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JOHNSON TRIES TO SAVE HIS SAIGON PUPPET

While the Pentagon propagandists again make the dubious claim that the military situation has improved for the U.S. in south Vietnam, the regime of puppet General Ky is tottering and can be pushed over at any time. This is the clear political meaning of the mass demonstrations in Hué and Danang and the student rallies in Saigon itself. The precariousness of Ky's grip was underlined by Johnson's order April 1 postponing all congressional junkets to south Vietnam until further notice. The Pentagon and CIA can no longer guarantee the safety of a U.S. congressman in Saigon. And lights were burning late in Washington as Johnson and his crew sought desperately to figure a way out of the morass.

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"From the White House down," said the Washington correspondent of the New York Times April 2, "there is a realization that the gamble made by the Administration at the Honolulu conference early in February in committing the United States to the Ky Government is now being put to the test.

"But the gamble, officials acknowledge, is turning out to be considerably more risky than the Administration expected when President Johnson literally and figuratively put his arms around Premier Ky at the Honolulu conference."

South Vietnam has been seething with unrest since March 10. The political crisis was touched off by a split in the ruling military junta when General Ky ousted General Nguyen Canh Thi, overlord of the Hué-Danang area in central Vietnam, from the governing military council on charges of "insubordination."

At the time, Ky's action was hailed with satisfaction in Washington as a "strong" move, and it was indicated that the puppet premier had acted in accordance with American "advice."

As the April 3 New York Times put it in "The News of the Week in Review": "When the generals who run South Vietnam voted on March 10 to dismiss Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi as the military commander-governor of the country's five northernmost provinces, American officials in Saigon privately applauded them. Like the generals, the Americans viewed the development as a step toward solution of one of South Vietnam's most nagging problems -- the tendency toward sectional and religious separatism, which has hampered creation of an effective central government."

Ky's "advisers" are now trying to shake off a little of the responsibility for dumping General Thi. They only advised Ky as to the "methods"! At least that is the claim made in the April 2 Washington dispatch to the New York Times: "Premier Ky acted with American advice on the methods of the dismissal, although apparently not on the basis of American advice or recommendations in the decision to remove General Thi." Thus it was Ky's responsibility and not really Johnson's.

Moreover, all the subsequent errors were Ky's handiwork, not Johnson's: "But then, in its political inexperience, the Ky Government as now seen by United States officials, blundered in permitting General Thi to return to the northern domain rather than arranging for his speedy removal from the Vietnamese scene."

Buddhist and student groups in the northern provinces immediately took advantage of Ky's (or Johnson's) "blunder" to come out into the streets and clamor for an end to military rule. The Ky government, rattled by the scope of the mass protests, compounded the "blunder," by sending General Thi back to Hué charged with the mission of calming the turmoil.

Things had already gone too far. As Ky's (or Johnson's) victim, General Thi, had gained instant popularity. The turmoil flared

higher. In Danang a general strike and student boycott of classes have paralyzed the city since the early days of the outbreak.

On March 27, some 20,000 antigovernment demonstrators marched through Hué in a procession about two miles long. They called for an end to military rule, the establishment of a constitutional government and the holding of free elections long promised by Ky.

By this time the centers of commotion in the northernmost provinces had slipped from control by the Saigon government. The March 27 parade involved 1,000 south Vietnamese soldiers along with local public officials. On March 29 the student leaders of the movement telegraphed Ky that unless he promptly answered their demands for a return to civilian government they would set off violent demonstrations.

Their protests quickly acquired a sharp anti-American edge. The most explosive incident occurred March 30 in Danang, where U.S. marines are based, when a military truck collided with a Vietnamese bus taking part in an antigovernment cavalcade. The student organizers sent President Johnson a 48-hour ultimatum demanding an apology for this interference. They added that they would be forced to take further acts if they got no satisfaction.

They also accused American marines of punching four demonstrators. Within three hours of the incident a crowd of about 2,000 gathered outside the billets housing the U.S. servicemen and demanded an apology from the marine commandant. They received one from a resident official.

The Hué-Danang area was obviously in a state of semi-insurrection. Students temporarily took over radio stations in the northern cities and broadcast antigovernment speeches. On April 1, after 10,000 people had assembled at military headquarters in Hué to hear pacifying speeches from General Thi and General Pham Xuan Chieu, third ranking member of the military directorate, student and Buddhist leaders gave orders that Chieu be prohibited from leaving the city and returning to Saigon. They threatened reprisals against anyone who tried to provide him with transportation.

The volatility of the situation was well illustrated by the attitude of the crowd toward Chieu. Thousands swarmed around the hotel where he was staying, demanding that he come out and speak. The general was apparently fearful of appearing, and not without reason. If he should indicate that his mission was to pacify their boisterousness, he might be torn apart limb by limb. Thi saved Chieu by addressing the crowd and then introducing his fellow general, who made some most diplomatic remarks. The crowd roared its approval and then insisted on wheeling the two generals in pedicabs down the street. Judging from the pictures shown on TV in New York, the pair did not feel that they were in the safest of hands. General Thi was reported in the April 3 New York Times as telling a friend, "I have been overtaken by events."

The day after detaining Chieu, militant Buddhists led a

general strike that closed down everything but the essential services. No move was made by soldiers or national policemen to stop the strike.

Beginning March 26 the anti-Ky and anti-American protests had spread south. On the same day that antiwar demonstrations were held throughout the United States and other countries, teen-agers and children marched into the central market of Saigon chanting "Down with Ky" and "We Want Democracy."

Denunciations of the war, demands for civilian government, and thrusts at U.S. domination continued through the week. At a rally in the same market square in downtown Saigon March 31 student orators condemned "an anti-Communism...that demands the rejection of our sovereignty in the economic, political and military fields." One declared: "The government intentionally mistook a friendly country for a master and thereby transformed Vietnam into a submissive country" and "a testing place for international forces to try out their new weapons."

Other students nailed crayon caricatures of Ky and two other junta leaders to the stakes along one side of the square used for public executions of traitors and profiteers. This grim portent of the Ky regime's future was shown on U.S. television screens.

South Vietnam's most powerful Catholic leader, Rev. Hoang Quynh, charged March 26 that the country's military dictatorship was "worse than the dictatorial government of Ngo Dinh Diem" which was overthrown in 1963.

Thus the junta of generals headed by Ky finds itself openly opposed by Buddhist and Catholic leaders and students in the principal cities who have been joined by its own public officials and soldiers in the five northernmost provinces. The regime lacks any popular support and hangs on solely through the backing of its foreign paymaster.

In this taut situation, Ky's American "advisers" were apparently itching for a display of "force" to stop the demonstrations forthwith. In an informative article in the April 1 New York Times, Tom Wicker indicated that the Johnson administration was weighing dumping General Ky because of his weakness. Among the faults now found in Johnson's favorite puppet is an apparent inability to crackdown on his critics:

"Nor does Washington understand why the Ky Government has tolerated such events as the temporary take-over of radio stations in northern cities by student demonstrators, who then broadcast anti-Government propaganda.

"Marshal Ky has threatened to take 'very, very strong measures' if the unrest continues, but has not yet done so. This also puzzles the Administration, although it is remembered here that when the Diem regime responded with violence to Buddhist opposition in 1963, the effect was only to create even stronger sentiment against the Government."

Ky finally responded to this pressure emanating from the political genius in the White House.

On April 1 Ky ordered authorities throughout the country to forbid antigovernment agitation and if necessary to prevent it forcibly. He said it was "time to protect the people, time to stop the trouble and demonstrations." Then he added: "I either stop it or resign."

The sound of clubs on the bodies of students was heard in Saigon April 3 as combat policemen charged 300 youths staging a sit-down protest outside the Saigon radio station. Tear-gas grenades helped break up the demonstration. "By sending the combat police into action today," said Charles Mohr in a report to the New York Times, "the government was gambling that it was better to use force and risk public indignation than to let the protests go unchecked in the capital." It remains to be seen how well the Ky-Johnson strategy works.

Meanwhile in Hué, 3,000 troops of the Saigon regime marched April 2 in a demonstration against Ky's dictatorship. Some Saigon "officials" (probably American) described this action as "virtual mutiny."

And in Danang the same day, 10,000 demonstrators marched against Ky's government, some of them shouting anti-American slogans. "The Government," said Mohr, "which has apparently lost its authority in the northern area of South Vietnam, proved powerless to prevent the marches."

The extreme shakiness of the Saigon puppet regime has placed the White House in an excruciating dilemma, as Washington correspondent Tom Wicker explained in his previously cited article. Can the Johnson administration "afford to let the present military government fall or should it move openly to keep it in power if that becomes necessary?"

Kennedy confronted a similar problem in 1963 when hatred of Diem's dictatorship reached its peak. Then the CIA encouraged compliant generals to do away with its used-up servitor.

However, circumstances have changed since then. First, there has been a succession of short-lived military regimes in the three years since Diem's assassination. Second, large sections of the American people and many allies of the U.S. have become increasingly disturbed by Washington's manipulation of its Vietnamese puppets which belie the last pretensions of Saigon's independence.

Finally, the U.S. president, writes Wicker, "publicly embraced the Ky government at the Honolulu conference in February, proclaimed its leaders as partners in winning the war and rebuilding south Vietnam, and gave strong endorsement to its plans for pacification and other reform programs."

If Ky is now overthrown by popular pressure, or even by a military coup, that could only be considered as a repudiation of the

United States. Moreover, "that could have strong repercussions on public opinion in this country, in Congress, and among other governments," says Wicker. It would deal a damaging blow to Johnson's prestige and credibility.

Finally, writes the New York Times reporter, if Ky goes, there looms "the possibility that a new government would seek to end the war. And no one here pretends that the downfall of the present regime would be less than a serious setback to the United States in the larger world picture."

For these reasons it appears that Johnson will do all he can to preserve his present puppet and save him from going the way of his predecessors. His fall would remove the last trace of political stability in south Vietnam and leave the United States nakedly exposed as an imperialist invader and occupier of the country -- the only force insisting on continuing the dirty war.

CUBANS URGE INCREASED AID FOR VIETNAM

The Cuban delegation at the twenty-third congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union sounded a refreshingly militant note at a gathering that otherwise appeared committed to stressing "peaceful coexistence" and the partial rehabilitation of Stalin.

According to the April 1 issue of Izvestia, Armando Hart Davalos, the head of the Cuban delegation, called for greatly increased material aid to Hanoi and to the Vietnamese freedom fighters. He insisted that "the necessary risk" must be taken to help them win against the invading U.S. imperialist forces. Hart was quoted as saying:

"From a tactical point of view, a military force should be created capable of stopping the bombardment of north Vietnam, of deactivating United States aircraft that are bombing Vietnamese territory.

