1.	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF UTAH
3	CENTRAL DIVISION
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5	INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF )
6	UNITED WORKER'S UNION, et al., )
7	Plaintiffs, )
8	vs. ) CASE NO. 2:04-CV-901DB
9	UNITED MINE WORKERS OF )
10	AMERICA, et al.,
11	Defendants. )
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14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEE BENSON
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17	February 17, 2006
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22	Motion Hearing
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1	February 17, 2006 10:00 a.m.
2	PROCEEDINGS
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4	THE COURT: Good morning.
5	We're here in International Association of United
6	Workers Union and others against United Mine Workers of America
7	and others. This is 04-CV-901. Could I ask those attorneys
8	who are here to state your name and who you represent so we'll
9	have it straight on the record.
10	Begin over here since there are fewer of you.
11	Mr. Hansen.
12	MR. HANSEN: Mark Hansen representing the I.A.U.W.A.
13	and its officers.
14	MR. KINGSTON: Carl Kingston representing C.W. Mining
15	Company and its officers.
16	MR. HANSEN: Also, Your Honor, for purposes of this
17	hearing Mr. Kingston has asked me to present arguments on
18	behalf of all of the plaintiffs.
19	THE COURT: Thank you.
20	MR. HUNT: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeff Hunt and
21	David Reymann on behalf of the Deseret Morning News.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Hunt and Mr. Reymann?
23	MR. REYMANN: Yes.
24	THE COURT: Great.
25	MR. O'BRIEN: Mike O'Brien on behalf of the Salt Lake

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1	Tribune and its employees.
2	MR. DRYER: Randy Dryer and Mike Petrogeorge on
3	behalf of The Militant.
4	THE COURT: Mr. Petrogeorge's first name?
5	MR. PETROGEORGE: Mike.
6	THE COURT: Right.
7	MS. RIVLIN: Judith Rivlin representing the United
8	Mine Workers and a number of individual named officers and
9	employees of the union.
10	THE COURT: Judith
11	MS. RIVLIN: Rivlin, R-i-v-l-i-n.
12	MR. ROSENBLATT: Richard Rosenblatt representing the
13	individual miner defendants.
14	MR. SANDACK: Your Honor, Arthur Sandack, local
15	counsel for the United Mine Workers and also for the individual
16	miners. I also represent them on a motion to quash from Local
17	8286.
18	THE COURT: Thank you.
19	MR. HATCH: Joseph Hatch representing Jobs With
20	Justice and their officer, George Neckel.
21	THE COURT: Why are you behind the bar there?
22	MR. HATCH: It is just too crowded. We felt a little
23	isolated way over there. It is better to see you from here.
24	THE COURT: You can sit up here, whichever is your
25	preference.

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1	MR. HATCH: If you want us to. It your preference.
2	THE COURT: I don't care. My preference is your
3	preference. Your preference is my preference.
4	MR. SANDACK: We have a better view from here.
5	THE COURT: You like it there better. You can sit
6	over there with these guys.
. 7	MR. HATCH: No thanks.
8	THE COURT: Anyone else who wants to make an
9	appearance? No. All right.
10	I have a lot before me. Do you have some order that
11	you had in mind?
12	MR. HUNT: Your Honor, counsel for the defendants
13	have met and agreed upon what we believe to be an orderly
14	presentation, and that is because the newspaper defendants
15	present a set of discrete issues, to have the newspaper
16	defendants go first and then have the union and the workers and
17	then Jobs With Justice counsel go after us.
18	THE COURT: And as between the newspapers, do you
19	have an order?
20	MR. HUNT: We do.
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. HUNT: I will be proceeding first and splitting
23	my time with Mr. O'Brien, and we'll be covering the
24	consolidated motion to dismiss of the Deseret Morning News and

the Tribune, and Mr. Dryer will follow us representing The

Militant.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUNT: May it please the Court and counsel, Your Honor, this is the third time the plaintiffs have reframed their pleadings in an attempt to state defamation claims against the media defendants. After the last motion hearing the Court allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint that eliminated statements that were based on attributed statements, and as to the remaining statements, to explain why they are defamatory. In response, the plaintiffs have abandoned the vast majority of the statements that they previously relied upon in attempting to state claims for defamation against both the Morning News and the Tribune.

Although the claims are now shorter, they are no less meritorious. The Tribune and the Deseret Morning News have renewed their motion to dismiss on the same six legal grounds that we asserted in our first motion, and I'm going to address two of those and Mr. O'Brien will address the remaining issues.

The areas that I'm going to cover, Your Honor, are lack of defamatory meaning and protected opinion. I'm going to do that in the context of the news publications themselves. As to defamatory meaning, I'm not going to recite the law in this area because it is in the briefs and we covered it at the last hearing, but, simply stated, whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law for this

Court and is a threshold hurdle that the plaintiffs need to overcome to state a claim. The context is very important when you're looking at defamatory meaning. To be actionable the statement must be capable of defamatory meaning, and the context of the specific article that is alleged to contain the defamatory statement, and then also in the broader social context of the dispute.

Here the broader social context is a contentious labor dispute at the Co-op Mine. In the Linn case and in the other cases the United States Supreme Court and other courts have recognized that when you're dealing with a contentious labor dispute or a political debate, they frequently contain contentious and inflammatory accusations, hyperbole, rhetoric and conflicting characterizations of the same event. That is what we have here, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the remaining claims in this case against the Morning News and the Tribune have been whittled down to nine Tribune publications and five Morning News publications.

