emphasis added.)

It is very clear that the philosophy of Pantja-Sila is an idealist philosophy. Perhaps it was considered to be only a means of uniting "the revolutionary groups." But it was not that. Aidit said that "Pantja-Sila is...everlasting"; "...these differences will exist forever..." Does he believe that class differences will exist forever? Does not our class struggle aim at abolishing class society?

Is such a statement from Aidit Marxist? Yet Aidit said, "I accept Pantja-Sila also from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint." (In the same speech.)

Similar conclusions hold for the PKI's acceptance of the "genuine concept" of NASAKOM(20) proposed by the demagogic bourgeois Sukarno. Aidit said, "Besides uniting various kinds of classes and groups, the National Front also unites various kinds of revolutionary ideas...namely; Islam, Nationalism and Communism."(21) "In the traditional struggle for national independence in Indonesia, we can find three political streams which were against Dutch colonialism; namely, nationalist, religious and Communist political thought. Thus it is natural to say that there will be national unity in Indonesia if these three political currents unite within the NASAKOM cooperation."(22)

And Aidit said, "This united national front has found its organization; namely, the 'National Front.'"(23) At the top it is

(19) D.N.Aidit, In Defense of Pantja-Sila. Jajasan Pembaruan. 1964. pp. 27-28.

(20) NASAKOM is an abbreviation for Nationalism-Religion-Communism.

(21) D.N.Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, Its Historical Background and Its Future. p. 65.

(22) *ibid.*, p. 72.

(23) *ibid.*, p. 67.

"headed by President Sukarno himself, who with his vice-presidents reflects the cooperation of NASAKOM...showing us how deeply rooted is the idea of the national united front among the masses. Now it is our duty to work hard to foster and consolidate it."(24)

During the struggle against the Dutch colonial power, it is true, there were many political groupings all of which were against the foreign imperialist rulers. But we could also see which were truly revolutionary, which were quasi-revolutionary, and which were opportunist. For example, the PNI [the Indonesian Nationalist party founded by Sukarno] was clearly bourgeois. In the beginning it reflected the national bourgeoisie but then it degenerated into a vehicle of the national bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, compradors and bribers. Thus during the struggle, it always swung opportunistically. And in times of revolutionary crisis, it was always on the side of the reactionary forces. A clear example was provided during the "Madiun Affair" in 1948 when it served as the "vanguard" of the reactionary forces that murdered thousands of Communist cadres and revolutionary rank and filers. Sukarno himself at the time issued the challenge: "Join Sukarno or Musso."(25)

Again in the recent period (1964), during the campaign for unilateral action in taking over the land belonging to the big landowners, the members of this nationalist party joined in suppressing the peasant movement; and the "most progressive" leader of this party issued an order to "stop any unilateral action." Yet the PNI was considered by the PKI to be its true partner in the NASAKOM cooperation as the representative of the nationalist political stream.

Similarly with the Nadhatul Ulama, an Islamic scholars party. The NU was very clearly the party of the feudalists and landowners. They used Islam as a cover for their reactionary activities in preserving their landownership and exploitation of the peasants. By using Islam as protective coloration, the party played a big role and had great influence among the masses that are still strongly under the sway of Islamic teachings. There is no instance in Indonesian history where this party has played a progressive or revolutionary role. It has always stood on the side of the reactionary forces. Yet the PKI sought to preserve unity with the NU within the so-called NASAKOM cooperation.

Besides the nationalist and religious parties in the so-called "National Front" led by Sukarno, there were other reactionary elements, including the generals.

Thus the so-called "National Front" was not a revolutionary

(24) D.N.Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution, Its Historical Background and Its Future. p. 72.

(25) Musso, a leader of the PKI in the twenties and thirties, managed to escape abroad when the Dutch suppressed the movement, returning in 1948.

front led by the working class. It was not even the united front depicted theoretically in the documents of the PKI; namely, a united front of the working class, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie led by the working class. It was clearly collaboration of all classes under the leadership of the demagogic bourgeois Sukarno.

Of course, the PKI cannot and must not struggle alone; the working class must not struggle alone. It needs allies. It should not isolate itself from the masses; but the masses are not the national bourgeoisie! It should be clear who is really an ally and who is really an enemy. In a country like Indonesia, in which poor peasants constitute more than sixty percent of the population, peasants are the real ally of the working class. The peasants should become the army of the revolutionary movement led by the working class. Poor city dwellers or the petty bourgeoisie are reserves to be drawn upon. Towards the national bourgeoisie there should be a cautious and vigilant attitude. The revolutionary movement could and should support the progressive attitudes or actions of the national bourgeoisie, but there should be no class collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, since this can undermine the alliance between the working class and the peasants. The Communist party should have its own policy based on the demands and experience of the most revolutionary class.

There is, naturally, the influence of Islamic teachings and nationalist thinking among the masses. This should be considered in propaganda work and in enlightening the masses. But it should never mask the class character of the struggle. The masses should be clear that this struggle is a class struggle and not a religious or racial struggle. The struggle is to overthrow the exploiters, to crush and abolish the system of exploitation of man by man. And the masses should even have a very concrete picture in their minds of the true character of the ruling class -- the compradors, the bribers, the usurers, the feudalists, the ruling-class apparatus, the reactionary government apparatus, etc. They must be shown how and trained to overthrow these reactionary agencies. Only by such means can the united front among all the oppressed classes be tempered, strengthened and made militant. Not through pleading with the "national bourgeoisie."

3.

