


international **socialist** review

FEBRUARY 1972

FIFTY CENTS



Chile: Reformism in Crisis

by
Peter Camejo and Les Evans

Betsy Stone: Women and the 1972 Elections
Fred Halstead: The New Antiwar Army

AMERICAN SOCIALISM got off to a good start in 1972. From thirty-one states, 1,240 delegates and observers came to the Eleventh National Convention of the Young Socialist Alliance held in Houston, Texas, December 28 through January 1. Also in attendance, as guests, were revolutionists from other countries, including Great Britain, Ireland, France, Germany, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and Sweden. Written greetings were received from throughout Latin America and from other areas of the world.

The convention, which followed three months of discussion by YSA locals around the country, decided on a plan of action for 1972. This year's presidential election was a major focus of attention for the convention. The YSAers voted a heavy commitment of energy to campaigning for the Socialist Workers Party slate—Linda Jenness for president and Andrew Pulley for vice-president.

The SWP campaign is already well underway and promises to be the largest nationwide socialist election effort since Eugene V. Debs ran for president in the early 1900s. Even before the new year had begun the candidates had spoken to 14,000 at campaign meetings and reached millions through coverage by the media. To date, stories have appeared in newspapers with a circulation estimated to reach twenty-one million people.

Ballot efforts by young supporters in Florida exemplify the kind of momentum the SWP candidates have inspired. In less than three weeks 51,600 signatures, almost twice the 27,000 needed, were gathered on independent nominating petitions to put the SWP on the ballot in that state. To help keep up the

pace, the YSA convention approved putting ten national teams on the road.

THE CONVENTION also projected continued support to the women's movement, La Raza Unida parties, the struggle for Black liberation, the antiwar movement, and other movements against social injustice.

In all respects the Young Socialist Alliance gathering was an important step in the growth of the revolutionary movement, and in particular showed the impact of socialist ideas in the South. The Houston convention was the first held by the YSA in the South and 305 people were there from Texas alone. In addition to radio and television time the activists received extensive coverage in the two major Houston newspapers, the *Post* and the *Chronicle*. It was also a victory in relation to the Houston Ku Klux Klan which over the years has attempted to intimidate radical, and not so radical, groups.

AS PART of the '72 offensive YSAers will be participating in a drive to build the readership of the socialist press.

Through March the *International Socialist Review* will conduct a renewal campaign among the 3,325 readers who subscribed during the 1971 fall subscription drive. This will coincide with a similar effort by the weekly socialist newspaper *The Militant* among its 32,580 readers.

Maximizing renewals among our new readers is part of laying the groundwork for an even bigger subscription effort in the final months before the election. Early returns from our initial publicity indicate we can look forward to going over the 10 percent renewal

rate we've had among introductory subscribers in the past.

As a special offer we are sending a free book with each year sub to the *ISR*. (See the ad on the back cover for a list of the books available.)

THE JANUARY 11 *New York Times* reports that the Supreme Court will rule on the right of the noted Belgian Marxist economist Ernest Mandel to obtain a visa to lecture at universities and conferences in the United States. The case began in 1969 when Nixon's Attorney General John M. Mitchell refused to grant Mandel's request to lecture here. At issue is the constitutionality of the section of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act which permits the government to prohibit foreign radicals from visiting this country.

Mandel, who has just completed a speaking tour in Canada, is the editor of the Belgian socialist weekly *La Gauche* and the author of the two-volume work *Marxist Economic Theory*. He is a frequent contributor to the *ISR*.

A suit challenging Mitchell's action was filed by Mandel, along with eight U. S. scholars from six leading Eastern universities. A three-judge federal court heard the case in March 1971 and ruled sections of the McCarran-Walter Act unconstitutional. But the government got an injunction against a visit by Mandel until the Supreme Court would hear the case.

The Mandel Case Legal Defense Fund has been established to help meet the court costs. Donations can be sent care of the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, 25 East 26th Street, New York, N. Y. 10010.

DAVE PRINCE

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
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our revolutionary heritage



THE CRUISER POTEMKIN. Revolutionary sailors in command after the famous mutiny in the Black Sea in June 1905.

Leon Trotsky: Prelude to 1905

INTRODUCTION

We are publishing here for the first time in English the opening chapter of Leon Trotsky's history

of the 1905 Russian Revolution. In this chapter of 1905, entitled "Spring," Trotsky describes the political unrest of the years 1902 through 1904, showing how everything czarist absolutism attempted, whether repressive or conciliatory, only stimulated radical sentiments.

Nothing could contain the spread of militancy among the masses and the czar found himself challenged by revolution.

On January 22, 1905, thousands of Russian workers, led by a priest, Gapon, converged on the square in front of the czar's Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. They came with a petition demanding amnesty, civil liberties, fair wages, gradual transfer of the land to the people, and a constituent assembly based

on universal and equal suffrage. The petition closed with the following words: "Sire, do not refuse aid to Thy people! Demolish the wall that separates Thee from Thy people. Order and promise that our requests will be granted, and Thou will make Russia happy; if not, we are ready to die on this very spot. We have only two roads: freedom and happiness, or the grave."

The czar's answer was to call out the Cossacks who attacked the unarmed crowd killing an estimated 500 people and wounding 3,000 more with their swords and guns. A wave of outrage and indignation swept Russia and "Bloody Sunday" marked the beginning of a gigantic revolutionary upheaval in-

volving the fate of 130 million people.

After a year of struggle czarism emerged temporarily triumphant but the experience gained in 1905 led the Russian Marxists to view the events as a dress rehearsal for the next revolutionary opportunity, which finally came in October 1917. All the forces of modern revolution revealed their potential for struggle against the old order. The military, a main prop of czarism, became unreliable. In both the army and the navy there were mutinies, the most famous on the cruiser Prince Potemkin. (This was the inspiration for Eisenstein's powerful film Potemkin.) In the countryside the peasants attacked the big estates, seized grain, and demanded the redistribution of the land. Among the oppressed peoples of Russia nationalist sentiments intensified. In December Polish students drove out the Russian teachers and students and demanded that all secondary schools be under the control of a council of workers' delegates; that worker and student meetings be held on school premises; and that students be allowed to wear red shirts as a symbol of their allegiance to the future society.

Two developments in particular had far-reaching implications for the revolutionary movement in the twentieth century—one was a new organizational form, the soviet (council), which arose in the final months of 1905; the other was a conclusion drawn from the dynamic of the struggle, Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution.

For the first time in history the full magnitude of the power and social importance of the working class was revealed on a truly massive scale. The theory of permanent revolution emphasized that while the struggle against czarist absolutism was waged for democratic demands associated with the bourgeois revolutions against feudalism it was at the same time clear that the Russian workers would have to make their revolution against

the bourgeoisie and not in alliance with it.

The bourgeoisie was only interested in freedom for itself, which it hoped to gain through a political compromise with absolutism. The bourgeoisie, as much as the czar, was hostile to, and feared, the aspirations of the masses. The only way for the revolution to answer this hostility, if its demands were to be met, was with socialist measures.

It was the emergence of the soviets, the mechanism through which the workers organized as an independent force, that helped bring to the fore the fundamental question of revolution, what class should rule. These bodies—delegates were elected by workers, soldiers, and peasants—developed when a strike of Moscow printers in October 1905 suddenly spread to the railway and then throughout the country. The unparalleled general strike demanded constitutional freedom.

However, the soviets soon began to take on the functions of government. The St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the most important in the country, enjoyed a wide authority among the masses. It stood for complete freedom of the press and the eight-hour day. Workers following its lead began attempts to carry these measures out. In every action the Petersburg Soviet found itself pitted against the government. When the czar declared a state of siege of Poland, for example, the Soviet welcomed delegates from Poland and affirmed the right of Polish self-determination.

The situation was unstable: either the workers or the czar had to be victorious. This time the czar prevailed, arresting the soviet on December 3, 1905. But the concept of the councils was an acquisition in the arsenal of class struggle which would emerge again in 1917, this time developing and realizing its full potential.

* * *

Leon Trotsky's 1905 is a unique history because of the role played

by the twenty-six-year-old Trotsky in the events. Elected to the Soviet Executive on October 17 he was later voted president on November 22 after the original president, a young lawyer, Khrustalyov, was arrested by the czar. From the Soviet's formation in mid-October until its arrest in December Trotsky was a central figure in the shaping of major policy and had a wide popularity and respect among the masses.

In the Soviet Executive Trotsky acted on behalf of a joint commission of Bolshevik and Menshevik delegates.

1905 was written between 1906 and 1909. It was originally published in German in Vienna in 1909 and was reprinted in many languages by the Soviet government in 1922. Before it came under attack and was finally banned under Stalin the book served as the official Comintern history of 1905.

The following selection was translated from the German for the International Socialist Review by Russell Block. It is taken from the 1923 edition put out by Vereinigung Internationaler Verlagsanstalten (International Publishers Association) in Berlin. (This month the entire book will be published for the first time in English by Random House.)

This chapter, "Spring," is of special interest because it shows the political life of a society in which a revolutionary crisis is unfolding but has not yet matured. Focusing on the last six months of 1904, we see all social layers, to one degree or another, starting to awaken into political life. Russian liberalism on the one hand sparked political unrest with its demands for more liberties; on the other it opposed a principled and determined attitude against czarism. The students as a result of their experiences with liberalism and with czarism were attracted to revolutionary politics, in advance of the working class, which would not move in massive numbers until the following year. Trot-

sky's discussion of the relationship between the revolutionary student movement and the politicalization of the working class is particularly valuable for the light it sheds on the dynamics of mass radicalization.

EDITORS

Part I

In a private letter the late General Dragomirov once wrote of Minister of the Interior Sipyagin¹: "What kind of domestic policy does he have? He is simply a general and a fool." This characterization is apt enough to excuse its stilted militaresque crudeness. Plehve followed Sipyagin in the same post. Then came Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii, Bulygin, and Witte-Durnovo.² Some did distinguish themselves from Sipyagin merely by having a certain cunning after their own fashion. All of them, however, retired from the field leaving behind them confusion at the top and hatred and contempt below. A general of doubtful intelligence, or a professional police spy; a dull-witted grandee with good intentions, or a stock speculator devoid of conscience or honor—all of them began with a firm resolve to put an end to the revolutionary movement, to restore the lost prestige of the governmental power, to preserve the basis of the existing regime.

1. Sipyagin was shot by a terrorist in 1902.—ISR

2. Vyacheslav Konstantinovich Plehve was minister of the interior from 1902 until he was killed by a bomb July 28, 1904. His successor, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii was dismissed soon after "Bloody Sunday."

Count Sergei Yulievich Witte was president of the council of ministers from 1903 until he became first constitutional premier in November 1905. Also in November P. N. Durnovo became minister of the interior. Both appointments coincided with the czar's October 30 Manifesto which promised a State Duma (based on limited suffrage and with only advisory powers), a constitution, and other freedoms.—ISR

And all of them—each in his own way—opened the flood gates of the revolution and was swept away by its current. The revolution developed with powerful regularity. It continually enlarged its field of action, secured positions it had won, cleared one hindrance after another out of the way. Against the background of this drama, with its internal rhythm and unwitting genius, appear the petty little men. They make laws and contract new debts, have the workers shot down and plunder the peasants, finally bringing the government they have taken under their charge to a state of increasingly impotent fury.

Formed in an atmosphere of bureaucratic conspiracies and departmental intrigues where impudent ignorance vied with cynical deceit, with no conception of the motion or meaning of the times, of the mass movement, or of the consistent laws of revolution—armed with two or three miserable tricks out of the canon of Paris stockmarket swindlers—these men try with ever increasing exertions to combine the methods of eighteenth century courtiers with the airs of "statesmen" in the parliamentary West. With supine obsequiousness they reassure the correspondents for newspapers in a stock-market-minded Europe. Before these reporters they lay out their "plans," "designs," and "programs." Every minister voices the hope that he at last will succeed in solving those problems on which his predecessor's endeavors ran firmly aground. If he could only manage to stem the "disturbances." They all begin on different tacks but end by giving the order to fire point blank at the breast of the revolution. To their horror the revolution is unkillable! They themselves conclude their careers with an ignominious fall, and if a terrorist's well-aimed blow does not free them from their miserable existence, they are condemned to survive their disgrace and see how the revolution with its elemental ge-

nus utilizes the very plans and designs of the "statesmen" to build its victories.

Sipyagin was killed by a revolver bullet, Plehve blown to bits by a bomb. Sviatopolk-Mirskii was a political corpse by January 22 [1905]. Bulygin was tossed aside like old rubbish by the October strike. Count Witte fell ingloriously, worn out by the workers' and soldiers' uprisings, on the threshold of the Duma he himself had created.³

In certain oppositional circles, especially among the liberal representatives of the *Zemstvos* (agricultural councils) and democratic-minded intelligentsia, vague hopes, plans, and expectations were awakened by each change of ministers. From the standpoint of the campaigns of the liberal press and the political aims of the constitutional landowners it did make a difference whether Plehve, the old police wolf, or Sviatopolk-Mirskii, the minister who inspired "confidence," stood at the helm. To be sure, Plehve was as powerless against the revolution among the people as his successor. But for the ascendancy of liberal journalists and *Zemstvo* plotters he was a scourge. He hated the revolution with the insane hatred of a police official grown old, threatened by a bomb from every corner. He persecuted the revolution with blood in his eye. In vain! Then he carried over his unsated hatred to the professors, *Zemstvo* representatives, and journalists whom he saw as open "instigators" of the revolution. He brought the liberal press to its knees in humiliation. He treated the journalists like dogs. Not only did he arrest them and send them to Siberia, but in his personal dealings with them he berated them like errant schoolboys. Toward the moderate members of the *Zemstvos*, who had organized at Witte's instigation, he acted as

3. Witte was dismissed in May 1906 five days before the convening of the State Duma authorized by the October 30 Manifesto which he had drafted.—ISR

if he were dealing with noisy college students, not "honorable" public representatives. And he achieved his aim. Liberal society trembled before him, hating him with the covert hatred of impotence. Many liberal Pharisees who never tired of condemning "the violence of the left" equally with the "violence of the right" greeted the bomb that exploded on July 28 [1904] as a heaven-sent savior.

For the liberals Plehve was an object of fear and hatred; for the revolution he was neither better nor worse than any other minister. The mass movement naturally overlooked the dividing line between what was permitted and what was not. Might not the masses fail to be impressed whether the boundaries were drawn with a bit more or a bit less latitude?

