

# WORLD OUTLOOK

PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

*Un service de presse ouvrier*

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 21 rue d'Aboukir, Paris 2, France

NEW YORK OFFICE: World Outlook, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

Vol. 4, No. 18

June 3, 1966

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## A NEW NOTE IN THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

At a memorial meeting for Leo Bernard, held in New York May 27, the 81-year-old Rev. A.J. Muste, referring to the expressions of solidarity that had poured in from all sectors of the American radical movement, said he could not recall anything like it in his lifetime.

In fact, at the meeting where he was one of the main speak-

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ers, the Communist party, U.S.A. -- for the first time in its history -- was officially represented on the platform in a hall of the Socialist Workers party side by side with a representative of the American Trotskyist movement. And a W.E.B. DuBois Clubs leader spoke alongside a leader of the Young Socialist Alliance.

Dave Dellinger spoke for the pacifists who advocate nonviolence; James Aronson for those who clearly distinguish between the violence of the Vietnamese freedom fighters and the violence of the imperialist aggressors. Messages were read from voices as widely separated politically as Murray Kempton, whose stand is scarcely distinguishable from that of the liberal Democrats, to the ultraleft Maoist Progressive Labor Movement. A spokesman of the American Civil Liberties Union was present as well as the Students for a Democratic Society. Messages were read from Betty Shabazz, the widow of the martyred black nationalist leader Malcolm X and from Stokeley Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.

If a listing were made of all those who sent either spokesmen or messages to this meeting or others like it held in many cities, it would include virtually all the significant organizations and tendencies of the antiwar movement in the United States, shading into the related civil-rights movement.

The immediate reason for this unprecedented demonstration of solidarity was to protest the murder of Leo Bernard and the wounding of Jan Garrett and Walter Graham by an ultraright political assassin in Detroit May 16. [See World Outlook May 27.]

Without exception, the entire American radical movement viewed this murderous blow against the Socialist Workers party and the Young Socialist Alliance, to which the victims adhered, as a blow against the movement as a whole. And all sectors decided to close ranks in a demonstration of solidarity.

This seems so logical and natural that the only cause for wonder would seem to be that it should cause wonder. Yet the truth is that the old slogan and practice of the Industrial Workers of the World, "An Injury to One Is an Injury to All," has not been observed among radicals in the United States since the poison of Stalinism set in during the twenties.

The sudden reappearance of this proletarian principle is due to a new balance of forces in the American radical movement, to the decay of Stalinism as part of the worldwide process of "de-Stalinization," to the consistent demand for a policy of "nonexclusion" of any tendency in the antiwar movement because of its political views, and to the influx of fresh new forces that see no reason whatsoever for maintaining old prejudices and sectarian attitudes.

It is too early to say that this noteworthy demonstration of solidarity represents a qualitative change, but it is a most significant sign of a new mood among radicals in the U.S. which holds bright promise for the development of a powerful antiwar movement.

BELGIAN MP DEMANDS U.S. WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM VIETNAM

For the first time in parliament in Belgium, if not in the parliaments of all of Western Europe, a voice has been openly raised in support of the National Liberation Front of south Vietnam and the heroic Vietnamese freedom fighters.

The occasion was during the debate on foreign policy April 27. Pierre Le Grève, a member of parliament from Brussels, took the floor to express a view that is growing in the radical movement in Belgium. He is a member of the Confédération Socialiste des Travailleurs [Socialist Workers Confederation], the new left socialist party which broke with the reformist Social Democracy eighteen months ago.

Among other things, he said the following: "The extraordinary example of Vietnam, which has held out against two modern imperialist armies, shows that guerrilla freedom fighters can even succeed in imposing real military defeats, as they did against France, which is a very rare feat indeed!

"That's what they did at Dien Bien Phu.

"To their misfortune, this unhappy people were then immediately faced with the most powerful army in the world, the American army. And nevertheless their resistance is not weakening at all.

"Recently all the urban centers have been in turmoil, a clear indication to international public opinion that the puppet government kept in power by the Americans has no popular base whatsoever and is universally hated throughout the land....

"In my opinion, only one attitude can possibly be adopted towards the war in Vietnam. I do not ask Mr. Spaak or the present minister of foreign affairs to serve as mediators. I do not call for negotiations. That's what the Americans want...All I demand is the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the American interventionist troops from Vietnam and the rest of the world."

Elsewhere in his speech, Le Grève made the first appeal in parliament for Belgium to immediately get out of the counterrevolutionary NATO alliance. His stand contrasts with that of the pro-Moscow Communist party which only asks that Belgium quit the alliance when it comes up legally for renewal in 1969.

La Voix du Peuple [The Voice of the People], the weekly newspaper of the pro-Peking Communist party, grudgingly admitted that Le Grève advanced a "correct position" on both the Vietnam war and the NATO question; and that he had spoken a "language hitherto unknown" in parliament.

The admission is even more significant in view of the fact that La Voix du Peuple constantly attacks Le Grève and other leading figures of the Socialist Workers Confederation as "Trotskyist."

## THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN PEKING

By George Novack

What is going on in Peking? This question is not only engrossing the diplomats in all the other capitals from Moscow to Washington; it is troubling the partisans of revolutionary China, regardless of their tendencies. It is of even more serious concern, we presume, to the ranks of the Chinese Communist party and the people of that country.

Unfortunately, no one outside the inner sanctum of the regime can know for sure what the precise issues in dispute are or the actual positions and arguments of the contending sides.

The command center of Communist China must be marked terra incognita on the map of world politics. We can learn little about the real state of political affairs from the officially published materials. Mao and his associates are as secretive and exclusive about the problems and processes of their policy-making as the ancient emperors and their mandarin advisers.

Such customs may suit a feudal monarchy but are out of place in a democratic or a socialist government. The millions of Communist party members and the 700,000,000 Chinese are entitled to know the different proposals for action, who their sponsors are, and on what grounds this or that course is accepted or rejected. So do the working masses of other countries who are anxious to help ward off the threat to the People's Republic of China and the peace of the world posed by U.S. military escalation in Southeast Asia.

The Mao leadership has insisted on thorough discussion and clarification of the questions involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Yet they keep everyone in the dark when it comes to the pros and cons of their vital decisions at home.

Such seclusion and isolationism have nothing in common with Marxism and Leninism. Ever since the Communist Manifesto of 1848, genuine revolutionary socialist movements have taken internationalism as the only effective guide for the conduct of a workers party or a workers state, both in arriving at their policies and then explaining and justifying them to the world working class.

Mao and his associates have been flouting the principle of international class solidarity by refusing to participate in a common front against American imperialist aggression with other Communist countries on the specious grounds of their differences with the Russian revisionists. This sectarianism has weakened both the defense of Vietnam and the security of China itself. Now they are equally culpable in disregarding the supporters of the Chinese Revolution who are confused by an enforced ignorance of the issues at stake in the current internal struggle agitating Peking.

In Lenin's time the working masses of the Soviet Union and revolutionists elsewhere were kept well informed about the major policy disagreements among the Communists both on a national and an international level. Such enlightenment was considered essential to Soviet and party democracy and the worldwide struggle for socialism.

In this respect Mao's regime sticks to the accursed tradition of Stalin who instituted the opposite practice of restricting policy-making powers to a tiny top group dominated by the arbitrary will of the unchallengeable individual. Everyone else at home and abroad was obliged to acquiesce in what emanated from the infallible leader.

How things stand in this respect in China is indicated by the fact that the Chinese Communist party has not held a congress since 1958. So far as is known, the Central Committee has not met since September 1962!

As a result of this authoritarian secretiveness, outside observers are reduced to "educated guesses" in analyzing and appraising the current political crisis.

\* \* \*

What facts have been reported in the Chinese and Western press to date as a basis for speculation?

For a number of months the Chinese press has been conducting a strident nationwide campaign against erring intellectuals who are condemned as insidious, two-faced, dangerous "antiparty elements." This massive propaganda effort has been stepped up in recent weeks. Hundreds of articles on these themes appear every day throughout China and denunciations of the culprits over the radio and in the newspapers have virtually excluded comment on other subjects.

An editorial in the May 4 Liberation Army Daily links this "extremely sharp class struggle on the cultural front" with previous ideological campaigns over the past fifteen years. It cites "the criticism of the film 'Life of Wu Hsun' in 1951; the criticism of 'Studies on "The Dream of the Red Chamber"' in 1954 and later the criticism of the reactionary ideas of Hu Shih; the criticism of Hu Feng and rejection of the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary clique in 1955; the counterattack against the reckless onslaught by the bourgeois rightist forces on the cultural front in 1957; the mushrooming of bourgeois and revisionist poisonous weeds in the fields of cinema, drama and literature since 1959 and our struggle against them; the criticism of Yang Hshien-chen's concept of 'two combining into one' in 1964." It asserts that "the current great polemic...is being carried to greater depth."

