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## FIRST REACTIONS IN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

It is not easy for the leaders of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, no matter how great their docility, to join Brezhnev and Kosygin in converting Khrushchev into an "unperson" in a single day. Some of them are displaying considerable embarrassment, if not twinges of conscience.

In a public statement, the top leadership of the British Communist party praised Khrushchev for his role at the Twentieth Congress and said about his sudden resignation: "The explanation of the changes so far given does not remove the natural concern felt by Communists abroad about this development."

Friheten, the official organ of the Norwegian Communist party, declared:

"It is quite evident that the explanation offered about Nikita Khrushchev's age and state of health is inexact. Whatever explanation may yet be given, we vigorously protest the fact that a change in leadership is not clearly motivated and not more openly prepared. With regard to his qualities as a chief, Khrushchev unquestionably had his strong and weak points. Under his leadership the Soviet Union made great progress, and this despite the fact that in certain matters he conducted himself with more impulsiveness and less wisdom than was desirable.

"We think that certain criticisms [made by Pravda] are justified with regard to certain aspects of the use of power under Khrushchev's leadership. But we are astounded that once again such a situation was permitted to develop over the years without a word of criticism and without any reaction.

"After all, the faults with which Khrushchev is reproached, were not noticed until the last days. . . It can be asked whether the Soviet Communist party is not still suffering from the dangerous evil that consists of lack of free and open discussion. If this is the case, the time has come to change things."

The Swedish Communist party praised Khrushchev as "the one who undertook the struggle against the cult of Stalin and all the evils associated with it."

Carl Hermansson, chairman of the Swedish Communist party, said: "It is difficult to accept that a person is a country's leading politician one day and has disappeared the next."

He deplored the custom of praising a political figure so long as he remains in power and not criticizing him until he is out. This custom is "particularly dangerous" in a one-party system, he said. He added that the Swedish Communist party is against the one-party system. He scored the "disquieting" way in which Khrushchev vanished from the stage, and declared: "A more open discussion would have furnished the best perspective for a positive evaluation of Soviet policies and thus for increased international confidence."

In Copenhagen, the Communist party registered shock. The party's daily newspaper Land og Folk on October 16 approved the ouster but said that Khrushchev's name would go down in history. On the following day an editorial disapproved the "unclear form" in which the important shift was announced to the peoples of the USSR.

The Belgian Communist party issued a public statement October 18 stating that the emotion aroused by the departure of Khrushchev renders "due homage to the exceptional contribution" the former head of the Soviet government had made "to defeat the forces of war and oppression." The party warned against "tendentious interpretations" that sought to interpret the shift "as a break with the policy of peaceful coexistence and democratization."

The Finnish Communist party, on the other hand, hailed the ouster of Khrushchev as a "positive development." It congratulated the Central Committee for eliminating "faults and errors" no matter "how elevated the position occupied by the person in question."

Khrushchev's dismissal shook the Italian Communist party. L'Unita declared in an editorial that its position could be summarized as follows:

"We hold open reservations, are even in disagreement, on the methods employed in replacing Comrade Khrushchev. We recall the fact that it was not today that we posed to the Communist and labor movement a series of problems concerning first of all the necessity of overcoming the obvious delay in continuing the process of renovation and democratization initiated by the Twentieth Congress. Fresh evidence on this is provided by the way the latest crisis in the USSR developed."

The author of the editorial, Alicata, stressed that "we think that complete and convincing information on the latest events that took place in Moscow is necessary, without denying that despite the great historic merits achieved by Comrade Khrushchev, certain moments and certain aspects of his activity could arouse perplexity, reservations and criticisms, as we ourselves did not fail to indicate on occasion, although always with a great sense of responsibility, as for example, at the time of the polemic a year and a half ago on culture."

At Santiago, Chile, Secretary General Corvalan said that "the Chilean Communists are disturbed by the eviction of Nikita Khrushchev in whom they recognized a promoter of peace. Moreover, the way in which he was evicted appears incomprehensible."

In Tel Aviv, Kol Haam, the organ of the Israeli Communist party, said that "the Central Committee must give the real reasons for the departure of a man who certainly had his faults but who accomplished magnificent work."

The French Communist party appeared to be acutely embarrassed. Waldeck Rochet, who succeeded the late Maurice Thorez as head of the party, was in Algeria seeking to overcome the effect of the party's bad record during the struggle for freedom. It was reported that he was asked to return at once to Paris in view of the sudden emergency. He preferred, however, to spend more time in Algeria.

When the news about the downfall of Khrushchev first appeared in the Paris evening papers of October 15, it was reported that the general reaction among Communist party circles was that the information was nothing but a monstrous provocation cooked up by the enemies of Communism.

Among the workers states, the report also appeared incredible. The presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party issued a declaration October 19 stating: "The news that Comrade Khrushchev had been relieved of his duties was received by our whole party and the public with surprise and emotion."

The declaration continued: "Our party and our people appreciated the activity of Comrade Khrushchev which was linked to the application of the general line of the Soviet Communist party in the struggle for the realization of the policy of peaceful coexistence as well as the denunciation of the false methods of the epoch of the cult of the personality."

In Hungary Premier Janos Kadar said October 18 "that the hundreds of thousands of Hungarians who in the recent past and also this year were able to welcome Comrade Khrushchev in our country from the depths of their hearts as the representative of the Communist party, the state and the people of the great Soviet Union as the tireless fighter for peace did well in so doing and need have no afterthoughts about it subsequently."

Wladyslaw Gomulka followed a similar indirect way of saying something for Khrushchev. "What is important for the world is that the political line defined by the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the Soviet Communist party should be continued."

He hailed the "fraternal affection of Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin" and said that the ouster of Khrushchev came to him "personally" as "no surprise." Gomulka said that the former Soviet premier in a conversation last fall "confided that he was thinking about a possible resignation."

In East Germany the United Socialist party [the CP] issued a communiqué October 17:

"The news of the resignation of Nikita Khrushchev aroused deep emotion within our party and the people of the German Democratic Republic, because Khrushchev unquestionably displayed ability, particularly in applying Marxism-Leninism as established by the Central Committee of the Soviet PC."

The Central Committee, continued the East Germans, "certainly" reached its decision because "Comrade Khrushchev did not measure up to his duties."

The leaders of the Chinese Communist party did not crow over the tremendous victory they scored in the ouster of Khrushchev. However, they thought it well to indicate that they were not unaware of what had happened. They were among the first to send congratulations to Brezhnev and Kosygin.