Part II

The official eulogizers of reaction tried to represent Plehve's regime as, if not a time of general well-being, then at least one of general quiet. Actually the czar's minister was not able to produce even a terrorized peace. Fresh in his new post, he proposed to make a demonstration of a professional convert's religious zeal by visiting the holy relics of Lavre [an historic old cloister near Kiev]. But he was forced to abandon his pilgrimage and make a hasty departure for the south, where large-scale agrarian uprisings had broken out in the provinces of Kharkov and Poltava. Peasant rebellions continued in unbroken succession. The famous November 1902 strike in Rostov and the mobilizations of the June days in 1903 spreading throughout the southern industrial areas were the forerunners of all the later proletarian mass actions. Street demonstrations continued without letup and the debates and decisions of the Committees on the Needs of Agriculture were the prelude to the Zemstvo campaign which followed immediately thereafter. Even before

Plehve's time the universities had become the sites of stormy outbursts of political unrest, and remained so for a long time to come. Two St. Petersburg conferences in January 1904—the technicians conference and the Pirogov conference—were the stage of advance-guard skirmishing by the democratic intelligentsia. Thus the prologue to the social "spring" was played out under Plehve. Wild repressive measures, incarcerations, interrogations, and raids creating a reactionary terror could not, in the last analysis, even halt the mobilization of liberal society.

The last six months of Plehve's regime coincided with the beginning of the war.⁴ The revolution had become quiet, or more correctly, it went into retreat. The book *Vor der Katastrophe* [Before the Catastrophe] by the Viennese journalist Hugo Ganz gives a certain picture of the prevailing mood of the bureaucracy and in Petersburg high society during the first months of the war with Japan. The feeling was one of confusion verging on despair. "It can't go on like this!" Where is there a way out? No one knows: neither the retired dignitaries, nor the illustrious liberal lawyers, nor the equally illustrious liberal journalists. "Society is completely paralyzed. A revolutionary mobilization of the people is unthinkable. If such a thing should arise, it would not turn against the ruling power but against the masters in general." Where is there hope for salvation? Hugo Ganz, who lived in Petersburg during the first three months of the war, reports that the fervent prayer of the moderate liberals and many conservatives as well was: "God help us lose!" This of course, did not hinder liberal society from sharing in the official patriotism. In countless declarations, all the Zemstvos, all the Dumas without exception, swore their faithful allegiance to the throne and pledged to sacrifice their treasure and their blood—they knew

4. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.—*ISR*

it would never come to that!—for the honor and power of czarist Russia. And their professorial colleagues joined them in their stalwart and staunch declarations.

This is not political ineptitude, not political ignorance. It is a tactic with a single underlying principle: rapprochement with the government at any price. It was an attempt to help ease the agonies of absolutism in reconciling itself to an inevitable liberalism. The liberals do not wish to take over the government, only to seduce it, earn its recognition and trust, make themselves indispensable. A tactic as old as Russian liberalism and one which has become neither better nor worthier through the years.


So, from the beginning of the war onward, the liberal opposition did everything in its power to aggravate the situation. The revolutionary logic of events would not stand still. The Port Arthur fleet was smashed. Admiral Makarov went under. The war was carried onto land—Yalu, King-chou, Dashi-Chao, Wafangou, Lyaoyan, Shakhhe, all names for one and the same thing: disgrace for the autocracy. The position of the government became difficult as never before, and the demoralization in the ranks of the government officials made a consistent and resolute domestic policy impossible. Vacillations, attempts to reach a peace settlement were unavoidable. The death of Plehve offered welcome occasion for a change of course.

Part III

To allow the government's "spring"⁵ to blossom Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii, former chief of the

CONTINUED ON PAGE 44.

5. This designation which has won a great deal of popularity was invented by Suvorin, the editor of *Novoe Vremya*, to characterize the period of "rapprochement of the government to the people."—*L. T.*



LAND. Peasants such as this one standing next to a sign of the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and MCR

(Revolutionary Peasant Movement) have grown impatient with the slow pace of Allende's land reform.

Chile: Reformism in Crisis

BY PETER CAMEJO and LES EVANS

"What is at issue is the direction in which the UP is headed. Is it an organizer for a revolutionary conquest of power against the ruling class? Or is it a brake on the mass movements of the workers and peasants, a pacifier of the masses. . . ."

Salvador Allende Gossens entered his second year in office in November amid publicly expressed hopes by high U.S. officials that he would not last much longer. Clearly the Chilean right was on the offensive against "the first freely elected Marxist president in the Western Hemisphere," as the American press has insisted on dubbing him.¹ But Allende's troubles do not end with the organized rightist opposition to his Unidad Popular (UP—Popular Unity) coalition. They include a rapid decline in foreign reserves, rising prices, growing influence of the military in the government, and mounting criticism from the left.

Allende's contention is that his difficulties are the inevitable price of having charted an anti-imperialist and prosocialist course. He dismisses left-wing opposition as the product of ultraradical impatience. That

1. The newspapers, along with much of the left, appear to have forgotten Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party government of Guyana of 1961-64. This experiment in the "peaceful road to socialism" ended in a debacle for the PPP and left Guyana as underdeveloped and dependent on imperialism as before.

PETER CAMEJO has visited Chile twice since Allende's election, most recently in November 1971. He is the author of the pamphlet *Allende's Chile: Is It Going Socialist?* (New York: Pathfinder Press).

LES EVANS is the editor of the *International Socialist Review*.

Allende's election was not a welcome development in Washington is hardly disputable, though the fear he is credited with instilling in American corporate circles seems highly exaggerated.² A clash with certain American corporations does not by itself, however, provide much of a clue to the social character of a regime. Mexico nationalized extensive American oil holdings in the 1930s and Bolivia took over U.S. tin in the 1950s, but both remain today integrated parts of Washington's empire below the Rio Grande.

Partisans of the Unidad Popular argue that its electoral victory on September 4, 1970, was a vindication for the perspective of the peaceful, parliamentary "road to socialism," and further, that the correct strategy in such an effort is the formation of an electoral bloc that includes capitalist as well as workers' parties. This perspective received a setback with the defeat of the Frente Amplio (Broad Front) in Uruguay November 28, which was modeled after the Chilean UP. Like the

2. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an arm of the American government that insures U.S. corporate investment in underdeveloped countries, in its annual report issued December 9 saw "the confiscations by Chile" as the prime reason for a precipitous decline in U.S. investment in Latin America last year. Total new U.S. investments in the continent insured for the second quarter of 1971 were only \$8 million, down from an average level of \$100 million for each quarter of the preceding four years.

UP, the Frente Amplio also included in its ranks representatives of bourgeois parties, and it excluded explicitly socialist measures from its program.

But if Allende's victory has failed to set more than a limited trend in Latin America (Frente Amplio, Uruguay; Nueva Fuerza, Venezuela), it has at least raised high hopes in wide sectors of the Latin American left—and in the U.S. as well. It is necessary to examine the experience of the first year of the Unidad Popular to see to what extent if at all these hopes are justified.

Moscow and the world Communist parties that follow its lead have been the most laudatory. It is, after all, the Kremlin's strategy of an alliance with bourgeois parties that Allende is carrying out. Thus the American Communist Party as long ago as December 1970 hailed Allende's election in extravagant terms:

"This was no ordinary electoral victory, no mere victory of a Socialist over the other candidates. Rather, in the words of the Basic Program of the six-party coalition which backed Allende, it represents a 'transfer of power from the old ruling groups to the workers, to the peasantry and to the progressive sections of the middle class of the city and country.'"³

Did this mean, as it seemed to say in plain English, that the inauguration of a UP government signified the toppling of capitalism in Chile and the establishment of a workers' state? *Political Affairs* is more than a little ambiguous on this question, but in the same article it rejects the proposition that Allende had already carried out socialist measures or should do so in the near future. The editors of *Political Affairs* polemicize with the Chilean Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and others who "see the revolutionary process in Latin America only as socialist, and deny the existence of an anti-imperialist stage."

Such an "anti-imperialist stage" supposes an alliance between the working-class parties and the "progressive" sector of the national bourgeoisie, on the basis of the indefinite preservation of capitalist property relations. For the duration of such an alliance, whatever the merits of its claim to be "anti-imperialist," no "transfer of power" from one class to another has taken place.

Other more honest observers than the CP will admit that this is the case in Chile today. Allende holds office but the working class does not control the economy and the power of the old ruling class in the state apparatus is essentially intact. Recognition that the transfer of power to the working class has not yet been accomplished is the starting point of any serious discussion of the program and strategy of the Unidad Popular.

Castro's visit

Fidel Castro's three-week visit to Chile, ending December 4, marked a setback for American imperialism's efforts to isolate the Cuban revolution. Followed by brief stopovers in Peru and Ecuador, the Chile tour went a long way toward making a dead

letter of the U.S.-inspired expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States in 1962. As the transcripts of his speeches indicate, Castro sought to limit the aims of his trip to the extension of diplomatic contacts and to avoid extensive comments on Chilean politics. Nevertheless it was inevitable that his tour would be seen as placing a revolutionary stamp of approval on the so-called Chilean road to socialism. Castro was not at all unaware of this and on several occasions indicated his general agreement with the course being followed by Allende. Thus in his dialogue with the students at the University of Concepción on November 18 he declared:

"Now, then, if you asked me what's going on in Chile, I would say, sincerely, that a revolutionary process is taking place in Chile." He qualified this judgment by adding: "A revolutionary process is-not yet a rev-

"Allende holds office but the working class does not control the economy and the power of the old ruling class in the state apparatus is essentially intact."

olution. . . . A process is a way; a process is a stage in its beginning. And if we are to characterize the Revolution in pure terms we must characterize it as a revolutionary phase in its beginning."⁴

Castro developed this theme further in response to questions from students at the State Technological University in Santiago, November 29. When asked what facts characterized the "Chilean revolutionary process," he replied:

Outstanding fact: it took advantage of the specific conditions, the concrete possibilities of Chile, within the framework of legal and institutional circumstances, even within a bourgeois capitalist state and its institutions. It united forces and opened a gap and opened it through peaceful means. . . .

We believe that the duty of revolutionaries under these conditions is to struggle for that opening, for that door they have opened. And they must defend it through legal means, through mass means, defend it with all the means that are necessary."⁵

Although he refused to discuss particular groups or programs either within or outside of the UP, Castro's position amounts to an endorsement of the general policy of the Allende coalition. It could be summarized in three points: (1) Allende's election does

3. "The People's Victory in Chile," editorial in *Political Affairs*, "Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party, U.S.A.," December 1970.

4. *Granma Weekly Review*, English edition, Havana, November 28, 1971.

5. *Ibid.*, December 12, 1971.

not by itself constitute the seizure of power, which still lies ahead; (2) the present leadership of the UP are carrying forward a process that aims at the elimination of capitalism; (3) the eventual confrontation will require "all the means that are necessary," presumably including armed struggle.

As Marxists we would agree with the first and third points of this thesis. What is at issue is the direction in which the UP is headed. Is it an organizer for a revolutionary conquest of power against the ruling class? Or is it a brake on the mass movements of the workers and peasants, a pacifier of the masses that seeks political collaboration with representatives of the capitalist status quo?

Castro and the Communist parties assert that the Unidad Popular is a revolutionary formation. An examination of its class composition, program, policies, and action reveals this not to be the case. In our opinion the UP is a class-collaborationist coalition in which not only the bourgeois participants but also the reformist Communist and Socialist parties seek to dampen the impulse of the Chilean masses toward revolutionary class struggle.

What has been achieved?

The Unidad Popular has implemented an impressive series of reforms. These include a 50 percent increase in the minimum wage and 30 percent increases for most other workers. A free milk ration has been instituted for children. The major American-owned copper mines have been nationalized, as have a number (relatively few) of Chilean-owned enterprises.

In its first eleven months, the Allende government expropriated 1,305 big landholdings totaling some 5.7 million acres. "This compares with 1,408 expropriated farms of 8.7 million acres under the government of [Christian Democratic] President Frei, 1965-70."⁶

Some 65 percent of the banks have been nationalized through the expedient of the government buying a controlling interest on the open stockmarket.

Supporters of Allende frequently point to the similarity between these reforms and measures adopted by the Cuban revolution in its initial stages. What they neglect to mention is that the Castro government had come to power in an armed struggle that had already broken the power of the old governmental apparatus, from the army and police to the political institutions of Batista's rule. This smashing of the old capitalist state put the reforms in an entirely different framework from that which exists at present in Chile.

None of the measures thus far inaugurated by the UP regime taken singly or together are what distinguish a workers' state from a capitalist state. In the hands of a procapitalist regime such reforms are essentially attempts to modernize the economy and re-

duce social tensions through material concessions to the working class.

This is not to deny the progressive nature of the UP's reforms. In the United States in the 1930s the winning of social security, unemployment compensation, union recognition, etc., were all progressive measures; but in not challenging the basis of capitalist rule their overall effect was to largely stabilize, not weaken, American capitalism.

Of course the UP is very different from the Roosevelt period in the development of American imperialism. But not different enough to constitute a revolutionary break with capitalist politics. In a real sense the UP represents a continuation and deepening of the liberal reform program of its predecessor, the Christian Democratic regime of Eduardo Frei Montalva. Both were responses to a deepening radicalization among the Chilean masses. To provide the material means for modernizing the economy and answering the most pressing demands of the workers and peasants these governments have been compelled to take limited steps against the holdings of foreign imperialist firms.

Under Frei these moves were sufficiently restricted to maintain the public support of Washington. Allende has pulled the tiger's tail a little harder and aroused the beast's displeasure. But in our opinion Washington's hostility to the UP regime is not founded primarily on anything Allende has done or intends to do. We would agree with E.J. Hobsbawm's assessment after a recent visit to Chile, when despite his evident sympathies for the Unidad Popular he was forced to concede:

"So far what it has done is not *qualitatively* very different from what several other Latin American governments have done, are doing, or could well make up their minds to do."⁷

Allende is a reformist, not a revolutionary. With the best intentions in the world his government cannot pay for serious improvements in the standard of living of the masses. This is true even if all imperialist concerns were expropriated, because dependency flows from the inability of the capitalist system in an underdeveloped country to revolutionize production.

We have seen numerous neocolonial regimes that for a time took their distance from foreign imperialism—Indonesia, Ghana, etc.—without ever completing the break. Whatever their socialist pretensions these governments remained capitalist and at some point direct imperialist domination was reasserted.

