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In this issue:

	<u>Page</u>
Voskhod Goes into Orbit.....	1
On the Eve of the British Elections.....	3
New Steps Forward in the Algerian Revolution -- by Livio Maitan.....	4
Bourguiba Devaluates the Dinar.....	8
German Social Democrats Score Electoral Victory.....	9
The Crisis in the Austrian Socialist Party (A Background Article).....	11
Papandreou Heats Up the Cyprus Issue.....	14
Happy Hunting Ground in Latin America.....	16
The Uproar Over Perón's Proposed Return.....	17
Guerrilla Fighters in Action in Venezuela.....	22
Police Terror in South Africa.....	23
South Africa (A Memorandum Submitted to the Committee of Nine).....	24
What Was Behind the Riots in the USA? -- by Evelyn Sell.....	32

VOSKHOD GOES INTO ORBIT

While Johnson and Goldwater argued in the United States over which had the best formula for "containing" and eventually "defeating" the new social order that began displacing capitalism in 1917, the Soviet Union scored a new triumph. "Voskhod" -- "Dawn" -- the first three-man spaceship, was sent into orbit October 12.

The reaction in Washington was quite typical. An unnamed spokesman said that the State Department was watching "with interest" and that a safe return was wished the three-man crew. Space chief James E. Webb stated for the record that it was a "significant space accomplishment." It remained for the unofficial commentators in the capital of the world's mightiest military power to confess that Soviet

technology had scored another startling advance. An unidentified "high official" of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Agency said that it would take five years before the United States could send three men aloft. This was the "space-gap" admitted by Eisenhower when the first Sputnik was sent into orbit October 4, 1957.

The team of Russian cosmonauts included Col. Vladimir Komarov, 37, the technician in command; Konstantin P. Feoktistov, 38, a scientist; and Dr. Boris B. Yegorov, 27, a doctor who has specialized in aviation and space medicine.

As they orbited the earth in cycles of 90.1 minutes, they broadcast messages to the peoples below. The first one went to the Africans. "We salute the peoples of Africa who are fighting for their liberty and independence."

The message was an appropriate one, for the new countries now dotting the continent over which Voskhod was spinning have all derived enormous inspiration from the October 1917 Revolution and from the unprecedented swiftness of the Soviet Union's rise as a major world power.

Over South America, the space team sent the following message to those below: "We salute the peoples of Latin America in their desire for peace and happiness. Warm greetings to the heroic people of Cuba."

Crossing the sister workers state of the People's Republic of China, they said: "We send our best wishes to the millions who constitute the Chinese people."

The international community of scientists stressed the technical hurdles that had to be surmounted. The size of the spaceship... the extra power...the feat of landing three men simultaneously...

Soviet scientist Leonid Sedov summed up this side of the achievement: "This success opens new perspectives in the conquest of the cosmos. The time is nearing when man will touch the moon, Venus, Mars."

However, that will not be the main inspiration drawn by most people. They are still bound to the surface of our planet. They must continue on a job that is often less than inspiring. Many must walk the pavements in search of jobs. Others in the swamps, the jungles and the mountains, must crawl on their bellies gun in hand to win the most elementary rights. To these people, who constitute the overwhelming majority, Voskhod orbiting overhead will be one more proof of the superiority of planned economy over the anarchy of capitalism; one more proof of how correct the Russian workers were in 1917 when they followed Lenin and Trotsky and established the first Workers and Peasants Government.

ON THE EVE OF THE BRITISH ELECTIONS

On the eve of the British general elections, the pollsters, gamblers and stock-market speculators were laying odds on a Labour victory. Only a week before the same experts were declaring it a neck-and-neck race and suggesting that chances for the Tories were on the rise. Others -- far, far to the left -- were acting as if it didn't really make much difference which party won, there was little to distinguish one from the other.

The publishers of World Outlook see no point, a few days before the voters go to the polls, of placing any bets. One of the reasons, of course, is lack of money. Yet, if wishes can have any influence on the outcome, we hope most strongly for a Labour victory. We think it will make a difference which side wins.

First of all, on the international scene Labour coming to power will have a heartening effect on workers throughout the world. This can have a favorable influence in their own struggles.

In Canada and the United States the consequences can be especially important. Labour's victory in England will put fresh steam in the New Democratic party organized by the Canadian trade unions. In the United States it will inevitably revive interest in the possibility of founding a Labor party there and bring many a militant to once again demand implementation of the many resolutions for a Labor party to be found in union minutes and convention proceedings. The labor bureaucrats in both North American countries will find it harder to justify their continued indifference to independent political action or their ties with such reactionary formations as the Democratic machine.

But in Britain itself the experience is of prime importance. This is not due to any loyalty to the principles of socialism on the part of Harold Wilson -- he has none. It is because a Labour victory is the most favorable way for the British working class to learn the limitations of the Labour movement, as it stands today, and the need to break through these limitations. A Labour victory offers the most fertile possibilities for forming a left wing standing squarely on the program of revolutionary socialism. It offers the best possibilities, moreover, for forming a left wing on the top rungs of the ladder leading to power. A defeat for Labour, on the other hand, would constitute a bitter setback for the left wing that is even now in gestation.

The British working class stood in the forefront during the whole epoch of the rise and consolidation of capitalism. Then it lost impetus. Are we now to see this sector of the proletariat rise again to inspire the whole world with the vision of socialism in a major industrial country? We hope so.

NEW STEPS FORWARD IN THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

By Livio Maitan

ALGIERS, Oct. 5 -- Ben Bella's two recent speeches -- at the inauguration of the gas liquefaction plant at Arzew and the opening at Laghouat of construction of an Algerian pipe line -- showed better than anything else up to now the orientation of the Algerian government on the oil question. The speeches thus understandably attracted public attention in Algeria as well as abroad.

For a whole series of rather obvious reasons, the Algerian government has been unable to pose for the present the perspective of a radical solution through outright expropriation of foreign capital, which, as is known, plays a preponderant role in this sector. It is necessary to add that the supple and prudent attitude of the French government, which seems to have taken into account the catastrophic experience of the United States in the case of Cuba, has not been of a nature to push the Algerians into precipitating things.

Nevertheless, the Algerians should not forget or underestimate the serious consequences involved in maintenance of the status quo which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Algeria's resources in energy are being exploited to the almost exclusive advantage of international companies that constitute veritable economic enclaves in Algerian territory.

(2) The profits of the companies are taken out of the country without exercising any stimulating effect on Algerian economy as a whole.

(3) Fiscal benefits for the Algerian government are not great.*

(4) The companies seek to exclude Algeria from participation in processing, transporting and selling the products.

(5) The top personnel and technicians are almost all foreigners. The status of Algerian workers (wages, etc.) is kept much below the scale for the foreigners.

In the face of this situation, Ben Bella endeavored in his two speeches to present a well worked-out line, formulating among

*At Laghouat Ben Bella gave the following figures: "If you take the case of 1963, for production of around 23,000,000 tons of crude oil, sold at an average price of 7,700 old francs [\$15.40] a ton, the over-all receipts rung up by the companies were almost 180 billion old francs [\$360,000,000] while the income received by Algeria as oil revenue was only 30 billion [\$60,000,000]."

other things the principles pertinent for other underdeveloped countries at loggerheads with the international companies.

"In the particular case of gas," the Algerian president said at Arzew, "our position is clear and cannot be mistaken by anyone; Algerian gas, a completely national resource, is the property of the state which will give priority to using it and processing it in Algeria. Next in priority will be its export to foreign countries that prefer long-time contracts with Algeria in order to guarantee a stable supply. Companies with concessions in the gas fields will be granted a just return on their investments in prospecting operations and development work but they should not seek to divide up with the state the income from discoveries of a raw material in our sub-soil as essential as this to the economic activities of a modern country. The distinction between normal returns linked to industrial activities and income resulting from a gift of nature is fundamental to understanding the abuses committed by concessionary companies in the division of revenues with the conceding state. If it is normal for companies to gain a remuneration from their activities called profit, which like all remuneration must be subject to taxation, the income from the soil does not belong to them."

Thus what is involved is a new orientation with regard to specification of basic economic concepts, including, so to speak, the legal level. First of all, it is quite evident that this orientation involves rejection of any claim whatsoever to extraterritoriality by the companies; secondly, it constitutes an anticipatory argument utilizable when the solution of radical expropriation is adopted; finally, in the immediate future, it aims at limiting the income of the international companies to the benefit of the Algerian state.

This represents an unquestionable step forward, all the more so since it does not at all represent an isolated position.

