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The 'Gorillas' Strike a Blow for Imperialism

THE COUP IN CHILE

by the Editors

Ernesto Gonzalez:

A March to Disaster on the 'Peaceful Road'

also:

The East St. Louis Massacre by Dr. E. Alex Swan

correspondence

This column is open to all viewpoints on subjects of interest to our readers. Please keep your letters brief. Where necessary they will be abridged. Please indicate if your name may be used or if you prefer initials instead.

On the Vietnamese CP

George Johnson and Fred Feldman's article ["On the Nature of the Vietnamese Communist Party," July-August *ISR*] is, as it purports to be, an important contribution to the debate on the nature of the Vietnamese CP, the Indochinese revolution, and more generally, the nature of Stalinism. However, it fails to answer the key questions, and confuses rather than clarifies the issues.

The central and most crucial theoretical question is avoided rather than answered, and the *practical* aspects of it are not even addressed. What kind of support should revolutionary Marxists, both in Vietnam and internationally, give to the leadership of that revolution? At one point the article states: "The support of revolutionary Marxists for the Vietnamese people, *including their current leaders*, against U. S. imperialism is unconditional." (p. 5, my emphasis.) Later they say, "When, following Hitler's rise to power in 1933, . . . the Trotskyists decided that the Stalinist parties were irredeemable [a strangely confusing word for a Marxist to use—M. H.] and began to build the Fourth International." (p. 9)

For an article intending to clarify the political issues, the *practical conclusions* for revolutionists are difficult to find. Should revolutionists give the kind of critical support to the VCP that we give even to national bourgeoisies in their anti-imperialist struggles? Should Marx-

ists denounce the VCP as "irredeemable" and call for its overthrow and the construction of a Trotskyist party? Isn't the first a strange way to regard the leadership of a socialist revolution, and isn't the latter a thinly disguised third-camp position symptomatic of Stalinophobia similar to the Shachtmanites?

Is it indeed Rousset who uncritically accepts the VCP's word? Isn't it Johnson and Feldman who subjectively analyze the VCP; isn't it they who condemn the theories of the VCP while refusing to acknowledge that the VCP has *objectively* broken with these theories through the dynamics of the struggle? And if they have not broken with these theories *in practice*, J and F have a lot of explaining to do about how these theories can lead to the establishment of a workers' state. Or are we to extend Gerry Healy's analysis of the Cuban revolution and deny that the dictatorship of the proletariat exists in North Vietnam?

Revolutionary Marxists *must* answer these questions *clearly*, for the debate is not just an intellectual one, it has crucial practical aspects for Marxists around the world.

M. H.
Cincinnati, Ohio

George Johnson and Fred Feldman reply: Reader M. H. charges us with avoiding practical conclusions in our article in the July-August *ISR*. To the contrary, we discussed the tasks for revolutionists at some length. Internationally, we emphasized the task of supporting the Vietnamese revolution by mobilizing mass opposition to the attacks on Indochina by U. S. imperialism.

We explained, however, that the VCP leaders are *not* carrying out a

To our readers

This issue of the *ISR*, with special coverage of the events in Chile, is an example of the timeliness that we strive to provide for our subscribers. (To make room for the Chile article, we are holding over Part Two of Dick Roberts' reply to the *Guardian's* attack on Trotskyism for our November issue.)

The *International Socialist Review* began a subscription drive for 2,500 new readers on September 1. The drive will last until November 30. Subscriptions are beginning to come in from all over the country.

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Michael Lux
Business Manager

revolutionary-socialist program. In South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia they are exerting themselves to keep the struggle within bourgeois-democratic bounds. They are against measures such as land seizures, factory nationalizations, and workers' control, despite the fact that these anticapitalist measures flow naturally from such a deep-going mass revolutionary struggle.

In North Vietnam, we explained that socialist democracy would have to be achieved through a struggle against the bureaucratic practices of the VCP leaders. We noted the harm done to the Vietnamese revolution by the failure of these leaders to tell the truth to the masses about the recent compromise forced

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The Coup in Chile

The coup d'etat of September 11 in Chile, replacing the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) government headed by Salvador Allende with a military junta vowing to "exterminate Marxism," represents a tragic setback for the Chilean revolution, for the Latin American peoples, and for the world working class as a whole.

For three years Chile was governed by a multiclass coalition whose main base of support was in the mass political parties of the workers' movement, the Communist and the Socialist Party. The Chilean president purported to be, and was widely hailed as, a Marxist. His government's goal, as perceived by supporters and enemies alike, was supposedly to traverse a peaceful road to socialism through constitutional means. A number of important economic and political reforms were implemented by the Allende regime, including a series of significant nationalizations of U.S. industrial concerns; the granting of political asylum to left-wing exiles from all over Latin America; and the recognition of Cuba. The majority of the country's workers, as well as many of the poorest peasants and others of the most oppressed segments of Chilean society, looked to the Unidad Popular government as "their" government.

The right-wing military chiefs who deposed Allende have unleashed a vicious repression against his supporters. Thousands of workers, peasants, rank-and-file soldiers

and sailors, and students have been arrested and an unknown number killed. The thousands of Brazilian, Uruguayan, Bolivian, and other political exiles in Chile have been ordered to turn themselves in to the police. Central junta leader General Augusto Pinochet's call for purging the country of "undesirable elements" was directed at these exiles, and threatens them with deportation to the prisons, torture chambers, and firing squads. They now face in Chile the horrors they escaped from in their native lands.

In the final analysis—there can be no doubt—the violent overthrow of the constitutionally elected Allende regime was the evil offspring of the international criminals headquartered in Washington, D. C. The Watergate gang had made no secret of its abhorrence of the left-leaning Chilean government from the day of its inception in late 1970.

Powerful U.S. corporations, coordinated by their capitalist government, campaigned long and hard for Allende's downfall. International Telephone and Telegraph was caught red-handed engaging in conspiratorial activities in Chile in concert with the American embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency. Kennecott Copper, in a more public effort, led an international drive to legally block the delivery of Chilean copper to the world's ports. The U.S. government quietly organized what the Chileans recognized to be an "invisible blockade" that bottled up the Chilean economy. World developmental agencies, ostensibly "international" bodies but effectively under American control, closed their doors to Chile. These maneuvers contributed heavily to the economic crisis that was crowned by the coup d'etat.

At the same time, U.S. strategists

pursued another angle: "The United States, which has consistently turned down Chilean requests for foodstuff imports and credits for transport and industrial materiel, has *doubled its military aid* to Chile. . . . A Washington source close to the discussions said the Nixon administration was putting no roadblocks in the path of Chile's requests for additional tanks and other weapons." (*Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 1972. Emphasis added.) Nixon consciously established and nourished the symbiotic relationship between Washington and the Chilean military chiefs that led to the counterrevolution of September 11.

The primary responsibility of North American revolutionists at this juncture is to expose the complicity of the U.S. government in the coup. In conjunction with this, a worldwide campaign must be built to defend the Brazilian and other exiles in Chile who are facing repression at the hands of the junta. Among these is Hugo Blanco, the Peruvian revolutionist who was saved from a death sentence in Peru several years ago by an effective international protest campaign.

Until the working class wins state power in the United States, American imperialism will continue to play its insidious counterrevolutionary role throughout the world. But recognizing that reality and opposing its manifestations by no means exhausts the responsibilities of revolutionary socialists in analyzing the setback in Chile. Virtually every worker, peasant, and left-wing student in Chile was well aware that U.S. imperialism was their principal enemy. They knew that Washington set the trap in which they now find themselves. The essential lesson to be drawn now, however, is that they were led into that trap by those they

trusted: the Unidad Popular, and the Communist and Socialist parties.

The reformist perspective of a social transformation by parliamentary means is not a road to socialism, but a roadblock that derailed the workers' drive to power. By attempting to restrict the revolutionary process to the boundaries of bourgeois legality, the Unidad Popular made it impossible for the workers and peasants to defend and extend the gains they had made. The UP's policies tied their hands, prevented them from preparing an adequate self-defense, and assured their defeat in advance.

Most flagrant in this regard was the UP's attitude toward the armed forces. In the string of escalating crises beginning in December 1971, Allende's standard opening gambit in response to right-wing-instigated civil strife was to call out the army and declare martial law. In October 1972 he upped the ante by bringing the country's top military leaders into his cabinet, thus investing them with the full authority of the Unidad Popular government.

The UP, with the Communist Party in the forefront, justified the promilitary policies by promoting the idea that the "nonpolitical" Chilean officer corps would defend the workers' interests by upholding the constitutionally elected government. Here these "Marxists" clearly discarded one of Marxism's most fundamental tenets: that the armed forces of a bourgeois state are constituted solely for the defense of capitalist interests *against* the workers. The September 11 coup in Chile has, in a tragic way, added fresh verification to this Marxist axiom. The bankruptcy of a "Marxist" president attempting to appease the military is illustrated by the fact that just two weeks before the coup Allende appointed General Pinochet commander in chief of the Chilean army. He put the wolf in charge of the flock.

From the first anti-imperialist re-

forms of the UP, the bourgeoisie set itself on a course of paralyzing and finally overthrowing the Allende government. The only possible defense of the reforms already made and the only hope of extending them to socialist measures lay in mobilizing and arming the workers and poor peasants against their natural enemies. Instead, in order to keep the "revolution" legal and respectable, the Communist Party above all sought to hold the workers in check while granting concession after concession to the army and the Christian Democrats.

The projection of a *peaceful, electoral* road to socialism was deemed necessary to win the support of the "middle classes" to the Unidad Popular. But this was the coalition's most glaring failure.

The composition of the Chilean petty bourgeoisie ranges from comfortably situated business and professional people to the self-employed urban poor. The bulk of those in the latter category are more oppressed and impoverished than many industrial workers. This petty bourgeoisie, then, excluding its upper strata, could be a natural ally of the Chilean working class.

But Unidad Popular's refusal to move beyond constitutional means cost it this crucial ally. Election statistics indicate that from Allende's victory at the polls in September 1970, when the UP received 36 percent of the vote, to the nationwide municipal elections in April 1971, when the UP received 50 percent, the governing coalition made large strides toward winning support among the petty bourgeoisie.

This support was gained because Allende's first six months in office had seen the implementation of significant reforms. But the April 1971 elections were the high-water mark for Unidad Popular. At that point the initiative passed over to the Chilean ruling class and its American backers, as they stepped up their campaign to sabotage the

Chilean economy and blame the resultant dislocations on Allende.

The UP played into their hands. By binding itself to parliamentary tactics when a hostile opposition controlled both houses of congress, it rendered the regime helpless, and obviously so. As the capitalists' success in paralyzing Allende's reform program became evident, the petty-bourgeois layers began to withdraw their support from the government. The March 1973 elections registered a surprisingly strong 43 percent vote for the UP, but this primarily reflected the increasing class polarization in Chile; the working class had voted more solidly than ever for UP candidates, while the "middle-class" support had sharply fallen away.

The alienation of the petty-bourgeoisie from the government provided the right-wing parties with ample material from which to build a mass movement against Allende. The power of the periodic "bosses' strikes" did not lie so much in the industrial centers, where the workers simply took control of the factories when the bosses attempted to close them down, but in the disruption of distribution by small shopkeepers and truck owners.

Despite the bankruptcy of the Unidad Popular policies, the period opened up by Allende's election in September 1970 was marked by a profound radicalization of the Chilean working class that resulted in a prerevolutionary situation. The process went deeper and produced more advanced organizational forms than the similar Torres episode in Bolivia two years earlier. Most frightening to the Chilean capitalists was the growing strength and influence of workers' organizations not directly controlled by the government, such as the *cordones industriales*, assemblies of rank-and-file workers in local industrial concentrations, and the *commandos comunales* (municipal commands). Former Chilean president Eduardo Frei, a leading bourgeois politician, in July expressed fears that "the constitution of a popular power


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Background to the Coup in Chile

UNIDAD POPULAR:

**A March to Disaster
on the 'Peaceful Road'**

by Ernesto Gonzalez



SANTIAGO, September 11, 1973. Presidential palace under attack.

The following article appeared in the March-April 1973 issue of the Argentine Marxist journal *Revista de America*. It is a contribution to the discussion of the events leading to the recent coup. Although the article was written before the coup, we are sure it will be of interest to readers of the *ISR*. Ernesto Gonzalez is editor of *Revista de America*, a leading Argentine revolutionary, and a spokesman for the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers Party), a sympathizing section of the Fourth International. The translation from the Spanish is by Candida Barberena. We have added several footnotes and bracketed insertions on points that might be unfamiliar to North American readers.

The events in Chile that culminated in the incorporation of three members of the military into Allende's presidential cabinet* have again raised a series of questions that were already under discussion when the Unidad Popular [UP—Allende's Popular Unity coalition] triumphed. The [legislative election] results of last March 4 and their consequences—the resignation of all the ministers, including the military commanders—have not lessened the impact of these questions.

The Communist Party in particular, and all the participants in the coalition government in general, continue asserting that through the 1970 electoral victory a transitional period has been opened, which they call the "Chilean road to socialism." On the other extreme we find diverse ultraleft and sectarian currents that, while correctly pointing to this position as a reformist illusion, refuse

*The first big "bosses strike," in which factory owners locked out the workers, small shopkeepers closed their doors, and individual truck owners halted transportation, took place in October 1972. Allende responded on November 2 by appointing two generals and an admiral to his cabinet. He gave the crucial Interior Ministry (which includes the police) to General Carlos Prats Gonzalez. — *ISR*

to see the tremendously contradictory character of the Chilean phenomenon. They satisfy themselves with characterizing it as bourgeois, without making a specific analysis of its contradictory character.


In *Revista de América* we have at various times pointed out that to try to define the diverse regimes that have emerged on the continent is not an idle task, and it is obvious that from the characterization that one makes will also flow a political policy. Unfortunately, there is no revolutionary party or organization existing in Chile that has made a correct analysis of the situation, and, therefore, that has developed a coherent and consistent strategy and tactics. This fact makes the present conjuncture more and more serious, with the growing offensive of imperialism and the more reactionary section of the bourgeoisie, and the continual weakening and concessions of the parties that constitute the Unidad Popular.

The October 1972 events proved these weaknesses, but also, in contrast, they threw into relief the tremendous possibilities that exist among the workers and popular sectors. The truck owners' and small businessmen's strike was neutralized by the mobilization of the workers' movement. The factory and vigilance committees and the

neighborhood organizations, although lacking a centralizing axis, were the bastions on which the answer to the bosses' general work stoppage was based. In fact, these workers' and popular organizations built themselves into the only power capable of blocking the offensive of the entire Chilean bourgeoisie and imperialism. Allende, for his part, trying to play the role of arbiter between these two forces, came dangerously close to playing the role that Kerensky played in the Russian Revolution. Instead of encouraging the workers' mobilization, he leaned on the army, leaving all the work of control and vigilance in its hands, displacing the authority of the popular organizations that had spontaneously emerged. The subsequent inclusion of the military ministers in the cabinet was only the culmination of this wavering and uncertain course.

We believe, therefore, that the present prerevolutionary situation makes it more than ever necessary to build a truly revolutionary organization. Because of their past and current histories, the Socialist and Communist parties cannot meet this historic task. The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario—Movement of the Revolutionary Left], has had a positive development during the last two years, shedding many of its elitist and guerrillaist conceptions and preparing an intervention into the mass movement. Yet there is no guarantee that it will attain the ideological and organizational coherence that Chile needs. The Socialist Youth have been radicalizing in pace with the class struggle, but here too it cannot be legitimately assumed, due to the lack of a truly Bolshevik tradition, that this organization will spontaneously give rise to the revolutionary party. What must be concluded is that the Trotskyist move-

"The wars against Bolivia and Peru at the end of the century (1879) mark the growth of English imperialist penetration. Trading, banking, and saltpeter fell under the direct control of English capital."



IQUIQUE, CHILE, 1905. A demonstration against exploitation in the saltpeter mines.

ment must rise to the high level of events, transforming itself into the nucleus of the present revolutionary vanguard. A policy of a united front with all groups and organizations that are evolving in a favorable direction, such as the MIR or the Socialist Youth, should be the first step toward building the party of the Chilean revolution. The objective situation favors this perspective. Revolutionists must face this historic challenge until it culminates in the establishment of a regime that is truly a workers' and popular government.

Chile: An English semicolony

We should above all remember that Chile, along with Argentina, was one of the countries in Latin America with the most advanced capitalist development. This does not at the same time prevent us from characterizing it as a backward or underdeveloped country. In the beginning, Chile, like Argentina, relied on a strong, relatively independent bourgeoisie that based itself on exploiting the natural resources. In contrast to Río de la Plata [Spanish colonial predecessor of Argentina], it relied not only on agricultural products to enrich itself, but also on diverse deposits of saltpeter, soft coal, and copper, as well as commercial activities related to import and export.

In 1833, the Chilean oligarchy (under Portales) had already laid the basis for its rule, which lasted throughout the entire nineteenth century. But this prosperous bourgeoisie could not resist the onslaught of English imperialism. England, dominant on the seas and therefore in world trade, gained control of Chile as well. Firms such as Morht Humprey and Dirkinson, Lever, Murphy and Co., Hardie and Co., and Morrison and Co. united in this new period with the investors in saltpeter companies and coal and copper mining. The old oligarchy, relatively independent in the previous period, became more

and more linked to financial and industrial imperialism and lost every possibility of autonomous development. The abandonment of oligarchic protectionism in favor of free trade thus coincides with the emergence of the Liberal Party. In Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, an independent industrial bourgeoisie that could conduct the bourgeois-democratic revolution against the old landholding oligarchy and for national liberation did not emerge.

The wars against Bolivia and Peru at the end of the century (1879) mark the end of the period of independence and the growth of English imperialist penetration. Chile's victory in the Pacific war transformed it into the dominant country in Latin America (stronger than Argentina). But, paradoxically, with this triumph—achieved with the support of English interests, which were especially concentrated in Tarapacá province—its decline began. The ruling classes fell into line behind the English interests and Chile was thereby transformed into an economic and political semicolony of Great Britain. Trading, banking, and saltpeter fell under the direct control of English capital, and with it, the whole economic and social life. John Thomas North was the symbolic figure of this era of surrender.

Various weak attempts to counter the country's new subordinate position proved insufficient. Balma-ceda's downfall in 1891 is one example. Despite the moderate and oligarchic character of his resistance, imperialism supported and financed the navy coup d'etat that toppled him. Thereafter, the old oligarchy's connection with England became more and more close at the same time that its decline as a social sector became more and more pronounced. The year 1920 can be considered the year of its political crisis and a foretaste of the general crisis that shortly exploded with the invention of synthetic saltpeter.

A new economic structure was

being formed in tempo with industrial development. The elements that shaped this new situation were the relative weakening of English imperialism, which dates from the end of the First World War, the growing aggressiveness of yankee interests, the rise of the workers' movement, the entrance of middle layers into the picture, and the slump in agricultural products. Arturo Alessandri's rise to power in 1920 reflected these changes.

North American interests began to control all activity related to copper. The government handed them all the state's lands in exchange for a share in the profits, at the same time exempting them from payment for the right to exploit. With this backing, yankee concerns applied a policy of rationalization and mechanization that helped sharpen social tensions. Production, which doubled in 1927, was then cut back in order to maintain prices. In 1929, some 285,500 tons of copper were produced, but in 1930 this fell to 181,500 tons. The saltpeter and copper mining population, which was 90,300 in 1927, fell to 71,800 in 1930, and in 1931 to 39,400.

The state lost its right to export saltpeter, and as a result the foreign debt reached figures never before seen: US\$420 million. The government found itself forced to suspend its payments and imperialist loans were not renewed. The consequences of this were inflicted on the workers and popular sectors through layoffs and new cuts in their already meager wages.

This entire period, from 1920 to 1930, or to be more exact, until 1932, was characterized by a sharp crisis on all levels that the 1929 world depression only exacerbated.

It is this situation that explains the emergence of mass organizations such as the Central Obrera [Workers' Central union] and the Socialist Party itself. From 1932 to 1940 it was the Socialist Party that capitalized on the radicalization of the middle class and the support of broad sectors of workers.