The reason imperialism is hostile to such governments, and to Allende in particular, is not so much because of the immediate loss it suffers in expropriations or because it fears that these governments will actually become workers' states. It is because of the expectations aroused in the masses by these reformist experiments. Processes are set in motion that push in the direction of mass anticapitalist action that the re-

6. *Washington Post*, December 9, 1971.

7. "Can Allende Make It?" *New York Review of Books*, September 23, 1971.

formist regimes may not be able to contain. This question of mass mobilization against the institutions of the capitalist state is far more fundamental than nationalizations in the abstract.

Marxist theory and the transition to socialism

Before examining the concrete institutions of bourgeois rule in Chile it would be useful to take up Allende's theoretical explanation of what he is doing. In a postscript to Régis Debray's book *The Chilean Revolution—Conversations with Allende*, the "Marxist president" writes:

The electoral triumph of the popular forces of my country has transformed into historical reality what up till now has been only stated as a theoretical possibility by classic Marxist thinkers. On that crowning day in September 1970, Chile showed the world that the popular forces, when acting in a true spirit of struggle, admit no barriers, and that under the right conditions the people, using the legal and institutional arms created by the bourgeoisie, can seize the reins of government by electoral means to undertake the construction of socialism.⁸

Here two ideas are expressed, neither of which have any foundation in the writings of "classic Marxist thinkers": (1) it is possible to topple bourgeois rule through electoral means; (2) the proletariat can take over for its own ends the existing bourgeois state. (These are not the same thing.)

We will begin with the second point. As early as 1872, in the last preface to the German edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels wrote:

"... One thing especially was proved by the [Paris] Commune, viz., that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes' . . ."

This is also the central thesis of Lenin's *State and Revolution*.

As for the "theoretical possibility" of an electoral triumph by the working class, Allende's case is very little better. In *State and Revolution* Lenin quotes Marx's letter to Kugelmann in which Marx wrote:

"If you look up the last chapter of my *Eighteenth Brumaire*, you will find that I declare that the next attempt of the French Revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to *smash* it, and this is the precondition for every real people's revolution on the Continent." (Marx's emphasis.)

Lenin adds this commentary on Marx's restriction of this prescription to continental Europe:

The words, "to smash the bureaucratic-military machine", briefly express the principal lesson of Marxism

8. Debray, Régis. *The Chilean Revolution—Conversations with Allende*, New York: Random House, 1971. p. 164.

regarding the tasks of the proletariat during a revolution in relation to the state. . . .

It is interesting to note, in particular, two points in the above-quoted argument of Marx. [We need be concerned here only with the first—P. C. & L. E.] First, he restricts his conclusion to the Continent. This was understandable in 1871, when Britain was still the model of a purely capitalist country, but without a militarist clique and, to a considerable degree, without a bureaucracy. Marx therefore excluded Britain, where a revolution, even a people's revolution, then seemed possible, and indeed was possible, *without* the precondition of destroying the "ready-made state machinery".

Today, in 1917, at the time of the first great imperialist war, this restriction made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives—in the whole world—of Anglo-Saxon "liberty", in the sense that they had no militarist cliques and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and suppress everything. Today, in Britain and America, too "the precondition for every real people's revolution" is the *smashing*, the *destruction* of the "ready-made state machinery" (made and brought up to "European", general imperialist, perfection in those countries in the years 1914-17).⁹

So much for Allende's invoking of the "classic Marxist thinkers." It should be added that when Allende cites this "precedent" he points only to Chile's supposed tradition of parliamentary democracy. It is clear from a reading of Marx and Lenin that this is not at all what they had in mind in discussing the possibility of such a peaceful development. Allende studiously ignores the highly developed military and state bureaucracy in present-day Chile, where the standing armed forces, including naval and air units, number more than 60,000 men (these figures are given by *The Statesman's Yearbook*, 1970/71).

This is not to mention the national police (the Carabineros), the old civil-service bureaucracy, the courts, the bourgeois majority in parliament, continued private ownership of major industry, and procapitalist control of the majority of the newspapers, television, and radio media. These bastions of bourgeois rule remain untouched. Furthermore, as the war in Vietnam and the 1965 invasion of Santo Domingo indicate, American imperialism is prepared in the last resort to intervene militarily against any mass revolutionary process that threatens to pass beyond capitalist reforms.

For those easily impressed by the appearance of motion in a progressive direction we must examine the heights that remain to be conquered before any qualitative change can take place in Chilean society.

The real question on which the UP must be judged is whether or not it has politically and organizationally

9. *State and Revolution*, in Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 415-16. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964. Emphasis in original.

prepared the masses for the impending confrontation. Here Allende's record provides little room for optimism. He ran on a program limited to reforms within the framework of capitalism and accepted office under conditions in which it could only be used to administer the existing capitalist state.

In regard to the officer corps of the army, the ultimate defenders of bourgeois privilege, Allende has refrained from public criticism, increased its pay, and urged the workers to place their confidence in the military rather than create their own armed organizations. We will return to this point later.

Allende does not project replacing the bourgeois congress with a national executive body based on the workers' organizations. Despite all the heat generated by the Christian Democrats, his proposal to abolish the Senate in favor of a unicameral legislature does

“. . . the expropriations in Chile have left important sectors of imperialist property untouched and have yet to make decisive inroads into domestic capitalist property.”

nothing in itself to change the fundamental nature of this institution. His appending of the name People's Assembly to his proposed streamlined model of the old bourgeois congress miseducates the Chilean masses. It bears no resemblance to the recent People's Assembly in Bolivia, which was an embryonic institution of workers' power (and was destroyed by the "loyal" officer corps for precisely that reason).

As part of the price of assuming office, Allende pledged to the Christian Democrats not to remove any of their appointees from the civil-service apparatus. This means that the one portion of the government, the executive branch, which is "controlled" by the UP is in reality largely in the hands of functionaries determined to sabotage even the limited reforms that have been proclaimed.

Are the nationalizations socialist?

As we indicated earlier, we believe that far too much is made of nationalizations abstracted from the general dynamic of the unfolding social process. All capitalist countries have employed some degree of nationalization to provide services to the ruling class as a whole (railroads, postal service) or to maintain branches of industry that had become unprofitable but remained necessary for the functioning of the economy (coal in Britain).

In the underdeveloped world this has taken a far more extensive form because of the weakness of the bourgeois forces. In the absence of sufficient private capital to create even the transport and processing

infrastructure needed for the efficient operation of imperialist concerns, the state apparatus has assumed the duties of accumulating capital for the benefit of foreign corporations and the weak domestic bourgeoisie.

The subordinate character of the nationalized industries is determined by their dependence on the world market (the price of copper has dropped from 68 to 49 cents a pound in the last year), the existence of a substantial private sector, dependency on external imperialist financial institutions, the absence of a monopoly of foreign trade, and the penetration of the economy to one degree or another by direct imperialist investment. Piecemeal nationalizations do not fundamentally alter the status of dependency as long as the political and economic pillars of the bourgeois state remain intact.

Even taken in isolation, the expropriations in Chile have left important sectors of imperialist property untouched and have yet to make decisive inroads into domestic capitalist property. The government has expressed its intention to nationalize some 250 indigenous industrial companies, but at the end of its first year in power it had done so in only thirty-seven cases.¹⁰ No timetable has been proposed for extending these seizures. Instead, the government has counseled industrialists on the harmony of interests between the "socialist" regime and private enterprise.

(The big wage raises, so the argument goes, provide an upsurge in demand. Entrepreneurs are encouraged to recoup in volume what they lose in wage payments. Some capitalists have accepted this advice, but for the most part they have concentrated their energies on evading the official price freeze. The government claims that inflation for 1971 will come to about 20 percent, down from 38 percent under the previous administration. Other sources put the current figure at closer to 30 percent.¹¹ Either way, two-thirds or more of the wage increases for most workers have already been wiped out by price rises.)

The 30,000 smaller capitalist enterprises have been told that nationalization in their case is not being contemplated.

There is no state monopoly of foreign trade, an elementary protectionist measure to wrest the Chilean economy out of the grip of the capitalist world market. This is a key critique of the claim that, while not yet socialist, Chile has entered an "anti-imperialist" stage.

The nationalization of the copper mines was a spectacular gesture, but taken alone does not constitute a break with imperialist influence in the economy. A year earlier the Peruvian military junta nationalized the International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, without compensation. That

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10. *Washington Post*, November 5, 1971.

11. *Ibid.* (Also, in my discussions with people on the left in Chile the opinion was commonly voiced that the government's figures were understated. — P. C.)

Women and the 1972 Elections

BY BETSEY STONE



“... If you want women elected this year, then you're talking about working for the Democratic and Republican parties and for the very same people who are responsible for maintaining the oppression of women in this country.”

The following article is taken from a speech delivered at a socialist educational conference on November 27 in New York City.

In the women's liberation movement, as is the case in every growing movement, there have been constant debates and discussions over what strategy should be adopted. During the past year, the question of the views and role of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance have been at the center of many of the discussions taking place. For example, there is hardly a women's liberation newspaper or radical newspaper of any kind which hasn't at some point discussed the role of the SWP in the women's liberation movement. This discussion has also taken place at meetings and large conferences.

This is not surprising, since the SWP is one of the larger groups that participates in the women's movement, and it certainly is the largest socialist group which actively supports and helps to build the movement.

Some of this discussion has been productive and has helped to clarify the issues. However, some of the debates have included distortions of the SWP's position, or have gotten bogged down in organizational disputes that come up on a day-to-day basis instead of focusing in on the important political questions.

What I would like to do here is discuss the position of the Socialist Workers Party—how we have tried to build the women's movement, and our ideas on an effective, long-term strategy for the movement, focusing on how women can best promote the struggle for liberation during the election year of 1972.

Perhaps it would be best to begin by looking at a strategy which is presently receiving a great deal of attention—the perspective put forward by the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC). The caucus's perspective is also shared by the National Organization for Women, although NOW is involved in a broader range of activities. These two groups are the largest, best-known organizations in the women's movement and they have the greatest number of forces, including within their ranks congresswomen and other prominent figures.

Both the National Women's Political Caucus and NOW have a perspective of what they term “organizing for political power.” By this they mean to get women elected to public office, and to influential positions within the Democratic and Republican parties.

Their rationale goes something like this: The feminist movement must become relevant and serious. Women must begin fighting for real political power. Therefore, women should relate to the elections and they should work within the Democratic or Republican parties. If you want to be relevant, you have to work through these parties because that's what the mass of women relate to, and that's where the power lies.

Of course, this is not the official position of the Women's Political Caucus. Formally the caucus is “non-partisan,” aiming to involve women from all political parties and viewpoints. But when it comes down to the concrete, all the meetings and conferences of the caucus have stressed the need to win power through the Democratic and Republican parties.

And in motivating this strategy, leaders of the caucus have implied that the women's liberation movement is a little bit passé. As Betty Friedan has put it, “We are moving from women's liberation to women's participation in equal political power.” She says that the women's movement has “crested,” and won't last if it continues simply building mass actions around basic issues of concern to women.

At this time the National Women's Political Caucus is growing, but there has also been some hesitancy and questioning of their strategy by women in the movement.

At the first conference of the NWPC in Washington in July 1971, Paula Page from the National Student Association expressed her reservations about the perspective of working through the Democratic and Republican parties. In a speech to the conference she proposed that women “organize as an alternative to the existing political parties.”

Another criticism of the Women's Political Caucus perspective appeared in the November-December 1971 issue of the newspaper *Woman's World*. Kathie Sara-child, in an article on “Women and the Elections,” wrote:

Already the hullabaloo about working for women candidates has shifted the emphasis in the National Organization for Women away from more *direct* action for women's rights. And both NOW and the Women's Political Caucus are now promising their concern for “humanity as a whole,” rather than the so-called narrower women's issues. . . . If the NOW and Women's Political Caucus women want to get themselves some jobs in politics, fine. If they do it right, they can even really help the feminist cause. But they must not lie. They must not say things like “now we women are getting ‘political’; now we're moving ‘beyond’ issues like sex and housework, *out* of consciousness-raising cells and zap action groups, and even mass marches, class action suits and strikes, to POWER.”

Renee Blakkan, a writer for the *Guardian*, put her finger on one of the greatest dangers involved in the

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NWPC perspective. In her article on the formation of the caucus which appeared in the August 11, 1971, issue of the *Guardian*, she criticized the programmatic "guidelines" which it adopted:

The guidelines do not mention mass mobilizations of women, such as last Aug. 26, when thousands of women across the country demonstrated their demand for free abortion on demand with an end to forced sterilization; free, 24-hour community-controlled child care and equal pay for equal work. Such demonstrations, which show the people their own power and which activate many previously inactive people, are not in the interest of the Democratic or Republican parties, which want the people's votes, but not their independent, organized mass action.

Renee Blakkan's article also notes that the caucus guidelines "say nothing about whether socialist candidates would be supported against, say, a Democratic or Republican candidate whose platform was not as good."

In their criticisms of the Women's Political Caucus, these women are attempting to come to grips with the reality facing the women's liberation movement in 1972. That is, if you start with the idea that you want fast results, if you are thinking in terms of working for candidates who actually have a chance to win, if you want women elected this year, then you're talking about working for the Democratic and Republican parties and for the very same people who are responsible for maintaining the oppression of women in this country. There is no alternative if you want to *win* the elections. This is especially true in the case of the presidential elections.

Who will be the next president?

One way of looking at the situation faced by women in 1972 is to begin from the realization that anyone can pretty well foresee the outcome of the elections—at least the most significant results. We can confidently predict: (1) the person who wins the presidential election will be white and will be male; and (2) he will be generally acceptable to that 2.2 percent of the population in this country that owns 86 percent of the corporate wealth (the figures are from a Treasury Department paper of May 1967)—the top layer of wealthy people who control the government.

We can also predict that the man who wins will *not* campaign for free, community-controlled child-care centers; he will *not* campaign for repeal of abortion laws; he will *not* take the offensive in fighting for equal pay and job opportunities for women.

Likewise, we can predict that the new president will have no solution for unemployment, no solution to the crisis of the school system, no solution to pollution, to narcotics addiction, or to the crisis in transportation. We can predict that he will not be for an end to the nuclear arms race, or take a principled

position against all military aggression or other interference in the affairs of other countries. And we can predict that he will support some form of wage controls, which especially hurt women by keeping them from winning pay equal to men.