Just to give the Court some idea of how those fall in terms of opinions and news articles, of the nine Tribune publications, seven are news articles, one is an opinion column, one is an editorial. Of the five Deseret Morning News publications, three are articles, news articles, one is an opinion column and one is an editorial.

Now, as to the Tribune's news articles, the seven

news articles, one of those news articles is a story. identified as T-2 or Tribune 2 in the plaintiff's second amended complaint. That is a publication I think you can take ! off the deck here this morning because it is an attributed statement, a statement that is alleged to have been defamatory in T-2, which is an October 12th, 2003 article by Mike Burrell of the Salt Lake Tribune. The statement that is alleged to be defamatory is a quote from Corey Hilton. The quote is, it kind of makes you mad that somebody could abuse people that badly. That is what the plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges to be defamatory in that article. It is attributed to Corey Hilton, who in the second amended complaint is identified as a Salt Lake Tribune reporter. He is not a Salt Lake Tribune reporter, he is chairman of the Building and Trades Organizing Project and is identified as so in the article. So it is a misidentification of the alleged defamer and it is a mis-attributed statement and the plaintiffs have abandoned their claims for attributed statements.

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Your Honor, as to the remaining articles, we don't have the time and there are a lot of counsel that need to speak here this morning, so what I would like to do is focus on the primary statements relied on by the plaintiffs to state a claim for defamation, and give the Court a couple of examples that illustrate the lack of defamatory meaning and the protected opinion status of those statements in the context of the

articles themselves.

I think we should start out with the primary statement that the plaintiffs rely on to state claims against the Morning News and the Tribune, and that is that the miners were fired and locked out. That appears repeatedly in the stories and in the editorials and in the opinion columns and in the allegations. First, there are three problems with that statement being capable of sustaining defamatory meaning. One, plaintiffs never explained how reporting that an employer fired someone defames the employer. It might be possible to defame an employee by falsely reporting that the employee was fired, but that is not the claim here. The claim here is that we have defamed the employer by saying that the employer has fired or locked out these miners. That meaning is not the same.

Second, Your Honor, in the context of this labor dispute the question of whether these miners were fired or quit for protesting unsafe working conditions is so typical in labor disputes that it can't contain defamatory meaning as a matter of law. That is the kind of thing that is at issue here. The miners claim that they were fired and the owners claim they quit. They have a difference of opinion about that. When read in the context of the stories that we'll get to in a minute, it is clear that what is being reported is both the miners' version of that event and the owner's version of that event.

So when read in context, that statement to a

reasonable reader reading that would not convey a defamatory meaning, because they would say, well, this is a labor dispute and the miners say they are fired and the owners say they walked out.

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Now, what the plaintiffs say in response to that is, well, you need to read those statements as implying defamatory facts, that the owners fired the mine workers for illegally engaging in protected union activity, and they claim that that is what is really defamatory. Well, those defamatory facts are never spelled out in the complaint or in the articles themselves. It is clear when you read the articles, Your Honor, and I'm going to give you two example here in a minute, it is clear that when you read it in context that is an implication, and the implication that the plaintiffs want you to draw, is not the one that the newspapers are implying. newspapers are not the ones implying that these workers were fired for engaging in protected union activity. Rather, when we report that information, that is the assertion and the allegation being made by the mine workers that that is what is going on here.

Just to give you two examples of that -- if I could approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUNT: This is what we're talking about. If you look at these two news articles from the Deseret Morning News

and one from the Tribune, they are talking about the miners planning to return to their jobs. If you look at the Deseret News article first, Your Honor, the highlighted language, the language that is highlighted in yellow is what the plaintiffs claim in their second amended complaint is defamatory. That is the same with the Tribune. The red is what I have underlined, and that provides the context.

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If you look at this, the highlighted language that is alleged to have been defamatory is that the miners are returning to their jobs after being fired. Essentially that is what that language says. What the plaintiffs do not say in their second amended complaint is the context. They omit the language that appears immediately following, which attributes the statements. If you read at the beginning there of the underlined portion, they were fired after contacting the United Mine Workers about getting a union organized at the mine, comma, said Alyson Kennedy, a member of the strikers leadership community. We want safer working conditions, better pay and benefits. In my opinion, no coal miner should have to work for minimum wage, Kennedy said.

Now, that makes it clear that this is the contention of the mine workers, that they were fired. To just pluck out, as they have done repeatedly in these stories, and say this is defamatory because you said they were fired when they actually quit, that is not what the law requires the Court to do, and

that is not the kind of analysis that is required. You need to read the article as a whole.

Just as a matter of fairness, and my colleague Mr. O'Brien will get to this, but if you look at the bottom of the page where it says John Kingston, and that is the Deseret Morning News reporting the Kingstons' version of what happened here. It says, John Kingston has said previously that the 74 miners fired last September staged an illegal lockout. A phone call to the Kingstons went unanswered. That is the type of reporting that is replete throughout these articles.

There are other examples. The Tribune July 3rd, 2004 article is the same sort of thing. You can look at it right there. That is the other article that I have handed to the Court. The highlighted language says that the miners were fired, but then you go right there to the underlined language, which is not included in the second amended complaint, and it is the attribution to Bill Estrada, the miner who claims they were fired. He, Bill Estrada, said that the settlement reached Thursday through the National Labor Relations Board validated what the miners had been saying all long, colon, that the Kingstons fired them illegally. That is attributed to one of the miners.