"Of decisive importance is the halting of the criminal aggression the bombardment represents, using all means available and taking the necessary risk.

"It is necessary to undertake final efforts and give decisive aid in order to transform the territory of north Vietnam into a cemetery of American aircraft.

"It is necessary, if the conditions demand, to be ready for battle in Vietnam with the aim of defending the territorial integrity and the very existence of this fraternal country."

An account in the New York press said that Hart's speech caused a "commotion" in the hall. Tass, the official press agency, did not include this part of the speech in the accounts it sent

overseas. Apparently the Brezhnev-Kosygin team found it embarrassing.

The proposal should not have astonished the Kremlin, however. In a speech in Havana March 13, the text of which has just been received in New York, Fidel Castro explained at some length why the "socialist countries" should have united in a common front at once when Johnson began bombing north Vietnam. Despite the differences, said Castro, obviously referring to the Sino-Soviet conflict, all the governments in the line of fire should have taken vigorous measures.

In view of the superiority of the "socialist countries" in "conventional" wars that do not involve nuclear weapons, they could more than cancel out American air power in the theater of conflict.

Castro added that despite the sharp differences that had arisen between Cuba and Peking because of the economic pressure Mao brought to bear in hope of gaining political concessions from Havana, the Cuban government would stand firmly on the side of China in case of a U.S. attack. Castro said that the Cubans would take this stand although they know full well that in the event of a conflict of this kind, they will be among the first victims of American imperialism due to their exposed geographical position.

STALIN GIVEN RETOUCH JOB AT SOVIET CONGRESS

Stalin died March 5, 1953 -- thirteen years ago. Yet the dictator has not yet been laid to rest in the Soviet Union. In fact at the twenty-third congress which opened in Moscow March 29, Stalin seemed to be enjoying at least the status of a living corpse among the bureaucrats whom he hand-selected for positions of power and privilege under his dictatorial regime. If there was no thought, for the moment, of reviving the famous "cult of the personality," steps were clearly underway to slow down if not to reverse the so-called "de-Stalinization" process initiated by Khrushchev at the twentieth congress in 1956.

One of the proposals under consideration by the delegates at the current congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union was to revive the title of "General Secretary" which Stalin assumed in 1922. This proposal was made by Nikolai G. Yegorychev, secretary of the party's Moscow city committee.

Yegorychev raised the question of partially rehabilitating Stalin by stating that the "cult of the personality" and the notorious practices associated with it have been "decisively rejected by the party" and "there will never be any return to that past."

After this reassuring opening, the Moscow bureaucrat got to the business at hand:

"At the same time the party also resolutely rejects every attempt to cancel out the heroic history of our people, which under the party's leadership has trod the hard but glorious path of struggle and victories for almost half a century."

The point to this is the theory that Stalin, despite all his crimes, must be credited with accomplishing some good. Otherwise how are the achievements of the Soviet Union to be explained?

The Trotskyist answer to this is that they were achieved despite Stalin and that they are due to the inherent power of a planned economy, even one suffering from grave bureaucratic shackles and distortions.

Stalin's heirs, like their late master, however, in order to justify their bureaucratic rule are compelled to identify the workers state with their own regime and to represent the achievements as due to their special capacities. Unfortunately for them, this leaves them completely incapable of offering a Marxist explanation for the vicissitudes of the Soviet government since Lenin's time.

The embarrassment faced by Stalin's heirs is understood by every serious student of Soviet affairs. It is generally known even among the better informed correspondents of the bourgeois press.

Thus Bernard Feron, correspondent of the Paris daily Le Monde, wrote on this subject [March 29]: "In a general way the history of the party must be brought into some order. It happens, as it enters its fiftieth year, that the Soviet regime, which is supposed to be the best in the world, in fact presents the peculiarity of having been headed by traitors, tyrants or incompetents. At least that is the impression given by the official textbooks. At the beginning, of course, there was Lenin, who was perfect but whose closest companions bore the names of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin. Then there was Stalin, who in accordance with the euphemism employed the past ten years, imposed the cult of the personality. Finally there was Khrushchev, who was a muddle-headed, incompetent figure. It is understandable that the members are disconcerted, since they are called on to revile all those who for years they had to venerate and praise. After decades, those in the saddle for the moment put a cross on all those who lost in the political battles. Hence the rehabilitations are only too often decided on as were the condemnations, more for opportunistic reasons than for concern about historic truth. These procedures can be effective in the short run. Over a longer period they destroy the confidence of the citizens and the members; they undermine the foundations of the regime."

Feron asks whether a partial rehabilitation of Stalin at present will not upset the work of the twentieth and twenty-second congresses. He thinks that the question is quite serious since there have been many indications that the Kremlin is considering trying to remove some of the tarnish on Stalin; and this has led to considerable uneasiness and even protests from intellectuals.

"The debate would be much clearer if Mr. Khrushchev and his comrades had presented a serious analysis of Stalinism in 1956; if they had really posed the problem of democracy in the party and in a socialist country. But, for reasons easy to understand, they claimed that the organism remained perfectly healthy during the period of the 'cult,' that the general policy applied by Stalin was correct and that it was sufficient to condemn the excesses of the former dictator. The author of the secret report sought to make up for the insufficiency of thought by a certain bitterness. Thus it was easy for the unreconstructed Stalinists to declare that the picture was made too black and that corrections are required."

The question should be taken up by the historians, Feron continues. After being the only star on the Soviet scene for thirty years, Stalin was swept into the ashcan. It is high time that these historians indicate the true place occupied by all those who played a role in their time. "But are they ready to conduct this work to the end by, for example, studying Trotsky's activities? It is to be feared that once again, an examination of the past is only a pretext, that certain people are seeking the partial rehabilitation of Stalin only to restore Stalinism."

The truth is that the bureaucratic caste that seized power in the Soviet Union, destroying the Bolshevik party build by Lenin and liquidating all the revolutionary leaders who remained faithful to Marxism-Leninism, still holds power. Since Stalin's death, the caste has made considerable concessions in face of mass pressure, but it has not started to reform itself nor does it intend to. For that matter, it has not even as yet acknowledged its own existence. But to bring out the truth about Stalin's rule, Khrushchev's rule and the rule of Brezhnev-Kosygin it is necessary to establish the elementary fact of the existence of the conservative, parasitic social forces they have represented. Recognition of this fact, however, would constitute a mortal danger to the continued special privileges of the bureaucratic caste and its monopoly of the Soviet government.

Deep-going trends are undermining the position of the bureaucratic caste. Internationally, the Soviet Union -- second in strength only to the United States -- should be playing a much more vigorous role against the thrust of American imperialism toward world domination. To be subjected to the rule of a parasitic layer that shuts its eyes to the clear danger represented by such moves as the imperialist invasion of Vietnam is becoming increasingly intolerable. Similarly at home the incapacity of the bureaucratic caste to eliminate the grave contradictions hampering a swifter rise in productivity is becoming more and more irritating. On the political level, the Soviet workers, students and intellectuals are growing impatient with the interminable delay in restoring Soviet democracy. Rallying Stalin against these forces will not stop them from advancing and finally burying the dead dictator and his heirs along with him.

MILITARY REGIME IN ECUADOR TOSSED OUT

The military junta that seized power in Quito through a coup d'état July 11, 1963, fell March 29 in the face of popular demonstrations. On the following day a businessman, Clemente Yerovi Indaburu, was sworn in as provisional president. The selection of Yerovi was an obvious attempt by the military to gain time by placating the masses with a return to ostensible "civilian rule."

Originally the junta was made up of four military figures: Rear-Admiral Ramón Castro Jijón, General Luis Cabrera Sevilla, General Marcos Gándara Enríquez and Colonel Guillermo Freile Posso. Four months ago Colonel Freile was arrested by the other three in the junta on charges of getting involved in "politics." The current unrest began about that time.

The background, however, goes back to the unseating of José María Velasco Ibarra on November 8, 1961. Ecuador was shaken at the time by popular demonstrations throughout the country. Agitation for a radical agrarian reform in the example of Cuba was particularly noticeable.

Velasco Ibarra was replaced by Carlos Julio Arosmena Monroy. Hopes were high that he would at least initiate an agrarian reform. Arosmena sought to temporize, offering a mild agrarian reform that never really got beyond pious words. Under pressure from American imperialism, Arosmena broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, still further weakening his position. The military then took over.

The charges levelled by the junta against Arosmena were not exactly on a high political level. They accused him of making a public spectacle of himself by hitting the bottle.

The nonalcoholic junta, however, proved as incapable of solving the basic problems facing the Ecuadorian masses as the alcoholic Arosmena. Inflation continued to undercut the already abysmal standard of living. The United States continued to profit as the imperialist buyer of Ecuador's banana crop. The land still remained in the hands of the oligarchy.

Students began staging demonstrations in late January. On February 7 the student federation issued a call to overthrow the junta. Students then met with representatives of the workers and demonstrations broke out on a massive scale in Quito and Guayaquil and other places. Recently small businessmen joined in the demonstrations, pulling down the steel shutters on their shops as the crowds stood up to the police and troops. The armed violence mobilized by the junta finally proved insufficient to put down the popular demonstrations.

Whether the sop of Yerovi will prove sufficient to stem the unrest remains to be seen. As he took the oath of office, he was greeted with cries of "Oligarch's lackey!" and "Military stooge!"

ANTIWAR MOVEMENT ON THE RISE IN THE U.S.

By Caroline Jenness

The antiwar movement in the United States, which began one year ago with the April 17 March on Washington and developed through teach-ins, rallies and the growth of "Committees to End the War in Vietnam" all across the country, suffered a temporary lull during Johnson's "peace offensive." With the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam, however, the antiwar movement responded with renewed vigor and opposed the escalation of the war through militant demonstrations in every major city in the U.S. These reached a peak in the International Days of Protest March 25-26 when the number of participants in the demonstrations reached a height never before equalled in the antiwar movement in the United States. In New York, for instance, the estimated turnout, as reported in the bourgeois news media, was between 75,000 and 100,000 in New York City alone.

The recent wave of demonstrations also reflected growing clarity among the antiwar activists, who have learned through experience that the stated aims of the government cannot be trusted.

The various campus organizations increased their activities, such as selling literature against the war, going door to door in the dormitories trying to convince students about the nature of the war, and organizing discussion groups, rallies and marches. At the University of California at Berkeley, four to five thousand students boycotted classes on February 9 in order to attend a rally against the war. The previous week, students in the Vietnam Day Committee demanded discussions in their classrooms about the character of the war in Vietnam. On February 23, more than 350 women from the Vietnam Day Committee and from neighborhood peace groups marched on an armed services induction center in Oakland, California, with a banner demanding "Bring Our Men Home from Vietnam Now."