Nothing less is involved than "a life and death struggle" against "antiparty, antisocialist activities" which are "in tune with the international anti-China chorus raised by the imperialists, modern revisionists and the reactionaries of all countries, in conformity with the activities of the overthrown reactionary classes

within the country to attempt a restoration, and in coordination with the antiparty activities of the right opportunist elements within the party."

The gravity of these accusations and the scale and intensity of the polemical campaign betoken a condition of high tension within the ruling circles of the regime. One commentator, Victor Zorza, in the May 12 Manchester Guardian, has likened the situation in Peking to "the crisis in the Soviet leadership a few months before the death of Stalin."

The present targets of the attack are a group of leading intellectuals, authors, scholars and journalists who have been intimately associated with the upper party levels and who hold high posts in the government.

The most eminent is Kuo Mo-jo, the country's most prominent scholar, who has been called the "Victor Hugo of China" by l'Humanité, the official daily of the French Communist party. He is president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers, chairman of the China Peace Committee, and occupies more than twenty other official positions. The 74-year-old Kuo has set the pattern for the current phase of the campaign by publishing a "self-criticism" made April 14 to the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress of which he is a vice-chairman.

There he confessed that all his voluminous writings deserved to be burned because he had not deigned to learn from the workers and peasants and had neglected to apply Mao's teachings correctly.

This obsequious obeisance to the omniscience of Mao Tse-tung by China's foremost scholar was preceded by a series of attacks upon four other prominent "bourgeois" historians and writers: Wu Han, Chien Po-tsan, head of the history department of Peking University, Hsia Yen, noted playwright, and Tien Han, for their failure to toe the line and for neglecting the role of class struggle in history.

It has been followed by attacks upon the official newspapers of the Peking municipal party committee for having published articles branded as "antiparty, probourgeois and profeudalist." These articles came from three writers: Teng To, Professor Wu Han and Liao Mo-sha. The party's theoretical journal, Hung Chi, said that these papers deceived their readers by pretending to criticize the three writers while actually shielding them and others who were carrying on their antiparty activities "in an organized, planned and led way." Professor Wu was accused of being "willing to be the slave of the United States and guilty of scheming and planning for the reactionary Kuomintang clique."

The trio are important official and literary figures. Teng is secretary of the Peking municipal party committee and former chief editor of Jen Min Jih Pao, the principal Communist newspaper. Liao is a former departmental director in the committee and Profes-

sor Wu is deputy mayor of Peking. They have now been joined by Li Chi, director of the party's Peking municipal branch, who has been assailed in radio and press commentaries for Soviet revisionist tendencies and for shielding antiparty elements.

One provincial broadcast has accused the Peng group of attempting to wrest power from the party's Central Committee.

Teng To, the so-called "leader of the antiparty, antisocialist gang of conspirators," may well have committed lèse majesté by indirectly questioning Mao's infallibility. In parables written in 1961, extracts from which have just been reproduced in both the army and the intellectual's newspapers, Teng said: "It is only a wild dream of foolish men to know everything and possess inexhaustible wisdom." In another article he discussed a famous reforming prime minister, Wang An-shih, who had many new ideas but one great shortcoming: "He was not open-minded."

He recounted a Ming story of a man suffering from amnesia, who tripped over his own arrows and thought someone was shooting at him and then stepped in his own dung. Teng wrote that "those who suffer from this disease swallow their own words and become untrustworthy," and that if the symptoms appear in an extreme form, "the patients must take a complete rest, say nothing and do nothing," otherwise, "the results will be quite disastrous."

The May 21 Economist believes that Teng To "was probably referring to the party's attitude after the 'leap,' its convenient amnesia about its errors, its switches of policy and its paranoia about opposition." So far Teng has refused to recant his heresies. Last December he held a meeting of students in order to urge the creation of a "hundred flowers" atmosphere in which everyone could write "according to our own views."

No comment on the charges against his co-workers has come from Peking's mayor, Peng Chen, member of the Politbureau and one of the top ten in the Communist party hierarchy. Since he has not been seen in public or mentioned in the press since March, he may be implicated in the opposition. Nor has Lu Ting-yi, director of the propaganda department of the Central Committee and minister of culture, been seen in Peking since the end of February.

\* \* \*

These one-sided polemics have been raging while speculation is rife about the health of Mao Tse-tung and the identity of his possible successor. After an unexplained absence of five and a half months, the 72-year-old chairman of the Chinese Communist party briefly reappeared -- at least photographically -- in mid-May to meet with the visiting premier of Albania. The occasion was staged to counteract rumors of his serious illness.

The missing Peng was rated high among the probable heirs of Mao Tse-tung. The disgracing of his closest collaborators in the

Peking municipal apparatus and its intellectual circles suggests that he has been put out of the running for the time being.

Hung Chi, the ideological journal of the party's central committee, has hinted that the purge of intellectuals and officials of the Peking municipal party may be expended to other areas. One is the army. Lo Jui-ching, chief of the General Staff, has not been mentioned in the press since November 27. The Peking People's Daily has hinted at the persistence of opposition among the military. "Our army does not exist in a vacuum," it wrote, and added that "class struggle in the society will surely be reflected in the army."

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From the accusations against the dissident intellectuals and other sources it is possible to discern the vague contours of their criticism and the trend of their thinking.

- (1) They doubt the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung.
- (2) They claim to be better Communists than the present leaders.
- (3) They display "sympathy" for the Khrushchev revisionists, that is, they want to unite the "socialist countries" in face of a possible attack by the United States, heal the breach, and renew the Russian alliance.
- (4) They have criticized the excesses of the "Great Leap Forward" and such wasteful efforts as attempting to produce steel in backyard furnaces.
- (5) They seek changes in economic policy and agrarian reforms.
- (6) They demand more intellectual liberty, freedom of expression, and the right to dissent from the official line.
- (7) They may even have dared to suggest that Mao step down on grounds of health or age.

Taken together, these positions would constitute a serious oppositional program to the policies of the Peking leadership. It thus appears plausible that a serious struggle is being waged in the top echelons of the Chinese Communist party over policy and perspectives and that the intellectuals under fire, and possibly the absent generals, are tied up with an anti-Mao faction and reflect its views.

The publicly assailed writers, experts and scholars may be surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and army, embracing those dissidents who are discontented with the results of the foreign and domestic policy in recent years, have voiced opposition to them, and project an alternative course vigorously rejected by Mao and his men.

The singling out of eligible intellectuals as symbolic scape-goats for the main opponents in the early phases of a political struggle has a precedent in the Sino-Soviet dispute when Yugoslavia served for a while as a substitute for Moscow in Peking's polemics against Khrushchev's revisionism.

It would also be in accord with the Stalinist habit of the Maoists to lump together left communist critics of their policies with "rightist" elements so that it is difficult to discriminate the one from the other. This was done during and after the short-lived "hundred flowers bloom" period in 1957.

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The multiple stresses and strains within the country menaced by attack from the United States and the crisis in China's foreign policy are likely to generate differences and conflicts over policy in leading circles, no matter how much veneration is accorded Mao Tse-tung. Those who can observe the conduct of the rulers at first hand in the capital, who are susceptible to the real sentiments among the people, and who are not bereft of realism, have adequate reasons for seeking a reconsideration of the present course.

China's difficulties are most apparent in the foreign field. It is being more tightly encircled and directly imperiled by the extension of U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia. It is uncertain about the Kremlin's response in case its nuclear installations are bombed. Its diplomacy has not met with success in Africa, Latin America and many places in Asia. The setbacks of the colonial revolution on these three continents have served to heighten China's isolation.

Its weakened position in "the third world" is coupled with growing isolation in the Communist world. After four years of controversy against Russian revisionism, only three Communist parties, those in Albania, New Zealand and Japan, followed its example in boycotting the recent twenty-third party congress in Moscow. Even the leadership of the Japanese CP does not see eye to eye with Peking's intransigence. The presence of so many Communist delegations in Moscow for that event was a tactical success for the Soviet leaders in their contest for influence against Peking.

Now signs of differences have emerged with Hanoi, which sent representatives to the twenty-third congress despite Peking's ban. The speeches made during the Albanian delegation's visit to Peking implicitly warned the North Vietnamese, who have been trying to steer a middle course between Moscow and Peking, against remaining friendly with the perfidious Russians. Both the Chinese and Albanians insist that there can be no neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict and that the struggle against "Soviet revisionism must be carried through to the end." The end means severing ties with Moscow on both a state and party level.

This factional demand that "Soviet revisionism must be defeated before victory over imperialism can be attained" was one of the major factors in precipitating a rupture between Havana and Peking. Whatever the pros and cons of the case, this breach has neither improved China's position nor enhanced its reputation in the other Communist capitals.

Finally, the catastrophe in Indonesia in which from 300,000 to 600,000 Communists have been slaughtered, and the biggest Communist party outside China and the Soviet Union crushed, is in part attributable to Peking's tolerance -- for its own diplomatic and factional reasons -- of Aidit's policy of relying on a bloc with Sukarno as the representative of the so-called progressive, anti-imperialist colonial bourgeoisie. This debacle has not enhanced confidence in Mao's omniscience.