As a matter of fact, as Ben Bella himself pointed out, a recent decision of the Algerian government requires the oil companies to utilize half their turnover in Algeria. In addition, the building of the liquefaction plant at Arzew will be followed -- on top of the pipe line mentioned above -- by construction of a government refinery (likewise in the Arzew center); while a government company to handle transportation and sales of hydrocarbons will assure sales abroad for Algeria of the natural gas in the Sahara fields. And a new company (with foreign participation) will be set up to extend prospecting operations. At the same time the Centre Africain des Hydrocarbures has been established in Algiers thanks to Soviet aid. It will handle the training of Algerian personnel (as will another center of the same kind which has been projected with French aid).

This problem -- known as the Algerianization of personnel -- was raised again by Ben Bella in another speech given at the congress of the oil workers union which ended yesterday in Algiers. After

voicing his support to the orientation of the oil workers union in favor of a "management trade unionism"; i.e., of fostering to an ever increasing degree the participation of workers "in the management of certain services in the enterprises,"* the Algerian president returned to the theme of the "shocking inequalities," declaring among other things:

"I will say clearly to the companies: you have the choice of immediately Algerianizing these posts [workers, helpers, technicians], after short training stages, or of lowering the wages of these so-called technical assistants to the level of Algerian wages, or of raising Algerian wages to the level paid their European comrades. . . . The brother Minister of Labor and Social Questions has been charged by me to draft a law to end all disparities in the wages of laborers, helpers and skilled workers on the basis of the distinction: Algerians -- foreigners."**

It could be argued that all these measures will not resolve the fundamental problem since they do not deprive foreign capital of the possibility of profiting at the expense of the Algerian people. Certainly, while disputing the right of the companies to monopolize revenues, Ben Bella did not place in question profit as such and he even talked about the desirability of extending the participation of foreign capital to other sectors of the country's economy. However what is important at this stage is not to let the status quo become crystallized, to constantly bring into question the positions acquired by the companies, to proceed in such a way that each new compromise operates to the increasing advantage of the Algerian side.

On October 1 the Algerian government made another important decision. It decided to put into force a law adopted July 8, 1963 -- which had been deferred long enough -- concerning the confiscation of the holdings of all the traitors and collaborators of the colonialist regime.*** A number of agricultural holdings --

* REPAL, a mixed company, in which the Algerian state holds forty per cent of the shares, has placed the workers in charge of managing the personnel training service and has included two representatives of the enterprise committee in the board of directors.

** In case the companies choose the third alternative, Ben Bella stated, the increase must be applied to investment funds aimed at accelerating professional training and the promotion of Algerian personnel.

*** Among other things the text of the July 8 law states:

"Article 1 -- All the goods, buildings and lands, seized, sequestered or confiscated for the benefit of the caïds, aghas, bachagans or any other agents of the colonial period, or common holdings, are declared to be state property;

amounting in certain regions to a total of some tens of thousands of hectares -- were immediately confiscated and their owners were simply kicked out.

Naturally it will only be after the operation is completed that a balance sheet can be drawn up and an evaluation made as to what degree land ownership by Algerians has been affected. The dimensions of this ownership are quite considerable, as Ben Bella himself indicated in his report to the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] congress last April. In any case what was most significant was that in his official radio speech, the president spoke of the opening of "the third phase of our agrarian revolution."

This point, we stress, could prove to be of crucial importance. The extension of the agrarian reform is at this stage a matter of primary importance for the Algerian Revolution which needs in this way to strike at the main ramparts of conservatism as well as assure a concrete acquisition for the very wide layers of poor peasants who have received no direct advantages from the preceding reforms (because of their limitation to the most advanced sector of agriculture).

In recent months, manifest hesitation has been displayed on this front, provoked no doubt by the fear of arousing hostility among the sectors of the national bourgeoisie who would be hit. These bids in the direction of the so-called progressive national bourgeoisie have not stopped in reality and the new editor of Révolution Africaine has played a significant role in this respect through his editorials. Moreover, in the commentaries on the October 1 decision, the writers preferred to center the attack against the feudalistic elements.

Events in the coming weeks and months will make clearer the significance of the recent expropriations, indicating whether we are now on the eve of a new radical agrarian reform or whether this is only a limited, although significant, measure.

It is clear in any case from the announcement of the new positions taken on the question of hydrocarbons and the blows struck at certain sectors of the reactionary classes that the Algerian situation is again in movement. This will have a positive effect on the cadres and militants who fell into a certain demoralization and passivity due to the wavering and difficulties of recent months.

"Article 2 -- Where the properties were the object of a regular transaction before September 1, 1954, the third purchaser will be indemnified in accordance with the expropriation procedures in force;

"Article 3 -- The properties specified in Article 1 shall be managed in conformity with the provisions of the decree of March 28, 1963."

BOURGUIBA DEVALUATES THE DINAR

TUNIS -- The Bourguibist regime, which has governed Tunisia since independence was gained in 1956, has been compelled to face increasing economic difficulties which could not be made to vanish by waves of the wand. At the end of September, a grave measure had to be adopted -- the dinar, the national monetary unit, had to be devalued twenty-five per cent.

The aim of the operation is clear and Bourguiba underlined it in a recent speech before the National Assembly. Exports must be encouraged by putting exporters in better position to meet competitive prices on the foreign markets. The foreign exchange to be gained in return will be earmarked to build up the country's equipment. As a secondary consequence, the new rate of exchange will stimulate tourism, bringing supplementary income in foreign exchange.

But how did it happen that a situation could develop requiring such a drastic measure?

Bourguiba maintains in his latest speech that the country has made quite considerable progress. The truth is that some big investments have been made (this was made possible thanks to foreign aid and particularly the granting of credits by the United States), but these investments in general have not been productive ones. If building construction -- public as well as private -- has expanded, the industrial sector has not grown to an appreciable extent. On the other hand, the export trade ran into growing difficulties; and, as a matter of fact, it was precisely a serious drop in exports that led to the devaluation. The result was that the resources needed to assure even the most modest economic development were lacking.

In reality, the current difficulties are linked to a more general setback which had already caused the regime to undertake a certain shift. Among the ex-colonial countries, Tunisia has gone the farthest in attempting to build a "classic" bourgeois economic structure by reserving a very wide field of action for private initiative and even avoiding any considerable reform of the set up of the colonial epoch.

The incapacity to actually emerge from underdevelopment, to give an impulse to the creation of modern industrial sectors and to improve the standard of living of the masses (which still remains very low) ended in a rather critical situation.

Sensing the danger, Bourguiba has sought to get out of the difficulty either by diverting attention to questions of foreign policy (for instance the imbroglio with France over Bizerte in 1961) or by outlining certain reforms in the countryside. Of these, the expropriation of the French and Italian colons was the most spectacular, 716,693 hectares [one hectare = 2.47 acres] being "recuperated."

[See World Outlook May 22.] At the same time a stronger accent was given to the role of the state, including its role in economics, and on Destourian "socialism." Especially since a "plot" was uncovered two years ago, the regime has tried to establish better ties with the masses, notably through wider and more regular mobilization of the Néo-Destour party.

Without doubt the regime will run into new difficulties in the coming period. The discontent aroused by the devaluation is very real. If the bourgeois layers have been invited to practice austerity, it is certain that the popular masses are already paying the cost of the increase in the cost of living due to the devaluation. Certain petty-bourgeois layers have also been hit, particularly by the increase in the prices of hard consumer goods (from abroad). Ferment is inevitable on the political level, too, and the congress of the Néo-Destour party scheduled for mid October may provide some interesting indications on this.

In fact cadres and militants of the party are already beginning to take advantage of the relative loosening up of the apparatus to express their criticisms and aspirations. The objective situation could spur them increasingly to develop a semisocialist or even outright socialist orientation that could only come into conflict with the official socialism. Of the latter, Bourguiba himself in his last speech offered the following characterization: "Socialism demands of each of us good management of his funds, his landed property or his factory."

This is a rather odd socialism that has no long road before it no matter how firm the grip of the Bourguibist regime on the masses may still be at the present stage.

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SCORE ELECTORAL VICTORY

COLOGNE -- Panic is evident among the German Christian Democrats. The stock market in the Federal Republic of Germany even shows considerable nervousness. The cause was the victory of the Social Democrats in the municipal elections in the biggest "Land," the densely populated Northrhine-Westfalia and the headway it has registered in Lower Saxony.

In Northrhine-Westfalia, the vote for the Social Democratic party [SPD] rose from 40.7% in 1961 to 46.6% (3,906,000). The Christian Democratic Union [CDU] fell from 45% to 43.1% (3,610,000). The Free Democratic party [FDP] dropped from 10.2% to 8%. The small splinter parties got less than 1% each.

Perhaps the most spectacular decline was experienced by the German Peace Union [DFU -- Deutsche Friedensunion] which seeks the Communist vote [the Communist party is outlawed and cannot run can-

didates itself]. In the Ruhr valley, the industrial heart of Germany, the DFU obtained only 21,582 votes, a bare 0.3%. In the thirties, the German Communist party mustered millions of votes. . .