The personality of [SP leader Col. Marmaduke] Grove was a unifying factor, but the absence of a uniform theoretical line or a consistent revolutionary organization, due to the decisive weight of the Chilean middle class, prevented the SP from transforming itself into the party of the revolution. This became clear in 1936 when the CP, in accordance with the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the [Communist] International, launched its famous and tragic Popular Front line for Chile. The Socialists, who had put forward Grove's candidacy, capitulated to the Stalinists, supporting the Radical Party and its candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a well-known rancher and representative of the most antiquated oligarchy. The Bloque de Izquierda [Left Bloc—i.e., the Popular Front coalition supporting Aguirre Cerda's successful presidential bid in 1938], embraced by the SP, thus succumbed to class collaboration.¹

As could be expected, this error sharpened the SP's contradictions. In 1940 the party split, and from this split the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores [PST—Socialist Workers Party] emerged. But the PST's anticollaborationist position was not maintained for long. Defeated in the 1941 parliamentary elections, it turned toward the populist front at exactly the time that the SP was breaking with the governing coalition. As a result, one part of the PST went into the CP (following Hitler's attack on Russia), and another rejoined the SP.

The Communist Party, for its

1. The Socialist Party, which subsequent to the defeat of the 1936-38 Popular Front had broken ties with the CP and suffered an internal split, followed the same course after the death of President [Juan Antonio] Rios [in June 1946]. It decided to support [President Alfredo] Duhalde, joining the new bourgeois government with three ministers.

[Duhalde, a leader of the Radical Party, briefly succeeded Rios. New elections in the fall of 1946 saw the Radical Party nominate Gabriel Gonzalez Videla (with the support of the CP), while Duhalde was forced to run, un-

part, continued its policies. The Popular Front, which was shattered when the Socialists left it, was reconstituted under a different name as the Alianza Democrática [Democratic Alliance]. The AD ran [Radical Party leader] Juan Antonio Rios as its candidate in the elections that were called after the death [in November 1941] of Aguirre Cerda. Consistent with its line, Stalinism renewed its support for the Radicals, despite the fact that the latter were still governing with the widest variety of bourgeois sectors.

When the war ended the CP was numerically strengthened thanks to the prestige gained by the Soviet Union following its victory over Germany. The CTCH split in 1945 was a reflection of the new frustration provoked by both these parties, which, while speaking in the name of the working class, did nothing but compromise and collaborate with various sectors of the Chilean bourgeoisie.

This stage, which opened in the thirties, and which saw the birth of the mass organizations and parties, ended toward 1945, revealing two indisputable facts: on the one hand, the total decline of English imperialism and its withdrawal from the Chilean picture as the principal exploiter, and on the other hand, the

successfully, as an independent with SP backing. — *ISR*

Later, when new presidential elections were called for the period 1946-52, the party debated amid the sharpest contradictions. The parliamentary virus, the policy of class collaboration, had chipped away the last remnant of class independence. According to Chelen Rojas in *Trajectoria del Socialismo*:

"In order to avoid the disgrace of a new [election], there was no other solution but to proclaim Bernardo Ibanez general secretary of the party, but this step, which halfway solved the question of discipline, could not prevent a large part of the Socialist forces from not supporting their own candidate."

This judgment is also confirmed by Oscar Waiss Band, who on page 48 of *Drama Socialista* says: "The transition to socialism by the Duhalde government left the same trace as camels crossing desert sands."

existence of two big mass parties that shared the sympathies of broad popular layers, but which were disgracefully corrupted by reformism and traditional parliamentarism.

The end of the war and the recovery by the United States opened up a new stage for Chile: it definitely passed over into the North American sphere of influence. Chile became like the rest of Latin America, being transformed from an English semicolon into a yankee semicolon in the economic and political sense. The signing of the OAS [Organization of American States] colonial pacts, the bilateral agreements signed by different governments of the Chilean bourgeoisie, and the numerous financial obligations that were contracted sealed this surrender.

Yankee imperialism: The principal enemy

When the second world contest ended, imperialism in the North, free of obligations, developed an overall policy. But we shouldn't forget that its interest in the Latin American continent had already been expressed in the nineteenth century with the famous Monroe doctrine. The 1929 crisis, however, had prevented it for the time being from carrying out its intentions, while the war, which broke out in 1939, deferred its ambitions a while longer. Once the conflict was brought to an end, the U.S. intensified its offensive, and for this effort it relied on the endorsement of the various governments of the bosses.

Following the big agrarian crisis at the end of World War I, Chile, in contrast to Argentina, depended more and more on its sales to the United States. Copper was not a liberating factor, but rather a source of submission. The red gold, which at the end of the nineteenth century had placed Chile first in world production and allowed it a certain independent development, now served as a new basis of exploitation for imperialist monopolies. In 1904 yankee penetration began with the formation of the

Braden Copper Co., later to become a subsidiary of the Kennecott Copper Corp. The Chile Exploration Co. and the Andes Copper Mining Co. (Anaconda) completed the appropriation of this fundamental source of wealth. From the beginning, Chuquicamata and Potrerillos [big foreign-owned copper mines] had all the privileges, but no obligations. The foreign companies were able to export all their profits, and today it is known that they reached the level of US\$10 billion during the last sixty years. This fact is the more startling when it is remembered that the initial capital spent by these concerns was only US\$3.5 million with a later additional investment of US\$100 million.

In 1932 controlled exchange rates were introduced, which meant a partial reimbursement. But each attempt at recovery was countered with a new maneuver by the imperialist concerns. During World War II, for example, Chile was able to produce 540,000 tons of copper, but the United States unilaterally set the price at 11.5 cents per pound, in order to prevent the wartime demand from raising the market price. The Popular Front government consented, and the country thereby lost nearly US\$500 million.

During this entire period Chile was led by "progressive" sectors, according to Stalinist terminology. Aguirre Cerda, Ríos, and González Videla rose to power with the support of the CP and the SP, despite the fact that both parties later broke with them, and spoke of "betrayal" of the program or national frustration. What is important for us is to determine how these governments behaved with respect to the working class and popular sectors and in relation to yankee imperialism, now the country's principal enemy.

Of course, during the war years Chile experienced a relative economic boom, but this development primarily benefited the propertied classes. In industry, the share of workers and employees in wages and salaries dropped during the

Popular Front government. In 1940, their share of total industrial income amounted to 52 percent; in 1944 it was 44 percent. And viewing the economy as a whole, workers and employees who in 1940 received 44.1 percent of the national income, in 1945 only got 42.6 percent. But those who most felt the effects of the Popular Front policy were the agricultural workers, whose real wages dropped by 20 percent in 1942.

The CP's support for González Videla

The González Videla government (1946-52) did not reverse this process. On the contrary, the economic situation of the previous period, which had permitted a certain industrial development, stagnated. In contrast to the preceding six-year period from 1940 to 1946, during which industrial production doubled, this period saw an increase of only 50 percent. Despite Chile's improved means (due to the accumulation of foreign exchange not spent during the war and improvement in the price of copper), González Videla used this situation to aid capital goods importers and check national production.

In 1947 this same government declared the Communist Party illegal (in spite of the fact that the CP had offered it its total support), thereby accommodating itself to the policy initiated by Truman on a world scale, which culminated with the cold war. The CP didn't gain anything by dedicating odes to "Ángel Gabriel" [González Videla] through the intermediary of its poet [Pablo] Neruda. Once again the working class saw its real wages reduced, and once again the Communist Party could be found tearing its hair because of the "betrayal" of the bourgeois program for which the CP had urged a vote.²

2. The SP, which tried to readjust its line after supporting Duhalde, refused to cooperate with González Videla. Allende was elected SP secretary gen-

In the meantime, swindled for the hundredth time, the masses took to the streets, raising demands against the rising cost of living. (Inflation went up 9 percent in 1945 and 30 and 23 percent in 1946 and 1947, respectively.) In 1949, a hike in fares was the straw that broke the camel's back. Videla's government, which had devised a whole body of repressive legislation, flung itself on the "seditious" rebels.

August 15, 16, and 17 of 1949 passed in a climate of popular insurrection. The confrontations on these days resulted in several deaths and hundreds of wounded. The official leadership of the SP voted with the government benches in parliament for special powers; the dissident sectors of the party were repressed and persecuted. The Radical Party, which reflected new sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie that emerged during the war, thus demonstrated in practice its inability to develop an independent policy. Instead, it followed the path of the old oligarchy in its methods of repression and lack of democratic scruples. But the workers' parties weren't able to channel the discontent or consolidate a real revolutionary movement either.

At the end of Videla's government the Korean war helped the Chilean bourgeoisie, which in turn repaid its favors to yankee imperialism. Thanks to an agreement between the two, the ceiling on copper was set at US 24.5 cents per pound for the duration of the conflict. This meant an additional loss of US\$300 million to the country.

eral and they formed the FRAS with the National Falange, the Democratic Radical Party, and Agrarios Laboristas [Agrarian Laborites].

This policy provoked a new split. The more collaborationist sector of the party supported the Gonzalez government and the law passed in 1948 banning the Communist Party. It was rewarded with three ministries, as well as government recognition as the only Socialist Party.

Ibanez and the 1953 inflationary crisis

The recession in the United States as a result of peace was also felt in Chile. Inflation reached unprecedented heights, culminating in the illusions created around General Carlos Ibañez del Campo, who assumed the presidency in 1952. Ibañez, who had already ruled as dictator during the 1927 crisis, assumed power with the populist aim of representing all social sectors. Tied to the old structure, but in an epoch in which yankee imperialism had already come in with all its batteries, no sooner had he stepped into government than he had to put aside his entire pseudo-nationalist program. The Chilean Perón was unable to benefit from the economic conditions that allowed the real Perón to grant the concessions that won him the massive following of the Argentine workers.

Although Ibañez benefited from the profits that he received for supporting South Korea, they were not enough to prevent the inflationary spiral from climbing to 88 percent in 1955. It was not accidental that this crisis coincided with an intensification of the yankee offensive throughout the continent. And although the Chilean government tried to resist this penetration by looking for agreements with Perón, the resistance was doomed to failure because it was not based on the mobilization of the exploited, but rather on diplomatic agreements.

The Klein-Saks mission that went all over Latin America in order to impose yankee economic policy was accepted by the Chilean government. If during his first three years Ibañez used the inflation to redistribute national income to benefit the popular sectors, during his last three, acting in accord with the Klein-Saks mission, he had to give back to the bourgeoisie and the imperialists all the concessions they had been forced to make. The "new deal," signed on

CONTINUED ON PAGE 25

"From the beginning, Chuquicamata and Potrerillos had all the privileges, but no obligations. The foreign companies were able to export all their profits."



CHUQUICAMATA. World's largest open-pit copper mine.

A Chapter from Black History

When Whites Riot-The East

What experience and history teach is this, that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history nor acted on principles deduced from it. — Hegel

This article will attempt to describe and analyze the political and economic climate in East St. Louis, Illinois, prior to and during the 1917 race riot. It is only as we understand the particular climate during this period that we can understand the riot behavior of whites and the circumstances out of which the massacre erupted.

Between 1910 and 1917, the Black population of East St. Louis increased from 6,000 to approximately 13,000. Blacks from the South went to East St. Louis to gain the financial, political, and social liberty which they had heard about, and believed that St. Louis would guarantee. Although many of the newcomers had friends and relatives who made them welcome and helped them to adjust, the housing situation was critical.^{1*}

Soon after arriving, Blacks began to seek jobs at the gates of manufacturers, encountering there many whites who were also crowding the gates in search of employment. Here, in a curious way, the slave-master mentality reasserted itself: employers usually hired Southern Blacks—not only because the Blacks were so anxious to get work that they accepted lower wages, but

also because management felt that Blacks would prove to be more loyal.

As a result, the hostility of whites who were not chosen—or who were chosen only after Blacks had been employed—turned against the Black workers, rather than against the white employers whose choice had been primarily motivated by economic greed. Jobless whites felt that they should have first choice at available jobs.

Just before 1917, East St. Louis suffered from a general labor shortage which was partially the result of a number of strikes in its packing industry and aluminum plants. Recruiters therefore went South to encourage rural Blacks to live and work in East St. Louis. Promises of better living standards, high wages, and stable positions, however, were found to be false. The little available housing was poor. Wages were not only lower than wages of whites, but also substantially lower than those promised; and the jobs were transitory. These factors notwithstanding, Blacks welcomed the opportunity to work; many Blacks, refusing to leave their jobs, infuriated white workers by working throughout the strike.

Since, for the most part, Blacks were considered a "Southern problem," it was not until the period of World War I that whites in East St. Louis began to regard them as a threat to their livelihood and way of life. It was generally felt among whites that Blacks would be drafted to fight; but many were rejected, and of these, a substantial number sought employment in the cities. It seems, also, that in East St. Louis there was little concern at the in-



*Footnotes appear at the end of the article.

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St. Louis Massacre

by Dr. L. Alex Swan



NEW YORK CITY, July 1917. 10,000 Blacks protest East St. Louis massacre.

crease in the Black population between 1900 and 1910. It had been assumed, perhaps, that Blacks would adapt to a subordinate and segregated position, interacting with whites only on the basis of an accommodative system defined and operated by whites. Blacks, therefore, were expected to conform to the system of segregation inside and outside the factories where there were separate facilities for Blacks and whites.²

Despite the 1874 and 1885 Illinois laws which prohibited such practices, the school systems were racially separate and public accommodations were segregated.³ White people paid no attention to the legislation. As soon as an increasing number of Blacks who were unwilling to adhere to a subordinate status began to challenge the system, whites of East St. Louis began to view them as threats to their political, economic, and social security.

Politricks in East St. Louis


In 1916, Democratic leaders won a closely-contested election in East St. Louis. Republicans accused Democrats of waging a racist campaign. But the Democrats' defense was that Republicans imported Blacks from the South, creating major economic, social, and political problems for whites, and forcing Blacks into segregated colonies. The Democrats claimed further that the Republicans in East St. Louis had imported the Black "colonials" in order to ensure their loyalty and thus gain both votes and cheap labor. The validity of the Democrats' position is evident, since most of the major employers were Republicans who wanted directly or indirectly to maintain political and economic control.

The Democrats, threatened by the

influx of Blacks as they defined it—i.e., in terms of the perceived and obvious gains to the Republican Party—quickly organized a political machine to deal with the issue. Their strategy, which focused on their opposition to colonization of Black immigrants, was designed to attract a large number of white votes, and, at the same time, to frighten a large number of Blacks, who would then avoid the ballot boxes.

The Democrats, determined to control East St. Louis politically, further charged that the Republicans were buying Black votes in return for jobs, and the Republican

made newly-arrived Black voters ineligible to vote. Democrats announced their intent to check and examine the registration for possible violators and violations, especially in the areas (Black Belt) where Rodenberg showed great strength.⁴ The *Journal*, in close contact with the Democratic politicians, began to publish items from newspapers, alleged to be accounts of crimes by Blacks against the property and persons of whites.⁵ At the same time the police department, controlled by Democrats, began to announce a rise in the crime rate, for which there could be found no sub-



Congressman William Rodenberg, in particular, was playing politics with Blacks and misled them into believing they could do anything they pleased. Although a few Blacks voted for Democrats the majority believed that the Republican leaders were ready to give them more economic and political gains than Democrats. The Democrats, who had support from the National Democratic Committee and the *East St. Louis Daily Journal*, had also in their favor the issue of the one-year residence requirement which

stantial evidence.⁶ The *Journal* continued to print stories about "bad niggers" and their disregard of white people.⁷ The *St. Louis Argus*, a Black weekly paper, attempted to no avail to get the details of the stories—as well as a "letter" claimed by the chief of police to have been received from a Southern lawman, who informed him that "dangerous niggers" had migrated to East St. Louis. The *Argus* concluded that the claims were false and that the intent was to intimidate the Black voters, decrease Black migration

from the South, and arouse and intensify anti-Black hatred.⁸

The Belleville *News-Democrat*, in response to the issue of selling votes, suggested that the practice was found among Blacks as well as whites, but that Blacks sold cheaper than whites.

The *Journal* complained about the employment by the Board of Election Commissioners of a Black man who asserted himself, to the discomfort of many newsmen, in telling whites what they could and could not do. The *Journal* then linked the Board with what it called the "colonization conspiracy" and raised serious questions as to the purpose of employing the Black man.⁹

With the election drawing near, the Democrats had to be certain that every strategy was in operation which would effectively intimidate Black voters, and at the same time, prejudice the white voters. Many Blacks who dared to register to vote were challenged by Democrats and frightened and harassed by policemen. Although many of these Blacks had lived in the city during the time legally required for voting eligibility, the Board of Election Commissioners erased the names of Blacks from the registration rolls because they did not reply to the Board's suspect notices.¹⁰

The fact that historically Blacks were affiliated with the Republican Party suddenly made them more vulnerable to several charges by Democrats both nationally and in Illinois. Therefore, Democrats deemed it politically expedient to campaign around the issues of colonization and political enslavement of Blacks (not because they were concerned for the political progress of Black people) and the subsequent gain in political power by Republicans, due to their having brought about increased migration of Blacks

from the South.¹¹

The *Chicago Daily Tribune* reports President Wilson's warning of vote frauds instigated by "conscienceless agents of the sinister forces."¹² U.S. Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory believed that Black migration was the result of political manipulation of economic forces and vowed that all those caught violating the election law would be prosecuted to the utmost.¹³ Another political move at the national level came from President Wilson. Although Wilson carried Illinois in 1912, the outcome of the election had been in doubt—as had the fate of the Democratic Party nationally—because of the increased Black vote in Illinois. Wilson verbally attacked Republican leaders, calling for intensive investigation and indictments.¹⁴ Assistant U.S. Attorney General Frank Daily, who had conducted the colonization investigation, saw to it that the investigation was widely publicized, and made a public statement to the effect that 300,000 or more Blacks of voting age had been colonized in Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana since 1915.¹⁵ The Justice Department declared that over 60,000 Blacks from the South had entered Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois in the month of August 1916. The *Chicago Herald*, the *St. Louis Republic*, and the *Journal* headlines read: "60,000 Bogus Votes for Hughes; Plot to Steal Doubtful States."¹⁶

Apparently there was no evidence to support the accusations of the Democrats; no cases were taken to court.¹⁷

East St. Louis and St. Clair County went to the Democrats while the state of Illinois went to the Republican Party in the 1916 elections. However, the controversy over colonization and the charges of vote fraud left Blacks and whites more estranged than ever. The local la-

bor leaders who had supported Wilson capitalized on the racial prejudice that already existed and, from industries and political camps, began to circulate anti-Black propaganda.

By 1915, the Black community in East St. Louis had become a potentially powerful political group. Although there was no indication that they would vote as a bloc, politicians realized that such potential must be reckoned with. In the resultant exchange of votes for cash and power, politics emerged as a big business, with much attendant corruption. Politicians were not interested in, or committed to, equality and justice; they were concerned with their own political power and economic status.

During 1915, Locke Tarlton controlled the political machine of St. Clair County. As chairman of the St. Clair County Democratic Central Committee and president of the East Side Levee and Sanitary District, Tarlton held great political sway in the county.¹⁸ The office of the state's attorney was of particular importance to Tarlton, since he did not want situations to develop—as in the Democratic administration of Mayor Lambert (1911-13)—which brought about the filing of indictments against public officials. Hubert Schaumleffel, in whose cooperation Tarlton had confidence despite the fact that Schaumleffel was a Republican, was therefore made state's attorney. Tarlton's hand was strengthened in the East St. Louis mayoralty election of 1915 when the Democrat Mollman defeated the Republican incumbent Chamberlin.

In 1916, Tarlton and his men were reelected to the Levee Board, largely because Tarlton had effectively engineered and attentively sought large blocks of Black votes (as he had done the previous year

in the mayoralty elections).¹⁹

There ensued, in East St. Louis, a constant struggle on the part of the political parties to control the Black vote. Locke Tarlton spent a great deal of cash to swing the Black vote for Mollman, while Republican Congressman Rodenberg launched a campaign to marshal Black votes which he felt Tarlton and his political gang would otherwise preempt. The testimony of a Black dentist, LeRoy Bundy, revealed that Tarlton made large pay-offs for votes.

