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"CHAOS" IN SAIGON

The attempt at another coup d'état in South Vietnam September 13 is fresh evidence -- if any were needed -- of the extreme deterioration of the position of American imperialism in Saigon. The Johnson administration is now down to praying for a "moratorium" on attempted coups d'état. . . just until the November election in the United States.

Bits of the truth about the tenuousness of the U.S. beachhead in the strife-torn land are now appearing in the American press. Thus C.L. Sulzberger, the New York Times expert on foreign affairs, declares in the September 16 issue [International Edition] "the situation in South Vietnam seems irreparable. . . ."

"The best to be hoped," he continues, "is that chaos may be frozen another eight weeks so that, after our elections, some patch-

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work settlement may be attempted and accepted, if not relished, by this country as well as the war-weary Vietnamese."

Sulzberger offers a rather graphic image of the U.S. puppet government: "The Government of Maj. Gen. Khanh balances in power like the pingpong ball on a shooting gallery fountain."

Even the possibility of negotiating something out of the collapse seems rather slim to Sulzberger in view of the fact that "guerrilla strength swells; Government strength diminishes." He thinks it doubtful even that the Johnson administration will succeed in freezing the chaos for another eight weeks:

"Anarchy cannot be institutionalized. All we can hope is to fight for time. If a neutralist coup d'état can be prevented until after our elections, perhaps slender room will remain for exploratory talks."

Meanwhile the radio of the FNL [Front National de Libération], which the Saigon puppet government calls the "Vietcong," has begun appealing to the people of South Vietnam "to take advantage of the critical situation and the extreme disarray as a good occasion to pass to the offensive."

It is calling on "the people of the cities to oppose the dictatorial regime and gain the departure of the Americans and the end of the war of aggression." The appeals are being made "in the name of an independent, democratic and neutral South Vietnam."

These appeals can now have great impact. The South Vietnamese bourgeoisie is in a state of acute crisis, manifestly incapable for the moment of rule. The various civilian groupings are either involved in the political gambles of the generals, who seem to be rolling dice to see which one comes up as the puppet "most favored" by the foreign imperialist power, or they have withdrawn, paralyzed with fear over Washington's course, which was finally to risk their future in an election campaign in the United States.

An increasing number of reports are now appearing in the world press, indicating the collapse of discipline among the troops at the disposal of the puppet government. Undoubtedly many soldiers are now going over to the side of the FLN and others are preparing to do so if the freedom fighters move in their direction.

If the FLN proves capable of moving vigorously, it could, with a few well directed blows, bring down what remains of the rotted structure of the American-backed South Vietnam government.

While dictator Khanh was bouncing like a pingpong ball on a shooting gallery fountain, Henry Cabot Lodge, the former U.S. ambassador who served as puppet master in Saigon, toured Europe, seeking

support and sympathy for the American "burden" in trying to "pacify" the rebellious natives in Southeast Asia. In Paris, the Boston aristocrat created something of a sensation when he outlined what the U.S. was seeking to do in South Vietnam.

American forces are in that distant country, he said, to prevent a "Communist victory." However, Washington is not seeking a military victory. "We want a political solution."

Enlarging on this theme, he said that American troops were in South Vietnam for "security" reasons and "to contribute to the main aim, that is, to win popular support for the government."

"Asked about the means to achieve this," continued Le Monde [August 20], "Mr. Cabot Lodge said he favored a method of dividing up areas in accordance with the procedures utilized by the French authorities and which were applied and described by Colonel Roger Trinquier. These methods, according to him, had brilliant results and enabled the French authorities to combat terrorism."

The final "brilliant result," which Lodge did not mention, of course, was the ultimate victory of the Algerian freedom fighters over the French imperialist armies.

Le Monde observed dryly in an editorial note: "In applauding the ideas of Colonel Trinquier, the methods used to block the Casbah in Algiers and to condition the population during the war in Algeria, M. Cabot Lodge is astonishingly frank. His declaration permits one to suppose everything about the policy of General Khanh and his American 'advisors.' 'It is necessary to organize the population from top to bottom. You can say I am a fascist, but we must make the population docile, easy to lead,' Colonel Trinquier once said. It was also he who declared at the trial of Salan: 'The O.A.S. [the reactionary terrorist Secret Army Organization] is a people defending itself.' Mr. Cabot Lodge ought to know that the 'structuration' of the population by the paratroopers contributed powerfully to regroup the Algerian masses around the FLN [the Front de Libération National which eventually won the war and established the Ben Bella government]. The same tactic applied in Saigon will rally the Vietnamese masses around the FNL."

In 1957, when the use of torture in Algeria by the French army was sickening the entire world, its use was defended by the most brazen and hardened "ultras." One of the documents, ascribed to Colonel Trinquier, can be found in a book La Raison d'Etat [Les Editions de Minuit, 1961]. An argument used by this sadist in support of torture was that a member of the FLN must be captured alive and forced to talk, to reveal the names of his comrades, his leaders. "It is necessary. . . in the interests of society, to convert him..." Lodge's admission tells us something about the methods used by the U.S. in South Vietnam.

THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION MARKS TIME

The fresh impetus which the congress of the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] and the adoption of the Charter of Algiers was to have given the Algerian Revolution [see World Outlook May 1], did not become concretized during the following months. The Revolution, in fact, is undergoing a difficult period characterized by disparate and, to a certain degree, contradictory tendencies, developments and symptoms.

First of all, the compromise with the conservative, even feudalistic forces, which led to including Chabaani not only in the Central Committee but also in the Political Bureau, proved to be ephemeral. Chabaani, for the second time, took to the mountains. He was quickly arrested and finally fell before a firing squad. In itself, the confrontation with the reactionary tendency represented by Chabaani was all to the good and no one who stands on the side of the Revolution will condemn it for defending itself with the utmost energy against its enemies, particularly when they resort to armed struggle and call for rebellion against the regime. Many firm supporters of the Revolution are, however, convinced that the defense would stand firmer in the eyes of the masses if trials such as was given Chabaani were held publicly instead of secretly and if the rights of the defendants were fully guaranteed. Nevertheless, what is most important to note in this is the rapidity with which an attempt at collaboration ended in a decisive break. This demonstrates the instability of the situation and the incontestable wavering in the orientation of the government.

As for the economic and social measures projected at the congress, especially in Ben Bella's opening report, the balance sheet is quite modest to say the least. Certainly no one would seek to impose a timetable on a revolution. But the situation is not one in which hasty and abstract demands have been placed. What the Revolution faces is multiple pressures which are blocking the adoption and application of essential measures.

In recent weeks, it is true, new nationalizations have been put into effect (movies and other minor enterprises). But these do not involve anything sweeping. What is primary is the delay in adopting the new agrarian reform that has been announced so many times. It is said now that this will be undertaken before the end of the year, however not until after the elections. Although this reform faces many real difficulties, its importance has been repeatedly stressed. Broad layers of the peasantry, perhaps the majority, have not yet gained direct economic benefits from the Revolution. It is necessary to link them with the Revolution through concrete measures, and very shortly. If not, this very important sector of the Algerian population can be alienated from the regime and undergo demoralization and complete passivity and even become ripe for counterrevolutionary maneuvers and adventures. Thus a delay can prove costly. It is for

this reason -- and not because of impatient radicalism -- that early adoption and application of the new agrarian reform is urgent.

The Algiers congress also emphasized the necessity for reconstructing the state apparatus and the party. Some changes have actually been undertaken in the administration. Reactionary elements have been replaced or eliminated, but the projected purge has not been applied consistently, and, more important, questionable criteria have been used. In the party, too, changes have been made at different levels in leading personnel. But it seems that the results have proved contradictory. In some places opportunist, ambitious, pro-imperialist elements were eliminated. In other places, contrariwise, militants of the left were victimized by the rightist apparatus.

The decision to create a militia could only be hailed in principle by the revolutionary Algerian left. Unfortunately, up to now, nothing effective has been organized. In the one case where militia have actually been put into operation (Kabylie), it involved contingents of the unemployed who were formed into brigades and paid a regular salary. Such a measure could be justified in an emergency where it was necessary to counteract actual military operations of counterrevolutionaries. But it is clear that this has little in common with a genuine popular militia.