So a reasonable reader reading this language that has been plucked out in an isolated form in the second amended complaint would understand that the Kingstons say they walked

out and the miners say that they were fired for engaging in protected activity.

I have also underlined the other language there because I think it shows the balance that has been shown in these articles. It says there that the miners say that the I.A.U.W. is a yellow dog or company run union. But Benson said that the N.L.R.B. did not gather sufficient evidence to support that allegation. The calls to the mining company Friday were not immediately returned, but the company has maintained Estrada was fired for insubordination after having been caught falsifying a safety inspection record. They are reporting both sides of the debate.

The second ground that I will speak to, Your Honor, is opinion. That is the other ground that we believe that most of these allegedly defamatory statements are protected. To state a claim for defamation you have to have a statement of fact. Statements of fact are objectively verifiable.

Expressions of opinion are not. This requirement derives not only from the common law but from the Utah State Constitution, Article One, and the United States Constitution, the First Amendment.

THE COURT: Tell me as a matter of procedure why this is appropriate under a 12(b)(6) motion. Aren't you asking me to engage in a whole lot of fact-finding here, and reading the underlying statements and deciding whether they are capable of

containing defamatory content? You're requiring me to read every article and put it in context, and now you're saying secondly that you have got to look at these at this stage of things and decide whether it is an opinion or not? 12(b)(6) is a simple statement, a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and is this appropriate at this stage? Shouldn't we wait? Why are you fighting so hard to dismiss the claim as opposed to moving for something like judgment on the pleadings or something?

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MR. HUNT: There are two reasons, Your Honor. One is that we have to deal with the complaint that has been drafted, and originally it was a shotgun approach and we have gone through three iterations now. We have narrowed it down to not that many statements, five news articles for the Deseret News and nine for the Tribune, so I think it is a manageable number of statements.

THE COURT: Tell me procedurally why.

MR. HUNT: Procedurally --

THE COURT: If someone accused you of negligence, you would start at the first of the process and say, well, with bare bones pleading they have accused you of negligence, and as soon as you started asking the Court to analyze the facts underlying that claim of negligence, you would be beyond the pleadings and you would be into some new ground, whether we analyze it after full blown what we call now discovery, or

right at the outset, and I'm just wondering because
procedurally this does not make perfect sense to me. It does
not.

MR. HUNT: It may be because of the First Amendment interests that are at issue here. We have cited the Court to cases --

THE COURT: Well, there is no First Amendment right to defame.

MR. HUNT: There is not.

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THE COURT: No. So I don't know that I see --

MR. HUNT: But courts have --

THE COURT: Does the First Amendment change the Rules of Civil Procedure?

MR. HUNT: No, but courts have said that claims that implicate the First Amendment should be given very close scrutiny at the pleading stage. If the plaintiffs can't meet the simple burden of coming forward and showing facts, pleading facts that state a claim for defamation, then the Court should dismiss it. We are seeking nothing more than that. We are just asking that --

THE COURT: Well, they say that they have stated a claim. They say this has defamed them by holding them up to public ridicule and that it is focused precisely on the kinds of things that defamation cases focus on. It has effected their there reputation, it exposes them to public hatred and

contempt or ridicule by what you said.

You're now saying, Judge, we want you to analyze everything that they complain about, and we're going to have you analyze it critically and carefully in context, and that does not seem like a pleading stage sort of -- it does not procedurally strike me as being appropriate under 12(b)(6).

The last time we were here the problem was, in my view, and as I ordered, a complaint that was so imprecise and overly done and overly broad that it didn't give you a clear understanding, I thought, of what you were being sued for. So many items were listed that it was a shotgun approach. Now they have distilled it and you still want it thrown out for failure to state a claim. Well, they have stated a claim. The claim is defamation. You want to say, well, because of some First Amendment considerations we are supposed to sort this all out now at the 12(b)(6) stage of things.

I don't know that it would go up on appeal, but I am wondering what an appellate court would say. You have to reach these issues sooner or later in the process. I am just wondering if you are not putting the cart before the horse, so to speak, and why you want to do it this way. Why do you want to push so hard it get it thrown out on this procedural ground?

MR. HUNT: We want to push this way because we believe they have not stated a claim for defamation.

THE COURT: Only by examining the underlying

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statements, and by underlying statements, statements from which they claim the defamatory meaning comes. The only way that you can have me do that is by reading all the surrounding articles and to get it in what you call the context and then argue that it is opinion versus fact. That is requiring quite a bit of the Court beyond just looking at the pleadings and saying, oh, no, this is what we typically do in 12(b)(6) matters.

MR. HUNT: But, Your Honor, the pleadings incorporate the articles and you can't escape from looking at the articles. They pull words out of the articles and say this is defamatory. So to understand whether those words are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning, which is the standard, you need to look at what is in front of them and what is behind them. That is all I am asking the Court to do.

THE COURT: Well, if you can tell me how you so nicely slice that line, and we are into examining facts and making some kind of a determination that is a mixture of fact and law. Is it capable of defaming? That is not what we usually think of when we look at a complaint and a claim in a complaint and ask whether it is capable of sustaining litigation to go forward. I don't see how anyone could argue that this is a mixed issue.

MR. HUNT: It is not a --

THE COURT: By the very argument that this is incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is asking the

Court to do an analysis of the underlying cause of action. Somebody smarter than me can figure out, I guess, whether something didn't defame as opposed to not being capable of carrying defamatory meaning, and I am sure there is a difference, but it is slight.