The Maoist groups in the capitalist countries, which started with great expectations, are becoming more and more demoralized, disoriented and disintegrated by these developments and their incapacity to justify them.

\* \* \*

China has recovered from the worst difficulties created by the Great Leap Forward and the famine years and has repaired much of the resulting economic damage. But the scars of the experience remain. Food production is only now approaching the output of 1956. The proposals for agrarian reform are understandably, as Victor Zorza says, the most explosive political issue raised by the opposition. However, it is impossible to make any informed judgments on the merits of the matter and the real tendency of the critics since the counterproposals are concealed.

Some military strategists are certainly calling for a more realistic relation with the Soviet Union for the sake of military defense.

On one point there is little doubt. That is the yearning for greater freedom of intellectual, artistic and scientific activity. This is denoted, not only by Teng's position, but by the parallel which the editorial in the Liberation Army Daily drew between the views of the critics and the Hungarian intellectuals who set up the Petöfi Circle.

The Petöfi Circle, named for the popular poet killed in the Hungarian patriotic war for liberation in 1849, was a debating club formed in Budapest March 1956 by the Communist youth organization as a response to the liberalization after the Twentieth Congress of the CPUSSR. Students, writers, philosophers, economists, scientists and dissident party members used it as a platform for vehement criticism against the crimes, blunders and deficiencies of Rakosi's regime. The controversies in this unofficial parliament played a key role in the ideological preparation for the popular outburst in October that was smashed with the aid of Khrushchev's tanks and the approval of Mao Tse-tung.

In crushing the Hungarian uprising, Khrushchev charged that it was "counterrevolutionary" and he associated it with the bourgeois restorationist currents that also existed in Hungary. Mao agreed. Chou En-lai even toured Eastern Europe to bolster Khrushchev's hand in this counterrevolutionary repression of the socialist aspirations of the Hungarian intellectuals, students and workers. The Hungarian workers, however, clearly demonstrated that what they wanted was proletarian democracy and not a return to capitalism.

The reference by the Liberation Army Daily to the Petöfi Circle is all the more interesting, since it may indicate the existence of similar left-wing ferment in China. By deliberately mixing up a tendency of this kind with the remnants of the "progressive bourgeoisie," whose parties are still represented in the government of the People's Republic of China, Mao would be following the pattern set by Khrushchev, who, of course, was only applying what he learned from Stalin.

Today in Peking the intimidated intellectuals must be keeping quiet, withdrawing deeper into themselves, and hypocritically kowtowing before Mao Tse-tung while privately cursing the abasement inflicted upon them and their associates. If Kuo Mo-jo must humiliate himself under pressure, what other intellectuals can feel secure?

Most alarming is the assertion that this struggle against "revisionist and bourgeois elements" will go on "anywhere from one to several centuries." What a cheering prospect for the Chinese writers, scholars and technical experts and for socialists everywhere! And what a damning admission of the incapacity of Mao's thought to convince either the present generation or the many generations to come, not to mention its incapacity to open a revolutionary perspective for the industrially developed countries where a socialist victory would quickly establish the material base for a classless society on a worldwide scale.

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Those for whom Mao has replaced Stalin as the fount of all political and philosophical wisdom hold that only servants of imperialism can ask to be informed about the issues and alignments on important questions or criticize the Chinese leaders for suppressing reasoned and informed discussion inside their party or in the Communist movement. These blind followers are as wrong today as they were in Stalin's time.

We may assume that the CIA, the Pentagon and other imperialist enemies have their own sources of knowledge about what is taking place in China from the remotest provinces and nuclear installations to the Politbureau in the capital. Indeed, they are far better informed on these matters than the workers of all countries and their Marxist vanguard. This state of affairs is highly damaging to the cause of revolutionary China and its defense at a time when it stands in great peril of an imperialist assault.

BRITISH SEAMEN CONTINUE TO TIE UP SHIPS

By John Walters

London

The strike of the National Union of Seamen is solid. As each British ship docks, its crew are joining those men already out. So the situation seems set for a long struggle. The union is talking in terms of three months, and have the funds to back this up. Further, the strike is receiving support from other sections of the union movement. The powerful Transport and General Workers Union has come out in support and told its members on the docks to honor the picket lines. It is also clear that there is the possibility of the dockers taking strike action themselves (even unofficially) to support the seamen. This happened in the unofficial seamen's strike of 1961, and today there is a bigger current running this way.

Alongside this has come a speech by Dan McGarvey, president of the Boilermakers Union (a powerful union in shipbuilding). He attacked the incomes policy of the government and said, "Where oh where, in the Labour party are the democrats who will come forward and stop this gross betrayal of the trade-union movement?" McGarvey said that the whole basis of the present incomes policy must be revised.

The strike committee at the port of Hull have issued a leaflet putting forward their case and demands. This leaflet, apart from putting the national position of the union, has a significant extra point:

"Incomes policy. The NUS accepted the incomes policy in the belief that it would benefit low-wage groups like the seamen. We now find a 15% increase for doctors...is permissible, but a 15% increase for seamen will ruin the country! Is it wrong for us to feel that 'incomes policy' has become the old familiar WAGE RESTRAINT? Shipowners cry they can't afford it. The seamen cannot judge this, and neither can Mr. Gunter [Minister of Labour] BECAUSE PROFITS AND COSTS ARE THE BEST KEPT SECRET OF THE INDUSTRY...THE SHIPOWNERS MUST PROVE THEIR CASE BY OPENING THEIR BOOKS. Too long they have cried 'wolf' about profits -- now once too often."

The demand that the shipowners open their books to inspection can become popular with the seamen as it is in tune with their very militant mood and their feeling that they have been "conned" by Wilson about the real nature of an incomes policy.

The demand to "open the books" has been suggested in the pages of The Week for the past eighteen months. The idea appears to have had an impact in Hull. Over the last few months, two pamphlets on the subject have been published in Hull, one a plan for workers control of publicly owned "bus undertakings," and the other a plan for nationalisation of the docks industry under workers control.

Clive Jenkins, general secretary of ASSET, the technicians union, has threatened to bring his men out at the airports if the shipowners try to fly in blackleg [scab] crews for their ships. Also the weekly Tribune has come out in support of the strike. This is a good sign of the sympathetic response to the strike, since this paper up to now has reflected that section of the Labour party "left" which has capitulated to Wilson.

Even the serious capitalist press, while condemning the strike, have published factual material on the seamen's wages and conditions which leave one in little doubt as to the justice of their present claim. It has been left to the "popular" press such as the Daily Mirror to scream vilification at the seamen in terms of "blackmail" and "sabotage." However, such language, rather than intimidating the seamen, has had the effect of solidarising them and wide layers of the labour movement.

The Wilson government seems determined to press ahead and try to defeat the seamen, and is making plans to have the navy help in strikebreaking efforts. As more and more British ships are tied up for lack of crews, this will mean that the ports will become jammed with idle ships, and foreign vessels will not be able to use them. There seem to be plans afoot to bring the navy in to move these ships and so keep the ports open. If this happens there is no doubt that the dockers will take action.

William Hogarth, general secretary of the National Union of Seamen, said in a speech on May 18 that if the government intervened it could mean the strike developing into a major conflict, and had the possibility of escalating into a general strike. Just how serious the possibility is, is a little difficult to estimate at the moment. It is true a number of known opponents of the incomes policy have declared for the seamen, but it is also true that a large number of other union officials are ardent supporters of this policy and it is difficult to see them sanctioning strikes in support of the NUS. However, rank-and-file opposition to the incomes policy is growing, and there could very well develop a series of unofficial strikes in support of the seamen, along with official ones.

The present strike is a very important one for setting the pattern in the coming period. Revolutionary Marxists have said that the question of an incomes policy would be crucial this year and that the possibility of a confrontation between the Labour government and the trade-union movement existed because of this. However, it was difficult to predict what sector would move into the lead. The present strike may indicate that the tempo of the class struggle in Britain is speeding up.

A victory for the seamen will open up a period of crisis for Social Democracy in Britain. On the other hand, if the Wilson government were to win, this would constitute a major victory in its attempts to shackle the working class. Thus the outcome of the present strike can prove to be decisive for the working class for the coming period.

SOME MERCENARIES FOR SAIGON

By Pierre Le Grève

[The following article has been translated from the April 30 La Gauche, the left socialist Belgian weekly. The author is a member of parliament from Brussels, representing the Socialist Workers Confederation.]

\* \* \*

A former Greek mercenary in the Congo decided to try his fortune in Vietnam with Ky and the Americans. He did not know who to get in touch with. He found the address of a South Vietnam Aid Committee in an appeal published in the press and naively decided to write them, offering his services. The secretary of the committee and I decided to see him in order to learn more.

Here is a quite accurate account of the conversation we had with him and a fellow Greek who also wanted to try the adventure.