With regard to the conflict of groups and tendencies in the FLN, the extreme right suffered a sharp setback with the elimination of Chabaani. In addition the development of the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens] has been positive -- a resolution on the agrarian reform was adopted at a recent congress and some of the most bureaucratic leaders seem to have been ousted. (Boudissa was not present at the congress and rumors have been circulating in Algiers that he is under arrest.) The change in the editorship of Révolution Africaine, on the other hand, constitutes a certain setback for the left.

An effort was made to minimize the import of removing Mohamed Harbi by designating Omar Ouzegane to replace him. Ouzegane's record could appear reassuring. But there is no doubt that Harbi was regarded as the spokesman of the Marxist left. (Among other things he played an important role in preparing the Charter of Algiers and in some of the commissions of the congress which were in charge of preparing the political resolutions.) The editorial announcing the change affirmed that Révolution Africaine would continue the same policy. This could only be judged in relation to the reasons for the shift in personnel, and, in fact, a week later Ouzegane published an editorial making concessions to the partisans of Arabic Islamic socialism, emphasizing his criticism of a certain left, the "revolutionaries of phrases. . . of France or elsewhere."

Algiers and the other Algerian cities are now the scene of an electoral campaign in which the government is again emphasizing its

commitments. The way in which these elections were prepared and are taking place deprives them of any real political significance. They constitute a formality which no one takes seriously. That is why, if the government seeks to become strongly consolidated by assuring the forward march of the Revolution, it should not be satisfied with the anticipated results of the ballot, but should carry out vital measures, above all the new agrarian reform, so as to give confidence to the masses and prevent the current marking of time from becoming prolonged and paving the way for a dangerous demobilization.

THE SPLIT IN THE ANGOLAN MOVEMENT

By Livio Maitan

Within recent months a somewhat new situation has been developing in the Angolan national liberation movement. Internal as well as international factors have caused some changes that can shortly lead to others.

The most important fact is the grave split which has occurred in Holden Roberto's GRAE [Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile] and which has already had repercussions in the FLNA [Angolan National Liberation Front] and the Angolan movement as a whole. A spectacular sign of the split was the resignation of Sawimbi, minister of foreign affairs in the Holden Roberto government. Others expressed solidarity with him, including some within the government (among others Taty, the minister of armaments).

Sawimbi's dissidence goes back some months. According to reliable sources, last spring Sawimbi, then in the minority, perhaps quite isolated, opposed sending a GRAE delegation to Peking. (Sawimbi claims that he was opposed to the way in which the trip was projected. Contrary to the allegations of his opponents, he says, he did not oppose the trip as such.) He was also against accepting the request of the group headed by Viriato da Cruz to be admitted into the FLNA. However, it was only later that his differences took such sensational form.

It is difficult to estimate the ultimate consequences of Sawimbi's split. An important fact is the announcement that he has, among other allies, won Kalundugo, chief of the general staff of the FLNA, and Valentin, former representative of the GRAE in Katanga. (Florentin Duarte, former representative of the GRAE in Cairo, who aided Sawimbi for a whole period in preparing his move, has now broken with him.) Another important fact is the projected alliance between Sawimbi and Dr. Agostinho Neto of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola].

How is this reflected inside Angola? Again, it is difficult

to judge because of the conflicting reports. In any case, one factor is deeply involved -- tribalism. Despite everything, this plays a powerful role in Angola. Sawimbi belongs to the Ovimbudus -- his father is one of the main chiefs -- and this could have great effect on the attitude of this tribe, which, with its two million members, is the most important in the country. It is clear that one of the most significant consequences of Sawimbi's split could be to end the influence of Holden Roberto and the FLNA in the regions occupied by the Ovimbudus and lead to the creation of guerrilla forces under the influence of Sawimbi. Thus Holden Roberto would again be reduced in the main to the Bakongo territory occupied by his own tribe.

But Holden Roberto's difficulties do not stop there. For years he has enjoyed support in his Congo base from the Adoula government. No one, of course, can seriously condemn the FLNA from exploiting this opening. But difficulties began above all as the guerrilla forces of Pierre Mulele and Gaston Soumaliot developed. The downfall of Adoula, the formation of the Tshombé government and the dramatic development of the situation in the Congo placed Holden Roberto in a critical and even extremely dangerous position. Thus a cloud was cast over his perspectives. Up to now no information has become available on his plans or intentions.

To complete the picture, since the grave vicissitudes which it experienced in 1962 and 1963, the MPLA has succeeded in recovering somewhat, thanks among other things to the Sawimbi affair and to a measure of more open international support (Neto's trip to Moscow). There is no doubt that whatever Neto's hesitation or real orientation may be, the MPLA which he heads has preserved valuable cadres and has even succeeded in organizing an effective fighting force in the Cabinda enclave.

The consequence of all these developments is that on the one hand certain African governments intend to reopen the Angolan file and perhaps revise their position (in fact, a new commission of inquiry has been set up) and, on the other hand, elements that favored rallying around the FLNA are again taking a more cautious attitude.

In any case the struggle in Angola more than ever appears long and difficult. Recent months have been marked by stagnation. External factors involving both Africans and non-Africans complicate the struggle. Further evolution in the liberation movement is quite possible and crystallization of the present forces is still far from being definitive.

On the basis of the facts at our disposal and the most likely interpretations (it is notorious that even the facts are widely disputed within the Angolan movement), it can be concluded that the FLNA remains the rallying point of the biggest part of the forces struggling in the country. Revolutionists thus are duty bound to assure it their collaboration and aid however critical they may be of its leadership or of some of its leading personalities. Nevertheless, if

other movements -- real, sincerely anti-imperialist movements -- develop independently of the FLNA in certain regions of Angola, they also would have the right to receive aid from the revolutionists.

It is necessary finally not to forget that the problem of coordinating the Angolan national forces has not been resolved and that it is urgent to avoid any repetition of grave conflicts that can only give comfort to the common enemy.

Revolutionists must participate in the actual revolutionary struggles of the Angolan movement. After all, this is the most effective way of aiding the movement, of blocking any neo-colonialist maneuvers and of helping the movement to find its way to a socialist program.

A TRAGIC EVENT IN ARGENTINA

In the afternoon of July 21 an explosion occurred in an apartment building at 1168 Posadas St., which runs through a district in the north part of Buenos Aires. At first it was thought that escaping gas had ignited in an apartment. But the explosion was extraordinarily violent. Apartments on seven floors and one below in the basement were completely destroyed, crashing in a heap of rubble. There were a number of dead and injured.

After the victims were cared for, city authorities brought in a bulldozer. Its blade hit some object and another explosion occurred. Experts then sifted through the rubble. They found 70 bombs, pistols, rifles, a radio transmitter, a number of topographical maps of areas in north-west Argentina and other equipment that guerrilla fighters ordinarily use. From further study, they concluded that the explosion had occurred in an apartment, one flight up. They estimated that probably between 150 and 250 kilos of explosives had been set off accidentally.

The police announced that four of the victims had been killed in the suspected apartment and that they were members of a guerrilla organization headed by Angel A. Bengochea, a former editor of Palabra Obrera, a well-known revolutionary-socialist periodical of Argentina.

The tragedy produced an immense sensation through the country. All the newspapers gave it front-page coverage, along with screaming headlines and pages of details. The Sunday magazine sections featured it in the most lurid way.

The police did not stop here, however. They raided homes of everyone suspected of belonging to the group. The newspapers were fed juicy details about the ramifications of the "Marxist conspiracy."

Within a few days a nation-wide witch-hunt had begun. The primary target, aside from Bengochea, who was rumored to have been killed, was the Palabra Obrera grouping and two of its leaders, Hugo M. Bressano and Ernesto Gonzalez.

On August 4, Nicolás Rodríguez, head of the federal police, issued a press release, listing a number of figures either formerly connected with Palabra Obrera (like Bengochea and the four victims of the explosion) or still active partisans of the socialist periodical. The newspapers gave this sensational coverage, running photographs of the many "fugitives from justice," who were said to have gone into hiding.

