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A STEADILY GROWING LAND WAR IN ASIA

In a lead editorial July 15 The New York Times [international edition] stated rather bluntly what has not yet been "officially acknowledged" by Washington. The "United States is fighting a land war of steadily growing proportions in Asia." The big New York daily, which is one of the most serious capitalist newspapers in the

U.S. and by far the most influential, voiced foreboding. "This is a momentous development in American history and it should be treated as such and not as a minor and soon-to-be-ended expedition to advise and bolster the Saigon Government."

As the Times sees it, "A major effort, of great cost in men, money and materiel, stretching over a period of years, is not in sight."

If the Vietnam government and China were to "give in" after this "monsoon or the next one," there would be reason for "rejoicing," in the opinion of the editors. But this is scarcely likely. The "South Vietnamese are close to the point where they will be unable to carry on as the major fighting force."

Drawing up an inventory of the situation, the Times admits that the tactics being used by the Vietnamese today are proving as successful as when they were used against the French and against Chiang Kai-shek. It admits that the government in Saigon is "perennially shaky" and that its military leadership is "poor." "There is always the possibility that a future government in Saigon might ask the Americans to leave, thus ending the legal basis for the American presence..."

The editors see three alternatives. It would be a "disastrous escalation...to carry the war further and more heavily into North Vietnam, with the strong possibility of directly involving Communist China, not to mention the Soviet Union." For this imperialist newspaper it would be "equally disastrous" to "get out now." The editors therefore propose that Johnson should seek "to establish a series of unconquerable beachheads along the coast and a perimeter around Saigon, and then hold on until the situation changes and negotiations on honorable terms become possible." What is most significant about the stand taken by the Times is that it sees no real hope of victory. On the contrary it is very much afraid that Johnson's war will end in disaster.

Up to now the American forces have not been badly hurt. In fact they have been able to wantonly bomb and murder clear up to the border of China without serious reprisal. The war, however, like all wars up to now, will not be settled in the air but on the ground. Thus sooner or later, American troops will find themselves involved in large numbers in a war of the most costly kind and one over which hangs the dread possibility of becoming converted into a nuclear conflict.

Johnson is now compelled to begin speaking more frankly about the need for more troops, and a little later he will be talking about the need for more American lives and sacrifices. On July 13 he told a press conference that "new and serious decisions" might require an increase in U.S. ground forces in south Vietnam. The following day Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said that it

would be necessary to call up reserves and enlarge the draft. He then flew to Saigon. The first request put to him by the puppet government was for more American troops. Saigon announced that its forces were to be increased.

It is not likely that there will be any rush to the Saigon recruiting offices, however, despite the rate of pay made possible by handouts from the U.S. Treasury. A Reuters dispatch July 13 said that teen-agers in south Vietnam are maiming themselves to escape military service. A common practice is to cut off the right index finger. Police said they had picked up sixty-six "draft dodgers" in the past forty-eight hours in Saigon and sent them to military training centers. There are so many draft dodgers that the government plans to form some of them into a "special corps of front-line coolies," including those who have maimed themselves.

This is the situation as Johnson begins his ground war in Asia. What will it look like as more and more American GI's write home telling the folks the truth about this dirty war?

PEACE FEELER FROM NEW DELHI TO PEKING

By Kailas Chandra

Bombay

Following the cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch, the Shastri government appears to be considering a shift in policy in the "border confrontation" with the People's Republic of China. President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan himself has come out publicly for India's need "to come to terms with China and Pakistan" so that the huge funds now spent on defence could be turned to "internal development."

This is the first time since the Sino-Indian border war in 1962 that such a conciliatory statement has been made about China on behalf of the government. That it comes from the head of the state is significant.

Dr. Radhakrishnan made his remarks June 2 during a speech inaugurating the aluminium plant at Mettur near Madras. It would appear that Peking took notice of the trial balloon and has responded not unfavorably.

In fact it has been reported that the Chinese government is willing to help create the necessary atmosphere for talks by agreeing to vacate the seven controversial military posts established in the Akshai Chin region of Ladakh. This would meet the precondition that India has been insisting upon for negotiations.

The Colombo proposals worked out by the five Afro-Asian governments when Mrs. Bandaranaike was the Prime Minister of Ceylon would constitute the basis for the talks.

New Delhi has contended that China did not accept the Colombo proposals "unconditionally" and that therefore the talks could not start. The Chinese have said, however, that they accept the "spirit" of the proposals subject to a final settlement through negotiations.

The most important question is whether New Delhi is prepared to give up its claim to the uninhabited Akshai Chin region which is now under effective Chinese control. China, it has been reported, is prepared to recognize the MacMahon line as the boundary between the two countries in the northern and eastern sectors.

The Indian bourgeoisie have some rather compelling reasons for reconsidering their intransigence in the border dispute. They are faced with a growing internal crisis due to the rapid dwindling of foreign exchange.

The imperialist countries have evidenced no willingness to pump in sufficient funds to keep the Indian economy going. A number of projects, advanced under the Fourth Plan, are likely to founder on the rocks of financial bankruptcy. Only the Soviet Union has come forward with offers of substantial aid.

The political representatives of the Indian bourgeoisie have consequently been entertaining sour thoughts about the attitude of the imperialist powers in questions of aid for the underdeveloped countries. The Indian bourgeoisie are not prepared as yet to completely surrender their "independence" to imperialism as is demanded.

Moreover, the enormous cost of building up the Indian armed forces has placed a tremendous added burden on the economy. The consequence has been a severe domestic crisis, both economic and political, which the bourgeoisie feel could well threaten their very existence as a ruling class. Having extended themselves too far, they feel the need to draw back.

It is also likely that the government has learned something from the slap in the face which Johnson dealt Shastri April 16 in announcing without previous consultation that the prime minister's visit to Washington had been "postponed." To have a "special relationship" with Johnson obviously doesn't pay off!

A friendly gesture in Peking's direction in the present world situation, on the other hand, might well serve to remind Washington that its own fences are badly in need of mending with something more attractive than announcements about the size of its nuclear stockpile.

BOUMEDIENNE'S GOVERNMENT

By Pierre Frank

In the month or so since the coup d'état that deposed Ben Bella, the new regime has in one form or another been granted recognition by the various powers, the big ones like the United States, the USSR and China, and the medium and small ones. The act of violence has thus been ratified on an international scale.

Within the country, the demonstrations that broke out immediately after Boumedienne seized power have come to an end. The "National Council of the Revolution," the membership of which was not announced until after two weeks, turned out to consist almost wholly of military figures for whom Boumedienne had just set an example they are bound to ponder over. A week later the composition of the government was announced. This, along with declarations made by spokesmen of the new regime, have given rise to some speculation.

It has been noted quite generally that the new regime has not turned the tiller sharply to the right, that it has expressed its intention to pursue Algeria's socialist "option," that it has come out for maintaining self-management, etc. The pro-Islamic declarations are said to be no surprise. Finally, the composition of the new government, in which Rabah Bitat made his reappearance, has been declared of interest. Particularly, the elimination of a Mohammedi Saïd has been stressed, and above all one of the more dramatic modifications, the replacement of Boudissa, who had a reputation of being reactionary and dishonest, by Zerdani as minister of labor. Zerdani has the reputation of being a man of the left who was one of Mohamed Harbi's collaborators when the latter was editor of Révolution Africaine.

Did the coup d'état then signify only a shift in personnel and not in political orientation?

Upon the announcement of the coup d'état, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International held that the operation of June 19 did not signify the immediate liquidation of the conquests of the revolution and the establishment ipso facto of a neocolonialist regime. [See World Outlook June 25.] It could even be expected, the Fourth International held, that while seeking to consolidate a regime to the right of Ben Bella's, Boumedienne might undertake certain radical measures, for example in the direction of agrarian reform.

Up to now this is the tendency that appears to be in the forefront. At the same time, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International stressed that an operation like the one carried out by Boumedienne has a logic that does not necessarily coincide with his possible intentions. This question has been quite correctly explained by Fidel Castro. Castro said that he would judge Boumedienne by his

acts; but, he added, a pronunciamiento cannot advance a revolution.

This is the root of the question. It could be objected that Ben Bella himself came to power in July 1962 under "nondemocratic" conditions. But the assertion is false. First of all the GPRA [Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne] was an assemblage whose relations with the Algerian masses were questionable; and it was on the spirit, the enthusiasm of the masses, that the Tlemcen team was brought to power. Following that, in the course of the successive elimination from the government of Khider, Ferhat Abbas, etc., the support of the masses was concretely shown through street demonstrations. This time there was the typical pronunciamiento, and the new power showed that it did not dare appeal to the masses, that it was very careful not to call on them to demonstrate in the streets.

Boumedienne's bonapartist game, which is not much different from Ben Bella's, is not what is decisive. In politics, it is not only the what that counts. The who and the how can have very considerable consequences. For quite a time Ben Bella addressed the masses above all, and the Algerian revolution made progress. Then he turned particularly to combinations at the top, and thus he opened the way to a coup d'état. Despite recognition from the big powers, Boumedienne's regime is unstable; it rests on an armed force that cannot help but feel the social tensions existing in the country. He does not have the capital of sympathy, of personal authority enjoyed by Ben Bella. In proceeding to a coup d'état, he created a new situation in which the first conclusion is that the Algerian revolution is weaker than before. The masses have been disoriented, and the partisans of the coup d'état encouraged.

A disquieting new element is the position taken by figures like Zerdani who are considered to be in the left. If it were the act of an individual it would have little importance. But unfortunately leftist figures in Algeria have had a tendency for more than a year to line up with combinations at the top in hope of advancing their ideas rather than trying to organize themselves and to organize the vanguard of tested, militant and clear-sighted middle cadres to be found in the ranks of the Algerian revolution. The only "positive" result which the June 19 coup d'état could have would be to stimulate the organization of such a vanguard in the light of the lessons of three years of independence. But if an important part of the left continues to use its talents in combinations at the top, this will prove disastrous for the future of the revolution. No revolution has ever advanced by such means. A revolution can advance only by the broad participation of the masses in political life. Corridor deals are incomprehensible to the masses, it wearies them and demobilizes them.

The policy of the new regime following the June 19 coup d'état is not in itself the sole determinant. Social forces have been set loose. Some of them, the neocolonialist forces, operate only in the dark. The revolutionary forces, in contrast, can advance only by organizing a political vanguard.

"RECESSION," "DEPRESSION," OR WORSE IN JAPAN?

A worried discussion is going on in the Japanese press over the correct name for the present economic situation. Is it a "recession," a "depression," the "eve of a panic," or a "panic"?

Even the Asahi Geino, a weekly noted for rather lurid material on the country's sex life, ran a heavy-weight article in its July 4 issue, "The Shadow of Economic Panic Hanging Over the Japan Islands."

The article maintains that Japan is on the verge of an economic panic. It draws parallels between the present situation and the economic panic in Japan around 1930.

Some interesting figures are presented on the present situation. Between last January and March, for instance, there were 2,520 cases in which 41,569 workers complained that they were not paid their wages.

The number of companies facing bankruptcy up to May was 2,464 which is 86% of the entire last year's figure.

Old-time cabaret managers who recall the 1930's think the situation is worse today than then. Many women, they report, are coming to Tokyo from the Tohoku area, "wishing to make money as 'night butterflies.'"

In 1931 in the same area daughters of farmers were sold for prostitution or as geisha. This is now prohibited. Nevertheless an illegal trade in girls is going on, according to the report.

Other weeklies are taking a less gloomy attitude, many of them simply calling the present situation an "age of bankruptcy."

Reports about bankruptcies have, in fact, given rise to considerable nervousness. The July 4 Sunday Mainichi reported that a baseless rumor caused a run on a cooperative that could not be stopped until it piled up 500,000,000 yen [\$1,389,000] in banknotes in front of its depositors.

JAPANESE PEOPLE AGAINST U.S. WAR IN VIETNAM

A nationwide public opinion survey conducted by the Kyodo News Service and published June 30, revealed that only 3.6% of the Japanese favor the United States Vietnam policy.

A majority of 59.7% were found to be worried over the pro-

spects of international or domestic developments.

At least three in every 10, or 33.4% were haunted by the fear of another war.

Support for the Liberal-Democratic government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato registered a sharp decline. Shortly after he took office on November 9, 1964, his support stood at 47%. Today it stands at 24.4%.