"So you want to go to Vietnam. Why?"

"To fight Communism."

"Have you already served as a mercenary?"

"I have but not him."

"For how long?"

"Seven months."

"Were you well paid?"

"37,000 francs a month, plus a bonus of 175,000 francs a year for the danger."

"Didn't that seem enough to you?"

"No, because it was in Congolese francs and you can't get more than 50 Belgian francs for 180 Congolese francs." [Fifty Belgian francs = about \$1.]

"Are you working on a job in Belgium?"

"No, I had some trouble because the Congolese government didn't pay up my back wages."

"Could you hire on again in the Congo?"

"Yes."

"Where would you do that?"

"The Congo embassy."

"Why don't you do it?"

"The pay is higher in Vietnam, the equivalent of 60,000 Belgian francs."

"What have you tried to get hired there?"

"I went to the American embassy. They asked me if I was a parachutist or specialist. I'm not either, so they advised me to get someone to invite me to Vietnam, a relative or a company, so as to have a pretext to give me a visa. I could have been hired on the spot."

"Have you tried any other angles?"

"I wrote the Vietnam embassy in London. They didn't answer."

"Are there only two of you that want to go?"

"If it works, there are forty or sixty ready to go."

"Your French is not very good. The letter you sent to the committee was well written. Who wrote it?"

"...A woman."

"If you had carefully read the notice that appeared in the press you would have seen that our committee was concerned about medical aid, and not in sending men."

"..."

"Besides, you would have noticed that we do not support the Vietnam you want to fight for. We are against your project because we believe that it's up to the Vietnamese to decide their fate and not foreigners who go there to commit mass murder in hope of making some quick money. If you want to give up your project we would agree to try to find work for you in Belgium and to help you in this way."

"I don't want to work for 1,500 francs a week and get barely enough to eat on."

\* \* \*

It appeared to us that this conversation would be worth publishing, despite its banal character, inasmuch as it shows once again the mentality of the adventurers who place their "bravery" at the disposal of the imperialist cause. Also because it shows that the Congo embassy remains an active recruiting center for

mercenaries and that the American embassy does not hesitate to recruit specialists in Belgium that it can't find at home since it became clear that the war in Vietnam is something different from a military parade.

### THE QUEBEC ELECTIONS

[The following article has been translated from the April-May issue of La Lutte Ouvrière (The Workers Struggle), published in Montréal, Québec.]

\* \* \*

Since the founding of the legislative assembly of the Province of Québec in 1796, the people of Québec have always been faced with choosing between two bourgeois parties. Until the time of the Rebellion [1837-38], one of these two bourgeois parties represented progressive social forces and thus deserved the support of the working masses. However, since the bloody suppression of the Rebellion, the national bourgeoisie of Québec has proved itself incapable of resolving any of the national or social problems of the nation of Québec. Nevertheless, up to now, the people of Québec have had no choice but to vote for one of the two candidates put up as representatives of big capital in Québec.

However, with the beginning of the twentieth century, and with the proletarianization and urbanization of Québec, another social force came on the scene -- the working class and its vanguard, organized in the trade-union movement. This social force, which represents the vast majority of the population, has created all the wealth which came with the industrialization of Québec. It is this class which, by its labor, has built the mining and pulp and paper industries and which, in the last analysis, is responsible for all of the progress which the nation of Québec has achieved. It has organized itself into a powerful, but limited movement, the purely economic trade unions. But it has never carried the economic struggle to the political level. Political power remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the representatives of big capital. While it has carried on a relentless struggle against the capitalists in industry, the union movement has been unwilling to take the next step and wage a political struggle against the government and the state controlled by these same bosses.

Since the "peaceful revolution," the economic struggle has intensified and, indeed, the political struggle between the bourgeois government of the "brain stormers" and the working class has become more marked. The last congress of the FTQ [Force de Travail Québécois, the Catholic trade federation], saw the acceptance of a resolution proposing the formation of a labor party. Also, Travail [Labor], the official organ of the CSN [Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux], the independent trade-union federation of Québec, has

begun to talk in terms of politics. The time has passed when the Laberges and the Rancourts could openly support the Liberal party of Lesage and Lévesque, and when Jean Marchand, the head of the CSN, could call the idea of a labor party in Québec immoral. The strikes at Régie des Alcools, at Hydro-Québec, at Manic, the strikes of the teachers and the students, plus the use of injunctions against all strikes, and against SPEQ [the teachers and students union] in particular, have given the working class of Québec empirical proof that the class struggle is above all a political struggle.

However, in spite of their fine words and resolutions, it seems certain that the union leaders have no intention of actually fighting against the political power of the employers. Once again, they will support the Liberal party, the party of the Québec employers, by abstaining.

Our two traditional parties, the reds and the blues, will take to the hustings once again but there will probably be four more new parties which will wheel and deal for votes. The Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale [RIN] is running on a program of "national liberation" which, according to its leader Pierre Bourgault, would leave American "big business" intact. The Québec that the RIN wants to liberate is merely a collection of abstract essences called "Québec" since the RIN is not ready to attack the foundations of capitalism, which is the essential prerequisite for the genuine liberation of the people of Québec.

By the admission of its leader, the Ralliement National is a coalition of right-wing nationalists and Créditistes [supporters of the social credit schemes which were the basis of the old Social Credit party; a demagogic petty-bourgeois formation] seeks to represent the "professional bourgeoisie."

It appears also that still another new party will emerge, the Conservative party of Québec, an English party, a thoroughly anti-Québec and antiworking-class party.

The working class of Québec will have a worthwhile alternative to the bourgeois parties in a limited number of districts. Making, perhaps, the most important decision in its history, the Parti Socialiste du Québec [PSQ] decided at its last congress, on March 6, to run as many candidates as possible, commensurate with its financial and organizational resources. The program and long-term objectives of the PSQ make it a party which can represent the working class in a real sense. Indeed, of all the parties which will run in the elections, the PSQ represents the only real alternative to the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois parties. It is incumbent on every unionist, every worker and every socialist to give it his active support. The PSQ can become the party of the unions which was invoked in the resolution of the FTQ and can give the CSN the opportunity to do more than talk about politics.

But the PSQ will run in only a dozen districts at most; and workers in other districts will again be faced with a choice of

voting for one or another bourgeois party. Since the official union leadership is prepared to abstain or vote liberal, the union locals and local labor councils should apply the congress resolutions and the "fine words" of the union papers themselves. They should run their own candidates. They should demand that the leadership make the labor party a reality by supporting the PSQ.

In the final analysis, it is necessary that all those who speak for labor break with the bourgeois parties and begin to build a working-class party now, which will be capable of forming a workers and farmers government in Québec. The only way to do this in the current elections is to support the party and the candidates which can represent the workers and to run independent union candidates.

For a workers party; for a workers and farmers government!

Support the PSQ and run union candidates!

#### DID KY SIGN SECRET AGREEMENT AT HONOLULU?

In the March 25 Socialist Congressman of New Delhi, H.D. Malaviya contrasts the Tashkent and Honolulu declarations, arguing that the latter was part of a plan to escalate the war in Southeast Asia. While utilizing press reports, Malaviya may also have had access to special sources of information in New Delhi. He describes Johnson's meeting with Ky as follows:

"President Johnson listened impatiently to the report from Ky and his functionaries and then read two documents which were called the Honolulu Declaration and Communiqué. The South Vietnamese side was not allowed to change a word in them. Ky simply affixed his signature under both these documents. Equally submissively he is reported to have signed four other secret agreements bearing on:

"(i) Further broadening of the already big rights and privileges of American servicemen in Vietnam;

"(ii) Additional prerogatives for private American companies and protection of their property by South Vietnamese soldiers;

"(iii) The construction of new secret sites for stationing American long-range strategic missiles;

"(iv) The training of an additional number of commandos from among the best South Vietnamese soldiers.

"It is thus clear that negotiations in Honolulu were conducted from positions of strength and open pressure.... A Reuter correspondent reported from Honolulu that the approach to the war was stated by President Johnson while Premier Ky simply had to listen and say 'yes.'"

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT URGED TO RECONSIDER CHINA POLICY

The debate in top circles of the ruling class in the United States over the advisability of finally recognizing the existence of the 700,000,000 people in China and the government they put in power seventeen years ago appears to have found an echo in Japan. A three-day teach-in on the subject in the first part of May, under the auspices of the Liberal-Democratic party's Afro-Asian Study Group, received considerable publicity.

The teach-in was held at the Dietmen's Club House of the House of Representatives. It included lectures by twelve intellectuals, scholars and commentators followed by question-and-answer sessions.

Public interest in the sessions was heightened by simultaneous reports in the press on the results of surveys on radioactive fallout from the recent test of a Chinese atom bomb that included thermonuclear materials.

The tone of the discussion was set by former Health and Welfare Minister Hideji Kawasaki, who criticized the Sato administration for "going too far to the right" in handling relations with Communist China. The consensus was that Japan should adopt a more flexible approach, particularly on the question of bringing Peking into the United Nations and on exchanging personnel with China.