In 10 of the 16 big towns in Northrhein-Westfalia, the Social Democrats won an absolute majority. In rural districts, on the other hand they made relatively little progress.

The vote in Lower Saxony showed the Social Democrats moving up from 38.8% to 43.2% (1,485,000). Gains were also registered by the Christian Democrats, from 28.2% to 37.5% (1,287,000), and the Free Democrats, 6.9% to 9.2% (314,000). The gains for the latter two parties stemmed from defeats suffered by the extreme right. .

There is no doubt that the Social Democrats moved ahead more because of the failures of their adversaries than because of their own policies.

The government coalition of Christian and Free Democrats has alienated many voters. The abolishment of certain measures designed to protect tenants from landlords cost the two parties something in popularity. Chancellor Erhard's accusations that inflation is caused by consumers who are not "sober minded" angered working-class voters. Clashes between the extreme right wing of the government parties, headed by Franz Josef Strauss, and a "middle of the road" wing led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Schröder also injured the Christian Democrats. At the same time, Willy Brandt, the Social Democratic mayor of West Berlin who is considered to be the main architect of the agreement to open a breach in the Wall, has won popularity for the SPD.

It is still too early, however, to predict a victory for the Social Democrats in the federal elections scheduled for the fall of 1965. The government will counter with a series of social concessions during the coming year. Among these are a special allowance of DM 40 [one Deutsche Mark = \$.25] a month for each child that continues to go to school after passing the age of fifteen; an increase in old-age pensions; measures to further the "accumulation of property" by workers; improvements in health insurance for workers, etc.

The Social Democrats have scheduled a congress for November which will issue an election platform. Up to now, it does not appear that the leaders intend to offer planks designed to inspire the working-class electorate that brought them victory in the municipal elections in Northrhein-Westfalia and in Lower Saxony.

A Background Article

THE CRISIS IN THE AUSTRIAN SOCIALIST PARTY

VIENNA -- Last spring Die Kronenzeitung, one of the city's "yellow" papers opened a campaign against those leaders in the Austrian Socialist party known to be hostile to Franz Olah, likewise a leader of the Socialist party and at that time Minister of the Interior.

Die Zukunft, the theoretical magazine of the party, answered in its way by opening a public discussion on Olah's methods. Party ideologist Karl Czernetz contributed an article "Leadership Problems in Democracy." He stated that in the Austrian Socialist party nobody could become a "leader" if only because most of the party members hold deep convictions against the appearance of a "leader."

This article was mild in tone. It was followed by a contribution from Minister of Justice Christian Broda, "The Socialist Party Is Not a 'Leader's' Party." This openly and violently attacked Olah, denouncing him as a "leader" lacking in ideology, a "practical" given to pseudo radicalism, a man ready to use "administrative" methods against opponents, a person who would not stop even at use of the police. "Neither Stalin nor Mussolini nor Pilsudski would likely have achieved their aim," Broda wrote, "if their methods had been openly and publicly opposed while there was yet time."

Olah himself did not answer these attacks. But Die Kronenzeitung continued its campaign against the SP leaders hostile to him. Finally, after a violent debate in the party leadership, it was decided to stop the discussion in Die Zukunft.

In reality this dispute over personalities stemmed from deep differences among the leaders of the Austrian Socialist party. These involved not only the issue of a "leader cult" versus a "collective leadership" of bureaucrats but key policy questions.

In this respect it is worth taking into account the bourgeois analysis of the conflict. Volksblatt, the daily paper of the Austrian Populist party (the main party of the bourgeoisie) published an article entitled "Dirty Campaign Against Minister Olah," that stated: "One of the main reasons for the fight inside the Austrian Socialist party is the struggle of the Austro-Marxist wing, which is friendly to Communism, against Franz Olah, who could be said to represent the moderate wing."

The other bourgeois party, the Austrian Liberal party also strongly favored Olah. Light is cast on this position by the fact that Olah is known to have favored switching from a "big coalition" (the SP and the Populist party) to a "little coalition" (the SP and the Liberal party). This despite the fact that the Liberal party, which represents the interests of West German capital in Austria,

has many links with neofascist elements and points proudly to a former Nazi minister as the founder of its tradition. When Olah was chairman of the Austrian Trade Union Federation, he even gave this party 1,000,000 schillings (\$40,000) out of the union treasury for its election fund.

It is true that Olah's enemies in the SP leadership do not foster principled class politics or even Austro-Marxism. They are wholeheartedly for coalition politics and regard a "little coalition" with the Liberal party as a mere tactical question. As parliamentary cretins they see no other alternative to a "big coalition" with the Populists than a "little coalition" with the Liberals.

The fact is that the "big coalition" has been in an impasse since the last general elections in 1962 and in an acute crisis over the possible return to Austria of Otto of Hapsburg (the pretender to the throne). The representatives of the two class forces, the Socialist and Populist parties are less and less able to maintain their fifteen-year-old balancing act. In the Populist party, the extreme right wing has taken over the leadership. This clearly showed the SP that the bourgeoisie again wants to wield all power in the state. It wants to decide all the pending questions in domestic and foreign politics in its own class interests.

It should be noted, however, that the bourgeoisie faces a powerful obstacle in the road -- the real relationship of class forces is still unfavorable for such a turn. Notwithstanding the opportunism of its leaders, the working class remains militant, it has powerful organizations which are ready to oppose any attack against its vital interests.

Differentiation within the Socialist party leadership had become inevitable. For more than a year sharp political discussions have flared. The trade-union leaders are against the "little coalition." They rightly fear a rise in the influence of West German capital which could threaten the strong positions of the trade unions and the workers in the big nationalized sector of industry.

After much hesitation and vacillation, the Socialist party trade-union leaders decided a few months ago to form a temporary political alliance with the Broda group against Olah and his followers. When party chairman Bruno Pitterman saw his position threatened, he joined the alliance.

The Broda group is now defending a policy which it calls "the socialist alternative for Austria." Broda formulated this "alternative" as follows in Die Zukunft:

"Socialists must be prepared in both the domestic and foreign fields to conquer political leadership in Austria, and must say this publicly. Evolution socially and politically is ripe for such a development."

Broda himself does not rule out the possibility of a "little coalition" with the Liberal party and holds that this party has become a "positive factor." He does not at all include in his formula the concept that the Socialist party could conquer leadership in the country only by mobilizing the working class in revolutionary action.

When the conflict inside the Socialist party leadership reached explosive proportions and Olah was forced to resign as Minister of the Interior, something completely new in the history of the Austrian working class happened. Mass sentiment unquestionably favored Olah. A demonstrative strike in his favor and against the party leadership broke out. Why did this happen?

The workers don't grasp Olah's real politics. To them he looks like a radical working-class leader who knows how to bang his fist on the table when necessary and how to speak up strongly against the party leadership. It must be said that he knows how to grab the spotlight and push others into the shadow.

The reasons for the pro-Olah sentiments among the masses can be summarized as follows:

(1) General discontent among the workers has risen quite high. The workers want more vigorous policies against the class enemy.

(2) The rift between the masses and the Socialist party leadership, which has been deepening for some time, is now public knowledge. The demonstrations refute the theory of vulgar Marxism which holds that people are generally content in the "affluent" society of today. There is no lack of explosive material despite the capitalist "prosperity."

(3) The masses were indignant over the official lies through which the party leadership sought to cover up their differences. The workers do not want to be constantly "manipulated" by the "elite." They want to know the truth. They want to be taken seriously by their own leaders.

(4) Coupled with these progressive tendencies, however, one must recognize something that could have reactionary consequences, the petty-bourgeois desire for a "leader" capable of "solving" all problems in an authoritarian way.

Since Franz Olah's forced resignation, the crisis in the Socialist party leadership has not been alleviated. Instead it has extended throughout the party.

In Lower Austria, the second biggest province of the country, the party organizations as well as the factory workers are nearly one hundred per cent behind Olah. Preparing for the provincial elections, Olah runs from meeting to meeting. He is received by the workers with tremendous applause. Party chairman Pitterman doesn't show

up for fear of being thrown out bodily. The provincial party leadership also supports Olah. Should he be expelled -- at the moment no one has proposed this -- three socialist party cabinet members, Kreisky, Czettel and Rösch, would immediately resign in protest.

In Vienna the party membership is deeply divided, with many factory workers displaying sympathy for Olah.

The monolithism of the Austrian Socialist party has been broken and a bitter fight is on. If it ends with Olah "taking power" in the Socialist party, the left wing, which hardly exists as yet, will have its work cut out. Not only will it have to unmask Olah; it will also have to convince the Austrian working class that the need is not for a false "leader" but for a genuine revolutionary leadership opposed to opportunism and determined to guide the class struggle exclusively in the interests of the masses.