Among traditional supporters of the Liberal-Democratic party, there was a decided shift among women in their fifties. The popularity of the party showed a decline from 29.1% to 20.6%.

Among the opposition parties the survey showed a rise in support for the Socialist party to 24.8%, which is 3.6% more than in the last survey.

SOCIALISTS GAIN SEATS IN JAPANESE ELECTION

In the July 4 elections in Japan to the upper house of parliament the ruling Liberal-Democratic party suffered a decline. Although the vote for the Socialist party remained the same as in 1962, it gained a number of new seats. The largest single vote in Tokyo went to the Communist party candidate Sanzo Nosaka. He won 619,893 votes.

The percentages for the parties was as follows:

	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>
Liberal-Democratic party	47.1	44.2
Japan Socialist party	32.8	32.8
Komeito [Clean Government party]	2.6	5.1
Democratic Socialist party	7.3	6.1
Japan Communist party	4.8	6.9
Minor parties	0.2	0.5
Independents	5.2	4.4

Sanzo Nosaka's high vote was ascribed to his campaign which centered on an attack against the Liberal Democrats for supporting U.S. policy in Vietnam. He also attacked the agreement negotiated by the Japanese government with South Korea, the basic aim of which is to strengthen U.S. and Japanese imperialism.

In a press conference July 6, Kozo Sasaki, chairman of the Japan Socialist party, predicted that within three more elections the Liberal Democratic party will have lost its majority. In that case he will seek the cooperation of other opposition parties who agree with the principles of the JSP to establish a "Socialist Front

Cabinet."

As for immediate plans, the party will launch drives against the Vietnamese war.

It will also organize a huge "people's movement" against ratification of the treaty with South Korea.

The current depression in Japan, he said, is now being felt even in agricultural communities. It must be met, in his opinion, not only with domestic measures but through strict neutrality and a peaceful foreign policy.

The drive against the imperialist treaty with South Korea promises to be a vigorous one. Sasaki said that the campaign will be pushed jointly with Sohyo [General Council of Japan Trade Unions], Churitsu Roren [Liaison Council of Neutral Trade Unions], scholars' and women's groups, and other organizations.

SOHYO TURNS TO POLITICAL ACTION

Sohyo [General Council of Japan Trade Unions] has announced a significant shift in policy. Instead of placing the emphasis on economic struggles, the emphasis will now be placed on political action.

The announcement was made recently by Chairman Ohta. He said that Sohyo, which represents some 3,700,000 members, will throw its energy into movements for peace and against the war in Vietnam.

The unions will campaign against the Security Treaty tying Japan to the United States and fight against the proposed revision of the Constitution which would make it again legal for the Japanese government to build up its armed forces and engage in new military adventures.

Chairman Ohta said that Sohyo cannot remain passive to the war raging in Vietnam.

WILL TRY NOT TO DO IT AGAIN

Takako Tanahara, an 11-year-old girl, was in the garden of her home in the village of Yomitan in central Okinawa when she was crushed to death June 11 by a six-ton truck parachuted from a U.S. Air Force plane in training. Seven representatives of the town filed a protest with Lt.Gen.Albert Watson II, U.S.High Commissioner

for the Ryukyus. The representatives, headed by Mayor Shosei Ikehara, called for suspension of the air force's paratroop operations.

The High Commissioner "expressed his understanding of the grief of the girl's family," reported the June 17 Japan Times, "and also their request to halt the exercise."

He also informed the delegation that "he would do everything possible to prevent recurrence of such an accident."

The paratroop exercises are to be resumed, but with smaller parachutes, presumably to reduce the amount of drift.

POISON GAS SHELL?

Several minutes after the sound of an explosion, presumably caused by a shell at the Tenhamori bombing range of the U.S. Misawa Air Base in Japan around 11:20 a.m. June 28, poison gas drifted through six nearby villages.

Villagers rushed into their homes or hurried out of their village to escape the bad odor. Fortunately none of them experienced more than headaches. However, rice plants and other crops withered in some twenty hectares of farmland. Three hens reportedly died.

The U.S. authorities said the incident could be due to disposal of "leaking liquefied chlorine" used for "sterilizing water."

They generously added that if the local residents could justify any damage claims they would "consider" compensation.

"RESETTLEMENT ZONE" IN MALAYSIA

Concentration camps are being put into use in Malaysia, under the name of a "resettlement zone."

According to a UPI dispatch, the Malaysian government "began moving hundreds of Chinese residents behind barbed wire" July 6. The reason given for this not unprecedented move was "to secure a vital road leading from Kuching to the interior of Sarawak State."

A stretch of ten miles was declared a "controlled zone" and sealed off. This move followed an attack by guerrilla fighters on a police station and "several homes along the road June 27," said UPI, in which nine persons were killed.

"All Chinese living between the 15th and 25th milestones on

the Kuching to Serian road were to be uprooted and resettled in five camps in the same general region."

No trials were held. The government simply issued a statement accusing the Chinese of "actively or passively aiding" the guerrillas.

It was added that both "British and Malaysian military officials were known to have been troubled by the concentration of possible security risks at the backs of their troops along the border."

Sarawak State Chief Minister Stephen Kalong Ningkan said in a special broadcast over Radio Malaysia that "The action now being taken is designed to protect the people in the area and eliminate Communist influence."

The Chinese residents were notified through 300,000 leaflets bearing the chief minister's message which were air dropped along the road shortly after dawn. It was not reported what fate might await those Chinese who failed to pick up a leaflet or who couldn't read it.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN GREECE

For somewhat more than a year a certain amount of political freedom has existed in Greece after many long years of repression. On February 16, 1964, the Caramanlis regime was defeated at the ballot box despite scandalous electoral frauds. Power passed into the hands of George Papandreou, leader of the Center Union party and a liberal in terms of Greek politics. This turn resulted in the restoration of democratic rights to a certain degree. The labor movement breathed more freely. The legalization of the Communist party was considered possible.

But Greece is the only country in the Balkans where capitalism was maintained following the war. With the political and material assistance of British and American imperialism, including armed force, the reactionary monarchy was restored to the throne, the church was bolstered and the army was shaped up to highly reactionary specifications.

To these reactionary forces, democracy represents a standing threat. Their fear of democracy is not without a real basis. At the end of World War II, the Greek proletariat stood close to taking power, failing only because its leadership bowed to pressure from Stalin and paved the way for the landing of British troops who then participated in a civil war that eventually crushed the proletarian forces and guerrilla fighters.

Papandreou's victory last year was a welcome sign of the

revival of the Greek proletariat. The regime itself, however, was clearly an unstable one. While the workers sought to utilize the relatively democratic atmosphere to maximum advantage, the officer caste busied itself with conspiracies to liquidate the Papandreou regime.

When Papandreou sought to block these plots by at least naming a new minister of the armed forces, he ran into resistance from the monarchy. The proposed change was scarcely a radical one, since Papandreou's candidate for the post was a member of the Center Union. The monarchy, however, decided to utilize the issue to oust Papandreou. King Constantine provoked Papandreou into a hasty resignation; and, in a move that had evidently been worked out well in advance by his advisers, appointed George Athanasiades-Novas, a member of Papandreou's own party, to replace him as prime minister.

The move thus had elements of a coup d'état, with the 25-year-old king serving as ostensible director of the operation.

The labor movement was alarmed. Papandreou's ouster might well signify a return to the McCarthyism of the Caramanlis period. A wave of protest swept the country. In Athens July 16 demonstrators were in the streets and the police were trying to club them down. It was reported that 108 had been injured, half of them being police. This was followed by a demonstration July 18, involving 25,000 participants. In Salonika, 3,000 demonstrators staged a rally near the university. They carried banners condemning the "royal coup d'état in Greece," and American policy in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. At Heraclion in Crete several thousand persons attended a meeting at which speakers denounced the "government of the king."

Greece may face a turning point. The reaction is pressing for a return to a regime like that headed by Caramanlis. To maintain itself it would inevitably prove to be even more ferocious and bloody. To meet this threat effectively, the masses have no choice but to move forward, bringing down the monarchy. This opening political wedge would put in question the entire present social and economic system.

Thus, at one of the extremities of Europe, the social equilibrium threatens to be upset. Workers everywhere should watch events in Greece now with the closest attention and be prepared to demonstrate their solidarity with the Greek people in their struggle against the threat of another wave of McCarthyism in Greece.

GENERAL KY SAYS HITLER NOT QUITE HIS "ONE HERO"

Saigon's puppet ruler decided July 16 to correct his admission to a reporter that his "one hero" is Hitler. "What I had in mind," he said, "was that Vietnam needs above all leadership and discipline..."

PERUVIAN ARMY STILL PURSUING GUERRILLA FORCES

Because of the censorship exercised by the Belaunde Terry government as part of a "state of siege," it is difficult to obtain news from Peru with regard to the three guerrilla fronts which the authorities are trying to liquidate.

Agence France Presse reported July 8, however, that arrests are being made throughout the country with the aim of cutting off the guerrilla fighters from alleged links with left-wing parties.

Among those arrested was Theodore Saavedra. The accusation lodged against him was that he was "suspected" of being a correspondent of the Soviet news agency Tass and that he had given out "tendentious" news taken from Cuban and Soviet short-wave broadcasts. He has worked for Agence France Press for about a year.

The Reuter news agency said it had learned that another journalist "suspected" of working for New China had been arrested July 8. The same source reported that government forces had run into guerrilla fighters at Pichay, close to the Apurimac river, on July 8. One soldier was wounded. The government, in an extreme effort to stamp out the guerrilla forces, ordered the entire population "evacuated" from the region.

It was rumored that thirty guerrilla fighters had been killed July 12 between Huanta and Ayacucho. But the Peruvian government would neither confirm nor deny this. The police announced that supplies of arms and ammunition had been seized at Quillabamba in the department of Cuzco.

A July 15 Reuter dispatch said that the army was bombing the Pucata region where guerrilla forces had been "sighted." They were said to be "completely surrounded." Meanwhile police were continuing to arrest persons west of Ayacucho on "suspicion" of "communism." Nine were arrested in Cuzco itself and "a number" were likewise arrested in Puerto Madonado near the Brazilian border.

Because of the lack of information, it has not been possible up to now to estimate the character of the three guerrilla fronts, particularly their relationship with the peasantry. Under Hugo Blanco, who has been held in prison for the past two years without trial, the major effort was made on organizing the peasants into unions. These, in turn, were oriented toward the occupation of land and organization of self-defense measures against the landlords.

COMMUNIST GOVERNOR OUSTED IN DJAKARTA

For undisclosed reasons, Sukarno ousted Henk Ngantung, a Communist leader appointed governor of Djakarta last October 17. The move was made in the absence of D.N.Aidit, head of the Indonesian CP who is at present on a visit to Moscow.

BARRIENTOS REVEALS ANOTHER "SUBVERSIVE" PLOT

General René Barrientos is not finding it easy to consolidate his dictatorial junta. Besides the opposition of the workers and the peasantry, he is continually beset by the most diabolical plots.

In the latest one, if we are to believe the general, former president Paz Estenssoro and former vice-president Juan Lechín Oquendo, both of whom were exiled by Barrientos, have "hatched a vast subversive plan" with the aim of "overthrowing the present authorities."

Estenssoro and Lechín are bitter political foes and have been for some time. But no matter; Barrientos revealed July 15 that the two had put their heads together. And Colonel Oscar Quiroga Teran, minister of the interior, issued an official statement confirming the revelations made by Barrientos:

"Paz Estenssoro himself conceived a plan to overthrow the military junta. The ex-president as well as Federico Fortuny and Augusto Cuadros Sanchez signed a check for \$30,000 payable in a Swiss bank. This money was intended for political exiles who received an order to utilize it for attempts at subversion."

The skill of the conspirators is something to marvel at! Estenssoro, who is in Paraguay, opens up a joint bank account in Switzerland that requires two signatures plus his own to validate a check for \$30,000 to finance "attempts" at subversion in Bolivia!

Perhaps the strangest bit, however, is the failure of Quiroga to report on what finally happened in the last plot uncovered by his department. This was reported to the press only last May [see World Outlook May 28]. In that plot Luigi Longo, the head of the Italian Communist party, allegedly wrote three letters in a strange cryptogram -- to which he attached his signature -- giving instructions on how to use \$25,000 which he sent to Lechín for "subversive" purposes in Bolivia.