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, I respectfully disagree that the issue of whether the statements is capable of sustaining defamatory meaning is a mixed question of law and fact. It is not. It is clearly a question of law. We have cited numerous cases in our briefs that make that abundantly clear.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that you need to disagree with me. They may say it is a question of law, meaning it is a question for the Court, but is it appropriate to be considered at a procedural stage like this?

MR. HUNT: Yes.

THE COURT: If anyone tells me that there is not a mixture of fact in what this is being called, I disagree with. It is impossible to call it purely legal. It is only by assessing the facts and the factual context that you can decide an issue such as whether something is capable of carrying defamatory meaning. I will never buy that one, that it is purely some legal issue.

It is an examination of facts. Fine, that the courts want to call it a question of law, it is really only saying it is a matter for the Court, and I am happy with that, but it

almost begs my initial question. Why then do we do that under a Rule 12(b)(6) proceeding as opposed to saying, okay, well, they filed their complaint, now let's dismiss it, and your argument would be that it should be dismissed on the basis that what they have sued us for is not capable of carrying defamatory meaning. We are not on a procedural issue of failure to state a claim, we are into a consideration of the underlying articles. I'm really asking a procedural question. It is their first line of defense as against your motion to dismiss.

MR. HUNT: But, Your Honor --

THE COURT: It is still not clear to me.

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, the law can't be, and isn't, that you can never dismiss defamation claims at the 12(b)(6) stage. If it were --

THE COURT: I am not suggesting that, Mr. Hunt, not at all. Why in this case?

MR. HUNT: I'm trying to explain why. That is because the statements themselves are either protected opinions or not capable of sustaining defamatory meaning. That is our position. Our position is that the Court can reach that legal conclusion by looking at the statements in the context of the articles themselves.

If the Court feels that that cannot be done without taking evidence or having discovery or being decided on a

1 summary judgment basis, then that is where we are going.

THE COURT: I at no time said that that can't be done without taking evidence or going through discovery or turning it into summary judgment. You're reading far too much into what I'm saying. I don't think you're listening to my question.

Go ahead.

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MR. HUNT: Well, I apologize, Your Honor. I thought the question was why should this Court decide this at the 12(b)(6) stage.

THE COURT: No. I am in no way suggesting that we have to go into full blown discovery.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  HUNT: My response is because that is what is required to --

THE COURT: I have heard your response.

Go on.

MR. HUNT: The other basis, Your Honor, is the opinion defense, and that is that statements of opinion are not actionable in defamation, and we have cited the Court to the opinion column of Mr. Wharton and Ms. Cortez, as well as the editorials which we believe, read in context, that those opinion columns and editorials which clearly signal to the reader that these are opinions and not statements of fact, and make those statements not capable of defamatory meaning and are protected opinion and, therefore, cannot state a claim for

1 defamation. 2 THE COURT: You think I can do that without making a 3 determination of fact whether people reading those would see those as opinions or statements of fact? You're asking me to 4 5 do that, and that is not asking the Court to engage in a 6 factual determination? MR. HUNT: We think that the Court can decide, reading that, whether it is a protected opinion or a statement 8 9 of fact and you can do that at the pleading stage, yes. 10 THE COURT: But without my making a determination of 11 fact? 12 MR. HUNT: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: How? 14 MR. HUNT: Because that is a conclusion of law 15 whether --16 THE COURT: We are back to the same question. 17 I do that? I have to read them and decide --18 MR. HUNT: That is true. 19 -- what a reader would think. THE COURT: Is it Mr. 20 Wharton? 21 MR. HUNT: Yes, Mr. Tom Wharton. 22 THE COURT: Is Mr. Wharton expressing an opinion or 23 is he expressing a fact? We are back to the same question. 24 cannot see how that does not require of me a determination, is

it a factual opinion or is it a statement of fact?

MR. HUNT: I quess --

THE COURT: I am not saying that it is a question of law that the Court gets to decide because the courts have said it is a question of law, and it goes back to my same question, why do that at the 12(b)(6) stage. Okay.

Go on.

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MR. HUNT: I think I have concluded, Your Honor.

I would just say that the position is that the Court, reading the language and giving those words their ordinary meaning, that a reasonable reader would give to those words in the context of the articles, is a decision for the Court whether that could sustain defamatory meaning and can be decided at the pleading stage.

THE COURT: Well, what do I use to make such a decision? Am I suddenly endowed with great powers of understanding of human nature and what people would take from a sentence?

MR. HUNT: No.

THE COURT: Am I that well trained?

MR. HUNT: No, Your Honor. It is just a reasonable reader standard.

THE COURT: How do I know what a reasonable reader would think? Do I rely on my life's experience?

MR. HUNT: I believe so. The Court would look at the language and in the context in which it appears and ask whether

that language is capable of sustaining defamatory meaning to the reasonable reader, bringing your life experience and whatever else you would bring to that question. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hunt. Mr. Hansen. 

MR. HANSEN: I hope the Court will bear with me a little bit this morning. I think I'm outnumbered here. I will be the first one to --

THE COURT: Well, that is because you sued so many people.

MR. HANSEN: That is because so many people did so many wrong things.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HANSEN: I admit I'm no Judge Boyce, so with that admission, on the defamation claim it only takes one defamatory statement to make it a defamation claim. Even if the Court threw out, and if there were six articles or 60 articles and five of them or 59 of them were found not to be defamatory, the Court would have to go through each and every statement in each and every article to find out if a single statement is capable of being defamatory. So we have a basis for a defamation claim.