## LABOUR'S VICTORY IN THE BRITISH ELECTIONS

By T. J. Peters

LONDON, Oct. 19 -- In what sport slang calls a photo finish the Labour party squeezed in to victory in the general elections held last week. Up to the declaration of the last results it was touch and go, Labour finally obtaining a parliamentary majority of 4 seats over all other parties, with a total of 317 against 303 for the Conservatives and 9 for the Liberals.

In spite of its narrow margin, the Labour leadership has stated that it intends to carry out its program, which includes the renationalization of the bulk of the key steel industry -- denationalized in the main by the Tories after the fall of the Attlee government in 1951 -- and several lesser industries; drastic reform in the ownership of land; repeal of the rent act favoring the landlord-profiteers and radical reforms in social services such as pensions, unemployment benefits, etc.

Since all the indications are that the precarious economic situation, revealed by the increasingly unfavorable balance of trade figures, is leading to an almost immediate financial crisis, it remains to be seen whether actions will follow words. Certainly all pressures in capitalist society will be exerted with tremendous drive against this program. But this is a left social-democratic government, different in degree from the last Labour government, and the internal working-class long-term trend which brought Harold Wilson to leadership after reaffirming Clause 4 of the party constitution -- the principle of public ownership of the means of production -- is bound to make itself felt as a powerful countervailing force.

The outstanding result of the elections is, therefore, the coming to power, for the first time since the inception of the post-war boom in the Western world, of a government backed by the working class and committed to the socialist principle of nationalization, in one of the bastions of capitalism. This fact is all the more significant and symptomatic because it has come before the collapse of the boom, while full employment still prevails and without a mass radicalization as yet of the working class.

What the election figures show beyond all dispute is the mass desertion of the party of the ruling class by the petty bourgeoisie, by the lower middle class, and above all by layers of the working class temporarily dazzled by the surface appearance of the "affluent society." The main gain was achieved by the Liberals, doubling their popular vote at 3,000,000. If the analysis made by The Guardian (Manchester) of the election returns is correct, the Liberal party gained even more votes from Labour than from the Conservatives (in a proportion of 68% to 32% in seats they contested at the previous election in 1959, and of 53% to 43% in seats they contested against both for the first time). Since the Labour vote at 12,197,456 (against

12,208,834 in 1959) remained practically the same, a qualitative shift must have taken place.

This is perhaps illuminated by an examination of voting trends in different areas. In fact the highest swing to Labour came in the industrial areas, particularly those hardest hit in the winter of 1963, when the brief economic crisis boosted the unemployment figure to the million mark and in a flash revealed all the cracks and leaks in the economy and, aided by the scandals in the Macmillan administration, showed up the rottenness at the root of society and tarnished its appearance of affluence.

In all likelihood, Labour lost a lot of its petty-bourgeois following to the Liberals along with the Conservatives, and made up for this loss by an accretion of strength from parts of the working class which had previously strayed mostly to the Conservatives, particularly among younger workers educated by the mass media in the boom period, and especially from those voting for the first time.

The narrow Labour victory can thus be ascribed as due to two factors: negatively, to the collapse of confidence in the ruling class and its Tory political instrument among the lower middle class which the boom previously had increasingly tied to it; positively, to the awakening of new layers of the working class to political class consciousness. The Tory party vote has shown, however, that the ruling class is not as yet in complete disarray, and has been able to retain the bulk of its following. The hard core of the working-class following which sustained the Labour party in opposition right through the years of the boom still remains, with increased strength from its own ranks, the decisive element even in Labour's victory. The petty bourgeoisie, deserting the Tories, and itself disoriented, has flocked massively to the Liberals, decimated and of no importance in the country for more than a generation, and made of them anew a factor in the political arena.

From the election results light is also thrown on the strategies of the two main parties and the class interests behind them. The "evolution" of Lord Home into Tory leader and Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home was at the time somewhat puzzling. The election showed that the capitalist class leadership, by entrusting this post to a member of the aristocracy after dropping the discredited Macmillan, thereby calculated correctly -- this play on the backward traditionalist loyalties of the predominantly rural middle class paid off in preventing a stampede of the hitherto demoralized following. It avoided a rout, and gained time for further maneuver.

Wilson's strategy -- as distinct from Gaitskell's -- was prominent only in its negative aspect: the refusal to ditch the "socialist" image, Clause 4. It proved to be useful in agitation for planning and modernization as an answer to the increasing chaos in the economy, for a scientific approach -- and above all, to hold the allegiance of a working class fearful that chaos would soon overwhelm

it in the form of a crisis.

But both parties "played it cool" in the campaign itself. This was largely to the advantage of the Tories. An aggressive campaign to expose the plundering role of the capitalist class which the scandals under Tory rule highlighted constantly would undoubtedly have benefited the Labour party and served to educate wide layers of the population and to bring them in tow. But this was too much to expect of social-democrats preoccupied, under Wilson no less than under Gaitskell, with the electoral game of not antagonizing the floating voter. In the event, the Liberals profited.

The City, as the financial center of the nation is called, is facing the result with mixed feelings. Steel shares, while not exactly nose-diving, are showing a steady downward trend after many ups and downs, reflecting fear that Wilson and his new administration mean what they say. The entire stock market is wobbly, not only due to the outcome of the elections, but also to the deteriorating trade figures and the uncertainties of the international situation brought about by the changes in the USSR and the explosion of an atomic bomb in China.

The financiers, both here and abroad, are beginning to exert their manifold pressures on the new government. A television interview with three specimens, one sugary, one distraught and one hard and hatchet-faced, gave a picture of their thinking. The first made an effort to be cheerful: he thought they ought to welcome the new government's economic policy of increased production and exports, but reminded it that the way they saw things this could not be done without keeping wages down, and hoped they would see the light. The second expressed bewilderment at the idea that with so narrow a majority Labour could even think of renationalizing steel -- and gave all the stock arguments against the move, including the new one that they have no mandate, the Conservative plus the Liberal vote constituting a majority against nationalization! The third spoke of the grave financial situation and warned that it could not be overcome without lay-offs and cuts in public spending.

A Swiss banker turned up on the screen, to reenforce the line of the trio, expressing grave concern over the British loans contracted by the Tories with a broad hand in recent months and stressing in a tough way the hope that the new Labour government would meet the commitments: otherwise the stability of all of Europe was in danger.