Palabra Obrera fought back vigorously. The day after the police chief's press release, Palabra Obrera made a public statement denying any connection whatsoever with either the explosion or those accused of being linked with it. What is involved, said Palabra Obrera, "is a typical maneuver of the repressive bodies to drag all the militants of the anti-imperialist left into incidents of this kind." The periodical pointed out that Bengochea had publicly resigned as its editor.

[Bengochea and his group, in fact, split from Palabra Obrera more than a year ago over the issue of guerrilla activities. The former editor of Palabra Obrera advocated "immediate direct action"; the majority of the grouping opposed guerrilla warfare or any other kind of violence if it involved isolated formations separated from the masses and the labor movement.]

The homes of Ernesto Gonzales and Hugo M. Bressano were raided by the police. The two filed a protest with the Ministry of the Interior. In the protest they again stated that they had no connection with either the explosion or those who died in it. They questioned the "evidence" found by the police, but said that if it proved to be substantiated, it would only show that those implicated had followed a "mistaken ideology and a completely erroneous political conception."

They added that they believed in taking full responsibility for one's political views and they therefore stated their own. Two points were as follows:

"At the end of the Peronist government, immediately after its fall, we were the only political sector that struggled against the coup d'état, and that declared it was necessary to create a workers militia against the forces of repression, both the 'gorillas' [top officer caste] and the Peronists due to their permanent antilabor and reactionary character.

"Unconditional defense for Socialist Cuba and Castroism as a movement of the new revolutionary Latin-American generation. We have

carried out this unconditional defense of Cuba and Castroism without slackening in the least although we consider the strategy of the Argentine Guevarists to be criminally wrong since they mechanically copy the guerrilla pattern of revolution and terrorism without at all taking into account the opinion and experience of the workers and the situation in each one of our countries."

While highly critical of the political views that led Bengochea and his group to split from Palabra Obrera, the periodical paid the four victims of the explosion the highest tribute.

Lazaro S. Feldman, 26, was married, had two children. He was "the most brilliant spokesman of the university vanguard" that broke from the capitalist-minded student movement and took up revolutionary socialism.

He was credited with bringing the student movement into connection with the trade-union movement of Argentina.

Until the time of the split, Palabra Obrera considered him "one of the most brilliant expounders of its line and programmatic positions."

"He could have enjoyed the advantages and income of an easy social position. He had no other ambition than that of struggling for the freedom of his country and the emancipation of its most oppressed sectors.

"In him could be seen the reflection of two almost parallel phenomena -- on the one hand the triumph of the Cuban Revolution through an original and highly successful method; and, on the other hand, a decline in the working-class and student struggles of his own country.

"Feldman's course and sacrifice thus symbolized the lack of understanding of a sector of the revolutionary vanguard which, separated from the real, concrete struggle of the working class, did not succeed in becoming integrated into the perspective of a new mobilization of the masses."

Hugo P. Santilli, 29, married, two children. He came to the forefront in the student upsurge of 1958. He gained his degree as a doctor of medicine while turning toward the working class and its struggles. For a time he was a truck driver.

An exceptional career was forecast for him as a doctor, but all his sympathies were with the poor to whom he offered all his talents, his medical abilities as well as his social vision.

Like Feldman, however, he could not wait in patience for the "rebirth of the labor and people's movement."

Raul Reig, 26, single, an engineering student. He decided to join the working class and took a job in a packing plant in Berisso. There he became an outstanding militant, active in the organization of union battles.

He was at his best in moments of intense activity. With a relative dip in the class struggle, he easily turned to methods which appeared more attractive than the difficult work of organizing a party deeply rooted in the masses.

Carlos Schiavello, 28, single, an engineering student. He was well known in the student movement as the head of the University Federation of La Plata.

During one of the great struggles in the country against the "gorillas," he succeeded in linking up his campus with the trade-union vanguard.

He was attracted to the socialist view and became a strong partisan of Palabra Obrera.

Like the other three, he became impatient over defeats suffered by the workers that slowed down the working-class movement and he decided to participate in trying to set up an "insurrectional center" that might help speed up things.

Despite its political differences with its four former partisans, Palabra Obrera declared that the working class, when it finally wins its victory, will scratch their names off the police blotter and place them in the history of the Argentine Revolution.

SILENCE ON HELL

Among the many crises facing humanity in the world today, one caught our special attention. In the first working day of the Vatican II Council's third session September 15, criticism was levelled on the failure to mention in the proposed draft of a holy document the possibility of one's going to hell after this life.

Perhaps the oversight is excusable. Modern civilization has established a hell in many parts of the globe. Thus millions of people are permitted to experience this variety of future life without first dying. This upset in the natural order of things raises doubt as to the validity of not a few theological doctrines.

In addition, another grave theological doubt has arisen due to recent scientific discoveries not anticipated in the Bible. Is it certain that hell would still be habitable in case a man-made nuclear war were carried through to its logical conclusion?

THE "GORILLAS" GRANT LAND REFORM IN ECUADOR

By Emmanuel Aguinaldo

The military junta of four "gorillas" [high-ranking officers] that has been governing the Republic of Ecuador for a little more than a year, celebrated its first anniversary in power by promulgating an Agrarian Reform Law. The president of the junta, navy commander Ramón Castro Jijón, said that the principal aim of the law was "to block Communism and demagogy from access to the peasant sector." He stressed that the government will oppose "any violent invasion of lands by peasants, deceived or misinformed, or led by tendentious actions." (Emphasis added.)

It is common knowledge that promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law, which is now being ballyhooed by the militarists, is part of the Alliance for Progress that has been unfolding in our countries of Latin America -- with outstanding lack of success, it must be said -- for exactly three years.

This Agrarian Law, moreover, is nothing but another of the many hoaxes which the oligarchies of Latin America have been pulling on our peoples under pretext of containing the advance of the social revolution. It is a genuine miracle for the Ecuadorian landholders, since it gives them the opportunity to own up to 3,500 hectares [one hectare = 2.47 acres] on the coast and up to 1,000 in the mountains. In order to determine the present status of land ownership, a census is scheduled. This will take . . . three years. Those latifundistas [big landholders] who offer plans for agricultural development within four years "will not be affected by the said law." In addition, "the bonds delivered to those whose land is expropriated are convertible. They can be redeemed through the acquisition of government properties and investments in farms or livestock approved by the Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization."

Sooner or later this palliative imposed by the State Department as a sop to the masses, had to come to the small South American republic. The fact that they had to deal with militarists rather than some member of the oligarchy did not bother the sanctimonious authors of the Alliance for Progress. The "gorillas" have never given the slightest indication of responsiveness to the profound wishes of the dispossessed. They have traditionally proved to be the most loyal servants of the oligarchs and the imperialists.

Consequently dictator Castro Jijón did not lie when he said that the main objective in promulgating the Agrarian Law was to keep the Communists away from the peasant sector.

It could not be otherwise. The Alliance for Progress itself was born under the same slogan: to keep the Communists away from all sectors of the national life. Not the Communists who follow the Kremlin line in every jot and tittle in accordance with its inter-

national interests, but the genuine revolutionary Marxists, who, with the reviving air that came from the Caribbean, have been trying in every possible way in all sectors of our continent to follow the Cuban example. In other words, the Alliance for Progress was created by Kennedy to contain Castroism. We doubt that it will succeed. The approaching revolution in Latin America cannot be contained by a hundred Alliances for Progress nor by the conversion of our countries into military barracks.

In addition, the Ecuadorian people have in neighboring Peru a terrifying example of an "agrarian reform" carried out by the Alliance for Progress in collaboration with the bourgeoisie. In Peru, the attempt to bring social and economic reforms into the countryside was transformed almost completely into a measure for colonizing eastern Peru (where the means of communication in this jungle area are so primitive that often to reach Iquitos, except by air, the whole continent must be circled to come up through the Amazon). The brutality of this "reform" is difficult to imagine. It involves trying to divide up inhospitable and unhealthy land among 5,000,000 Indians of the mountains who have lived from time immemorial in the areas where they were born. It is difficult for them to survive even the change in climate.