Since the resumption of the bombings, the antiwar movement has been steadily gaining support from broader layers of the population. The statement against the war issued by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee [SNCC], a civil-rights organization based in the South, has stimulated more open support for the antiwar movement from the Negro community. The SNCC statement said:

"We recoil with horror at the inconsistency of this supposedly free society where responsibility to freedom is equated with responsibility to lend one's self to military aggression. We take note of the fact that 16 per cent of the draftees from this country are Negro, called on to stifle the liberation of Vietnam, to preserve a 'democracy' which does not exist for them at home."

There has been widespread support for Julian Bond, a 26-year-old Negro and member of SNCC, who was elected to the Georgia House of Representatives but was not permitted his seat because of his views on the war in Vietnam.

The increased sentiment against the war in the population as a whole has been reflected in the quantity of mail U.S. senators are receiving. Senators Morse and Fulbright report receiving hundreds of letters and telegrams supporting their stand against escalation of the war. Senator Mansfield said his mail was running 100 to 1 against the war. Another reflection of the discontent with the war is a statement issued by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, the first national trade union affiliated to the AFL-CIO to criticize Johnson's policy publicly.

With the increased escalation of the war, the antiwar demonstrations have become increasingly militant, the slogan "Bring the Troops Home Now" becoming more and more popular as was clearly evident in the huge parade in New York March 26. A good example of the spirit in the antiwar demonstrations was provided by the February 23 demonstration in New York when 5,000 participants assembled outside the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel where President Johnson was being given a "freedom award." Supported by almost every radical and antiwar group in the city, the rally was marked by signs calling for an immediate end to the war and withdrawal of U.S. troops. The chant of the pickets probably reached the ears of Johnson as he received his decoration, "LBJ, LBJ, How Many Kids Have You Killed Today?"

A newly formed Harlem group, the "Afro-Americans to End the War in Vietnam," carried a huge banner: "Bring Our Black G.I.'s Home Now." (Similar Afro-American committees have also been formed in Detroit, Boston and Chicago.) The picket line culminated in a rally where Julian Bond was presented with a real freedom award by the demonstrators.

Against this increased militancy, the government made a move seeking to intimidate and silence the antiwar movement. On March 4, U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board to require the DuBois Clubs of America to register with the federal government as a "Communist front" organization. The DuBois Clubs is a pro-Moscow socialist youth group that has been actively opposing the Vietnam war. The day after the announcement of Katzenbach's petition, the national headquarters of the organization in San Francisco was bombed and members of the DuBois Clubs in New York City were beaten by police and hooligans outside their headquarters.

The antiwar movement rallied solidly to the defense of the DuBois Clubs, and committees against the war all over the country passed resolutions protesting this violation of the right to free speech as an attack on the whole movement against the war. Some antiwar activists, including Yale professor Staughton Lynd, have joined the DuBois Clubs as a demonstrative act of opposition to the government attack. So far, this witch-hunt attack by the government has not diminished the force of the antiwar movement.

The organizing effort that went into preparing for the International Days of Protest March 25-26 showed how much the movement has grown in the five months since the first International Days of Protest October 15-16. A new publication, Bring the Troops Home Now

Newsletter (Box 317, Mt. Auburn Post Office, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02139) helped spark the militant tone of the nationwide demonstrations. The Newsletter carries articles on the truth about the war and reports of antiwar activities in the major cities of the country. The publication and its supporters call for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops, holding that slogans centered around appeals for "negotiations" play into the hands of the Johnson administration. The circulation of the Newsletter is expanding in a most encouraging way.

The debate over whether the antiwar movement should call for negotiations or for withdrawal of U.S. troops has recently spread among members of the DuBois Clubs. Although the official position of the organization is to favor negotiations, the National Committee is divided on the question and this is reflected in the ranks. In face of the increasing militancy of the antiwar movement in the U.S. and the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese freedom fighters who reject negotiations until the invaders withdraw, many members of the DuBois Clubs think that a socialist group in the imperialist United States should show its solidarity with the Vietnamese revolutionists by demanding complete withdrawal of U.S. troops even if this position does not conform with the theory of "peaceful coexistence."

LONDONERS PROTEST WAR IN VIETNAM

By Brian Gormley

London

The call by the American antiwar movement for protest demonstrations March 25-26 against Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam met with active response in London despite feverish last-minute electioneering. The Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament organized a march of more than 1,000 participants which wound its way through the West End March 26, chanting slogans against the war in Vietnam.

A segment of the marchers attempted to demonstrate in front of the American embassy, but the police were expecting this and at times actually out-numbered the protesters. They dispersed the demonstration.

For a city the size of London, a turnout of 1,000 is not large. However it must be considered in the context of the apathy in England in recent months despite the escalation of the war in Vietnam. The march is the first sign of an upturn.

The night before the demonstration a meeting was sponsored by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign at the London Welsh Association Hall. The speakers were Robin Blackburn of the New Left Review; Raymond Williams, author of Culture and Society and The Long Revolution; Ken Coates, who is associated with The Week and the International Socialist Journal; and Ralph Schoenman of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, who was recently in north Vietnam. The meeting was chaired by an American now living in London, David Horowitz, author

of the recently published book Free World Colossus.

Robin Blackburn told about his experiences in Havana where he attended the Tricontinental Conference as an invited observer for the Russell Foundation.

He met many of the young fighters of the National Liberation Front at Havana, he said, and they told him about the fierce nature of their struggle.

Blackburn described the Tricontinental Conference as an example of the widespread resistance in the "third world" to imperialism. What the FLN members told him was a "general picture applicable to Latin America and Africa, a world-wide phenomenon that brings forth a world-wide response."

Referring to the resistance movements in many countries that never receive mention in the Western press, he called for Socialist movements in the imperialist countries to demonstrate solidarity with them.

The National Liberation Front fighters were of the opinion, he said, that the time might come when it would be necessary to ask for volunteers to help Vietnam, even if only in token numbers. One of the things that might be done now, said Blackburn, is to collect names in preparation for such a turn.

Raymond Williams said that the main problem with intellectual thinking in the West is that it does not see the historical necessity for revolution. That is why they fail in their approach to Vietnam. There has been an institutionalizing of brutality in the colonial world, he said, and a considerable lag in liberal understanding of that brutality.

"There are four common positions on Vietnam in this country," he continued, "not simply two -- one for and one against the Americans."

On the American side there is the position that the policy of containing Communism is correct and the variant that while it is correct it is taking place at the wrong time and at the wrong place. This position he labelled as "incredibly smart."

On the left, he illustrated the two positions by describing his own experiences in February 1965 when he came down to London from Cambridge with a group of students after they had collected several thousand signatures on a petition demanding "negotiations."

"Then suddenly the Johnson line became the Wilson line! We were left looking silly -- getting down to saying what kind of negotiations. While we had the right instincts, we were outflanked."

Williams said, "I now see the call for negotiations was a trick. While we didn't put forward the position as a trick, but out of the best instincts, it is being used against us."

Ken Coates attacked the position of the Labour party leadership on Vietnam, comparing the statements they made before and after they gained office. He quoted Harold Wilson, showing how he had once opposed the American policy in Vietnam and supported the revolution. This was in the tradition of the Labour movement. "Wilson lies in his teeth," said Coates, "when he uses Nye Bevan to bolster his argument of support for the Americans. Bevan resigned from the Shadow cabinet of the Labour party in order to influence policy."

Commenting on those in the government who have acquiesced to Wilson's capitulation to Johnson on the ground that their hands were tied by the small majority held by Labour, Coates said, "It's a lie, a deception, morally debasing, to believe that pressure can be exerted from seats of power."

He referred specifically to Anthony Greenwood. "How many times we marched behind him on the Easter CND March, when he used to make all those wonderful statements against the bomb and against war!"

Ralph Schoenman had just come from Hanoi. He had also been in New York where he had given evidence on behalf of David H. Mitchell who was on trial on charges of violating the draft laws because he refused to report for induction on the legal ground that under the statutes applied at the Nuremberg war criminal trials, the United States is now engaging in a criminal war.

In Vietnam, Schoenman talked with men and women who had suffered torture under techniques practiced by the Nazis and later by the French imperialists in Algeria. He described the water torture, systematic mutilations, the gas used by the Americans that causes immediate abortions in pregnant women and sometimes blindness and permanent nervous shock.

"It makes me sick as an American," he said, "to see and learn of this, to know that Americans are doing it."

He held that "those people who tell the Vietnamese they should negotiate under these circumstances are betrayers." It was a racist outlook, he said, that led people into such a position. "What would the British have said in 1940, when they were being bombed, when London was blitzed every night, if someone had told them to negotiate, or if Mussolini had sent a peace mission?"

He was convinced, he said, that if it were a people with a white skin who were being victimized like the Vietnamese -- for example, the Belgians or some other European nation -- the response of the British people would be much greater.

"We have to examine this racism," he said; "we have to see it in ourselves, before we can do what has to be done about Vietnam."

VIETNAMESE THANK ISRAELI DEMONSTRATORS

Tel Aviv

A letter of thanks for expressions of solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people -- the first of its kind received in Israel -- was sent by the European delegation of the National Front for the Liberation of south Vietnam to the secretary of the Israeli Peace Committee, Yaakov Majus.

The letter was read at a well-attended meeting of solidarity with Vietnam held recently in Tel Aviv under sponsorship of the Israeli Peace Committee. Both Jewish and Arab youth were present.

The text of the letter was as follows:

"Allow me to acknowledge receipt of your letter and telegram of February 15 and 16 to Professor Nguin-Van-Hiu, chairman of our European delegation. As he is still away traveling, and in order to avoid further delays, we wish to thank you for your expression of solidarity with the struggle of our people.

"We are following with much interest and thanks the campaign the forces of peace in Israel are waging against the American war of aggression in Vietnam. We are confident that more and more people in Israel will join this movement and demand the cessation of the war by the American government, withdrawal of her troops, so that the people of Vietnam will be left alone and free to settle their own affairs.

"With greetings for peace and best regards on behalf of the secretariat of the National Front for the Liberation of south Vietnam in Czechoslovakia.

"Pam Van-Chuing."

The letter was read by the chairman of the meeting Dov Peleg (secretary of the youth section of the Mapam -- left Socialist party). It was greeted enthusiastically by the youthful audience.

Speeches were given by Muhamed Yunes (Mapam), the writer and translator Mordekai Avi-Shaul, Danny Peter (Communist party) and the Canadian-born theatrical producer and veteran of the Spanish Civil War, Peter Frey, who compared the anti-imperialist war of liberation of the Vietnamese people with the struggle waged thirty years ago by the Spanish workers and peasants.

The meeting concluded with the sending of a telegram of protest to the American embassy in Israel, demanding cessation of American aggression and the granting of the right of the Vietnamese to decide their own future.