PAPANDREOU HEATS UP THE CYPRUS ISSUE

ATHENS -- The political scene in Greece is now dominated by the question of Cyprus. In fact a wave of nationalist hysteria has caught up all the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies. Each is trying to outdo the others in displaying its patriotism. Unfortunately, this ugly mood has also begun to affect the working class.

The principal guilt for this situation lies with the Papandreu government, the instrument of Greek capitalism. It is seeking to prepare the masses psychologically for a war adventure with Turkey, its NATO associate. The proclaimed aim is defense of the right of Cyprus to self-determination.

What the Papandreu government is really concerned about, however, is not direct intervention by Turkey in Cyprus, but the intervention of the Cypriote masses. This could finish the present "leadership" of Makarios, Grivas and Company, opening up the road taken by Cuba and Algeria, transforming Cyprus into a new stronghold of the colonial revolution and posing the issue of socialism point-blank. Cyprus, in fact, could become a revolutionary banner in the East Mediterranean as Cuba is in the Caribbean and Algeria in North Africa. This is the possibility feared by the Greek bourgeoisie and the Anglo-American imperialists.

The Greek bourgeoisie bear a big share of the responsibility for the situation in Cyprus. In 1954 the Papagos government backed General Grivas, who was notorious for his record in the war and the occupation and his relations with the English colonialists. The task of this fascist-minded militarist was to counter the anti-imperialist rebellion of the Cypriote masses, to bear down on the left (the Communist AKEL) and to impose the conservative administration of Archbishop Makarios. The Karamanlis government continued

this policy.

The London-Zurich agreement, which was forced on the Cypriote people by the British and which imposed the pattern of government that was bound to end in the present explosion, was accepted by all the bourgeois political parties in Greece.

Makarios, too, accepted it, and did not change his course until hard pressed by the Cypriote masses, many of whom are armed and under the influence of the AKEL. But he sought support from the Greek government in turning the bitterness and anger of the Cypriote masses against the national minority of the Turks, converting them into a scapegoat. To win full support from the Greek government Makarios fostered the slogan of "unification with Mother Greece." This is his alternative to the Cuban road.

As for Turkish capitalism, it finds the Cyprus question a welcome diversion from the economic and political crisis that has been deepening in the country. Through Kutchuk and Company Turkey exploited the desires of the Turkish Cypriotes for independence, seeking to use them as tools in its own adventurist policy.

At the same time, the Anglo-American imperialists are doing their utmost to avoid granting the Cypriotes what they really want; i.e., the right to determine their own fate. Free exercise of self-determination would greatly favor a Cuban-type solution. Consequently, the imperialist game is to offer pseudo independence under a docile regime servile to NATO, maintaining Cyprus as a military base for use against the developing Arab and African revolution.

Papandreou hopes to persuade the Anglo-American imperialists that the best way to save the situation is to grant Enosis, union with Greece. The credentials he offers Wall Street and the City are impressive. He was in the forefront of the counterrevolution that met the great postwar socialist upsurge in Greece and finally crushed the heroic partisan movement of 1947-49. In the elections last year, he boasted of his success in cutting the Communist vote in half (down to 12%). His basic point is that Greek capitalism is now the most stable and dependable force in the region.

As between the Greek Papandreou, the Turkish Inonou, the Cypriote Makarios and the Anglo-American imperialists, the workers and peasants have nothing to choose. What is called for is solidarity between the Cypriote, Greek and Turkish workers and peasants. The Greek and Turkish workers in particular must understand that they are class brothers and have nothing to gain from a war between their two countries. They would be the first and main victims in such a conflict.

The enemy is not on the other side of the border. The enemy is to be found at home. The name of the enemy is capitalism.

In Greece the revolutionary Marxists are not against defend-

ing their country; in fact they are for it -- but only after the government of the capitalists has been replaced by a workers and peasants government.

The slogans which the revolutionary Marxists are advancing in Greece against the warmongering capitalists are as follows:

"Immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus."

"Immediate withdrawal of the UN forces."

"Down with the exploiters and hangmen of the working people. Down with the capitalist governments."

"Long live the anticapitalist struggle of the workers and peasants! Long live proletarian internationalism!"

"Only a socialist democracy of workers and peasants, of Cypriote Turks and Greeks, can assure peace, progress and brotherhood among the people of Cyprus."

HAPPY HUNTING GROUND IN LATIN AMERICA

The reason for the avid interest displayed by merchants, industrialists and bankers of the United States in the domestic politics of the Latin-American countries can be gathered from some statistics compiled by Monde Uni [March 1964].

In the category of food, the United States imports from Latin America: bananas, 95%; coffee, 85%; sugar, 76%; cacao, 48%.

Figures for raw materials are as follows: beryllium, 71%; copper, 62%; iron, 58%; zinc, 52%; oil, 43%; bauxite, 42%; tungsten, 40%. These are only examples from a long list.

For handling key supplies like these, American businessmen insist on a cut. The annual take is about \$1,000,000,000.

As an example of what can be accomplished under benevolent dictators backed by American ambassadors and military missions, the International Railway Co., a United Fruit enterprise, on an investment of \$28,000,000 in 1904 realized \$97,000,000 by 1953.

And for their generosity in supplying the United States, the Latin-American people are rewarded with sometimes catastrophic drops in the prices of what they sell. From 1951 to 1959, for instance, cacao dropped 52%; sugar, 47%; wool, 46%; coffee, 33%; lead, 32%; zinc, 28%; cotton, 23%; canned beef, 22%; tin, 20%; cereals, 11%, etc.

THE UPROAR OVER PERON'S PROPOSED RETURN

BUENOS AIRES -- Talk began in Argentina last January about the possible return of Perón. Little by little the rumor gained ground. Certain trade-union leaders who frequently travel to Madrid for conferences with the former president announced that the return of the Justicialist* leader would be this year. However, everything remained conjectural until recently when top Peronist trade-union and political leaders confirmed the report. The public thereupon began to seriously consider the return of the main and undisputed leader of the Argentine working class as a real possibility.

There is no doubt that Perón's actual return would, for many reasons, constitute the most outstanding event in recent years for Argentina. Although almost a decade has passed since Perón was overthrown by the Armed Forces with the support of the oligarchy, most of the industrialists, and the political parties, the hatred and fear in which his government was held still remains alive. Consequently when the former president himself announced in an open letter to the Argentine people that he intended to return this year in order to collaborate in bringing peace to his fellow citizens, the response was most vigorous. It is possible that one of the objectives of the letter was just to send up a trial balloon. If this was Perón's intention, it is evident that he succeeded.

Up to the day the letter was published, opposition to his proposed return did not appear to be extensive. Opponents openly against the return of the "deposed tyrant," as he is customarily labeled by La Prensa -- the paper of highest prestige in the country -- could be counted on one's fingers. Only an occasional political committee and a grouping of small civic organizations that appeared in the heat of the so-called "Liberating Revolution" of September 16, 1955, had made the public record. Not a single major party had ventured to offer an opinion. Even more -- the secretary of the Federation of Center Parties [Federación de los Partidos del Centro] -- a grouping of completely conservative cut, typically representative of the "oligarchy" -- had declared that it was not worth the bother to say anything, since the announcement made by the Justicialist leaders that Perón intended to return to Argentina had no other aim but to create a sensation among the Peronist forces and raise their morale.

But the big unknown was the government and the Armed Forces. Before the election that gained him the presidency of the Republic, Dr. Arturo Illia and his party -- the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo -- had declared that Perón's return was a problem that only Perón himself could decide. When the possibility began to be dis-

*"Justicialismo," the doctrine advanced by Perón, claims to stand between Communism and capitalism, combining idealism and materialism, individualism and collectivism. Banned as "Peronism," the movement gained sanction from President Frondizi to participate in the March 1962 elections as the "Justicialist Front."

cussed this year, the question was immediately asked, "What does the Executive Power say?"

By way of the mouths of his highest functionaries, the Executive Power insisted again that he had nothing to say, since it was not up to him. "Perón," said the Undersecretary of the Interior, "is a private citizen like anyone else. It's up to him to decide and no one else."

The "abstention" of the Illia government in regard to a trip home by the president who was toppled in 1955 was taken to mean either of two things:

(1) Since a case was pending against Perón charging him with statutory rape involving a minor -- a dubious charge -- and since he could be accused of other crimes (fraud, etc.), the benevolent attitude of the Executive Power could be considered the prelude to possible amnesty to be granted by parliament. A favorable vote on this could be obtained with relative ease since the present government holds an absolute majority in the senate, while in the chamber of deputies it could count on the support of other parties anxious not to get crossed up with Peronist voters.

(2) The acquiescence of the Executive Power in Perón's return could mean that Illia had succeeded in convincing the Armed Forces that the entrance of the former president would not provoke any big disturbances.