It is clear that the Wilson administration is from the first going to be given the squeeze play by international capital. A similar situation in 1931, when a Labour minority government, supported by the Liberals, was in power, resulted in the treachery of Ramsay MacDonald and the discreditment of the Labour party. How will Wilson shape up in 1964?

There is no doubt that in the very nature of a social-democratic government lie the seeds of class betrayal. The leopard doesn't change his spots. But 1964 is not 1931. The British working class has not undergone any recent defeats as was the case then, shortly after the General Strike. The international situation has also changed greatly, the new interrelationship of class forces has reduced the power of capitalism on a world scale. The continuing leftward trend of the British workers which has brought the left social democrat Wilson to power will not diminish, but gather momentum and exert its own force upon the government, reenforced by events on the world scene.

As against the press, the mass media, the entrenched wealth of the ruling class, the Wilson government has no points of support except the power of the organized workers behind it. The left wing of the Labour movement has as its main task to stiffen the resistance of the government to the expected assault of the ruling class, the mobilization of the workers behind every progressive stand taken by the government, the participation of the workers in mass action against any attempt at a solution at their expense.

An inquest into the thirteen years of Tory plunder of the wealth of the nation is the demand of the hour: to open the books and let the country know how it came to this pass, how the nationalized industries were mulcted for the profitable working of "free enterprise," how lavish business "expenses" flourished amid the wage squeezes, how dividends doubled and quadrupled while the pensions of the aged fell below subsistence levels.

Vigilance against the flight of capital needs to be organized: bureaucratic decrees and controls will not suffice -- the workers in the key communications industries and financial centers will have to give their organized support.

Above all the starts in planning, in nationalization -- to forestall the sabotage of the business community which is certain -- have to be undertaken under workers' control and participation. The left wing of the Labour party faces a great test and great opportunities.

#### BRAZILIAN COMMUNISTS DEPOSE LUIS CARLOS PRESTES

Luis Carlos Prestes, secretary general of the Brazilian Communist party since the thirties, is reported to have been deposed at an underground Central Committee meeting in Rio de Janeiro in September. He was made "honorary chairman." The more militant 38-year-old Mario Alves was named head of the party. A Stalinist, then Khrushchevist, Carlos Prestes held that peaceful and parliamentary means could win socialism in Brazil.



An Eyewitness Account

ENGLAND'S QUEEN OF CLUBS VISITS QUEBEC

By R. Brock

QUEBEC CITY, Québec -- Inside the ornate Red Chamber of the legislature on October 10, Québec's Prime Minister Jean Lesage was addressing his guest of honor, Britain's Queen Elizabeth:

"The true democracy will fight for freedom of speech for its detractors so that problems will be aired in public. It will always be ready to question its own ideas, to revise its judgment and not to tear apart, pillory, or to describe as traitors to the country those who have the courage and perhaps the temerity to differ in opinions with it openly. Democracy must assure freedom of speech to everyone, even the adversaries of freedom of speech."

Outside, at that moment, scores of helmeted riot police, wielding heavy oak batons, thrashed right and left at French-Canadian separatist demonstrators whose only crime had been to chant, as the Queen's heavily guarded limousine speeded by, the seditious slogans "Le Québec aux Québécois" and "Québec Libre."

The previous night, Québec's largest separatist party, Le Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale [RIN], had held its biggest meeting to date in this usually conservative city. About 2,000 members and sympathizers heard RIN leaders Pierre Bourgault and Guy Pouliot protest the Queen's presence in Québec.

After the rally, they filed out in disciplined formation, as directed by the RIN's husky 'service d'ordre,' to march toward a designated location, point "X," in fact the legislative assembly.

But they never got there; the police suddenly pulled Bourgault into a nearby garage and closed the doors on him. Emerging pale and upset twenty minutes later, he ordered the restless crowd to disperse, claiming the police had threatened to use troops to break up the peaceful demonstration by force if necessary. The demonstrators promptly disbanded. Most of them stayed home the next day.

But some were intensely disappointed at what they felt was a sell-out by the RIN leadership. Among them were members of the militant Front Républicain pour l'Indépendance [FRI] led by the former Montreal prize-fighter Reggie Chartrand. This group of not more than 25 workers and unemployed youth provided the initial core for the spontaneous demonstrations which dogged the Royal party the next day.

The police reacted in the most brutal way. Wherever a few youth gathered, the cops would wade in, swinging their clubs indis-

criminally, striking innocent bystanders and journalists as well as demonstrators. The youth were outnumbered by police as much as four to one. By day's end, almost fifty had been arrested; six journalists had been hospitalized; and the population of Québec City had turned against their own police force. With more than a thousand journalists present, people the world over learned for the first time of the treatment suffered by Québec "indépendantistes."

The events in Québec were nothing new for the separatists. On Queen Victoria Day this year, no less than 300 youth were arrested in Montreal for demonstrating at the Monument to the 12 Martyrs of the 1837 Revolt. (The martyrs were hanged by the British colonial régime.) On Labor Day nearly eighty members of Chartrand's "Chevaliers de l'Indépendance" were arrested in a mass demonstration in Montreal's Lafontaine Park. Their crime -- to set fire to a British flag.

The FRI headquarters have been raided by police, and files destroyed. For selling Québec Libre in the streets (like the big dailies), FRI members have been fined in excess of \$100.

On Confederation Day, July 1, ninety young separatists in Montreal alone were picked up and held incommunicado without charges for twenty-four hours. The police calmly dismissed this brazen violation of elementary civil rights with the cynical explanation: "Preventative Detentions."

The journalists, too, became involved. By midafternoon they were going in delegations to the police to demand an end to the violence. Of the many incidents I witnessed personally, one speaks for all.

In an alley just across from the Château Frontenac, five French-Canadian reporters came upon an RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] plainclothesman trying to handcuff a struggling youth whom he was kneeling on.

In response to the detective's demands to "call the police," one newsman exclaimed: "No, you cops have been provoking trouble all day, and I'm fed up with this senseless brutality."

Another said, "Why don't you feds go back to Ottawa; we don't want you here!"

When the cop claimed that the young man had "wanted to plant a bomb in the Château Frontenac," the reporters moved in. They pulled the cop away, tearing his coat and knocking his handcuffs to the ground. The youth promptly ran away. "These guys think they're in Russia," one of the reporters said.