The "Communist" plot in Bolivia is getting thicker and thicker...

ECUADOR SWEEPED BY CIVIL STRIFE

Civil strife has again risen to a high pitch in Ecuador. The military junta, which seized power July 11, 1963, ousting President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, is seeking to stand firm with the assistance of the U.S. against the popular clamor for return to a constitutional government. On July 9 and 10 some 20,000 persons

participated in demonstrations in Guayaquil. The police sought to disperse them with tear-gas grenades. Eleven police and an undetermined number of demonstrators were injured. In addition, three police were reported "missing."

Mass arrests, mounting into the hundreds, were made in Guayaquil and Quito. Sixteen leaders of the "National Patriotic Junta," which is in opposition to the ruling military junta, were put aboard a military plane July 11 and deported to Paraguay.

These repressive measures failed, however, to prevent the demonstrations from continuing. On July 13 the Quito police tried again, charging with their clubs into crowds led by students. They were answered with stones. Four people were reported killed in the fighting in Quito and Guayaquil.

The government declared a curfew in Guayaquil and moved tanks and truckloads of soldiers into the city. The unions, student organizations and political parties all said they would continue in action until the junta agreed to hold elections.

In face of fresh demonstrations the following day, the junta sent an armed patrol into the offices of the Guayaquil university. They arrested Gonzalo Caamaño, dean of the faculty of political economy, the president of the student union and fifteen students.

Casualties in Guayaquil up to this point were listed at two students killed, and thirty civilians and eighteen police wounded. Colonel Gonzalez, civil and military governor of Guayaquil, said that martial law would be applied with "implacable" severity. But the turmoil appeared to be spreading into every town in Ecuador. The pressure could reach explosive proportions if the junta sought to hang on too long.

STROESSNER DISCOVERS "COMMUNIST" PLOT

With "Communist" plots being hatched all over the world, it would be strange if a dictator like General Alfredo Stroessner were to go too long without discovering one. How could the Paraguayan government keep up its good relations with the White House, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency without demonstrating at least occasionally that it is the target of sinister subversive efforts?

On July 6 Stroessner's minister of the interior, Edgar Insfran, announced that a vast "Communist plot" had been uncovered. Arrests were made throughout the country in the following days.

The key figure in the conspiracy, according to Stroessner's

man, was a Chilean named Francisco José Prado Leon who had been sent to Paraguay by a "Communist" organization with headquarters in Santiago, Chile. A training camp for guerrillas had been set up at Pasobril, Argentina, and the plot was to be sprung next December 8 during religious ceremonies in a town fifty kilometers from Asunción which Stroessner planned to attend.

As further evidence of the plot, Insfran announced July 8 that the body of Santiago Cronel Acevedo, "who had been trained in Cuba and who was known under the name of Patricio Duarte" had been "found in the forest of Santa Elena, northwest of Asunción."

According to Insfran, four groups of guerrilla fighters "were going to go into operation in accordance with the Communist plot, the discovery of which was announced Tuesday."

Unrest has been persistent in Paraguay for many years under Stroessner's foul dictatorship. It has led to sporadic outbursts which the fascist-minded ruler has put down with the most ruthless terror. It is possible that he detected signs of new unrest among the Paraguayan people and decided to take preventive measures as he has in the past. The standard procedure in beginning such an operation is to discover a "Communist plot." This is then used as justification for a nationwide witch-hunt in which the bodies of "subversives" are often "discovered" by the police.

ANGOLANS CONDEMN U.S. AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM

"The Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile strongly condemns the aggression of the American imperialists against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," declares a statement issued July 8 by Johnny Eduardo, head of the GRAE Official Mission in Algeria.

"What is most to be condemned is the imperialist project to transform all of Asia into a vast scene of war," continues the statement. China is aimed at because of the country's "social, economic, technical and scientific progress, and the active support this friendly country offers to the liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as its determination to combat imperialism to the end."

In the opinion of the GRAE, the Vietnamese and Chinese people will win "because they are sure of the support and solidarity of all the people concerned about peace, justice and freedom in the world."

The statement appeals for condemnation of the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, the project to bomb Hanoi, and Johnson's escalation of the war.

The SLL Draws the "Lessons"

IS TROTSKY'S TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM APPLICABLE TO ALGERIA?

By Joseph Hansen

In 1938 Leon Trotsky drew up a rather brief program, The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International, which was adopted at the founding conference of the organization. It soon came to be called the "transitional program," inasmuch as it dealt with a key problem that has concerned revolutionists since well before Marx and Engels -- how to make the transition from a small circle of dedicated, highly political cadres to a mass revolutionary socialist party capable of winning power. Brief and unpretentious as this program was, it embodied the thinking and experience of the Marxist movement on this problem since the publication of the Communist Manifesto. It is scarcely surprising that it should have become of central influence in the tactics and strategy of the Trotskyist movement, being particularly noticeable in the construction of political platforms, in the selection of slogans, in the choice of areas of work, in the method and manner of proceeding in revolutionary activities.

Among the groupings claiming adherence to Trotskyism, there is only one notable exception to this -- the Socialist Labour League in Britain whose streak of ultraleftism has broadened considerably in recent years. The leaders of this organization are not unaware of the existence of the Transitional Program; in fact it is on their book list. In their politics, however, they pay little attention to it. This is strikingly evident in their reaction to the current situation in Algeria.

While their influence among revolutionary-minded circles in that country is nil -- so far as is known they do not have a single cothinker in Algeria -- it would be a mistake for revolutionary Marxists not to take their views into consideration. No opinions should be dismissed simply because those holding them happen to be few in number. Truth can begin as a minority of one, as is well known, although it should not be forgotten either that a minority is capable of being colossally wrong.

In considering the views of the SLL leaders on Algeria we are, unfortunately, faced with a complication. They approach the subject indirectly -- by attacking the position of the Fourth International, which they hold to be "revisionist." It is thus difficult to weigh their views on Algeria without considering their strictures, all the more so in light of a certain incapacity on their part to present the position of the Fourth International with reasonable accuracy.

"Exposed Again"

Let us begin with the reaction of the SLL to Boumedienne's seizure of power on June 19. The theme is set by the headline in the June 26 issue of The Newsletter -- the group's official publication -- "Revisionists' role exposed once again," and a similar headline over an article by Cliff Slaughter in the July 3 issue, "Algerian coup -- a final, crushing blow to revisionists' theory."

The emphasis on "revisionist theory" -- which no doubt led to brisk sales among the British workers -- is perfectly logical from the viewpoint of the SLL leaders, since they believe it played a central role in Boumedienne's success. The reasoning goes like this: Both Ben Bella and Boumedienne are political representatives of the "national bourgeoisie" in Algeria. To establish its power, the "national bourgeoisie" had a double problem. One was to shake off the foreign imperialist domination. The other was "to push back the forces of the workers and peasants whom they had to mobilise for the first aim." In carrying out this dual task, Boumedienne's army "is the instrument of 'order' on behalf of the native capitalist class in Algeria" while Ben Bella, in "consolidating the centralised state power against the workers and peasants," did not "go far enough and was too prone to give concessions to the masses." Boumedienne "and the right" therefore decided to throw him out.

We pause for a brief comment. The view of the SLL leaders that the "native capitalists" in a series of colonial countries are capable of leading a "national-revolutionary struggle, involving years of large-scale armed conflict," as Slaughter puts it, to a successful conclusion against "foreign imperialist domination," is revisionist to the core. It not only places confidence in the capacity of the "native capitalists" to solve a highly revolutionary task, it leads directly to the theory of state capitalism. To deal with this adequately, however, would require a full article. Let us pass on.

The decisive element in Boumedienne's coup d'état, as seen from the vantage point of London, was a "betrayal." Boumedienne's success was really due to this "betrayal." The "betrayal" was one committed -- the leaders of the SLL are adamant about this -- by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. The "betrayal," still according to the SLL leaders, was "advocating liquidation of the revolutionary party" in Algeria in the belief that the "national bourgeoisie" in Algeria could complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution. A further "betrayal" was the view -- which they allege the United Secretariat promulgated -- that a "workers state" was established in Algeria; i.e., the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, according to the SLL leaders, put the label of a "workers state" on the Algerian capitalist state and this disoriented the Algerian vanguard.

The source of these "betrayals," as the SLL leaders see it,

is the position taken by the world Trotskyist movement on the Cuban revolution; i.e., that Cuba became a workers state and that it achieved this without the prior formation of a revolutionary Marxist party in Cuba. In the SLL view, the United Secretariat mechanically repeated in Algeria what it had done in Cuba, assigning to Ben Bella, as it assigned to Castro, the task of completing the revolution.

If this seems out of focus somewhere and even hard to fathom, the confusion lies in the SLL position. They maintain that Castro is a political representative of the Cuban "national bourgeoisie"; thus support to Castro amounts, in their eyes, to supporting Cuban capitalism. Consequently, if you look hopefully for "another Castro," you are looking hopefully for another political representative of a national bourgeoisie and you are thereby committing a "betrayal."

Perhaps a word should be said here about the Trotskyist attitude toward Castro and Ben Bella. When Castro began organizing the guerrilla struggle in Cuba, the world Trotskyist movement took note and some of the Cuban Trotskyists even joined his movement at an early stage, but he was regarded nonetheless as a petty-bourgeois, if very courageous, revolutionist until it became completely clear from the actions he initiated and from the program he unfolded that he was something much more than that, or had developed beyond that stage through revolutionary experience. When he proclaimed his acceptance of the revolutionary Marxist outlook, bringing his avowed beliefs into harmony with his actions, it was quite clear that something new had appeared -- the socialist revolution had opened in the Western Hemisphere, producing as its first fruits a workers state and a revolutionary leadership uncontaminated by Stalinism.

In the light of this experience, the world Trotskyist movement kept an open mind on Ben Bella. It offered critical support to his government in its struggle against imperialism and indigenous reaction and in its orientation toward socialism. But it did not consider Ben Bella to be "another Castro." Would he were! Ben Bella's antipathy to the scientific outlook of Marxism was but one of the indications that he lacked the stature of a Castro. It should be added that French imperialism learned from the mistakes of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Having been defeated in the bloody attempt to put down the revolution by force, French imperialism quite consciously avoided ultimatums that might have set off a chain reaction in Algeria such as ended in Cuba with the country leaving the capitalist orbit. De Gaulle approached Algiers with adroit diplomacy and -- financial aid. His aim was to ward off "another Castro."

With that clarification, let us turn again to the SLL's estimate of the meaning of Boumedienne's coup d'état.

The SLL Formula for Algeria

The SLL theoreticians do not lack in eloquence when it comes to denouncing the United Secretariat of the Fourth International or

the Socialist Workers party in the United States. Perhaps this has a practical aim -- it keeps the subscriptions to their paper rolling in. As for specific analysis of the political currents in Algeria, or the problems of the Algerian revolution, this is not to be found in their writings. If a simple schema serves, what's the point of trying to probe the complexities of a subject? Thus they do with "two crutches" in the world of colonial politics -- the category of "bourgeois nationalist" and the opposing category of "revolutionary Marxist." Revolutionary Marxists not yet having appeared in countries like Cuba and Algeria, due to the alleged obstacle of the "revisionist" position of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the most urgent problem, from their point of view, is to break up and remove this obstacle.

The program they offer for the Algerian revolution is marked by similarly elegant simplifications. For instance, a lengthy statement by the "International Committee of the Fourth International"* includes only a single sentence referring to programmatic problems in Algeria: "A revolutionary workers' party would gain an enormous following for a programme of workers' control, leading to workers' state power, expropriation of the landlords, confiscation of the vineyards and the formation of peasant soviets, and the expropriation of foreign holdings." (And what about the "vineyards" already expropriated and placed under workers self-management?)

The real program of the SLL for Algeria consists of only one plank. It is formulated by Cliff Slaughter in the July 3 Newsletter as follows:

"What was actually required was a struggle of the workers, leading the poor peasantry, to fight behind a Trotskyist party for their own power in opposition to the existing state."

This formula, it must be granted, is unassailable. There is not a Trotskyist, genuine or otherwise, who will disagree with it. And not only for Algeria. It is equally applicable to India, Italy, Chile and even Great Britain where the poor peasantry is scarcely a massive force. In fact it applies to any country where a capitalist state exists. Every Trotskyist in the world will hail Slaughter's perspicacity in reaching this conclusion in the case of Algeria.