Although Blacks were dissatisfied with the Republican Party, they supported the national Republican ticket in the 1916 elections. Bundy, upset and totally dissatisfied with the results for Blacks after the various elections, established in St. Clair County a Black Republican League to demand political equality. Bundy's contention was that if Blacks could wait until the political parties—especially the Republican Party—recognized the importance of their vote, they would find themselves in a bargaining position to demand jobs and/or money. Further, he contended that token gains were not sufficient to represent the county's Black population. Though local whites resisted the demands of the Black Republican League, Tarlton, realizing that the Democrats were persisting in their attempts to associate Blacks with the colonization conspiracy, became interested in the ticket-splitting notion. Bundy, however, was eventually "identified" as the leader of the colonization move and was arrested on this charge. The charge seemed to have no substance; therefore, for lack of evidence, Bundy was released. Despite the public statement by the state's attorney concerning the Black leader's innocence, the *News* and the *Journal* played up the incident, making it

appear as though Bundy were really quite guilty of the charges.²⁰ Although Tarlton played a significant role in regard to Bundy's arrest, Bundy and the Black Republican League continued to support Tarlton's political machine, which engineered Mayor Mollman's reelection bid in 1917.²¹ It was believed that Bundy's support came as a result of the mayor's promise to employ a number of Blacks and to improve the general living conditions in the Black community. Again, however, opposition leaders began to raise threatening voices to intimidate Blacks who seemed ready to vote for Mollman.²²

John Dumhoff was Mollman's opponent for mayor in the 1917 election. Although Mollman won easily, the campaign was filled with racist propaganda. To gain white support, Mollman, through wide publicity, played the arrest of a number of Blacks against his opponent's assertion that he was totally dependent on the Black vote for victory. Again, federal officials published warnings which threatened to deal with individuals found guilty of buying and selling votes. However, after the testimony of Bundy, which implicated many high local officials—Republicans and Democrats—the threats to prosecute were reconsidered.

Illinois Attorney General Edward Brundage estimated that over a thousand persons were involved, including many "respectable" citizens. "Immunity baths" were promised to those citizens who would testify to the election fraud. Brundage, however, pressured by Tarlton and Mollman, modified his position to the effect that only those who sold their votes were to be indicted, rather than those who bought and sold votes.

The climate of open governmental

corruption and organized crime, protected by politicians who profited from it—and who controlled the police, judges, and juries—was not conducive to the administration of justice or the elimination of institutional racism practiced in East St. Louis' political matters.

Labor leaders vs. capital: A family quarrel

The movement of Blacks into East St. Louis created fear in whites relative to two things on the job front. The first was the possibility of a wage increase; the second was the issue of collective bargaining. The fact that many Blacks were moving into East St. Louis meant that they would inevitably be competing with whites for jobs. This was the continuing fear of thousands of white workers, many of whom had also moved to East St. Louis hoping to establish a stable economic foundation for the future. Politicians and white labor leaders were ready to utilize racist propaganda to benefit from the historical conflict (1) between Black and white workers (especially between those whites who belonged to labor unions, and Blacks who were not permitted to join white unions), and (2) between management and labor. For example, the Aluminum Ore Company, which had a large number of employees, began to follow a policy of increasing the number of Black workers, following victories for white workers, so that the demands of white workers would be likely to decrease.²³

At the same time Blacks were employed by the Aluminum Ore Company, members of the Aluminum Ore Employees' Protective Association were being dismissed. The association was incorporated in Decem-

**'The union began to heap the blame, not upon
the true oppressor--the company--but upon the
Blacks who had migrated to East St. Louis.'**

ber of 1916, just after the strike.²⁴ White workers felt that their dismissal was a function of the stand their organization took against management, and ironically, viewed Blacks as a factor responsible for the actions of management.

Before 1913, the Aluminum Ore Company was totally white. As Blacks began to replace striking whites, anti-Black feelings were reactivated. There was some contention with regard to a successful approach to the problem. Many white workers suggested that the organization invite a few Blacks to join—which a few did—but there were those white workers who wanted to see Blacks totally disbarred from the employment rolls of the company. Management, aware of the reasons behind the associations' move to encourage Black membership, began to employ recent migrants.²⁵

The Protective Association had planned a major strike for April of 1917, at the same time it was considering strengthening its power base by cementing its relations with the American Federation of Labor.²⁶ Both organizations feared the influx of Black employees and met often to plan a counterstrategy to check the machinations of management. The AFL was not in favor of the strike at the time it was planned, and proposed that a strike be planned after a substantial increase in membership and the formulation of a satisfactory plan for dealing with Black employees. The leaders of the AFL felt that with a larger and more cohesive group, management would be forced into consenting to their demands. However, management seemed prepared for the strike, as more Blacks were employed and key members of the union discharged.²⁷ The strike began on April 18, 1917, as planned,²⁸ but the strike seemed

to fail as efforts were employed and as labor reserves—many of whom were Black—were utilized.²⁹

The Aluminum Ore Corporation anticipated violent confrontation with the union and resorted to extreme measures to protect its property. It brought in Illinois militiamen who patrolled the property of the company to guard against any possible damages.

The other tactic which severely curtailed picketing was the accusation of the company's lawyers—in an attempt to secure a restraining order against the activities of pickets—that the pickets were organized and led by radical elements with communist support, whose aim it was to overthrow the American government. Despite the fact that the lawyers failed to present substantial evidence supporting their accusations, the judge issued the order.³⁰ After management had secured the order, the final blow which destroyed the effectiveness of the Protective Association, rendering it powerless, came in a declaration by a superintendent of the company to the effect that no members of the association would be employed and that no employee could be a member of the Protective Association or the AFL.³¹ Immediately, the union began to heap the blame, not upon the true oppressor—the company, in its greed for profits—but upon the Blacks who had migrated to East St. Louis.

Labor leaders indicated that the first united attempt of whites must be to stop the influx of Blacks into East St. Louis, and the second, to reduce the number of Black employees in industry. Since management had begun to use Black labor as a check to the white labor leaders' demands, the difficulties involved in carrying out these tasks were monumental.

Mayor Mollman was warned by

the AFL that unless Black migration was checked, violence would flare up in East St. Louis as never before. The mayor did not really believe the unionists and therefore did not attempt to convince them he would take any favorable action. Moreover, the mayor would not have made a move to the disadvantage of the plants.³²

In May of 1917, a clash between Black and white youths resulted in the arrest of many young Blacks and the killing of a Black adult male who was a member of a Black protest group.³³ At this time, Blacks became alarmed, as whites, determined to resist Black "invasion," established restrictive policies. Whites claimed that if Blacks were allowed to distribute themselves throughout the city without strong restrictions, the whites' property values would fall.

Black leaders, especially ministers, opposed segregation ordinances but agreed with white industrialists that a special territory should be constructed for Black migrants who were openly being recruited.

On May 28, 1917, a protest rally was organized by union leaders to plan strategies and tactics to deal with the "issue" of the Blacks' presence in East St. Louis. There were shouts of: "Let's kill some niggers and chase the rest out of town!" "Let's beat them up and the rest will stay away!"³⁴ Although these cries may not have come directly from the labor leaders themselves, the leaders fully supported the views.

By placing their sole interest in higher profits and the protection of their corporate property,³⁵ white industrialists consistently imposed intolerable economic insecurity upon Black workers, and brought upon Blacks the inflamed and ever-mounting hostility of the white workers. Although some unskilled

Blacks joined locals which showed interest in unionizing them, Black workers remained suspicious of these locals' efforts, having met previous unpleasant experiences and white racist attitudes in other organizations. In addition, the number of Blacks who joined the locals was not substantial enough to make a power difference; and curiously — yet also to be expected — management and labor agreed on one issue: Blacks were to be excluded from clerical and skilled positions.

Regardless of Black (as well as a few white) leaders, hatred and racial confrontation increased until violence became inevitable. The white community, well armed, took every opportunity to warn Blacks of their doom. Alarmed that white men were permitted by police to carry weapons, Black leaders warned their community of the danger of arming themselves even for protection. Many Blacks, however, had little faith in the system, for police arrested a great number for carrying concealed weapons. Although white merchants sold weapons to everyone, Blacks and whites, the police never searched whites.³⁶ As police, applying a double standard in this case, stripped Blacks of their weapons for self-defense, they stripped them also of the protection which the police themselves were supposed to have provided.

The sensational publicity given the arrest of Blacks for carrying weapons seemed to provide a justification for whites to hold to the notion that they were in danger if they were not always armed. With every other effort failing to stop Black migration, the fabricated threat of a Black "take-over" of economic, and even political, power — together with rumors of an alleged crime wave for which Blacks were

supposedly responsible — seemed real to whites. They therefore believed that acts of violence were the only means of dealing with the problem; they hoped that these tactics would frighten Blacks into leaving the city.³⁷

A massacre: May 28 to July 2

In May, a group of white citizens filed before the city council a formal protest against Black citizens who had migrated to East St. Louis — unconcerned that the facts showed many of these Blacks had moved to the area at approximately the same time as the whites. Since the council room could not accommodate all the protest group, many stood outside during the discussion. Even when the meeting was moved to the larger city auditorium, not all those in the group could find room. As a result, a great number of whites took to the streets, shouting insulting epithets at Black people.

Most of the core protest charges were lodged against the Aluminum Ore Company, and against Mayor Mollman, who had done nothing to check the heavy flow of Blacks into East St. Louis. However, it was neither the corporations nor the officials who were to bear the brunt of the whites' attack: Blacks and their community became the targets of the whites' hysterical rage.

The mayor promised to deal with the situation; but the protestors disbelieved the mayor's statement that he and the city council had a partially completed plan to prevent Blacks from leaving the South for East St. Louis.³⁸

After several speakers condemned Blacks for moving into white neighborhoods and for providing the companies with cheap labor, whites left the auditorium shouting and re-

portedly determined to lynch every Black they encountered on the way home. A change in direction came when the crowd was told that a Black man had killed a white man during an attempted armed robbery. The crowd, now having an excuse to attack Blacks, headed toward Broadway and Collinsville Avenue. There they attacked every Black they could catch, dragging many from streetcars, restaurants, barbershops, and saloons — and destroying many business places as well. Small white groups moved quickly over the area searching for Blacks, beating even those who offered little or no resistance, partly because the victims were not prepared for the attacks and partly because Blacks were intimidated by the great number of whites who attacked them. Blacks retaliated at Collinsville and St. Clair Avenues, but were quickly overcome as the white group was reinforced by other whites. The police, intentionally ineffective in stemming the violence of the whites, arrested many of the Blacks who were beaten.

The mayor sought help from the National Guard as the conflict intensified. The newspapers reported that when the original rumor (of the shooting of the white man by the Black man) was found to be false, the crowd of whites had quickly dispersed. But whites had accomplished a part of their intended purpose, for on the 29th of May, many Blacks were leaving East St. Louis.³⁹

It was rumored that a large number of persons in the Black community had bought guns at pawnshops. Again, police operated by a double standard; whites who roamed the streets were not searched, or even stopped; while Blacks who could not avoid police were searched, stripped of their weapons, and arrested.

The Black newspaper, *The Argus*, reported the smuggling of guns into East St. Louis by "passing" Blacks—that is, Blacks who were light-skinned enough to pass as white. In this manner Blacks took advantage of the differential application of the search procedure employed by the police.

With the guns smuggled into the Black community, Blacks felt protected; to reassure the community, *The Argus* carried the following statement:

"As long as the State or United States troops do not disarm us we are able to take care of ourselves and protect our community."⁴⁰

White protesters did not welcome the troops, and continued their attack on Blacks. At Summit Avenue, Blacks returned fire, but only after several homes were damaged. The rioting which took place between Second and Fourth Streets and St. Clair and Broadway Avenues became so widespread that additional troops were required. With firm action by the soldiers, however, rioters retreated.

Although there had as yet been

no killing, six Blacks and six whites were shot and many Blacks were seriously beaten. Reports indicate that not all the soldiers were motivated to protect Blacks, and that some of them were seen to encourage whites to attack Blacks. However, the troops' presence did provide a check to the rioting whites' behavior.⁴¹ What seemed very clearly to the advantage of the white rioters was the fact that the mayor and his administration were unable or unwilling to cope with them.

For the remainder of their stay in East St. Louis, the troops occupied themselves in searching the homes of Black citizens for weapons. It was easy to see that the militiamen identified with the whites, for they arrested many Blacks, mistreating and oppressing them.⁴²

Although whites expected Blacks to retaliate, Blacks, with the exception of those who were trying to escape, remained indoors, afraid to leave their homes. It is believed that between May 28 and May 31, 6,000 Blacks left East St. Louis—refugees from violence in search of a safer place to live.⁴³

As was to be expected, no prosecutions were initiated against whites, and the city council and mayor did nothing to assure the Black community that whites would not attack them in the future.

The Walker Committee, which investigated the riots, suggested that the riots were the results of a conspiracy of capitalists to import a large number of Blacks to work in East St. Louis. Yet no form of prosecution was suggested; there was even a sense of justification, rather than self-condemnation, on the part of the whites.⁴⁴

By June 30, most of the troops were removed. Blacks expected the conflict to intensify, since no real efforts were being made to improve power relationships and no change was evident in the police department or in city officials, in case of a worsening of the situation. Nor could they hope for any protection from the two militia companies who still patrolled the property of the plants.

During the time between May 28 and June 15, the *Journal*, which was widely read by white citizens, published every sensationalized account it could get hold of or invent regarding crimes committed by Blacks.

By June 24, the *Journal* reported incidents of resumed rioting which, it claimed, started because of the refusal of an old Black man to give his seat on a streetcar to an old white woman.⁴⁵

Leaders in the Black community held meetings to decide what to do about attacks and assaults on Black women and children, which followed the above-mentioned incident. They decided to meet with Mayor Mollman. The Black delegation, headed by Dr. Bundy, informed the mayor of the assaults on Black citizens by whites. They further told him that the situation was getting worse and

If we must die, let it not be like hogs
Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot,
While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs,
Making their mock at our accursed lot.
If we must die, O let us nobly die
So that our precious blood may not be shed
In vain; then even the monsters we defy
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!
O kinsmen! We must meet the common foe!
Though far outnumbered let us show us brave,
And for their thousand blows deal one death blow!
What though before us lies the open grave?
Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack,
Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!

--from **Harlem Shadows** (1922) by Claude McKay

would soon become critical. Despite the numerous rumors to this effect the mayor claimed that the racial situation was substantially improved.⁴⁶ As rumor had it in the Black community, however, the whites who had stated that Blacks planned wholesale attacks on July 4 were themselves arming to stage a massacre of Blacks on that date.

The continued support of both Black and white voters was crucial to the maintenance of the mayor's political machine. Action in favor of one group would tend to alienate the other; therefore, the mayor assured the delegations of Blacks and whites respectively that their complaints and charges would be promptly investigated. In this way, he placated both sides with reassuring words and an appearance of concern, while doing nothing about the matter.

On the night of July 1, 1917, whites drove through the Black community shooting into several homes. Immediately, the Black neighborhood prepared to protect itself against further attacks. Each car that went driving through was carefully watched, and whenever its occupants started shooting, Blacks returned the fire. However, the reports that reached the police department regarding the shootings by Blacks at their attackers did nothing to motivate the police to protect Blacks who had found it necessary to defend themselves. Early on the morning of July 2, policemen—some uniformed officers, and some plainclothesmen—drove to the Black community to investigate the incidents. The reports of the "investigation" indicated that the police were fired upon as they drove into the community. It was further reported that the police had intended to protect the Black community, but that this protection was refused by Blacks, who fired on the policemen

unprovoked.⁴⁷ These reports, alleged by whites to indicate the determination of Blacks to "take over" East St. Louis by means of armed aggression, were attributed to "too much freedom" for Blacks and to the influence of "outside agitators." Not many whites believed that the police incident was one of mistaken identity, as explained by Black leaders, but asserted that the police properly identified themselves, to no avail. Black community leaders, however, defended the action by stating that the first car whose occupants started shooting into the homes of their families was identical to the car used by the police officers a few hours later. They stated further that they had no way of ascertaining whether or not the occupants of the vehicle were police officers, because the occupants had not identified themselves.⁴⁸ But to the whites, in their paranoiac hostility and fear, the death of the detectives was sufficient proof that Blacks had to be checked. Later that morning, a protest meeting was called by whites at the Labor Temple at Fourth and Collinsville Avenues. Because the protesters' actions were rationalized as being conducted on behalf of the "peace officers," the public officials realized that they could not expect the police to control the crowd or disperse them. The mayor, rather reluctant to solicit the return of the National Guard, nevertheless later called the governor for help in preventing the possible destruction of his city.⁴⁹

An all-out attack was staged about 10:00 a.m., July 2, 1917, on Division Avenue, St. Louis Avenue, Missouri Avenue, and Collinsville Avenue—all between Illinois Avenue and Broadway.⁵⁰ This time, as previously, whites were indiscriminate in their attacks. A Black family on their way home across the Mississippi River in East

St. Louis was attacked at Collinsville and Illinois Avenue. The wife was seriously injured, her hair torn out by the roots and her scalp partly torn off. The husband was beaten, and their teen-age boy was shot; both died. The pattern of white assault seemed to disregard sex and age in this renewed attempt to chase Blacks permanently out of town.⁵¹ Although only a few of the protesters actually beat and killed Blacks, a large number of whites, including women and children, marched along beside those who participated, urging them on and giving them "moral" support as they moved from street to street looking for victims.

Reports told of how Blacks who were caught begged for their lives with their hands raised above their heads. Appeals to the police and militiamen brought no results as dying Blacks were mercilessly shot.⁵²

By the time additional National Guard troops had arrived in the evening, whites had burned down practically the entire area around Broadway and Eighth Street: an area of sixteen blocks covering over 200 houses. Homes were also burned on Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth. In addition, much damage occurred between St. Louis and Missouri Avenues, and also between Thirteenth and Fifteenth Streets. Even after the soldiers' arrival, the *Journal* reported killings.⁵³

Fleeing Blacks were repeatedly refused shelter by whites who, though they did not take part in the riot, had apparently taken sides.⁵⁴ The city hall auditorium was opened as a place of refuge for the terrified wounded and suffering.

There are conflicting reports as to the number of persons killed. However, all accounts seem to agree that more than a hundred Blacks died, as well as nine whites.⁵⁵ The Congressional Inves-

'It became evident to Black soldiers that the enemy was not in Germany; that they had been spilling blood for the wrong cause.'

tigating Committee official report of thirty-nine Blacks killed fell far short of the correct figure. There were reports of Black bodies buried without inquest or identification, because the coroner's office thought post-mortem to be useless — a waste of time and money. It was also reported that many of the bodies thrown into the creek were never recovered.⁵⁶ During this entire riot, Blacks had remained relatively passive, making little effort to defend themselves; their main goal had been to escape into St. Louis. Those who stayed to defend themselves and their property were destroyed.

At about 8:30 on the evening of July 2, small groups of Blacks decided to take a defensive stand. They stationed themselves between Eleventh and Thirteenth Streets; between Thirteenth and Fifteenth Streets they returned fire as whites drove by in cars. There seemed to have been no real counterattack by Blacks, despite the attempt by certain editors to manufacture one.⁵⁷ The National Guard organized an intensive investigation, searching every Black home which was not destroyed by fire, for guns and other dangerous weapons.⁵⁸

Whites spread rumors that Blacks from nearby areas were planning an attack on the white community. No evidence is found of such retaliation from the surrounding areas of Belleville, Brooklyn, and Alton. The *Chicago Defender*, which was at the time labeled a militant newspaper, reported that a Black army had entered East St. Louis from outside to fight on behalf of the Black victims in the downtown riot area. It stated that "the younger members of the Race are not afraid to die."⁵⁹

Dr. W. E. B. DuBois did a brief account of the riot in East St. Louis following a visit to the area just after 1917. His view depicts a more

defensive Black community.

"So hell flamed in East St. Louis! The white men drove even black union men out of their unions and when the black men, beaten by night and assaulted, fled to arms and shot back at the marauders, five thousand rioters arose and surged like a crested stormwave, from Monday until midnight; they killed and beat and murdered; they dashed out the brains of children and stripped off the clothes of women; they drove victims into the flames and hanged the helpless to the lighting poles. Fathers were killed before the faces of mothers; children were burned, heads were cut off with axes; pregnant women crawled and spawned in dark, wet fields; thieves went through houses and firebrands followed; bodies were thrown from bridges and rocks and bricks flew through the air. The Negroes fought. They grappled with the mob like beasts at bay. They drove them back from the thicket cluster of their homes and piled the white dead on the Street, but the cunning mob caught the black men between factories and their homes, where they knew they were armed only with their dinner pails. Firemen, policemen and militiamen stood with hanging heads or even joined eagerly with the mob."⁶⁰

Regardless of the position taken, it is understandable that Blacks were not as successful in self-defense as many would have desired.