Both of the white, male candidates chosen by the Democratic and Republican parties will take essentially the same positions on every single fundamental question. There may be some tactical differences; in fact, there *will* be differences—but on the major issues facing the people of the U.S. today, no real alternatives will be offered.

The way the politics of this country are set up—in the "two-party system"—the American people do not really have a say about the policies of the government. Polls have shown that the views of the majority of Americans do not coincide with a great many of the positions taken by Democratic and Republican party politicians. For instance, if the people of this country were given a chance to vote on issues, instead of simply picking between a Democrat and a Republican, they would probably vote for repeal of antiabortion laws, for a network of federally-funded child-care centers, and for immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and military aid from Southeast Asia.

But within the two-party system the American people have no way of participating, no way of determining what issues are going to be raised and decided. The whole Democratic and Republican party election set-up is arranged to try to cover over the real issues, to try to focus all attention on the candidates.

When you vote for a Democrat or a Republican you end up voting for a kind of image, and not for issues. These parties do a Madison Avenue job on their candidates—it might be a tough, law-and-order image, or the benevolent, peace-loving image, whichever they think will serve their interests at the time. There are no clear debates. The candidates are never held responsible to carry out a specific policy. Their promises and claims are, more often than not, lies or distortions.

In addition, Democratic and Republican party politics are set up so that if you want to run for office and have a chance of winning, you must have access to vast quantities of money. It takes plenty of cash to get a good Madison Avenue job done on you, to get on the radio and television, to reach any significant number of people. It is estimated that this year the two major-party presidential nominees will need as much as \$20 million each to run an effective campaign. So either you have to be a millionaire yourself—like Kennedy or Rockefeller—or your politics have to be acceptable to the millionaires.

The Democratic and Republican parties have another way of preventing the desires of the mass of people from being clearly expressed through the elections. That is, these parties are themselves organized in such a way as to minimize debate on important issues.

Women's liberation and political power

Although each party has a written platform, everyone knows that this is not to be taken seriously and that candidates are not bound to the platform of their party. Both Bella Abzug and Lester Maddox, for example, represent the same party. At the Democratic and Republican conventions it is understood that no serious political discussion will take place. Rather, the important decisions are made in backroom wheeling and dealing between wealthy and powerful individuals and machine politicians while delegates are on the convention floor blowing whistles, throwing confetti, displaying signs and hats with their candidates' name on them, and generally putting on a show.

After the conventions take place and the Democrats and Republicans have chosen their candidates, then the degree of choice open to the American people is even narrower. If the Democrat knows he faces no

"Both of the white, male candidates chosen by the Democratic and Republican parties will take essentially the same positions on every single fundamental question."

major threat or competition from the left, he often begins compromising more and more with the right, trying to pick up votes from the Republican.

And this is precisely what is going to happen in 1972. First of all, it is unlikely that the Democratic Party candidate is going to be McGovern. And it certainly won't be Shirley Chisholm. Both of them are considered too liberal to suit the needs of the Democratic Party at this time. And the Democratic candidate—Humphrey, Kennedy, Muskie, or whoever—is going to be moving to the right if he feels that he has the support of the left locked up.

The way this whole game works, the way the Democrats will get masses of people to get out and vote for them, is by pointing to the even worse dangers and evils of the Republican candidate. You may not like the Democrat, we are told, but at least he is better than the Republican.

All this adds up to the fact that there is no fundamental difference between the Democratic and Republican parties. They are more like two factions of the same party, because both are based on upholding the "free enterprise system," here and around the world. Both parties are controlled from the top by the wealthy industrialists, bankers, landlords, and their representatives. There is no fundamental difference between a liberal-talking politician who is supported or controlled by the capitalists, and a conservative politician who is supported or controlled by the capitalists. The capitalists themselves know this. One way many millionaires and billionaires show it is by giving equal campaign contributions to both parties—to cover both alternatives.

So how can the women's liberation movement and the socialist movement deal with this situation? How can we organize and relate to the masses of women in this country who agree with us on many of the basic issues, but who still have illusions about the Republican and Democratic parties? How can we organize an independent force strong enough to take on both the Democratic and Republican parties with all their resources and power?

The first thing we have to do is to give up the idea that we can elect people to national office in 1972 who are going to fight for the rights of women and other oppressed people in this country. The only possible way we could win this election is by joining with the parties of our oppressors and compromising with them, instead of organizing independently to fight them.

We have to take a long-run view. And we have to raise the issues, the real issues that relate to masses of women.

On this point the Socialist Workers Party would disagree with some of the leaders of the Women's Political Caucus. A common view held by caucus leaders is that the problems of this country stem from the fact that men control the government; for instance, they think that a major reason why Nixon rains bombs down on Vietnam is because he is a man. Gloria Steinem expressed this idea in an article in the October 6, 1971, *New York Times* called "The Machismo Factor." Here she implied that the "Masculine Mystique" is one of the reasons why the men in the government won't pull out of Vietnam. "It's this kind of thinking," she wrote, referring to the masculine mystique, "that denies the courage in admitting mistakes, in forfeiting false positions, and so locks us into the unnecessary, inhuman gamesmanship of global showdowns in the O. K. Corral."

This is absolutely false. The reason Nixon won't pull out of Southeast Asia is because he wants to win that war and because he wants to prevent Vietnam from making a socialist revolution. It has nothing to do with the fact that Nixon is male and doesn't have the courage to admit a "mistake."

Gloria Steinem put forth a similar position regarding the negotiations with the Vietnamese in Paris. She said she thought that if the United States sent female negotiators to Paris to talk to the Vietnamese, whose chief negotiator is a woman, they could understand each other better and the talks would lead to a solution. In trying to say that women should be in positions of power, Steinem ignores the *main issue*, which is that no U. S. representative—male or female—has the right to negotiate concessions from the Vietnamese regarding how the Vietnamese should run their own country.

In other words, the problems of this country will not be solved simply by substituting women for men in the positions of power. The political *program* of those in power is what is crucial.

The Socialist Workers Party has a very different view than the leaders of the Women's Political Caucus on

what is at the root of the problems in this society. We believe that these problems stem from the capitalist system, not the "Masculine Mystique." The reason we don't have equal pay or child care is not because of the psychological traits of males, but because it would not benefit this capitalist, profit-oriented system.

It will not help to run women candidates through the Democratic and Republican parties. To win fundamental changes, we must begin to build an alternative power to these parties, and we must demonstrate to women that these parties are rotten, undemocratic, and not representative of the American people.

Mass action during election years

The key way to begin is by organizing around the *issues*, because this is where the rulers of this country are most vulnerable. The best illustration of this fact is the effect of the struggle against the war in Southeast Asia. The massive organizing that has taken place around this central issue has done the most to raise doubts about whether the Democratic and Republican parties actually represent the people of this country. It is the massive, independent organization of people around specific issues, such as the war, which has begun to create a certain amount of disillusionment about the politicians of the major parties. For instance we now see far more new young voters registering as independents, rather than simply signing up for the same party that their parents supported. Even the existence of the Women's Political Caucus, the Black Caucus, and the newly formed Youth Caucus — although they still represent no real break with capitalist politics — are reflections of this growing distrust and disillusionment with the Democratic Party.

Another area where we can see the changes that are occurring because of independent organizing around issues is the abortion struggle. For years people tried to reform the abortion laws in this country by lobbying, talking with legislators, and other behind-the-scenes-type activities. But these reformers were quite timid. For them, abortion was still considered a big "dilemma." There were the "rights" of the fetus to be considered, along with the rights of the woman, and it was only on certain occasions, if the woman had been raped, or the child was going to be deformed, that after long agonizing consideration the reformers felt the law should allow the woman to have an abortion. This sort of thinking pretty much dominated the whole field of abortion reform before the rise of the women's liberation movement.

With the women's liberation movement came the concept of the woman's right to control her own body, the woman's right to choose whether or not to bear children. This concept became the dominant philosophy within the abortion movement and the demand now being raised is for total repeal of abortion laws.

Women have for the most part stopped talking in terms of the rights of the fetus versus the rights of the woman. It is clear that the fetus is not a human being,

plain and simple. The woman *is* a human being.

This change, this new confidence, has come about through masses of women entering the struggle, taking direct action themselves rather than relying on the Democratic or Republican parties, unafraid of telling the truth, of taking a militant position, of speaking for women. It is this kind of confidence and militancy in masses of women that constitutes our power to force changes. And that is what we must try to build up, rather than building up the careers and influence of individual politicians within the capitalist parties.

And the way we can build this power is to unite around concrete demands of concern to large numbers of people — including people who still vote for the Democrats or the Republicans — involving them in struggle and through the process of struggle causing more and more questions to be raised about the basic nature of this government and the organization of this society. The process of winning people away from support to the capitalist parties can only take place through this kind of struggle around issues.

That is why it is so important to keep up independent actions during an election year, confronting all

"Through a united mass movement we can continue to fight around basic feminist demands, even though we may disagree . . . in the elections."

the Democratic and Republican party candidates on where they stand. For instance, at the November 20 demonstration in Washington for repeal of abortion laws many of the rally speakers addressed themselves to the elections. Lana Clarke Phelan from Los Angeles NOW urged women to refuse to vote for any candidate who was not for repeal of abortion laws, refuse to support them in any way, refuse to give them money, and oppose them and put them on the spot everywhere they go.

Linda Jenness noted in her speech to the rally that all the Democratic and Republican party candidates have attempted to duck the question of abortion-law repeal. It is actions like those on November 20, where women organize independently around their own demands and challenge the government, that help to make people start thinking. Through building up this power and confidence of women that they *can* organize, that they *do* have power, that they *can* affect the policies of the government and win victories, in this way we begin to lay the groundwork for meaningful electoral action which can involve and represent the masses of people, not the ruling circles.

One example of this is the Raza Unida parties — the Chicano parties which exist in the Southwest and on the West Coast. In almost every area where La Raza Unida parties are active, they grew out of independent mass struggles around issues of concern to

the Chicano community. For example, in Crystal City, Texas, the impetus for formation of the Raza Unida Party came from a series of high-school struggles for control by the Chicano community over the policies of the schools.

The same was true of the independent Black political party—the original Black Panther Party—that was formed in Lowndes County, Alabama, in the middle 1960s. It was also built out of struggles of the people in Lowndes County over the question of the schools.

Another example of electoral action which is based on support to independent mass struggles is the Socialist Workers Party election campaign. Support for the SWP campaigns has greatly increased in recent years because of the effect of the mass movements that have arisen and challenged the government. If you look back to 1964, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the Socialist Workers Party and Malcolm X were just about the only people in this country who opposed both Johnson and Goldwater. There were not many people who supported the 1964 SWP presidential ticket.

But in 1968 we began to see a change. And today the response to the SWP campaign has been qualitatively greater.

So in supporting the building of mass movements around specific issues, the SWP does not mean that people should reject participation in the elections. The elections are very important as far as putting forth a perspective of how society as a whole should be changed. But for electoral activity to aid the struggle of women or any other oppressed group it must be undertaken outside of the Democratic and Republican parties which serve the interests of the ruling class. And it must be based in its demand and program on the masses of working people and oppressed nationalities—because it is only the masses of working people who have the power to effectively challenge the present capitalist rulers.

A basis for unity in 1972

At this time, it is clear that most women involved in the women's movement will in fact vote for the Democrats or Republicans, or not vote at all. It will take time, and experience in the struggle, before large numbers of women are radicalized to the point where they begin to break from the capitalist parties. So, it is crucial, in the meantime, that we maintain the unity of the women's movement as much as possible, despite the illusions which still exist about the two-party system.

Through a united mass movement we can continue to fight around basic feminist demands, even though we may disagree on what to do in the elections. As a matter of fact, the election period is a particularly good time to do this, because it is a time when the attention of the country is directed to political questions.

And it is on this point that the dangers of the ori-

entation of the Women's Political Caucus can be seen most clearly. That is, once you orient toward the Democratic and Republican parties, there is a logic which leads to downgrading independent, militant actions by women during election years. This is what I think Renee Blakkan meant when she noted that the guidelines of the caucus do not even mention mass actions of women such as the August 26 demonstration in 1970. The Women's Political Caucus has not organized any big demonstrations of women in its entire existence. And it has not helped to build the one nationally-organized action that women are taking now: the abortion-law repeal campaign of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition. In fact the caucus scheduled conflicting conferences on November 20, the day of national demonstrations for repeal of abortion laws, graphically flaunting their disinterest in such actions by women.

Why does the Women's Political Caucus seem to see a contradiction between electoral work and street demonstrations or other visible actions? If you start from the idea that the most important thing to do in 1972 is to defeat Nixon, to defeat the Republicans, and to get some more liberal women candidates elected, then many things follow.

Once you fall into the trap of thinking McGovern, for example, is qualitatively better than Nixon, you end up concluding that if McGovern is going to make a serious bid to win, he can't mention things like the antiwar movement or abortion. You fall into the whole trap of the two-party election game, where the real issues go out the window.

This is true even with local candidates—who would supposedly have more leeway to support "radical" positions. One incident on the West Coast during the organization of the San Francisco November 20 demonstration for repeal of abortion laws shows how this works. The organizers of the demonstration faced a big problem from the so-called "right-to-life" forces, who mobilized to pressure the San Francisco Board of Supervisors not to grant a permit for the demonstration to march in the street. Diane Feinstein—Democratic member of the Board of Supervisors who recently had campaigned as a "prowoman" candidate—opposed granting the permit for the proabortion march.

Many women in NOW had supported Feinstein as a "progressive" woman candidate, and her action was very embarrassing and disturbing to them. But this was a clear example of how mass mobilizations of women making specific demands can expose the positions of women who are responsible to, and subject to the pressure from, the Democratic Party.

During every single election year since the beginning of the general radicalization in the early 1960s, sections of the Black movement, the student movement, and the antiwar movement have turned toward the Democratic Party and away from militant,

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Was Stalin's Pact with Hitler Justified?

BY MILTON ALVIN



STALIN AND VON RIBBENTROP. The occasion is the signing of the pact between the Soviet Union and Germany in August 1939.

"The idea that workers of other countries were the only dependable allies that the Soviet Union could have . . . was completely foreign to Stalin."