But this is precisely where the problem begins. How is this

*The majority of the International Committee of the Fourth International united with the International Secretariat of the Fourth International in 1963 at a Reunification Congress that healed a ten-year-old split in the world Trotskyist movement. A small minority of the International Committee, consisting of the SLL and the French La Verité grouping refused to go along with the majority. For the sake of confusion, this rump group chose to use the name "International Committee of the Fourth International."

desirable objective to be achieved? Unfortunately, precisely at this point -- where Trotsky's Transitional Program comes in -- our ultraleft wise man bids us goodbye. Instead of considering the very real problem of party building in Algeria, Slaughter wastes valuable printer's ink trying to prove that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International advocated "liquidation of the revolutionary party" in Algeria.

Since his procedure is quite typical of SLL polemics, we will take it up briefly. Slaughter cites a sentence from a news account in the June 25 World Outlook indicating the reason for the lack of organized resistance to Boumedienne's coup d'état. Here is the sentence: "In the absence of a well-organized vanguard party, of unions with an independent leadership, the army stood as the only cohesive power in the country." From this sentence, Slaughter selects the phrase "well-organized vanguard party." The use of such a phrase is "deliberate confusion," he claims, because World Outlook, according to his deductions, wants "one set of readers" to understand this as a reference to the FLN, the National Liberation Front, while at "the same time" hoping "that those who regard themselves as Trotskyists will understand by a 'vanguard party,' the revolutionary party of Marxism." As revealed in Slaughter's crystal ball, what World Outlook is particularly insistent on is that "the relation between the two things must not be clarified." Continuing, he argues that this clarification is precisely what has been necessary in the past period. "In this way, the revisionists complete their betrayal..."

Let us try to assist Slaughter in reaching the necessary clarification. A few examples will, perhaps, prove of service.

Trotsky and the SWP

In the United States, the Socialist Workers party, which is a revolutionary party of Marxism, has called for the formation of an independent labor party for the past quarter of a century. It is well known that the suggestion to take this stand came from Trotsky at about the time he wrote the Transitional Program. Was Trotsky unprincipled in making such a suggestion in view of the fact that an independent labor party would almost certainly begin with the corrupt, bureaucratic, petty-bourgeois, capitalist-minded leadership of the American trade unions at its head? Trotsky contended that the mere formation of such a party in the American political scene would constitute an enormous step forward that could well signal the beginning of the socialist revolution in the United States. To argue that it stood in contradiction to organizing the revolutionary Marxist party was an ultraleft position. Precisely by taking a transitional position, by advocating and helping to organize an independent labor party, no matter what its initial leadership, the revolutionary Marxist party, in this case the Socialist Workers party, would find its chances for growing and prospering much improved.

The issue was debated with special sharpness among the

American Trotskyists because, out of intransigent opposition to the conservative trade-union bureaucracy, they had previously opposed formation of a labor party and had recruited on this basis, so that among some of the new recruits advocacy of an independent labor party was considered to be a "betrayal" of principles. However, after a clarifying discussion, the position was adopted by an overwhelming majority and has constituted part of the platform of the Socialist Workers party ever since.

Let us take a more recent example. In Europe, particularly in France, a standing slogan of the Trotskyists has been that the Communist and Socialist parties should strive to take power. The treacherous character of the leaderships of these parties is no secret; to list their betrayals would require a thick book. But what is actually required, if we apply the thinking of a Slaughter, is a struggle of the workers, leading the poor peasantry, to fight behind a Trotskyist party for their own power in opposition to the existing state. Is it not a gross betrayal, therefore, to call for the treacherous CP and SP leaders to take power? The answer is no. The workers are not prepared to fight behind a Trotskyist party for their own power, desirable as that would be. They still stand behind the CP and SP leaders. The Trotskyists have no choice but to recognize this fact, to proceed from it, and to seek transitional steps that can help put the working class into movement despite their treacherous leaders. Moreover, the Trotskyists promise to participate in this and to support it with all their energy and ability, while retaining their right to criticize the inadequacy of such steps as are actually taken along this road. Is this unprincipled? No. Any partial step, any slogan that can help the working class move forward is principled if no halt is made, if the motion toward the socialist goal is kept up with more advanced steps and slogans. In the Transitional Program, Trotsky explained the reasons for calling on petty-bourgeois leaderships of the workers and peasants to take power, citing the experience of the Bolsheviks, Lenin having used it with telling effect in the Russian Revolution.

Let us take a current example. In Argentina, at a recent unification congress, the Trotskyists decided to advocate that the General Confederation of Labor should engage in independent political action. The CGT leadership is not a revolutionary Marxist leadership. It is under Peronist influence; it does not have a socialist outlook; it is even quite corrupt. But behind these bureaucrats stands the organized Argentine working class -- potentially the greatest force in the country. The question was vigorously discussed at the congress of the Argentine Trotskyists [see World Outlook July 9]. Interestingly enough, those who objected to the slogan and course of action repeated arguments used among the American Trotskyists before World War II when they discussed Trotsky's suggestion about advocating an independent labor party. And the arguments used in reply in Argentina were similar to those advanced in the United States. General agreement was finally reached at the Argentine congress on the correctness of pressing for the CGT to engage in inde-

pendent political action. Were the Argentine Trotskyists wrong? It would be instructive, perhaps, to hear the opinion of the SLL theoreticians on this.

Which Page Do You Read?

A final example leaps from the pages of the July 3 Newsletter. This is a reproduction of a leaflet being distributed by the Young Socialists in Britain in opposition to the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. Two slogans stand at the head of the leaflet: "US imperialism Get out of Vietnam!" and "Victory to the Vietcong!" The latter slogan is not without relevance to our discussion. We note, in passing, the jarring use of the term "Vietcong," the epithet applied by the South Vietnam puppet government to the freedom fighters, meaning "Viet Commies." However, those who drew up the leaflet might well argue that unfortunate as this is, the word "Vietcong" has been popularized by the imperialist press in Britain and one must make some concessions...

That is a minor criticism, however. What is decisive is the political content of the slogan. The National Front of Liberation in south Vietnam is not a Trotskyist party. It is a broad front containing heterogeneous class forces. And its program is not a Trotskyist program. If anything it is less radical than the program of the FLN in Algeria. If the line followed by Slaughter on page three of The Newsletter is correct, then The Newsletter is guilty on page one of joining the Young Socialists in a "revisionist betrayal."

How is this glaring contradiction to be explained? One can conclude that either the editorial board of The Newsletter is not much concerned about consistency, feeling perfectly content to follow one line in Algeria and a completely contradictory one in Vietnam; or it could be surmised that there are conflicting views. Perhaps there is an ultraleft sectarian position, represented by Slaughter, and a position that comes closer to Trotskyism, a position more aware of the importance of the colonial revolution, of its particular problems and the pertinence of the Transitional Program in solving them. Each tendency, in accordance with the principles of cricket, is granted a certain expression in the columns of The Newsletter. If this is the case, we of course offer critical support to the tendency inclined in the direction of "revisionist betrayals."

Healy and Messali Hadj

Considerations analogous to those indicated in the above examples have been applied by the Trotskyists throughout the Algerian revolution. For instance, Gerry Healy, the national secretary of the SLL, found himself supporting a wing of the revolutionary nationalist movement, the Mouvement National Algérien headed by Messali Hadj. The experiment had an unfortunate ending when Messali Hadj went over to de Gaulle; but it was nonetheless correct to seek

to find an opening or point of entry for Trotskyism in the Algerian revolutionary nationalist movement. If one attempt ended in failure or led into a blind alley, it was necessary to seek another. Healy and his French supporters, however, decided after their dismal venture to follow the much less dangerous and far more comfortable course of abstention. Such a decision is quite typical of ultraleft sectarianism.

The Trotskyists under the leadership of the International Secretariat did much better by throwing their forces into the FLN. They did this in accordance with the criterion at the heart of the Transitional Program -- revolutionists must always go where the main forces in the struggle are to be found, whether they are organized in the unions, in a front battling for freedom, or in some other formation. In the most difficult days, when the FLN was under ferocious persecution from French imperialism, the Trotskyists were of great service in helping to organize material aid. As a result Trotskyism gained very honorable standing among Algerian revolutionists and a good basis was established to gain a favorable hearing for the program of Trotskyism in the further development of the revolution.

After the victory of the struggle for national independence, the Trotskyists in Algeria continued their work along the same lines, following the pattern laid down in the Transitional Program. Their policy in relation to the FLN was stated in a declaration issued December 9, 1962, by the International Secretariat of the Fourth International when it opposed Ben Bella's banning the Algerian Communist party. Here is a translation of the text of the declaration as published in the March 1963 issue of Quatrième Internationale under the title, "On the Banning of the Algerian CP":

For a Reorganized FLN

"The IS [International Secretariat] of the Fourth International disapproves the decision taken by the Algerian government banning the PCA [Parti Communiste Algérien] and its official newspaper.

"The Fourth International has never spared its criticisms of the PCA, whether this involved the approval given by the PCA to the colonialist repression in the Constantine area in 1945 or its line during the armed struggle for independence. It is still opposed to this party's line.

"On the other hand, the Fourth International is convinced that the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale], reorganized as a genuine party with a mass base and a democratic centralist structure, and struggling to have the Tripoli program carried out in practice, will be able to play a decisive role at the present stage of the Revolution; and the task of the Algerian revolutionists is to work for such a perspective within this organizational frame.

"But in no case will the Fourth International drop its position of principled opposition to any kind of bureaucratic restraint on free expression for currents, tendencies and organizations that respect the legal framework of the Revolution and which are committed to a consistent struggle against imperialism. The Fourth International is convinced that the only way to select out a genuine leading party and a genuine revolutionary leadership is through an eventual dialogue among forces of this kind, along with practical experience; while any attempt to resolve this problem by administrative means will prove to be illusory and, in the final analysis, prejudicial to the interests of the Revolution.

"The criticism of the decision banning the PCA involves no change in our attitude of critical support to the revolutionary Algerian Government, as already advanced in our resolution of November 4, and does not hinder our supporting the progressive measures which this government has taken since the adoption of our resolution (for example, the reduction of the high salaries paid to top functionaries, ministers and deputies)."

In accordance with this, the Algerian Trotskyists (1) opposed the banning of the Algerian Communist party or any other political grouping that remained within the legal framework of the revolution; (2) opposed the setting up of a single party; (3) advocated that under the circumstances revolutionists should join the FLN; and (4) that there should be freedom of tendencies within the FLN. The aim was to advance the program of revolutionary socialism under the concrete circumstances in which the Trotskyists constituted but a small minority. To argue against this course, as Slaughter does, is really to argue against the Transitional Program. And to go so far as to call the course taken by the Algerian Trotskyists a "revisionist betrayal" is to call the Transitional Program itself a "revisionist betrayal." This, of course, may be Slaughter's real position.

The Question of the State

So much for the ultraleft strictures of the SLL leaders about party-building tasks in Algeria. We turn now to another issue that will take us to the heart of the situation in Algeria and at the same time place the most glaring light on the ultraleftism of this grouping in the British radical movement.

One of the major arguments which they advance, as indicated above, is that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International called Algeria a "workers state," thereby granting to the national bourgeoisie the possibility of carrying out proletarian tasks. "We insisted against the revisionists," they state, "that Algeria remained a bourgeois state." "In the epoch of imperialism," they affirm, "the bourgeoisie, neither in Algeria nor in Cuba, nor in India, nor anywhere else, can achieve these tasks." We leave to others the task of trying to convince these ultraleft sectarians that Algeria, Cuba and India really belong in quite different categories, and turn to

the "proof" they offer that the United Secretariat of the Fourth International was guilty of calling Algeria a workers state. The "proof" consists of some extracts from a statement issued February 17, 1964, by the United Secretariat [see World Outlook February 21, 1964]. To show the level to which these theoreticians descend, it is necessary to consider the full text of this statement. Everyone can then judge for himself on what basis the extracts were selected. To facilitate this, I have italicized the extracts which were published by The Newsletter. Now watch the SLL brain trust, deep in thought as they study the statement of the United Secretariat and debate among themselves which sentences will best serve to "prove" that the United Secretariat called Algeria a "workers state" and advocated "liquidation of the revolutionary party." You can see them, ball-point pen in hand, carefully underlining the sentences that fit their thesis!