To think that the gentlemen landholders of the coast or mountains are going to give up "their" properties simply because a law has been passed is to believe in myths.

It is true that our rulers are ready to offer some land, but this involves only the marginal areas. In Ecuador, with the same social and economic characteristics as Peru, with 2,000,000 Indians constituting approximately forty-five per cent of the population, the same pattern is projected: the indigenous peasant will receive nothing more than he already has -- his miserable huasipungo.*

Thus it was not by chance that peasant militia were organized in the Cuzco region despite the agrarian reform laws, or that comunists have frequently invaded the lands of the gamonales [landholders], or that the main peasant leader has been imprisoned for more than a year. Nor is it by chance that the major Ecuadorian "gorilla," quite aware of the rotten core in his proffered reforms and knowing what happened in Peru, categorically declares that they will not permit "any violent invasion of lands by peasants, deceived or misinformed, or led by tendentious actions."

Castro Jijón knows very well that the promulgation of his

*Huasipungo: The landholder concedes to the Indian the temporary utilization of a small piece of land, a half hectare or perhaps up to two hectares of poor quality, generally without irrigation. In exchange for this, the Indian has to work in the fields of the landholder four days of the week for a daily salary of \$0.05 U.S.

Agrarian Reform Law gives nothing to the desperate, land-hungry peasants. But he also knows that the reformist gestures of the Alliance for Progress, despite their merely palliative character, arouse growing expectations that can be dangerous to the status quo. Hence the military dictatorship is compelled on the one hand to promise division of the land and, on the other, to warn that anyone trying it out will receive a bullet in the head.

What is happening in Peru and Ecuador must serve as an example to the other countries of the continent. It must help teach the dispossessed masses to realize that to gain ownership of the land on which they toil they have no recourse but to use the same methods employed by the "gorillas" against them. They can rely only on their own organized strength and their own initiative against the oligarchs and the militarists in their service.

JEUNES GARDES CARRY ON TRADITION OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL

In Brussels on September 6, some 50,000 workers, including several thousand socialists from other European countries, turned out for a parade in celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the First International. Unfortunately, this impressive demonstration was marred by a different kind of demonstration conceived by the reformist leadership of the Belgian Socialist party. They ordered police to remove from the ranks of the marchers 300 members of the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes [Young Socialist Guards of Belgium].

Among the "distinguished guests" on the official reviewing platform were such international celebrities as Harold Wilson, Guy Mollet, Willy Brandt, Giuseppe Saragat, etc. The top brass of the Belgian Social Democracy were embarrassed at having them see the placards and banners carried by the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes. Moreover, some of the slogans could have a "seditious" effect on the workers in the parade, who included many nationalities.

Among the "dangerous" slogans carried by the young Belgian socialists in accordance with their concept of the tradition of the First International were: "Let's Quit NATO." "Imperialists: Hands Off Congo, Vietnam, Cyprus!" "Workers Control." "The Factories to the Workers." "Tshombe Murderer." "Long Live Socialist Cuba!" "Solidarity with the Struggle of the American Negroes."

The Social Democratic brass at first tried to expel the Jeunes Gardes by ordering the parade's own "commissars" into action. But the youth stood their ground.

The red-faced fossils on the reviewing stand then decided to give the youth a lesson in the deeper mysteries of the Social Democracy. They called in the cops.

The police, however, were confused. They were quite familiar with the blue shirts and red ties of the Jeunes Gardes in innumerable former demonstrations. As for their slogans, they were not much different from those carried by the same youth in the May Day parade in the streets of Brussels. Finally, they had not been briefed on why they should intervene in what looked like an internal dispute among the paraders.

The general secretary of the Socialist party thereupon denounced the Jeunes Gardes as "Communist infiltrators." The police found this understandable, if not completely compelling, and joined in the fight to throw out the youth.

The young militants lost most of their banners and saw the seditious appeal "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" trampled underfoot by the bourgeois cops, a fitting climax to a demonstration in honor of the hundredth anniversary of the First International!

But they managed to close ranks repeatedly despite the assaults of police and commissars and went by the reviewing stand in a compact group, chanting the slogans inscribed on the banners that had been torn from their hands.

The national leaderships of the Jeunes Gardes and the Socialist Students Organization at once issued a sharp protest. This received wide publicity, being read over the radio.

Several trade unions and local sections of the Socialist party also lodged energetic protests.

The leadership of the Social Democratic machine now faces a bit of a problem. On the eve of municipal elections should they initiate disciplinary measures against the Jeunes Gardes? Or should they seek to smooth over this dirty business?

The daily paper of the Liege trade unions has come out strongly in favor of the Jeunes Gardes. This reflects the feelings of the crowds who watched the parade on September 6. Their applause was very warm for the youth who sought to continue the revolutionary spirit that inspired the First International.

LIKE SELLING SOFT SOAP?

Senator Goldwater has decided in mid campaign to change his public image for something more attractive. The advertising agency of Erwin Wasey, Ruthrauff & Ryan has been hired for the emergency work. Johnson's image, meanwhile, is being worked over by Doyle, Dane & Bernbach. Robert Kennedy is reported to have applied to Pappert, Koening & Lois for a similar packaging job.

THE KIDNAPPING OF DENNIS HIGGS

[The following statement was issued in Lusaka, Zambia, by the All-African Convention and the Unity Movement of South Africa. It concerns the sensational kidnapping in that city of Dennis Higgs, a former lecturer in mathematics at the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg for six years, who left South Africa last March as an opponent of the government's racist laws. In Zambia he married a South African Colored, a marriage forbidden in South Africa. When the kidnapers burst into the home, Mrs. Higgs locked herself in the bedroom.

[This was the second kidnapping within two weeks in British-administered territory. In the middle of August, Rosemary Wentzel, a South African who had settled in Swaziland, was abducted near her home. It was later reported that she had been "detained" under South Africa's fascist-type 90-day-detention law.

[Under heavy pressure from the British Foreign Office, the South African government agreed to return Dennis Higgs.]

* * *

On the morning of August 29, 1964, all Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and the rest of the civilized world were stunned by the shocking news that Mr. Dennis Higgs had vanished from his house the previous night, having been abducted by unknown persons. The facts of this outrageous incident are now a matter of common knowledge, but there are still some loose ends that have to be tied together.

We do not propose to deal with the more obvious questions:

(a) How and when did the kidnapers enter Zambia in the first instance?

(b) How did they know exactly where their victim lived?

(c) How did they manage to cross the border at least two hours after the first alarm had been raised?

(d) How did the kidnapers manage to go through all the check-points (presumably four of them) at the borders of Northern Rhodesia-Southern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia-South Africa, with their human loot in the car? It is not our task to deal with these matters, as they fall more appropriately within the ambit of police investigations.

What we are concerned with are:

(a) The behaviour of the Government of South Africa in this instance.

(b) The attitude of the South African Government towards its neighbouring African States.

(c) The relations between the South African Government and the gangsters trafficking in human flesh and operating within the South African soil and abroad.

(d) The public morality of the South African Government.

The striking feature of this villainous affair has been the attitude of the South African Government, which seemed more concerned with protecting its police force rather than the fate of a man who is known to have been brutalized by his kidnappers and the violation of the integrity of a neighbouring State. The South African Minister of Justice, Mr. J.B.Vorster, announced that Mr. Higgs was in the hands of his police. While pleading ignorance of the abduction and dissociating his Government and his police from it, he nevertheless announced that: "Mr. Higgs would be detained. . . and the British Government would be informed of the charges against him," and that extradition proceedings would be started against him. Thus Vorster behaves like a man who says: "I did not steal the sheep, but I will have the meat all the same."