For thirty-two years Stalin's associates and successors have been trying to explain and justify his 1939 pact with Hitler. One of the more recent efforts was a series of three articles by Ivan Maisky that appeared in the August 30, 31, and September 1, 1971, issues of the *New York Times*. Maisky was the Soviet ambassador to England at the time the pact was signed.¹

Writing under the title "How the Second World War Began," the former ambassador contends that Stalin was compelled to enter into a nonaggression pact with Hitler in 1939 because the heads of the British and French governments, Chamberlain and Daladier, refused to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union. He further postulates that such an agreement between the Kremlin and the Western "democracies" would have prevented war:

"The only effective way was to form urgently an even stronger alliance—of the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the United States (or of the first three at the minimum)—for protection against the aggressors." The latter are described as Germany, Italy, and Japan, who had concluded an anti-Comintern pact among themselves.

The underlying assumption of such a thesis is that governmental pacts can turn aside the built-in drive of imperialist powers toward war in times of world economic crisis. Moreover, it implicitly assumes that some imperialist powers are "aggressors" while other imperialist powers—Britain, France, and the United States—are capable of stilling the urges of their capitalist economies for expansion abroad and of becoming forces for peace (Maisky calls them "antiaggressors").

Throughout most of the past forty years this theme has been repeated by the Soviet bureaucracy and its apologists in a multitude of variations: the *antimonopoly* coalition, the *antifascist* front, the alliance with the *progressive* wing of the national bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped world, etc. In each case what is proposed is a political alliance between the Soviet leadership (and the Communist parties that follow its lead)

1. Maisky was one of a number of right-wing Mensheviks, that is, opportunist socialists, who opposed the Soviet government of Lenin and Trotsky during the civil war. He held a ministerial position in the White government of Admiral Kolchak, a czarist who fought to restore Nicholas II to the throne. After Kolchak's defeat Maisky changed sides and joined the Bolsheviks. He supported Stalin in the internal conflict among the Russian Communists in the 1920s.

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and a sector of the capitalist class. The price of such alliances has been political support by the world Communist parties to a program limited to liberal capitalist reform and eschewing and even suppressing independent revolutionary action by the working class. The justification has usually been that there are important measurable differences between the right and "left" wings of the capitalist class even in the imperialist centers that can be exploited for the benefit of the proletariat.

The Stalin-Hitler Pact stands out as a big fly in this ointment. By no stretch of the imagination can the Nazis be described as representing the "progressive" wing of the capitalist class. Yet during the term of the pact Communist parties around the world dutifully disbanded their antifascist committees. While they didn't hail Hitler as a leader of the world's oppressed they did declare an anathema on all of his bourgeois enemies. Thus Roosevelt, who had been supported by the CP in his 1936 election campaign (the CP's "candidate" Earl Browder ran on the slogan "Defeat Landon at all costs"), in 1939 suddenly became a "reactionary."

It is rather difficult to argue that soft-pedaling criticism of nazism promoted the class struggle. What the Stalin-Hitler Pact did suggest was that the Soviet bureaucracy in reality saw little difference between "progressive" and "reactionary" bourgeois regimes and that the political subordination to its bourgeois "allies" it demanded from the Comintern never in any case had as its aim the strengthening of the workers' movement outside the Soviet Union. Rather, Stalin viewed the Communist parties of other countries as pawns that could be sacrificed at will to secure agreements with imperialists to protect the Soviet Union from invasion or involvement in war.

Of course, it would be difficult to recruit and hold members to a Communist party that openly proclaimed that its only purpose was to defend a revolution somewhere else. But it can be shown that this was the main aim of the Comintern in all of Stalin's prewar and wartime maneuvers with "democratic" and dictatorial capitalist regimes alike.

The experience of World War II is also a devastating refutation, however, of the Soviet bureaucracy's premise that governmental alliances with capitalist states *could* effectively defend the Soviet Union. The sacrifices the Communist parties of other countries chose to make of the possibilities for independent revolutionary action by the working class did not achieve even the narrow end they were designed to serve.

The search for "collective security"

The Stalin-Hitler Pact can be fully understood only if it is seen as a continuation of, and not a departure from, the Kremlin's fundamental strategy of relying on agreements with existing bourgeois governments to preserve the status quo.

To Stalin an alliance with a capitalist nation seemed

something solid and tangible. The idea that workers of other countries were the only dependable allies the Soviet Union could have, as Lenin taught, was completely foreign to Stalin as it was and is to Maisky, his servitor. Yet it was the workers of Western Europe who tied the hands of the imperialists during the Russian civil war in the early 1920s sufficiently to prevent effective invasions of the newborn Soviet Union. It was the French sailors who rebelled against invading the Soviet republic. The British workers threatened to call a general strike if Churchill, then minister of war, resumed intervention. It was American workers in Seattle who refused to ship supplies to an expeditionary army sent to Siberia by Washington. These and many other sympathetic demonstrations did much to save the young Soviet state that fought a civil war and foreign invasions on fifteen fronts from 1918 to 1921.

Of course one cannot really blame Maisky, who was fighting on the other side in the civil war, for failure to understand Lenin's policies. But Maisky is merely an apologist for Stalin who was the architect of the strategy that culminated in the idea that alliances with capitalist governments could best serve the interests of the Soviet Union and that alliances with workers of other countries were worthless.

Such a notion did not spring full-blown from the consolidation of Stalin's power in the late 1920s, but was implicit in his theory that socialism could be constructed in a single country in isolation from developments in the rest of the world. This narrow nationalistic concept was first propounded only after Lenin's death in 1924. It reflected the interests of a conservative, privileged stratum rising in Soviet society that found political expression in the Stalin grouping inside the Communist Party. Determined to protect its status and power from all comers, this bureaucratic layer had little interest in revolutions abroad that could "provoke" retaliatory actions by capitalist governments against the Soviet state. It viewed such revolutionary movements with distrust. In involving masses in struggle in other countries, examples of proletarian democracy were certain to arise that could only have the effect of inspiring opposition to the proscription of all political dissent on the left within the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, it took more than a decade for the the pragmatic Stalinist leadership to evolve a general policy of conciliation with foreign imperialism (motivated today under the slogan "peaceful coexistence").

Prior to Hitler's taking power in Germany the Communist International, completely under the control of the Stalinists, followed an ultraleft sectarian policy in all countries from 1929 to 1934. Even in its ultraleft phase, however, Stalinism evidenced a hostility to independent initiatives by the masses and a fear of common action with other workers' organizations. In Germany, the most critical country of that time, the Communist Party rejected seeking a united front with the mass Social Democratic Party and trade unions against Hitler's Nazis. The Stalinists called the Social Democrats "social fascists" and looked upon them as the

main danger. This policy was mainly responsible for Hitler's taking power without a struggle. At Hindenburg's invitation he became chancellor and walked into office between the Social Democrats and the Communist Party, even though these two workers' parties outnumbered the Nazis.

Because they denied that fascism really was more repressive than Social Democracy or the run-of-the-mill bourgeois reactionary the Stalinists announced that disillusionment with Hitler's rule would shortly bring them to power at the next turn. But Hitler in command of the armed forces used his own armed bands of thugs to immediately destroy both the Social Democratic and Communist parties.

Following this most terrible and shameful defeat Stalin and the Comintern swung sharply to the right. Hitler in power posed a genuine threat to the Soviet Union itself. It was a prime target of Nazi efforts to expand. Hitler had said so in plain and unmistakable ways numerous times. In 1925, when his *Mein Kampf* was first published, he wrote:

"If land was desired in Europe, it could be obtained by and large only at the expense of Russia, and this meant that the new Reich must again set itself on the march along the road of the Teutonic Knights of old, to obtain by the German sword sod for the German plow and daily bread for the nation." This was an incessant theme of Nazi propaganda.

Fearing war with Germany, Stalin proclaimed the People's Fronts against fascism. This became the official doctrine of the Comintern at its Seventh World Congress in 1935. The purpose of these People's Fronts was not to fight for socialism at all, but to win the cooperation of nonfascist capitalist parties for the defense of "democracy." It is indisputable that there are real differences between bourgeois democracy and a fascist dictatorship and that the former type of rule is preferable if the working class must choose between masters. What such a strategy ignored, however, was that a social crisis deep enough to force a section of the bourgeoisie to opt for a fascist solution meant that the "middle road" of bourgeois democracy provided no solution to the conflict. The bourgeois liberals, after all, defended the interests of the same social class as the bourgeois fascists. If they had to choose between fascism and revolution they would choose fascism. The only way out of such an impasse was for the workers to boldly move toward the conquest of power.

This is not a question of abstract theory but was tested empirically in several countries during the late thirties. People's Fronts were successful in forming governments in Spain and France. Since this kind of alliance must adapt to the most conservative elements within it, the two governments did not go beyond the programs of the liberal capitalists who were part of them. In Spain the result was the blocking of the mass upsurge that followed Franco's rebellion in 1936 and the consequent defeat of the revolutionary forces. In France a powerful upsurge of the workers was stopped dead in its tracks by the People's Front government

headed by Social Democrat Leon Blum in which the bourgeois liberals participated and which the Communist Party energetically supported.

People's Frontism was eminently unsuccessful as a response to fascism. Though it did not aim at socialism, it failed even to protect and save bourgeois democracy. After the French government of Blum was replaced by one further to the right and the Spanish Civil War was lost to Franco, the stage was set for further depredations by Hitler. As a matter of fact none of the capitalist opponents in Europe that Hitler confronted during this period and in the early stages of the war stood up to him; they all collapsed ignominiously at the first real blow and sometimes at the mere threat of a blow.

The corollary of the People's Front on the inter-governmental level was the policy of "collective security." This was intended to secure the military alliance Maisky speaks of between the Soviet government and the cap-

"People's Frontism was eminently unsuccessful as a response to fascism. Though it did not aim at socialism, it failed even to protect and save bourgeois democracy."

italist regimes in Britain, France, and the United States. But Chamberlain and Daladier remained unimpressed with Stalin's good manners. His insistence that the Spanish Popular Front reject any socialist measures failed to convince these wily imperialists that they had common interests with the world's first workers' state in combating the advances of fascism in Europe.

When in September 1938 England and France signed the Munich Pact with Germany and Italy, Stalin's dream of a military alliance, to which he had sacrificed the Spanish revolution, was finally dispelled. The Soviet Union was not even invited to participate in the Munich talks, where Stalin's prospective friends, the British and French, gave away the Sudetenland, a critical part of Czechoslovakia, without even consulting the Czechs. From this moment on Stalin began to look toward an accommodation with Hitler—a possibility he had kept open even at the height of the Popular Front period.

Stalin's first move was to liquidate Soviet and Comintern participation in the Spanish Civil War, where the International Brigades faced German and Italian "volunteers." Such an embarrassing military confrontation was an impediment to discussions with the Nazi high command. The chronology of this move is quite plain. The International Brigades fought their last battle during the Ebro campaign on September 22. The Munich Pact was signed on September 29. By November 15 the International Brigades were leaving Spain. This move doomed the Loyalist government to certain defeat, when it is a historical fact that as late as September 19 Mussolini was still convinced that Franco

had no chance of winning an outright victory and that he would have to settle for a division of the country in a compromise peace.²

The revolutionary Marxist opposition to Stalin saw clearly where the Soviet government was headed, although the Stalin-Hitler Pact was to come as a great surprise to virtually all of Stalin's followers in the Communist International who took his rhetoric about the fight against fascism for good coin. Leon Trotsky in particular predicted the Soviet-German alliance from the day of the Munich Pact.³

Maisky tries to picture the decision to seek rapprochement with Hitler as having been taken at the last minute, in mid-August 1939, after "sabotage" by Chamberlain of negotiations underway in Moscow for a military pact with Britain and France. The former ambassador is concerned here with establishing that the Soviet government's proposal of April 17, 1939, for the formation of a tripartite alliance with Britain and France was tendered in good faith and was not accompanied by simultaneous secret talks with the Germans. Maisky is interested in making the record on this in order to reassure the governments of today that the Soviet Union lives up to its word in international agreements.

(That Maisky is writing for the future and not the past is evident from the concluding paragraph of his series. Here he cites Churchill's rebuke to Chamberlain for not having more forthrightly sought an alliance with Stalin against Hitler. Maisky writes: "It remains only to add to these words of Winston Churchill that in our time, as never before, the success and prestige of political leaders depend to a great degree on their ability to draw appropriate lessons from the past." The lesson being, presumably, that the "antiaggressors" among today's imperialists would do well to bloc with Moscow in the fight against—whom? Is the United States still to be included in the camp of "antiaggressors"? Maisky does not say.)

It is not necessary to defend Chamberlain and Daladier in order to question Maisky's contention that Stalin's turn to Hitler was a last-minute act of desperation. Undoubtedly British and French imperialism would have preferred to see Germany and the Soviet Union exhaust each other. But Maisky himself reveals that Stalin as early as the spring of 1939 was none too eager any longer to commit himself to the perspective of an alliance with the "democracies." Thus he writes:

On the morning of March 18 [1939], William Seeds, British Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., called on Foreign Commissar Litvinov and asked him, on Chamber-

2. See *The Spanish Civil War* by Hugh Thomas (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 554.

3. See *Writings of Leon Trotsky—1938-39* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1969), especially the following three articles: "After Munich, Stalin Will Seek Accord with Hitler" (October 7, 1938), "What Lies Behind Stalin Bid For Agreement with Hitler?" (March 6, 1939), and "Stalin's Capitulation" (March 24, 1939).

lain's instruction, what the Soviet Government would do if Hitler attacked Rumania.

Litvinov replied on the evening of the same day that the Soviet Government would deem it necessary in this case to convene urgently a conference of the U. S. S. R., Britain, France, Poland, Turkey and Rumania, preferably in Bucharest, to discuss measures for averting more acts of aggression. [Emphasis added.]

To convene a conference, that is, to talk things over a bit, this was the response of the Soviet opponents of aggression! Litvinov's answer was hardly the response of a militant anti-Nazi workers' state. It reflected, rather, the fear that Stalin had of Hitler and his anxiety to come to terms with him.

Only a "nonaggression pact"?

Maisky describes the pact with Hitler, which was reached as a result of negotiations in Moscow between Soviet representatives and von Ribbentrop, in this way:

"It was a nonaggression pact. I stress here that it was *not* a union, bloc or pact of mutual assistance but a nonaggression pact of the type the U. S. S. R. had with many other states." (Emphasis in original.) The only true part of this statement is the assertion that the pact was typical of the kind of treaties between the Kremlin and "many other [capitalist] states."