Complete Text with Extracts Indicated

"For some time the course of the new regime in Algeria has shown that it is a 'Workers and Peasants Government' of the kind considered by the Communist International in its early days as likely to appear, and referred to in the Transitional program of the Fourth International, as a possible forerunner of a workers state.

"Such a government is characterized by the displacement of the bourgeoisie in political power, the transfer of armed power from the bourgeoisie to the popular masses, and the initiation of far-reaching measures in property relations. The logical outcome of such a course is the establishment of a workers state; but, without a revolutionary Marxist party, this is not guaranteed. In the early days of the Communist International it was held to be excluded in the absence of a revolutionary Marxist party. Experience has shown, however, that this conclusion must be modified in the colonial world due to the extreme decay of capitalism and the effect of the existence of the Soviet Union and a series of workers states in the world today.

"An essentially bourgeois state apparatus was bequeathed to Algeria. A crisis in the leadership of the FLN [Front de Libération National] came to a head July 1, 1962, ending after a few days in the establishment of a de facto coalition government in which Ferhat Abbas and Ben Bella represented the two opposing wings of neocolonialism and popular revolution. The struggle between these two tendencies within the coalition ended in the reinforcement of the Ben Bella wing, the promulgation of the decrees of March 1963 and the ouster successively* of Khider, Ferhat Abbas and other bourgeois leaders although some rightist elements still remain in the government. These changes marked the end of the coalition and the estab-

*The editors of The Newsletter print this as "successful ousting" instead of "ouster successively." The bias against accurate reporting appears at all levels in this paper.

lishment of a Workers and Peasants government.

"As is characteristic of a Workers and Peasants Government of this kind, the Algerian government has not followed a consistent course: Its general direction, however, has been in opposition to imperialism, to the old colonial structure, to neocolonialism and to bureaucratism. It has reacted with firmness to the initiatives of would-be new bourgeois layers, including armed counterrevolution. Its subjective aims have repeatedly been declared to be the construction of socialism. At the same time its consciousness is limited by its lack of Marxist training and background.

"The question that remains to be answered is whether this government can establish a workers state. The movement in this direction is evident and bears many resemblances to the Cuban pattern. A profound agrarian reform has already been carried out, marked by virtual nationalization of the most important areas of arable land. Deep inroads have been made into the old ownership relations in the industrial sector with the establishment of a public and state-controlled sector. Yet to be undertaken are the expropriation of the key oil and mineral sector, the banks and insurance companies, establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade and the inauguration of effective counter measures to the monetary, financial and commercial activities of foreign imperialism.

"Among the most heartening signs in Algeria are (1) in foreign policy the establishment of friendly relations with Cuba, Yugoslavia, China, the Soviet Union and other workers states with the possibility this opens up for substantial aid from these sources; (2) the active attitude of the government toward developing the colonial revolution in such areas as Angola and South Africa; (3) within Algeria the establishment of the institution of 'self-management.' 'Self-management' with its already demonstrated importance for the development of workers and peasants democracy offers the brightest opening for the establishment of the institutions of a workers state.

"As a whole, Algeria, as we have noted many times, has entered a process of permanent revolution of highly transitional character in which all the basic economic, social and political structures are being shaken up and given new forms. This process is certain to continue. It will be greatly facilitated and strengthened if one of the main problems now on the agenda -- the organization of a mass party on a revolutionary Marxist program -- is successfully solved.

"The appearance of a Workers and Peasants Government in Algeria is concrete evidence of the depth of the revolutionary process occurring there. It is of historic importance not only for Algeria and North Africa but for the whole African continent and the rest of the world."

Was Trotsky Right?

What theory Slaughter or his collaborators followed in making their judicious selection of quotations remains obscure; but it must be admitted that it certainly facilitated their polemical work. On the other hand, it constitutes convincing proof of what a mistake it would be to take them seriously on the level of theory. For they leave unanswered a series of questions of the utmost importance and timeliness in the international class struggle of today, all of which are implied, if not directly referred to in the very statement on which they performed their surgery. Were the Bolsheviki correct in suggesting that Workers and Peasants governments might arise as transitional formations while the capitalist state still remained in existence? Was Trotsky correct in referring to this possibility in the Transitional Program?* Has this possibility, foreseen by the masters of revolutionary socialism who were our teachers, been realized anywhere in life? If so, what should be the attitude of the Trotskyist movement toward such transitional formations? What kind of program should they propose for them? How should they participate in such developments?

Not only is there the deepest silence on these questions in The Newsletter, the evidence would seem irrefutable that the leaders of the SLL deliberately exclude these topics, particularly if they stand in the way of falsifying the position of opponents with whom they insist on carrying on a dead-end factional struggle. Such methods spell doom for the Socialist Labour League. In the case of Algeria, for instance, the "theory" of Slaughter and his collaborators signifies never advancing beyond the barest of abstractions and either monstrously mistaking the reality or missing it completely.

We are told about the need for a Trotskyist party in Algeria.

*Here is what Trotsky said: "Is the creation of such a government by the traditional workers' organizations possible? Past experience shows, as has already been stated, that this is to say the least highly improbable. However, one cannot categorically deny in advance the theoretical possibility that, under the influence of completely exceptional circumstances (war, defeat, financial crash, mass revolutionary pressure, etc.), the petty-bourgeois parties including the Stalinists may go further than they wish along the road to a break with the bourgeoisie. In any case one thing is not to be doubted: even if this highly improbable variant somewhere at some time becomes a reality and the 'workers' and farmers' government' in the above-mentioned sense is established in fact, it would represent merely a short episode on the road to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat." We call the attention of the ultraleft SLL leaders to the fact that Trotsky specifically referred to "petty-bourgeois" parties. (Transitional Program, page 35 of the SLL edition.)

Wonderful! We are told that the national bourgeoisie cannot carry out the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Superb! But then this promising beginning trails off in gibberish. Algeria is equated with India and Cuba. And the gibberish continues: "Where the state takes a bonapartist form on behalf of a weak bourgeoisie, as in Algeria or Cuba [!], then the type of 'revolt' occurring on June 19-20 is on the agenda. The role of the Fourth International is not to take sides [!] and campaign for mass support for one or another wing of the bourgeoisie [!], but to build independent parties of the working class which can utilise such crises for the overthrow of the capitalist state."* We thus end up precisely where we began -- without having advanced a single step in solving the problem of how to build an "independent" party of the working class capable of utilizing a crisis like the one on June 19-20 to overthrow the capitalist state.

A Crucial Contradiction

In contrast to this barren ultraleft approach, consider the concrete analysis reached by the Fourth International, as indicated in the documents cited above. At the heart of the political struggle in Algeria stands a glaring contradiction. A deep-going revolutionary upheaval thrust into power a government capable of taking far-reaching measures, such as expropriating the land held by the French colons, instituting workers "self-management" on the expropriated properties and projecting a socialist "option" for the country. This government nevertheless rests on a capitalist state structure inherited from the French colonial period. The government points in the direction of socialism; the capitalist state structure in precisely the opposite direction. A contradiction of such intolerable character can signify only a highly unstable situation. The nature of the alternative has never been in doubt. Either the Workers and Peasants government must initiate further radical measures, eventually transcending the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution, or the counter pressures, backed by the imperialist world (primarily France and the United States), will overwhelm this government in

*In a press interview at Chantilly (near Paris) June 24, Messali Hadj denounced both Ben Bella and Boumediene with fine impartiality. "A civilian dictatorship has been ousted," he said; "to be replaced by a military dictatorship. It's really not worth bothering about... That's why the PPA [Parti du Peuple Algérien] refuses to choose between the regime of a single party and dictatorship, and a military coup d'état." While certain leaders of the SLL might respond sympathetically to this, caution is still advisable in any projected approaches to Messali Hadj. He ended his interview, according to the June 26 Le Monde, by paying "homage" to the "constitutional monarchy of Morocco"; calling for the creation of an "Islamic Algerian state"; and declaring that while there had been "trouble" under French rule in Algeria, nevertheless "a certain freedom of expression existed that has disappeared today."

one way or another and lead to the stabilization of a neocolonialist regime. All the political forces (if we leave out the abstentionist ultraleft wiseacres who find it the height of wisdom "not to take sides") lined up in accordance with this alternative and have sought with the means at their disposal to affect its final outcome.

Theoretical insight as to the nature of the contradiction was provided by the Transitional Program and certain discussions and documents of the first four congresses of the Communist International. The same sources also provided basic orientation in finding ways of promoting the program of revolutionary socialism in the Algerian class struggle. The real situation in Algeria, of course, determined what could be most effectively advanced. Thus the idea of a popular militia to strengthen the defense of the Algerian revolution made rapid headway during the Moroccan attack and the armed counter-revolution centered in Kabylie. (The idea of a popular militia was opposed, naturally, by the reactionary forces, especially the military clique forming around Boumedienne.) A more dramatic example was the development of workers self-management. A much more advanced slogan (or phase in the revolutionary process) than workers control, it became of outstanding importance due to unique features in the Algerian revolution.

The example of Cuba has appeared like a banner over the struggle. In fact, bearing in mind all the obvious differences between the two countries and their problems, the key question can be aptly formulated: Will Algeria follow the road blazed by Cuba?

To utilize the example of Cuba in the Algerian political scene constitutes a "revisionist betrayal" in the eyes of the SLL leaders, of course. In their opinion Cuba is a capitalist state, not a workers state, and Castro -- as they view him -- is trying, if rather unsuccessfully, to sell out to American imperialism. (Yes, that's their position!) However, outside those holding this freak view, few would deny that the establishment of a workers state as dynamic as Cuba on the strategic southern shore of the Mediterranean might well constitute a decisive turning point in world history. From the beginning, those with any capacity for objective appreciation of the possibilities understood how high the stakes are in Algeria.

The Coup d'Etat

The meaning of Boumedienne's coup d'état must be weighed in this context. In Algeria itself the revolutionary vanguard has displayed hesitation. The first reaction was fear that all the revolutionary conquests might be under threat of immediate liquidation. Spontaneous demonstrations broke out. These were met with sharp repression, a number of deaths being reported in some areas. But there were also reports that soldiers in the army expressed bewilderment. In at least one town, they began fraternizing with the demonstrators. However, a regime resting solely on the barracks

and offering the masses nothing but a diet of tear gas and bullets could not last long in Algeria. Boumedienne soon sought to reassure the advanced sectors of the workers and peasants; and the demonstrations died down. In making up his government, Boumedienne gave concessions to the left. El Moudjahid [formerly Le Peuple] kept in step and recent issues have played up "self management" and the need to carry out the Algiers Charter. It is not excluded that Boumedienne will make some dramatic moves in an effort to popularize and consolidate his regime. That he is capable of such a turn is shown by the fact that he was one of the most emphatic in denouncing the Evian agreement as a "sell out."

Castro, in denouncing Boumedienne's coup d'état, did not reject the possibility that its authors were motivated by revolutionary aims. But Castro was completely correct in pointing out that even if this was true, the coup d'état injured and endangered the Algerian revolution. In Castro's opinion, the differences with Ben Bella should have been fought out on a political level in the FLN and before the masses. That would have strengthened the revolution.

From the Trotskyist viewpoint, the key question is: How does the coup d'état affect the main contradiction in Algerian politics, the contradiction between the government and the state? There cannot be the least doubt that the acuteness of the contradiction has been reduced -- in an unfavorable direction. The bureaucratic elements lifted their heads and breathed easier, as did all the anti-Marxist forces. On the other hand, a government that came into power on the shoulders of the masses was greatly weakened in its popular basis.

Since Boumedienne took no immediate sweeping measures against the conquests of the revolution, and may even offer headline-catching concessions to consolidate his regime, it may appear that his seizure of power represents no fundamental change. And that is undoubtedly how it is being read by many leftists in Algeria after the first shock. The sag in the revolution, Ben Bella's disregard of the warning signs pointed out by the revolutionary Marxists, his policy of substituting maneuvers and compromises for development of the class struggle, his concentration of power in his own hands -- all helped contribute to the impression among Algerian leftists that the shift in power occurred without much alteration in the political scene.

From a distance, of course, it is not easy to weigh the validity of this view. However, the coup d'état itself is a most palpable fact. It has its own logic. And this logic can run much stronger than the intentions of its organizers, even if their intentions were of the best. The coup d'état at once heartened and encouraged the reactionary social forces in Algeria; it dismayed and obviously weakened those who favor socialism, who want Algeria to follow the Cuban example. The true significance of the coup d'état must be judged at the beginning from the direction it points to.