Since it was necessary to find some political motive in all this, the silence of the government; more accurately, its refusal to come out unequivocally against Perón's return, provoked more and more speculation in political and journalistic circles that the two had reached a political understanding. Since you can't lift yourself by your boot straps, as the popular saying goes, it was not any attachment to electoral promises that determined the attitude of the authorities. If Illia was not opposed to Perón's return it was purely and simply because the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo was negotiating for the support of the Peronist movement in the next parliamentary elections scheduled for March 1965.

These elections can be of decisive importance to the government, inasmuch as a defeat could mean a strong opposition in parliament for some years. And where did Peronist votes come in? Why not assume that Perón's return could be purchased in return for electoral support for the government party?

La Razón, the country's most widely circulated evening paper, published an interesting report with regard to this. Three military figures had been sent to interview Perón in Madrid, the paper said, to discuss the terms of an agreement.

Other newspapers ran a report that appeared in the London Times, claiming that an agreement had been reached along the follow-

ing lines: Perón would return to Argentina for a short stay -- three months more or less -- his aim being to iron out internal problems of the Peronist movement and to leave the leadership in the hands of Vandor, the strong man of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo]. Vandor was said to favor a tacit understanding with the government. In return for this, the Justicialist movement would support Illia in the parliamentary elections next March. In order not to give the Armed Forces cause for worry, Perón's arrival and stay in Argentina would be undertaken with every conceivable precaution. There was even talk of confining him to a distant corner of the country and keeping him practically under lock and key until the time came to send him abroad once and for all.

All these rumors about a possible agreement between Perón and Illia -- with the approval of the Armed Forces -- were denied at one time or another by both sides. Nevertheless, despite being urged more and more to state his opinion about the return of the former president, the Executive Power persisted in dumying up. Wasn't this the best proof that a deal was actually being worked out?

Perón's letter to the Argentine people changed the situation at once. It was clear that Perón proposed to return. And he had set the date -- before the end of 1964. Those who had been watching things with a knowing smile, believing that it was all a Peronist "bluff," had to change their minds.

The opposition to his return mushroomed. The two most important dailies of the Republic, La Prensa, which the Justicialist leader expropriated when he was in power, and La Nación began by recapitulating the chorus of the small rabidly anti-Peronist organizations that had already come out against his return. Both of them commented editorially on Perón's letter and declared that he could not and must not return. Political personalities spoke up in the same way. Américo Ghioldi, main figure of the Partido Socialista Democrático, a liberal organization that participated actively in the struggle against the Peronist regime, had declared some time ago that the return of Perón would draw his following away from many parties fighting for the Justicialist votes. At first it seemed that Ghioldi would not oppose the proposal to let the former president return. However, he now came out vigorously in opposition and had his party do the same.

The Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo, the official wing of the Unión Cívica Radical (both were once united under the leadership of former president Frondizi), had maintained silence up to this point. This is easily explained. Neither of these parties can view the return of Perón with equanimity. In fact both of them are gambling on the Justicialist movement abstaining in the next electoral contest. Their greatest ambition is to make a secret deal that would end Justicialist competition. But, as is understandable, such an agreement would be ruled out if they said they were against Perón's return. A party not facing this problem, UDELPA [Unión del Pueblo Argentino], which was organized by former president Aramburu, who ran against

Illia, spoke up against Perón's return without any hesitation.

Although the attitude of the government and the Armed Forces continued to remain enigmatic, a series of facts proved that here, too, the ground was not favorable for Perón. Before the publication of his open letter, certain officials in retirement said that they opposed his return in any form. With the appearance of the letter, the protests rose. It was well known that the chief of Campo Mayo -- General Lanusse -- a stubborn anti-Peronist, had filed his veto with the Executive Power. It was evident, therefore, that the reluctance of the government to take a stand in the matter would not last long.

The occasion came with the ninth anniversary of September 16, 1955, the so-called "Liberating Revolution." In the previous eight anniversaries the festivities were almost always limited to ceremonies that were rather played down. This time it was different. Throughout the country, the "democratic" elements staged rallies in which inflammatory speeches were made against the "return of the past." The government backed these ceremonies in an ostentatious way. If there were any differences among the Armed Forces, no one could see them. The secretaries (a post second only to the Minister of War) of the three departments, expressed the views of their respective bodies, and they all agreed that Perón must not return.

As might be imagined, the Executive Power had already decided before these ceremonies to exercise a definitive veto. In a statement made to Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune, President Illia, forgetting all his previous affirmations, said: "There is no desire for him to return because the Argentine people want peace and tranquility. The government has not taken any measures. . . because I don't believe they are necessary. The ceremonies commemorating the sixteenth of September demonstrate that public opinion is opposed to his return."

The Peronist reaction to the veto by the Executive Power and the Armed Forces has been cautious up to now. Apparently they are a little disconcerted. The repeated assertions that Perón would return without fail in 1964 indicate that they had come to believe -- at least some of them -- in the possibility of a deal with the government forces. Otherwise their optimism is inexplicable. Perón, according to the declarations of his followers and then his own assertion would return as the "peacemaker." This ruled out beforehand that it would occur as the culmination of powerful popular demonstrations. And the facts corroborated this conclusion. The Peronist-oriented "62 organizations" -- the strongest nucleus of the Confederación General del Trabajo -- although they had mobilized in favor of his return, did so in an absolutely peaceful way, with a series of actions that created no stir whatsoever.

Will they continue the same kind of course after the veto? Everything indicates that the answer is yes. It is clear that the Peronists will continue to issue threats. They were issuing them

before they knew that the Armed Forces were against Perón's return. "If the government does not permit Perón to return, it will bear the responsibility for whatever happens." This is the repeated refrain. But it is difficult to say what the hierarchy proposes to do. It is not that they cannot count on mass support for genuine acts of resistance. If they have not resorted to a militant course to promote the return of Perón, it is simply because they didn't want to. The pretext of the leaders is that a militant attitude would prejudice the cause for which they are struggling. There is no reason to believe that they will change in this. The "struggle" for the return will no doubt take shape in a series of acts of some scope, but not sufficient in any case to gain the proclaimed objective.

It would be a mistake to conclude that Peronism suffered a big defeat. It is certain that Perón's aspiration to return to Argentina received a setback. But is this what he actually sought? It is difficult to imagine a politician as skillful as the former president of Argentina seriously believing for a single moment that he could return with the "benevolent" permission of the Armed Forces.

This is not to deny that dealings were carried on with the government as rumored, but Perón undoubtedly knew that in a problem as grave as his return, the ultimate decision would be made not by the authorities but by the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. And in view of their rabid anti-Peronism, permission would not be forthcoming.

The fact that officers apparently in agreement with the return (among them appears to be Onganía, commander in chief of the army and the man who at one time broke the uprising of the "colorado" faction, the "gorillas" [reactionary officers] of the army) were not permitted to say anything, indicates that the Armed Forces still view Peronism as a formidable enemy. Perón is undoubtedly aware of this. Thus it seems difficult to believe that he really thought he could get permission to return.

What is most probable is that the entire campaign had no other objective than to give Peronism fresh impetus. The division between followers of Framini and Vandor, the "Fraministas" and the "Vandoristas," constituted a potential threat which the former president had to meet. In the March 1965 elections, the Peronists will, without the least doubt, make an attempt to win a goodly number of deputies and senators and perhaps governors of important provinces. The division could be healed with realization of this hope.

But how to unite the dissidents in the meantime? The "struggle" for the return of the undisputed chief could do it. And that's what happened. When he returned from Madrid, where he had seen Perón, Framini said that the battle with Vandor was something secondary, since after all, "We are Peronists."

The opposition of the government and the Armed Forces now offers Peronism still more reason for closing ranks. In a record-

ing made in Madrid and brought back by Framini, Perón, foreseeing the veto in store, addresses the Peronist workers, telling them that he is ready to return to Argentina, but that it is up to them to prepare the conditions for it. It would not be remarkable if from now until the elections next March, the entire Peronist campaign to mobilize the workers were to center around this slogan.

GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN ACTION IN VENEZUELA

On September 21, President Leoni told a French correspondent that "scarcely any guerrilla actions or terrorist attempts had occurred for six months" in Venezuela.

A little more than two weeks later, the Leoni government had 10,000 men scouring the country, searching for clues that might lead them to Lt. Col. Michael Smolen. The deputy head of the U.S. Air Force mission in Venezuela had been kidnapped in Caracas by four armed men on October 9. More than one hundred "suspects," mostly students, were arrested.

At the height of the publicity over the affair, Lt. Col. Smolen was released. He said that he had been courteously treated and well fed, that no harm had been done him and no threats had been made against him, sensational rumors to the contrary which were publicized in the Venezuelan press.