The pact was signed on August 23, 1939. Days later, on September 1, the Nazis invaded Poland, signaling the beginning of the Second World War. Britain and France declared war on Germany but provided no direct assistance to their Polish ally. On September 17, Soviet armed forces entered Poland from the east and rapidly occupied about a third of the country along with taking over the Baltic states. The Germans made no protest at this incursion; instead they made it clear that the partition of Poland had been agreed upon beforehand.

This was not all. The pact that Maisky is now advertising as purely nonaggressive contained secret protocols that provided for economic exchanges of vast scope which were very important to Hitler, as England set up a blockade of German ports to deprive the Nazis of needed imports. The Soviet Union began shipments of raw materials of various kinds in exchange for manufactured goods from Germany. Stalin scrupulously kept his part of the economic agreements and continued sending materials until the very hour that Hitler attacked the Soviet Union twenty-two months later in June 1941. On the other hand, there were numerous complaints from the Soviet side about German tardiness in shipments to the Soviet Union.

The most devastating result of the Stalin-Hitler Pact was its effect on the Communist parties outside of the Soviet Union. These now ceased "fighting fascism" and blaming the world crisis on Hitler and the anti-Comintern Axis. The new line proclaimed that the fault lay

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The New Antiwar Army

BY FRED HALSTEAD



"Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration it has already attained . . . Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding."

— Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address

In the June 7, 1971, issue of the *Armed Forces Journal* there appeared an article by Marine Corps historian Col. Robert D. Heintz Jr. (Ret.). Col. Heintz is one of many American military experts who considered the half-million-man force the U. S. had in Vietnam in 1967 to have been the best army the U. S. ever put into the field. Yet in mid-1971 he made the following astounding statements:

The morale, discipline and battle-worthiness of the U. S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States.

By every conceivable indicator, our Army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused com-

bat, murdering their officers and non-commissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous.

Elsewhere than Vietnam the situation is nearly as serious.

The author cited some evidence to substantiate his conclusions and then continued: "All the foregoing facts — and many more dire indicators of the worst kind of military trouble — point to widespread conditions among American Forces in Vietnam that have only been exceeded in this century by the French Army's Nivelle Mutinies of 1917 and the collapse of the Tsarist armies in 1916 and 1917."

The effects on the army of the antiwar sentiment in its ranks have been mounting for some time. This was relatively hidden until recently. The last year, however, has seen an explosion of revelations in articles, statements, and discussions about the state of the American army.

Reports on an incident at Fire Base Pace in October 1971 gave the general public a glimpse of what was going on. Pace was an American post set up in South Vietnam just 600 yards from Cambodia to provide artillery support for South Vietnamese (ARVN) troops operating over the border. Fifteen men from the third platoon of Bravo Company at the base were ordered

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to make a night patrol and set an ambush along the tree line outside the base.

The point man in the unit—and therefore the one who would have been most exposed—approached the company commander, Captain Robert Cronin, and declined the assignment. Shortly thereafter the rest of the men also declined to participate.

Cronin avoided a confrontation with his men by waiting awhile and then telling them that subsequent information had made a night patrol and ambush unnecessary. He said he would not take action against them for the initial refusal if they would make a daylight patrol which he personally would lead. This they did and there were no casualties and no punishments. Later Bravo Company was transferred to a different base further from the fighting.

What is significant about this incident is that it is not unusual. It was exceptional only because one of the GIs wrote a letter, signed by sixty-six members of the company, to Senator Edward Kennedy complaining about the original patrol order, and because a free-lance newsman did an in-depth story on the incident and sold it to Agence France-Presse.

The Agence France-Presse release labeled the incident a mutiny and got world headlines. Kennedy demanded an investigation when he got the letter but backed down when the army called the whole thing a misunderstanding.

ing. But the statements by the men involved are instructive.

In his letter to Kennedy, Bravo-Company-member Sp/4 Robert Grana of Los Angeles wrote: "We are ground troops who are supposedly in a defensive role (according to the Nixon administration) but who constantly find ourselves faced with the same combat role we were in ten months ago."

The point man in the proposed patrol, Sp/4 Ernest French, of Mattoon, Illinois, told newsmen: "At home newspapers write that GIs are committed to defensive positions only. We were told that this was an ARVN operation and we would only provide security. And then they send us out to ambush Charlie, and our CO and the colonel are telling us that our mission is to destroy the gooks—and go out and seek and kill them."

Nixon's withdrawal gambit

It may seem ironic that the material effects of the antiwar sentiment should be so deep just when Nixon's troop withdrawals are being so loudly ballyhooed as the winding down of the war, and when indeed the troop level has been cut to a third of its 1968 peak.

But Nixon was forced into the piecemeal withdrawal

gambit precisely because of the spread of the antiwar sentiment in the U.S. population as a whole. That opposition became a visible majority opinion in 1969 as shown by the Moratorium actions in October and the New Mobe demonstrations that brought 1,000,000 people into the streets of Washington and San Francisco November 15.

And that sentiment is the real source of the GI dissent itself. It has continued to deepen since 1969—April 1971 saw the biggest demonstrations in United States history. Though the overt civilian antiwar activity fell off in the latter part of 1971, this did not reflect a decrease in the public's hostility to the war. The actions declined as many people grasped at the illusion that Nixon was really winding down the war and they looked to the 1972 elections as a solution to the problem. But the same people who hold this illusion are ever more deeply opposed to the American involvement in the war.

Furthermore, while Nixon's gambit could fool a lot of people, it could not fool that section of the population directly involved—the GIs being ordered into combat. On the contrary, their tendency has been to seize on the administration's statements as further—indeed as definitive—justification for avoiding combat. And this factor accounts for the virtual collapse in 1971 of the ground-combat effectiveness of the American army in Vietnam.

Some army spokesmen dealing with dissent take a pollyanna stance and declare that the problem is really just temporary. They say the new American GIs, for all their strange habits, fought very well when the major ground operations were going on. Some of this is wishful thinking since incidents of combat refusal were not rare even in 1968. But some of it has a basis in fact.

It is a law of life among combat GIs in any war and in any army that their first loyalty is to their buddies, to the smallest unit of which they are a part. If they fight, it is to save these men. If they run, it is to save these men. If they kill, if they are silent, if they make noise, it is to save these men. But when the war itself seems purposeless, who is being fought or who is being run from or who is being killed is less important than who is being saved.

Unless the dissent is virtually universal, this kind of solidarity has a positive effect on the fighting ability of the army as a whole, as was seen through much of the Vietnam war.

But this is no longer the case. And once that change occurs, the combat solidarity turns into its opposite and cannot be reversed. The units must be replaced or combat must be scaled down.

As a symptom of this, Col. Heintz points out that the search-and-destroy missions have acquired a new name among troops. He writes: "'Search and evade' (meaning tacit avoidance of combat by units in the field) is now virtually a principle of war." The "enemy" accommodates this evasion, says Heintz. He points to "the VC recent statement at the Paris Peace talks that

communist units in Indochina have been ordered not to engage American units which do not molest them."

One example of the "search and evade" tactic cited by Vietnam GIs is the frequency with which some units light fires when on patrol. When asked why they would do such an apparently foolish thing, they reply: "So the VC will know where we are and won't come through here. That way nobody gets killed."

Some such accommodation across the lines is found occasionally in almost all wars. But it has become epidemic in Vietnam.

"Working it out"

An article in the September 13, 1971, *New York Times* by B. Drummond Ayers Jr. describes a process called "working it out," which started in Vietnam and now has spread even to training exercises in the U.S. and Europe, especially in places to which men from Vietnam have been reassigned:

"The procedure is simple and has even been filmed by television news crews. A unit or man refuses to advance or take an order. Everybody—including officers and sergeants—sits down and talks. A safer route or alternative job is agreed upon."

Ayers continues: "Officers and sergeants in Vietnam who refuse to participate in these discussions run the risk of being 'fraggged' by a hand grenade tossed into their bunk by one of their own men." Grenades are more often used than guns because their fragments, unlike bullets, cannot be traced.

Ayers cites the following figures released by the Pentagon: In 1969 there were 126 actual or possible "fraggings." In 1970 there were 271 reported, "and the figure for 1971 will probably exceed 425." Seventy-eight men have been killed in this way and more than 600 wounded, according to the Pentagon figures, says Ayers. Many times this number of "dud" fraggings take place as warnings.

According to Heintz, "in the morale-plagued Americal Division fraggings ran one a week" for the first half of 1971. The division was disbanded toward the end of the year. Heintz also reports that "word of the deaths of officers will bring cheers at troop movies or in bivouacs of certain units."

Referring to the notorious bloody assault on Hamburger Hill in mid-1969, Heintz claims that a GI underground paper in Vietnam, *GI Says*, offered a \$10,000 bounty on Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, the officer who ordered and led the attack. Honeycutt made it home in one piece, but Heintz quotes a veteran major as saying: "Another 'Hamburger Hill' [i.e., toughly contested assault] definitely is out."

Heintz's piece is not without wit, as when he coins phrases such as: "plagued by a new breed of litigious soldier (and some litigious officers as well)." But the Marine historian seems to lose his sense of humor entirely when he indignantly reports that some literature circulating among GIs on the West Coast quips: "Don't

desert. Go to Vietnam and kill your commanding officer."

Author Arthur Hadley, whose *Playboy* magazine piece was reprinted in the August 15, 1971, *Washington Post*, quotes an unnamed young general in Vietnam:

"Lieutenant Colonels [the usual rank of battalion commander] also must expend themselves dealing with the ten per cent, the hard core, the anti-authority people, both black and white. They must continually explain why, because men will not move from A to B merely on the basis of an order. That's all very well now, but in an emergency it may kill us. And it drains the good men."

Hadley says a majority of the battalion commanders he talked to in Vietnam have been threatened with murder: "Such threats were occasional in World War II; now they are more common and hold more terror."

Like many other observers, Hadley notes the wide generation gap between the older noncoms and the young draftees or draft-oriented NCOs and officers (those who enlist to get a choice of assignment rather than wait to be drafted). He describes a senior NCO club where the windows are covered with heavy screening to prevent grenades being tossed in by the men the senior NCOs lead. He quotes one of the top sergeants as saying:

"We come to this grubby place and eat Spam and eggs 'cause that's all we can get, and have a beer, so we won't have to eat with the filth they've got in the Army today."

Says another: "First they threaten you. Then they spit in your face. And the officers won't back you up. You can't court-martial a man anymore. Hell, a D. D. (dishonorable discharge) is a badge of honor to these kids . . . You can't even send the son of a bitch home . . . The draft boards are giving us the dregs. What the home, the community and the church have failed to mold."

Comments Hadley: "The home, the community, the church. What obsolete words are these? Who has them today? As often in Vietnam, I feel I am talking under water to men already dead."

Hadley is invited back for a party and there he hears songs he thought had been forgotten. As the NCOs finish singing "God Bless America"—a World War II favorite—someone outside tosses a grenade against the wall. Their stomachs sink, but it is a dud. Hadley says no more about this incident, but the thought arises that it would be safer to sing *that* song around NLF troops than among young American GIs.

The reports all make the same point: the army everywhere—not just in Vietnam—is in trouble. In the early 1960s, before the antiwar movement, one out of every four volunteers reenlisted. Today it is one of every five. Before it was 10 percent of draftees. Today it is 5 percent.

Most significant of all, enrollment in ROTC, which provides the army with the majority of its officers, has declined from 165,000 in 1961 to 74,000 in 1971.

Reenlistments by ROTC graduates is also down sharply. In 1961 one in three reenlisted. Today, it is one in five.

Even West Point shows the trend. The number of academy graduates leaving the service after the required five years of service has increased sharply. Only 15 percent of the class of 1956 resigned by the end of 1961. But over 30 percent of the class of 1966 resigned in 1971.

Some army observers take comfort in figures showing a decline of antiwar activity in the armed forces in 1971. The number of underground GI newspapers, for example, has dropped in the last year from about sixty to thirty, according to the Pentagon. (They don't explain that they have been doing everything they can to suppress these papers.)

But the hard statistics traditionally used by the army itself as indicators of general morale all show trouble, including AWOL and desertion figures. The all-army desertion index (AWOL over thirty days) stood at 74 per 1,000 men last fall, according to the September 5, 1971, *New York Times*. This is an all-time high, surpassing the previous peak of 63 per 1,000 near the end of World War II.

Incidentally, the desertion rate in Vietnam has always been much lower than the all-army rate, due probably to the difficulty of living for any length of time off post and the virtual impossibility of ever getting home. For those seeking escape, drugs are the routine form in Vietnam.

Drugs: the chemical AWOL

The usual figure cited is that 15 percent of the men in Vietnam are on heroin. Marijuana isn't even counted, and many army officers dealing with the drug problem privately deplore the fact that the army formerly campaigned vigorously against marijuana because many men won't listen now when the very real dangers of heroin are described.

In September 1971 the *Washington Post* published a nine-part series entitled "Army in Anguish." It said: "Ironically, many officers in the drug field believe the Army would be a lot better off if the heroin users could be converted back to pot. Lately even the Army radio has been taking a notably mild line on marijuana."

Though hard drugs are not limited to Americans in Vietnam, Vietnam has increased the problem drastically.

It has been an open scandal since 1964 that private planes carrying this stuff had the protection of the Saigon regime. At least once, the trade got a little too close to home for comfort. In 1970 the command pilot for the U.S. embassy in Saigon was caught at the Saigon airport with \$8 million worth of heroin in his plane. A major, he was convicted and sent to prison.

Heroin is also much cheaper in Vietnam than in the U.S. and about twenty times as concentrated. Still,

there are many American GIs who are on it in Vietnam who would not be on it at home no matter how easy it was to get. In explaining why so many soldiers take heroin in Vietnam, Maj. Richard Ratner, a psychiatrist at Longbinh, said in May 1971:

"Vietnam in many ways is a ghetto for the enlisted man. The soldiers don't want to be here, their living conditions are bad, they are surrounded by privileged classes, namely officers; there is accepted use of violence. . . . They react the way they do in a ghetto. They take drugs and try to forget."

Dr. George F. Solomon, associate professor of clinical psychiatry at Stanford University's School of Medicine, testified in mid-June, 1971, before the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. He cited the example of a pilot whom he called "X":

"X" was considered a gung-ho soldier. He deeply resented antiwar demonstrations at home. After Vietnamization of the Delta, he was involved in ferrying ARVN troops by helicopter to areas of operations in the Delta. Frequently the South Vietnamese soldiers were reluctant to land and had to be forced from the "choppers" sometimes by beating their hands as they clung to runners. Two of X's friends were killed by bullets from U.S. M16 rifles shot by resentful ARVN troops after they had been landed. "X" turned to heroin in order to be able to keep flying status. He is now militantly antiwar.