Blacks had believed that the militia would offer them safety from attack, but there was, at best, a reluctance to provide this safety — and Blacks, unprepared and unaided, were frightened into a kind of frozen inactivity. In addition, many Blacks in 1917 had yet to go through decades of further oppression and suffering at the hands of a profit-oriented, corporate society, before freeing themselves of their unduly trusting "faith" in the vain promises of

established institutions to include them among the recipients of the benefits of the "American way." Even as Black people had not in 1917 outgrown this optimism and naivete born of disunity and vulnerability, neither had they yet cast off an attitude of accepting nonresistance to brutality at the hands of their white oppressors. In addition, Black pedestrians in East St. Louis were heavily outnumbered by whites in the business area of the city where most of the rioting had occurred. The violence had erupted on the periphery of a small Black district and spread to the center of this district, where there were a relatively small number of Black homes. The rioters had avoided entering the larger Black district, not far from the riot zone. Had they done so, there is at least a possibility that they would have encountered a stiffer resistance, and retaliation on a larger scale.


In the main, whites failed in their attempts to drive all Blacks out of East St. Louis; for many stayed and some who had fled returned. Race hatred persisted, however, and both whites and Blacks believed that the racial undercurrents were deeper and more dangerous than ever. Regarding the temporary and hollow victory gained by whites in driving hundreds of Blacks out of East St. Louis, DuBois asserts that:

"If the white workmen of East St. Louis felt that Negro workers would not and could not take the bread and cake from their mouths, their race hatred would never have been translated into murder. If the black working men of the South could earn a decent living under decent circumstances at home, they would not be compelled to underbid their white fellows. . . . In the great organizing of men for work, a few of the participants come out with more wealth than they can possibly use, while a vast number emerge

with less than can decently support life."⁶¹

Democracy in action

During this period of racial conflict, East St. Louis, a great industrial center, lost 6,000 laborers for the development of its plants. The shortage of labor presented ad-



JULY 28, 1917. Harlem demonstration against East St. Louis pogrom.

ditional problems, augmented by the fact that Europe also needed labor. Industrialists throughout the nation had come to realize that Black skilled laborers, as well as common laborers, were indispensable to industrial supremacy.

National reaction to the conflict in East St. Louis was very critical; although some newspapers did not publish detailed accounts of the incidents, the more militant papers demanded justice for the victims and prosecution of looters, murderers, and arsonists.⁶²

Traditionally (according to southerners), the North had been hypocritically harsh in criticizing the way the South treated Black people. Now, southerners seemed happy that northerners had demonstrated

that they, too, were capable of barbarous acts.

The riots had shattered the expectations of thousands of Blacks and whites who thought that Black-white relations in the North would be different and more rewarding. Comparatively speaking, therefore, the entire history of the East St. Louis riots seemed to surpass the oppres-

sively racist-oriented historical Southern attitude in reacting to the "Black threat." However, it was not so much the threat of poverty, but, in a sense, fear of death—the death of the dream of white economic and political supremacy—which haunted both the white racist employers and their subject employees. Newspaper editors sensed the political and economic implications, attributing the conflict to these factors.

Black leaders spoke out against the riot and the rioters, asserting that Black people must either share in the future economic and political democracy of America or overturn it. They also noted that labor leaders and politicians in East St. Louis had profited from degradation, colonial exploitation, and economic

and political oppression of Black people.

Estimated property damages amounted to somewhere between \$1.4 million and \$3 million. Approximately 312 buildings had been destroyed, 750 persons injured, and 44 railroad freight cars burned. As has always been the case, there were numerous suggestions and recommendations for investigation and correction of the matter. Blacks put little faith in these, for they were fast learning that such suggestions were a prelude to avoidance and to the furtherance of the establishment's do-nothing policy. There were local and regional investigations; congressional investigations; Military Board hearings; Council of Defense hearings; and an investigation by a select committee of the condition of the State of Illinois. There were speculations by newspaper editors as to the underlying factors, as well as the immediate causes, of the riots.⁶³ And that is all there were—investigations.

The NAACP organized a "Silent Protest Parade" in response to the violence. Ten thousand Blacks marched down Fifth Avenue in New York with banners which read: "Thou shalt not kill"; "Give me a chance to live!"—and with a message to the president asking him to "Make America safe for democracy." It seemed evident to Black leaders that if something substantial were not done by the government, more violence would occur, not only in Illinois, but in many other parts of the nation. It also became very evident to Black soldiers, as well as to the Black community, that the enemy was not in Germany or certain regions of America, but that he was to be found throughout the ranks of the corporate capitalists and would-be capitalists, on the one hand, and among the labor leaders on the other. Indeed, they had been spilling blood for the wrong

cause and shooting the wrong people. It became clear that whites believed they had every right over Blacks—that they should have all privileges and positions in established institutions and industries in preference to Black citizens. Whites had, in other words, come to define themselves, their position in society, and their actions, on the basis of their *whiteness* and what it had come to mean in the American society, in relation to what *blackness* had come to mean.

There were two overriding concerns. The first was in regard to the identification, prosecution, and conviction of white rioters; and the second was related to the reduction of competition between Blacks and whites which, it was thought, would reduce the causes of the conflict. The first concern became very difficult to implement; the political machine in East St. Louis was reluctant to indict—making the excuse that it was too problematic to obtain substantial evidence and that eyewitnesses could not be found. Therefore, all of the defendants were released after a preliminary hearing for lack of evidence.⁶⁴ However, as a result of a protest to the governor of Illinois, a grand jury investigation began. Between mid-August and the beginning of September, 149 persons, including the mayor, were indicted. The charges against Mayor Mollman were dropped. The "prevention philosophy" prevailed; if the majority of the persons formerly indicted and arrested were convicted, it would deter the future rioters, not only in East St. Louis, but also in other parts of the country. The outcome of this situation, it was thought, could serve as an example to the nation. The future was to prove this notion incorrect.

A disproportionate number of Blacks were charged with and convicted of murder, while whites

agreed with the prosecuting officials to accept the minimum penalty for a plea of guilty to the charge of rioting or conspiracy to riot. Only four whites were charged with murder. It was very obvious that there was still no justice to be obtained through the courts on behalf of Blacks. Indeed, the officials seemed to display no sense of moral responsibility—not to mention any legal principle of accountability—to the Black community.⁶⁵

The sentences bargained for whites ranged from ten days to thirty days in prison, and from ten dollars to fifty dollars in fines.⁶⁶ Seven policemen who were charged with homicide and rioting got off with fines for rioting—the homicide charges were dismissed.⁶⁷

The *Argus* criticized the conduct of the entire proceedings and what it called the inadequate defense the Black defendants received in the trials.⁶⁸

The *Belleville Daily Advocate* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* did report that the defense lawyer, Silas Cook, put up a vigorous fight, realizing that the jury would hesitate to convict whites for killing Blacks. Cook demanded the death penalty.

Although two white men were sentenced to fourteen years in prison, Black leaders and a few Black newspaper editors asserted that the sentence should have been greater.⁶⁹ Others were glad for partial victory—which was, to them, some indication that a modicum of justice might be obtained in the courts. City officials and industrial leaders were relieved at having a case to refer to should the city be accused of racism in its refusal to convict whites for murdering Blacks.⁷⁰

Three other persons were eventually convicted of accidentally killing a white hardware merchant who was reported to have been a source of supply of weapons to Blacks.⁷¹

NOTES

1. "East St. Louis Riot" (House Document 1231, 65th Congress, 2nd Session), printed in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 56, Ct. 9 (65th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1918), p. 8826.

2. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 440, 657, 710, 1019, 1641.

3. *Chicago Commission of Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922), pp. 234-35.

4. *East St. Louis Daily Journal* (hereafter cited as *Journal*), October 9, 10, 11, 19, 22, and 24, 1916.

5. *Ibid.*, October 24, 1916.

6. *Ibid.*, September 28 and December 16, 1916.

7. *Ibid.*, October 19, 1916.

8. *St. Louis Argus*, October 20, 1916. See also "Congressional Hearings," pp. 471-72.

9. *Journal*, November 1, 1916.

10. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1916.

11. *Journal*, August 16, 1916; *Chicago Daily News*, October 11, 1916; *Chicago Defender*, October 28, 1916; *News-Democrat*, November 10, 1916.

12. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 6, 1916. Hereafter cited as *Tribune*.

13. *Chicago Herald*, November 4, 1916. Hereafter cited as *Herald*.

14. *Tribune*, November 6, 7, 1916.

15. *Ibid.*, November 4, 1916.

16. *Herald*, November 4, 1916; *St. Louis Republic*, November 4, 1916 (hereafter cited as *Republic*). See also *Journal*, November 5, 1916.

17. *New York Times*, November 15, 1916; *Daily Advocate*, January 15, 1917.

18. *People v. Gerald: Reports of Cases at Law in Chaucery, Argued and Determined in Supreme Court of Illinois—Illinois Reports* (CCLXV, 1915, pp. 448-86). See also *Journal*, March 11, 15, and 29, 1914; April 28, 29, 1914; December 9, 17, and 20, 1914; February 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16, 1915; *Post-Dispatch*, December 17, 1914; February 3, 10, 12, and 16, 1915.

19. "Congressional Hearings," p. 4565. House Document, pp. 8829-30.

20. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 168, 3812-23, 4596-99, 4438-40;

House Document, p. 8830; *Journal*, July 5, 6, 1917; March 22, 1915; *St. Louis Times*, July 5, 1916; *Globe-Democrat*, October 20, 1917.

21. *Journal*, October 13, 19, and 20, 1916; *Daily News*, October 17, 18, and 19, 1916; *Chicago Evening Post*, October 18, 1916; *Daily Advocate*, October 20, 1916; *Republic*, October 18, 1916, and November 26, 1917; see also *Herald*, October 18, 19, 1916.

22. *Journal*, March 6 and 30, April 14, 1917.

23. House Document, p. 8830.

24. "Illinois State Council of Defense Hearings," p. 26. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1513-15, 28.

25. *Journal*, December 13, 1916; "Congressional Hearings," pp. 215-53, 2245, 2039-42; *News-Democrat*, April 19, 1917.

26. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1507, 2219-20, 2244.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 2155.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 1951, 2168-69, 2231-32, 2241, 2262, 4307-08, 2315, 2167-68, 2259; *Journal*, April 23, 1917.

29. *Ibid.*, April 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 1917. See also May 6, 1917; *News-Democrat*, April 23, 1917; *Republic*, April 20, 1917.

30. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1448, 1495-97, 1660, 3900-71, 4005-62.

31. *Journal*, April 22, 23, 24, and May 31, 1917; *St. Louis Times*, April 27, 1917; *Defender*, October 27, 1917; "Congressional Hearings," pp. 2455.

32. *Journal*, May 11, 1917; *Post-Dispatch*, October 31, 1917; "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1869-70, 3122.

33. *Republic*, May 24, 1917; *Journal*, May 24, 1917.

34. *Globe-Democrat*, May 29, July 8, 1917; *Post-Dispatch*, May 29, 1917; *Journal*, May 29, 1917.

35. See W. E. B. DuBois, *Dark Water* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1920), pp. 92-93.

36. *Journal*, May 17 and 28, 1917; *Republic*, May 28, 1917; "Congressional Hearings," p. 2134; *News-Democrat*, May 14, 1917. Also, "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1872, 3125, 3146, 3182, 3869, 4364.

37. *Journal*, May 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, and 25, 1917; *Republic*, May 24, 1917; *Globe-Democrat*, May 25, 1917.

38. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1782, 2026, 2401-02, 3162-63, 3169; "Council of Defense Hearings," pp. 6-13.

39. *Journal*, May 29, 1917.

40. *Argus*, June 1, 1917.

41. *Republic*, May 30, 1917; *Argus*, June 1, 1917.

42. *Argus*, May 31, June 1 and 8, 1917; *Republic*, May 31, June 1, 1917; *Post-Dispatch*, May 31, June 1, 1917; *Globe-Democrat*, May 31, June 1, 1917; *Journal*, May 31, June 1, 1917.

43. *Globe-Democrat*, May 30 and July 7, 1917; *East St. Louis Star*, May 30, 1917.

44. Report of the Labor Committee, Illinois State Council of Defense, June 30, 1917, pp. 3-4.

45. *Journal*, June 18, 25, and 26, 1917.

46. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 687, 1078, 1352-54, 2133, 3532, 3631. See also Rudwick, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

47. *Republic*, July 2, 1917; *Post-Dispatch*, July 2, 1917; *Globe-Democrat*, July 2 and 8, 1917; "Military Board Hearings," p. 154.

48. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 251-52, 403, 546-47, 557-62, 2038; "The East St. Louis Riot," House of Representatives Document No. 1231, *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, July 5, 1918, p. 8826; *People v. Evanhoff*, Circuit Court (September Term, 1917, pp. 2-3, 15-16).

49. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 3100-01, 3653. "Military Board Hearings," pp. 14-15, 568, 627.

50. "Military Board Hearings," pp. 320, 394-96, 468.

51. *People v. Evanhoff, et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 3; "Military Board Hearings," pp. 319-41; *News-Democrat*, July 3, 1917.

52. *People v. Evanhoff, et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; *People v. Richard Brockway*, Circuit Court (September Term, 1917, p. 61); "Military Board Hearings," p. 332.

53. *Journal*, July 5, 1917.

54. *Daily Advocate*, July 3, 1917; "Military Board Hearings," p. 67

55. *Congressional Record*, LVI (1918), p. 1654; Eighth and Ninth Annual Reports of the NAACP, 1917-18 (New York: 1919), p. 90; NAACP Branch Bulletin, I (1917), p. 53; W. E. B. DuBois and Martha Gruening, "One

Massacre of East St. Louis," *Crisis*, XIV (1917), p. 219; *Defender*, July 7, 1917; House Document, p. 8828; *Globe-Democrat*, July 18, 1917; *News-Democrat*, July 18, 1917; *Post-Dispatch*, July 15, 1917; *Cleveland Gazette*, July 7, 14, and November 10, 1917.

56. "Military Board Hearings," p. 632; "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1230, 1248, 1250; *Globe-Democrat*, July 5 and August 15, 1917; "St. Clair County Grand Jury Report," pp. 333-39; Illinois Attorney General's Report 1917-18 (Springfield: 1918), pp. 16-18.

57. "Congressional Hearings," pp. 1424-38, 1691-94, 1785-87; *Post-Dispatch*, July 3, 1917; *Journal*, July 3, 1917; *Republic*, July 3, 1917.

58. "Military Board Hearings," pp. 78, 471-74, 556, 560-61.

59. *Defender*, July 7, 1917.

60. W. E. B. DuBois, *Dark Water*, pp. 94-95.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

62. *Crisis*, XIV (1917), p. 300; *New York Times*, July 29, 1917.

63. Ninth Report of the NAACP, 1918, p. 10; *Cleveland Gazette*, July 7, 1917.

64. "Military Board Hearings," pp. 116-17.

65. *News-Democrat*, October 26, 1917; *Defender*, November 3, 1917, and April 20, 1918; *The Messenger*, July 1918, pp. 9-10.

66. *Journal*, December 4 and 10, 1917; *Daily Advocate*, December 3, 1917; "Congressional Hearings," pp. 3648-49.

67. *Journal*, February 6 and 8, 1918.

68. *Argus*, February 8, 1918; *People v. Parker*, October 1917; *People v. Bundy*, March 1919.

69. *Defender*, October 20, 1917.

70. *Journal*, October 19, 1917; *News-Democrat*, November 15, 1917.

71. *Journal*, October 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 23, 1917; *Globe-Democrat*, October 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 23, 1917; *Post-Dispatch*, October 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 23, 1917; *News-Democrat*, October 18, 1917; *Daily Advocate*, October 18, 19, and 22, 1917; *Defender*, October 20 and 27, 1917.



May 15, 1955, fixed a 50 percent reduction on the payment that the state was supposed to receive in the form of copper taxes or royalties.

The "simplification" of types of exchange rates and the devaluation of the Chilean peso by nearly 60 percent was also an indirect form of aiding foreign investors. Furthermore, the economic agreements that stimulated yankee imports impoverished the country, draining its capital, and making it depend even more on loans granted by financial organizations controlled by New York or Washington. This explains why at the end of Ibañez's administration there was an average of 9 percent unemployment in the city of Santiago and an increase of 8 percent in the number of families on the rolls of the *villas callampas* [literally, "mushroom towns"; here, sprawling slums].

Meanwhile, in 1955, the workers' movement, which had been struggling to overcome its atomization since 1949, created the CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores Chilenos [Central Union of Chilean Workers]), headed by Clotario Blest. The struggle for higher wages, for plant-wide collective bargaining, and for greater democratic freedoms made up the axes of the demands. In May 1954, as Ibañez's restrictive policy sharpened and inflation eroded meager wages, the imprisonment of Clotario Blest touched off a twenty-four-hour general strike for his release and the release of all trade-union and political prisoners.

Emergence of the FRAP

The Partido Socialista Popular [PSP—Popular Socialist Party],

which had withdrawn from the government in 1953, launched the slogan for a workers' front, and on March 1, 1956, signed the founding statement of the Frente de Acción Popular [FRAP—Popular Action Front], in which the CP, the PSP, the Demócratas del Pueblo [People's Democrats], and other minor groups participated.

Obviously the FRAP was a consequence on the one hand of Ibañez's even more reactionary turn (paralleling the demands of the Chilean bourgeoisie to make the exploited masses pay for the crisis and the penetration of yankee imperialism), and on the other hand, of the process of radicalization of broad layers of the middle class and the workers' movement, disillusioned with all the bourgeois variants that had been unable to surmount Chile's chronic crisis.

The reunification of the Socialists within a single organization was also a product of this dual phenomenon. The situation created in 1949 was repeated in 1957. A new hike in transport tariffs unleashed a violent reaction from students that was accompanied by true workers' and popular uprisings in Valparaíso and Santiago. Once again, however, this wave of revolt would not be deepened or broadened but rather would be channeled into a parliamentary course. The 1958 elections were the instrument that the old reformist parties were able to use to divert working-class forces from their fundamental objective, which should have been the struggle for power.

A new offensive against the masses began under Jorge Alessandri (who triumphed [in the 1958 presidential elections] thanks to the fact that the priest of Catapilco received 44,000 votes).* The workers tried

*The 1958 presidential elections were very closely contested. Alessandri won with 387,292 votes, barely defeating Salvador Allende who received 352,915 ballots. An unfrocked priest who entered the contest at the last minute received 44,000 votes that would otherwise have gone to Allende. — *ISR*

to block this offensive, but the CUT and FRAP leaders prevented the resistance from being generalized.

Alessandri's government was a government of the bourgeoisie as a whole, oligarchic and proyankee in character, yet not representing the interests of any particular sector of the ruling class. The danger of a FRAP victory forced the old oligarchy to compromise with the industrial sectors, and forced all of them to tie themselves up with the dominant imperialism. For this reason, Alessandri's government would be more proimperialist than any up to then. This is not to say that earlier ones were anti-imperialist, but rather to point up that at least they attempted to negotiate their surrender. On the other hand, Alessandri went to the extreme of wanting to liquidate the [government] petroleum and electricity [monopolies], which no other government had dared to do. His submission to the dictates of the OAS (the expulsion of Cuba), the adoption of free trade (with the virtual elimination of INACO [Instituto Nacional de la Construcción—National Construction Institute]), the loans taken out at unfair interest, further accentuated Chile's semicolonial character.

Needless to say, during this period no relatively strong bourgeois sector emerged to attempt an effective resistance. The weak national bourgeoisie, accounting for only the 10 percent of copper and saltpeter production represented by Cuevas Mackena (the rest being controlled by imperialism), could not put itself forward as a serious opposition. The industrial bourgeois sector (semiheavy industry) for its part had no scruples about becoming a partner of imperialism, transferring part of its stocks to yankee investors, as in the case of Huachipato. And finally, light industry, particularly that which produced for the domestic market, also weakened by the introduction of new imports, didn't plan any resistance either.

It is this situation that explains the FRAP. The nationalist designs

"The Christian Democracy's policy of 'nationalizing' copper resembled Mobutu's in the Congo: it was done in complete agreement with imperialism."