"Never before has such open criticism of Sato's China policy been voiced at a public meeting," said Kenji Arai and Shusuke Negashima in an article in the May 16 Japan Times.

Former Health and Welfare Minister Yoshi Furui declared at the teach-in that Japan's China policy was "all too evasive and passive to the point of being irresponsible." He was particularly impatient with the argument advanced by ultrarightists and militarists in the United States that China could be brought to its knees simply by exerting pressure.

Tokuma Utsunomiya, a prominent figure in the Afro-Asian Study Group, asked: "What would happen to Japan's security should the current U.S. confrontation with Communist China as its hypothetical enemy lead to an open clash?"

His answer was that the current Japan-U.S. "security treaty" could hardly serve as an adequate guarantee for Japan.

Moreover, he argued, it would be well for Japan to take the initiative in bringing Communist China into the United Nations.

Most of the speakers sounded more sympathetic to the People's Republic of China than otherwise. Only a few clung to a stand of blind opposition.

Takeo Takagi, an editorial writer of the Yomiuri Shimbun, maintained that the "two Chinas" question lies at the root of the present confrontation between the U.S. and Communist China.

Assistant Professor Kanji Seki of Kokugakuin University held that Washington is overconfident. But the U.S. is not regarded as "a patrol car" by many countries. The "domino theory," he maintained, is "a fallacious hypothesis."

He urged that the Japanese government should seek to convince the U.S. that it should abandon its extremely dangerous balance-of-power strategy. This could be done through frequent debates between Japanese and American spokesmen over policy with regard to China, he said.

#### USE OF OKINAWA BASE AROUSES FEAR IN JAPAN

Uneasiness is rising in Japan over the Pentagon's conversion of Okinawa into a major logistical base for supporting and escalating the war in Vietnam.

Vast areas of the flat coastal land have been turned into parking lots for trucks, tanks, guns and packing crates containing military equipment to be shipped on to Vietnam. Freighters lie at anchor awaiting their turn to get into port.

About \$1,000,000,000 have already been put into Okinawa for military facilities and new projects are proceeding feverishly. Okinawa provides for medical evacuation, jungle training, rotational quarters and aerial refueling in relation with the war in Vietnam.

In case of an attack on the People's Republic of China, the base would become of even greater strategical importance. The airstrips built by the Pentagon can accommodate B-52's carrying nuclear weapons.

The Japanese fear that the use to which Washington is putting Okinawa can only serve to help suck their country deeper into the escalating vortex in Southeast Asia.

#### "DR. ZHIVAGO" BANNED IN THAILAND

The film, "Dr. Zhivago," which won six academy awards, has been banned in Thailand as subversive. The censors got a bad case of gooseflesh as they watched the scenes showing the overthrow of the Czar. Thailand has a constitutional monarchy which enjoys "special relations" with the CIA, the Pentagon and the White House.

WALL STREET PLEASED WITH COUPS IN AFRICA

[The succession of coups d'état in Africa in the past year have been greeted with considerable satisfaction in U.S. imperialist circles. They see them as either blows against socialist tendencies (Ghana), or against undue instability arising from flagrant corruption and inefficiency (Nigeria). Wall Street wants Africa made safe for investments and high profits.

[The way American big business views the series of overturns in Africa is indicated in the following article by Lloyd Garrison, datelined from Lagos, which appeared in the May 15 New York Times.]

\* \* \*

It is an accepted generalization that governmental coups create "instability" and instability in turn upsets local commerce and creates anxiety among investors abroad.

Therefore, it is said, coups are "bad" and countries holding to the status quo are therefore "good."

But like most generalizations, there are apt to be exceptions. And for the moment at least, Africa's six coups within the last six months have conformed more to the exception than the rule.

Has local business shrunk at the point of a gun? Have investments dried up? The answer in almost every case is "no."

What has happened here in Nigeria offers perhaps the best example.

This most populous of African markets was long viewed by many as the most stable, most democratic and most fertile territory for free enterprise in all of Africa.

Then came January's military putsch and the murder of Prime Minister Tafawa Abubakar Balewa. Nigeria's solid reputation, ballooned by the State Department and Whitehall, seemed to be destroyed overnight. But was it?

To many veteran observers here at the scene, Nigeria had begun cracking at its political seams long before the coup. Two successive fraudulent elections to maintain the status quo had made a mockery of Nigeria's pretense of being a democracy.

In the violence that followed last fall's rigged elections in the Western Region, hundreds had been killed, and were still being killed, up to the time of the coup.

Less than four months have passed. Now, by any objective standard, Nigeria is far more stable than it was before the military struck.

Anthony D. Marshall, the New York-based president of the African Research and Development Company, Inc., reflects the feeling of many investors here.

The other day, Mr. Marshall paid his first visit to Nigeria since the coup. Sipping a gin and tonic before lunch in the Bristol Hotel, he weighed the question of what changes had struck him most vividly.

"Well," he said, "things are politically much calmer -- the coup seems unquestionably popular. Five months ago I wouldn't have driven through the Western Region for fear of the rioting and the road blocks. Now there's nothing to fear."

The facts bear out Mr. Marshall's renewed confidence in Nigeria.

Trade is now flowing uninterrupted from the powerful Northern Region down through the west to this seaport capital of Lagos.

Talk of the Eastern Region's secession, so prevalent during the political crisis that led up to the coup, is a thing of the past.

Corrupt politicians who headed the Federal ministries have been swept from power and replaced by highly respected professional civil servants.

Gone are the once automatic bribe offers for contract awards. Gone also are the get-rich-quick deals by which foreign contractor finance companies sold the Government a plant and equipment of frequently dubious economic value to the country as a whole.

Nigeria's economic outlook has never been better. Its foreign currency reserves are up. Oil has become its top export -- promising an even bigger influx of hard currency for investment. And from Washington come reports that the World Bank is all but certain to inject fresh capital into Nigeria's development plan.

Private investment has hardly been deterred by the coup. For example two American companies that had projects in the works before Prime Minister Balewa's downfall have decided to go ahead with them: Chase International is expanding a textile mill outside Lagos and a Gulf Coast combine is going to work on a shrimp freezing plant in Port Harcourt.

The reasons behind Africa's coups vary slightly from country to country. But they seem to represent several common characteristics.

First, their objectives were to restore order, to end corruption, cut spiraling costs, inject a sense of discipline and national purpose where the politicians had failed.

What has emerged is a coalition of army men at the top in

alliance with the civil servants at the second echelon. In short, the coup wave has been a revolution of the technocrats. It is not a radical wave -- the coup leaders do not fancy themselves as ideologues, but as realists.

In Dahomey and the Central African Republic, the Communists and Chinese were expelled. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah's dependence on both Peking and Moscow has been reversed overnight; now, private enterprise, both Ghanaian and foreign, has a chance to breathe.

No observers can be found here who will predict that all of the coups will succeed in fulfilling their promises.

General Mobutu in the Congo, like his predecessors, faces the constant possibility of political downfall, not so much from a matter of incompetence, but from the sheer weight of the Congo's seemingly insurmountable problems.

The coups in former French-speaking territories such as Dahomey and Upper Volta may increase governmental efficiency, but they cannot reverse the fact that neither of these countries show much promise of being viable entities for years to come.

Here in Nigeria, the military is already faced with a shortage of food and rising prices -- a problem it did not create but must certainly tackle head on to avoid public recrimination. And Nigeria's Supreme Council is faced with the same challenge that bedeviled the civilian politicians -- how to keep tribal and regional tensions from rending the nation.

But for the present, all of these new regimes appear energetic, dedicated and practical in their approach to the future. And where they exist, stability, at present, is still the rule.

#### GENERAL IRONSI TIGHTENS HIS GRIP

General Ironsi, head of the military government that seized power in Nigeria last January 15, announced the abolishment May 24 of the four regional governments that constituted the Federation. From now on the country is to be known as the Republic of Nigeria.

The move is designed to counter separatist tendencies and to strengthen the central power.

The general went further than this, however. He also decreed the dissolution of all parties and political and tribal organizations until January 17, 1969. The decree listed 107 organizations.

In addition, the formation of any new organization embracing more than two persons having the same objectives is banned.

On top of this, it is forbidden to mention either orally or in writing the names and slogans of the banned organizations or even the names of their leaders.

All the banned organizations are ordered to file a financial statement with the government within thirty days. The penalty for violating the order is a minimum of five years in prison.

### NEW REGIME PUTS GHANA UP FOR SALE

E.N. Omaboe, chief economic official of the counterrevolutionary military clique that overthrew the Nkrumah government last February, was sent on a mission to New York to sell his country for whatever it might bring in the countinghouses of Manhattan.

At a luncheon staged by the African-American Chamber of Commerce May 20 in the St. Regis Hotel, Omaboe stressed the openings available for the taking in Ghana to any enterprising American shark. "Textiles, knit goods, simple clothing and tough denim jeans are already a hit with all ages and sexes up and down the coast," he said. "We want New England and Californian fishermen to fish our coasts and set up canneries.