This meeting wasn't the only expression of solidarity with Vietnam in Israel. During the last few months, many meetings were held all over the country by the various workers parties, except, of

course, for the official Social-Democratic Mapai.

A pamphlet on Vietnam has been published and distributed by the youth section of the Mapam.

Two demonstrations were held on Saturday, March 26, in Tel Aviv and Haifa, as part of the "International Solidarity Day with Vietnam." Thousands of workers and youths participated in these demonstrations.

The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Abba Eban denied a statement made by Saigon's ambassador in Washington regarding a decision by his government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel so that aid could be received from Israel in establishing frontier settlements. Eban declared in the Knesset [parliament] that his government doesn't contemplate establishing diplomatic relations at this stage. He denied having made any contacts with Saigon for this purpose.

At a public forum held in Tel Aviv, the representatives of the major political parties, including right-wing opposition parties, endorsed the statement made by the minister.

The Israeli press and politically informed circles consider the statement made by the Saigon ambassador in Washington to be part of the political and diplomatic pressure being exerted lately by the American government on Israel to establish diplomatic relations with Saigon.

So far, the Eshkol government has successfully resisted the American pressure. It's up to mass pressure from the Israeli socialist and peace movement to prevent any change of the government's policy regarding the blood-stained Saigon regime.

"WAR ON POVERTY" ADDS FUEL TO FLAMES

By Evelyn Sell

Detroit

The Johnson administration's two-year-old "War on Poverty" has always been intimately linked with the American black people's war on racism and second-class citizenship. Federally funded and controlled programs are continually being dangled in front of Negroes in the hopes that a lot of promises and a few crumbs will dampen and divert black protests and struggles.

A recent move along these lines is the special task force, created by President Johnson and headed by Vice-President Humphrey, to reduce teen-age unemployment and social unrest during the coming summer. Unemployment among Negro youths consistently runs twenty-five per cent -- substantially greater than among white youths. The government estimates that 1,750,000 youths will not be able to find work this summer without aid.

Humphrey headed a similar task force last summer. The plainly announced goal at that time was to head off the kind of racial explosions that rocked the East Coast during the summer of 1964. Almost a million jobs were found for youths during the summer of 1965 (37,000 jobs provided directly by the federal government and the rest by private industry, churches and social welfare groups). Despite this apparent success, the Watts ghetto of Los Angeles exploded in a mass black revolt that made the 1964 Harlem events look minor by comparison.

Undismayed by this contradiction, this year's task force is again designed to prevent black youth revolts. Just ten days after the president announced the job-getting program, Watts erupted again. The occurrence of "another Watts" provides a significant commentary on the effectiveness of federal antipoverty programs as a means of stifling ghetto struggles.

After the Watts revolt of August 1965 a Governor's Commission was created to study the underlying causes of the event. After a 100-day investigation, the commission issued its report (popularly known as the McCone report because the commission was headed by former Central Intelligence Agency Director John A. McCone). Among the "series of aggravating events" in the year preceding the August revolt were listed: "Publicity given to the glowing promise of the federal poverty program was paralleled by reports of controversy and bickering over the mechanism to handle the program here in Los Angeles, and when the projects did arrive, they did not live up to their press notices."

The press notices following the August revolt continued to give publicity to glowing promises that never came true. For example, a Detroit Free Press headline [November 25, 1965] announced: "Watts Gets 1.8 Million For Poor." Sargent Shriver, director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, announced that this sum for neighborhood social services had been designated specifically for Watts and the surrounding area. Three days later, the New York Times pointed out that the funds allocated for the Watts area are for "long-term social assistance projects rather than anything geared to the urgency suggested by the County Commission on Human Relations." This commission had stated that 5,000 new jobs were "imperatively" needed in the Watts area to avert further "trouble." Local politicians were reported to be reluctant to funnel millions into Watts because they didn't want to appear to "reward lawbreaking."

Article after article about Watts cited the lack of jobs as a crucial factor which helped provoke the August revolt. It was estimated that one out of every three men in Watts was without work. Press reports repeatedly highlighted the demands for federal job programs from high-ranking committees and public figures. The California advisory committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights called for "Immediate assignment of a federal official to decide on allocation of federal funds. Among other things, he would help establish a crash program to help the unemployed find jobs, including new jobs created with federal funds."

The McCone Commission recommended that "our robust community take immediate steps to relieve the lack of job opportunity...by cooperative programs for employment and training." California Governor Brown hastened to agree, stating: "Your proposal confirms to me the fact that the real key to this is jobs." He told the commission that he had sent a copy of their report to the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Glowing promises again.

A March 8 Detroit News article, however, reported "Watts Unchanged as New Programs Lag." The article explained:

"Four overlapping community action programs have been initiated by Mayor Samuel Yorty of Los Angeles. He takes a lively interest in the politics of the situation but has failed to convince any of Watts' thousands of Negroes that he really cares.

"Gov. Brown's request for a \$2.5-billion massive public works program has gone unheeded in Washington."

Six months after the August revolt, it was reported that Watts had the following antipoverty programs in action: the Westminister Neighborhood Association with an annual budget of \$840,000; four teen-age canteens; a legal aid assistance office; a state employment referral office. Social workers in the area were calling for a crash program that would channel from \$30 million to \$75 million a year into Watts.

Six months of pious speeches and pronouncements from President Johnson down to Mayor Yorty. Six months of calls for crash programs. Six more months of living with the cancerous problems of the Watts ghetto. While the glowing promises were making the headlines, the Los Angeles police were preparing.

The day after the March eruption the Detroit News reported: "Lt. Frank Beeson said police had learned some valuable lessons last August which were applied successfully yesterday. 'Last time we used motorcycle officers, who proved very vulnerable. This time we are sending everybody down in cars,' he said."

The next day the Detroit News explained: "Police maintained a tight grip on the Watts area today. Code 77 -- police radio language for rushing in every available patrol car to a specific area at the first hint of trouble -- was the newest step taken by the community to minimize disturbances before they could build into riots...Sheriff's deputies and California highway patrolmen would be available to back them up, as would California national guard, if needed."

Instead of stifling and diverting black struggles, the "War on Poverty" has served to add fuel to the burning frustrations already present. Then, when these frustrations reach the boiling point, the "War on Social Revolt" is launched. Once again, the ruling class relies on naked police force.

CEDRIC BELFRAGE DEPLORES CASTRO'S FACTIONAL POLEMICS

In the April 2 issue of the National Guardian, a progressive weekly published in New York that is widely read among American left-ist circles, Cedric Belfrage deploras the recent involvement of Fidel Castro in factional polemics. Belfrage, a founder of the National Guardian, was one of the prominent victims of the McCarthy-ite period. Deported from the United States, his name has been carried in the weekly's masthead ever since as "Editor-in-Exile." At present he is in Mexico where he has been following Latin-American developments.

Just before the Tricontinental Conference ended in Havana, Cedric Belfrage sent a dispatch to the National Guardian in which he said that in "the buoyant atmosphere of Cuba, unity against imperialism triumphed over internal Left disputes..." Writing now from Mexico City, he reports that while no one at the Havana gathering hoped that the rifts would be magically healed, still it "seemed that the epic struggle of the Vietnamese had forced disuniters into silence." The conference was thus a triumph for the "nonpartisan" attitude of Cuba in the conflicts of the anti-imperialist "schools."

"Many delegates were startled," continues Cedric Belfrage, "when Primer Fidel Castro, in his speech winding up the proceedings, himself launched the first intramural attack. Attributing to the Fourth (Trotskyist) International libelous statements about the disappearance of Che Guevara, he denounced it as a 'discredited, antihistoric, fraudulent' movement which had 'become a vulgar instrument of imperialism and reaction.' One 'well-known theorist of Trotskyism' attacked by Castro was Argentine journalist Adolfo Gilly, an enthusiast about Cuba and a champion (in U.S. progressive but non-Trotskyist publications, among others) of the Luis de la Puente guerrilla movement in Peru and the Yon Sosa guerrillas in Guatemala. The Guatemalan movement was represented at the conference by Luis Turcios, leader of the rival guerrilla group which insists that the Yon Sosa group is not only 'dangerously infiltrated by Trotskyists' but by police and CIA agents masquerading as such.

"But Castro's blast seemed out of context since the Peruvian guerrilla movement, which the conference treated with the same respect as all others, is well-known to have been sparked by Trotskyists. Furthermore Trotskyists have since shown from the record that the sources quoted by Castro on Guevara's disappearance were not Fourth International spokesmen, and that groups affiliated with the International have in fact always supported Castro and the Cuban revolution.

"By itself, the denunciation of the Trotskyists might have been shrugged off as an aberration from Castro's prudent line. But it turned out to be the first of a series of onslaughts, bringing Cuba into the thick of the controversy within the world movement."

The Editor-in-Exile of the National Guardian then notes that

Castro's restraint about the reduction of Chinese rice supplies to Cuba turned to "outright hostility toward China's leaders."

This was followed by an acrimonious reply to an editorial in Borba, the official organ of the League of Yugoslav Communists, on the Tricontinental Conference.

Then came Castro's denunciation of "Chile's Eduardo Frei, leader of the only South American regime elected on a radical platform, as a 'coward' and 'liar.'"

Cedric Belfrage deals in greater detail with these latter three disputes and also with Castro's comments on the recent trial in which seven defendants were charged with an assassination plot. However, he does not examine the possible reasons for Castro's plunge into this type of polemics. Perhaps he will return to the subject in a coming article.

CIA DOES CLOAK AND DAGGER JOB ON STATE DEPARTMENT

In a front-page story April 3, entitled "Passport Chief Flouts Orders On CIA Phone," the New York Herald Tribune indicated what may be the source of the mysterious power which Frances Knight, director of the Passport Office, appears to wield in the State Department. Miss Knight's superior, Abba Schwartz, recently resigned when he learned that his office had secretly been marked for dismantling. Schwartz, a liberal Democrat, had been warring with the reactionary Miss Knight over passport policy. Three years ago she was ordered to end direct connections with the CIA and "especially to remove a private CIA line she had then."

According to the Herald Tribune, Miss Knight "has ordered a direct 'scrambler' telephone to the Central Intelligence Agency installed in her office."

The Herald Tribune also said that it had learned "from reliable official sources that Miss Knight has on her staff at least three persons in 'intimate' contact with the CIA -- if not directly in that agency's employ."

Through these secret links, the CIA is able to by-pass the State Department's own secret service, the Intelligence and Research Bureau, in getting "special passports" or having ordinary applications turned down or tagged.