For the Ottawa and Québec governments, the Queen's visit was unrewarding. The population boycotted the ceremonies and parades

almost completely -- those few who joined the crowd of journalists and 4,000 uniformed police and plainclothesmen were mostly of English origin. (The bourgeois 150,000-member Catholic St-Jean-Baptiste Society called on the population to stay home, neither demonstrating for nor against the monarchy.) Québec was an armed camp, with all access roads blocked by police barricades. Dogs, horses, armoured cars, tear gas, fire hoses, and four recently purchased machine guns were held in readiness.

The separatists won a significant moral victory, and many residents of Québec who formerly looked askance at them (the Québec City region includes less than 300 of the RIN official membership of 7,000) are now solidarizing with the movement. And the separatists won their first understanding from English-Canadian journalists.

But within the separatist movement, the RIN leadership, particularly the "left wing" Bourgault, is now coming under increasingly heavy attack -- not so much because of bowing to police intimidation the night before as for failing to organize mass protests the following day. The RIN left the protests to the courageous young men and women who, despite the police violence, never gave up their calls for a "Québec Libre." Only the widespread protests against the police prevented a debacle for the separatist movement. As for the left-wing intellectuals who speak condescendingly of "patiently penetrating each milieu as agitators and educators" -- they were nowhere in evidence.

The whole affair served to underline once again the basic organizational weakness of the separatist and socialist movements here. Spectacular actions can't replace solid organization. The real heroes of the day were the demonstrating youth who, in the space of a few hours, threw up an improvised leadership, and nearly ran the police ragged by nightfall.

#### SOCIALIST LEAGUE FOUNDED IN MONTREAL

MONTREAL -- A significant step forward for the Québec left was taken here recently with the formation of the Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière (Socialist Workers' League).

The Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière is a disciplined group of revolutionary socialists who, basing their action on the accumulated experience of the international working-class movement, and the theory elaborated notably by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, believe that they have an unique and important contribution to make to the formation of a party which will lead the Québec workers and farmers to a socialist revolution. It holds that the French-Canadian nation must be free to establish its own road toward socialism.

The Ligue maintains the closest fraternal relations with the League for Socialist Action in English-Canada, and cothinkers around the world, such as the Socialist Workers party in the United States.

The Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière plans to commence publication in the near future of a public information bulletin, La Lutte Ouvrière, which will present its position on contemporary Québec and international developments.

The headquarters of the Ligue are at 62 ouest, rue Guilbault, Montreal.

### NEW TURN IN ALLEN CASE

According to a report in the October 19 London Times, Dr. Victor Leonard Allen, who is on trial in Lagos, Nigeria, on charges of "sedition," sought to escape from the country and was captured by the police.

Dr. Allen is a Leeds University lecturer who was studying in the country at the time of his arrest. [See World Outlook October 9.]

On October 9, F. Wickliffe, the chief magistrate in the case, reserved judgment until November 10 and released Dr. Allen and three other defendants on bail.

The police claimed that Dr. Allen sought to disguise himself as a Hausa, a member of a north Nigerian tribe. He allegedly stained his face, hands and feet deep brown, wore yellow robes, carried a string of Koranic beads and presented a travel document giving the name Alhaji Madu Hassan Doga. At the frontier post of Idiroko, it was reported, immigration officials became suspicious and arrested him.

His counsel, Michael Odesanya, saw him in a cell at police headquarters and said he was "calm and composed."

In a letter to a friend in England, reported in World Outlook, Allen had written that a number of experiences with the police and the Lagos court had convinced him there was little hope for a fair trial. "I lost all faith in the court," he wrote, "and now expect the worst."

## CAIRO CONFERENCE STRADDLES KEY ISSUES

The exclusion of the neocolonialist stooge Moïse Tshombe from the conference of "nonaligned nations," which met in Cairo October 5-10 held the headlines in the world press. The action was a popular one although the Egyptian government utilized some rather flimsy pretexts to carry it out. Tshombe's entry into the country was first delayed, then permission was refused his plane to land in Cairo. Finally, when he came despite these rather broad hints, he was placed under virtual house arrest and held there during the retaliatory anti-Egyptian moves that were made in Leopoldville.

To have admitted Tshombe at such a conference would have created a scandal. He is the ally of the South African fascist Verwoerd and the Portuguese colonialists as well as being the puppet of the Belgian and American imperialists. He was deeply involved in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. No propagandistic magic could succeed in painting this vile agent as "nonaligned."

The "statesmen" assembled at the conference did not care to utterly expose themselves by including such a compromised figure in their deliberations.

Outside the rebuff dealt to Tshombe, the Cairo conference did little that could be hailed by Congo's freedom fighters.

First of all, the conference asked President Kasavubu to come to Cairo as a replacement for Tshombe. But Kasavubu was the one who plotted the first "coup" in the short history of the Congo's independence. He struck down Prime Minister Lumumba, initiating the agonizing struggle that has martyred the people of the Congo ever since. Tshombe got his present post through Kasavubu's nomination. In fact Kasavubu bears responsibility for most of the antipopular measures and developments in the Congo during the past four years.

That is why the leaders of the freedom fighters in the Congo have unanimously demanded that Kasavubu be removed from office before any serious political discussion about the future of the country's government can be entertained.

By asking Kasavubu to sit in on their deliberations at Cairo, the "statesmen" assembled there, who in their great majority are representatives of the colonial bourgeoisie or reactionary semifeudal regimes such as the one headed by the Emperor of Ethiopia, "aligned" themselves against the courageous Congolese guerrilla forces.

In addition to this, the conference endorsed measures taken by the Organization of African States to "re-establish peace" in the Congo. The final resolution correctly denounces the intervention of foreign powers in the Congo, but so far as the stooge government of Kasavubu-Tshombe is concerned, it merely calls on it to refrain from

recruiting white mercenaries and to dismiss those now in its pay. What was required was full recognition of the Stanleyville government of the People's Republic of the Congo and active support for it against the Leopoldville puppets.

The conference sought to straddle on many acute issues. For example, it declared that peaceful coexistence between different social and political systems is both possible and desirable. This was an obvious concession to Khrushchevism. On the other hand, the United States came in for implied criticism when "colonialism and neocolonialism" in Latin America was condemned.

One of the clearest statements concerned Cuba. The conference demanded that the United States lift the economic and commercial blockade of the revolutionary island and evacuate the naval base at Guantánamo.

The final resolution also stated that "colonized peoples are justified in resorting to arms to obtain respect of their rights of self-determination and independence."

#### GUARDS PROTECT LEATHER WORKER DELEGATES FROM LEAFLETS

ATHENS, Oct. 14 -- Some unpleasant incidents marred the congress of the International Federation of Shoe and Leather Workers which is being held here. Journalists were barred and doors and windows were shut.