Here we really are on a 12(b)(6) motion. Does the

complaint state a claim for defamation? Mr. Dryer argued only two points, are the statements capable of defamatory meaning, and --

THE COURT: Mr. Hunt.

MR. HANSEN: Mr. Hunt. I'm sorry.

Are the statements factual or solely an opinion? You can't determine whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning just by looking at a single statement. I agree, and I think Mr. Hunt said this and if so I agree, that you do have to look at the statements in context and you do have to look at the entire article. You have to look at the article as a whole, which is why I think it is kind of an artificial construct to require in the complaint that we just look to an article that may be five or six pages long and pull out one or two or three or ten statements and say that these are the defamatory statements.

Those statement do have to be taken and considered in context, and that does go beyond the scope of the complaint, and it does require a factual analysis not only of the statements themselves but the context in which they are made, which requires the Court to go into facts that are not alleged in the complaint. It is going to require a lot of discovery in this matter to get all of those things resolved, Your Honor.

Is a statement capable of defamatory meaning? For that we need to look at what are defamatory meanings. We are

dealing with state law here, and the principle as stated in the cases that I have cited, particularly West versus Thompson

Newspaper, the Utah Supreme Court case, the guiding principle in defamation is, does the statement have the tendency to injure the reputation in the eyes of its audience? If a statement tends to injure the reputation and the statement is false, then that is defamation and that is all we need to show. That is all that we need to allege and we have alleged that.

The question is whether a publication might be considered defamatory by a reasonable person. Mr. Hunt has said this is a question of law. I think it is a mixed question of fact and law. The complaint does allege that certain individuals who have not been sued upon reading the statements, and the kind of statements alleged in the complaint as being defamatory, have come forward with statements of their own, wherein they have concluded from hearing those statements that the plaintiffs had done certain inappropriate things. In other words, actual reasonable people have heard those statements and have come forward with statements to the effect that the reputations of the plaintiffs have been injured in their eyes.

We have people that have been reported by these same newspaper people as having heard those statements and having concluded that the plaintiffs' reputations have been injured in fact, and how is it possible that those statements are not capable of defamatory meaning? They are capable because they

have resulted in defamation and they have resulted in injury. The only other thing we need to prove is that those statements that injured the reputation were false as far as the newspapers are concerned. There is an additional hurdle that we need to overcome as far as the statements by the U.M.W.A., and that is the mine workers, the people that are actually involved in the labor dispute, and the newspapers are not involved in that dispute. Certainly where individuals that have heard those statements have imputed a defamatory meaning to us, then they are capable of defamatory meaning.

For one example, I would agree that mere statements that certain workers were fired or locked out may not be defamatory. But if you say a worker was fired and locked out for trying to organize a union, that is imputing unlawful conduct and that is defamatory if it is not true.

THE COURT: Tell me your best, and I know that is qualitative, but tell me your best allegation of a defamatory statement by either the Deseret News or the Salt Lake Tribune, where either of those publications defamed one of your clients. Tell me exactly, if you can, and I know I'm putting you on the spot, but you have narrowed it down now to only a few articles as to each of these papers, but pick one and tell me what was said and why you claim it is defamatory and who it defamed. That would be very helpful to me.

MR. HANSEN: The Desert Morning News, and I don't

have the exact cite to the news article here, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, we are going to need that.

MR. HANSEN: Okay.

THE COURT: It is sort of rug cutting time here, so to speak, so tell me what they said and why it is defamatory or capable of defamatory meaning, and let's use Mr. Hunt's phrasing, and tell me who it defamed. Who, as in the people.

I have your amended complaint here right in front of me, second amended complaint.

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

THE COURT: This is a test to see if you have one. Because I have read every one of these articles, and if I'm entitled to do what Mr. Hunt seems to think that I'm entitled to do at this stage of things, I am going to throw the whole thing out. I cannot read these based on my life's experience and find any way that any reasonable person could believe that one of these two -- and Mr. Dryer has a tougher case -- that one of these two newspapers could be accused reasonably of defaming anybody connected with your clients.

I have read every word of every article. I am not sure why I am doing it in a 12(b)(6) motion, as I hammered Mr. Hunt on, but I have. So help me out here. Where do they say something? Usually when people get defamed they have some basis for alleging it because they know their reputation has been hurt and they know, or at least they feel strongly that

way, and they know what evidence they have to support it. It is that this person said X and it has really caused me to be held up to ridicule or my financial situation has plummeted. I wish they had not said that lie about me.

Let's give it a go.

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MR. HANSEN: Let's look at paragraph 173, the Deseret Morning News article of July 8th, 2004. It is written as an editorial, but the title is Victory, First Step For Miners.

THE COURT: Okay. Your paragraph 173?

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

This one is I think a good one because it is written as an editorial, but it also covers his fact versus opinion kind of a question.

THE COURT: Do you think it is a good one because it is an editorial?

MR. HANSEN: I think it is a good one to talk about. It is a part of our complaint, and so it is something that we need to address and we may as well do it here.

THE COURT: Great, but I have asked you for your best one. Wouldn't you go with a news story as opposed to an editorial? An editorial is going to be endowed with a fair amount of good argument that it is expressing opinion. It is on the editorial page. I could take judicial notice that we look at editorials in newspapers differently than we look at news stories.