The hard drug problem is also severe at bases in Europe and the United States. Captain Dean M. Steffy, of the army's drug education program at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, says many soldiers turn to drugs because they hate the army. "They just hate it. It blows their minds and some of them use drugs to rebel. . . ."

"We have guys," he continues, "who come into the rehabilitation program who say, 'will you help me get off drugs?' We say, sure, why do you want to get off? And they say, 'Because I'm going to leave the Army.' Then you ask: If you were going to stay in the Army would you get off?' And they say, 'Hell no. I'd stay on.'"

The new solidarity

Army spokesmen, and many reporters as well, tend to lump a number of factors together as evils flowing from the same cause—some malaise in the society as a whole. They include drugs, racial tensions, Black militancy, dissent about the war, lack of discipline, crime, increased politicalization of the young soldiers, increased willingness by young soldiers and officers to go to court against the brass, and so on.

But a number of these factors are direct opposites. Antiwar organizers in the military, for example, have learned from hard experience that they must avoid drugs of any kind because the brass will bust them for it even if drug use goes on openly all around them. These young men, including the Black militants, ex-

hibit an enviable solidarity and no inconsiderable purpose and discipline. It just isn't the discipline the lifers got used to in the days of the silent generation. One of the reasons for the increase in barracks crime is a lack of purpose and solidarity. But when these qualities appear among Blacks, for example, the army tries to stamp it out.

Col. Mathew R. Wallis, commander of the Second Armored Regiment in West Germany, a Georgia-born West Point graduate, was quoted in the *Washington Post* series about the racial situation as follows:

If we could just get it so that when two soldiers have a fight, and one is black and one is white, that everyone would stand around and cheer on their man, this would be a return to the old Army.

But now, if a fight exists between one black and one white, within minutes there will be three to 15 blacks who will join it without even knowing what the fight is about. . . . Now this gets to this emphasis of the black soldier on brotherhood and togetherness and "We've got to stick together." The black soldier, I assume, feels that the other people—people like me—are not sticking up for him and protecting his rights, and therefore the only way to protect the black man is black solidarity. . . . And this is what defeats me.

Describing conditions at the Merrell Barracks in Nuremberg, Germany, where GIs occupy dilapidated housing that was once an SS barracks, the *Washington Post* comments:

In today's Army many young soldiers are saying openly that their own generals should be tried as war criminals. They reject the slightest semblance of military discipline. They do not accept the rationale, mission or role for this Army. Even their songs, unlike those of a generation ago, bitterly condemn war and the men who wage it. These soldiers know no heroes, hate no Nazis or Communists, fail to subscribe to the old adage about their country, right or wrong. They live among conditions of crime, racial turmoil and drug use more intensive than anything American soldiers have experienced.

It is not really that young soldiers have nothing to hate or that they are incapable of righteous indignation. An AP reporter last fall related the following conversation with GIs at Fire Base Siberia in Vietnam:

Spec. 4 Terry O'Brien, a 20-year-old Irishman from New York City, hates officers who want to climb the promotion ladder on the bodies of their men.

"Kills, kills, all they want is kills" he complained. "The war is winding down and they're grabbing for a last chance to kill a Dink and win a medal, but they're killing us instead."

Do they hate the enemy too?

"What've the Dinks ever done to me?," asked Dupasquier [another GI in the conversation].

"Sure they shoot at us and we step in their booby traps, but they wouldn't if we weren't here. It's the Army that pushes us onto them.

"It's the Army I hate. The Green Mafia, those fat

cat supply sergeants back at base camp who screw us out of our beer ration. Every time there's a supply chopper we take up a collection to buy beer. Every time we get only half what we've paid for."

When he gets out of the Army, Dupasquier vows to "grow my hair long and demonstrate. Against the Army, the Pentagon, every uniform I see."

Haynes Johnson and George C. Wilson, two of the authors of the *Washington Post* series, make this point: "Two factors distinguish today's Army from the old one of GI griping and questioning: the depth of the hostility expressed and the willingness of some soldiers to do more than merely complain about conditions."

Heinl comments on a suit by the anti-Vietnam-war Concerned Officers Movement (COM) against Secretary of Defense Laird: "Such nuisance suits from the inside by people still in uniform were unheard of until two or three years ago. Now, according to one Army General, the practice has become so common that in his words, 'I can't even give a directive without getting permission from my staff judge advocate.'"

The brass on the defensive

GIs seeking support for their civil liberties from civilians, lawyers, and the courts, is a particularly sore point for many spokesmen of the brass. It especially angers many lifer noncoms who were used to being a law unto themselves. But a number of higher-ranking officers are very careful on this matter.

They know they are bucking the mood of the majority in the United States and are trying to ride it out without attracting too much attention to their repressive measures. They have even attempted, here and there on an experimental basis, discussions in which GIs are told they can speak freely. Some officers have even experimented with grievance committees elected by the ranks. These measures have some ameliorating effects on relatively routine irritations, but they can't get to the heart of the matter.

Says a captain at Ft. Bragg, a member of the Concerned Officers Movement, quoted in the *Washington Post* series: "They [the brass] realize something's wrong and they'll ask you what it is. But they won't listen when you tell them."

In truth, even the relatively high ranks in the army are sprinkled with men who know what is wrong. But they speak in private and decline to be identified as a rule. The *Post* series quotes one flag officer: "The young people know the war is wrong. They know we've killed more people than the North Vietnamese ever would have. We have to wait 10 years before we can regain the trust of the young."

And a former division commander: "No, I just can't justify it now that I see what the war has done to our country. It went on much too long. We already lost more than we can ever gain, no matter what happens."

The case of Lieut. Col. Anthony Herbert is the most publicized example of how unchanging the top brass is when it gets to fundamentals. Col. Herbert, a much-decorated, by-the-book commander, insisted on reporting war crimes when he saw them, and when his superiors did nothing he brought them up on charges. The charges have been dropped and Herbert has been driven out of the army.

What the brass complain about as "politicalization" in the army is actually the American people's will reflected in their GIs. This profound process has begun in good part because the civilian political process—dominated by the Democrats and Republicans—has utterly failed to carry out that will regarding the war in Vietnam.

The lifers and brass have been responsible only to their careers, to their personal security, and to their chance for advancement within the system. The young GIs march to a different drummer. They are the ones who are listening to the American people.

Says a captain who is part of an antiwar group at Ft. Bragg: "I had a long talk with my commanding officer a month ago and he said, 'Someday the burden of responsibility is going to be placed on your shoulders.' And as I left his office I thought to myself: the burden of responsibility is on my shoulders right now. . . ."

Maj. Gen. O. C. Talbott, commander of Ft. Benning, is quoted as follows in the *Post* series:

"In the long run, our Army cannot exist without the good will of the people. Draft or no draft, volunteer or not volunteer, it just cannot exist because it is the people themselves who are coming to it. They will come to it bitterly and with distaste, or with pride and willingness to perform—based on the national attitude of the people as a whole . . . it is not a simple military question."

The problem centers on Vietnam, and what it represents, but the effects are universal. The following is from the September 13, 1971, *New York Times*:

The tremendous strain placed on the United States Army by the Vietnam war has left many of its units stationed elsewhere not only demoralized but also unfit for heavy combat.

Officials here [Washington] say that at least nine of the 11 divisions on active duty outside Southeast Asia are incapable of waging immediate, full-scale war because of manpower and training shortcomings. . . .

"I'm afraid we're quite a long way from the early nineteen sixties, when we were about as good as an Army can get," says Maj. Gen. Donnely P. Bolton, a Defense Department specialist in unit readiness.

The armed forces branches other than the army are also affected. The Marine Corps has been pulled out of any ground role in Vietnam and an attempt is being made to insulate this branch as a smaller, elite corps. When the 84,000-ton carrier *Constellation* sailed for Vietnam in October 1971, attorneys for several of its crew members filed suit that the ship was bound

on an "illegal mission, including the murder of civilians" and should be placed in custody of the court pending a vote among her 5,000 crew members to determine whether they wished to go to Vietnamese waters. The suit lost, of course, but the very idea would have been unthinkable five years ago.

Another carrier, the *Coral Sea*, sailed for the same mission November 12, 1971, after 1,000 of her crewmen had signed an antiwar petition. The "vote" in any case will take place in thousands of small and probably unsung ways. These are the ships from which Nixon is launching a good part of his bombing raids. He sent one of them toward Bangladesh at the height of the fighting there.

Not limited to Vietnam

That the "politicalization" is widespread and goes beyond simply the question of Vietnam is shown by what happened when the Canadian ship *Greenpeace*, which was protesting the Amchitka A-bomb test, was boarded by a party from the U. S. Coast Guard cutter *Confidence*. A member of the boarding party passed a note signed by eighteen men to the *Greenpeace* crew. It read in part: "Due to the situation we are in, we, the crew of the *Confidence*, feel that what you are doing is for the good of all mankind."

The eighteen *Confidence* crewmen were fined for this expression of solidarity.

One of the chief casualties of the Vietnam war has been the confidence of the American people in the U. S. government. The *Post* series quotes Alfred B. Pitt, the Pentagon's manpower chief during the Kennedy-Johnson years, and a major planner of the Vietnam escalation:

The war has really destroyed for a great many people the conviction that the government is something which is respectable and entitled to credence in its efforts.

The Army as an institution has an extraordinary ability to take young men and make them selfless in a sort of a peer group situation. . . . But that ability depends on a sustained belief in the value of what they're doing, and that sustained belief doesn't exist right now, although obviously not everybody has that attitude. But enough do so that there's a critical mass of sullen, dispirited contemptuous guys. . . .

General Hamilton H. Howze (Ret.), the former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and of the Eighth Army in Korea, wrote recently in *Army* magazine:

"The military forces of the United States face a disciplinary situation which, if not already critical, is at least one of rapidly growing proportions. Should senior commanders not be able to reverse the trend toward indiscipline, this country will, not long from now, lose its status as the world's first power, and stand almost helpless against those who would humble and destroy it."

What the general means by standing helpless has nothing whatever to do with the defense of the American people or the country. He means America's role as the chief imperialist policeman in the world will be finished if it can't maintain an army that will fight counterrevolutionary wars in other people's countries without massive dissent.

The awareness of this truth is widespread within the ruling circles of the United States and is a major factor in the split within the ruling class over what to do in Vietnam.

Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield had the following to say as he entered the *Washington Post* series into the *Congressional Record*:

"The tragedy of Vietnam has played no small role in the degradation of spirit which is observed. It will continue unless and until responsible people and institutions insist on a definite end. Only then will the tragedy of Vietnam and the effect of its spirit be removed. This must and will be done, in the interests not only of the Army but of the whole Defense Establishment."

This theme is played over and over in the literature on the crisis of dissent in the army: as Vietnam is left behind, the problem will be resolved.

A typical statement is that by Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert F. Froehke, made July 1, 1971: "Our country isn't divided by Vietnam, it's fragmented. And what one institution is more involved in Vietnam than the Army? There isn't any other. So therefore it has to follow that the number one problem of the Army is Vietnam. And when we do extricate ourselves from Vietnam, we are going to make the solution of a lot of problems much easier."

The catch is that Vietnam—and its essence, which is counterrevolutionary warfare—is not being left behind.

The reporters and even some of the officers who have commented on the crisis in the army are under the illusion that the Vietnam war is almost over for the U. S. But Nixon and the army chief of staff, General William C. Westmoreland, know better, regardless of what they might say for propaganda purposes. And even if they are forced out of Vietnam—as they will be sooner or later—they know a major purpose of the armed forces is to be ready to intervene in such affairs.

Reporters Johnson and Wilson, in their summary of the *Post* series comment:

It is not hard to conclude that the Army for a long time was out of touch with what was happening to the country—and not just the noisy, protesting segment of society—and within its own ranks. Perhaps that's not surprising. For a long time, political leaders were too. From the end of World War II until Vietnam, America and its Army were riding high, deluded by a vision of omnipotence, and infallibility. That led to a type of mentality that made it possible to believe you could beat ideology with technology, defeat poorly equipped peasants with a blitz of bombs.

But can the top leadership of an apparatus whose central purpose is counterrevolution have any other mentality?

A volunteer army

The government's proposed solution to the crisis is the all-volunteer army—once again a technical answer to a political problem. Westmoreland is now distributing to top officers a sixty-two-page booklet entitled "Master Program for the Modern Volunteer Army—a Program for Professionals."

It outlines plans for encouraging enlistment and re-enlistment through such devices as better living conditions, training combined with recreation and education, etc. But it contains no magic formula for getting GIs to fight a war they know is wrong.

The all-volunteer army idea also faces severe technical difficulties which are aggravated by the public mood. Half the army's total strength is presently provided by draftees or draft-oriented volunteers. But more like four-fifths of the front-line strength comes from this type of GI. Of the 5,000 true volunteers per month, only 300 choose the combat jobs of infantry, armor, or artillery. For these jobs the army required 6,500 men monthly in 1971, or twenty times the volunteers it can expect.

Of course a complete withdrawal from Vietnam would ease this technical difficulty considerably, as it would the political difficulty—until the next civil war the American capitalist power structure tries to settle in its favor with massive armed intervention.

In his syndicated column of September 21, 1971, Max Lerner, the classic cold-war liberal declared:

"The debate that has raged for several years, as between the conscript and volunteer armies is no longer a real contest. No matter what its cost, the volunteer Army is the only possible choice—if it can in fact be raised. For another draft Army will prolong or repeat the agony that is being suffered in handling this one."

Chief of Staff Westmoreland in an interview in the *Washington Post* series, professed optimism that this kind of technical reorganization would refurbish American imperialism's war machine. He declared:

"I would say that we are perhaps at a very difficult crossroad and indeed this is an important bench mark in the history of the Army. I feel that I'm fortunate to be in the position I am and to play a part, and a key part, in revitalizing and rebuilding the Army at this important part of its life. We're going to come out of this a stronger Army."

Opponents of Nixon's aggression against the Vietnamese people—and of American imperialism everywhere—have good reason to expect that the general's words on this occasion will prove no more accurate a prophecy than the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel statements he made so often when he commanded the U. S. forces in Vietnam.