The sessions were considered so secret that guards and police were posted. Members of the affiliated Greek union who sought to distribute leaflets to delegates were beaten.

Among the offending slogans proposed in the leaflet were: "Freedom for the Trade Unions"; "A Common European Scale of Wages and Unified Social Security"; "A 40-hour Week with a Daily 20-minute Break"; "Equal Pay for Women."

#### TWO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OCTOBER 16

Two nuclear devices were detonated October 16. The one in China made headlines throughout the world. The other, in Nevada, was scarcely noticed. Yet it was the seventeenth to be exploded since January by the United States. On October 12, the Pentagon announced that it had conducted more than thirty-five nuclear tests in the past year. These were underground, but the weapons being tested, are all designed to explode above ground.

### AIT AHMED CAPTURED IN ALGERIA

The capture of Hocine Ait Ahmed October 17 brought down the curtain on the efforts mounted almost exactly a year ago [see World Outlook October 11, 1963] to topple the Ben Bella government by armed counterrevolution. Ait Ahmed was one of the main figures behind the so-called "Front of Socialist Forces."

At a press conference October 20, Hocine Zahouane, spokesman of the Political Bureau, said that Ait Ahmed would be given a public trial. This means that the case will be handled in the civil courts with full protection of the legal rights of the defendant. Under Algerian law he could have been court-martialed, the case being handled behind closed doors as happened with Chaabani, another figure in the counterrevolutionary maquis, who was given the death penalty. [See World Outlook July 17.]

It is not known at present what kind of defense Ait Ahmed will offer. A recent leaflet of the "Front of Socialist Forces," boasted of killing "hundreds" of loyal supporters of Algeria's revolutionary government since September 10.

In Paris, Mohamed Boudiaf, one of the leaders of the CNDR [Comité National de Défense de la Révolution], a newly founded organization that has sought to bring together all the opponents of the Ben Bella regime, issued a press release in which he said:

"After the murder of Colonel Chaabani, and the many liquidations of numerous other patriots, the government may be tempted to give Ait Ahmed similar treatment. I launch a solemn warning to the regime for anything that may happen to Ait Ahmed, and I alert world opinion on an outcome, the repercussions of which could carry heavy consequences."

According to the October 20 issue of the Algiers daily Le Peuple, Ait Ahmed was captured in the village of Iguer, half way between Azazga and Mekla, near Bouzgane. Peasants reported his hideout.

A battalion of soldiers headed by Commandant Bey, who was in charge of the capture of Chaabani, accompanied by fifty members of militia and various officials of the government and the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale], left for the area Friday evening. Inside a house they discovered a trap door. Out of the small cellar to which it led, four men and two women fled. Among them was Ait Ahmed.

The Paris daily Le Monde [October 20] said that Ait Ahmed's "political downfall preceded his capture." And it added, assessing his course in taking up arms, that "despite himself he became the hero of reactionary regionalism and even appeared as the last hope for a dispossessed and threatened bourgeoisie."

THE DOWNFALL OF KHRUSHCHEV

A New Stage Opens in the Crisis of the Soviet Bureaucracy

[The following is the text of a declaration issued October 19 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the world party of socialist revolution founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938.]

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I.

The sudden removal of Khrushchev as head of the Communist party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and head of the Soviet government offers fresh and striking proof of the deep contradiction between the progressive character of the economic structure of the Soviet Union and the retrograde political institutions set up by Stalin.

The launching of the space ship Voskhod was the most tangible evidence of the immense advances achieved by Soviet science and industry. Three days later came the downfall of Khrushchev, offering a completely opposite spectacle of political weakness and confusion.

The new Kremlin chiefs at once hastened to assure the world that the sudden change-over did not signify any alteration at all of a major character in either domestic or foreign policy. They propose to follow substantially the same course as Khrushchev.

Why then did the bureaucracy dump Khrushchev?

If the top bureaucrats display little concern over Khrushchev's general line, it is because they, like him and Stalin before them, are utter empiricists. They became worried over what they consider to be Khrushchev's excesses and blunders in applying the line.

The truth is that Khrushchev ended up in blind alleys in various fields, increasing tensions and sharpening contradictions. Seeking a way out, the bureaucracy decided to make a start by offering him up as a scapegoat.

In the field of domestic economic policy, Khrushchev was associated with the grandiose promises about raising the standard of living of the Soviet masses. For nine years, things did improve for Soviet consumers -- Khrushchev's popularity during this period was based on this. But the situation changed radically when, due to the stagnation of agricultural production for five years, he was obliged to increase the price of meat and butter and to import large quantities of grain from the capitalist countries. The long queues in front of bakeries last winter dealt a mortal blow to his popularity. The good harvest this year could not save the situation.

Khrushchev's "virgin lands" project likewise ended in failure.



Pravda's sudden allusion to "harebrained schemes" that disregard the advice of scientific specialists refers to the "virgin lands" project which was undertaken against the advice of the Academy of Sciences.

The bankruptcy of Khrushchev's agricultural policy -- which the Fourth International has pointed to since 1955 as decisive for Khrushchev's leadership of the CPSU -- is all the more serious in view of the fact that the belated turn toward intensive agriculture cannot give immediate large-scale results; and the creation of a major chemical industry, required as a concomitant, demands time.

The plans for establishing a chemical industry, which were launched with great publicity, have been considerably slowed down due to a general lowering of the rate of industrial growth in the USSR. It was impossible at one and the same time to maintain a rapid improvement in the standard of living for the masses, to keep up with the imperialist powers in an armaments race, grant increasing aid to the colonial bourgeoisie, undertake feverish construction of homes, and increase the volume of investment on the colossal scale needed to maintain a constant high rate of industrial expansion.

It must also be emphasized that the economic reforms introduced by Khrushchev, which succeeded in overcoming the difficulties created by the hyper centralization and grossly oversize scale of approach in Stalin's time, began to decline in effectiveness. The present economic discussion in the USSR is symptomatic of this new economic impasse.

Khrushchev was not ready to take the "big leap forward" that would have been possible with the introduction of democratic planning and workers self-management.

The bureaucracy sacrificed Khrushchev, holding him responsible for the agricultural and industrial difficulties, hoping in this way to gain time for experimenting with new solutions. However, possible reforms can prove only of limited efficacy; what is needed is a radical transformation of the whole system of management.