EDUARDO FREI. Former Christian Democratic president of Chile.

that were followed from the 1936-45 Popular Front up to Ibañism did not succeed in shaping a single strong and cohesive organization. With the intensification of imperialist pressures, Allendism became the most solid attempt to give form to this current. It is not accidental that sectors that worked alongside Ibañez during his early years joined it: the CP and the PSP (now reunited with the Chilean SP), the medium-sized mining companies, such as Cuevas Mackena, Ibañez's most populist wing (Foncea and Mamerto), and part of the Partido Radical Doctrinario [Orthodox Radical Party] led by Rudecindo Ortega.

The fact that the strongest sectors that joined the FRAP were the SP and the CP led many to think of this structure as a proletarian united front. This error was later continued with the establishment of the Unidad Popular. But as Marxists we have the obligation to specify class character. The FRAP was a very contradictory phenomenon. On the one hand, programmatically it was a bourgeois-nationalist movement; on the other hand, however, it had a petty-bourgeois, not bourgeois, leadership.

The third element adding to the confusion is that the social base of this movement was provided by the working class and popular sectors combined in the two reformist parties. In this sense it resembled Peronism, with the difference that in Chile the working class is incorporated into these two big working-class parties, even though, as we said, they are reformist. From this we consider Allendism a nationalist movement or front rather than a proletarian united front, despite the fact that the bourgeois sectors are in the minority.

Allende's working-class base is the element that serves to show how his movement differs from the 1936-45 Popular Front. During that entire period the bourgeoisie was the axis of the coalition. The working-class parties provided the votes and support, but it was the Radical

Party that controlled and led everything. Not only was the program much more lukewarm, but so was the policy that was enacted.

When Aguirre Cerda signed the agreement he promised to begin a land reform, and the CP for its part promised not to organize the peasants in unions. It goes without saying that Aguirre Cerda did nothing to transfer the land to those who worked it, but the CP did keep its pledge. It is this difference that explains why the farming zones have always been the base of support for reaction and why this situation is now beginning to change, as demonstrated by the last parliamentary elections [March 4, 1973].

"Revolution in Freedom": Land reform and Chileanization

We have already said that none of the events in Latin America can be understood if one forgets for a moment the strategy outlined by yankee imperialism. But within this strategy there is also that of the Catholic church. In Chile the traditional bourgeois parties were unable to appear as a populist alternative before the masses. Alessandri ended his government in neither embarrassment nor glory. At this stage the Radical Party no longer had the strength it had during the forties. The best electoral perspective for the purpose of imperialism was that offered by the Christian Democracy.

Following World War II, the Catholic church, conscious of the change that had taken place internationally, also changed. It cloaked its policy for Latin America of supporting the old landholding oligarchies, unconditionally tied to English imperialism, with a "social," "developmentalist" mantle, so as to be able to go along with the new dominant imperialism and prevent broad popular layers from turning toward more radical positions. The Christian Democratic parties with a petty-bourgeois base were the instruments of this readjustment of the church.

Neocapitalist development — the

incorporation of new branches of production, such as chemicals, electronics, automobiles, etc.—required a broadening of the domestic market. Hence the policy of the Chilean Christian Democracy. Its class interests, linked to the industrial momentum following 1945, led it to advocate land reform; a land reform looked upon favorably by imperialism, but opposed by the National Association of Agriculture. With this policy it gained the support of broad sectors of the peasantry, at the same time that important layers of the middle class and proletariat were given false hopes by the prospects raised through the well-known slogan of "Revolución en Libertad" [Revolution in Freedom].

The 1964 electoral triumph [of the Christian Democratic Party] should not be a surprise, especially if it is kept in mind that Alessandri decided to support [Christian Democratic candidate Eduardo] Frei, together with the liberals (following the partial victory of the Socialist candidate Naranjo in a traditionally conservative bastion in Southern Chile shortly before the general elections).

The "developmentalism" imposed by Frei was nothing more than national accommodation to the penetration of yankee imperialism. His support to ALALC [Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio—Latin American Association of Free Trade], inspired by the North Americans during its early stage, was part of this accommodation. Public investments in companies producing capital goods, and not consumer goods as during Alessandri's term, were also part of the period that opened up.

The Christian Democracy therefore represents the interests of the Chilean bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie that linked up with neocapitalism. Its policy of "nationalizing" copper resembled Mobutu's in the Congo: it was done in complete agreement with imperialism; even with much goodwill. In referring to the agreements, the business magazine *Hanson's American*

Letters stated:

"No government [referring to Chile] has treated North American companies so generously in the contracts it signed as Frei's."

This excessively flattering treatment was so lacking in balance and judgment and so prejudicial to Chilean interests that it almost provoked hilarity in Washington. In an addendum to issue No. 105 of *Punto Final*, André Gunder Frank and Gladys Diaz thoroughly studied what the [U. S.-owned copper] companies received, thanks to Frei's "nationalization of copper." Among the facts brought to light is the extra price that was paid as a result of Chileanization.

In order to get an idea of this, we should know, for example, that in 1963 El Teniente's book-value was US\$65 million, and in 1967, US\$72 million. Nevertheless, the Christian Democratic government accepted an overvaluation of the mine at US\$160 million, which meant that US\$81 million had to be paid for only 51 percent of the shares. In his May 21, 1971, speech Allende brought out how, after Chileanization, the companies experienced a fabulous increase in profits. Braden Copper Co., which became La Sociedad Minera El Teniente, went from US\$8.5 million in 1965 to US\$40.5 million in 1970, and the Anaconda Co. increased its profits from US\$187.8 million for the period 1965-67 to US\$239.8 million for the same span in 1968-70. But this wasn't all.

During Frei's administration there was a lot of propaganda about the expansion of mining and a US\$600 million investment that the foreign companies would make. When Allende came to power he discovered that the mixed enterprises owed the government US\$632.4 million. But worst of all, production had remained practically stagnant.

Gunder Frank and Gladys Diaz conclude by summarizing what yankee imperialism owes the Chilean people. The concept of unrepaid value, minus the investments, plus the difference in the price of copper unilaterally set by the United

States during the Korean and Vietnam wars, plus the price difference due to depreciation, add up to a total of US\$3.1 billion. If we add to this sum US\$3 billion in interest which is also part of this swindle, the total figure comes to US\$6.1 billion. Obviously, Frei's government wasn't the best qualified to defend the national interests when it agreed to Chileanize copper.

Rise of the mass movement

The bloodless revolution that Frei had promised was transformed in the end to blood without a revolution. In 1967 a new mass upsurge began that was marked by nearly 2,500 conflicts involving more than 2 million workdays in strikes. This rising continued throughout 1968 and 1969.

This popular ferment resulted during 1969 in 3,024,000 workdays lost in "illegal" strikes and 931,000 in "legal" strikes. The Mademsa Madeco and Fensa conflicts and the Metalpar, Famela, and Somela occupations culminated in May-June 1969 in the Marina Mercante Nacional and railroad conflicts, and in the first big national peasant strike (May 1969).

Now the struggles of the peasants and the "mushroom towns" were added to those of the workers' movement. The land occupations in Santiago (Barrancas, La Reina, Conchali, etc.), in Concepción (Partal and San Miguel), and the massacre of the people of Puerto Montt revealed, on the one hand, the class character of the Frei government, incapable of solving the most urgent problems of the downtrodden sectors, and, on the other hand, the generalized fighting spirit of this same exploited people.

From a figure of 94,000 agricultural workers in 1936, the total has gone up to 250,000 to date; and while the *inquilino* [tenant farmer] sector dropped from 107,000 to 76,000, the small latifundistas [rural landowners] rose to nearly 200,000. This explains how, in step with the demagogic posture

of the Christian Democracy, the number of organized workers has also risen. By December 31, 1969, there were 394 trade unions with 103,644 members. As we know, during the first big general strike this process took the form of demanding plant-wide collective bargaining. But the key to the period is found in the numerous and repeated occupations of rural lands. In 1969 there were twenty-five occupations in the zone of Norte Chico, forty-four in the Melipilla zone, and a number of others in Curicó. The taking of hostages and setting up of barricades was one of the forms of the peasant rising.

For its part, the squatters' movement of this period began to gain momentum during the fifties. A precedent was the agrarian and salt-peter crisis in 1920-30, which drove many families to the main urban centers. The "conventillos" [tenement houses] date from that period. The current urban squatters' movement was stimulated by the process of industrialization that occurred from 1940 to 1960. New families from the interior moved mainly into Santiago and Concepción in hopes of finding work. These were the proletarian and semiproletarian forces that carried out the neighborhood takeovers that contributed to creating the revolutionary atmosphere that Chile is experiencing today.

Another important sector that furthered the general radicalization was the student sector, although because of the fatal guidance of the CP and SP, in 1969 it began to succumb to electoralism and endless discussion about the famous university reform. This policy ended in bringing victory to the Christian Democracy during the last elections for the post of rector of the Central University [April 27, 1972].

As we've stated, 1967 marked a qualitative jump in the mass struggle. After having been on the defensive the masses went over to the offensive. The economic deterioration was the basis of this new radicalization, which spread during 1968 and 1969 and culminated in the 1970 electoral triumph of the

UP. It was this objective situation that provided the structural base for the Unidad Popular.

Rise and triumph of the Unidad Popular

The failure of the "Revolution in Freedom" revived the agreement between the Socialist and Communist parties to channel the rise of the masses toward the electoral process. The Unidad Popular has the same characteristics in program, composition, and leadership as the FRAP did in 1958. That is to say that it is a nationalist front rather than a proletarian united front. But it is a nationalist front whose particular feature is that it is basically made up of the two big reformist working-class parties; a nationalist front that exists in a period of profound sharpening of the class struggle and the general upsurge.

This fact and the fact that it is the reformist workers' parties that control the leadership, distinguishes it from the 1936 Popular Front. Unfortunately, the terminology used by Stalinism has served to confuse the entire left. Popular Fronts emerged in Europe especially after Hitler had risen to power in Germany and the frightened Soviet bureaucracy took a turn to the right in search of antifascist and democratic bourgeoisies.

The highest expression of these Popular Fronts appeared in France. Trotsky defined it as a coalition between the proletariat and the imperialist bourgeoisie. The Communist Party contributed as much to this diversion as did the French Socialist Party. And the Radical Party, a middle-class party in the service of the imperialist policy of the French bourgeoisie, led the entire process that culminated in an electoral triumph and, in this way, handcuffed the workers' movement, which stayed behind the Communist and Socialist parties. This characterization does not apply to either the FRAP of 1958 or the Unidad Popular of 1970.

This does not mean that Popular

Fronts cannot appear in the colonial or semicolonial countries. We recognize that there are Popular Front elements in the Unidad Popular, and that to the extent that the Allende government comes closer to Kerenskyism, these traits will become sharper.

In the same way that we are against thinking of every alliance of workers' organization with the bourgeoisie as a "Popular Front," however, we are also against defining every bourgeois variant in colonial and semicolonial countries as anti-imperialist. An analysis must be concrete.

The nationalist process in China culminated in the fascist government of Chiang Kai-shek. But it would be incorrect to say that Trotsky was wrong when he defined it as a nationalist movement. For us, the Unidad Popular presently takes the shape of a broad democratic and agrarian anti-imperialist movement with a petty-bourgeois leadership, in which almost the entire working class, part of the peasantry, and important sectors of the middle class play a principal role. The undeniable concessions granted to the workers by the Allende government give it a bonapartist character *sui generis*, but at the same time, by being so dependent on the political and trade-union workers' organizations, its role as arbiter between imperialism and the exploited masses weakens in order to acquire Kerenskyist traits.

Whoever holds the opinion that the rise of the Unidad Popular instituted a multiparty reformist workers' government, or more timidly, that it isn't bourgeois (without being any more specific), is mistaken. The Chilean bourgeoisie as a whole accepted, or tolerated, Allende's installation in the Casa de La Moneda [the presidential palace]. Allende resolved to govern within the bourgeois legal structure—with the parliament, the police, the army, and bourgeois justice. On the other hand, the parliament, with an opposition bourgeois majority, is also part of All-

ende's government. How is it possible to ignore this fact? After October [1972], with the incorporation of the military figures into the cabinet, there can no longer be any doubts.

But just as dangerous as this opportunist interpretation is the sectarian variant that is unable to distinguish the differences between this type of bourgeois government and those that have already governed Chile. It is obvious that, independently of bourgeois consensus and the Communist Party's efforts to reach an agreement with the Christian Democracy, clashes have increased, sharpening the contradictions between the opposition bourgeoisie and the popular sectors.

The October events also served to illustrate the Kerenskyist traits that we have pointed out. If those elements of dual power and civil war that appeared did not result in an open war, it was for two reasons: on the one hand, because of the conciliatory action of Allende himself and of the two major parties that did everything possible to prevent the workers from mobilizing and organizing, and on the other hand, because of the opposition bourgeoisie's skill in knowing how to keep the process within the bourgeois framework in anticipation of a future electoral solution. But these facts should not lessen the significance of the 1970 electoral victory and the period that was opened up.

Allende's nationalism: Part of a Latin American phenomenon

The nationalization of all large-scale mining, including copper, iron, coal, saltpeter, and cement cannot be written off with the argument that it was done in sectors where imperialism no longer wants to invest or that the indemnities promised greatly surpass the cost of the concerns taken over by the state. To recognize that these nationalizations are a tremendous step forward does not mean that we consider the government that carried

them out to be a revolutionary or a workers' government. Rather it serves to prove that Allende's government differs from Frei's precisely because of its nationalist character. The Chileanization of the Christian Democracy was to serve the monopolies. Allende's nationalizations, on the other hand, were a blow to them. But we emphasize that this recognition does not mean that we give the least bit of confidence to Allende's government or to the bureaucrats charged with directing state-run industry.

Today more than ever a revolutionary policy must be followed. Such a policy must begin with support for every concrete anti-imperialist measure, but at the same time must demand that the workers' movement control the means of production that have come under state control. This is the only way to make the nationalizations serve the masses.

The bourgeois-nationalist policy of the Unidad Popular is also demonstrated in other measures. The banking system was nationalized, putting 90 percent of the credit in the hands of the state-run bank. Some ninety factories went over to the mixed state-private sphere (although successive weakening has caused this figure, currently under dispute, to drop). According to official data, these factories in the social sector accounted for 20 percent of total industrial output and some 18 percent of industrial employment.

The state itself presently controls 85 percent of foreign export trade and 45 percent of the imports. Unemployment went from 7.2 percent in 1970 to 3.9 percent in 1971. The purchasing power of the popular sectors also increased during that year: by 12 percent for salaried employees and 38 percent for agricultural and industrial workers.

In the field of housing there were clear advances: during its first year Allende's government contracted for more than 100,000 dwellings, in contrast to the 25,000 that were built in 1970.


Educational opportunities in-

"Allende resolved to govern within the bourgeois legal structure--with the parliament, the police, the army, and bourgeois justice."



Allende with Peruvian military chiefs.

"The banking system was nationalized, putting 90 percent of the credit in the hands of the state-run bank. Some ninety factories went over to the mixed state-private sphere."



A nationalized bank in Santiago. The banner reads: "A Bank More at the Service of Chile and Her People—Unidad Popular Committee of the Bank of London."

creased, as shown by the following percentage increases in registered students: 5.1 percent in secondary education, 21.1 percent in secondary humanities, 37.1 percent in secondary trade-school education, and 28 percent in university education.

In the countryside the dynamics of the reform initiated by Frei's policy were accelerated: 1,400 latifundios comprising approximately 2.3 million hectares were expropriated. This accounts for approximately 30 percent of all farm land.

To these measures one must add the collective management bodies that have been created in the various state-run concerns. Although the majority of these are bureaucratically run and the workers are a minority on them, the fact that administrative councils exist means that they can be utilized by revolutionary organizations to help develop workers' consciousness about the need to convert them into the sole administrative bodies of the country.

Despite the fact that official sources may have exaggerated these facts, it is obvious that Allende's government should not be thought of as just another bourgeois government, or worse yet, analogous to the Popular Fronts that were formed in imperialist countries such as France or the United States during the 1940s. In *Revista de América* we have attempted to explain the appearance of these phenomena that are shaking the continent, such as Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Torres in Bolivia, and now the Uruguayan military.

For us, Allende fits into the overall situation throughout Latin America, the product of two factors: on the one hand, intensification of the imperialist offensive, and on the other hand, the tremendous rise of the urban and rural masses. In Chile as elsewhere we have seen the progress of neocapitalist development, with consequent tightening of the bond between the monopolies and the state, combined with the emergence of new branches of pro-

duction, such as automobiles, petrochemicals, electronics, etc., and the spread of credit organizations.

In his pamphlet on the 1970 elections, entitled *And After the Fourth?*, [Chilean Marxist Luis] Vitale illustrates this development when he describes imperialist investments in new branches of production (see page 27 of his pamphlet). From this source we take the following facts:

In metallurgy, during the last few years, imperialist monopolies have invested in Inchalam, American Screw, and Siam di Tella; ADELA for its part has bought shares in CINTAC and COMPAC. In the automotive industry, Rockwell Standard combined with two Chilean companies and now controls the production of parts. General Motors invested through Automotora Pacifico, Ford through Chile Motores, and Chrysler through Automotora Chilena and Nun German. These investments have penetrated traditional industries, such as food and beverages.

But what is important to point out is the new categories: in explosives there is Dupont; in electronics, Phillips, RCA, and Electromet; in iron and steel, Armco; in chemicals and pharmaceuticals, Pfizer, Parke Davis, and Lepetit; and so on down the line. In 1967 Dow Chemical came into the country to exploit petroleum derivatives, and today it controls 70 percent of the stock.

This imperialist penetration and the rising of the masses that has proceeded alongside it since 1967 have accelerated the contradictions of Chilean society. It therefore is not accidental that Allendism revitalized itself in tempo with this situation and transformed itself into the highest expression of this nationalist phenomenon that—particularly since 1968—has been spreading throughout Latin America. The latest acts of the Uruguayan military corroborate our analysis. But if we linger on it, it is not for mere intellectual exercise. Defining the character of this phenomenon is important for our developing a correct policy.

For a correct characterization of a contradictory phenomenon

It is clear that if we were to draw an equals sign between the present government of Allende and the one that emerged in France under Leon Blum in 1936 we would be committing an unforgivable error. Leon Blum's government was the government of an imperialist bourgeoisie controlled through the French Radical Party, which, to be sure, relied on the support of the Socialist and Communist parties. In contrast, the Unidad Popular government is the government of a nationalist movement in a country exploited by imperialism. In the work of Trotsky that we publish in this same magazine he observes:

"The internal regime in the colonial and semi-colonial countries has a predominantly bourgeois character. But the pressure of foreign imperialism so alters and distorts the economic and political structure of these countries that the national bourgeoisie (even in the politically independent countries of South America) only partly reaches the height of a ruling class. The pressure of imperialism on backward countries does not change, it is true, their *basic* social character since the oppressor and oppressed represent only different levels of development in one and the same bourgeois society. Nevertheless the difference between England and India, Japan and China, the United States and Mexico is so big that we strictly differentiate between oppressor and oppressed bourgeois countries and we consider it our duty to support the latter against the former. The bourgeoisie of colonial and semi-colonial countries is a semi-ruling, semi-oppressed class."³

This is the case of Allende's Chile and not of Blum's France. This is

3. *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937-38*, "Not a Workers and Not a Bourgeois State?" (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p. 94.

why we deny that the Popular Front in France is the same as the Chilean Unidad Popular. But this question leads us to another: that of knowing how to use objective methods to determine the "degree of nationalism" or the "degree of progressiveness" of these nationalist movements. In the same article, Trotsky also gives us guidelines for this. There he states:

"The character of a workers' organization, such as a trade union, is determined by its relation to the distribution of national income. The fact that Green and Co. [leaders of the American Federation of Labor] defend private property in the means of production characterizes them as bourgeois. Should these gentlemen in addition defend the income of the bourgeoisie from attacks on the part of the workers; should they conduct a struggle against strikes, against the raising of wages, against help to the unemployed, then we would have an organization of scabs and not a trade union. However, Green and Co., in order not to lose their base, must lead within certain limits the struggle of the workers for an increase — or at least, against a diminution — of its share of the national income. This objective symptom is sufficient in all important cases to allow us to draw a line of demarcation between the most reactionary trade union and an organization of scabs. Thus we are duty bound not only to carry on work in the AFL, but to defend it from scabs, the Ku Klux Klan and the like."⁴ (Emphasis added.)