"All these are the sort of enterprises which you American businessmen can set up rapidly and efficiently."

Among the inducements offered by the new regime in return for setting up apparatus of this kind to pump Ghana's wealth into the bank accounts of American stockholders, Omaboe mentioned five to ten years "tax relief," duty-free importation of materials, and guaranties for repatriation of profits subject to foreign-exchange conditions.

And don't worry about expropriation, Omaboe told his attentive audience. In the unlikely event a business should be "nationalized," compensation would be forthcoming with the World Bank acting as "arbitrator."

However, the "emphasis" of the new regime, said Omaboe, is not at all on nationalizations. In fact the generals who succeeded in ousting Nkrumah have worked out plans to turn over a number of state-operated enterprises to private ownership.

Earlier in the week, the International Monetary Fund decided to rush a big roll of money to the new regime as a kind of down payment. The agency set up a standby credit of \$36,400,000 as a "first step" in overcoming the tight financial situation in which the traitorous generals find themselves.

GUERRILLA FORCES REPORTED ACTIVE IN RHODESIA

Guerrilla forces have begun activities in Rhodesia against the racist Smith regime, according to reports from Dar es Salaam published by Hsinhua, the Chinese news agency.

In the Sinoia area about eighty-five miles north of Salisbury, fighting broke out in the latter part of April. Freedom fighters adhering to the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU] killed twenty-five white colonial troops and policemen and wounded thirty others. They also shot down two helicopters of the air force.

The Smith regime has sent out hundreds of troops and arrested many prominent Africans in an effort to repress the rebellion.

A strict censorship has been imposed on all news relating to the guerrilla struggle.

MORE ON KUO MO-JO

[In the May 13 issue of World Outlook, we reported that the 74-year-old Kuo Mo-jo, the outstanding intellectual luminary of the Mao regime, had appeared before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to confess his failure to grasp the thought of Mao Tse-tung. "For a number of decades," he was reported to have said, "I have written poems, translations and articles. On the quantitative side, this represents more than a million characters; but, judged by present standards, my work is devoid of value and ought to be burned."

[As reported by the press in both the United States and Western Europe, Kuo Mo-jo went even further in self-abasement and in praise of the value of Mao's thought. He was quoted, for instance, as saying that he wanted to "roll in the mud...to be smeared with oil and blood." The exact meaning of these phrases remained somewhat obscure, but were generally interpreted as meaning that Kuo's head might be among those marked to roll in the current internal conflict in the Chinese Communist party and that he was trying to save his position.

[We have not yet seen a translation of the full text of Kuo Mo-jo's declaration before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The Chinese press, however, continues to publish reports about his activities, such as receiving foreign dignitaries. Thus it may be that he is not seriously threatened. His kowtowing to Mao may have been little more than the groveling expected at the moment from all the leading intellectuals whether they continue to remain in favor or end up among those retired from public view. In any case, this deduction would seem to fit better with the account of Kuo Mo-jo's declarations released May 7 by the Hsinhua

news agency. It is clear from this that Kuo Mo-jo's references to mud, blood, etc., were neither as direct nor as gross as they were made out to be by the Western press.

[Below, we have reproduced the full text of the Hsinhua dispatch.]

\* \* \*

PEKING, May 6 (Hsinhua) -- China's intellectuals should feel indebted to the workers, peasants and soldiers and regard them as their teachers, said Kuo Mo-jo in an article widely publicized in the Peking press.

Entitled "Learn From and Serve the Worker, Peasant and Soldier Masses," the article is the text of the speech made by Kuo Mo-jo in his capacity of vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, at the committee's session on April 14.

He said: "Chairman Mao Tse-tung told us more than twenty years ago that we should serve the workers, peasants and soldiers. But today the situation is not that we are serving them but the other way round. Through the study of Chairman Mao's works, they are now writing better stuff than we are."

Kuo Mo-jo, who is also chairman of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, quoted "The Song of Ouyang Hai" as an example. He described it as "an epoch-making novel." He said that the author, Chin Ching-mai, had served as a soldier for many years and was still working in the cultural troupe of the Kwangtung military command. "It is precisely because he has been a soldier for many years that he has been able to produce this novel," said Kuo Mo-jo. "He has given a truly vivid portrayal of the hero Ouyang Hai, creatively infusing Chairman Mao's thinking into the novel."

Ouyang Hai, a soldier in the People's Liberation Army, died in 1963 in the course of preventing a railway accident. Kuo Mo-jo said that the novelist had succeeded in bringing into the novel almost all the party's policies and Chairman Mao's ideas up to that year.

"It seems to me," he added, "that such a novel is beyond the capacity of the so-called professional writers and artists today. The author has been able to write such a work of literature because he personally knew what it meant to be covered in blood and muck in the army. It is clear that the soldiers are serving us, it is not we who are serving them."

Kuo Mo-jo referred to the set of life-size clay sculptures featuring the cruelty of the landlords in collecting rent and described it as "a revolution in the art of sculpture." He added: "I have been to see these sculptures three times and have found

them very moving. Many visitors wept, because the sculptures reminded them so vividly of their own past and touched their class feelings. So popular are these sculptures that hundreds of thousands of people have visited the exhibition."

He said that he watched some of the clay sculptures being made by a group of Szechwan sculptural workers. "In my view, the character of these clay sculptures is unsurpassed," he declared. "They are more impressive than plaster casts and marble sculptures, particularly when used to portray peasants."

He attributed the success of these works of sculpture to the mastery and creative application by the workers of Chairman Mao's ideas. "This epoch-making achievement in the field of sculpture is the result of the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's thinking," Kuo Mo-jo stated. "It shows that the workers are serving and educating us, rather than the other way round."

"As a matter of fact, many peasants study Chairman Mao's writings much better than intellectuals like us do. These intellectuals, grandiloquent philosophers, historians and what not, are no scholars at all. Workers and peasants are much better students.

"Last year I made a trip to Shansi and listened to a talk by Comrade Chou Ming-shan (he is a peasant) on what he had gained from studying Chairman Mao's works. It was a really vivid and lively lecture. He is now Communist party secretary of Chiangshien county and is also a deputy to the National People's Congress.

"Instead of serving the workers, peasants and soldiers, we are being served by them, in the fields of literature, history and philosophy. We should be grateful to them and regard them as our teachers, because they have done a good job in studying Chairman Mao's ideas and have applied them creatively," Kuo Mo-jo said.

In conclusion, Kuo Mo-jo said: "Though in my seventies, I still have great aims and high ideals. I am willing to get covered in muck among the peasants, in grease among the workers, and in blood among the soldiers. Should the U.S. imperialists dare to attack us, then I, too, will lob a few hand-grenades at them."

#### MAKES OUR MOUTH WATER

About a year and a half ago, one of the world's most skilled Ping-Pong players was reported by Peking to have ascribed his success to his diligent study and application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Fruitful results have now been reported in bringing Maoism to bear in the distribution of watermelons.

The discovery, obviously a capital one, was made by Chou

Hsin-li, manager of the Chapei District Co., a subsidiary of the Shanghai Municipal Fruit and Sundry Goods Co. According to a May 17 Peking dispatch, released to the world press by Hsinhua May 19, Chou Hsin-li wrote an article describing how his study and application of Mao Tse-tung's teachings "On Contradiction" led him to a great success in his own special sector. The article, according to Hsinhua, "has attracted wide interest and is now being reprinted in the People's Daily and all leading Peking papers."

It seems that back in 1963 his company retailed 250 to 400 tons of watermelons a day at the height of the season. "The staff were overwhelmed and felt simply helpless. They did their best but could not prevent a high rate of wastage."

This was nothing, however, compared to the crisis in 1964 when the staff learned that the crop would be about fifty percent above the previous year. What to do?

It is not reported what impelled Chou Hsin-li to resort to the course of action he took, but it was the right path. "Chou Hsin-li says that he and his comrades derived tremendous help at this juncture from the ideas contained in Mao Tse-tung's 'On Contradiction.'"

The bedeviled manager and his staff found the following sentences: "There is nothing that does not contain contradictions. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward."

With these sentences, the problem was already solved. Only the practical side remained to be worked out. "The important thing was to pin down the contradictions and decide which was the main one."

They proceeded methodically. "Careful analysis led them to the conclusion that the problem lay in the contradiction between the heavy rush of supplies in a limited period and the use of the sales force; it expressed itself in the weakness in the retail network, staff arrangements, transportation, storage space, and management."

In short, it was superficial to view the problem as one of too many watermelons. After all, for Shanghai's population of more than 7,000,000 people, even 600 tons of watermelon a day meant less than 3 ounces per person, including the rind. Viewed more deeply, it was clearly a question of either inefficiency on the part of the staff or its need to expand.