Miss Knight has also been in the news because of a recent rather sensational exposure that her office had requested the Paris and Moscow embassies to keep an eye on the Harvard historian Prof. H. Stuart Hughes who plans a trip to Europe. Miss Knight revealed that the request originated with the FBI, the agency that serves as America's secret political police, and that such procedures have been going on for thirty years!

THE LESSON OF INDONESIA

[The following statement on the meaning of the catastrophic defeat suffered by the workers and peasants in Indonesia at the hands of indigenous counterrevolutionary forces and their foreign imperialist backers was issued March 20 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the world party of socialist revolution founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938.]

* * *

(1) The United Secretariat of the Fourth International vigorously condemns the barbaric repression of the leaders, members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist party unleashed by the reactionary Indonesian army, the comprador and "bureaucratic" bourgeoisie and the clerical wing of the petty bourgeoisie. In this repression, the lives of more than 100,000 Communists have been taken and tens of thousands of Communists and other left wingers have been imprisoned or fired from their jobs, which is often equivalent to condemnation to starvation in face of the current mass unemployment. The Communist party press and mass organizations, including the largest trade-union federation in the country (SOBSI), have been officially banned. Many leading Communist party cadres have been murdered, and Njono, the general secretary of the SOBSI and a member of the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist party, has been executed after a farcical trial. All this was capped on March 12 with the official banning of the Communist party [PKI] throughout Indonesia.

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International asks the working-class organizations in all countries to start a mass protest campaign, demanding the immediate release of all political prisoners, the immediate legalization of all working-class parties, including the PKI, the Partai Acoma and the Partai Murbah. It calls for establishment of an international working-class Commission of Inquiry to investigate the fate of the top PKI leaders, Aidit, Lukman and Njoto, who, according to many sources, have been murdered by the military.

Out of solidarity, the international working class must be mobilized to the fullest extent to stop the dirty war being waged by the reactionary forces against the left in Indonesia!

(2) If it is now an elementary duty to defend the victims of reaction in Indonesia, this by no means signifies that there is less need to analyze the debacle suffered by the biggest Communist party in any capitalist country, a party with three million members and millions of sympathizers in various "front" organizations, and to draw the proper lessons from it. The main reasons for the tremendous defeat are as follows:

(a) The leadership of the Indonesian Communist party granted leadership of the Indonesian revolution to Sukarno, questioning that the state apparatus on which he stood was bourgeois in character; and, in contradiction to the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state,

presented this apparatus as a "people's state," a "national democracy" having "two sides" -- "one for the people, one against the people." The PKI accepted the theory of "revolution in stages," limiting the "first stage" in reality to the anti-imperialist and antifeudal struggle; and in practice even abandoning the fight for a proletarian, Communist leadership during this stage although it is declared necessary, in theory at least, by the leaders of the Chinese Communist party and even by Aidit himself in some of his writings.(1)

In fact, the leadership of the Indonesian CP went so far as to boast about its close collaboration with the Indonesian bourgeoisie,(2) and to openly express its support for Sukarno's ideology of the "Pantja Sila" (five principles), although one of the five is "belief in a single god." The Aidit leadership stressed its position that the "union" of the ideology of the "revolutionary classes" (including the "national" bourgeoisie!) was needed by the Indonesian revolution as long as Communism was not "eliminated" from the union!(3)

(1)"The Indonesian revolution is at the present stage bourgeois-democratic in character and not socialist and proletarian. But the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Indonesia no longer belongs to the old type, and is no longer part of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, which belongs to the past; it is a revolution of a new type, which is part of the proletarian socialist world revolution, firmly opposed to imperialism...Given the fact that the Indonesian revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type, it is the historical duty of the proletariat to struggle to conquer its leadership." (D.N.Aidit: The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Indonesian Communist Party. pp. 15-16. Peking. 1965.)

(2)In a speech at the School of Advanced Studies of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party in Peking, September 2, 1963, D.N.Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian CP made the following quite blunt statement: "The alliance with the national bourgeoisie has also been realized. The national bourgeoisie starts to return [!] to the side of the revolution, particularly since the party formulated a correct policy and overcame sectarianism in its ranks...We have now collaborated with the Indonesian bourgeoisie for nearly ten years, and the revolutionary forces have continually developed rather than grown fewer during this time, whereas the reactionary forces have experienced failure after failure. Even the public anti-Communist clamor of five or six years ago is officially condemned today as...against unity. President Sukarno has played an important role in the struggle against Communophobia and for national unity." (D.N. Aidit: *ibid.* pp. 82-82.) It would be difficult to find a better example of self-delusory opportunism paving the way for a tragic defeat.

(3)"Another concept which also reflects the unity of the nation and the unity of NASAKOM is expressed by the Pantja Sila or five principles: (1) belief in a single god; (2) humanitarianism or internationalism; (3) nationalism or patriotism; (4) democracy and (5) social justice. The Indonesian Communist party supports and sustains the Pantja Sila, although [!] one of its principles is belief in a single god, in view of the fact that the Pantja Sila, rather than being an

(b) For these reasons, the Indonesian CP, concentrating on "mass recruitment," and failing to provide adequate ideological education and revolutionary training for most of its members, bowed to Sukarno's initiatives for many years, abstaining from any appeal to mass struggles that could decisively change the relationship of social forces in the country. Sukarno arbitrarily suspended the constitution and reduced the Communist party to thirty seats in his new "appointed parliament" of 260 members; when he suspended democratic freedoms and ordered all parties to register for government authorization, the PKI accepted these infringements of its rights and even agreed to participate in the various cabinets which Sukarno subsequently formed. Included in these governments were such reactionaries as General A.H.Nasution, Hamengku Buwono, the sultan of Djokjakarta and the leading bourgeois politician Ruslan Abdulgani. Today they are the main political brains behind the counterrevolution and members of the counterrevolutionary Suharto cabinet. Yesterday the PKI leadership treated them as "brother revolutionists" and "allies" inside NASAKOM and Sukarno's cabinets. They even tried to use these arbitrary forms of Bonapartist government to eliminate some of their own competitors in the labor movement. But these very same rules and regulations have been used since October 1, 1965, to suppress the PKI itself. Discerning bourgeois observers have noted that the logic of the PKI policy was to leave the initiative with the anti-Communist forces.(4)

(c) At various times in recent years the Indonesian masses moved into action against the declining standard of living due to mass unemployment, inflation, high prices, the plunder of state property by the army high command, rampant corruption in the state administration, etc. Again and again they seized imperialist property, occupied plantations and factories, sought to divide the holdings of the big landowners. Again and again, the Sukarno regime and its stooges, with the help of the army, drove out the masses and placed the administration of the properties in their own corrupt hands. Again and again, the PKI leadership refrained from supporting these mass uprisings, refrained from educating the masses and their vanguard in the spirit of preparing to fight for power. It even refrained from systematically denouncing the dangerous reaction looming not only in the religious organizations but also in the army high command in particular. Aidit referred over and over only to the parties suppressed by Sukarno -- the Masjumi and the Social Demo-

attempted substitute for the philosophy of all its supporters, combined [!] all existing ideological tendencies in society. The party is, however, resolutely opposed to those who seek to transform one [!] of the five silas into the leading dominant tendency." (D.N. Aidit: *ibid.* p. 85.)

(4)An American liberal bourgeois observer, Donald Hindley, correctly summed up the political situation in Indonesia resulting from Aidit's tactics: "Meanwhile, however, the fate of Indonesia would be determined largely by the action or inaction of the non-Communists." (The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963. p. 304. University of California Press. 1964.)

cratic party -- as agents of imperialism and feudal reaction. (5) As a result the military coup of October 1-2, 1965, caught the masses completely by surprise.

It is true that a few months before the counterrevolutionary coup, Aidit shifted his line somewhat to the left. He began to call on Sukarno to arm the workers and peasants (which the Indonesian Bonaparte, of course, carefully refrained from doing). Aidit called on the masses to "seize" the imperialist properties as well as the nationalized properties administered by the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" or the army. (Speech September 25, 1965, at the closing rally of the sixth congress of the plantation workers trade unions, reported in the September 27, 1965, issue of the party's central organ Harian Rakjat.) It is true that in the same speech he warned the masses in an obscure and indirect way: "History has compelled the people and the working class of the entire world to choose between being an anvil and a hammer. If they become an anvil, they will be like the Indonesian working class at present, suffering blow after blow [In his long report to the school of the Chinese CP's Central Committee, mentioned above, not a word is said about these blows!] from the bureaucratic capitalists, embezzlers, grafters, and other exploiters and oppressors. The workers, with back-breaking toil, earn barely enough in a month to last a week, while the bureaucratic capitalists, embezzlers and grafters wallow in luxury, thanks to the blood and sweat of the working class. If they do not want to be an anvil, they should become a hammer; not an ordinary hammer but a huge hammer. Therefore the Indonesian working class should adopt the following attitude: Boldness, boldness and boldness again! Take over, take over and take over again! Act, act and act again!"

But these warnings, voiced on the very eve of the army's counterrevolutionary coup, then already in full preparation, came without any previous or accompanying measures for broad mass mobilizations, without preparation for a general strike, without preparation for arming the masses, without concrete warnings about the impending army coup. The warnings could only heighten the determination of the counterrevolutionaries to strike immediately. They could not create adequate means to prevent or to reply to the counterrevolution. It is not surprising under these conditions that the only concrete response this belated warning evoked was the desperate action of a small group around Lieutenant Colonel Untung and not a mass uprising.

It should be added that while the PKI leadership at first expressed solidarity with this desperate attempt to stop the counterrevolutionary generals from taking over the country, (6) they reversed

(5) D.N. Aidit: *ibid.* p. 85.

(6) Harian Rakjat, the central organ of the PKI, wrote in its October 2, 1965, issue: "Whatever the pretext may have been, the coup d'état which the 'Council of Generals' wanted to perpetrate was in any case a counterrevolutionary action which must be condemned... The people... are convinced that what the September 30 Movement did to save the revolution and the people was a correct action... The

their stand a few days later -- after the counterrevolution won its first decisive battle -- and disowned Untung's actions, thereby increasing the general confusion among their own followers.(7) As for the Kremlin, it denounced the September 30 events as a "provocation" without mentioning by a single word the preparations of the reactionary generals to pull a coup d'état.(8)

According to a dispatch released February 15, 1966, by the Indonesian news agency Antara, the trade-union leader Njono, a member of the Political Bureau of the PKI, stated during his trial that the impending counterrevolutionary coup of the Indonesian generals was discussed in the Political Bureau as early as July 1965. Njono declared that opinion was divided on whether it would be better to react before the coup or immediately after it took place. In any case it was decided to leave the initiative up to the "progressive officers" who were prepared to act within the army against the generals. While it is possible that Njono's torturers falsified this report before executing him, his courageous and dignified stand during the trial, in which he publicly denounced his torturers and the counterrevolutionary generals, lends credit to this version of the facts.