We believe that this approach is applicable to the Unidad Popular with respect to imperialism and pro-imperialist forces in Chile. The difference between Allende's bourgeois government and Alessandri's or Frei's should be measured by their relationship to the distribution of national income. While the latter two allowed imperialism to carry off the greater part of the national income, Allende, although using bourgeois methods and procedures,

4. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

cut off this drainage. For this reason we hold that every small revolutionary group now organizing in Chile should maintain the same policy toward Allende that Trotsky recommended for trade unions in the hands of bourgeois bureaucrats. That is, all small revolutionary groups are duty bound not only to pursue work within this nationalist movement, but to defend it against attacks from the reaction and against the possibility of a coup d'etat.

Of course, we do not confuse a trade union, which is a workers' united front organization, with a nationalist movement. But Trotsky and Lenin didn't confuse it in this sense either, pointing out that a proletarian united front proclaimed in Western countries corresponded to an anti-imperialist united front in the Eastern colonies. Thus as Lenin and Trotsky encouraged work in the bureaucratized trade unions, without capitulating to their leaders or ideology, they also recommended total and absolute independence in an anti-imperialist front:

"Only when its [the Communist Party's] importance as an independent factor is recognized and its political independence secured, are temporary agreements with bourgeois democracy permissible and necessary."⁵

But we must also not forget the lessons of these two great teachers in the noted "Theses on the Eastern Question":

"The Communist parties of the colonial and semicolonial countries which are still in a more or less embryonic stage, must take part in every movement which gives them access to the masses."⁶ (Emphasis added.)

We know that this policy poses

5. Jane Degras, editor, *The Communist International, 1919-1943—Documents*, "Theses on the Eastern Question Adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress," November 1922 (Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1971), Vol. 1, p. 390.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

the danger of falling into opportunism, but the opposite danger, that of sectarianism, stems from not seeing the contradictory, uneven, combined character of the colonial and semicolonial countries where democratic tasks, national liberation tasks, and the task of the transition to socialism, as well as building the revolutionary party, all remain to be resolved.

Unfortunately, there have not been many experiences from which we can learn. Following the death of Lenin, Stalinist domination prostituted Marxism so much that today it has become difficult to find examples of a correct policy. The theses of the first four congresses of the Third International are still a guide for action, just as the writings of Trotsky are. We should once again remember what Trotsky said regarding the government of Cárdenas in Mexico:

"In the industrially backward countries foreign capital plays a decisive role. Hence the relative weakness of the *national* bourgeoisie in relation to the *national* proletariat. This creates special conditions of state power. The government veers between foreign and domestic capital, between the weak national bourgeoisie and the relatively powerful proletariat. This gives the government a bonapartist character *sui generis*, of a distinctive character. It raises itself, so to speak, above classes. Actually, it can govern either by making itself the instrument of foreign capitalism and holding the proletariat in the chains of a police dictatorship, or by maneuvering with the proletariat and even going so far as to make concessions to it and thus gaining the possibility of a certain freedom toward the foreign capitalists."

And he continued:

"The present policy [of the Mexican government—*Trans.*] is in the second stage; its greatest conquests are the expropriations of the railroads and the oil industries.

"These measures are entirely within the domain of state capital-

ism. However, in a semi-colonial country state capitalism finds itself under the heavy pressure of private foreign capital and of its governments, and cannot maintain itself without the active support of the workers. That is why it tries, without letting the real power escape from its hands, to place on the workers' organizations a considerable part of the responsibility for the march of production in the nationalized branches of industry."⁷

Isn't this also the case of Chile at the present time? Absolutely. Doesn't the nationalization of copper, saltpeter, iron, and cement correspond to the nationalizations of oil and railroads carried out during the government of Cárdenas and that Trotsky termed "its greatest conquests"? Is it or isn't it true that Allende's government "finds itself under the heavy pressure of private foreign capital and of its governments," and that it "cannot maintain itself without the active support of the workers"? If this were not the case, how do we explain the attempts by ITT to provoke a coup d'état to prevent Allende from assuming power? Or Kennecott's legal proceedings, attempting to put an embargo on copper sold by the Chilean state? Or that yankee imperialism has decreased its purchases from Chile and frozen diplomatic relations? And finally, how do we explain how the entire Chilean bourgeoisie submitted to the general strike by truck owners and small businessmen in October 1972 that caused a loss of more than US\$200 million?

The limitations of Allendism

The consideration that we've already dwelt sufficiently with the limitations of any bourgeois movement notwithstanding, in order not to leave any doubt on the policy we are recommending we return to a

7. *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1938-39*, "Nationalized Industry and Workers' Management" (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969), p. 87.

paragraph from the "Theses on the Eastern Question" that we completely agree with, so as to show that these same limitations apply to the Allendist regime:

"The bourgeois nationalists' fear (in India, Persia, Egypt) of the agrarian watchwords, and their anxiety to prune them down as far as possible, bear witness to the close connection between the native bourgeoisie and the feudal and feudal-bourgeois landlords, and to the intellectual and political dependence of the former on the latter. These vacillations and hesitations must be used by all revolutionary elements for the systematic criticism and exposure of the timidity of the bourgeois leaders of the nationalist movements. It is precisely this timidity which places obstacles in the way of organizing and rallying the working masses, as the bankruptcy of the non-co-operation tactics in India shows."⁸

Although here one speaks about the national bourgeoisie in relation to the land problem, this characterization can be extended to all fields. The experiences of Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia in 1952 and Torres twenty years later, of Haya de la Torre in Peru, and Perón in Argentina make it unnecessary for us to further enlarge upon the dubious, timid character of national bourgeoisies faced with carrying out the bourgeois-democratic tasks. That is, our characterization of Allendism as an anti-imperialist, democratic, agrarian, and nationalist movement with a petty-bourgeois leadership doesn't mean that we underestimate the limitations that Lenin and Trotsky already pointed out about the nationalist bourgeoisies in the East during the early twenties. On the contrary. This is why we will pause a while in our analysis of the political economy of the Unidad Popular, so as to examine some of the limitations of the so-called Chilean road.

The government's first year was one of euphoria. The nationaliza-

8. Degras, op. cit., pp. 386-87.

tion of copper and other natural resources brought Allende US\$60 million in profit, which, for the first time, was not transferred abroad. This US\$60 million served to create a better distribution of wealth. Thanks to this, family consumption could rise by 13 percent, bringing to 60 percent the share of wages in the national product. But during the second year, it became clear that these measures were not sufficient. Spiraling inflation, aggravated by the decline in the price of copper and by the need to buy more food-stuffs abroad (there was already a deficit during Frei's government), reached unforeseen heights.

Faced with this situation, the Unidad Popular decided to authorize new wage increases and tolerate price rises in non-nationalized industries. This policy obviously didn't only help the workers, but also the industrial bourgeoisie (especially the "intermediate" or "dynamic" sector) and the commercial bourgeoisie that profited from the greater buying power of the masses and from the freezing of prices on articles made in factories that had gone over to the social sector. The maintenance of these politically determined prices aimed at those bourgeois sectors that, in spite of everything, couldn't be either won over or neutralized, as the "brains" of the Unidad Popular had hoped. This failure to win over the "dynamic" sector of the bourgeoisie was a result of the latter's quite concrete policy: to take over all the surplus value won from imperialism through the nationalizations and not to share it with the mass movement.

While Allende increased the tempo of production, and production itself broke all records, creating the illusion that this was the way to build socialism, the same Allende made it clear that distribution and trade would remain in the hands of the "national bourgeoisie." The October events suffice to demonstrate what this lame policy was good for.

At the same time, the shortages of the most essential goods were used by the entire bourgeois opposition. Street demonstrations by

sectors of the upper class beating empty pots have become the best instrument of reactionary agitation since the middle of 1972. Instead of going ahead with its plan for nationalizations, the government cut back on its initial objective. Of 200 factories that were scheduled to go over to the social sector, the number dropped to 90, and recently the Communist Minister of the Economy in turn introduced a different plan, reducing them to 44.

With respect to the plan to create a state-run distribution network, another step backward was taken. Frightened by the truck owners' strike, Allende pledged to uphold private ownership, and he stopped talking about creating an official body to control all distribution. As could be expected, these concessions on the economic plane were paralleled on the political plane.

Instead of developing organizations of workers' power, the only way of blocking the attack by the bosses, the UP government decided to incorporate the armed forces into the national cabinet. No further proof is thus necessary to establish the character of the Allendist government and its limitations.

Offensive of the proimperialist bourgeois opposition

These retreats that we point out were what permitted the opposition bourgeoisie as a whole to go over to the offensive in the middle of last year. They were aided by all the concrete economic problems the Unidad Popular faced. The low price of copper, which dropped from US\$0.60 per pound in 1970 to US\$0.47 in 1971, helped to sharpen the crisis. Imperialism's embargo and its refusal to finance the debt left by Frei, which reached US\$4 billion, was also used by the bourgeois opposition.


Although they presently constitute a united bloc around the CODE (Confederación Democrática [Democratic Confederation]), it is possible to see differences among the bourgeoisie. The National Party, led by Alessandri, reflects the in-

'Frightened by the truck owners' strike, Allende pledged to uphold private ownership.'



Striking truck owners at anti-UP rally in Santiago.

"The army and the police remain under the control of bourgeois agents. To deduce that this army is going to allow the peaceful transfer of all private property to the state is not only a utopian concept, but also reactionary."



JULY 1973. Troops defending presidential palace. UP government placed its defense entirely in the hands of the bourgeois army.

terests of the old landholding oligarchy and of the old monopolies from the epoch of the Conservative and Liberal parties. Together with what remains of the Radicals, they constitute the most recalcitrant wing of Chilean employers, which has lately been gambling on a coup d'etat.

The Christian Democracy for its part brings together the new bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors linked to neocapitalist penetration. These two parties will intensify their offensive through all the key posts they retain in the management of the economy. The marches of the pots culminated in the October strike, and although we can't say whether or not the two parties had deep differences between them on the question of a coup d'etat, it is certain that they used the general work stoppage to try to weaken Allende's regime.

Now the March 4 results have undoubtedly revitalized the Unidad Popular. By voting against imperialism, the masses backed the government, which has become relatively stronger, as demonstrated by the increasing separation of the military from the duties of government. Nonetheless, the opposition bourgeoisie still has all the means to continue its offensive. Although the masses have again defeated the plans of the reaction, the battle has not been definitely won.

The bourgeoisie has all the means in its hands to insure that Allende will not overstep the boundaries set for respecting the regime's laws. The bourgeois state is intact. The attempts being made by the epigones of the CP to show that in Chile the bases for something hitherto unheard of are being laid clash with this crushing reality. The two houses of the legislature, dominated by the opposition, serve in the same way as the control of the judiciary and the Office of the Inspector General to obstruct any move by the current Unidad Popular government that might be too audacious.

But their best insurance is that the army and the police remain under the control of bourgeois agents. In

respect to this, no one can ignore that Latin American armies have also been shaken by imperialist penetration and the rise of the masses. To the Peruvian and Bolivian example we can now add Uruguay. This is why we are not ruling out that there might be a sector of the army in Chile too that agrees with the nationalist measures adopted by Allende's government. But to deduce from this that this army is going to allow the peaceful transfer of all private property to the state is not only a utopian concept, but also reactionary.

Unfortunately, the Chilean CP considers the army's integration into the government's duties a positive step. For us this step only confirms our characterization of Allende's government, and we wouldn't be revolutionists if we weren't careful to say that this integration was a concession to the proimperialist bourgeoisie, against the interests of the masses.

The CUT: A bureaucratic monster

Another factor that has stimulated the strengthening of the reaction has been the Chilean labor federation's open attitude of applying the brakes to the workers' struggles. Despite its potential influence and strength, the CUT hasn't played a vanguard role in the latest events.

According to the figures put forward by Clotario Blest, former CUT general secretary, cited by Luis Vitale, 27.4 percent of the 2,694,100 workers who constitute the total Chilean work force are unionized. This means that between the public and private sectors there are 738,261 workers organized within the CUT. But these figures, high though they are, have not found political expression thanks to the bureaucratic leadership that the Communist and Socialist parties have stamped on the federation.

Before Allende came to power, the CUT was utilized as a pressure body, but never as a consistent tool to mobilize the masses for the sei-

zure of power. In this sense, the Central Workers Union under the control of the Socialists and Communists differed very little from the Argentine CGT [Confederación General de Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor]. The parliamentary vices that characterize nearly the entire political life of the two working-class majority parties infected trade-union life.

The ascent of Allende to power didn't change the methods of this bureaucratic leadership. This leadership came to a direct agreement with the government on a wage policy, but neither the masses nor their rank-and-file organizations participated in drawing it up.

When inflation and speculation reached impossible limits, the government created the JAPs (Juntas de Abastecimientos y Precios [Supply and Price Control Boards]), but the workers' leadership was very careful to demand for themselves all the decision-making power over speculators and those who tried to corner markets.

The elephantine weight of this bureaucratic apparatus could best be seen during the bosses' strike in October 1972. The CUT bureaucracy consciously did nothing to mobilize its forces, and the workers, who were ready to enter the streets to reopen the stores and start the trucks running, were blocked, while the Communist leaders "were in the vanguard" to make them carry out orders from above. The cases of workers, primarily those in construction, who protested against the obstacles imposed, are well known. The bureaucratic role of the CUT in the administrative councils of factories belonging to the social sector could also be examined. Of course, the government created these councils, but we shouldn't deceive ourselves; they are not under the workers' control or anything close to it.

It is the bureaucracy and the technicians who manage the factories, but worst of all, the Central Workers Union has no policy in this respect. The slogan for workers' control is not included in its demands.

The CP and SP in the service of bourgeois nationalism

There is nothing odd about this. The policy of the CUT leadership is a direct result of the policy of the parties in the Unidad Popular. Traditionally, the leadership of the SP has been more to the left than that of the CP. This is also currently the case, but, as we've already seen, their respective paths do not substantially differentiate them. Today the situation is the more serious because together they control the government. Unfortunately, all of the facts demonstrate their capitulation to bourgeois interests.

Faced with runaway inflation and speculation, both parties have agreed on a single measure: to authorize a rise in prices and, correspondingly, in wages. This decision, which in appearance seemed to help the popular sectors, was fundamentally motivated by a desire to compromise with the industrial and commercial sectors of the bourgeoisie who were encouraged to step up investment in the private sector to take advantage of the better prices authorized.

Orlando Millas, a member of the CP and Minister of the Economy, carried out this initiative. Now the same Millas has proposed to return some of the factories already in the social sector to their owners. And although this touched off a public debate between Altamirano [a leader of the left wing of the SP] and Corvalán [the head of the CP] on the future of nationalized concerns, the danger remains.

No one is unaware of the CP's negotiations with the Christian Democracy throughout 1972 to "convince" it of the government's good intentions, or the endorsement conferred on these negotiations by Allende himself.

But the capitulationist policy of the two parties is best demonstrated in the attitude they took toward the incorporation of three high military commanders into the last cabinet prior to the March 4 electoral

victory. This policy isn't in the least different from that traditionally imposed by Stalinism on all the Communist parties in the world.

Support to Chiang Kai-shek from 1925 to 1927 set back the Chinese revolution for twenty years. Support to Sukarno in Indonesia cost 500,000 victims when the reactionary sector of the army, led by Suharto, drowned the late resistance of the CP in blood. Unconditional support to Torres allowed Banzer to triumph [in Bolivia in August 1971] (because of the lack of an independent working-class line that would persuade the army to swing over to the side of the revolution). In the same way the policy of the Chilean CP and SP could lead to a similar defeat.

The constant breach of principles, the vacillations, and the open concessions to the bourgeoisie have generated criticism and resistance in the rank and file of both parties. In the SP, for example, a left tendency (some call it "Trotskyizing") is known to exist that maintained amorphous ties before October. During the bourgeois offensive, a weekly newspaper, *La Aurora de Chile*, appeared that tried to transform itself into a collective organizer, but Allende himself took charge of silencing it. After the crisis had passed it was allowed to reappear, and now it has in fact become the official organ of the SP left led by Altamirano, which has support in the Santiago, Cordillera, Valparaíso, and Concepción regional organizations.

The problem that is still posed is whether this left can truly organize and transform itself into a Bolshevik organization, or whether it will follow the traditional road of the party's "left wings" that were tolerated as long as their criticisms were put forth on the level of generalizations, serving to prevent the more radicalized layers from breaking with the party. Up to now this left has remained within the second category.

The policy of both majority ruling parties, far from counting on the unconditional support of their

secondary leaderships and their ranks, has received very sharp and deserved criticisms from these quarters. In tempo with the sharpening of the class struggle these dissident trends could make it possible for a truly revolutionary current to emerge that could change the present conciliatory and collaborationist course of the government. But we repeat that this perspective has to do with the situation of the working class, the current struggles of the peasantry, and the popular sectors that truly want to head toward socialism.

The need for a revolutionary party

There is no need to dwell too long on a situation that is very well known to everyone. With the 1970 electoral victory and the assumption of power by the Unidad Popular the prerevolutionary character of the situation in Chile deepened. We have already pointed out that if this wasn't transformed into a clearly revolutionary situation, it was due to the skill of the Chilean bourgeoisie in preventing it and the concessions and capitulations of the leadership of the Unidad Popular itself. But this doesn't mean that social contradictions haven't increased. The mere fact of Allende's rise to power has spurred the impending confrontation.

The distribution of land to peasants, in accordance with the law approved by the Christian Democracy, served to incorporate this generally more backward sector into the process of permanent revolution that Chile is going through. The latest vote [March 4, 1973] reflects the turn that has taken place within the peasantry. Despite the stagnating production and the bureaucratic manipulation of the land reform, it cannot be disputed that the land reform is a fact. The occupations of the *fundos* [estates] and the rise in unionization are the most profound indices.

The workers' movement for its part has continued to radicalize.

We must bear in mind that the parliamentary and accommodationist tradition of the working-class parties was a very important factor in deforming the consciousness of the workers. Fortunately, as the class struggle has sharpened the workers are beginning to lose those illusions and are rapidly moving toward class-struggle positions.

The high point of this radicalization was reached in October. The general mobilization neutralized the work stoppage by truck owners and small businessmen, and there was hardly a factory that halted production, despite sabotage by their owners. It was on this occasion that defense committees and some liaison and coordinating committees spontaneously emerged. The process was uneven: In some work places where vigilance or production committees already existed, but were run routinely or bureaucratically, they were activated by new *compañeros* or *compañeros* not recognized as leaders up to that time. In other places where no organizations existed, they emerged overnight on the workers' own initiative. But, we stress, their fundamental characteristic was their mass support.

There are plenty of examples of the popular initiative. In Santiago, it was the construction union that was in the vanguard. In one worksite the *compañeros* decided that they had to get "totally" prepared, and they began to manufacture crude arms and explosives, without waiting for the "specialists" from the CUT or from the parties in the government. At another worksite they decided they had to organize standing defense teams and they asked for volunteers. From the first day they all signed up, an unusual thing inasmuch as when the same request was made on other occasions few registered.

In a word, everyone mobilized to break the employers' strike, despite their dissatisfaction with the major trade-union organizations that didn't issue precise calls to mobilize. It is well known how angry the workers were who went en

masse to guard the central union headquarters and were given nothing to do for the whole time. The workers wanted to reopen the closed stores by force but were stopped by the trade-union leaders and by the government, which ran to the army, the Carabineros, and the Dirnico [Dirección de Industria y Comercio — Office of Industry and Trade] functionaries to "guarantee order."

As a product of this uprising, Community Coordinating Committees appeared. The *cordones* [industrial strips or areas] in V. Mackenna, Maipú, and Cerrillos, traditional working-class bastions, saw the initial outlines of dual power when joint commissions of factory workers, community leaders, and representatives from women's organizations and housewives were formed. In some places these Coordinating Committees organized real mobilizations and, acting on their own, opened up stores and factories that the owners refused to start operating. This was the tendency during the "October days." It was the masses who spontaneously neutralized the reaction. The working-class and revolutionary parties were in the rear.

In their publications the MIR and the Izquierda Socialista [Socialist Left] pointed out the need to develop dual power, but they did it in a superabstract and general way. For example, *El Rebelde* (organ of the MIR) addressed its readers with these two cover headlines in its September 26, 1972, issue (Number 49): "PREVENT THE ADVANCE OF THE REACTION: FOR A REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM FOR ALL THE PEOPLE."