On the Question of Building the Party

The PKI's program calls for making the party "both a mass party and a cadre party." Aidit said, "The PKI is a mass party but at the same time a cadre party; it has many members and close contacts with the masses."(26)

In 1952 the membership was only 10,000. In the national con-

(26) D.N.Aidit, Be a Good and a Better Communist. p. 49.

ference held that year, it was decided "to expand the membership from 10,000 to 100,000 within six months." (Emphasis added.)(27) And after the implementation of the first "Three Year Plan" [1956-59], the membership increased to 1,500,000.(28) At the mid year 1965 it was reported in the press to have reached 3,000,000.

It is an amazing growth. A mass production of Communist cadres! Perhaps no precedent exists for this in the history of Communist parties. But is it guaranteed that all of these three million members were good revolutionists? Perhaps the CIA agents knew the answer to this better than the members themselves, so that the reactionary forces dared to launch a brutal and massive suppression of the PKI. Of course, the rapid recruitment by the PKI frightened the reactionary forces, but apparently they recognized the fatal weakness of the organization better than did the members of the PKI.

Obviously it is not easy to turn out good revolutionists with mass production methods. Aidit himself recognized the inherent weakness in this rapid growth and mass production of members. For example, he said, "In the beginning they become party members because they seek protection from the rising revolutionary tide of the peasants. But their cultural level is higher than that of the agricultural workers and poor peasants, therefore within a short time they occupy the chair of leadership in the party and for the time being the peasants grant them their trust. Besides there are cadres who joined the party during the armed struggle in 1945 or even before then, thus in the days before the party had an agrarian program. At the time they were good cadres; they implemented the party's policy with high spirits against imperialism and took an active part in the campaign to crush the reactionary rebellion. But they are not agrarian cadres."(29)

Aidit recognized that in the local leadership of the party, in the villages, many were "under the thumb of rich peasants and this is not in line with the membership of the peasant movement which is mainly poor peasant."(30)

Yet the slogan still remained, "Both mass party and cadre party." The fact is that the real cadres of the party stood at a distance from the mass members of the party. Thus the structure of the party was more or less like a mass organization. The cadres did not completely trust the mass members and tended to form many tight, secret rings within the party. The bureaucratic character of the

(27) D.N.Aidit, Forty Years of the PKI, p. 72.

(28) *ibid.*, p. 89.

(29) D.N. Aidit, The Peasants Crush the Village Devils. Jajasan Pamburuan, Djakarta. 1964. p. 55.

(30) *ibid.*, p. 55.

party was thus intensified. And in a time of crisis like last October, the party could do nothing. Instead of issuing instructions on what to do to counteract the brutal massacre initiated by the reactionary forces, the top leadership scurried for safe spots (some of them going to President Sukarno's palace) which they knew about in advance, leaving the mass members in the lurch. Even two months after the disaster, there were still many in the rank and file who did not really know what was going on until they were massacred. Some fought back, but only in personal defense. They still did not know whether the leadership was intact or not, what policy was to be followed, etc. The rank-and-file member was not privileged to know the real policy of the party.

This state of affairs proved to be very dangerous. Experience shows that it is necessary to build a party of real cadres who have a correct political line, who are actively engaged in political work among the workers and peasants, and who dare to conduct an armed struggle to achieve the goals of the revolution. The party must have a program "which reflects the thought and experience of an authentic revolutionary movement, aims at really aiding the highest possible revolutionary activity of the working class, while starting out from its most elementary demands." There can be no secrecy among the members, since all are cadres, while democratic centralism must rule. Everything is discussed by all members, but all act in unity!

4.

Too Much Stress at the Top

Because of its policy of seeking to achieve socialism by means of a "parliamentary democratic" struggle and building a false "united national front," the party concentrated its struggle at the top instead of the bottom. Collaboration at the top was considered to be the best way to inch towards socialism. Activities centered around the "coalition cabinet" beginning in 1955, then around the "cooperation cabinet" in 1959, the last one being the "NASAKOM cabinet" in 1963.

The party sought to gain power through "working together" with its enemies.

Considerable progress was registered throughout this period. The masses were moving toward a revolutionary crisis. But they were not armed -- not armed with a correct political line and not armed with real weapons to crush the reactionary ruling class. The peasants were set in motion to take over the land, to smash the domination of the feudalists. But there was no clear political line. And even the land take-overs were stopped because of the "impending probable" formation of a "NASAKOM cabinet."

The party did not protest the banning of strikes in industry because industry was considered to belong to the government, which was almost "a government of NASAKOM."

The party did not issue instructions to counteract the

military-fascist suppression through armed struggle because "Sukarno is still at the top," the "pro-people elements are still in the government."

This line should have been reversed! All forms of struggle must be employed but the stress must be on building a genuine revolutionary working-class party, activating the masses in the revolutionary movement and preparing for armed struggle!

In Conclusion

The above criticism is not intended to undermine the role of the PKI nor to arouse distrust in Indonesian Communism. But the revolutionary movement in Indonesia will be successful only if it learns from past experience, if it learns not to repeat the same mistakes.

Only true revolutionists have the courage to correct errors. Criticism and self-criticism constitute the best method of reaching a more correct line. Mistakes are bad, but not to understand the mistakes is worse; and the worst is not to correct a mistake, having recognized it.

The situation is now quite favorable for a new line. People in arms are to be found everywhere. The line between friend and foe is very clear. The brutal character of the reactionary forces is very obvious. The opportunistic character of a bourgeois leader like Sukarno is very clear. Whether the leadership of the party likes it or not, the masses cannot wait out the increasing massacre against them any longer. What is needed now is a politically correct, class-conscious and militant leadership, which will lead an armed struggle to abolish the whole system of exploitation of man by man in Indonesia and establish a workers state!