(d) The strategy of the PKI was not to conquer power by mobilizing the masses, but to slowly "transform" the character of the state and the government by infiltrating sectors of the army and administrative cadre. Under this illusion, they gave completely uncritical support to Sukarno, hoping to take over when he died. This explains why they relied on Sukarno instead of mobilizing the broad masses in defense of the revolution and the PKI, not only before the reactionary coup of October 1-2, but even after the coup.

(3) These grave political mistakes of the PKI leadership were reinforced and magnified by the opportunist policies of the Kremlin and Peking, both governments supporting Sukarno uncritically, presenting him as the prototype of the "noncapitalist" leader of "national democracy," the world leader of the "newly emerging forces" and similar empty, misleading formulas.

For diplomatic reasons -- Sukarno's temporary posture against

September 30 Movement will enjoy the support and the sympathy of the people."

(7)The October 5, 1965, issue of Harijan Rakjat disowned the September 30 Movement.

(8)"The fact that the Communist party of Indonesia, as early as October 5, published an official declaration in which it dissociated itself from the organizers of the unsuccessful conspiracy and characterized it as 'an internal affair of the army' is being completely ignored. Even if we assume that individual members of left-wing organizations lent themselves to the provocation and had something to do with the events of September 30, nevertheless this can in no way justify repressions against the Communist party of Indonesia." (Pravda, October 26, 1965.)

Anglo-Dutch imperialism in the West Irian and Malaysia affairs -- the Kremlin gave full uncritical support to the Sukarno regime, not only internationally but even on the domestic level, supplying his army with many of the weapons now being used to kill the cadres and members of the PKI. After the October 1-2 military coup, the Kremlin leaders continued this criminal policy, even trying to blame "putschist" and "adventuristic" elements in the PKI for the defeat and calling repeatedly for the "unity" of the Indonesian "revolution" around NASAKOM; i.e., for "unity" between the butchers and their victims. On October 12, after Sukarno had already called for a thorough purge of those involved in the "September 30 affair" and had permitted PKI leaders to be arrested and murdered in Djakarta, Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin sent him a special message in which they wrote: "We and our colleagues learned with great joy [!] that your health has improved...We have with interest heard about your radio appeal to the Indonesian people to remain calm and prevent disorders...This appeal will meet with profound understanding [!]" (Pravda, October 12, 1965.) Not until December 26 did the Soviet press publish a clear condemnation of the anti-Communist regime in Indonesia. Before then reporting on the events in that country was limited to reproducing short items from the bourgeois press agencies coupled with "regrets" about the "anti-Communist measures." And at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, the Soviet delegation displayed a shameful attitude, trying in every way to block public condemnation of the counter-revolutionary terror raging against the Indonesian Communists, an attitude which won public praise from the counterrevolutionists in Djakarta. (9)

As for the Peking leaders, out of similar diplomatic considerations and maneuvers -- such as supporting Sukarno's walkout from the UN and trying to pit the "newly emerging forces" against the "old established forces" -- they likewise gave full and uncritical support to the Indonesian regime. Even after the October 1-2 military coup, they went ahead in Djakarta with the World Conference Against Foreign Bases, and without protest stood by as their Indonesian comrades were arrested in the conference hall itself! It is true that they began to denounce the counterrevolutionary activities much sooner than the Kremlin press. But even then they carefully refrained from any open and clear-cut criticism of Sukarno, trying to present things as if Sukarno had systematically opposed the repression of the PKI,

(9) In a dispatch from Djakarta February 14, the Indonesian news agency Antara gave the text of three resolutions adopted by the Indonesian parliament February 11. One deals with the Tricontinental Conference. After denouncing the refusal of the Preparatory Commission to seat the official delegation sent by the Indonesian government, the resolution states in point No. 5: "Expresses full appreciation [!] of the efforts of the delegations of Nepal, Mongolia, the Soviet Union and others at the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who successfully neutralized [!] the efforts of the counterrevolutionists [!] of the so-called September 30 Movement, and their protectors and leaders, to intervene in the internal affairs of Indonesia and to induce among the other delegations a hostile attitude toward the people and government of Indonesia."

whereas in reality he covered up the repression in good part, merely trying to limit it in order to maintain his own Bonapartist position.

Today some "friends of Peking" maintain that the Chinese CP leaders were in fact critical of Aidit's policies, but they did not want to criticize his party publicly in view of the fact that they were for internal discussion among all the Communist parties that refrained from publicly attacking the Chinese CP and its friends. But this is no valid excuse for remaining silent about a problem of outstanding importance to the international Communist movement; it is only additional proof of the basically opportunist attitude of the Chinese leaders towards the Indonesian question.

(4) The events of recent weeks -- the elimination of General Nasution from the government, Sukarno's declaration that "the revolution is again embarking on its left-wing course," the public collision between Sukarno and the ultraright-wing forces of the Islamic students organizations (more or less passively tolerated by the army) -- inspired new illusions in official CP circles that the pre-October 1 situation could somehow be restored. Sukarno, a typical Bonapartist figure, representing the "national" and "bureaucratic" bourgeois forces in Indonesia, balanced between the "left," represented mainly by the PKI and its mass proletarian and peasant organizations, and the "right," represented mainly by the army and the clerical Moslem organizations, spokesmen of the comprador bourgeoisie and semifeudal landowners. The October 1-2 military coup delivered a shattering blow to the left, leaving them leaderless and dispersed (while far from completely destroying them), thereby fundamentally upsetting the equilibrium on which Sukarno depended for his leading position. Naturally he then tried to bolster his position by looking for ways and means to somehow reduce the strength of the army high command and to divide its ranks. These leaders preferred not to take over rule immediately after October 1-2; in the first place because they were not yet sure of the support they could muster in the countryside, where Sukarno remained very popular; and in the second place because they did not want to assume responsibility for the mismanagement of the economy, the complete failure of the so-called "heavy rupiah" and the raging inflation plaguing the country. Therefore they left Sukarno in power for another six months although he retained only the shadow of his previous Bonapartist strength. When he tried in desperation to reestablish the equilibrium by ousting General Nasution from his cabinet, they permitted the students to stage mass demonstrations (paradoxically, the ultraright-wing Islamic student associations could now appear to stand in the forefront of the fight against inflation and corruption due to the extreme weakening of the forces led by the PKI.) In conjunction with pressure from the army high command, these demonstrations compelled Sukarno to turn over the leading role in the government to the army's "strong man," General Suharto.

(5) It is extremely unlikely, however, that the counterrevolutionists now in power in Djakarta will be able to stabilize the situation for any length of time. The country's economy is stripped; and American imperialism, while able to shore up the new regime with a heavy underpinning of credits, cannot move in on such a scale

as to generate any real momentum in economic growth. The army leaders themselves will not readily give up their nationalist, anti-imperialist verbiage which reflects real conflicts of interest with British imperialism and the ruling comprador bourgeoisie and semifeudal landowners of Malaysia. A large part of the budget will therefore continue to be squandered in maintaining a huge military establishment and in undertaking costly experiments like the attempt to make an Indonesian nuclear bomb. The masses, although leaderless and deeply shaken, have not lost all fighting potential, particularly in the countryside. It will prove impossible to get the thousands of squatters to evacuate the imperialist-owned or "nationalized" plantations managed by corrupt army officers, or to compel the thousands of plantation and oil workers to revert to the "normal" working conditions of colonial times. And without such a shift to "normalcy," the Indonesian economy will not be able to develop in accordance with the neocolonial pattern. The incapacity of the military leaders to achieve some social and economic stability will undermine the counterrevolutionary dictatorship politically. This could even occur in the near future if the military prove unable to cope with the problem of inflation.

The defeat suffered by the PKI is of such depth that certainly no quick change in the situation can be forecast. It will take years to regain revolutionary possibilities as excellent as those lost in 1964-1966 due to the opportunist policies of the PKI leadership. However, what remains of that leadership along with the surviving party cadres -- especially the best educated, those steeled by the terrible experiences they went through in the past six months -- will have taken the road of guerrilla war, if only out of self-defense. If they succeed in regrouping and in regaining a mass following in some regions of the countryside by calling on the peasants to immediately take over the land held by the landlords, the plantations and army administration, they could gain on a progressive scale due to the inability of Indonesian reaction to solve the country's basic economic plight and due to the divisions in the ranks of the army which that inability will undoubtedly provoke. It will become possible to link this peasant base to the working class when, under pressure of economic necessity, the urban masses overcome the stunning effect of the defeat and once again take the road of action. Such a comeback, involving a renewal of organized influence among the workers, is still possible -- provided that all the main lessons of the terrible defeat are analyzed and assimilated.

(6) The main lessons to be drawn from this tragic defeat, which the Indonesian revolutionary Marxists must continually hammer home while energetically participating in all attempts by revolutionary PKI elements to start armed resistance against the military dictatorship, are as follows:

(a) While it is correct and necessary to support all anti-imperialist mass movements, and even to critically support all concrete anti-imperialist measures taken by representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie like Sukarno, for colonial revolution to be victorious it is absolutely essential to maintain the proletarian organizations strictly independent politically and organizationally

from the "national" bourgeoisie, to instill among the masses a spirit of distrust towards this bourgeoisie and a spirit of self-reliance, to lead the masses towards organizing independent organs of power (committees, workers and peasants militia, etc.) as requisites for the victory of the revolution. The Indonesian events have proved once again that the theory of the capacity of the "progressive" forces of the "national bourgeoisie" to lead a "consistent" fight against imperialism as the "embodiment of the whole nation" -- the theory of a "national democratic state" and a "bloc of revolutionary classes" -- leads only to defeat.

(b) While it is correct and necessary during the first phases of the revolution in backward countries to place the main stress on the problems of winning national independence, unifying the country and solving the agrarian question (i.e., the historical tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution which constitute the most burning tasks in the eyes of eighty to ninety per cent of the population), it is indispensable to understand that the solution of these tasks is only possible when the working class, in alliance with the poor peasantry, has conquered leadership of the revolution, establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry and pushes the revolution through to its socialist phase. The Indonesian events once again confirm that the theory of "revolution by stages" -- the first stage being a victory under a "national front" led by the "national bourgeoisie" -- only paves the way to defeat. Either defeat under "national" bourgeois leaders or victory through the conquest of power and the establishment of a workers state -- this is the dilemma that faces all colonial revolutions.

(c) While it is necessary to win the broadest possible mass base in the countryside, a revolutionary party capable of applying that policy must be based upon a hardened proletarian cadre thoroughly trained in Marxist theory and revolutionary practice, without illusions about a "peaceful transition" to socialism or "national democratic states," a party that relies mainly on mass mobilizations and mass struggles instead of intrigues and infiltration for achieving its historical goals.