Despite this rising, the masses were unable to go beyond their bureaucratized and probourgeois leaderships. Allende compromised with the reaction through the military, giving in all along the line, and the workers' movement as a whole abided by these decisions, although critically. Thus, the process of radicalization still hasn't culminated. Clearly what is missing in Chile is an alternative leader-

ship, a revolutionary party to lead the workers. This period could end in a new disappointment if this revolutionary party isn't built.

In this regard, there are some currents that point to the MIR as the only valid prospect for the construction of a revolutionary party. Our opinion is that the MIR (like the MAPU [Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria — Movement of United Popular Action] and the Izquierda Socialista) currently reflects the process of radicalization that Chile is going through, but is far from being the revolutionary organization that is needed.

The MIR emerged in 1965 under the influence of the Cuban Revolution. Having essentially a student composition and a guerrillaist position in the beginning, it evolved finally to giving critical support to Allende's government, which it decided not to characterize as working class, although it defined it as "not bourgeois."

It had a sectarian position toward the 1970 elections: it ignored them, calling for abstention. Allende's victory caused it to make a turn, but in an opportunistic way, deciding upon critical support. The important thing is that with its creation of the FTR (Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios [Front of Revolutionary Workers]), the FCR (Frente de Campesinos Revolucionarios [Front of Revolutionary Peasants]), and the FER (Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios [Front of Revolutionary Students]), the MIR did try to develop a policy directed at the masses, partially rejecting its previous elitist conception.

This turn despite a certain lack of consistency, brought it much broader support among certain sectors of the peasantry near the city of Concepción, among the proletariat linked to the construction industry, and among squatters in the shantytowns. Several land and village occupations were inspired by the MIR, which helped to establish its reputation as a revolutionary vanguard organization.

Nonetheless, we should make this

clear: For three years the MIR has been flailing about without a definite program. Its congress has been postponed several times and its regional congresses have not been able to provide it with the program required by the objective situation in Chile. This lack of direction is reflected in the appearance of diverse wings and in a constant change in the agitational axes of its newspaper *El Rebelde*. The militarist faction is still strong, and now another tendency, accused of being Trotskyist, has emerged, which in turn denounces the current leadership as bureaucratic.

For all these reasons we do not agree with those people who argue that the MIR is the revolutionary alternative. We believe that the MIR, as well as the MAPU (the radicalized faction of the Christian Democracy that split from the CD to join the Unidad Popular), and the unorganized left of the Socialist Party are undoubtedly expressions of the general radicalization that has taken place in Chile during the past period, but none of these forces can substitute for the revolutionary party that must be built.

If Chilean Trotskyism wants to play any historical role in the current process, it cannot ignore either these forces or the youth of the Communist Party. Furthermore, it would be difficult to build such a revolutionary party without examining the dynamics of these political groupings and without developing a policy toward them. Hence, Chilean Trotskyism must develop a whole program that helps to mobilize the working class and popular sectors, and, without resorting to sectarianism or opportunism, takes into account these leftist groupings that are sincerely looking for a tool to make the Chilean revolution possible.

A transitional program to develop dual power and mobilize the masses

Today more than ever the objective situation in Chile requires that revolutionists develop a clear

"The masses were unable to go beyond their bureaucratized and probourgeois leaderships."



Luis Corvalan, general secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, flanked by other CP leaders.

'Since Allende's rise to power the class struggle has become even more bitter, polarizing forces to an extent never before seen in the country.'



MARCH 1973. Unidad Popular supporters celebrating after parliamentary elections.

transitional program. Since Allende's rise to power the class struggle has become even more bitter, polarizing forces to an extent never before seen in the country. The relatively high percentage received by the Unidad Popular in the March elections shows that despite Allende's wavering policy, the working class, and now the peasantry as well, voted against the oligarchy and imperialism.

The turn in the peasantry is important. It means that despite the bureaucratic character of the land reform, this sector of society is being drawn into the process of the democratic revolution. Their vote for the SP and CP candidates cannot be interpreted in any other way. This fact, instead of reducing the importance of the need for a transitional program to spur the mobilization of the workers, on the contrary emphasizes the urgency of putting it into practice. But at the same time, it must be made clear that this is not a question of formulating as "complete" an omnibus program as possible and only using it as a banner or symbol at big rallies or commemorations. This, unfortunately, happens all too often in Chile, along with the mistake of using vague generalities and abstractions.

Thus, for example, the February 22, 1973, issue of *Aurora de Chile*, the organ of the Socialist Left, devotes half of the first page to the "canastas populares."* Is this the paper's principal slogan to mobilize the masses? It appears to be,

*The *canastas populares* (people's food baskets) emerged at the beginning of 1972. They were distributed by popularly controlled consumers groups formed to guarantee the supply and distribution of foodstuffs and other articles as well as to meet spiraling inflation and the expanding black market. The *canastas* were supplied weekly by Agencias Graham SAC, a state-run corporation, and distributed through Supermercados Montserrat to people's markets where they were sold at controlled prices. — *Translator*

although we aren't certain since all the rest of the newspaper revolves around hard-felt problems, but which are also taken up in a very general, abstract way. The best example of this tendency toward abstraction occurs in the article "Mano Firme y al Ataque" ["A Firm Hand and Move to the Attack"]:

". . . because October demonstrated that only the working class can make a real and effective revolution and that it is the only class that maintains and gives strength to our process; because October demonstrated that the workers are the most and the best. Hence, *La Aurora's* slogans: *A Firm Hand and Move to the Attack; Not a Second of Truce; Don't Give Anything Back; Don't Compromise.* Hence, the party's general slogan: *A Great Leap Forward, Now.*"

We honestly don't believe that these slogans will mobilize anyone, and, least of all, that they will go beyond the reformist and bureaucratic leaderships denounced in the same weekly. But let's examine the "*canastas populares*" article, which is the most concrete. In that article it is pointed out that the initiative launched by Comrade Onostroza, a functionary in Agencias Graham, to distribute 20,000 food baskets should be supported by adopting the following measures:

- (1) Issue statements of support to the leaders of Agencias Graham and Supermercados Monserrat;
- (2) Organize demonstrations, marches, and public meetings;
- (3) Organize in every neighborhood, community, village, rural zone, or squatters' encampment to ask Agencias Graham to provide more *canastas populares*;
- (4) Demand that all the popular parties and candidates clearly state whether they support or oppose the *canastas populares*.

We could debate the correctness of these measures; what is most startling is that there is no slogan demanding centralization of the actions. The CUT, the most important workers' organization, is not even mentioned. Why wasn't the slo-

gan launched to mobilize the entire proletariat in a massive meeting to demand that the government, which calls itself a workers' government, place all distribution under its control? Isn't this slogan much more concrete than the one to "Organize marches, demonstrations, and public meetings"? Of course it is.

The slogan to "Organize marches, demonstrations, and meetings" is just symbolic. On the other hand, it is clear who the slogan to force the CUT to organize such actions is directed at and it provides a concrete axis of activity for all militants at the same time that it helps the working class to see who is blocking the process. The slogan to "Organize marches, etc., etc., in general" makes the responsibility fall back on the rank and file and not on the leaders who are obligated to put themselves up front.

The slogan we are proposing expresses the need for a total mobilization and not one that is atomized by community, zone, or urban squatters' village. It is clear that this campaign, because its actions are coordinated by the CUT, will have to be accompanied by factory and community assemblies on all levels, but the basic slogan should be one that promotes a massive mobilization that discourages the government from siding with the interests of the bosses.

This example could be infinitely multiplied for each concrete problem of the workers. Following October, Allende, without caring two cents about the opinion of the rank and file, brought three members of the military into the government. Sadly enough, no organization, despite its criticisms, clearly and forcefully demanded: *Remove the military ministers from the government! All the ministers must be elected by the workers' movement and the people's organizations!*

A transitional program isn't an interminable list of slogans, one "more revolutionary than the next," but rather a tool for mobilizing the workers and the masses for the seizure of power, starting from the

concrete problems of these same masses. Obviously, in this march for power these slogans should also bring the workers' movement into confrontation with the institutions that are holding it back. The government of Chile is as much composed of Allende as of the parliament. A transitional program that doesn't lead the masses to gain experience with this reality and impel them to go beyond it isn't worth anything.

Likewise with respect to the CUT, a program that doesn't call for mobilizations and that doesn't say that the working-class organizations should be responsible for them, could be anything except a transitional program, since it doesn't call for the building of an alternative leadership. This program has to take into account the weight of the Socialist and Communist parties and their influence among the masses, but without capitulating to their petty-bourgeois and bureaucratic leaderships.

From this, then, it follows that the development of dual power is basic. In Russia the development of dual power took place through the workers' councils, the soviets. In Chile, there have already been embryonic experiments in this respect. The Popular Assembly of Concepción that emerged last year was considered by some groups as an approximation of the Bolivian Popular Assembly, and for these groups this was already a soviet. We don't believe that this was the case, although we place a great deal of importance on it, as it was the first attempt to remove the roadblocks imposed on the working-class movement by the two traditional parties.

The Concepción Popular Assembly was only a public meeting, attended by some 5,000 people including workers and peasants; it did not have an on-going or decision-making character. It was a demonstration against the bureaucracy, but it didn't go beyond that. On the other hand, in the course of last year, and especially in October, committees and coordinating

bodies appeared in many factories and in the workers' *cordones* that were in fact transformed into a real working-class force superior to the trade unions or commissions in existence up to that time. Hence, we can logically say that the Chilean struggle itself will determine the specific forms that future organizations of dual power will take.

What we stress is that revolutionists must learn how to generalize these experiences. Separated as we are from the objective situation in Chile, we can't say if these bodies are actually currently functioning. Any illusions about them could be as damaging as making the mistake of ignoring them because of revolutionary nearsightedness. The same can be said about the rest of the programmatic slogans. It would be irresponsible to try to outline a program for Chile from outside the country. For this reason we state that our proposals should be taken as suggestions. Keeping this point in mind, we will comment on some of the questions that are disturbing us.

The struggle against imperialism cannot be confined to a public meeting when the interests of the Chilean people are under attack. It is now a necessity for self-preservation to repudiate the foreign debt of close to US\$4 billion. This is in addition to the need to nationalize all essential enterprises, whether or not they are controlled by imperialist capital. But just as important as this slogan is the one for workers' control of all nationalized industry. Collective management is currently a fraud. Its bureaucratic and minority character denies all decision-making power to the workers. To insist that the workers have majority control is not something to just talk about, but is rather a key point in avoiding the stagnation of the process begun in Chile.

The greatest problems are the shortages of goods, the rise in the cost of living, unemployment, and the housing shortage. None of these has been solved, despite the government's rhetoric. It is true that during the first year of the UP gov-

ernment unemployment dropped from nearly 8 percent to 3 percent. But the fact remains that 3 percent of the work force remains without fixed employment. In a country like Chile, where Allende and Fidel have tired themselves out asking workers for more hours of work, we should all agree that these hours could be covered by the currently unemployed, prorating the hours of work but continuing to pay a full day's wages. The same kind of prorating could be used in the distribution of essential foodstuffs that are in short supply.

In face of an imperialist siege, sabotage by the bourgeoisie, the agrarian crisis, and speculation by middlemen, there can be no half-way "solutions." The complete nationalization of distribution is absolutely necessary. Control by the JAPs is not enough, as trade is still under private control. Hence, the first and fundamental step is for the state to bring distribution under its control. Of course, the problem of shortages will continue to exist until a complete economic plan is elaborated, especially in the field of agriculture and the production of consumer articles, but the nationalization of distribution cannot be put off until this plan is drawn up. This slogan is currently taking on decisive significance.

The question of the rising cost of living is also on the same plane. The black market is a frightening reality. The lines get larger every day. And in addition, the price of a family food basket gets larger at the same pace, reducing, as we know, the buying power of wages. During the last elections, the Unidad Popular put forth a program in which it affirmed that the government would grant the workers an annual cost-of-living increase, to be paid in quarterly installments. But of course, all of these projects must first go through the two chambers of the legislature. In point of fact, the last raise that was approved has already been canceled by a corresponding increase in prices. This is why we are raising

an unambiguous slogan during this period for a sliding scale of wages. The workers and the popular sectors can't go on waiting for ratification by the legislature each time the cost of living rises.

If at the end of each month there is an increase in the cost of the goods contained in a family food basket, wages should immediately be raised in proportion. This measure calls for immediate attention. It is no longer a question of talking about the "Chilean road," but rather of resorting to a basic measure now, while capitalist society still exists.

The housing question is still of great consequence. After two years the government has recently completed only 35,000 of the 100,000 housing units planned. This is why the bureaucratic bodies can no longer be relied on, but rather it is necessary to give real participation to the workers and residents of the slums so that they themselves can plan for what needs to be constructed. Our proposal in this respect is that not only should the big residences of the upper bourgeoisie be expropriated, but also that landlords' houses and apartments should be transferred to their current tenants with their monthly rent being used to finance a concrete plan for new housing. We emphasize, however, that this must all be controlled and directed by workers and their representatives in the slums.

The Unidad Popular's electoral platform ends with a chapter devoted to the armed forces. There it states that "the armed forces should be assured material and technical resources and a just and democratic system of wages, promotions, and pensions that guarantees commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant officers and enlisted men economic security during their enlistment in the ranks and during retirement."

In other words, it doesn't advance a single point that calls into question the present bourgeois character of the army. The Unidad Popular deludes the masses with its

slogan that in Chile the army is "professional," instead of correctly characterizing it, because of its role, composition, and leadership, as a body serving the propertied classes. In light of this we feel that its complete democratization is indispensable. Therefore, without failing to recognize that the use of arms requires technique like any other profession (and in this aspect is an art), we should demand that this field be opened up to everyone and most especially the working class.

One fundamental demand should be for the right of all noncommissioned officers and soldiers to be promoted to the posts of commissioned and commanding officers, along with the demand that trade unions control the military training.

We repeat that this does not mean that the professional character of this activity should be ignored. It is a question of eliminating this profession as a tool of oppression by the ruling class.

In the meantime, the Chilean working class and popular sectors must create their own self-defense organizations, given the existence of the reaction's paramilitary groups, such as Patria y Libertad [Fatherland and Freedom] and Comando Matus.

What best sums up the bourgeois policy of the current governing coalition is the slogan for a "People's State" that it raised in its last electoral program. For the parties in the Unidad Popular everything is reduced to calling for a one-chamber congress, the simultaneous election of congress and the president of the republic, and empowering the president to dissolve the national congress. These demands have been won in many capitalist countries without changing the nature of the state. Of course, the platform also states that at base, "popular power should be the expression of the unity, strength, and growth of all the organizations that the working class and popular sectors have developed to defend their interests and win power."

In place of this pompous rhetoric,

we believe that it is essential to call for a constituent assembly to reorganize the country from top to bottom, not only from the institutional viewpoint, but also from the economic, political, and social standpoint as well. The working class and popular sectors would go to this constituent assembly to advance *their solutions*, which are not those that the Unidad Popular is currently raising. A constituent assembly to reorganize the country should be demanded by the workers, who should not give an ounce of trust to the secret meetings currently going on in the corridors of the ministries.

The land reform can't be limited to continuing Frei's plan or to the possibility of extending the expropriation of the estates to everything over forty hectares (so far they are only expropriated up to eighty hectares). The countryside needs to be stimulated by bringing in new techniques and by complete electrification. A program also has to be elaborated for the countryside that includes the creation of cooperatives and the equipping of self-defense groups that can stop attacks by the bosses.

At the risk of appearing pedantic, we cannot conclude this overview without referring to Chile's present isolation. The current economic pressure requires that all the socialist countries must come to Chile's assistance. Cuba and Chile should now establish an economic confederation that integrates their economies while the rest of the socialist countries should grant them as much financial credit as possible without charging a single peso in interest.

Finally, we must not forget what we have continually repeated: History teaches that socialism cannot be achieved without the mobilization of the workers and peasants. For this reason we stress the responsibility of the Chilean Trotskyists. It is not simply a question of having a broad program with all the possible slogans, but also of knowing how to determine at each point which slogan will best aid

the mobilization of the workers.

The Bolsheviks were able to take power in Russia thanks to the fact that they knew how to dialectically combine these two aspects as no one had previously been able to do. They had a correct program and they applied it correctly, always aiming for the mobilization of the masses. The Russian party became stronger in the period of the revolution from February to October because it knew how to reach out to the masses with the proper slogan at the correct time. During a revolutionary situation this requirement becomes more than ever decisive. And Chile is on the threshold of a clearly revolutionary situation. Let us hope that neither sectarianism nor opportunism prevent Chilean Trotskyism from being up to the level of events.


**Against an imperialist coup!
For a workers' government!**

The March 4 elections haven't changed the Chilean situation. The votes won by the Unidad Popular demonstrated that the working class and peasantry had openly expressed themselves against imperialism and the opposition sectors of the bosses. It is clear that despite Allende's concessions to the military, shortages, the black market, the rising cost of living, etc., the workers, and now the peasantry voted against the CODE [Democratic Confederation], staking their hopes on socialism. With this electoral victory the Chilean masses momentarily thwarted the plans of the opposition bourgeoisie.

The search for a "hot" coup, by winning the support of a sector of the army, or a "cold" coup, by impeaching Allende, had to be put aside for the time being. But the bourgeoisie hasn't lost hope of displacing the Unidad Popular government, which it doesn't consider to be "its" government. The problems continue to be posed after the elections.

The reactionary bourgeoisie will

"The Unidad Popular deludes the masses with its slogan that in Chile the army is 'professional,' instead of characterizing it as a body serving the propertied classes."



Former defense minister Jose Toha, a Socialist Party leader, watching troops disperse a crowd.

attempt to use all the wavering and hesitations of Allende's government, as it has done up to now, to discredit it before the masses and make way for its defeat (in the 1976 elections if the bourgeoisie is forced to accept what is for it the worst variant). At the same time it will take advantage of this wavering to increase its share of the surplus value, to the detriment of the exploited masses. We can't forget that up to now everything obtained by Allende's government has been with the consent of the bourgeoisie itself. The nationalizations, just as much as the land reform, were carried out by using legal "instruments" bestowed by the Chilean employers.

It is commonly heard in Chile that thanks to Allende's "skill," copper, coal, iron, saltpeter, and cement have been nationalized. But this is not true. A sector of the opposition bourgeoisie, the Christian Democracy in particular, supported those measures with the view that the surplus value previously going to imperialism would be better shared among the new bourgeois sectors within Chile which had developed during the last few years. We can say the same with respect to the land reform. Important sectors of the opposition bourgeoisie itself did not look unfavorably upon initiating an agrarian reform. Those industrialists concerned with the domestic market approved the reform in the hope that new sectors of consumers would enter the market with a higher buying power.

What Allende did should not be exaggerated. It wasn't skill that made it possible for him to accomplish certain gains, but rather his policy of not transgressing the bounds permitted by the opposition bourgeoisie.

But it is obvious that this situation cannot go on indefinitely. The masses, who are already suffering the consequences of Allende's policy, will struggle to deepen the revolutionary process. It isn't certain that they will resign themselves to "a government of crap, even though it be theirs." Confronted by the ene-

my they won't hesitate to defend it, but as they see its ineffectiveness, they will look for forms to go beyond it without falling back on the old bourgeois government [of the Frei type].

For its part, the opposition bourgeoisie isn't disposed to maintain an unstable situation much longer either. The period could last until 1976, the date of the new presidential elections, but we can be sure that the Unidad Popular government, despite its policy of making concessions to the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, is not considered by this bourgeoisie as its government. Hence the present period in Chile should be defined not only as prerevolutionary, but also as an increasingly unstable period that could lead Allende's government into a situation similar to that which occurred in Russia with Kerensky's assumption of power.

We, who have rejected considering the Unidad Popular as a Popular Front government, don't rule out the possibility that it might degenerate into open Kerenskyism. We still haven't reached this stage in Chile, although we are witnessing elements that bring us closer to it. The instability of the situation cannot be hidden behind the illusory strengthening of the UP shown in the recent election results. Allende's government is currently wavering between pressure from imperialism and from the workers' movement.

This role of arbiter that it wants to play cannot be maintained indefinitely in the midst of the deepening class struggle. The opposition bourgeoisie continued to sharpen its offensive up to the elections, but the workers' movement wasn't set back; far from it. The brakes applied by the government and the parties of the Unidad Popular were unable to dampen the workers' spirit of combativity. And although a long parliamentary tradition has deeply influenced the workers, the bourgeois escalation itself, by intensifying the class struggle, has been reversing this process.