We are informed that Mr. Higgs had been wanted by the South African police who conveniently found him bound and gagged in a combi [station wagon]. Mr. Higgs himself tells us that when the Special Branch man opened the door of the combi, he said: "Welcome back to South Africa." He was obviously not astounded to find a man whom the police knew to be in Northern Rhodesia delivered to them in this fashion. Clearly, these gangsters knew that Mr. Higgs was wanted by the police. The Minister of Justice revealed that an application for an extradition order was pending. The question is, how did these thugs know unless they are themselves members of the South African police force or are working in close collaboration with it?

As if to assure the gangsters that they have the protection of the South African Government, the Prime Minister himself announced that: "The onus of investigation of the alleged abduction rested with the Government of Northern Rhodesia or the British authorities, but not with South Africa."

Emboldened by the knowledge of this protection and in a clumsy attempt to cover up their own tracks, the gangsters now indulge in a game of mysterious telephone calls to the press. The one rushes to the call-box in Southern Rhodesia and proclaims to the Star of Johannesburg: "What we did to Higgs, Mrs. Rosemary Wentzel, we will do to all traitors who escape across the borders of South Africa. We will do it so that nobody will in future be able to prove that they were kidnapped." Another, who styles himself "leader" of this gang, using a call-box in South Africa, conducts a lengthy interview with the Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg). Inter alia he says: "In future

we won't hand these people to the police: we'll bump them off." Adding that his main purpose in phoning the press was to remove the impression that his gang was associated with the police, he said: "We have no association with the police. We are not from the Republic." He went on to explain that his gang was established in the three British Protectorates and consisted of a force dedicated to "fair play and punishment of saboteurs and others. . . who cannot be touched by the law."

These last words have a familiar ring, for as early as June 1963 we learned that a secret (underground) branch of the Security Police was about to be formed. Its function would be to liquidate all those opponents of the Government who could not be convicted by the law courts. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of this information for every bit of it has been proved to date. This was the story and circumstance: one of the loquacious young recruits was put onto an official of our organization. In order to gain the confidence of the official, he pretended to be interested in the organization and gratuitously offered information that could be verified. He said that a top-ranking officer in the Security Branch, notorious for his brutality in dealing with African politicians, would soon retire from the force. His retirement would be published in the newspapers, but this was only a cover. What was in fact going to happen was that the man would be seconded to a secret force, with the formation of which he was entrusted. It would be the duty of this force to hound, intimidate and, if necessary, liquidate, "all those opponents of the Government who could not be convicted by the courts of law." True enough, in time the press did announce the retirement of the high-ranking official, and now we are witnessing the process of "hounding, intimidating" and the threat of "liquidating."

Bush Morality

We have already referred to Dr. Verwoerd's equivocation on this matter, but what we find even more striking is the moral code propounded by a Prime Minister of a State. Dr. Verwoerd is not concerned with apprehending the culprits who perpetrate so heinous a crime against a human being: in fact he says it is not his business to do so, though he knows that the criminals are or were on the soil of South Africa at the time he made his statement. His main concern is to pat himself on the back for his high standard of morality. "There had been nothing," he said, "to compel South Africa to return Dennis Higgs to Northern Rhodesia, except our own moral sense and the Republic's respect for international usages." Continuing in this self-righteous way, he said: "We shall now see, irrespective of whether or not there is an extradition agreement, whether decency in international relationships is expected only from South Africa and not also from the other countries concerned."

But his vaunted sense of decency is not outraged by the brutal abduction of Mr. Higgs. It does not go against his moral grain when

a human being is treated like a wild beast. He is not revolted by the very idea that a citizen of another country has been subjected to humiliation and degrading treatment by gangsters in his own country.

A closer examination of the facts reveals the reasons for this strange species of morality. The Government of South Africa is caught on the horns of a dilemma. In its desperate attempts to silence criticism and to crush all opposition, it has abrogated the rule of law and instituted a police state. But now the police force, drunk with power, is running amuck, to the extent of even transgressing international or territorial boundaries. But the world holds the Government of South Africa responsible for these outrageous acts of its police force. There are unfortunately still international codes of behaviour. It is this dilemma that compels Verwoerd to mount his peculiar breed of moral horse.

Dawie, an authoritative columnist of a Verwoerdian party paper (Cape), expresses without equivocation the views of his party, the ruling party in South Africa. Let us quote him: ". . . there are countries in Africa where would-be saboteurs and guerilla fighters receive training, and, officially and openly we cannot get at them. If underground action is taken against them. . . then I refuse to be over-meticulous. Naturally counter-terrorist adventures can cause embarrassment for South Africa. . . . When this happens, we must express the necessary disapproval and make the necessary restitution. We must act correctly at all times. I do not think that South Africa's interests are served by encouraging the terrorist intriguers outside the country to believe that they can continue peacefully and undisturbed with their dirty work. I am not going to hinder unnecessarily anyone who wants to keep an eye on them and frighten them. Only if it is going to cause international difficulties for South Africa which will outweigh the advantages of his actions, will I have to say to him, 'Steady, old chap.'" (Our own emphasis.)

Now this is the clearest exposition of the public morality of the South African Government -- a bush morality.

The question still remains, why did they return Mr. Higgs? The truth of the matter is that Mr. Higgs is not a South African citizen and therefore could not be legally throttled or incarcerated and allowed to perish in their dungeons in terms of one or another of South Africa's inhuman laws. He is not a citizen of a weak Black State either. He is a citizen of a powerful State -- Britain -- which virtually controls South Africa itself. They therefore had no choice in the matter but to moralize and send him back.

Let there be no mistake about it. The Higgs incident, like the others before it, is not an exception nor an isolated episode. It flows from the fundamental position of a Government that considers that a Black man is sub-human. Thus it follows that any

State with an African Government is less than a State and therefore cannot be accorded the respect and dignity on a par with other states. In its own country the South African Government has devised a system for the legalized violation of the dignity and personal integrity of every Black man, woman or child, a system which has engendered an attitude of mind in the white population that regards the Black man as little more than an animal whose only function is to minister to the needs of the Master Race and who can be disposed of at will. It is this attitude of mind that enables the South African Government to release a reign of terror on the whole Black population without a serious protest from the White Master Race. It is the same attitude that makes it possible for the Government to imprison without trial, to sentence for life and to hang so many African people for no other reason than that they dared to ask for ordinary human rights in the country of their birth.

So long as South Africa is a White Police State, so long will it continue to violate the integrity of the African States. This is not merely a matter for those States bordering on South Africa, but is the concern of Africa as a whole. It is the concern, therefore, of the Organization of African Unity to which South African Herrenvolkism has become a real threat as the Congo incident has shown.

"WALL STREET JOURNAL" DOUBTS DR. PERERA CAN SUCCEED

An instructive analysis of the new coalition government in Ceylon, which includes three former Trotskyists headed by Dr. N.M. Perera, appeared in the September 8 issue of the Wall Street Journal. Sent from Colombo by correspondent Robert Keatley, the article is evidently based on information provided by top government circles.

The motive for the coalition is explained quite succinctly to readers of the well-known American capitalist newspaper. The "beleaguered" ruling Sri Lanka Freedom party of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike "hopes its new allies can bail it out of the political and economic morass into which it has led potentially prosperous Ceylon."

According to Keatley, "many critics have their doubts." That's on the economic side.

"Politically, however, the move already has paid off for the strong-willed Mrs. Bandaranaike, the once-reluctant prime minister who is now her party's undisputed boss. Taking on Trotskyite allies shattered an opposition coalition of Ceylon's half-dozen squabbling Marxist parties, which generally claim her socialism isn't radical enough. It also gives her a clear parliamentary majority. And it even split the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party itself; a splinter group criticizes LSSP leaders for 'collaborating with the bourgeoisie' rather than fomenting world revolution as preached by party

hero Leon Trotsky."

The Wall Street Journal notes that the "Fourth International, parent organization of the world's remaining Trotskyite parties, has expelled Ceylonese leaders for joining the local government rather than trying to destroy it."

Despite its cynical approach, the Wall Street Journal finds the "newly appointed Finance Minister Dr. N.M.Perera" a congenial figure. "Dr. Perera, called by many Ceylon's most capable economist, refutes the stereotype of Trotskyites as bearded bomb-throwers and pamphlet-printers who inhabit dark alleys in obscure capitals. Wealthy and British-educated, he is considered scrupulously honest, dedicated and hard-working, rare qualities among Ceylon's political leadership."