In the field of foreign policy, Khrushchev became the scapegoat for a series of blunders that gravely lowered Soviet prestige. These included the miscalculation involved in putting rockets in Cuba, the unkept promise of an imminent solution of the problem of West Berlin; the vote in the UN to send the "blue helmets" to the Congo where the operation ended in the murder of Lumumba. It was above all the way in which he handled the Chinese question that aroused the most resentment and opposition.

Was it necessary to carry the dispute between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist party onto the government level? To abruptly halt Soviet aid to China? To grant military aid to Nehru in a war involving the People's Republic of China? To go back on the agreement to help China in setting up a nuclear industry? Such questions

undoubtedly worried a growing number of Soviet leaders. Above all, was it wise to schedule the preconference of twenty-six Communist parties for December 15, 1964, without assurances in advance that a big majority of these parties would accept the invitation and support the Soviet theses?

In truth, the manner in which Khrushchev handled the Sino-Soviet conflict added up to a disastrous balance in the eyes of the Soviet bureaucracy. The unity of the Communist international movement was destroyed, the authority of the Soviet party brought to a new low everywhere. Its directives were no longer followed even among parties backing the Kremlin against Peking. The conflict set up enormous centrifugal forces, not only among parties, as shown in Italy, but among governments, as shown in Rumania. Should Eastern Germany tomorrow protest against the projected rapprochement with Bonn and take the road being followed by Rumania, Kremlin control over more than half of the buffer countries would be in a state of disintegration.

Again, by sacrificing Khrushchev, the Soviet bureaucracy sought to halt the steady deterioration in its relations with Peking. The main obstacle to resumption of the dialogue having been eliminated, Peking can in turn make its own concessions without losing face.

If the December preconference now takes place, its meaning may be completely altered. The unbridled polemics, the irresponsible acts that have characterized both sides may cease. If reconciliation is not reached, the conflict is at least taken out of the gutter and returned to the green baize tables of the diplomats and "theoreticians."

## II.

Khrushchev's years in office will become known as the period of "de-Stalinization." Under national and international conditions completely different from those that made it possible for the Soviet bureaucracy to usurp power in the Soviet Union and for Stalin to convert this power into a personal autocracy wielded with increasing arbitrariness, the Soviet masses are no longer willing to endure a ruthless police regime, the complete subordination of their standard of living to spectacular-sounding projects that involve enormous waste. To avoid an impending explosion such as occurred in Eastern Germany in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and to save their special privileges and their grip on power, the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy deliberately sacrificed the Stalin cult and liberalized their regime. In doing so, they also eliminated some of the most arbitrary and obnoxious methods of leadership and administration that Stalin introduced into Soviet economy, government, science and culture and which increasingly blocked progress.

Khrushchev, often pictured as the most typical representative of this "de-Stalinization," was neither its principal initiator nor its most resolute protagonist. Many times, in various fields, younger

and more dynamic forces sought to press "de-Stalinization" further. The logic of this would have been the rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky and his generation of Bolsheviks. The advocates of further "de-Stalinization" were called to order or even silenced.

"De-Stalinization" was not Khrushchev's fundamental orientation nor his personal policy. It was a course of half measures, of doled-out concessions, approved by the immense majority of the bureaucracy which gained from it a higher degree of personal security as well as a popular response from the masses. The objective factors that determined this course will continue to operate after Khrushchev's downfall.

The years of progressive improvement in their standard of living lessened the fear that paralyzed wide sectors in Stalin's time. The Soviet masses, their self-confidence on the rise because of the concessions they won, will never tolerate a return to the regime of misery and terror. Any attempt to return to the methods of Stalin would be met with a violent popular reaction.

It is highly significant that the new leaders hastened to declare, in the first issue of Pravda after Khrushchev's downfall, that the line of the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the CPSU will be continued. In this way they promised the masses that whatever else may occur and whatever the appearances in secondary fields, the essential gains of "de-Stalinization" will be maintained. There will be no going back to an all-powerful police, to ferocious repressive laws in the plants, to the low standard of living of Stalin's time. The effort to raise the standard of living of the masses will be kept up. These concessions to the masses will in the long run only reinforce their self-confidence and further undermine the rule of the bureaucracy.

Just as objective conditions permit no fundamental retrogression in "de-Stalinization," so they permit no fundamental alteration in the field of foreign policy. The Soviet bureaucracy has never headed toward world war -- the opposite contention is simply one of the lying themes of imperialist propaganda. On the other hand it has never deliberately fostered socialist revolution, the only road to a world of enduring peace. Both courses, in quite different ways, involve destruction of bureaucratic rule. What the men who ousted Khrushchev will do is follow his policy of so-called "peaceful co-existence." This policy did not originate with Khrushchev -- parentage belongs to Stalin. Khrushchev's policy of "economic competition with the United States" was only the application under new conditions of Stalin's old thesis about "building socialism in one country."

The new leaders of the bureaucracy may use stronger language than has been Khrushchev's habit for the past two years, if only to facilitate resumption of conversations with the Chinese and to camouflage their own uncertainty and lack of assurance until their positions have been consolidated. It is possible that they will

modify some of the more scandalous ways in which Khrushchev has lately collaborated with American imperialism, his course, for instance, of joining with the Pentagon in arming the Indian bourgeoisie (against the Indian masses as well as the People's Republic of China) and giving American imperialism a free hand in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the Congo. Without doubt any spectacular softening of relations between Moscow and Bonn has now been ruled out, a perspective that had caused uneasiness in Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, particularly since the West German bourgeoisie refuse to recognize the new borders of Germany and continue to seek nuclear arms within the framework of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

As under Khrushchev and Stalin, the Soviet bureaucracy will continue to seek an over-all arrangement with Washington based essentially on joint defense of the status quo. It will continue to oppose the dissemination of nuclear arms, faithfully doing its best to keep them from other workers states, no matter what Washington does in giving countries like Canada stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It will propose slowing down the arms race and advocate disarmament. It will continue to seek economic collaboration with the colonial bourgeoisie as an alternative to fostering socialist revolutions in the colonial area which could radically alter the relationship of forces to the disadvantage of bureaucratic rule in the USSR however advantageous it might turn out for the workers states as a whole. It will continue to do what it can to confine working-class struggles in the imperialist countries within the limits of capitalist rules and regulations, postponing any bids for power there until after per capita production in the USA has fallen behind that of the USSR.