The lieutenant colonel had been taken by the FALN [Armed Forces of National Liberation]. The publicity stunt was fresh evidence that the guerrilla movement in Venezuela has not been liquidated, as the Leoni government boasts.

The truth is that the guerrilla fighters ordered a unilateral ceasefire last January. They did this out of deference to the wish of currents in the radical movement who hoped that the Leoni government would grant an amnesty, free the some 1,500 political prisoners, permit the legally elected deputies of the Left Revolutionary Movement [MIR] and the Communist party to resume their seats in parliament, and restore constitutional guarantees in the country.

The government answer was to step up the repression and order the armed forces into the field in a major effort to stamp out resistance.

In June, the guerrilla command drew up a balance sheet and decided that there was no choice but to end the ceasefire.

A series of incidents have occurred since, of which the kidnapping of the American officer is but the most recent and most spectacular.

POLICE TERROR IN SOUTH AFRICA

LUSAKA, Northern Rhodesia -- Verwoerd's police have now turned their vicious attention in a big way on those organisations affiliated to the All-African Convention and the Unity Movement of South Africa.

The week end of September 26 they arrested Mr. W. M. Tsotsi, Vice-President of the Unity Movement, just outside Basutoland and detained him in a Bloemfontein prison under the 90-day law. Mr. Tsotsi has been practising as an attorney in Basutoland since 1961. He had a Basutoland passport and a permit to enter South Africa when the police arrested him.

During the following week they arrested Mr. J. L. Mkentane, Vice-President of the All-African Convention and a lawyer in King William's Town, Cape Province. He, too, is detained under the 90-day law. Like Mr. Tsotsi, Mr. Mkentane is a leading member of the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa [APDUSA].

Before these two leading members of the Unity Movement were arrested, the Special Branch [Security Police] had Mr. A. Wilcox dismissed from his job at the Simonstown docks as a "security risk." An Assistant Secretary of APDUSA, Mr. Wilcox is now banned for five years and confined.

Mr. G. Qaba, Acting Secretary of the Unity Movement and Executive member of the APDUSA, has been served with a notice to leave Cape Town where he works and lives with his family. He has been deported to the Transkei where he is not assured of a place to live. The Native Commissioner or a chief may decide that he is an "undesirable person" and he will be compelled to leave. If this happens, as it has many times before, Mr. Qaba and his family will be homeless wanderers with no one, not even their parents, allowed to house them.

Mr. D. Nyamela, Chairman of the Cape Town Branch of APDUSA, and two brothers -- Eric and Ernest Jama -- who are leading members of the Cape Town Branch of APDUSA, have been served with deportation orders to leave Cape Town for the Transkei. They, too, lose their employment. In addition there is a whole layer of ordinary members of organisations affiliated to the Unity Movement who have been subjected to intimidation throughout the country.

Every official of the All-African Convention to a man has either been put under house arrest, banned and confined or simply banned and deported. The same applies to the Unity Movement. Now the fascist police force is dealing with the affiliated organisations, depriving them of their leadership and terrorising the membership. All those banned under the fascist laws of South Africa are also forbidden from participating in any of the activities of any of the organisations affiliated to the All-African Convention and the Unity Movement or continuing to be members of these.

Now the fascist regime of South Africa has decided to send the army into Pondoland in the Transkei in order, they hope, to clean up that area of members of APDUSA, which has been growing into a force.

But these acts of terrorism and intimidation by Verwoerd's fascist regime will not deter the people from continuing to fight for their liberty.

SOUTH AFRICA

A Memorandum Submitted to the Committee of Nine

[The following analysis of the political situation in South Africa and the nature of the struggle for liberation was submitted to the "Committee of Nine" set up by the Organization of African States. The memorandum was presented by I.B.Tabata, President of the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA), N.Honono, President of the All-African Convention, and Miss J.Gool, Chairman of the Working Committee of the Non-European Unity Movement. The subheadings appear in the original text.]

* * *

Two Struggles

The subject of the complex political situation in South Africa is so vast that in the limited space at our disposal we can deal only with those aspects that have a bearing on the struggles of the immediate future. It is a matter of great urgency that we should understand what is the key to the situation, namely, THAT THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE STRUGGLES GOING ON AT PRESENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. On the face of it they may seem to be one and the same struggle and they are often assumed to be the same by the outside world. But the fact is they are totally different in aim, in dimension and in direction.

The first is the NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA, in which the whole of the African peasantry in the "Reserves" is involved. This basic struggle is not one that the outside hears or reads about. Yet in the last decade it has grown in intensity throughout the country. It is a struggle far more grim than the one that is frequently published in the newspapers throughout the world.

The second struggle is the conflict between the representatives of Imperialism in the South Africa and the Boer or Afrikaner Fascist wing, the Nationalist Government that has been in power since 1948. It is this conflict with all its ramifications that receives publicity both in the home and the world press, though naturally it is not presented in those terms.

This has the effect of creating confusion and blurring the real political issues involved. The unfortunate fact is that a section of our oppressed people themselves has been drawn into this conflict. Some of our best men and women are sacrificing their lives in it. But they are being sacrificed on the altar of Imperialism in its own defence.

Now unless we and the rest of the independent States in Africa understand the nature of these two separate and indeed ultimately opposing struggles, and in their actions are guided by this understanding, the cause of liberation of our people in South Africa will be lost and the sacrifice of our bravest fighters will have been in vain.

The first and true struggle for liberation has as its immediate objective liberty and land. It leads to political freedom and freedom from want.

The Tactics of Imperialism

The second struggle declares as its objective the removal of the Verwoerd Government from power. But its ultimate aim though an unavowed one is NEO-COLONIALISM, that is, the loosening of some of the more obvious bonds of political slavery while ensuring the economic stranglehold of Imperialism on the soil of South Africa.

Imperialism has to resort to the strategem of channelling the deep discontents of the people and harnessing their energies to its own conflicts and rivalries, thus diverting the oppressed from the true struggle for liberation. To this end they employ all their tricks and resources of publicity, devices that should be familiar to us through their long history of divide and rule.

The complex political situation in South Africa can be more clearly understood, also, when we view it in the setting of the Cold War where there is a confrontation of two opposing social systems on a world scale -- Socialism versus Imperialism.

After the Second World War British Imperialism emerged so weakened that it could no longer hold down all its colonies by force of arms. It had to adopt more subtle methods in order to maintain its hold on its vast empire. It evolved a new policy of granting political independence while seeking to strengthen its economic control on its former colonies. In the intense competition between Imperialism and Socialism the Western Imperialists in general adopted similar tactics, especially as they were confronted with the disastrous effects of the policy of French Imperialism in Indo-China and Algeria. Their long history of the oppression of people of Colour has placed them at a disadvantage. Imperialism is eager to bury its shameful past.

It is in this context that the South African Nationalist Government has become a polecat in the community of the Western

Nations. Its Apartheid policy and its Herrenvolkism -- the myth of the master race -- stinks in the nostrils of the world. Thus Verwoerd becomes a severe embarrassment to the West and has to be removed. It has become the task of imperialism to replace him with a more acceptable government, at once less obviously oppressive and at the same time capable of safeguarding its large investments.

But Imperialism finds itself up against a difficulty. It is not possible to remove the Nationalist Government through the ballot. The only people in South Africa who have the vote are the three million Whites, of whom the Boer (Afrikaners) are in the majority. Now the Afrikaners have organized themselves not so much by class as by race. In every sphere they are organized separately into Afrikaner Trade Unions, Afrikaner Churches, teachers, organizations and the Afrikaner Chamber of Commerce, etc. Over all is one federal Afrikaner body (F.A.K.) which is controlled by the Broederbond, the fascist brotherhood at the core of the Nationalist Party. Through the F.A.K. the Broederbond controls all the Afrikaner organizations down to the lives of individuals. It is difficult for any Afrikaner to vote against the Nationalist Party. In the present situation, then, and in the foreseeable future, it is not possible to vote into power a Government more suitable to Imperialism.

But Imperialism is faced with the necessity of getting rid of Verwoerd. The international situation is fast deteriorating and Verwoerd with his intransigent policy of Apartheid continues to place in jeopardy not only the large investments in South Africa but also the economic stakes that Western Imperialism has placed in the Continent of Africa. He endangers their vast plans of Neo-colonialism.

After the massacre at Sharpeville in 1960, the news of which echoed round the world, British Imperialism tried to bring about the downfall of the Verwoerd Government by manipulating the stock-exchange. This plan failed. Why? In South Africa, Britain alone has more than a thousand million pounds of investments. In addition to this, about 79% of industrial and commercial activity in the country is in the hands of the English-speaking section who support the politics of British Imperialism against Verwoerdism. Thus any attempt at financial manipulation recoiled first on the heads of the financiers and their local supporters.