These positive aspects clash, however, with another objective fact:

No revolutionary party exists in Chile as there did in Russia at the time of Kerensky. The Chilean Bolshevik party has yet to be built. In our opinion this party will be something completely new. We believe that anyone who is betting on the MIR or the Socialist Left is mistaken. What we are certain of is that this party will emerge from a united front of currents coming out of the groups and parties now in existence.

The Socialist Youth has continued to radicalize. But this phenomenon has occurred before. Because of its structure, the leadership of the SP has always authorized the existence of a disorganized left wing. In the same spirit as the bourgeois parties that tolerate leaders and groups that call themselves leftist, the Chilean Socialist Party has also known how to maintain this "democratic image." The problem is that to the extent that this left is not organized and doesn't fight the capitulations of its actual leadership with Bolshevik methods, this left only, unfortunately, cosigns these capitulations.

Therefore, we say that the party of the Chilean revolution *must* be built, and to do this Trotskyists will have to elaborate a correct revolutionary united-front policy. In this sense we disagree with Aníbal Quijano who, in issue No. 2 of his magazine *Sociedad y Política*, published in Peru, incorrectly states that the "rising of the masses could bring even the Communist Party to adapt to their combativity."

The Chilean situation makes it necessary for conscious revolutionists to spur the building of the revolutionary party, without relying on the masses to create it through spontaneous generation. The objective conditions are favorable. Anyone who deludes the masses about a peaceful road to socialism is obstructing the revolutionary process which, with its on-going character, is the only one that can open up the possibility for the installation, in Chile, of a second socialist republic in this hemisphere. The Chilean revolutionists have the floor.

books

GEORGE LUKACS by George Lichtheim. New York: Viking, 1970. 146 pp. \$1.85 Paper.

BY ALAN WALD

It is no surprise that one of the most informative booklength studies of the late Hungarian Marxist George Lukács should come from the pen of the German-born émigré George Lichtheim. In a sense both were kindred spirits; or more accurately, each came to stand for certain types of intellectuals, representative of Eastern European and Western capitalist society respectively.

Lichtheim was born of a well-to-do Jewish family in 1912 in Berlin. His father was a full-time editor and diplomat for the World Zionist Organization. The young Lichtheim traveled about, living in London for a time, and then the family returned to Berlin in 1923. In those years the city was an avantgarde intellectual center for modern theater, cinema, neo-Marxist thought (including the ideas of Lukács and Karl Korsch), and psychoanalysis. Lichtheim became a Hegelian and a Marxist, and was active for a time in the periphery of SAP.¹

When the Nazis came to power Lichtheim fled to London and then Jerusalem. There he served for a number of years as foreign editor of the *Palestine Post*. In the 1940s Lichtheim settled in England and his articles began appearing in American journals such as *Commentary*, the *Partisan Review*, and

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the *New Leader*. In those days he was known as an outstanding political journalist only among a small circle of intellectuals. However, the 1961 publication of his book *Marxism* marked his transformation into a historiographer. Within a decade his stature grew to the point where he was considered to be the leading historian of socialism in our time by many bourgeois academicians.²

The paramount achievement of Lichtheim's study of George Lukács is that it places the philosopher and



George Lukacs in 1919.

aesthetician in the tradition of Central European thought. Lukács was born in 1885 in Budapest, also of wealthy Jewish parents. He became

1. The Socialist Workers Party of Germany (SAP) was originally formed in 1931 by expelled left-wing Social Democrats. In 1932 it was taken over by a group that split from Brandler's KPO (Communist Party Right Opposition) and for a time considered affiliation with Trotsky's International Left Opposition.

2. Two tributes to George Lichtheim provide further information. One is by Walter Laquer in *Commentary*, August 1973. The other is by Dennis Wrong in *Dissent*, Summer 1973.

intimately involved in the intellectual life of the city and by 1911 had produced a philosophical study (*The Soul and Its Forms*) as well as a two-volume work on modern drama. As a student during the years before World War I, Lukács began to gravitate toward *Lebensphilosophie*—a form of vitalism or intuitionism that stood in opposition to scientific rationalism. He moved away from his academic training in rigorous neo-Kantianism, and came under the influence of the German Wilhelm Dilthey and his disciples.

Dilthey made a sharp division between the realms of natural science and history, the latter of which he believed could not be explored in causal terms. Instead, what Dilthey thought was required was a "hermeneutic" understanding of the past through an act of imaginative recovery of other humans' thoughts. One must transfer oneself to another spiritual dimension in order to understand; one must "relive." This phase of development—and especially Dilthey's radical differentiation between natural science and history—left an indelible stamp on Lukács's intellect, which would be most clearly manifest in his famous *History and Class Consciousness* (1923).

The matrix of much of Lukács's philosophical work was his literary and aesthetic studies. In the early years of World War I, Lukács participated in an esoteric circle around the poet Stefan George. Imbued with individualism he sought refuge from reality in a world of pure art. Politically he had been an anarcho-syndicalist disciple of Ervin Szabó. Lukács opposed both sides in the war, and drifted about in despair until the actuality of the Russian Revolution seemed to give a practical answer to his theoretical

questions. Consequently he evolved into a self-styled follower of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg.

Throughout the 1920s Lukács traveled politically in an ultraleft current of Western Communists. Philosophically, in *History and Class Consciousness*, he set out to challenge what he believed to be dialectical materialism's mechanical view of cognition. Lichtheim explains: "His [Lukács's] standpoint could be summarized by saying that materialism and spiritualism are the thesis and anti-thesis of a debate which had its origin in a failure to overcome the cleavage between subject and object. The solution lies not in opting for one or the other, but in transcending the area of dispute, and this can be done by following Marx in treating practice as the concrete union of thought and reality."³

Lukács held the view that the work of the young Marx in the 1844-45 period demonstrated the conviction that the importance of human consciousness flowed not from the fact that it reflects reality, but in that it transforms reality. Lukács incorrectly counterposed the writings of the Young Marx to those of Engels and their major German and Russian disciples. However, in later years Lukács would repudiate many of the fundamental tenets of *History and Class Consciousness* that had made it so influential, especially through its impact on Karl Korsch and the Frankfurt Institute Marxists (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin).⁴

When the entirety of Lukács's work has been translated, his outstanding achievement will most likely be judged to be his theoretical

aesthetics. Here he concentrated the major part of his work because he saw the object/subject dimension most fluid in the realm of art. In this area, as elsewhere, Lukács's views are derivative of the anthropocentric outlook of the German Enlightenment: at the center of the world is humanity, and all aspects of society must be subordinate to the needs of that end. The ultimate significance of art, therefore, is ontological—it discloses the true nature of humanity. Related to this is Lukács's use of the category of totality, which he believes enables the critic to relate individual creations to types or genres corresponding to particular historical stages. The third central component of Lukács's aesthetic thought is his conception of realism: in art, it means portraying the world in the sense that it enables humanity to understand its own true nature, no matter how complex the mediations. Art articulates the self-consciousness of the human species.

Although Lichtheim admirably achieves his stated goal of recreating the cultural tradition which forged the young Lukács's intellect, the study is marred significantly by the author's excessive hostility to his subject.⁵ Certainly the virtual dismissal of Lukács's *Studies in European Realism* as nothing more than propaganda for Franco-Soviet cooperation must be taken as an overzealous exaggeration (although the point that Lukács's literary judgments were largely shaped by political expediency is important).

In addition, the book is grossly uneven: key works are scarcely mentioned; the content is alternately recondite and redundant. Yet the derivative, synthetic, and creative character of Lukács's thought comes to life, and its complex ori-

gins and roots are probed and partially elucidated. From a revolutionary-Marxist standpoint the achievement of Lukács is marked by a repudiation of materialism and philosophical revisionism in its early period, and by repeated subordination to Stalinist political expediency from the late 1920s onward. Nevertheless, despite qualifications, one cannot deny it a place as an authentic contribution to the general body of twentieth century Marxist and Hegelian thought. And Lichtheim is perhaps cast in his most fitting role as well, as commentator and critic of another's achievement.

In contradistinction to Lukács, George Lichtheim never openly identified with any organized political movement after his collaboration with SAP, although he circulated in the right-wing Social Democratic movement. A defender of the Israeli state, he claimed to oppose the ideology of Zionism. A proponent of the goals and ideals of socialism, he came to hold the view that the technocratic necessities of capitalism would bring about collectivized production of its own accord.

In his biographical study, *George Lukács*, Lichtheim paints a portrait of the late Hungarian as a pathetic genius whose life and work were warped by a struggle between his real convictions and Stalinist dogmatism. Such a dilemma makes Lukács representative of a certain type of contemporary Eastern European intellectual. Yet in his own life and work, George Lichtheim, defender of the West, fared little better. Lichtheim reflected the isolated and fragmented existence of the rootless intellectual in bourgeois society. Despite his increasing fame in the 1960s, Lichtheim's alienation only intensified and he came to feel that even his scholarship was dispensable. His chronic sarcasm and pessimism became increasingly dominant. In April of this year George Lichtheim committed suicide at the age of sixty-one.

3. *George Lukacs*, p. 60.

4. A refutation of Lukács's deviations from Marxist materialism is contained in George Novack's "Georg Lukacs as a Marxist Philosopher," in the *International Socialist Review*, January 1972. The article also recapitulates Lukács's tumultuous political career and his degeneration into a Stalinist apologist.

5. This was especially noted in Paul Breines' review of Lichtheim's book in *Telos*, Fall 1970. In addition to being distorted by extreme Stalinophobia, Breines charges that Lichtheim's work employs a fundamentally academic and therefore reductive method.

EDITORIAL/FROM PAGE 5

means in fact creating a parallel army," which would have to be crushed "before it is too late." (*Chile Hoy*, July 27, 1973.)

The capitalists' strategy originally had been to wait Allende out. Their hope was that Allende would keep the workers under control and, as the bourgeois politicians kept his hands tied with their parliamentary veto, the workers would become demoralized, the radicalization would subside, and Chile could return to a more "normal" mode of bourgeois rule.

But as the class struggle intensified, it was evident that the UP, in spite of its efforts, was becoming progressively less able to restrain the workers' militancy. During the "bosses' strike" of October 1972, the workers spontaneously rose up to resist it. As *Le Monde* reported (October 24, 1972):

"No factory has closed its doors. The railroads, airports, the mines, and the public services continue to function normally. Workers and students, activists and the unaffiliated, have stepped forward to insure the distribution of food to the population. . . ."

The UP did its best to squelch this process. According to an October 13, 1972, Associated Press dispatch, Allende "called on the Government's left-wing supporters to abstain from any moves—such as the occupation of factories, communications centers, or public buildings—that could be interpreted as a 'provocation' and cause the army to stand against the government."

Allende "ended" the October 1972 crisis by bringing the highest-ranking military officers into his cabinet. But in the ensuing period, the class polarization proceeded to the point that even this most obsequious of class-collaborationist ploys was unable to resolve the final crisis that ended in the coup.

During that crisis, as Eduardo Frei noted, the workers began to

take initiatives by arming themselves at the factory level. This was contrary to CP and SP policy, but rank-and-file CP and SP members were prominently involved in this movement, indicating a progressive deterioration of the reformist leaderships' ability to bridle their ranks.

This led the Chilean ruling class to drop its original strategy of waiting to vote the UP out in the 1976 presidential elections, choosing instead a more naked military solution. The September 12 *New York Times* reported that "three weeks ago United States diplomatic and intelligence analysts predicted that a military coup would occur soon because of increasing nervousness in the armed services over the expansion of groups of armed factory workers in bases around Santiago. In the proclamation by the military junta that seized power today, the factory groups were cited as a reason for the revolt."

As this clearly illustrates, the workers' struggle had begun to overflow the limitations imposed upon it by the reformist workers' parties. The conflict was developing into a direct clash between the big propertied interests and the working class.

Tragedy befell the Chilean revolution because, when the workers began to break in action with the CP and SP leaderships, there was no alternative, revolutionary-socialist leadership to organize them for the inevitable showdown. A nationally coordinated struggle was necessary to match the power of the highly centralized armed forces at the disposal of the capitalist class.

This was the central lesson of the victorious Russian Revolution of October 1917. The Bolsheviks steadfastly refused political support to the class-collaborationist Kerensky regime, to which the majority of self-styled "socialists" and "Marxists" adhered at the time. Instead, they built an independent revolutionary party implanted in the

masses that worked for the *overthrow* of the Kerensky regime from the left.

When right-wing Russian military forces, led by General Kornilov, rose against Kerensky from the right, the Bolsheviks joined, and in fact led, a united front with the reformist workers' parties in defense of Kerensky that easily defeated the reactionary putsch. Following that, the Bolsheviks united the Russian working class for the revolutionary conquest of power and established the world's first workers' state.

In Chile this revolutionary process went only halfway. The Chilean Kornilovs are now holding power, due to the absence of a mass revolutionary party of the Bolshevik type.

While the reformist "peaceful-road-ers" of the CP and SP outrightly betrayed the revolution, the role of some of the struggle-oriented currents must be criticized as well. The MIR and the left-wing SP forces, despite their many correct criticisms of the wavering of the UP regime and its refusal to mobilize the masses, failed to provide a clear alternative to the reformist government.

These militants, under pressure from the mass reformist parties, were unfortunately further disoriented by Fidel Castro's stamp of approval on the Unidad Popular regime. Of all the left-wing movements, only the Trotskyists of the Fourth International clearly differentiated themselves from the UP and warned against its fatal course.

In the United States, while the *Guardian*, the *Daily World*, *Monthly Review*, and other self-described "Marxist" publications were promoting various degrees of confidence in the Unidad Popular, the *International Socialist Review* projected an accurate analysis of the UP's character and direction and a forecast of the role of the officer caste, as later confirmed by the test of events. Salvador Allende, in an interview that appeared in the

March 28, 1971, issue of the *New York Times*, declared:

"The determined attitude of the [Chilean] Government and the revolutionary energy of the people, the democratic resolution of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros, will see that Chile advances surely along the road to emancipation."

Peter Camejo and Les Evans, writing in the February 1972 issue of the *International Socialist Review*, replied with the following question and warning:

"Where does [Allende] imagine that ruling-class violence will come from if not from the organized, armed, repressive apparatus of the capitalist state? If the ruling class decides to seriously dispute Allende's tenure, the army and the Carabineros can be counted on to act, but it will most assuredly not be on the side of 'emancipation.'"

There are still reports of resistance by rank-and-file workers in the factories and proletarian districts of Santiago. We would like to hope that this will consolidate into a movement capable of defeating

the American-puppet generals who have seized power. But every indication suggests that the Chilean workers have suffered a grave defeat that will not be turned around easily or in a short time. While U.S. imperialism is the principal criminal force in the Chilean counterrevolution, those who sought to keep the workers disarmed in order to pursue an illusory "peaceful road" to socialism must take a major share of the blame for derailing one of the most promising revolutionary situations in Latin America in many years. Socialism will be won in Chile only when a mass revolutionary party is built committed to intransigent struggle against the bourgeois state and not collaboration with it. In the meantime socialists and progressive-minded people everywhere must mount the broadest possible campaign in defense of the new levy of victims that now fills Chile's jails.

September 20, 1973

CORRESPONDENCE/FROM PAGE 2

on them, and about the treacherous role of the Stalinist chieftains in Moscow and Peking. We showed that the VCP leaders have invariably opposed the program of revolutionary Marxism, not hesitating even to assassinate its advocates.

It is for these eminently practical reasons that we, unlike M. H., place no *political confidence* in the VCP leaders, even while unconditionally supporting them against U.S. imperialism. We do not believe that the VCP is the instrument best suited to advance the Vietnamese revolution.

M. H. seems to be playing with words when he questions what "kind" of "critical support" we give to the Vietnamese revolution and its present leadership. He implies that our support to Vietnam is similar to our defense of an anti-imperialist struggle led by bourgeois forces and is therefore inadequate.

In both cases our defense is *unconditional*. It is rather hard to see how the ante could be raised, except by endorsing the political program and practices of a leadership. Naturally we distinguish between an anti-imperialist struggle led by a bourgeois party and one led by a reformist workers' or peasant party. But we unconditionally defend both, while at the same time counterposing to these very different kinds of misleadership the Marxist program of the Fourth International. We defend the interests of the working class against these inadequate leaderships whenever necessary.

As Trotskyists, we favor the building of Trotskyist organizations in all countries, including Vietnam. Such a formation would necessarily have to counterpose its program to the class-collaborationist and bureaucratic program and practice of the VCP.

M. H. indicates, by means of a leading question, that he believes that to advocate the construction of a Trotskyist organization in Vietnam is "a thinly disguised third-camp position symptomatic of Stal-

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inophobia similar to the Shachtmanites." This is a serious charge.

The "orthodox" adherents of the late Max Shachtman (those who did not follow their mentor into the right wing of the Social Democrats, USA) hold the theory that North Vietnam is not a workers' state. In their view, Stalinist parties like the VCP represent an "imperialist ruling class" bent on world domination. They call for abstention from struggles led by Stalinists, in the name of a "third camp," which in Vietnam they long identified with the ineffectual and pro-capitalist Buddhist organizations. Many Shachtmanites even gave critical support to Diem for a time as a "more democratic" alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Under the heavy pressure of the antiwar movement, in which Trotskyists played a big role, some Shachtmanites now claim to support Vietnam against U.S. imperialism. They show their true colors, however, by abstaining from the antiwar movement and by calling for a *social* revolution in North Vietnam which would overthrow not only the bureaucratic leaders, but also the progressive property relations established by the revolution in the North.

In sharp contrast to the Shachtmanites, Trotskyists have always supported the revolutionary forces in Vietnam, and unconditionally defend the workers' state in the North, while opposing the policies of the leadership. The Stalinists—both the Moscow and Peking brands—slander Trotskyists by falsely identifying this position with that of the Social Democratic opponents of the Vietnamese revolution. They demagogically identify the revolutionary struggle of the Vietnamese masses with the Stalinist leaders, in order to conclude that any opposition to the VCP leadership is "counterrevolutionary." M.H.'s charge follows a similar logic.

After trying to smear us as Shachtmanites, M.H. quickly shifts gears and hints that we have become followers of Gerry Healy, the head of the super-sectarian Socialist La-

bour League of England. Healy broke with Trotskyism in 1963, in part because he insisted that revolutionary Cuba was still ruled by capitalism. Healy held that only a Trotskyist party could create a workers' state in Cuba. Since Castro and the guerrilla movement were obviously not such a party, he concluded that no workers' state existed there. Healy's methodological error was to deny an obvious reality—the overthrow of capitalism in Cuba—because it did not fit his preconceptions.

M.H. also appears to assume that only a revolutionary party can be at the head of a successful revolutionary movement. He derides the view that a party with a Stalinist ideology could, under certain circumstances, "lead to the creation of a workers' state." Since the Vietnamese CP was at the head of a movement that created a workers' state in half of Vietnam, M.H. evidently believes that it must be some kind of revolutionary socialist party, despite its obvious Stalinist origins, history, program, and methods. Like Healy, M.H. denies an obvious reality—in this case, the Stalinist character of the VCP—because it does not fit his preconceptions. This approach has nothing in common with the materialist method of Marxism, which starts from facts rather than preconceptions.

According to M.H.'s reasoning,

we would have to hold that Mao, Tito, and Enver Hoxha "objectively" broke with Stalinism, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, since workers' states came into being shortly after they took power in China, Yugoslavia, and Albania respectively. We would have to conclude that Stalin himself "objectively" broke from Stalinism in his later years. After all, under the pressure of the Cold War, he ordered social transformations that resulted in the creation of workers' states in seven East European countries after World War II.

Unlike M.H., Trotskyists do not deny any aspect of reality. We recognize that workers' states exist in North Vietnam, China, North Korea, and the East European countries. And we also recognize the Stalinist nature of the leaderships of these states, which have continued to carry out class-collaborationist, anti-internationalist, and bureaucratic policies.

Only the recognition of *both* these realities makes it possible for revolutionists to adopt a correct orientation. M.H.'s approach leads to denying the practical relevance of the revolutionary-Marxist program and the need to build an international revolutionary party. He is, therefore, quite correct when he states that this debate "has crucial practical aspects for Marxists around the world."

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