Under these conditions, any sudden liquidation of the Sino-Soviet conflict through both states and both parties coming to complete agreement on a common line is as improbable as a reversal of "de-Stalinization" and the policy of "peaceful coexistence." The Sino-Soviet dispute is not the product of any "blunders" by Khrushchev. It expresses the deep differences in interests of two bureaucracies differently situated with regard to imperialism, the international revolution and the masses of their own countries.

The success of the first Chinese nuclear test has profoundly affected the international situation of the People's Republic of China. It could accelerate its admission to the United Nations, a possibility already improved by the recognition of China among many African countries following the recognition granted by France. But Johnson will not withdraw the Seventh Fleet from the Far East, give up Taiwan or approve the dissolution of SEATO. So long as Washington maintains its pressure, China faces the possibility of imperialist aggression and suffers a partial economic blockade. This situation has long been sufficient to compel Peking to pursue a course that is quite different from Moscow's.

By continuing to follow the main lines of policy advanced by Stalin and developed by Khrushchev, the new Kremlin chiefs will find

themselves caught in the same profound difficulties that led to political disaster for their predecessor.

### III.

The Soviet bureaucracy dumped Khrushchev in hope of finding a temporary solution to the contradictions it faces. It will perhaps have gained time, provided that the new team is accepted by the great majority of the apparatus and the political crisis does not undergo a new sensational turn. But the bureaucracy is incapable of overcoming the contradictions resulting from the very nature of its rule. Far from being able to attenuate the contradictions and difficulties, Khrushchev's successors are more likely to exacerbate them.

To prevent things from becoming highly explosive in the economic field, the plan for agricultural investments must be put through in double-quick order. But Kosygin the technocrat, who is known to have got into a dispute with Khrushchev over the allocation of investment funds among the different sectors, will certainly not display greater readiness than Khrushchev to sacrifice heavy industry. The very fact that Kosygin was chosen to share top rank with Brezhnev is evidence of the weight of his sector in the bureaucratic caste. On the other hand, a general slowing down of the rate of industrial growth would certainly not augur well for the chemical industry plans and for a qualitative improvement in agriculture. In order to get out of the impasse something has to give -- either the aspirations of the masses, the predilections of the technocratic sector of the bureaucracy, the demands of the managers of plants and trusts, the appetites of the Kolkhozian peasants, or the interests of several layers at once.

Things are not much better in the field of international politics. The new masters in the Kremlin are anxious to demonstrate their attachment to the cause of "peaceful coexistence" by some spectacular gesture. But how is it possible to win improved relations with Peking and at the same time reassure Washington when the two aims require moves of diametrically opposite nature?

The same holds true in the international Communist movement. Of course, some improvement in relations with Peking could slow down the Chinese in their drive to set up a new international pro-Chinese Communist movement in competition with Moscow's "official" movement. But how is it possible to avoid seeing that the sudden downfall of Khrushchev has increased the uneasiness, the worry and the confusion affecting all the Communist parties? How is it possible to avoid seeing that this ouster and the conditions under which it took place, will inevitably strengthen the already skeptical attitude of foreign Communist militants toward Soviet documents and theses, their tendency to stop lining up mechanically with every turn taken by the Kremlin? Precisely those who ran into the biggest difficulties in explaining "de-Stalinization" and establishing the prestige of the

unknown Khrushchev may feel the worst foreboding at the prospect of putting a new god on the pedestal, after the transition of "collective leadership" once again ends in the selection of a new "first secretary" to wear the mantle of power.

Contrary to the intentions of the top bureaucrats, and even the immediate consequences which can prove to be deceptively encouraging to them, the elimination of Khrushchev, instead of arresting the slow disintegration of the Kremlin's sway over the international Communist movement, can end up by accelerating it. The bureaucracy reproached Khrushchev with having promoted the tendency toward "polycentrism" by his acts. The act of suddenly discarding him can only encourage the growth of this same "polycentrism" in the international Communist movement. Without a single leader of high caliber, with only bureaucrats screened and doubly screened by Stalin in the days of the purges and the liquidation of every single figure who displayed the slightest capacity for independent thought, the bureaucracy will prove less capable than ever of re-establishing its prestige after this new blow to monolithism. The Soviet bureaucrats will have to accustom themselves to seeing their moves discussed more and more, their switches subjected to increasingly hard criticism in the international Communist movement.

Those parties that have displayed tendencies to follow an independent course, whether to the right as in Italy or to the left as in Venezuela, will now be all the more inclined to give free rein to this inclination. And those parties that managed up to now to present themselves as models in submissiveness, as in France, may suddenly display a quite new look. "Polycentrism" will tend increasingly to reveal that it has a logic of its own.

The same logic applies to the workers states. For them, too, the downfall of Khrushchev is both an outcome of a crisis profoundly affecting the whole system of workers states and a new element tending to deepen that crisis. All of them are well aware of the coincidence, if not causal relation, between the explosion of the first Chinese atom bomb and the downfall of Khrushchev. The abrupt removal of the head of the Soviet Union contributes to a radical modification in the relationship between the USSR and the other workers states.

These states have changed considerably since the days of absolute subordination under Stalin. First they saw the Yugoslav revolt, then the appearance of China as an independent power. The feeling of revolt grew high, flaring in the uprisings in Eastern Germany, Poland and Hungary. The Kremlin regained its grip at the cost of some loosening of control. Years followed of steady erosion of the authority of the Soviet bureaucracy under pressure of the masses as well as the indirect consequences of "de-Stalinization." The collapse of Khrushchev dealt this authority another very hard blow. The result will be fresh impetus to "polycentrism" on this level, too.

And what will be the ultimate consequences in Soviet society

of Khrushchev's downfall? The masses are ripe for a radical change in the political regime. After the shock of surprise at the abrupt disappearance of Khrushchev from the political scene, the masses will feel inclined for many reasons to demand of the new Kremlin chiefs that they carry out the promises repeatedly made by Khrushchev.

The list of these promises is a long one, ranging from erecting a statue to commemorate the victims of Stalin's terror to assuring a standard of living within a few years equal to that of the workers in the United States. New demands, suggested by the nature of the change-over itself, will be added.

The downfall of Khrushchev will give new and powerful impulsion to critical thought among the masses of the Soviet Union and therefore new and powerful impulsion to further dislocations in the bureaucratic regime. After the liquidation of the cult of Stalin, after the sudden removal of Khrushchev, the Communists in the Soviet Union, in the workers states and throughout the world can better appreciate the historic scale of the crisis shaking the rule of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. They can better understand that far from constituting a threat to the stability of the Soviet state and the "socialist camp," the establishment of the norms of proletarian democracy is a primary condition for achieving stability. Trotsky's analysis is being proved to the hilt.