Imperialism had to find other means of unseating Verwoerd, who in the eyes of the West is leading the country into an abyss. The organization of demonstrations, passive resistance campaigns, pass-burnings and the threat of one-day strikes -- strikes controlled from above -- were calculated to cause confusion in the country in order to frighten and alarm the White electorate into rejecting the Nationalist Government.

It is in this way, also, that confusion was created amongst the oppressed people themselves, who became involved in the conflict between Imperialism and Verwoerd. All this activity was given much

publicity in the herrenvolk press and therefore in the world press. It was all part of the tactics of attempting to dislodge Verwoerd. And note the effects. The more Imperialism tried to embarrass Verwoerd, the more viciously he hit back at the oppressed people. Many were jailed and organizations were banned.

Verwoerd on his part started an anti-Communist witch-hunt, presenting himself as a bulwark in defence of Western Civilization. He staged the dramatic, long-drawn-out Treason trial of more than 150 people, of whom the great majority were members of Non-White organizations. When this venture failed, he launched into the series of diabolical legislative measures culminating in the Sabotage Act and the 90-Day Detention Act (1963), which damns any protest or opposition to Apartheid under the blanket term of Communism. Thus today in South Africa there is what is known as statutory Communism.

In the immediate battle against the local representatives of Imperialism, Verwoerd armed himself with extraordinary powers which he is now able to use in an attempt to crush the real liberatory Movement -- the Movement that is fighting against both Verwoerdism and Imperialism.

Vulnerability of the South African Economy

In order to appreciate the desperate plight of Imperialism, it is necessary to take a look at the imperialist investments and the state of the economy in South Africa itself, which are under a constant threat because of Verwoerd's reckless Apartheid policy. As we have said, Britain alone has a thousand million pounds invested in South Africa. The kingpin of the economy is the gold-mining industry and the gold mines are dependent on cheap African labour.

In 1959, for example, a total of 62,025 WHITES were employed in the mines, but 487,982 AFRICANS. The mining industry -- gold, diamonds, coal -- is the biggest earner of foreign exchange. In 1959 it made available for direct import the sum of 215 million pounds. Although secondary industry produces by far the major part of the national income supplying the luxuries enjoyed by the whites, nevertheless it is not able to stand on its own feet. In 1959 it showed a debit balance of 175 million pounds, so that it depends for its foreign credit on the mining industry and agriculture. And these are precisely the two industries that depend almost entirely on cheap African labour. In short, it is the Africans who by their labour carry on their backs not only the gold mines and agriculture but also secondary industry, and therefore the whole of the South African economy.

Now, though all the racialist laws of South Africa are geared to providing the cheap labour vital to the profits of the mines and the White farms, there is always a chronic shortage of such labour. In 1959 there were as many as 650,000 African labourers from territories outside South Africa employed in the mines and on the farms. 60% of all the African mineworkers in the gold mines were recruited

from the surrounding African territory. The Portuguese, for example, have a standing agreement with the Government of South Africa for the sale of 100,000 African labourers a year.

When we bear all these factors in mind, we realize the vulnerability of the whole South African economy which could be gravely crippled by the withdrawal of its labour-force. At the present moment there is a world-wide campaign for the boycott of South African products, spearheaded by the independent African States. But something far more dangerous and effective would be their boycott of LABOUR, that is, the withdrawal of mine labour supplied by the territories outside South Africa.

This is what Imperialism fears most of all. It would have a most devastating effect. It would cripple both the mining industry and agriculture, both of which are the sole earners of the foreign credit that secondary industry so sorely needs. With one fell blow the African States could shatter the economy of South Africa, the economy that sustains the monstrous armaments, the army, the police force and the vast arsenals of war with which the fascist Verwoerd Government is preparing to crush the liberatory Movement, and in the process precipitate war on an international scale.

In the threatening boycott of labour, Imperialism sees the sword of Damocles hanging over the South African economy and also over its huge investments. Both parties in the conflict, Afrikaner Fascism and Imperialism, are acutely aware of this threat. But they each have their own plans for solving it. Imperialism sees its salvation in easing the sharp tensions in South Africa and in granting some concessions to the Blacks, that is, the Africans, Coloureds and Indians. They want especially to win over the goodwill of the intellectuals. They would use the Black intellectuals as their frontline of defence. They are even prepared to see a few Black faces in Parliament, though they would not allow the Africans to be in the majority, as in the independent African States. And this is a most important factor when we are considering the complex political struggle in South Africa.

A precondition for these Imperialist plans, however, is the removal of the Nationalist Government from power and for this they will use all methods. It is in this perspective that the machinations of the Imperialist agents are revealed in a diabolical light. They are harnessing the discontents of the people, their aspirations and their willingness to sacrifice themselves, but it is in a battle that has nothing to do with the struggle for liberation. The whole Imperialist press in South Africa is geared to the achievement of this aim. It is in this setup that some of our bravest men and women are being thrown to the wolves.

Verwoerd's Tactics

Verwoerd on his part sees another solution. He believes that with his military build-up he can destroy the liberatory Movement

and by intensifying his Apartheid laws he can further regiment labour to meet the requirements of the economy, even if the African States should withhold labour from their territories.

The Group Areas Act, for example, which separates the people into different racial pens, is designed to turn the country into a White Group Area, with pockets reserved for the Coloureds, Indians and Africans, strategically placed throughout the country. These constitute labour reservoirs for the mines, the farms and industry.

Then there is the proposed creation of "Bantustans," which are cynically called independent States for Africans. To begin with, these so-called States can neither be States nor can they be independent. In the first place they are not viable. They comprise in all 12.9% of the land area of South Africa for the accommodation of four-fifths of the population. The so-called Parliament consists in the main of Government chiefs, who are appointed and paid by it and are liable to be dismissed if they do not carry out government orders. The main function of the chiefs is to facilitate the recruitment of labour throughout the "Bantustans" for the mines, the White farms and industry.

One of the most sinister features of these "Bantustans" is the attempt to re-establish tribalism. Every African man, woman and child is to be classified under one tribe or another, whether they work in the towns or live in the Reserves. Everyone must come under tribal law. Common law has been abolished and the right of Habeas Corpus for the individual has been withdrawn. The word of the chief is law. If a man fails to obey the order of a chief, he is guilty of a criminal offence. In actual practice these laws permit of police terror throughout the Reserves and indeed they reinforce it.

This seemingly senseless and unnecessarily brutal regimentation is a logical concomitant of a forced labour system. The whole purpose is to enable the chiefs to draft labour in the required quantities. This is Verwoerd's reply to the problem of labour. At this moment populations are being reshuffled according to tribes that no longer exist. Each chief is armed not only with extraordinary powers but with weapons for his henchmen. Verwoerd sees in the chiefs his particular front line of defence for Herrenvolkism. They are going to be used as a fifth column for the purpose of crushing the liberatory Movement.

The Battle for Unity. Two Outlooks

To those outside South Africa it may seem strange that the oppressed people should be so blind to their own interests that they have allowed themselves to be made use of by the rival parties of the oppressors. It is a simple matter to understand the behaviour of the chiefs who are dreaming of the dead past of tribalism and think that by attaching themselves to Verwoerd they will regain some of their long-lost power. It is a different matter, however, with the African intellectuals who have accepted the norms of present-day society.

Here it must be stated that for the last twenty years there have been two different outlooks amongst the leaders of the oppressed; there have been two divergent policies which have led to two opposing directions in the conduct of the struggle. It is precisely at this time, when a new phase in the objective situation is opening up, that it is imperative for the leaders to ask themselves in what direction their policies are leading them and the people with them.

There are those who saw the struggle as a question of pleading their cause before the Herrenvolk and hoping for justice and a change of heart. This was specially true of the older intellectuals, who in this were following an old and honoured tradition of attachment to the liberal bourgeoisie in South Africa.

Their political struggle consisted in deputations, beginning in the days of Victoria, "the Great White Queen," and followed by innumerable other deputations to successive South African Governments. Such ideas die hard, especially when they have always received the fulsome support of the liberals who were well aware that, as long as the Africans followed this policy of humbly pleading their cause, so long were the investments of Imperialism safe in South Africa.

It was this policy that was followed by the oldest political organization, the African National Congress, established in 1912 during the crisis of the Land Act. Its leaders had an attachment to and a reliance upon the local representatives of Imperialism.

But this policy of the older leaders was the source of the incapacity of the African National Congress to extend itself into a real national organization dynamically connected with the masses of the oppressed, whose aspirations they claimed to express. To this day it has no roots amongst the peasantry anywhere in the country, though the peasantry comprise by far the greatest majority of the oppressed in South Africa. To such leaders the function of an organization was chiefly as an instrument for bringing pressure to bear on the government in order to gain concessions. It is for the same reason that they have never appreciated the vital necessity of aligning themselves with the many people's ORGANIZATIONS in the country, that is, the organizations among the peasants, the workers and the professionals. In fact about 1940 they allowed themselves to be wrenched out of the federation uniting all the African organizations, the All-African Convention (A.A.C.) to which they had belonged since its foundation during the political crisis of 1935, when the Africans were robbed of their last vestiges of Parliamentary voting rights and were fobbed off with the so-called Native Representation Act.