1 That is true. MR. HANSEN: 2 THE COURT: Okay. We are here on a 12(b)(6) motion with 3 MR. HANSEN: all the --4 5 I have got you. Let's go with that. THE COURT: 6 MR. HANSEN: Let's go with that one. 7 THE COURT: They have given me copies of these 8 articles in Exhibits A and B to Mr. O'Brien's and Mr. Hunt's 9 memorandum, so we can refer to the actual article if you want 10 to. It is D-10, I think. 11 MR. HANSEN: Yes. 12 THE COURT: Okay. I have it right here. 13 MR. HANSEN: Maybe I ought to pull it out. 14 THE COURT: Victory Is First Step For Miners is the 15 way that the editorial is headlined. Okay. Show me in there 16 where you think somebody among your clients has been defamed. 17 Is it the second line? The miners, most of them Mexican 18 nationals, were fired from their jobs last fall for attempting 19 to organize a union to address poor pay and mine safety issues. 20 Is that the part that you feel is clearly defamatory, or at 21 least that you allege is defamatory? 22 MR. HANSEN: I am trying to find the article right 23 now, because I do want to look at the article rather than the 24 complaint.

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Yes.

THE COURT:

1 It is in Exhibit B to their memorandum, if that 2 It probably does. Mr. O'Brien can hand it to you. helps. 3 MR. HANSEN: Okay. THE COURT: 4 Yes. 5 Okay. The miners, most of them Mexican MR. HANSEN: 6 nationals, were fired from their jobs last fall for attempting 7 to organize a union. That statement is not attributed to 8 anvone. That is an affirmative statement in the article. What it is saying is that C.W. Mining Company and its managers 9 10 engaged in activity that is prohibited under federal law. 11 THE COURT: Well, it does not say that. It does not 12 tell the reader anything about this being activity that is 13 prohibited under federal law. It just says they were fired for 14 attempting to organize a union. 15 MR. HANSEN: Yes. 16 THE COURT: You think that is defamatory because you 17 didn't fire them for that reason? 18 MR. HANSEN: You can't fire someone for attempting to 19 organize a union. 20 Not that you can't; did you? You claim THE COURT: 21 you did not, correct? You claim the mine did not fire them for 22 that reason? 23 MR. HANSEN: That is right. That is a false 24 statement. We contend that a reasonable person could read that

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statement and find that C.W. Mining and its managers'

1 reputations were injured as a result of that statement.

THE COURT: I guess this reasonable reader wouldn't read the next paragraph?

MR. HANSEN: The next paragraph begins with, the National Labor Relation Board has said the mine owners fired the miners illegally. That is also a false statement. The N.L.R.B. has never said any such thing.

The N.L.R.B. said that the miners should be reinstated. They have never said any such thing.

THE COURT: Well, didn't the settlement indicate a reinstatement?

MR. HANSEN: The settlement concluded --

THE COURT: Didn't it involve a reinstatement of the miners?

MR. HANSEN: Yes, but it was completely voluntary. It was not the N.L.R.B. The reason for reinstating the miners is not set forth anywhere in the complaint and it is not set forth anywhere in the news article. That has not been disclosed by C.W. Mining Company. My understanding, and I don't represent C.W. Mining Company, but from my understanding, and I can't testify because I am not privy to it, but I think the evidence is going to show that these 75 workers left their jobs, and they were lobbying for a union organizational vote, and C.W. Mining Company thought that if they offered these people their jobs most of them would not come back to work, and

that would disqualify those that didn't come back to work from 1 2 being able to vote. Now, here we are getting into facts that may be 3 capable of proof, but they are not alleged in the complaint and 4 they are not set out anywhere in the articles, so we are 5 getting into factual issues that go well beyond the 12(b)(6) 6 7 motion. To finish our little exercise, tell me THE COURT: 8 who this defamed. 9 MR. HANSEN: That would be C.W. Mining Company and 10 its lead management that would have been responsible for the 11 decision to fire these people if, in fact, they were fired. 12 THE COURT: But they were not. 13 They were not. MR. HANSEN: 14 Who is it in the community now that is 15 THE COURT: being held up to public ridicule or whose reputations have been 16 damaged by this? Are you equating all false statements in an 17 editorial with defamation? 18 MR. HANSEN: There may be false statements that are 19 20 not defamatory. But you claim that this one is THE COURT: 21 22 defamatory? The N.L.R.B. said that the mine MR. HANSEN: Yes. 23 24 owners had fired the miners illegally.

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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HANSEN: Yes. 1 Why is that defamatory? I'm just THE COURT: 2 wondering. What is your theory? 3 Because the statement is a statement MR. HANSEN: 4 that the federal government has already determined that the 5 firings were illegal. The firings were not illegal. If the 6 firings were illegal that would injure the mine's reputation, 7 in that they were engaged in illegal activity against the 8 That is the statement that is injurious to a 9 workers. company's reputation, that they are engaging in illegal 10 activity. 11 And that these persons have named how THE COURT: 12 many people among the officials of this mine that have suffered 13 the loss of reputation? 14 MR. HANSEN: Now we are getting into the group 15 defamation, and that is another issue, but --16 I am just asking a simple question about THE COURT: 17 who you believe is suffering, I guess daily, a loss of 18 reputation in the community in which they live because --19 At the very least it would have been MR. HANSEN: 20 Charles Reynolds, who was the mine manager. He would have been 21 ultimately responsible for the firings. So Mr. Reynolds in 22

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particular.

THE COURT: Where does he live?