The arrow has swung around to the opposite of the overturn in 1962 that ended the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic which the French sought to sustain. The fact is that the Algerian revolution is now facing its most dangerous crisis.

Is a New Upsurge Possible?

After subsiding for some time, the Algerian revolution recently began to show signs of revival. Whether this would continue, whether it would end in a new upsurge, what changes this might lead to on the political level, and particularly in the government's course, remained to be seen. It has been reported that Ben Bella was preparing to move against the growing army power, that the agrarian reform was to be resumed, that the long promised purge of bureaucratic elements would begin, and so on. Whatever the truth to these reports, and there was probably some truth to them, the Boumedienne clique apparently decided they could no longer delay their project to seize power, which, the evidence tends to show, had been plotted for some time.

Does Boumedienne's victory then close off the possibility of a new upsurge in the Algerian revolution? There is little likelihood of that. Among the revolutions of our day, this one has displayed most remarkable recuperative powers. How many times the pundits declared it dead during the dark years of the dirty war! And each time, this heroic people refused to pay attention to the obituaries, suddenly dealing French imperialism a new stunning blow.

However, even without a new mass upsurge in the immediate future, the struggle to defend and advance the revolution will continue. As was the case under Ben Bella, innumerable issues, often of seemingly narrow scope, will press insistently forward; for example, the tug of war over workers self-management, the question of ties with the workers states, the problem of imperialist pressures, the handling of foreign trade, the development of the agrarian reform, the fight against unemployment, the right to free trade unions, the struggle for emancipation of the women -- all the multitudinous problems for which the opposing social forces in Algeria offer mutually exclusive solutions.

The crucial problem of constructing a revolutionary socialist leadership will gain fresh urgency in the thinking of the vanguard of the workers and poor peasants as the dangerous forces encouraged by the coup d'état move more boldly into the open. The potential cadres for constructing that leadership are to be found primarily in the left wing of the FLN, where the key slogan continues to be the need to build a genuinely independent mass party representing the interests of the workers and poor peasants. There are many militants in the left wing of the FLN imbued with the idea that Algeria's only hope is to really exercise its socialist "option" and join the noncapitalist camp where Cuba already stands. Their receptivity to "Trotskyist" ideas, particularly of a transitional

nature, is bound to rise.

To work in a field like that of the left wing of the FLN, to find the specific partial issues that will best advance the work there, holds little attraction for ultraleft masterminds preoccupied with broader things, like meeting the demand of the British market for articles "exposing" the Fourth International. For them Trotsky's Transitional Program is a document to be praised, not to be understood and applied. The Trotskyists in Algeria, who seek to participate in even the most limited battles and experiences of the vanguard, take a different attitude.

In the complex and contradictory reality of Algeria, the Transitional Program provides a method for finding avenues and points of entry for the ideas of revolutionary socialism, for struggling most effectively against the reaction and for stimulating the revolution. While this by itself is no guarantee of victory, it at least indicates the only road on which victory can be achieved. Not the least of its virtues is the assistance it offers in avoiding the deadly trap of ultraleftism.

IT WAS A GREAT DAY FOR WILSON

In parliament July 15, Prime Minister Harold Wilson did a beautiful job of showing what standing he has won by playing the faithful servant to Johnson. Wilson reported that his emissary to Hanoi, Harold Davies, was "unable to see any North Vietnamese Ministers or to obtain any undertaking that the Commonwealth mission would be received in Hanoi." Nevertheless Davies had "protracted conversations" with certain officials who took "copious notes."

A Tory spokesman had suggested that Davies might come back "brainwashed." But Wilson had seen the "full notes" taken by Davies. "Let me say it was Mr. Davies who brainwashed them, as anyone would expect who knows him."

Another Tory had suggested nastily that Wilson sent Davies to Hanoi without "the permission of the Americans."

The Prime Minister was triumphant. "...I can tell him now that this was most warmly received by the Americans, not only in private but in public. I am able to say that we were in the closest connexion with them while Mr. Davies was there..."

A great day for Wilson! Hanoi brainwashed. The Tories confounded. And the Americans in stitches over the comedy performance of Johnson's well-trained British butler...

ON THE CRISIS IN ALGERIA

[The following speech was given by Fidel Castro June 26 to the Cuban youth who were chosen to attend the Ninth World Youth Festival, which was scheduled to be held in Algiers July 28 to August 7. The Algerian government information service accused the Prensa Latina office in Algiers of duplicating this speech and distributing copies of it in the "public thoroughfares" of the Algerian capital. The information service said that this was impermissible interference in the internal affairs of Algeria; and the police ordered Prensa Latina's office to be locked up. The translation provided below is an unofficial one distributed by the Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York. We have made some typographical changes and corrected some obvious minor errors.]

* * *

Comrade Delegates to the Ninth Youth and Students Festival:

For many months the selection of the representatives of our youth to the Ninth Festival has occupied an important part of our people's attention.

The enthusiasm with which the preparatory activities and the selection of the Cuban delegation were carried out, would probably compare favorably with what was done in any other country.

We do not know how the delegates are chosen elsewhere. We naturally feel that the organizations do everything possible to select the best everywhere. But we can feel absolutely sure and satisfied that, thanks to a revolutionary mass procedure, Cuba has selected representatives of top quality, that is, real representatives of the best of our people and our Revolution.

And all the people supported this effort. The millions of arrobas [one arroba equals about 25 pounds] of cane cut, the tens of thousands of acres weeded, the countless and endless projects, the countless efforts made in honor of the Ninth Festival, speak for themselves of the warmth with which the nation centered its effort on this activity, even in the middle of the sugar harvest. And the efforts were coordinated. Many were enabled to distinguish themselves in the harvest, and the selection and the effort made to choose the representatives of Cuba in turn helped the harvest.

It is said that the effort made was as if the Ninth Festival was to be held in Cuba. The country chosen as the site, our relations with the people of that country and with the revolutionary movement which that country represents, served as a stimulus to our efforts. And an undoubtedly exceptional work was done.

And there was our delegation with their bags practically

packed, with the ship already on the way here, when suddenly the scene where the Ninth Festival was to be held abruptly changed.

It would no longer be a clear and eloquent slogan to speak of the World Youth and Students Festival for solidarity, peace and friendship, if it were held there where the concepts of peace, solidarity and friendship are now doubtful. Because it can be said that the circumstances in Algeria are now quite different from the circumstances which moved the organizers of the Festival to choose it as the site of the event.

It is not at all agreeable and it is always rather a thorny question to pass judgment on events which have taken place in a country beyond our frontiers. It is even more regrettable and more thorny when these events take place in a country whose heroic people won the sympathy of the whole world, and, as part of that world, our people. When these events take place in the middle of a revolutionary process which awoke the interests of all the nations of the world and especially the interest of those nations which have fought wholeheartedly against colonialism and imperialism, and of the nations which have liberated themselves or are struggling to liberate themselves, and also of the nations which cannot be called underdeveloped, whose progressive sectors were showing extraordinary interest in the Algerian revolutionary process.

These are the circumstances which, although they make analysis doubly thorny and painful, justify the universal concern at the events which are taking place there and justify not just the right but the duty to express an opinion.

In expressing our opinions we are not seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of any country but we are seeking to exercise the right of analysing events wherever they take place which necessarily influence the rest of the world, because to a certain extent the events in Algeria affect us all.

And that is why what is happening there, in that country, which in its long and extraordinarily heroic years of struggle won sympathy, solidarity and aid from different parts of the world, is something that in one way or another concerns us all.

And that is why tonight, at this meeting with the youths selected to leave for Algeria, facing the unavoidable need to answer the question what we are going to do, we find it necessary to deal with this matter and answer the question.

We are not going to speak in diplomatic language, we are going to speak in revolutionary language. Diplomatic and revolutionary language are not always in contradiction. Sometimes they are in contradiction, and other times they are identical. In this case we will forget the diplomatic aspects of the question and confine ourselves to the clearly revolutionary aspect.

Why beat around the bush? We cannot discuss this question without offending a few people even though there is no intention to offend anyone.

We cannot discuss this question without creating enmity. But in these circumstances what is important is the correct point of view, a correct and objective analysis as far as possible.

In the first place, the military revolt which overthrew the Revolutionary Government of Ben Bella is not and cannot be described by anyone as a revolutionary uprising.

It is true that the crisis arose within the Revolution and among the ranks of the revolutionaries; it is also true that the men that headed that uprising played a prominent role in the struggle for the independence of Algeria; and it is also true that among those figures there are men that had maintained a good revolutionary line up to this moment, and other figures who although they have played a distinguished role in the revolutionary process did not have a good revolutionary position.

In our relations with Algeria we made contacts with the revolutionaries, with the representatives of that country, considering them all as part of the same thing. We met many Algerian personalities, many of them visited our country; many of them discussed and held wide exchanges of information with representatives of our country during our visits there or their visits here. Some of them are today in one camp and some in the other; some of them are victims and some victimizers.

But, forgetting names, figures or personalities, the description of a military revolt as revolutionary or not depends essentially on the facts. There can be a revolutionary military revolt and in the case it would be more correct to describe it as a revolutionary movement rather than a revolt. A revolt can also be something that is more crudely described as a putsch, a military seizure of power or a right-wing military coup.

The target against which the revolt is directed is, in the first place, one of the elements that determine how it is described although its description will not depend on the target against which it is directed but also on the ends it pursues.

Over a decade ago, another North African country, the United Arab Republic, was ruled by a king named Farouk, a representative of a feudal monarchy and of foreign monopoly interests. It was a regime which represented the most crude exploitation of the workers and peasants, and in those circumstances a military movement emerged which led to the overthrow of the king, to the establishment of a republic and to the true independence of the country.

That movement was led by a military man and carried out by

military men. That revolt from the very moment it took place could unquestionably be described as a revolutionary military uprising. The mere fact that it was directed against the most anachronistic form of government and against the representatives of the interests that exploited the country, made that movement, from the first moment, a revolutionary movement, or a revolutionary military uprising or, simply, a revolution.

Those circumstances were radically different from those in which the Algerian revolt is taking place. In Egypt, the progressive forces in the army rose against a social system and the government that represented it; revolutionaries rose against supporters of feudalism and against imperialists.

Are these the circumstances in which the Algerian revolt took place? No, it is, in the first place, a painful clash within the revolutionary ranks; a painful conflict within the revolution, in which arms and force are used against revolutionaries and not against a feudal king, not against a representative of imperialist interests, not against a spokesman of the exploiters and reactionaries, not against an enemy of the people, but against the representative of the Algerian Revolution, against a revolutionary and anti-imperialist fighter, against a fighter whose position in the international arena in the struggle of the peoples against imperialism, won in a few years great prestige in his country and abroad.

The weapons of the revolution and of the people are turned against one who, unquestionably enjoyed the support of the people; against one who unquestionably represented the will of the majority of the people.

This consideration of what the defeated government represented, the government against which the military revolt was directed, does not have anything to do with passing judgment on the work of that government, does not have anything to do with the achievements or with the errors that men and governments, made up of men, inevitably commit.

There is no attempt in this to make a detailed analysis of a number of years of government, of what was done, good or bad, because this is a question open to argument, a matter of opinion, of judgment.

One could have an opinion on whether more could or could not have been done, on whether they did more or less than they could. But what we are talking about today are facts, not opinions or judgments, but facts accepted by everyone.

Who could deny that Ben Bella was the leader of the Algerian people, who could deny the historic part he played in the independence of Algeria and in the Algerian Revolution? What government, what party ever said before the treacherous overthrow of President Ben Bella that Ben Bella was not a revolutionary, that Ben Bella was

not an interpreter of the feelings of Algeria, that Ben Bella was a traitor to the revolution, or that Ben Bella was pro-imperialist, a conservative, a reactionary, a despot?

The Conference of Afro-Asian Countries, as well as the World Youth Festival, was going to be held in Algeria. No one ever proposed to hold it in South Viet Nam, in the capital of the pro-imperialist puppets; no one proposed to hold it in South Korea or in Formosa or in the Malaysian Federation, or in any of those countries where the governments represent antisocial and antinational interests.