The Manhattan periodical quotes "one political authority" on Dr. Perera's political characteristics: "He is a gradualist, not a revolutionary."

The Wall Street Journal takes note of Dr. Perera's initial moves without much alarm although its own sympathies are with the far right in Ceylon. Here is what it says about the possibility of saving the SLFP regime:

"Whether the three new Marxist ministers can help Mrs. Bandaranaike bail the nation out of its economic mess seems doubtful. Many worried Ceylonese fear the country is moving from stagnation to rapid decline and see little prospect of reversing this trend soon. Foreign exchange reserves, at about \$80 million, are at a postwar low. Imports, ranging from factory spare parts to razor blades, have been sharply restricted, thus promoting a busy black market. Per capita income actually declined some 10% last year to about \$130 annually. And this agricultural nation must import half its rice needs despite underutilized farmland and rural unemployment."

Other problems of crisis proportions are noted. In a population of 11,000,000, some estimates "put unemployment at 800,000, though the government places the figure at only 160,000."

The "basic problem" in Ceylon is "disinvestment"; i.e., the allocation of export earnings to "consumption rather than basic agricultural and industrial projects." This includes rice imports, half of which are subsidized by the government. Another item is education, "free for everyone."

"Many doubt," says the Wall Street Journal, "whether Dr. Perera, whatever his intentions, could afford the political risks involved in trying to revise such programs. The ruling coalition must call national elections within a year and faces formidable competition from both the left and right."

THE TESTAMENT OF PALMIRO TOGLIATTI.

By Pierre Frank

The document that has been called the "political testament" of Palmiro Togliatti was drawn up by the late leader of the Italian Communist party in preparation for a discussion with Khrushchev. This discussion did not take place. The publication of the document by the party leadership has now opened a new stage in the international crisis of the official Communist movement.

Up to this time the public side of the crisis was most visible in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Chinese and the Russians, Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev, represent the two poles in the crisis. It was known, of course, that the two camps were not homogeneous. It was known that on the side of the pro-Khrushchevists the leaderships of some Communist parties systematically refrained from aping the French Communist party leadership, who, under Thorez, took their cues from the Kremlin. Knowledgeable observers of the Communist movement were certain that in the pro-Khrushchevist camp there was a wing that could be considered much more consistently rightist than Khrushchev himself. However, before Togliatti's document was published, the differences were visible only obliquely in the hauling and tugging over what tactics to follow in relation to the Chinese. It is probable that Togliatti wrote the memorandum for confidential use and would have reached some compromise with Khrushchev. But publication of the document, the wide circulation it will inevitably be given, the repercussions among the Communist parties -- all this creates a new situation, since the document goes far beyond a tactical disagreement with Khrushchev in the struggle against the Chinese Communist party. On some of the key issues in the current situation, this document offers a platform different from Khrushchev's. It represents the platform of a third tendency within the Communist parties.

Togliatti, it should be stated, carefully avoided presenting things in this way. He singled out for criticism merely the way in which the Chinese are being fought. But from this point of departure, he brought in a whole series of differences of prime importance.

"Polycentrism"

The first thing he places in question is the leading role of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, offering in its place -- although without employing the term -- "polycentrism," the concept he advocated for a time in 1956. He does this by contending that holding an international conference would be either useless or dangerous even if no danger existed of a formal split, and he proposes that regional conferences be held instead.

If in weighing the meaning of this proposal one also notes that he is against blanket condemnation of the Chinese (he repeats

several times that he is opposed to general condemnation and that he is for using concrete arguments), it becomes clear that what he seeks is to avoid any kind of debate over doctrines. It is to be noted, however, that he does condemn the Chinese on general issues and says absolutely nothing about their concrete policies in what, for him, is their sector.

It could even be concluded, to judge from certain sentences, that he does not share Khrushchev's perspective on the possibilities of an over-all deal with American imperialism: "It is with a certain pessimism that we evaluate the perspectives of the present situation on the international plane and in our country. The situation is worse than it was two or three years ago. . . "

His conclusion on this point is based on Khrushchev's own view; namely, that within the imperialist camp there are those who favor war and those who do not (in contrast to the Marxist view that imperialism as a whole generates war). But from his appreciation of the perspectives, which he himself characterizes as pessimistic, Togliatti deduces two things:

(a) That there must be no break with the Chinese in view of the potentiality of dangerous crises. On this point, Khrushchev's international policy leads one to think that his hope is to buy an agreement with imperialism, going so far as to pay for it in advance by breaking with the Chinese.

(b) That the Communist parties must follow a policy of liquidating "every form of dogmatism." The examples he cites show that his own political position is rightist to the core.

Warmed-Up Bernsteinism

He takes up first of all, and rather lengthily, the Communist parties in the capitalist countries of Western Europe. We will take up only what he says about the need to abandon atheistic propaganda and the need to open up a dialogue in all cultural fields. In reaction to Zhdanovism [extreme Stalinist policing of the cultural domain], he completely abandons the class viewpoint in the most important areas of the superstructure. He is for "mutual understanding." Such eclecticism is characteristic of all revisionists. But revisionism is openly proclaimed on the political level itself in Togliatti's document.

He recognizes that "the crisis of the bourgeois economic world is very profound," that "the ruling classes are no longer succeeding by traditional methods in resolving" the new problems that have arisen in the monopolistic structure of today. He sees the capitalists compelled to resort to a certain amount of "planning" (he uses the term "programming"). He notes that this implies "a substantial element" of "income policies." He observes that this interferes considerably with

trade-union struggles "which can no longer be conducted only in an isolated way, in each country." He condemns the World Federation of Trade Unions for conducting only general propoganda and not taking "any worthwhile initiative for united action against the policies of the big trusts."

But from all this does he conclude that the task of the Communist parties in the countries of western Europe is to open up a socialist perspective for the broad masses? That their task is to point to the real possibilities in these countries of the West to construct a socialist world on the basis of an economic and cultural level higher than that in the countries that have already broken out of capitalism? Does he propose to formulate a transition program including a series of ways and means capable of mobilizing the broad working masses for the conquest of power by a workers and peasants government? Does he say that western Europe is more than ripe for socialism? Not at all. Some quotations from the document will show exactly where he stands:

"This requires development and co-ordination of immediate labor demands and proposals to reform the economic structures (nationalizations, agrarian reforms, etc.) within the general framework of a plan of economic development in opposition to capitalist programming. This will certainly not yet be a socialist plan, because it lacks the conditions of such a plan, but it is a new form and a new means of struggle to advance socialism. The possibility of a peaceful road for this advance is strictly linked today with the understanding of and solution to this problem. . . .

"More profound reflection on the possibility of reaching socialism by a peaceful road compels us to define what democracy in a bourgeois state means for us. How can the frontiers of freedom and democratic institutions be widened, and what are the most effective forms for participation of the working and toiling masses in economic and political life? This is the way the question is posed on the possibility, for the working classes, to conquer positions of power within the framework of a state which has not changed its character of a bourgeois state, and on the possibility of struggling for progressive transformation, from within, of this character of a bourgeois state."

Thus Togliatti, unlike strictly obedient Stalinists of the Thorez stripe, raises the issue of the road to socialism under present conditions. He seeks to work out a plan, a kind of transition program, but it is not a plan to overthrow the bourgeois order. To do that, he says, "the conditions are lacking." This categorical affirmation is not proved. One would very much like to know what he considers these conditions to be. In particular, what conditions were lacking at the time of the Liberation, following World War II, when the Communist parties of France and Italy had behind them not only the great majority of the proletariat but also broad layers of the middle class and tens of thousands of armed workers.

The plan outlined by Togliatti is as follows: win "positions of power" within the framework of the bourgeois state, and struggle for its progressive transformation, from within, into a state of a different social character. What Togliatti claims to offer in a new situation -- this deepening and this development -- is nothing but a rehash of the old concepts advanced by Bernstein at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Bernstein envisaged socialism growing progressively in capitalist society with each gain of a legislative seat, municipal administration, establishment of a co-operative, etc. Today, posts in government bureaus of all kinds, operating in the interests of capitalism, are added. The conquest of these so-called "positions of power" is substituted for the conquest of power.