Only by thoroughly assimilating these lessons can the Indonesian Communists and revolutionists overcome the results of the present defeat and avenge the victims of the counterrevolutionary terror by organizing and leading the workers and poor peasants in their fight for power in Indonesia!

GORDON LAYS DOWN THE LAW TO LATIN AMERICANS

Lincoln Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, laid down the imperialist law to its Latin-American "partners" at a conference of ministers in Buenos Aires March 29. Any aid given them under the "Alliance for Progress" has strings attached. They must "buy American." They can't buy anywhere except the U.S. even if the prices are cheaper or if it would be more advantageous to them in relations with other countries.

THE TRICONTINENTAL AND AFTER

(Monthly Review's Comments on Castro's Attack on Trotskyism)

[In his closing speech at the Tricontinental Conference January 15, Fidel Castro stressed the central theme of the deliberations and resolutions of that gathering -- the need for the peoples of the underdeveloped countries to take the road of armed struggle in seeking to overthrow the rule of the indigenous oligarchies and their imperialist backers. He called for unity among all the revolutionary tendencies in advancing this struggle. Unfortunately, he immediately violated his own appeal, devoting a good part of the final section of his speech to attacking the Trotskyist movement, not on the basis of genuine political differences but in a way reminiscent of Stalinist practices. (See the February 11 issue of World Outlook for the full text of Castro's speech and the February 18 issue for the reply by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.)

[An attack of this nature was bound to be of deep concern to revolutionary Marxists because of its possible portent in the development of the Cuban Revolution, in the struggle to follow its example, and in the problem of providing the best possible defense of its achievements and goals. The dismay aroused by this part of Castro's speech is expressed in a well-reasoned way in the April issue of Monthly Review, an independent socialist magazine published in New York and widely circulated in Latin America in a Spanish-language edition. The editors, Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, have been strong partisans of the Cuban Revolution from the beginning. They have done much to extend a Marxist appreciation of its meaning.

[Because of the importance of the Monthly Review's contribution to the discussion over Castro's attack on Trotskyism we have made the full text available below. (Subheadings appear in the original.) For additional copies, we suggest writing directly to Monthly Review, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10014. The cost is \$.50 per copy.

[We call special attention to the reservations expressed by the editors of Monthly Review over Adolfo Gilly's reply to Castro which appears in the same issue. Next week we have scheduled an article by Joseph Hansen commenting on Gilly's position.]

* * *

In his closing speech to the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana during the first half of January, Fidel Castro launched a fierce attack on the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, "MR-13," led by Antonio Yon Sosa and on the Argentine journalist Adolfo Gilly who has probably done more than anyone else to acquaint the world with the character and achievements of MR-13. Since Gilly's most comprehensive reportage on the Guatemalan guerrillas appeared in this magazine (in the issues of April and May of last year), and since Gilly is also a frequent and valued contributor to Monthly Review, we are

devoting a large part of this issue to printing the relevant part of Castro's speech and Gilly's reply, the latter taking the form of a general critique of the Conference itself. In this editorial we attempt to clarify MR's position on some of the principal issues in this politically very important controversy.

On Trotskyism

One aspect of the Castro speech is ugly and perhaps ominous. His attack on MR-13 rests entirely on two propositions: first, that it is "infiltrated" by Trotskyites and has a Trotskyist program; and second, that Trotskyites are agents of imperialism. If the second proposition were true, the first would of course be a devastating indictment of MR-13. But the accusation has no foundation whatever, as anyone who has seriously studied the history of the communist movement since the October Revolution must know. It was precisely this accusation which provided the rationalization for the Soviet purge trials of the 1930's. If anything has been proved -- and not least by the Soviet government itself -- it is that the trials were a shameless frame-up; and no evidence has ever been produced to restore credibility to the accusation. To revive it now is a sure sign of either ignorance or malice. For our part, we prefer to believe that in this matter Fidel himself is ignorant and that the malice comes from advisers who never abandoned the attitudes and methods which underlay the trials. If so, it behooves Fidel to take time out for serious study of the history of the movement to which he is, for reasons which do him no discredit, a latecomer (he could do worse than begin with Isaac Deutscher's brilliant three-volume study of Trotsky which is much more than a personal biography). In the meantime, one can only hope that Fidel's bad example is not going to lead to a revival of the kind of witch-hunting which so bedeviled and stultified the world revolutionary movement in the Stalin era.

As to the rest of the indictment of MR-13, that there are Trotskyites in the movement and that it has a Trotskyist program, we neither know nor care whether or to what extent it is true. In our opinion, the only kind of revolution that has any chance of succeeding in Latin America today is a socialist revolution. We were, we believe, among the first to say that the Cuban Revolution would be forced to advance rapidly to socialism -- or be overthrown. After visiting South America in 1963 we stated our opinion in these pages that there is no such thing as feudalism in Latin America and that it therefore makes no sense to talk about a bourgeois revolution. When the Guatemalan guerrillas, conducting an armed struggle against the bloody dictatorship imposed on their country by the CIA and United Fruit, adopted a program reflecting similar, if not identical, ideas, we hailed the event as an historic breakthrough. Nothing that has happened since, including Fidel Castro's name-calling attack, has caused us to change our minds. If Fidel wants to argue rationally about the validity of MR-13's program, well and good; let him do so. He will find no lack of serious revolutionaries to weigh his views with all the respect and attention due the leader of the Cuban Revolution. But he should not deceive himself that he can sway any but cowards and sycophants by mere denunciations.

One more point in this connection: Whatever its role in Guatemala, Trotskyism is certainly not a large or important political force in Latin America as a whole. But if Fidel Castro and the Latin American Communist Parties duck the question of socialism, and still more if they attack as Trotskyites all those who openly struggle for a specifically socialist revolution, then the prospects for Latin American Trotskyism will be vastly improved. For the necessity, and indeed the inevitability, of socialist revolution, not in some vague future but as the next historical stage in Latin America is rooted in the underdeveloped, imperialist-enforced reality of that region. This is not to say that socialist revolution is coming in Latin America tomorrow or next year: great historical changes do not happen that way. It is simply to say that no other kind of revolution is possible in Latin America and that sooner or later all serious revolutionaries are going to have to come to terms with that fact.

The Achievement of the Conference

Gilly's evaluation of the Tricontinental Conference is wholly negative -- a Conference "without glory and without program," he calls it. This seems to us to result from a lack of proper perspective.

It was a great, indeed a "glorious" achievement to bring together delegations representing revolutionary and anti-imperialist organizations in scores of Asian, African, and Latin American countries. New and lasting contacts and channels of communication were opened up. Views and experiences were exchanged, perhaps more in private than in public sessions. Above all, the Conference aroused and gave dramatic expression to an unprecedented sense of revolutionary militancy and international solidarity among the victims of imperialism. The right and duty to meet imperialist violence, exemplified for all to see in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, by revolutionary counter-violence was the central theme of the entire Conference. As Marcel Niedergang reported from Havana in Le Monde of January 20th, "revolutionary enthusiasm easily carried the day, and the Soviets who arrived with resolutions of prudence were obliged to intone the same refrain."

The Havana Conference, in other words, sounded the death knell of all those narcotic illusions of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which lie at the very heart of modern revisionism; it brought closer the day when, in the words of the Communist Manifesto, "man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his relations with his kind." Can it really be said that this was not a great achievement?

Do not misunderstand us. We do not maintain that the policies for which these illusions provide the rationalization are themselves dead. In the report already cited, Marcel Niedergang stated, with evident agreement, that "certain observers" at the Conference considered the concessions made by the Soviet delegation "purely verbal and formal." But is it really of no importance that they felt it necessary to make such concessions? Has not the Havana Conference thrown down a profound challenge to the Soviet leadership, and indeed to the whole Soviet people? And is it too much to hope that

mounting pressures of this kind will eventually force a change of policy and perhaps even a change of leadership in the Soviet Union?

The Position of Fidel Castro

Gilly asserts without qualification that Castro, as the ally of the Soviet leadership, has now espoused the line and policy of peaceful coexistence. In our view this is an oversimplification and distortion of a much more complex reality. To convince oneself of this, one need only read the major speeches by the Cubans at the Conference -- the opening speech of President Dorticós, that of Osmany Cienfuegos, the secretary of the new tricontinental organization set up by the Conference, and the closing speech of Fidel. We quote from the last:

The world is big and the imperialists are everywhere. And for Cuban revolutionaries the battlefield against imperialism covers the whole globe! (Prolonged applause)

Without boasting and without immodesty, that is the way we Cuban revolutionaries understand our internationalist duty; that is the way our people understand their duty, because they realize that the enemy is one and the same; the same who attacks our coasts and our land, the same who attacks others. And because of that we state and proclaim that revolutionary movements in any corner of the globe can count on Cuban combatants. (Prolonged applause)....

If Yankee imperialists take the liberty of bombing wherever they wish and of sending their mercenary troops to suppress the revolutionary movement in any part of the world, revolutionary peoples feel they have the right to help, even with their physical presence (Applause) the peoples who fight against the Yankee imperialists.

And thus if each one helps according to his capacity, if each one helps according to his possibilities, the Yankee imperialists will be defeated. And if there is any place where they are doomed to suffer a crushing defeat, that place is Southeast Asia. (Applause)

Because there it is possible to establish a correlation of forces incomparably superior to those of the Yankee imperialists.

That is why we have not the slightest doubt that they will be defeated, that they will be crushed by the people themselves of that area, and if they increase their forces and those of their reactionary allies, they will be defeated not only by the forces of the peoples of that area, but by the forces of the socialist camp and of the other peoples. (Applause) That is why the Yankee imperialists launch their hypocritical peace offensive in order to create confusion and deception. And that is why the peoples of Vietnam have correctly

stated that peace, true peace, can only be achieved when the Yankee imperialists cease attacking, when the Yankee imperialists no longer occupy the territory or part of the territory of Vietnam and when the Yankee imperialists withdraw their mercenary troops and dismantle their military bases in the territory of Vietnam....

And if we were in a similar situation, I am completely sure that we would say exactly the same. (Applause) We would refuse to negotiate under bombardment, we would refuse to negotiate while under occupation....

In Latin America there should not be just one, or two, or three peoples struggling alone against imperialism. The correlation of the forces of the imperialists on this Continent, the proximity of its metropolitan territory, the zeal with which they will try to defend their dominions in this part of the world, require a common and simultaneous struggle. (Applause) If the imperialists have to face not just the Dominican people alone, or the Peruvian people alone; if they must also fight -- at the same time as in each of these countries -- against other oppressed peoples, such as those of Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Argentina (Applause) and other peoples of Central America; if the struggle is carried out on a broad scale, if each one of these peoples, if each one of the revolutionaries of this Continent fulfills his duty...then the hour of liberation of this Continent will be nearer.