MR. HANSEN: The mine is located in Bear Canyon,

which is an offshoot off of Huntington Canyon. I am not sure if Mr. Reynolds actually lives in Bear Canyon, because there is another group of people that work and live in Trail Canyon that is about --He lives close to the mine?

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THE COURT:

MR. HANSEN: He lives within a mile of the mine itself, yes.

THE COURT: He lives in a community with the Kingston clan, does he?

MR. HANSEN: I don't know if there are Kingstons down there or not. Most of the people that actually work at the mine are not Kingstons.

THE COURT: I'm trying to think of the community in which his reputation is suffering. The general notion is that the Kingston group is quite -- and I am not meaning to be pejorative at all here -- but somewhat clannish and that they sort of stick together and live together. So where is it that he is walking around being defamed? People in his own community I'm assuming have a high regard for him. Maybe I'm assuming too much, but do you have evidence to show that his reputation has been hurt in the community in which he has any participation?

MR. HANSEN: We have not deposed people in Huntington, Your Honor. We can't do that.

> THE COURT: But you made a claim and you have to have

facts to support a claim. If you say he has been defamed you have to have something under Rule 11 or you can't file a lawsuit. Maybe you can go flesh out more if you want to take all these depositions, but lawsuits are still based on some factual predicate when we bring them.

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So what information, I'm just wondering, did you have behind this allegation that he was defamed?

MR. HANSEN: Well, the facts that we have at this point are those that are set out in the complaint of other publications.

on itself? We have the miners making accusations, and if this is the way society works, we are just going to have an endless stream of defamation cases in court. People make accusations about someone else and if they are false, if they turn out to be false, that person against whom they were made has a defamation claim and that is it. We better hire more judges.

You're referring now to your complaint?

MR. HANSEN: Yes. The specific things that we have are --

THE COURT: Specific to Mr. Reynolds.

MR. HANSEN: There, Your Honor, again, I don't know that anybody has named him by name, but they have talked about people that have overheard these statements and that have come back and said that the people who are running the mine and the

owners and managers are evil people and that they are exploitive.

THE COURT: It does not say that the mine managers are evil people. It says that the National Labor Relations

Board has said that the mine owners fired the miners illegally.

That is the phrase we are going from.

MR. HANSEN: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't think that says anyone is evil.

MR. HANSEN: Well, it does not say it there, but if you look at paragraph 195 of the complaint, there are other statements that have been published attributing to people who have read these types of statement that show the results of these statements on the reputation of the plaintiffs in the eyes of the public.

THE COURT: Just out of curiosity, and while we are in the middle of this and, Mr. Hunt, you may not know, and I hope I am not being unfair to either of you for asking you to get too technical here today, but he is claiming that the statement that is made in this editorial, quote, the National Labor Relations Board has said that the mine owners fired the miners illegally, unquote, is not true, and that the National Labor Relations Board never did that. They never said that.

Do you know what your client's defense is to just an accusation about whether that is false or true?

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, I think that there is a

distinction there. I don't know that it matters for defamation purposes, but I think what happened is that there was a charge of unfair labor practices filed that alleged that, and then the N.L.R.B. got involved and there was a settlement between the parties, a voluntary settlement, that allowed the reinstatement and the ability to get backpay. That fact is reported in the editorial, the second to the last paragraph, and it reports that it was a settlement.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. HUNT: And there was a non-admission clause, which meant that the mine did not admit to any unfair labor practices. That is probably a more accurate statement of what happened.

THE COURT: I have gotten you off your outline I'm sure, Mr. Hansen. I think you have answered my question. You can say whatever else you want to say in response to Mr. Hunt.

MR. HANSEN: Okay. I would point to one thing that you have said, Your Honor, and the idea of the nature of this group, and you're obviously looking at something that is beyond the pleadings or even the memoranda here. You appear to be looking to things that you are aware of by other news articles. In other words, we are getting into things that are well beyond the pleadings and that are well beyond the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. That is what we are here on right now is the 12(b)(6) motion.

Essentially what the newspapers are asking the Court to do is substitute its reason for that of a jury, and to sit here and say I don't think any reasonable person reading these things could possibly find that the reputations of any of the plaintiffs were injured in their minds. I don't think the Court is in a position to do that at this stage of the proceedings.

Again, to the extent that what they are arguing are defenses, we have pointed out in our memorandum that defenses that are beyond the scope of the complaint itself is beyond the scope of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to begin with, and that the proper thing to do in the case is to raise those defenses and if you think you have those, file a motion for summary judgment, otherwise let's have a Rule 26(f) conference and do our exchanges and get into it.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Hansen.

Mr. Hunt, do you have any response to what Mr. Hansen has said that you want to make?

MR. HUNT: Briefly on the procedural issue, Your Honor. If Your Honor wishes, you can convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(c). If the Court wants to do that it has the authority to do that. We believe that the law is that the Court can consider the articles themselves in the record as part of the pleadings, and we have cited the

Court to the Tenth Circuit case in our footnote one, the G.F.F. Corp. case, Tenth Circuit, 1997. It makes it clear that if the plaintiffs refer to an article it becomes a part of the pleadings and it does not move us beyond a motion to dismiss.

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I would just mention that as to the procedural issue. THE COURT: Right.

I don't think there is any -- well, not think, there is no question about that. They are referred to specifically in the complaint and they may be considered in determining whether Rule 12(b)(6) has been satisfied, whether a claim upon which relief can be granted has been made. My issue has never been with that. I can certainly consider all of the things referred to directly in the complaint and those related to it which, as I have indicated, I have done.