To tell the truth, Bernstein could offer greater excuse than Togliatti. Bernstein formulated his revisionism at the apogee of capitalism, after close to twenty-five years of prosperity, before the world had seen the development of a fundamental crisis in the system, whereas Togliatti voices his revisionism after a half century in which the capitalist system has given us ten years of world war, years of fascism, of unemployment of tens of millions of men, of revolutionary uprisings that have ended capitalism in a third of the globe. That is the time chosen by Togliatti to propose "progressive transformation" of the bourgeois state from within!

Can't See the Colonial Revolution

Togliatti's document is extremely succinct on the colonial revolution although it is today in the forefront of the world-wide revolutionary struggle. He proposes that the Communist parties of the West establish relations not only with the Communist parties of the colonial countries but also with "all the forces struggling for independence and against imperialism, and even, where this is possible, with government circles in the recently freed countries that have progressive governments." At the same time, he adds, "we must probe more deeply the problem of the roads of development for the former colonial countries, in the sense of the socialist objective for these countries, and so on. It is a question of new contentions that have not been clarified up to now."

On the first point, it is possible that Togliatti drew some conclusions from the attitude of the French Communist party during the war in Algeria or from the fact that many anti-imperialist struggles are developing outside of any Communist leadership. But his manner of speaking shows that he is not thinking in class terms. This is still clearer in his claim that problems concerning the socialist objective in these countries have not been clarified up to now.

It is impossible to believe that Togliatti has never read about the permanent revolution, whether in Marx's writings of 1850 or in

Trotsky's works or in recent Chinese texts. If the practical tasks in the underdeveloped countries are sometimes very difficult to carry out, it cannot be said that there is any ambiguity as to the socialist direction of development among the underdeveloped countries. What Togliatti writes on this subject testifies to his gradualist, Menshevik concept of the road to socialism. Here, too, he must think that "the conditions are lacking" as in the economically developed countries. However, the revolution moves forward. . .

In Togliatti's attitude, as it is expressed in the document, a contradiction is observable. He seeks to "deepen," to clarify new problems. But at the same time he bids Khrushchev not to take the discussion with the Chinese to a general level, but to concentrate instead on the "concrete":

"We have always won the best successes when the discussion shifted from the general level (character of imperialism and the state, motor forces of the revolution, etc.) to the concrete field of our current policy (struggle against the government, criticism of the Socialist party, trade-union unity, strikes, etc.). Here, the Chinese polemics remain completely disarmed and powerless."

The Menshevik reveals himself in his disdain for the "general" and his preference for the "concrete." What meaning is there in a "concrete" that finds no place in a general view? Such a "concrete" is a thousand times more abstract than the most simple Marxist theories. Why study Capital, the theory of value, surplus value, etc., all these "abstractions" that are not included in the pile of economic statistics? How can what is happening in the colonial revolutions be understood if you leave out the character of imperialism, the state, the motor forces of the colonial revolution, etc.?

Togliatti's "Ignorance"

With regard to both the economically developed capitalist countries and the colonial or former colonial countries, Togliatti's document constitutes a quite characteristic rightist platform. Class concepts are wiped out; and it is on a vague "progressiveness" that hopes are placed for humanity to move forward.

With regard to the workers states, Togliatti takes a different tack. It is quite true that he raises questions and criticisms which we are hardly accustomed to hear from these Communist leaders. But it must not be forgotten that this document was designed for a highly limited audience; it was a memorandum prepared for a discussion with Khrushchev and the exchange of opinions would most certainly have remained confidential if unforeseen circumstances had not occurred.* Togliatti thinks that the Chinese criticisms have no

*Khrushchev's representative Brezhnev, it has been reliably reported, was unable to get Luigi Longo, the new head of the Italian Communist

appeal in Italy except among poor peasants in certain regions. But he knows that questions have been raised within the working class at least since the time of the Twentieth Congress.

"The whole context of problems of the economic and political construction of socialism is too summarily and even too sketchily known in the West. We lack knowledge of the differences between the situations in the various countries, the different methods of planning and their progressive transformation, the methods adopted and the difficulties arising in the area of economic integration among the different countries, and so on. Certain situations are hard to understand. . . .

"It must not be concealed that the criticisms of Stalin left rather profound traces. The most serious is a certain amount of skepticism with which even elements quite close to us greet the news of new economic and political successes. In addition, it is generally thought that the problem of the origin of the cult of Stalin and the reason why the cult became possible has not been resolved. . . .

"There are many concrete facts we do not know. . . ."

That ordinary Communist militants are largely ignorant of the problems facing the workers states, that they raise a number of questions -- of this there can be no doubt. But for Togliatti to invoke such arguments is a little too much, even if it is taken into consideration that he resorted to a good deal of diplomacy with Khrushchev in broaching these questions. In addition, Togliatti shows that he knows more than he cares to admit when he says that research should be done on these questions by "historians and qualified cadres of the party" to which he adds: "Nevertheless we counsel prudence in the conclusions."

Prudence in the conclusions! Togliatti could be held to be a model of prudence: prudence toward Stalin for long years, prudence toward Khrushchev, prudence toward the Chinese. . . and also prudence toward the Italian bourgeois state, the Catholic church. It is understandable why the bourgeois world rendered homage to such a prudent "revolutionary" chief. . . .

The document, however, is of exceptional interest due to the fact that it raises a burning issue:

party, to keep Togliatti's document under wraps. It can be concluded that its publication was mainly due to the existence of divergent political tendencies in the Italian Communist party leadership who found common ground in opposing a conference aimed at condemning the Chinese. Out of fear of one of the others seeking some kind of advantage through revealing the existence of the document if it remained concealed, the entire leadership preferred to publish it.

"Today, the problem that draws the most attention with regard to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is most especially the problem of overcoming the regime of the limitation and abolition of democratic and personal liberties that was installed by Stalin. The socialist countries do not all offer the same picture. The general impression is slowness and resistance to returning to the Leninist rules which would assure, inside and outside the party, wide freedom of expression and debate in the fields of culture and art and even on the political plane. We do not understand this slowness and this resistance very well, above all if we take into account the present conditions where the encirclement of capitalism no longer exists and where economic construction has won immense successes.

The words "and even on the political plane" are rich -- as if in Lenin's day the party discussed culture and art most of the time and only occasionally took up political topics. Once again, Togliatti does not "understand." This may be evidence of his years of Stalinist servility or evidence of maneuvering with Khrushchev; however that may be, what is important is the admission that far from having returned to Leninist rules, the Soviet Union, that is, primarily the Soviet people, face resistance and obstacles on the road to regaining their liberties. The gradualism, the reformism of Togliatti in the sphere of the capitalist states and the colonial countries is replaced in the sphere of the workers states by "ignorance" of the bureaucracy as a social layer that gave rise to the cult of the personality yesterday and to resistance today to the real, deep-going democratization of Soviet society.

Consequences of Publishing the Testament

We leave aside a series of interesting points in Togliatti's document to single out its main nature: it is the platform of a political current that is to the right of the Stalinists and, accurately speaking, the successors of Stalin. But it is a very skilfully presented platform. Togliatti places the emphasis on the necessity to discuss all kinds of questions and problems -- those disturbing the great majority of Communist militants -- and he displays a certain prudence here, too, in presenting his answers to these questions, his solutions to these problems.

Togliatti's document is important not only for its political content but also for its timing in the crisis of the international Communist movement and for its possible repercussions.

Up to now, the rightist tendency whose views Togliatti voiced has refrained from publicly disclosing itself as a political current distinct from Khrushchevism. It placed pressure on Khrushchev to give his policies a more rightist character. It is not certain, after publication of the document, that this rightist tendency will now show itself more clearly and openly -- in the workers states there are persons who, because of the leading functions they fulfil, are not free to express themselves openly. But the publication of

the document will not fail to increase Khrushchev's difficulties and to weaken his position in preparing for the conference of twenty-six parties scheduled for mid December. The Italians and probably others who are with them will stand pat on Togliatti's document in order to keep their distance from the Moscow leadership.