"This 'exposure' of the contradiction helped them to see the size and nature of the problems to be tackled. They seemed formidable, and some members of the management hesitated and advocated cutting down the volume of buying to suit their existing structure."

But the majority decided otherwise. If they could only get themselves set up better... "The question was how?"

Once again, reference to the thought of Mao Tse-tung proved invaluable. "This was where Mao Tse-tung's idea, 'concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one,' came in useful. The principle referred to war tactics, but Chou Hsin-li and his comrades adapted it to their own problem of selling melons."

The company did not give up pushing other items. During the peak of the watermelon season it merely made a shift and "concentrated its forces on melons." Among other things a bold innovation was tried. The staff "set up stands at convenient places on the streets." Here they even went so far as to offer watermelons by the slice.

During the busiest days, they had as many as 300 people selling only watermelons. In contrast to the previous year, the year of the big wastage, they sold "all stocks as rapidly as supplies came." And they prepared for the final rush when it would be necessary to select a reserve for the autumn.

They borrowed storage space from other organizations. Instead of relying on a few big trucks supplied by the City Transportation, they used their own small trucks and pedicabs. "This did away with one of the main causes of waste of time and goods."

In this way they sold seventy percent more watermelons than in 1963, lowered expenses by more than thirty percent, reduced waste to less than two percent and increased gross income from watermelons by thirty-five percent.

It was a triumph in every respect. "Shanghai people love to eat watermelons in the hot summer," explains Hsinhua. "By their new arrangements, the company satisfied demand as never before and, at the same time, encouraged the rural communes in their production."

How omniscient is the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Already a bible at the Ping-Pong table, it has proved of equal relevance in the watermelon patch.

Man, watch out! Careful where you spit those seeds...

### CASTRO, GUEVARA AND CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Under a Havana dateline, an instructive series of articles by Marcel Niedergang dealing with the Cuban Revolution appeared in the Paris daily Le Monde [May 12, 13, 14, 15-16 and 17]. The final article, taking up the foreign policy of the Cuban government and the departure of Che Guevara from the political scene, is of particular interest.

Niedergang begins by quoting from the letter from Che Guevara which was read by Fidel Castro last October: "Fidel, other nations of the world call for my modest efforts. I can do that which is denied you because of your responsibility as the head of Cuba and the time has come for us to part..."

These few phrases, says Niedergang, can be found prominently displayed in many local headquarters of the new Communist party of Cuba from Havana to Santiago.

He then quotes from Fidel Castro's March 13, 1966 speech, in which the Cuban leader reminded the students he was addressing that the Cuban Revolution could take pride in having introduced a law that is unique up to now: "A law of the Revolution, one of the first laws of the Revolution, prohibited naming any street, any city, any town, any factory, any farm, after a living leader."

Le Monde's correspondent continues: "This law is rigorously observed. In Cuba you cannot find a statue of Fidel Castro, of 'Che' Guevara or of any other leader. But the farewell message of the Argentine doctor, so closely and so brilliantly associated with the Cuban Revolution since the organization in Mexico of the Granma expedition, is offered for meditation to the 'guajiros' (peasants) of the smallest villages and towns in the most remote places in Oriente. And his well-known portrait, ironical smile and broad black beret, is often placed beside that of Camilo Cienfuegos, Fidel's other lieutenant of great prestige, who disappeared tragically in 1959. As if he would never return..."

In Cuba, according to Niedergang, the disappearance of Che for a year now has not aroused the kind of concern and speculation to be found abroad. As a whole the Cubans appear to be satisfied with the successive explanations given by the prime minister, who still said on December 4, 1965: "We can tell you that Ernesto Guevara is alive and in good health..."

It is only among the circles of leaders and some intellectuals that the deeper reasons for his departure and the questions posed by his present fate are brought up, "rarely, with discretion and a certain embarrassment." At the time of the Tricontinental Conference an African delegate asked one of the members of the Cuban delegation: "Why didn't 'Che' send a message of sympathy to the Tricontinental?"

To this question, and more "insidious" ones, some Cubans "particularly well placed to be informed," replied: "We are certain that 'Che' regularly sends news to his family in Havana."

Niedergang affirms: "That he had a rather sharp verbal exchange with the prime minister when he returned in March 1965 from his long trip of three months in Africa and Asia is undoubted and is not denied in top circles." Che was very popular in Cuba because of his temperament, which was quite different from that of the Cubans, his intelligence, his exceptional role in the Revolution

before and after the victory, his intransigence of character, his prestige as the romantic guerrilla fighter. He is still very popular.

"His theses were well known: violently anti-imperialist and a theoretician of guerrilla warfare, he never hid his distrust 'with regard to the Soviet system of political and economic organization.' The real application of proletarian internationalism was one of his dominating ideas. 'If his revolutionary ardor (the ardor of a revolutionist) is blunted when the most urgent tasks are being accomplished on a local scale and if he forgets his proletarian internationalism, the revolution which he leads will cease to be an inspiring force and he will sink into a comfortable lethargy which imperialism, our irreconcilable enemy, will utilize well. Proletarian internationalism is a duty, but it is also a revolutionary necessity.'" [Socialism and Man, by Che Guevara, p. 19 in the edition published by the Canadian Fair Play for Cuba Committee.]

"The overly long silence of 'Che,'" continues Niedergang, "has aroused a good deal of speculation outside of Cuba, not only in the United States, but likewise among certain revolutionary circles in Latin America. The most summary and most frequent thesis is that 'Che,' considered to be 'pro-Chinese,' became separated, voluntarily or otherwise, from the majority of the revolutionary leadership and from Fidel Castro who have been resolutely 'pro-Soviet' since the last conference of the Communist parties of Latin America held in Havana (November-December 1964). The provisional conclusion of this outright polemic is to be found in the communiqué of the Guatemalan MR 13 (Yon Sosa's Revolutionary movement of the 13 of November), accusing Fidel Castro of 'lining up with Moscow and betraying the revolution.'"

Niedergang calls attention in a footnote to Castro's counter-accusation at the close of the Tricontinental that the MR 13 is a "Trotskyist movement." This charge touched off widespread protests. [See recent issues of World Outlook.] However, the correspondent of the Paris daily does not go into the repercussions to Castro's speech. He offers instead his own conclusions concerning the thesis about Castro being "pro-Soviet" and Che being "pro-Chinese."

"The least one can say is that this thesis is too simple and does not take into account either 'Che's' latest public positions or, above all, the ambiguity of the Cuban Revolution and its influence in Latin America since the crisis over the missiles (fall 1962) which constituted a major date in the history of relations between China and the USSR.

"In February 1965 in Algiers, where he participated in the second Afro-Asian economic conference, 'Che' admitted that 'the conditions of struggle had changed in South America since the victory of the Cuban Revolution' and that 'American imperialism would never let itself be caught by surprise again south of the Rio Grande.' This is exactly what Fidel Castro declared in Havana,

in January 1966, at the close of an important conference, held behind closed doors, with the heads of Latin-American delegations who attended the Tricontinental.

"This did not involve any renunciation by either of them of revolutionary struggle in Latin America or of aid to the movements already engaged in armed rebellions, but implied a better, more realistic evaluation of the true 'objective' conditions of combat 'against American imperialism in South America and elsewhere.' It is true that Che's Guerrilla Warfare has been and still is the bible of leaders of a great many insurrectional movements that have erupted in the hemisphere since 1959. Today it is admitted, and it was one of the lessons drawn by the Tricontinental that 'blind, systematic imitation of the Cuban example has been outmoded.'"

Niedergang continues with his analysis of the latest public positions of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro:

"Before his withdrawal, 'Che' said nothing different and he likewise seriously amended his theories on the 'role of the national bourgeoisie during the more or less long transitional period of alliance with all the anti-imperialist classes,' separating himself here too from the strict orthodox Chinese position on this subject. If it is absolutely necessary to compare the 'Che' of the spring of 1965 (concretely discovering the profound solidarity between the national liberation movements of Africa and Latin America) with anyone, one should conceive rather of Franz Fanon...

"To picture 'Che' as a 'diehard pro-Chinese' is as simplistic as to imagine that Fidel Castro is 'under Moscow's orders'; it displays a profound misconception of the psychology of two of the most important leaders of the Cuban Revolution. Voluntarily or not it signifies ignoring the fact that the debate begun in Cuba and in Latin America between those who could, if really demanded for the sake of simplification, be called 'pro-Chinese' or 'pro-Soviet' has undergone such an evolution in the past two years that it is no longer at all occurring within the perspective of possible allegiance to Moscow or to Peking but within the frame 'of a revision of the concrete revolutionary strategy applicable in each country in Latin America.' This, too, was an important lesson drawn at the Tricontinental...