My question is, again, one of procedure primarily.

If from your point of view you want the Court to take advantage of the Court's opportunity to decide these things in a manner that has been stated by the Court to be an issue of law for the Court, then I am just wondering if it wouldn't be more sustainable, if there is not a more sustainable method than packaging it under Rule 12(b)(6).

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, you may be right about that.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I am right. I just know that I'm reading the West case from the Utah Supreme Court, and they, in a defamation case, and this is language

that Mr. Hansen has provided, and they phrase it, first, could a reasonable fact finder conclude that the underlying statement conveys the allegedly defamatory implication?

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Second, if so, is the implication sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proven true or false? These get so close to questions of fact, and that is what is of some concern to me. In your brief you refer me, and I didn't take the time, and maybe I should have, to read the one case you refer me to from the Northern District of California, although it is a District Court like me opining on the issue, I suppose, and you say other Federal District courts have considered and enforced the neutral reporting privilege when it was raised in a motion to dismiss.

Maybe I should go read Barry versus Time, Inc., a 1981 case.

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, I think a much more pertinent case and more on point is the Mast versus Overson case, which is a Utah case, Utah Court of Appeals, 1998, where the Utah Court of Appeals sustained on a motion to dismiss defamation claims that were asserted by Mast against Overson. That was done at the 12(b)(6) stage. That involved a number of very caustic statements such as that the plaintiffs were politically motivated, mean spirited and a sham, and that they engaged in character assassination, that they made statements that were rife with misstatements and bare faced lies, and a number of

1 | very tough caustic statements.

The trial judge there looked at that on the basis of all of the contents of the statements and asked, are the statements capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning to the reasonable reader in the context of this political dispute, which was the Mast/Overson dispute, and in the context of the article the court said no.

THE COURT: I take it that that involves statements made by the participants in the dispute?

MR. HUNT: That is correct.

THE COURT: Do you have a case, and there is never a case exactly on point, and lawyers look for them, but that involves a publication whose article does not attribute statements to those individuals who were involved in the fracas, but that has some sentences that are just statements of fact without attribution, and that those are considered covered by this anything goes in a labor fight sort of rule of law?

MR. HUNT: I think the West case is pretty close,
Your Honor. That was a case that dealt with an opinion column,
and maybe Mr. Dryer could speak to it because I think he had
some involvement in it, but I don't know that those statements
were attributed. That may not be on all fours with what we
have here.

THE COURT: Well, did West get thrown out on a motion to dismiss?

MR. HUNT: I don't know that it did. I think it was a summary judgment case.

THE COURT: Which gets us back into this area that I have been --

MR. HUNT: Judge, I suggest if the Court is troubled by that that the Court could convert the motion to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this then. If we did that, is there a way to do that without opening up this matter to considerable and massive discovery?

MR. HUNT: It does open the door unless the Court -unless there is material that is outside of the pleadings that
the Court is going to consider that would be determinative to
the Court in making that defamatory meaning protected opinion
decision. I can't think of anything off the top of my head,
but it probably does open the door to discovery.

THE COURT: We have parallels in other areas of the law, and I think there is an arguable parallel in patent law with claims construction hearings, and you don't open things up all the way but you do have a little additional opportunity for receiving evidence.

Qualified immunity gets us into this same box sometimes. We don't want a person who is entitled to qualified immunity to be required to run the entire gamut of the litigation experience and that is why qualified immunity

exists. It does get discussed and decided earlier than someone who is required to ride the entire ride all the way up to what is a typical summary judgment proceeding.

I will freely admit that I am just wondering about an appellate court looking at this and saying, well, why was this thrown out at the 12(b)(6) stage? I am being very candid about it.

MR. HUNT: I understand that. The analog, I guess, in the defamation field would be to open discovery for the limited purpose of establishing whether the plaintiff is a public figure or public official. Some courts have opened up discovery for that purpose. We have not brought that kind of motion, because that kind of motion typically requires some discovery, unless they have pleaded sufficient facts.

In this case, Your Honor, I don't know that it works that well, because what we are claiming to be the legal deficiencies really are the words themselves taken in the context of the articles as not being capable of defamatory meaning and being protected opinions. So I don't know that the opening up the narrow vein of discovery on those issues would help.

THE COURT: It is a bit of a head scratcher for me. He wants to say, or he does say, and they have said in the complaint, that this did open people up to defamation. It did hurt their reputations and standing and held them up to public

ridicule. It seems like clearly the facts to support that are extremely limited in terms of being announced in anything. But that is where some would argue we are with our notice pleading rules.

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MR. HUNT: Well, Your Honor, on the issue of whether they pleaded facts that establish injury to reputation, if you look at 195 it is all the statements that are being made by the defendants.

THE COURT: That is why I said it does sort of turn it --

MR. HUNT: It does not seem to me to be facts that really show injury to reputation caused by the statements they claimed were defamatory.

THE COURT: Well, in his first one, if you look at 195, it makes some argument for what he is saying. As I recall, the very first one is a gentleman, David Brown, of P.A.C.E. Local 758 said, and then he makes a statement about this being a basic struggle for basic human rights, and that the co-op miners are denied the basic rights to live and survive. The Kingstons are taking advantage of these miners. Then from that they want to argue that the plaintiffs, whoever they are, their reputations were injured in the eyes of Mr. Brown. Of course, the link between where Mr. Brown got that from and --

MR. HUNT: That is the problem.