The document will have repercussions among the leaderships of many Communist parties. After so many years of daily reformist politics, there is no lack among them of those who would like to be rid of a vocabulary still "encumbered" with vestiges of the period of Lenin and Trotsky. For them it is a godsend to be able to invoke the authority of a Togliatti, a veteran of that epoch.

It is not excluded that the Chinese themselves will seek to turn Togliatti's testament to account, since even in energetically condemning their positions he did not wish to break relations with them. In his document he proposed discussion, debates, etc., and rejected a conference involving a split. The Chinese are not in disagreement with such a proposal. And while they have even denounced the preparatory conference scheduled for December, they could perhaps shift on this point in hope of putting over this position.

Widening of Discussion

But much more important than the possible consequences among the Communist leaders are the repercussions that publication of the document will inevitably have among the rank and file of the Communist parties. Among them, the rightist solutions proposed in Togliatti's document will have far less impact than the questions he raises and his demand to discuss them. At a time when the Sino-Soviet discussion has lost attractiveness, becoming repetitious, Togliatti's document can revive the discussion, bringing in a new viewpoint and presenting things in a new light, above all by emphasizing the need for a discussion.

This desire for a genuine discussion -- which Togliatti sensed and which he asked Khrushchev to take into account in order to keep control of the movement -- will be encouraged by the publication of what Togliatti said. All the militants who want to liquidate Stalinism -- whether they stand on the right or the left, or whether they are still far from having made up their minds -- will utilize the document to ask for a wide debate which no conference called under present conditions could terminate.

Togliatti says: "Every party must. . . learn how to proceed in autonomous fashion. Party autonomy, which we firmly stand for, is not only an internal necessity of our movement but an essential condition for our development under present conditions. We would therefore oppose any idea of creating a new centralized international organization."

To go by the declarations of all the leaders of the Communist

parties, no differences are apparent on this point. But differences do exist in practice because the Soviet leadership, even in the absence of any formal organization, holds that the Communist parties should line up in accordance with its views as in the past. The Chinese challenge guidance from the Soviet leadership because of its policies. As for Togliatti, it is because he wanted to emphasize in Italy the "national" character of his party that he opposed a conference which, even if it did not create a formal organization, could force the Italian Communist party to follow a line of conduct which it rejected on some points.

The real problem is not the one posed by Togliatti. Naturally it is impossible to conceive of a genuinely revolutionary party that could not stand on its own feet. Revolutionary Marxists have never defended the creation or existence of an International in order to eliminate the need for qualified national leaderships and to substitute for them an international super general staff. They support an International because even on a national scale action cannot be determined except in relation to international perspectives and orientation. These can be elaborated only by an International that is both democratic and centralized.

This Marxist concept is among those that have been obscured by the decades of monolithic bureaucratic practices of Stalinism. While not a few revolutionary Marxist concepts have begun to be revived in the current crisis, the issue of the International still remains buried under the rubbish of confusion engendered by Stalinism. In addition, the slogan of "socialism in one country" which served the Soviet bureaucracy in destroying the Communist International has now turned against Moscow. Each Communist party leadership demands autonomy, while seeking to impose monolithism in their own party. An international conference that could settle the current crisis would presuppose capacity to immediately create a mass revolutionary Marxist International. The situation is far from that. What is essential at present is to widen the discussion to the maximum, to involve the cadres still absorbed by the issues, to permit the tendencies to express themselves within each party, to bring in the views of revolutionary Marxist opposition currents, above all the Trotskyists, the Fourth International, which has not only worked out answers that are already old to the questions associated with the origin of the cult of Stalin but has also made a contribution toward solving current problems which both the Chinese and Russians recognize with fear as can be seen from their polemics in recent months.

Communist militants anxious to find a way out of the crisis affecting their movement will energetically pick up the proposal in Togliatti's document for a prolonged discussion and overturn the Kremlin's projected scheme. Togliatti's document shows that the discussion not only has not come to an end, it is only in its opening stage.

WHY MOSCOW PUBLISHED TOGLIATTI'S "TESTAMENT"

The publication of Togliatti's "testament" September 4 by the leadership of the Italian Communist party was an important event in the crisis raging among the official Communist parties. Pravda's publication of the same document on September 10 was likewise of first-rate significance.

It is known that Khrushchev's representative Brezhnev, who went to Italy to attend the funeral services for the late leader of the Italian Communist party, argued with Togliatti's political heirs for several days not to publish the text but to keep the whole thing secret. The same sources report that the "testament" itself was written by Togliatti after a hot argument with Brezhnev from which the Italian Communist party leader emerged deeply disturbed. Whatever may be the accuracy of these reports circulating in the Italian Communist party, Brezhnev's position accorded with the interests of the Kremlin group, as viewed at first sight, and Khrushchev's decision to publish the text as a "lesser evil," was evidently reached only after considerable reflection.

Is there any internal source of pressure in the Soviet Union that sought publication of the document in Pravda? On this, one can only speculate. On the international level, however, it is not difficult to find compelling reasons for the move.

Khrushchev decided to hold an international conference which would inevitably end with a pronouncement on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Suslov, Khrushchev's leading spokesman in such matters, demanded flat condemnation of the Chinese. But the Soviet declaration convoking the preparatory conference of twenty-six parties in mid December did not go as far as Suslov's report. It stated that there was no intention of condemning the Chinese there. Nevertheless, the preparatory conference clearly faces many difficulties. The Chinese and the four or five parties that agree with them will not be present. Four or five others may not participate. Now the "testament" of Togliatti has been tossed in, announcing that the Italian Communist party will go to the preparatory conference in order to argue for a point of view that places in question whether it will accept a world conference in 1965.

Khrushchev is thus caught up in an enterprise in which his prestige is at stake. To evade publishing Togliatti's final words only a few days after eulogizing the man at his funeral, would in fact constitute a rebuff to the friendly stance of the Italian Communist party and risk closing the door to any compromise. Khrushchev also had to take into account the fact that this "testament" is most certainly regarded favorably by not a few Communist party leaderships. He also had to weigh the fact that however opposed to the Chinese position Togliatti was, his document is not without its advantages to the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. It substantiates the accusations of revisionism while at the same time opposing

convocation of a conference in 1965. By publishing Togliatti's document in Pravda, Khrushchev had to cede to several thrusts which he would have preferred to side step by pretending complete ignorance of their existence.

To a certain degree, he therefore had to make a virtue of necessity. But Khrushchev, it should not be forgotten, has a side that reveals a player willing at times to take high risks. Under the circumstances, for reasons pertaining directly to the international crisis of Stalinism, the readers of Pravda learn that Togliatti raised questions on the origin of the cult of the personality of Stalin, on the hesitations and resistances to de-Stalinization, on the new contradictions appearing in the camp of the workers states, etc., and that Togliatti himself posed the need for public discussion of all these questions. No matter how prudent Togliatti's formulations were, this is not at all an ordinary occurrence for the Soviet public. On the contrary!

It is still too early to judge the repercussions in the Soviet Union. It is quite probable in a society that has been deprived so long from experiencing free confrontation of views, that it will take time to have visible effect. But whatever the Soviet leaders do to soften the impact, their efforts will be in vain. There is no comparison between the men and their "testaments," but a gauge does exist to show how times have changed and with this the capacities of the bureaucracy. Lenin's "testament" remained hidden for almost forty years. Its possession or circulation meant at least deportation. Twenty days after Togliatti's death, his "testament" appeared in Pravda.

What happened with regard to Togliatti's "testament" shows that the leaders of the Communist parties, no matter how powerful they may appear, are no longer able to contain the crisis shaking their parties. Incidents of all kinds upset their calculations and plans. Discussion is engendered by the very force of the most revolutionary situation the world has ever seen. Bureaucratic authorities and bureaucratic means are destined to fail. Maneuvers fail along with repression. The complete liquidation of Stalinism is on the agenda.