#### IV.

The main lesson to be drawn from the downfall of Khrushchev is the need for a thoroughgoing change in the political structure of the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev was ousted by a decision of strange nature. Neither the Soviet Communists in their vast majority nor the members of the international Communist movement know who made it, who carried it out, the reasons for it, the arguments advanced. They do not know the views of the victim nor his defense against the secret accusations. Clearly genuine socialist democracy, proletarian democracy, does not exist in the Soviet Union.

The official propoganda assures us that a communist society is being constructed; that is, a society in which the state and all forms of constraint associated with the state have disappeared. The official propoganda assures us that "the entire people" holds power (the new program adopted by the CPSU at the Twenty-second Congress solemnly baptized the Soviet state as the "state of the entire people" and the Communist party as the "party of the entire people"). The people, supposedly in power, saw the government abruptly changed without even knowing what members of the Central Committee were present at the October 14 meeting that made the decision, how they voted, or what the motions were they voted on. It does not know in what respect the program of the new government differs from that of the

old. The state belongs to the "entire people" but the "entire people" remain in ignorance of the state's business.

Government power in the Soviet Union is exercised by a force much broader than a single man, even one as dictatorial as Stalin. But clearly it is not the "entire people" nor the proletariat. What is this force? Is it the "Communist party of the Soviet Union" wielding power in the name of the people? The millions of party members heard the news for the first time over the radio October 15 or read it in Pravda the next day. What about the "Central Committee" of the CPSU? This body displayed its real social base when it assembled hundreds of top bureaucrats from all over the country in 1957 to give Khrushchev his mandate. Whether the meeting that deposed Khrushchev was of this character or much smaller, it, too, represented only the bureaucratic caste which has monopolized political power in the Soviet Union for more than thirty-five years.

In his "testament" -- which unquestionably played a role in the downfall of Khrushchev -- Palmiro Togliatti declared that the Soviet Union has not yet returned to Leninist norms and has not yet established freedom of opinion and discussion in political questions. This is correct, if but a pale reflection of the truth. The way in which Khrushchev was replaced shows how distant the Soviet Union is from the norms established in Lenin's time when the USSR was much poorer, weaker and under far greater imperialist pressure than today.

The norms of Soviet democracy call for workers and peasants councils (soviets), within which all groupings and persons who respect the country's constitution are guaranteed freedom of expression. Under these norms, a congress of all the councils (congress of soviets) designates the head of the government on the basis of a stated program and after full public discussion. In the Communist party, Lenin's concept of democratic centralism meant full discussion among the ranks before decisions were taken by leading bodies, it meant freedom to form tendencies on the basis of publicly declared platforms and with full right to debate the issues before the membership, delegates to decision-making bodies being elected on the basis of such documents and after a democratic discussion throughout the party. Under the conditions of today a system of multiple working-class parties to strengthen the process of proletarian democracy would be quite feasible.

The re-establishment of proletarian democracy in the Soviet Union would greatly strengthen the unity of the proletariat and the peasantry. It would make possible the establishment of popular confidence in the government such as has not existed since the days of Lenin. One of its enormous advantages would be the establishment of an orderly institutional mechanism for the normal changes in leadership.

Abroad, especially in the imperialist countries, the attractiveness of the Soviet Union to the laboring masses would be greatly



enhanced. The advantages of Soviet democracy for the workers both individually and as a whole would be proved in life.

It is for the establishment of norms of proletarian democracy along such lines -- even broader and more effective than in Lenin's time -- that the Fourth International has long battled.

The bourgeois journalists and politicians contrast "Western democracy" with the practices that became established under Stalin. Capitalist democracy, however, never extended into productive relations, and in the political sphere it has suffered vast erosion, giving way at times to fascism. The norms of proletarian democracy extend right into the factories and farms and throughout the whole structure of society. Proletarian democracy is qualitatively superior to the best ever developed under the bourgeoisie.

The introduction of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union requires a political revolution to break the monopoly of power now held by the bureaucrats and to return it to the mass of workers in the cities and countryside. The downfall of Khrushchev and the manner in which it was brought about show both how necessary this revolution remains and how its approach is being hastened.

When the Stalin cult was dealt its death blow in the Soviet Union at the Twentieth Congress in 1956, the international Communist movement was shaken to the bottom. In the United States, for instance, it finished the Communist party as an effective organization. Elsewhere it gave rise to big discussions, to changes in leadership and to splits. The Sino-Soviet conflict has had similar impact, the repercussions going far beyond the ranks of the membership. The success of the Cuban Revolution, which brought to the fore a new revolutionary leadership originating outside the Communist movement, added further to the ferment. Khrushchev's downfall now brings a new dynamic ingredient into this gigantic process which at bottom involves the breakup of fossilized structures and the construction of a new revolutionary-socialist leadership on a world scale.

Communist militants therefore have a deep interest in drawing all the lessons from this latest event. They should press for full and free discussion of every single issue involved in the ouster of Khrushchev. One of the first requisites is to hear Khrushchev's own defense of his course. The stenographic record of the sessions that ended with Khrushchev in a minority should be made available at once and Khrushchev should be granted space in the Soviet press and an opportunity to appear on television and the radio to explain his side. All working-class tendencies, including the Trotskyists, should be granted the right to participate in the discussion.

In their own parties, Communist militants everywhere should draw one very big obvious lesson; that is, the danger of relying on Moscow for leadership. The disastrous nature of Stalin's guidance was revealed for the blind to see at the Twentieth Congress. Now

fresh revelations are on the agenda concerning the consequences of Moscow's leadership since Stalin's death.

The Communist parties must learn to work out their own revolutionary Marxist policies independently in the light of the needs of the revolutionary process in their own countries. The end result of this will be to enormously strengthen the camp of the workers states by hastening the end of capitalism.

The downfall of Khrushchev underscores once again the fact that the major problem facing the international working class is the crisis in leadership. This crisis can be resolved only through the construction of a new leadership genuinely capable of carrying out the program of revolutionary socialism on an international scale -- in the imperialist countries, the colonial world and the sectors that have already won their revolutions and achieved the status of workers states. This is what the Fourth International has fought for since its inception.

#### SOUTH AFRICA

The second part of the document "South Africa -- A Memorandum Submitted to the Committee of Nine," which was scheduled for this issue of World Outlook will appear next week.