By almost unanimous agreement of all progressive and revolutionary movements it was decided that the Conference should be held in Algeria, that the Festival should be held in Algeria. No one, no government, no party, ever said that this man was a turncoat or a traitor or a despot or an enemy of the Algerian people.

I am basing myself on realities, not on opinions but on facts and truths universally accepted.

The day following the inglorious coup a delicate situation arose for all governments and for all parties: what to do? And this question also involved us. What to do and why and what our attitude was to be towards these events.

A government very friendly to us had been overthrown, a government with which we maintained the best of relations, because we saw in it the representative of the Algerian Revolution. We are not looking at this problem in the light of friendship as some have tried to insinuate. No. We are looking at it in the light of truth, of our principles, of dignity.

Our relations with President Ben Bella were simply the expression of our relations with and our sympathy for the Algerian Revolution and the Algerian people.

It is true that our people felt a great admiration for President Ben Bella personally, because of course we had not forgotten, it is not something that could be easily forgotten, the gesture of the revolutionary leader of Algeria, the president of the new state which had won its independence after seven years of heroic struggle, on the eve of those critical days of October 1962.

In an atmosphere of growing tension he arrived in the United States, invited by the government of that country, the country which maintained such a high degree of hostility towards us, the country which judges men and governments and adopts reprisals against them on the basis of how friendly or unfriendly they are towards Cuba. It must not be forgotten that the representative of Algeria, a country which had been devastated and scorched by war, rejecting all pressure from the imperialist government of the United States, with-

out having anything to expect from us, or to receive from us, spontaneously and without any hesitation accepted an invitation to visit our country; to travel from Washington to Havana, thus affronting the imperialists precisely during those critical and tense days.

We recall our contacts with that leader, his decency, his kind and revolutionary character, expressed not in words but in deeds, because a true revolutionary attitude is not expressed in words but in actions.

And it was not a case of mere words but of a deeply revolutionary gesture of solidarity, so well understood by our people that they gave our visitor one of the warmest welcomes ever extended in our country to a foreign visitor.

But we also recall the embarrassing situation in which we found ourselves with our visitor because the (October) crisis was taking form. The U.S. government had put forward its points of view in answer to the concern expressed by the visitor over the hostility of the United States towards Cuba. And they had told him that if the weapons in Cuba were not offensive weapons there would be no problems, but that if the weapons were offensive then there would be problems.

This was for us an unacceptable description of weapons. Because the sovereignty of a country does not involve, and cannot involve in any way, any obligation to give an account of its armaments.

The United States has signed military agreements with Turkey, which borders on the Soviet Union, and is closer geographically to the Soviet Union than Cuba is to the United States, and with Japan and with Italy and with many other countries. Under these military agreements the United States has stationed in those countries the kind of nuclear weapons it saw fit, ranging from strategic missiles with nuclear warheads to bases for atomic submarines or for atomic bombers. Neither the United States nor the governments with which it signed those agreements admitted that any one could ask them to render an account nor did they consider themselves under an obligation to render an account to anyone.

That is why we never accepted these premises and never agreed to them. We are not going to recall the details of those days. To us they were the expression of the most extraordinary heroism and of the greatest dignity that a nation could show.

But we are not going to go into the background of tactical errors in the political field, of public statements that could have played into the hands of our enemy. When one has the right to do something and truth is on one's side, there is no need to resort to a lie. It should never be necessary to lie.

But the fact is that the imperialists had worked out the doctrine of offensive and non-offensive weapons. We perfectly well understood that there could be strategic or nonstrategic weapons; nuclear or conventional weapons.

But in the days when President Ben Bella visited us, very close to the October crisis, the whole plan for the military strengthening of our nation was in full swing and the establishment of the nuclear weapons was near completion. What should we do with our guest? Could we accept in silence the explanations he gave us about what he had been told by the imperialists? Could we let him leave our country without saying a word, without explaining to him the storm that was approaching, and without telling him the truth? Could we reveal secrets or facts that should be kept rigorously secret? Could we reveal the extent of the military strengthening of our nation, and the nature of this strengthening?

It was really a delicate and embarrassing situation. And what did we do? We did not tell him we were going to have nuclear weapons, but we allowed him to understand it. We explained to him the philosophy of our position, the truth about our situation in relation to U.S. imperialism, its constant interference in our affairs, its implacable hostility, its aggressive plans, its criminal aims to crush our homeland, the dangers hanging over our country, the danger of a conventional war whenever it pleased them, plus the danger of a nuclear war if such a war broke out for any reason in any part of the world.

And we explained to him how we were directing our strategy toward the simplification of this problem, to get out of this alternative and have only one risk over our heads, the risk of a thermonuclear war that we would have to face anyway, if such a war broke out for any reason anywhere.

And not many words are necessary in the case of one who understands well. And Ben Bella showed himself to be a person of magnificent and intelligent understanding.

Of course, that was not the only reason for the presence of strategic weapons, since we were not thinking only of our purely national interests. Our thinking when the decision was taken, was not on the security of our country alone but was essentially on the security of the whole socialist camp, the security and strengthening of all the enemies of imperialism.

And it must be said that when the decision was taken, the fundamental concern of the Cuban leaders was not the security of our country but the total coincidence of our national policy and our international policy; the full identity, without contradictions of any kind, in our revolutionary policy, because our homeland and the socialist camp would both be strengthened.

Of course, all this can be the subject of multiple discussions, because everything can be discussed. Whether or not it meant a strategic strengthening of the socialist camp, whether or not missiles were needed here, whether they were "hard" or "soft"; that is, whether they were underground or on the surface. But, without trying to settle the question which history will have to clarify, the unquestionable fact is that the strategic missiles in Cuba had an incomparably shorter distance to travel than the strategic missiles in the Soviet Union.

We believe that this is not the time, that it is up to history to clarify the intentions of each and every one of those who acted on that occasion. Changes in governments take place, new situations arise, men pass, facts remain and history will weigh the actions of men.

But I say simply this, in our concept, and not without a very solid basis, the presence of the missiles in Cuba meant the strengthening of the power of the whole socialist camp.

I say this so as not to leave this delicate question without clarifying one or two points that should not remain obscure. But essentially I was referring, and that is why it comes up today, to the practical problem we faced with Ben Bella's visit at that moment, a few hours after he had talked with the president of the United States. What was our attitude and what was his? What did he understand? He understood quickly and correctly. He told us that things were all right, that he understood our position.

And there is something more. When the Cuban-Algerian communiqué was drafted -- and when these communiqués are drafted, more radical and less radical positions always appear, and the position of the (Algerian) Foreign Ministry was not then the most radical -- the clearest and most radical positions in the communiqué were those of Ben Bella, not of the Algerian Foreign Ministry.

I don't remember whether Bouteflika was the foreign minister or whether it was his predecessor, but I recall that the checking of the joint communiqué took place very near the time of Ben Bella's departure. The communiqué had to reflect the ideas of both countries, and for our part we did not, and could not, in any way raise issues likely to make the acceptance of the communiqué difficult for our visitor.

I remember that when the final communiqué was read, I will never forget, that in recalling the conversation we had had on offensive and non-offensive weapons -- and I forgot to tell you that as well as that explanation of the alternatives we also explained our position on the description of weapons as offensive and defensive -- in recalling that conversation which was undoubtedly the most important question we had dealt with, Ben Bella said to us: "a phrase has to be added to the communiqué, that Cuba has the right to take

any measure it deems fit to defend its security."

And that phrase, more or less as I have quoted it, must be there in the records, in that communiqué. It was on his initiative, showing just how well and how clearly he understood our position, and how he roused in us sufficient confidence, sufficient gratitude for his gesture at that time so that, without being either casuistical or concrete, we did not hesitate to explain the philosophy and the base of our position, and everything else he deduced himself. Hence he got to know a lot about an extraordinarily important secret when he visited our country.

The relations and friendship between the two peoples became greater and greater. Later, circumstances arose, moments of crisis for Algeria, difficult moments for the Algerian nation, when they asked for our help. And men and arms from our country, crossing the Atlantic in record time, arrived in Algeria ready to fight alongside the Algerian revolutionaries. And when our men were there, they were with those who today are divided. Those who today have taken up arms against Ben Bella in a fratricidal struggle, were then at his side.

At that time, distance did not keep us from being the first to arrive. Proletarian internationalism in deeds, in deeds, and not in cheap speech making. We, the small country, constantly threatened by the imperialists, parted with some of our most important weapons and sent them to the Algerian people. And the deeds were strengthening relations and friendship between the two peoples, in their best and most glorious moments.

Perhaps, unfortunately, those weapons that one day left our country for the Revolution and the defense of the Algerian people, in a glorious moment of brotherly solidarity, were employed at an inglorious moment, in a fratricidal act, against the Algerian government and people.

But what is important, what remains, are the deeds that go on forging history in the relations between two countries and two revolutions. It will be the job of the Algerian historians, or some other country -- because everyone has the right to have an opinion about what happens anywhere -- to assess the work of Ben Bella at the head of the Algerian government.

Many people will be satisfied and many people will not be satisfied, but some and perhaps many, and among them ourselves, have not the slightest doubt of the extraordinary good faith with which Ben Bella worked, of the honesty of his intentions and of his position at international meetings where Cuba was present. There we were also exceptional witnesses to the fact that the most revolutionary positions were represented by Ben Bella and not by Bouteflika, the foreign minister whose insubordination marked the culminating moment in the overthrow of Ben Bella. There is no doubt at all that this

intellectual of the military seizure of power is not a revolutionary but a man of the right and known as such by the Algerian people and the whole world. A man of the right, an enemy of socialism, that is, an enemy of the Algerian Revolution, although in their proclamation as in all such proclamations, a certain revolutionary language is used, not a completely revolutionary language, since there is not a word about the national liberation movements, of help to the national liberation movements, help about which Ben Bella never bargained, solidarity which Ben Bella never refused.

And this gentleman, spokesman and one of the men behind the military seizure of power, is a man of the right, a reactionary. And I believe that these facts serve to define the situation.

And at these international meetings the position of Ben Bella was the most revolutionary. It's not easy to judge and we have to confine ourselves to the facts. Everyone will have his own opinion, everyone has his own style, others perhaps would have done things differently. Perhaps with a little more shrewdness, and less kindness and nobility, Ben Bella would not have been a victim and would have foreseen the danger, the danger which we unfortunately did foresee. Because we saw that around Boumedienne there was a clique gathering, we saw that around Boumedienne there were officers who liked to discredit Ben Bella. And here, unfortunately, on many occasions when delegations visited us, our comrades saw with sorrow that a militarist caste, obviously influenced by militarist conceptions, was showing disdain for the Algerian president.

Naturally we were not going to spread the gossip because this was also quite a general attitude among the men close to Boumedienne. I am not judging Boumedienne. Let us not judge him for what he has done now, so that history may judge him for what he has done and what he may do. He is a very silent man, of few words. It is difficult to know what he is thinking, but his supporters were neither quiet nor lacking in words.

And unfortunately the military seizure of power took place. If Ben Bella had been shrewder and less ingenuous, there would not have been a military seizure of power, and the masses would have disarmed the men behind the revolt, but the unfortunate events took place. I repeat, we base ourselves not on exaggerations but on what we know for a fact, and it does not involve an analysis of the work of Ben Bella, but an analysis of his intentions, of his characteristics, of his decency, of his nobility, of his goodness, of his passion for the Revolution and for Algeria, demonstrated on many occasions.

And now, in view of the events, were we going to ignore all this history, all the ties which bound us to the Algerian Revolution and its most legitimate representatives, to abuse the fallen hero because he no longer governs in Algeria and to try at all costs to win the support of those who assumed power at the point of the sword?

No, because we would be engaging in the most repugnant political opportunism.

Could we express our support for the military seizure of power? No, because in the conditions of Algeria, in the middle of the revolutionary process, we find no possible justification for the way in which they acted. We could, at the most, wait and see if the unlikely and almost impossible happened, that after using treacherous and dishonorable methods, they later showed, without any possible doubt, really revolutionary intentions, showed that they are leading and not following the Algerian Revolution.

In that case we could exonerate them or be tolerant of their very serious mistakes of today, because of the way they might be able to remedy them tomorrow, but it is not possible to expect this. It is not probable, it could be possible, but it is not probable.