"The rumors, the charges, the speculation, the uneasiness provoked inside Cuba by the rumors incited Fidel Castro to take up the 'Guevara affair' at length and brutally before the delegates at the Tricontinental. By evoking, to the general surprise of almost all those present 'the imperialist campaign of intrigues and slanders against Cuba with regard to the case of Comrade Guevara,' he gave the impression of seeking to associate in the same censure 'the Trotskyists and the Chinese.' Should this be viewed as a warning addressed to the most intransigent Cuban elements, particularly in the army and in university circles, who are more sensitive and above all more affected by the 'anti-Soviet Chinese brochures' distributed up to the end of 1965 despite the numerous protests of Fidel Castro to the ambassador from Peking? The purge

begun in March, hit not only the elements of the 'new class,' charged with or suspected of indulging in the 'dolce vita,' but also, less obviously, some important figures in the armed forces."

What has been motivating Fidel Castro, and possibly Che Guevara, in the recent period? Niedergang offers his own theory:

"Undoubtedly, in order to win his current bets, the prime minister must play a tighter hand than ever. A 'revolutionist' to the bottom of his soul, as little 'bourgeoisified' as 'Che' after seven years in power, burning to really help by all means 'all those in the world who are fighting against imperialism,' he also has, it is clear, the responsibilities of a statesman. This is the big difference between him and 'Che.' But in his way, Fidel is a 'Guevarist,' hence the equivocation or embarrassment in some of his declarations. One of the themes for which 'Che' argued on the economic level was 'the necessary redistribution of tasks within the socialist camp,' because 'the socialist countries have the moral duty to end their tacit complicity with the exploiting countries of the West.' He took up the subject at some length in his speech in Algiers in February 1965, published by Maspero.

"At the Tricontinental, the Cuban delegation had prepared a complete, documented report on this theme in hope of having it adopted among the general resolutions. On the last day, they had to give it up due to opposition from various sources. 'But we will fight to the end for this idea which we consider to be correct,' I was told by a number of leaders responsible for the project.

"The Cubans, in fact, are far from being completely satisfied with the commercial agreements reached with the USSR and the East European countries. To listen to the functionaries of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the sheaf of grievances is rather heavy. The Czechs offered an industrial center, but refused the raw materials necessary to keep it running well. The Czechs, the Bulgarians (and the Russians?) are 'charged' with having resold Cuban sugar on the free market at a time when the difference between the 'free' and the 'preferential' price permitted this operation. It remains true, of course, that the Soviet aid, estimated to be \$300 million a year, and the delivery of oil from the Baku gives the USSR exceptional importance in the Cuban economy, an importance grown all the greater with the question mark placed over the trade agreements with People's China since November 1965.

"Naturally, this revision is 'political' from two sides, as the Cuban prime minister himself finally admitted. Minister of Defense Raúl Castro's trip at the beginning of 1965 to Moscow, where he participated in a consultative meeting boycotted by the Chinese was already a sign that was not sufficiently noted. During the course of the year, the 'lider maximo' increased the allusions which were likewise courteous but firm refusals, in opposition to the Chinese anxious to compel the Cubans 'to take sides in the ideological quarrel dividing the socialist world.' When Fidel Castro chose the platform of the Tricontinental and the celebration

of the seventh anniversary of the Revolution to reveal the existence of the 'crisis' between Havana and Peking, the die had already long been cast.

"Also, while advocating the ideal, probably unrealizable under present conditions, 'of a redistribution of tasks within the socialist camp,' the Cuban leaders are trying to diversify their foreign trade (noticeable reduction in agreements with the countries of East Europe, intensification of trade with Great Britain, Spain, France, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Japan). Thus France is selling trucks (much appreciated), bulldozers, locomotives, and could certainly buy more nickel. The English are exporting a \$25 million order of Leyland buses and a five-year, 60 million dollar agreement has been reached with Spain to construct fishing boats and freighters.

"Despite the 'return to sugar,' a rational industrialization plan, based in particular on the very important and rich deposits of nickel as well as electrification, could assure Cuba in the next years a desirable equilibrium. Despite a still difficult immediate future on the economic level, Fidel Castro does not seem to have sought to renounce his 'revolutionary role.' The results of the Tricontinental, moreover, have perfectly shown the extent of his bet and its limits.

"The Tricontinental,' he repeated last March 13, 'was a victory for the revolutionary movements, a victory of the "small nations" and not the big and powerful ones.'

"The most important result of the Tricontinental (aside from the choice of Havana as the provisional headquarters of the new body) was the creation of a coordinating bureau for all the revolutionary movements and parties of Latin America. This 'organization of the peoples,' a reply and counterstroke to the 'Organization of States,' was not imposed by the Latin Americans, but decided on by the Cuban leaders after the Tricontinental and at the end of what all the delegates agree was an 'exceptionally positive work session.' It would thus be hazardous to affirm that Fidel Castro is seeking to slow down the 'revolutionary élan in Latin America' by advancing the argument that he agreed to 'coordinating' and 'organizing' things on a continental scale in agreement with the pro-Soviet Communist parties. On the contrary, everything indicates, despite the necessary discreet reservations in this field that the aid is going to be intensified and rationalized.

"Moreover, the Cuban delegation kept up the pressure throughout the conference, thus 'rallying' around their banners 'all the forces engaged in armed struggle against imperialism in Africa and the Americas,' and the main theme of Fidel Castro in his closing speech was: 'Some day or other all the peoples will take up arms to free themselves.' In specifically stating that 'Cuba would support the revolutionary movements by deeds and not by words, in practice and not in theory,' he implicitly criticized China and

recognized in the USSR 'the role of the big power that actually carries out its promises.'

"But it was also a call to order and an invitation addressed to Moscow. Although the Soviet delegate had publicly declared that the USSR 'was ready to aid the peoples engaged in armed struggle against imperialism,' everything may still depend on the concrete application of this maxim which is not exactly new. The contradiction then does not lie on the side of Cuba where they are inspired by the formula: 'We have need of you, but you have just as much need of us.' It lies, and will lie perhaps tomorrow on the side of Moscow in facing the necessities of 'peaceful coexistence,' which is not 'necessarily applicable to the "third world,"' and the demands of 'those with arms in hand' who count more than ever on Cuba to point out their needs and to 'prescribe' for them..."

#### REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE REPORTED BEGINNING IN THAILAND

A number of items in the press point to the conclusion that the Vietnamese Revolution is beginning to extend into Thailand where a revolutionary struggle conducted by guerrilla fighters is already spreading in several provinces.

Last April 11, an underground broadcasting station called "The Voice of the People of Thailand" appealed for armed struggle in order to liquidate the American troops based in Thailand territory and the traitorous group headed by Thanom, the prime minister.

In an April 26 broadcast, Radio Pathet Lao (which broadcasts from the part of Laos controlled by the revolutionary forces), the announcer violently condemned the repressive and counterrevolutionary actions of the Thailand government. He promised the Thai people that they would be helped by the peoples of the entire world, particularly the peoples of Indochina.

Recently the Thailand government is reported to have undertaken a big "mopping up" operation in the northeast provinces near Laos. Thousands of police and soldiers are said to have participated, as well as American troops. The direct participation of American troops in the "mopping up" operations in the Nong Hua Lamphoo district in the province of Udorn was confirmed by the underground radio "The Voice of the People of Thailand."

A Thailand Patriotic Front is reportedly leading the armed struggle. A "Patriotic Organization of the Thai Youth" is said to have been created to support the efforts of this Front to recruit youth.

In its April 27 issue, the People's Weekly of Peking greeted

"the recent victories gained by the patriotic armed forces of the people of Thailand." By stepping up their repression of the mass struggle, writes the Chinese Communist party organ, American imperialism and the Thai reactionaries seek to prevent their country from becoming "a second south Vietnam." But they will finish "by accelerating precisely this very process."

It appears likely that the unleashing of armed struggle in Thailand is the direct effect of a rise in the revolutionary struggle in south Vietnam and Laos. The fact that American troops have been utilizing airfields in Thailand for some time in their aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is certainly one of the factors that have incited the toiling masses in Thailand to take up arms in active support of their Vietnamese and Laotian brothers and at the same time to take the first steps along the road to their own emancipation.

The recent decision of the Thai government to send an expeditionary corps to fight in south Vietnam along with American imperialism will only stimulate this vanguard.

#### DOCUMENTS OF FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS

The main documents of the last congress of the Fourth International are now available in French, English and Spanish. A German edition is underway.

The congress, held in Switzerland December 5-12, 1965, was the second congress since reunification of the Trotskyist movement and the eighth since the Fourth International was founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938. It was attended by more than sixty delegates and fraternal observers.

Four major documents were adopted: "The International Situation and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Marxists"; "The Progress and Problems of the African Revolution"; "The Evolution of Capitalism in Western Europe"; and "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Crisis of the International Communist Movement."

A copy of the documents in French can be obtained by sending three francs [\$.60] to Pierre Frank, 21 rue d'Aboukir, Paris 2.

For the Spanish edition, send 4½ pesos [\$.35] to Editorial Indice Rojo, in care of Miguel Fuente, Apartado Postal 27-509, Mexico 7, D.F., Mexico.

The documents in English can be obtained by sending \$1 to the International Socialist Review, 873 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10003.