The explanation for the policy of the African National Congress clearly lies in its attachment to the liberal bourgeoisie. This attachment had a powerful influence both upon the outlook of the leadership of the Congress, on the structure of the organization and on the nature of the struggle. It is this reliance on the good

will of the representatives of Imperialism that dictated their repeated declarations that theirs was a non-violent struggle -- even as late as the Sharpeville days of 1960. In fact it was precisely on the issue of such attachments that the youth in the African National Congress broke away in 1959 to form the Pan Africanist Congress. Their stated reason for the break-away was that the African National Congress was too much under the influence and control of the Whites.

The All-African Convention Calls for Unity

A second trend manifested itself amongst the oppressed, marking a sharpening of political consciousness. It crystallized itself in 1943 during the ferment created by the Second World War, when the All-African Convention sent out a clarion call for the Unity not only of all Africans but of ALL SECTIONS WHO SUFFERED UNDER A COMMON OPPRESSION, THE AFRICANS, COLOUREDS AND INDIANS.

This was a revolutionary concept in the given conditions of South Africa. The All-African Convention called for unity on the basis of a clearly-defined programme, rejecting inferiority with all its manifold forms of racial oppression, and demanding full and equal rights for all South Africans, irrespective of race, colour or creed. It enunciated that the absolute precondition for the creation of a truly national organization for the successful conduct of the struggle is the complete break-away from the tutelage of White Herrenvolk Parties, be it the liberal or any other party.

This new policy meant striking out into a completely independent path of struggle and the establishment of the Movement on a principled basis, free from Herrenvolk influences and ideas.

The federal organization uniting many Coloured organizations, the National Anti-C.A.D. (that is, against the proposed Coloured Affairs Department), responded to the call for UNITY and together with the All-African Convention formed the NON-EUROPEAN UNITY MOVEMENT in 1943. At the first all-in Conference there were over 150 organizations and branches represented.

The African National Congress was also invited, as well as the South African Indian Congress. In fact, for several years special seats were kept open in the Executive of the Unity Movement for the African National Congress. The South African Indian Congress, which was at that time under the complete control of the Indian merchant class leadership, was invited by the leaders of the Unity Movement to a special conference in 1944, where the question of Unity was thrashed out. The leaders of the South African Indian Congress refused to accept the demand for the full franchise, stating quite frankly that they were pledged to a policy of Compromise with the Smuts Government of the day, under the old Ghandi Agreement which had placed the Indian population in a special position. The African National Congress, for its part, preferred to seek its allies amongst the liberal bourgeoisie rather than with the other sections of the oppressed.

THE QUESTION OF UNITY HAS BEEN THE CARDINAL POINT IN THE MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR TWENTY YEARS, especially as the struggle began to grow in intensity.

[To be continued.]

That FBI Report

WHAT WAS BEHIND THE RIOTS IN THE USA?

By Evelyn Sell

Between July 18 and August 31, riots broke out in the Negro ghettos of seven Northern cities: New York, Rochester (New York), Jersey City, Elizabeth and Patterson (New Jersey), Dixmoor (a Chicago, Illinois, suburb) and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania). President Johnson ordered the secret political police to make a comprehensive study of the events and the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] has now published its official report.

The report describes a common pattern of events: ". . . in each instance there was first violent interference with the policemen on the scene, followed by the gathering of a crowd. . . In a majority of the areas affected store windows were broken, sometimes for many blocks, rocks were thrown, ash cans were hurled from roof tops, bottles, bricks, Molotov cocktails and fire bombs were thrown . . . Looting followed. . . In most of the communities respected Negro and other civic leaders, clergymen and public officials made every effort to halt the riots. . . In almost all cases only massive and vigorous police action or the arrival of state police or the National Guard finally brought about a termination of the riots and the restoration of law and order."

Inescapable Facts

The FBI, no friend to the Negro people, could not help but reveal the inescapable facts of ghetto misery that prompted Negroes to explode in such a fashion. The report pointed out that it was essential to understand that: "The social and economic conditions in which much of the Negro population lives are demoralizing. . . many of these areas are characterized by miserable living conditions, houses that are badly maintained, many of them rat infested and filthy. Drunkenness, narcotics peddling, prostitution, idleness, frustration, poverty and lack of opportunity are part of the atmosphere many people in these districts breathe."

Unlike the Southern demonstrations and the previous actions in the North which were aimed at integrating a specific lunch counter or getting jobs for Negroes from a particular company, the riots were

a generalized protest against the totality of Northern ghetto living. In each riot-torn area there is a similar pattern of high Negro unemployment, indecent housing, inadequate educational facilities and police brutality. Although the rioters were called "hoodlums," it is significant that newspaper reports of the events in Rochester stated that the few Negro-owned businesses, the Black Muslim mosque and the headquarters of a civil-rights organization, Congress of Racial Equality, were untouched although white-owned businesses on either side were wrecked.

Although the FBI report recognized to some extent the significance of the conditions of life within the ghettos it hailed Johnson's phony antipoverty program and "other private and public activities" as a "long range" solution to the problems of the black ghetto.

Police Brutality

A good portion of the report deals with one of the most crucial sore points of the black ghetto: police brutality. All but one of the seven riots were touched off by an incident involving the police. In New York it was the shooting of a 15-year-old Negro boy by an off-duty white policeman; in Rochester it was the arrest of a Negro man at a street dance; in Jersey City and Philadelphia it was the arrest of a Negro woman; in Patterson it was a fight between Negro teen-agers and policemen; in the Chicago suburb it was a case where a white liquor store owner accused a Negro woman of stealing a pint of gin. In each case rumors spread that the police were beating or maltreating a Negro and crowds quickly formed to aid the Negro or to protest the police actions.

In its summary conclusions the FBI report states: "A common characteristic of the riots was a senseless attack on all constituted authority without purpose or object." Senseless? Without purpose or object? As far back as thirty years ago a mayor's commission in New York stated that the main cause of tension in Harlem was the community's resentment against police brutality. There have now been four major riots in Harlem within the past thirty years -- in 1935, 1943, 1959 and this summer -- and each time police brutality was at the core of the disturbance. Charges of police brutality are constantly made in every large Northern city. A Negro in Rochester told reporters during the riots, "There are two sets of law, one for white and one for black. We just took enough of it. Police brutality, that's the name for it."

The FBI report absolves the police of any wrong doing, demands additional powers for the police, recommends increased training in riot control for local police forces and launches a long attack against civilian review boards which were set up in Philadelphia and Rochester to curb police brutality. Many other areas have demanded the creation of such boards and the demand was reiterated after the riots.

The FBI report claimed that "where there is an outside civilian review board the restraint of the police was so great that effective action against the rioters appeared to be impossible. This restraint was well known in the community and the rioters thereby emboldened to resist and completely defy the efforts of the police to restore order. In short, the police were so careful to avoid accusations of improper conduct that they were virtually paralyzed."

FBI Challenged

Officials of the review boards quickly challenged the FBI statements. It was pointed out that the police acted with similar "restraint" in the other cities -- where there were no review boards. It is interesting to note that the FBI attack comes at a time when a proposal to create a public review board is being considered by the City Council of New York.

The FBI proposals to deal with the causes and effects of the social explosions within the ghettos are obviously inadequate or nonsensical. They call for "coordinated and concerted programs to keep teen-agers in school" -- when statistics prove that unemployment among Negro teen-agers is twice as high as unemployment among white youth and that a high-school diploma means almost nothing in terms of getting a job. They complain about the frequent "absence of punishment of any kind" for "lawless youth" who are "well informed of their privileged condition, including the fact that in many jurisdictions they cannot be punished at all by fine or imprisonment but only by probation or reform schools." (My emphasis.) The report overlooks the many times that Negro youth have been judged, sentenced and punished on the spot by trigger-happy policemen such as the one who shot and killed the Negro youth and thereby set off the Harlem rioting.

There are many concerned parties who are attempting to head off riots in their own tense communities. The mayor of Buffalo, only seventy miles from the rioting in Rochester, called together a group of more than one hundred Negro and white community leaders to discuss preventive measures in their city. The president of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People told the mayor, "I say to you it's time for you to act. You have got to give us something we can tangibly tell our people. Something important, something that feeds their stomachs."

The mayor suggested a week or day of prayer. The FBI suggests increased riot training for police. Neither proposal will prevent or stop further explosions within the seething black ghettos of America.