Let's imagine that these gentlemen were even more revolutionary, that the Algerian Revolution appeared backward and show that they wanted to deepen it, to go further. Let us assume for a moment that the arguments or the motives that inspired their action had a base, at least, in intention. Let us imagine, as a hypothesis, that they were right. When you are right, is it necessary to resort to treason? Is a military revolt the only road open to them? Was their situation that of Nasser in Egypt against King Farouk? Not at all. Many of the cabinet ministers are still there. If it is true that the promoters of the coup represented the will of the people and if it was true that they were right, why did they resort to a military seizure of power? Why did they not raise the problem before the masses, before the people? Why did they not take up the problem within the party, within the ranks of the revolutionaries?

How could we, Marxist-Leninists, accept, in the specific conditions of Algeria, a military seizure of power carried out treacherously at night, which reminds us so much of March 10 (the military coup by dictator Batista in 1952), both by the hour and the way in which it took place and by the forms of repression already being used against the people, soldiers, fire trucks, shooting, beating and police cars with howling sirens.

With deep sorrow it reminds us of the days following the tenth of March. It would not be correct to say that the Algerian military seizure of power is similar to that of March 10 in the composition of its forces. No. But in the methods used it is as similar as one drop of water to another. And it has to be similar, because whenever soldiers move against the will of the people, repression arises; and repression against the people, against the masses is very similar anywhere, at any time.

If they thought they were right and were the interpreters of the will of the majority, why did they not go to the masses, why did they not go to the party? If in addition to force and the military

commands, they were right and had the support of the people, why did they resort to force?

Why did they not explain the problem to the masses and to the political organization of the revolutionary masses? And I think that anyone who is really convinced that he is right and that he represents the will of the people would not lack the courage to take the problem to the people and to their representative institutions.

Those who are not sure of being right or of interpreting the will of the people resort to the only means open to them at a given moment, to force. And we, as Marxist-Leninists, cannot justify this military procedure against the masses and against the party.

Aside from what they may do afterwards, even if they were more revolutionary than Karl Marx himself, we would not refrain from telling them, while recognizing their virtues, of their errors and the wrong they have done, of the damage to the Algerian Revolution that may arise from their conduct, of the damage to the revolutionary movement in Africa and other parts of the world; of the mistrust that they may arouse in other liberated countries of Africa and how unfortunate it is to establish on that continent the procedure of military seizure of power in the middle of a revolutionary process.

And if they really would like to be more revolutionary how could they accomplish these more revolutionary intentions? "Could" they do, with a divided people, what Ben Bella, full of good intentions, could not do with a united people? Could they with a divided people face the imperialist danger? Could they wage the hard battles, the hard battles that a process of radicalization of a revolution inevitably involves? How could we have waged those hard battles with a divided people? Battles that we have won as a united people, with all the forces of a united people?

How are they going to arouse energies without the masses? Will they arouse them in the barracks? No. The energy that emanates from the barracks, divorced from the people will never be sufficient to resist the power of the imperialists which can only be met by the tremendous revolutionary energy and strength of the people, of a united people.

To make the revolution more radical in those conditions would be extraordinarily difficult; of course, it would not be impossible. But to face those very difficult battles and those very difficult situations would require on the part of those who have replaced Ben Bella a political talent and a revolutionary audacity which Boueflika and Company do not seem to have; would require support not of the conservatives but of the revolutionary people, the support of the workers, the farmers, the students. And I don't see how anyone can win the support of those masses by using their rifle butts and firing at them; I doubt that the support of the masses can be won by those who do not believe in the masses, who are contemptuous of the

strength of the masses and try to replace it with the power of military garrisons, behind the backs of the people.

I was not telling in vain that those responsible for the coup did everything possible to prevent the Algerian army from becoming a people's army, to prevent the armed forces, the working class and the peasantry from becoming closely associated, as has happened in our country. Because in order to foment a militarist spirit the armed forces cannot be truly popular and revolutionary and have roots in the people and their revolutionary and progressive classes. By repressing the students, the youth, the workers, I don't see how anyone, however well intentioned, however imbued with revolutionary ideas and aims, can get anywhere.

And as we see the news, and the cables about the repression that is taking place, we believe that the facts will show more and more each day how unjustifiable the procedure was and what painful consequences it may bring to Algeria. But there is something more. The Algerian army was formed, to a considerable extent, of revolutionary fighters.

It is very difficult, in so few years and in the middle of a revolutionary process, for any clique to have been able to inculcate a caste spirit, to wipe out the patriotic and revolutionary feelings of the men, of the fighters who make up the army. Armies of this kind are no good for repression, armies of this kind cannot be led against the people for long.

To count on the unconditional support of armies of a revolutionary origin, in the middle of a revolutionary process, against the revolutionary people, is mad, mad and suicidal.

And for that reason we see the picture of Algeria today with sorrow. From the bottom of our hearts we hope that brother country can escape the enormous abyss which has been opened before it, that it can overcome its difficulties without bloodshed. For this, it would be necessary for those who undertook the adventure, to understand in time the extent of their actions and the consequences they could bring for their country. Almost a miracle would be necessary. In their situation they would have to march forward firmly and decisively, showing in deeds the intentions they claim to have, in which case, if they were audacious, if they had the capacity, if they understood that such a battle cannot be won without the support of the people, they would have a difficult but not impossible road ahead, with great but not unsurmountable obstacles.

The road of counterrevolution cannot be taken in Algeria. Military despotism, political reaction and repression cannot prevail in a country whose people won independence and freedom only a few years ago at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives; a people who learned how to handle their weapons and to fight against a larger and better equipped army than that of Boumedienne. Repres-

sion, political reaction and counterrevolution have no possible place in Algeria.

Our attitude will be determined by facts and based on principles. Our hope is that they may be capable of understanding the blunder they have committed. And if they are not capable of this, our hope is that they have the courage to show in deeds that they are more revolutionary than the men they have overthrown, that they can justify in deeds what is completely unjustifiable as far as the method used is concerned. And our position will be determined by what they do, regardless of what they are doing now. If they should break relations with us, they would not be the first military regime to do so. We are not thinking of today, we are thinking of the future, and we do not act as opportunists but as Marxist-Leninists.

If those who staged the coup show by their deeds that they are against imperialism, if they show in deeds that they are wholeheartedly with the Algerian Revolution, that they are body and soul with the revolution of the oppressed peoples of Africa and of the whole world, we would not deny them our support, we will not deny them our backing.

And if because they are revolutionaries the imperialists one day turned against them and threatened Algeria, we would not deny Algeria our moral support, and we would not deny our blood to help them, to help the Algerian Revolution, to help the Algerian people.

But what side are we on, and what side will we be on? We are and we will be with the Algerian people and with those who interpret their revolutionary will. And the Algerian people will be with the revolutionaries. And our support will be, therefore, for the Revolution. And it is the people who will decide tomorrow just as they are deciding today.

For these reasons we consider that our delegation should not go to the Festival in Algeria, because the circumstances which justified our presence there no longer exist, because our presence, the presence of our exemplary delegation cannot be allowed to justify what can in no way be considered exemplary but is rather, a very bad example.

This means that we will not go to Algeria.

And where will we go? We can't ourselves decide if it will be held in another country or in what country. If it is in Algeria under the present conditions, we will not go. If it is held in any other country where conditions exist to justify the presence of this delegation and the presence of youth delegations from other countries, we will cooperate with the same enthusiasm, and our whole delegation to this Festival will take part. But this will be decided, and it will surely be decided soon, by those who organized the Festival.

If the Festival, because of the unfortunate events in Algeria, cannot be held with the participation of all, then we will wait for better times.

We would be in favor of choosing another date and another place, and we will attend if conditions permit the attendance of representatives of the youth of the whole world, and if there are, as there always have been, the requirements and conditions which justify our attendance.

I know very well that this is not bad news for you. Interpreting your feelings, I am sure that on the contrary, from a moral point of view it is the most satisfying news and in the eyes of all the people the trip and the Congress or Festival in itself, was only a part. Because a part, a very important part, has been the methods and the system followed in the selection of our young delegates, the title of exemplary delegation was not something they were going to receive outside Cuba. No, they received it in Cuba, from our people.

And if there should be no Festival this year, and there is one next year or the year after, this delegation of young people who almost all, or probably all will continue conducting themselves as they did when they were chosen, will represent Cuba, because you are not going to get old in one year nor in two years, and you are not going to change and you will continue to be our exemplary delegation if there should be no Festival this year.

So what should we do in the meantime? Where do we go? We could do something even better than picking coffee while we wait for the problem of the Festival to be solved. And if there is no Festival, I want to suggest this idea to you: that the time that was to be spent in the trip and the Festival should be used to go to an area of Oriente (Province) and through your effort start what could become one of the most useful, appropriate and promising activities of our youth today: to begin in a revolutionary way the reforestation of our country.

From the beginning of the Revolution we have been making an effort in this direction. When we visit many places in Cuba, we see mountains and entire regions under the destructive effect of erosion, completely devoid of forests, wasting the soil, affecting the climatic conditions. We see these regions devastated by an iniquitous, cruel and improvident exploitation, that levelled the forest of this country. We see that these areas include hundreds and hundreds of thousands of acres which could form the basis of incalculable riches, that could produce thousands of millions to help our economy, in a not too distant future of which all our youth will be the beneficiaries. I think that by a revolutionary and mass effort, well organized with the forestry organization, by mobilizing our youth in the summer, in areas that are really very pleasant, healthy and capable of attracting any young person, by preparing the necessary food supplies and making plans in good time, by assembling the resources

needed, we could, starting this year, with an effort which would be relatively modest, plant for example one million pine trees, starting with a vast and extremely beautiful plateau near the zone of Mayarí, in the pinewood of Mayarí. Starting in an almost symbolic way, the experience will serve to inspire our youth in the coming years to a massive mobilization, since the coffee can be looked after by some twenty thousand young people and there are, this year, more than forty thousand available. There is ahead a task which could become one of the most positive, most beautiful, and useful objectives for our youth: the commitment to reconstruct what was destroyed by exploitation; the commitment to recreate with all the wealth and beauty entailed, the new forests of our country.

And in the course of a few years, these hundreds of thousands of acres could be reforested, could be cared for by groups of workers devoted to the maintenance and care of forests, with every modern technique to protect them and to fight against fire. Our young people with their strength and enthusiasm, with a minimum of investment, could create fabulous wealth that no one will have a better right to enjoy than themselves.

To invite our old people to plant trees that are going to be cut in ten or fifteen years would seem absurd. But I am also sure that many men, for the pleasure of creating -- following that beautiful sentiment of Martí; that to be a man, to feel a complete man, requires three things: to write a book, to have a child and to plant a tree -- I am sure that many would plant a tree for the sake of planting a tree, even though they expected nothing from that tree. But if it is not very logical to invite our young people to undertake this task, who, if not our young people should we invite to do those things, which they, more than anyone else, are going to enjoy?

We are taking advantage of this occasion, and these circumstances to begin with you, the exemplary young people, this task to which I am sure you will give such a moral impulse, and in which you will put such effort that later when our young Communists take this task into their hands they will bring it to sure success and it will enter in the wide stream of the Revolution and into the history of the Revolution as one more positive achievement, a new creation.

We are taking advantage of the circumstances and this opportunity to put before our young people this beautiful task and to invite you to be the first to plant trees in this great effort.

I don't think we lack saplings to plant a million pines. On a recent visit to the area where they have already planted some millions, they told us that this year they would plant three million, six hundred thousand. They must have enough little pine trees so that none of you will be left without some to plant.

Furthermore, we have already been discussing a plan with the comrades responsible for reforestation, to plant all that plateau

next year. And in the coming year it should be possible to make a much greater effort, mobilizing several thousands and planting some tens of millions, if we gather all the seeds. The comrades are now collecting all the pine seeds on the island and if they collect all the seeds it will be possible to completely finish the plan by the coming year; to plant some fifty to sixty thousand acres, and so on until not a single mountain remains bare, sterile, and eroded.

I believe that youth is not only a state of life, but a right of all those who do not allow themselves to be conquered by years and never lose their youthful spirit.

I believe that in this we have a concrete task with which we can occupy ourselves while we await developments, while we wait for the Festival, or in which we can spend the time that we would have spent at the Festival.

We have a concrete task and we also know our line and our position, and there is no better place, no more suitable auditorium in which to explain the international political line of our country and this concrete plan of work for our young people.

And it is almost unnecessary to say that we are sure that you will take this line and this task into your hands and make it your own.

Homeland or death!

We will win!