It would be simply absurd to assert that this is nothing but "purely verbal and formal" rhetoric designed to cover up secret support for the line of peaceful coexistence. Rather it comes from the heart of the real Fidel Castro who is as much a revolutionary and a fighter today as he ever was. It is also true, however, that by attacking the Chinese and MR-13 Castro has taken a position on the Soviet side of the great division in the world communist movement. There is a real contradiction here: on the one hand Fidel is passionately advocating the very policies of armed national liberation struggle which the Soviets would like to abandon in the interests of a deal with the United States; on the other hand he joins the Soviets in attacking not only a small movement which is putting these policies into practice but also China, the socialist giant which is standing firm against United States blackmail and by so doing is creating a situation in which the national liberation struggles of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have a chance to develop and mature. The trouble with Gilly is that he fails to recognize the reality of this contradiction and hence of course is precluded from understanding its implications.

Out of contradictions come movement and change and so it will be here, for it is unlikely that Fidel will be able to continue indefinitely lining up with the Russians against the Chinese and at the same time throwing Cuba's weight behind the broadening and deep-

ening of the national liberation struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.* As pressures and tensions mount -- primarily those emanating from the developing national liberation struggles themselves -- he will be increasingly forced to choose, not only in words but also in deeds.

The situation is much too obscure and complicated to permit predictions at this stage, but it seems worthwhile to stress two things which will certainly play an important part in determining the outcome. The first is the fate of Che Guevara, the second the condition of the Cuban economy.

In his final speech to the Conference, Castro said that "some day mankind will learn all the facts. That will be the day when the villains will see that comrade Guevara was not murdered; each of his steps will be fully known." Let us hope so, and let us hope that the day comes soon. For Fidel should be under no illusions that only imperialists and their agents are interested in Che's fate. More than anyone else, even more than Fidel himself, Che has come to symbolize all that is best, all that is pure, all that is beloved

*That Fidel's support for these struggles was not confined to public utterances is confirmed by the correspondent of Le Monde. "It was really behind closed doors...that the discussions between Fidel Castro...and the Latin American delegations took place. They occurred in a feverish atmosphere and uninterruptedly from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. and from 8 p.m. to 1 a.m. 'We didn't even dare ask for a sandwich,' said some of the Latin Americans unaccustomed to this pace; and Fidel certainly lived up to his nickname of 'horse.' During this session there were shouts, quarrels, focusing of issues, self criticisms, and a discourse by Fidel Castro which all delegates agreed was 'remarkable.' 'Without this long meeting of Latin Americans' the delegates further said, 'the Tricontinental would have left us with a feeling of dissatisfaction.' It seems that this long 'synthetic report' by Fidel Castro included the following themes: the victory of the Cuban Revolution was not an historical accident. 'What we have succeeded in doing in Cuba you can do yourselves. Our conditions of struggle were not all that favorable. To take only one example, before the fall of Batista, Havana University was largely nonpolitical. Today, on the contrary, the universities in Latin America are active arenas of progressivism.' Second point: it is clear today that 'imperialism is on guard' and that 'the United States will never accept the loss of Latin America.' Hence, repeating one of the phrases of his Saturday speech, 'sooner or later the peoples are going to have to take up arms to liberate themselves.' A new 'lesson': 'Unity is an essential condition for success.' It is indispensable to 'surmount the divergencies, the rivalries, and the conflicts of tendencies' which weaken the 'revolutionary front.' It is no less indispensable to 'coordinate the struggle' and to 'study very seriously the objective and subjective conditions of this struggle in the different countries.'" Calling this a "resolutely Cuban game," Le Monde's correspondent permitted himself to wonder what will be the real reaction to it of the Soviets.

in the Cuban Revolution, a great historic event which belongs not only to seven million Cubans but to all the people of the Americas and indeed to all mankind. If, as some charge, anything untoward has happened or should happen to Che, those responsible (and that would necessarily include all who knew and kept silent) will be forever disgraced. A Cuban regime guilty of such a crime would lose its moral authority and either would be replaced or would degenerate into a police state. In the latter case, of course, the worst bureaucratic elements would rise to the top and do whatever was demanded of them by their more powerful counterparts abroad.

On the other hand, if the official Cuban story about Che turns out to be correct, if he reappears as a revolutionary fighter and theorist elsewhere, and if he retains his close ties to Fidel and his other former comrades in the Sierra Maestra, then the bonds linking the Cuban and world revolutions will be strengthened and the chances of a favorable evolution inside Cuba will be immeasurably improved. Is Fidel Castro aware of the real issues at stake in the Guevara affair? And does he realize that every day's delay in clearing up the mystery brings anxiety and doubt to honest revolutionaries everywhere and joy to their enemies?

The relevance of the condition of the Cuban economy to Fidel's future evolution is perhaps less obvious but probably not less important. The first impulse of the revolutionary government after it came to power was to diversify agriculture and drastically reduce Cuba's dependence on sugar. In this way, it was thought, Cuba could end the anomalous, and indeed scandalous, situation in which one of the world's potentially richest agricultural areas fell far short of feeding its own inhabitants. But the problems of diversifying agriculture turned out to be more difficult than had been anticipated, and the advantages of expanding sugar production for seemingly assured markets in the socialist countries appeared to be so attractive that the early enthusiasm for diversification died out and Cuba returned to a policy of heavy dependence on a single crop. It now appears that this may have been a serious mistake which could have grievous consequences for Cuba's future.

The real problem is not whether in abstract theory the socialist countries should or should not foster a high degree of international division of labor: the question is whether in the world as it actually exists -- with all its conflicts and uncertainties and potential disasters -- any particular socialist country can afford the risk of excessive dependence on others. Cuba's recent experience in having its rice supply drastically cut by the Chinese decision to buy less sugar and sell less rice to Cuba in 1966 than in 1965 certainly suggests a negative answer. In saying this we mean to imply no criticism of the Chinese action. The reasons they gave the Cubans for their decision with respect to rice are valid and justified, and we think the Cubans should have accepted them as such instead of launching, as Castro did in his speech of February 5th, a vulgar and unbridled attack on the Chinese. Here are the Chinese reasons as quoted by Fidel himself: "(a) The need to create a reserve in case of any attack by the U.S. imperialists. (b) The aid they have to give Vietnam. (c) A deficit in the production of other grains

which forces them to import from the capitalist area and hence to use some rice in order to obtain foreign exchange for that purpose."* At the Tricontinental Conference Fidel talked a lot about the duty of all revolutionaries to help Vietnam and carry on the struggle against imperialism. Does he now presume to tell the Chinese, who are doing most of the helping and a large part of the struggling, that all that comes after the duty to supply Cuba with the amount of rice it asks for?

But the point we wish to emphasize here concerns not the specifics of the Cuban-Chinese rice trade but the general situation in which Cuba finds itself. Cuba's dependence on China is, after all, much less than its dependence on the Soviet Union. Under present circumstances, Cuba's vulnerability to shifts in Soviet policy, no matter what their motives or justification, or simply to being cut off from the Soviet Union, which could easily happen as imperialism's war of intervention in Latin America spreads and intensifies -- this vulnerability is extreme and mortally dangerous.

The conclusion seems obvious: If Fidel wants Cuba to be in a position to follow a relatively independent course -- to continue, in Marcel Niedergang's words, to play "a resolutely Cuban game" -- in the explosively tense and stormy period which lies ahead, he had better return as quickly as possible to a policy of agricultural diversification and self-sufficiency in foodstuffs.

The Struggle for a Socialist Orientation

The Tricontinental Conference laid to rest once and for all the illusion of peaceful coexistence between imperialism and its victims. This was a great historic achievement. But -- and here we are in full agreement with Gilly -- it is not enough. It is not enough for the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to know that they must expel the imperialists from their lands by force of arms, or even to understand that by acting all together they can achieve this goal despite the imperialists' enormous technical superiority. They must also have a clear idea of what they are going to put in the place of the miserable underdeveloped capitalist societies which the departing imperialists will leave behind. And here we are completely convinced that the only viable answer is socialism.

There is no such thing as a progressive capitalist society in the period of world revolution and the general crisis of capitalism.

There is no such thing as a bourgeois class which has an interest, as a class, in fighting imperialism.

Coalitions between revolutionaries and supposedly progressive bourgeois classes are bound to result in stultification at best and disaster at worst (the horrible slaughter in Indonesia, until recently a showpiece of anti-imperialist coalition politics, should

*Granma, English edition, February 6. Castro's speech is also published in full in Peking Review of February 28th.

drive this lesson indelibly into the consciousness of every revolutionary).

Only a workers' and peasants' state, disposing over society's basic productive apparatus and prepared to plan and act in the interests of the victims of four centuries of exploitation and underdevelopment, can possibly clean out the Augean stables of imperialist-backed capitalism and lay the foundations of a better future.

These are the truths which must become as self-evident in the last third of the 20th century as were the truths proclaimed in our own Declaration of Independence in the last third of the 18th century. An unremitting struggle to that end must be undertaken within all the revolutionary and anti-imperialist organizations of the world, and not least within the new organization of solidarity of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples established by the Havana Conference.

A second Tricontinental Conference is scheduled to be held in Cairo in 1968. If it merely repeats the slogans and resolutions of the Havana Conference -- anti-imperialism, armed struggle, unity -- it will indeed be a Conference "without glory and without program." The time has now come to take a giant step forward, to go beyond Havana, to proclaim socialism as the necessary and indispensable condition of real national liberation. That must be the object and goal for Cairo.

In the meantime, one final point: nothing we have said implies the isolation of the socialist -- that is, the workers' and peasants' -- movement from progressive elements of the bourgeoisie. The prospects of success in this connection have never been as bright as they are now. But that does not mean that alliances with bourgeois classes or sub-classes (national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, etc.) are either rational or feasible. To think so is simply to betray a woeful ignorance of contemporary reality. What is needed is an understanding that what Marx and Engels said in the Manifesto, perhaps in partial explanation of their own uncompromising revolutionary position, holds true today in the underdeveloped countries to an unparalleled degree. Every revolutionary should take these words to heart:

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular a portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

These people are abandoning their own class, and for good and sufficient reason -- because their class has become the enemy of humanity. The object of the proletariat, using that term in its broadest and now most relevant meaning, must be to maximize the number of such converts, not to deceive itself into believing that pacts can be made with the enemy itself.

(March 8, 1966)

NEXT ISSUE

A Marxist analysis of the coup d'état in Ghana and its background: "Nkrumah's Downfall -- Its Meaning and Portent" by Henri Valin.

And an article by Joseph Hansen on Adolfo Gilly's reply to Fidel Castro.