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did not turn General Juan Velasco Alvarado into a revolutionary socialist.

In the case of Chile, the nationalization of copper was actually begun by the staunchly pro-American Frei government several years ago when it forced Anaconda and Kennecott Copper to sell a 51 percent interest in their mines to the Chilean government. It is not without significance that Allende's bill for outright nationalization passed the Chilean congress *unanimously*, even winning the votes of the far right-wing National Party of Jorge Alessandri, his principal opponent in the September elections.¹²

The copper nationalizations shed some interesting light on the UP's claim to be an anti-imperialist front. The book value of the U. S. companies' share of the copper mines amounts to \$550 million. Allende agreed to pay this, but only after deducting the "excess profits" taken out of the country during the years the mines were in operation. The Chilean government has set this figure at \$774 million, thus wiping out any compensation to the American firms. What is not so widely reported is Allende's agreement to assume the debts of the U. S. companies. This comes to over \$700 million—more than the assessed value of the properties! Moreover, the \$550 million book value could have been

12. This has been the pattern in all fields, although Allende has not always won such broad agreement from the non-UP bourgeois parties. To pass anything requires the votes of at least a substantial section of the Christian Democrats. Hence *all* reforms have been limited to areas where a consensus could be secured with large numbers of bourgeois politicians. The growing hostility of the Christian Democratic leadership to his regime suggests that Allende's future, as long as he continues to insist on purely parliamentary initiatives, is to become a helpless lame-duck captive of the conservative congress with little real power to do anything. True to his electoralist training, Allende has nothing to propose but a national plebiscite. In view of the propaganda vehicles still in the hands of the bourgeois parties and the repressive forces they command, such a course is at best dubious. Elections under bourgeois rule are intrinsically weighted toward the more conservative layers of the population. The best that the UP has secured to date in an electoral contest was a bare majority in the municipal elections of April 1971. Allende won only a plurality on September 4 and took office only by grace of a vote of confidence by the non-UP members of congress.

paid off over a long period of time at low interest rates, while the companies' debts are largely bank loans at high interest.

Allende comes off with the credit for expropriating imperialist interests without compensation, but the Chilean workers and peasants are saddled with an immense debt to U. S. creditors. Including the copper debts, Chile's total foreign obligations come to more than \$3 billion in principal and interest—half of the country's annual Gross National Product. This is at a time when the country's dollar reserves have plunged from \$335 million in November 1970 to \$100 million a year later.

The UP government's response has not been to repudiate the debt incurred by former regimes but to propose a renegotiation of the terms of the loans. As Chilean Minister of the Economy Pedro Vuskovic has said, "There is no possibility that Chile will declare a unilateral moratorium on her foreign debts unless a situation is created for us with no normal renewal of credits and no new inputs of capital."¹³

It may well be that Chile's foreign creditors will refuse to allow further credits or to extend the existing notes, in the hope of toppling the Allende regime. In this case Chile will have no choice but to refuse to pay because it simply does not have the money. But the repudiation of foreign debts on the grounds of outright bankruptcy bespeaks a rather conditional sort of "anti-imperialism" and does not augur well for the possibilities of genuine development.

The nationalization of copper does not end direct U. S. investment in the Chilean economy. Oil and pharmaceutical companies have not been touched; nor have such firms as General Electric, General Tire, Gillette, and RCA.

While copper is Chile's main source of foreign exchange (60 percent), mining represents only 11 percent of the country's Gross National Product and employs only 4 percent of the labor force. It remains to be seen what attitude the UP will take toward foreign investment in less obviously exploitative sectors. At one point in negotiations with the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. Allende proposed joint ownership with the Chilean government. This expedient has been widely used in the underdeveloped world to mask imperialist penetration. The government acts in these cases as an economic partner of the foreign imperialist concerns and as a guarantor of their profits.

Production for whom?

Allende's principal campaign in his first year in office has been on the economic front. Apart from the pedestrian extension of nationalizations this has consisted mainly of appeals to the workers in nationalized and private industry to increase productivity. This amounts to a speedup on the production

13. *New York Times*, October 10, 1971.

line and an increase in factory discipline. Workers have begun to ask themselves, productivity for whom? It is one thing for a workers' state to mobilize the working class to sacrifice for the benefit of society as a whole. It is something altogether different for a "socialist" caretaker government to goad the workers to produce more when the state and the economy are still in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Allende even boasts that through his cajoling the number of strikes has been drastically reduced. Thus

“. . . while Allende talks frequently about the need for independent mass organization, his formulas for achieving it are couched in the most class-collaborationist terms.”

in his May 21 message to congress, his most important programmatic declaration in 1971, he said:

"Between the months of November and February, the number of workers who have been obliged to go on strike has decreased from 170,000 to 76,000. The Popular Government's identification with the workers who share its successes and setbacks has made disputes unnecessary which were formerly inevitable."¹⁴

What entrepreneur could fail to applaud this success of a reformist regime in securing class peace and demobilizing the direct actions of the union movement? It must be noted that Fidel Castro gave his unqualified endorsement to Allende's speedup campaign during his Chilean visit.¹⁵

Allende claims that his government has "advanced energetically along the path of irrevocable change" in the economic sphere. On the contrary, as the principal representatives of the Chilean bourgeoisie calculate, and with good reason, Allende's economic policies will prove a disastrous stumbling block for his government, even as a reformist enterprise. The government's socialist demagogy has raised expectations among the masses of a steady visible improvement in their standard of living. This can be secured in an underdeveloped coun-

14. An English translation of this revealing document is included as part of Allende's postscript to Regis Debray's book cited earlier.

15. See in particular Castro's speeches to workers in the nitrate mine at Pedro de Valdivia and to the copper miners at Chuquicamata which appear in the November 28, 1971, *Granma Weekly Review*. At Pedro de Valdivia, Castro told the workers: "It's noteworthy that one of the first and very interesting phenomena is that you are already identifying with the country and with production, and how you now feel enthusiastic about boosting the production of saltpeter even with fewer hands than were employed previously." To fully appreciate such sentiments it is necessary to imagine them being addressed to workers in Mexico's nationalized oil industry or Britain's government-owned steel works.

try only through the institution of a genuine planned economy in all areas of productive life (the only real meaning of a "socialist sector"). At the minimum this means full state control over investment priorities.

But the Chilean bourgeoisie has gone on an investment "strike" (as have the imperialist corporations, as the figures cited in footnote 2 indicate). Local entrepreneurs are refusing to invest their profits in new facilities, with the express aim of creating an economic crisis that will bring down the government. The optimum course, from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, and the one involving the least social disorder, is to wait until the masses are demoralized by the failure of Allende's promises to materialize. This, so the scenario runs, will result in a shift to the right in the congressional elections of 1973, leaving Allende to complete his term as a powerless figurehead without any real options.

In the area of foreign policy, Allende has hewed to the same course of conciliation with native and foreign capitalist reaction. It is true that he has established diplomatic relations with China and Cuba, but many bourgeois governments have done the same. This step was supported in congress by the Christian Democrats. More important, Allende has conspicuously refrained from public criticism of dictatorial regimes in Latin America. In his May 21 message to congress, for example, he declared:

"It is our fundamental aim to strengthen all the links which will increase our continued friendship with the Argentine Republic, eliminating the obstacles which stand in the way of realizing this objective." Not a word about the trade-union and revolutionary victims of the Argentine generals. He has refrained from mounting even a propaganda campaign against the U. S. war of aggression in Vietnam.

Mobilizing the masses

Thus far we have concentrated on the legislative and economic sides of Allende's program and practice. These do not fundamentally challenge capitalist property relations. There remains the question of the Unidad Popular's nonparliamentary program: is it mobilizing the masses and preparing them politically for the coming struggle for power?

To pose this question is not to say that a revolutionary confrontation with the ruling class is always on the agenda. Reformists are fond of attributing this kind of mechanical ultraleftism to revolutionaries to justify pursuing a course of class collaboration. But all the evidence points to the building of such a confrontation in Chile in the near future if the combativity of the masses is not dissipated in purely electoral schemes. In any case, an elementary principle of revolutionary politics at all times is political opposition to the parties and institutions of bourgeois class rule and the creation of independent organizations capable of mobilizing the working class and the oppressed in de-

fense of their own class interests. In Chile today must be added the objective necessity of arming the masses for defense against the rising tide of capitalist reaction.

The course of the UP has been to discourage independent mobilizations of the masses at every turn so as not to antagonize bourgeois "public opinion." This is not just a matter of inaction, but has involved open appeals to the working class to put their trust in the bourgeois army and police, and in the institutions of the capitalist state. Thus, while Allende talks frequently about the need for independent mass organization, his formulas for achieving it are couched in the most class-collaborationist terms. In his message to congress he put it this way:

The principal constructive agent of the new regime consists in the organization and the conscience [conscience — P. C. & L. E.] of our people, in permanent mobilization in different forms, according to the objective needs of each moment.

We hope that this responsibility, which is not necessarily that of the Government alone, is shared by the Christian Democratic Party, which must demonstrate consistency in adhering to the principles and programs which it has so often laid before the country.

The procapitalist and proimperialist Christian Democrats, then, are publicly invited to help in the "mobilization" of the people! Allende teaches the working class that all that is really wrong with the principal party of the ruling class is that it lacks "consistency" in carrying out the reformist promises with which it has deceived the people.

The main mass base of the UP apart from the ossified apparatus of the Socialist and Communist parties has been the local committees formed during the election period. Instead of being developed as organs of workers' power they have been discouraged from taking any independent initiative and they are in the process of decay and dissolution. In an interview with the Italian film-maker Roberto Rossellini in October Allende discussed the completely subordinate role these mass organizations play in his perspective:

"The 'Popular Unity' committees continue to function; some of them seriously, others less so. But we can revive them and thus see to it that the parties don't lose their contact with the masses."¹⁶

Allende's land reform has been carried out under the Agrarian Reform law passed by the previous government. This requires compensation to be paid by the peasants for lands that are occupied and limits the size of holdings subject to seizure. The peasants, however, particularly the Mapuche people of the south, have organized their own land recuperations without waiting for government approval. Some 300 estates have been "illegally" occupied in this way. Rather than encouraging this independent peasant mobilization and using it to build the revolutionary consciousness of the oppressed masses, the Allende government has sent

16. *AfricAsia*, October 18, 1971. The interview is in French.

in the hated Carabineros to forcibly evict peasant squatters. Like any good reformist, Allende finds it much easier to justify repression of the masses than to crack down on the privileged and powerful. In his message to congress he said:

The occupation of land by squatters, the indiscriminate occupation of agricultural terrains, are unnecessary and harmful. Belief in the Government is warranted by what we have done and by our attitudes. For this reason, the plans made by the Government and the time fixed for their execution must be respected. We invite political groups and individuals who are not in the Popular Unity to meditate seriously upon this.

How much belief may be warranted in the government's promises in this area is subject to more than a little question. Since Allende's message, a moratorium has been declared on *official* land expropriations until next April on the excuse that it is necessary to restore production on the lands already taken over.

Allende's thinly veiled threat against the peasant organizers has been backed up with open police violence. One peasant leader, Moisés Huentelaf, was murdered by armed landlords during a clash on the Chesque ranch near the town of Loncoche, northeast of Valdivia, October 22. The police joined in the landlord assault and later arrested the peasant squatters. The newspaper of the MIR gave this account of the events:

The attack by the landlords lasted more than three hours, until our companero Moises Huentelaf fell fighting in the front line, and two other companeros were wounded.

At the conclusion of the barrage, three . . . policemen arrived from Loncoche and started shooting along with the landlords.

Afterward, all the peasants who took part in the seizure of the ranch were arrested. They are still being held incommunicado. This included the vice-chairman of the Agrupacion de Asentamiento de Loncoche [Loncoche Community Group], Villarrica y Pucon, and companero Felix Huentelaf. The chairman of the Michimalonco Asentamiento, companero Armando Cayufilo, has also been jailed and is being held incommunicado.

Day and night more than 100 policemen from Valdivia and Loncoche have been persecuting the peasants, raiding their houses, beating them, and killing their livestock. The judge has not jailed Munoz Millan, the one member of the armed group of landlords who was wounded, who must have been shot by one of his own companions. But at the same time, the judge is holding the peasant companeros, some of them wounded, in jail and incommunicado. . . .

As for the Comité Político de la Unidad Popular de Loncoche [the Political Committee of the Loncoche UP], it has washed its hands of the affair and blames the death of our companero Moises on the companeros of the MIR.¹⁷

Among the industrial proletariat the performance of the UP is no better. There have been proposals to establish factory committees. But as James Petras, an

American radical scholar who has written widely on Chilean developments, testifies, only "in some cases" do these committees "already exist."¹⁸ That is, in most cases they do not. The proposed function of those committees that have been set up, however, is neither workers' control of production nor the creation of political institutions of workers' power, but merely "participation" with management in plant administration. This, after all, was de Gaulle's proposal in opposition to the general strike of the French working class in May-June 1968.

The bourgeois army and the armed masses

The most crassly opportunist aspect of Allende's policy has been his attitude toward the army and the police. These are the "armed bodies of men" on which in the last resort all ruling classes depend for their survival. They have no other purpose. In every genuine revolution large sections of the *ranks* of the military can be won over to the masses but this is rarely true of the police and has never been the case among the officer corps of either body.

But Allende, in what must be counted as a betrayal of the interests of the Chilean working class, has proclaimed:

"I have absolute confidence in the loyalty" of the armed forces. "Our forces are professional forces at the service of the state, of the people. . . ."¹⁹

Allende's message to congress can only be described as toadying to the forces of "law and order." He declared:

"The Chilean Armed Forces and the Carabineros, faithful to their duty and to their tradition of non-intervention in the political process, will support a social organization which corresponds to the will of the people as expressed in the terms of the established Constitution. . . .

"The difficulties we face are not in this field."

In the same speech Allende projected how he will deal with the threat of violence directed against his government and against the "Chilean road to socialism":

"The determined attitude of the Government and the revolutionary energy of the people, the democratic resolution of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros, will see that Chile advances surely along the road to emancipation."

17. *El Rebelde*, November 1-15, 1971. The text is a speech by Alejandro Manque, a national leader of the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (Revolutionary Peasant Movement). For an English translation see the December 6, 1971, issue of the New York weekly *Intercontinental Press*.

18. "The Transition to Socialism in Chile: Perspectives and Problems," *Monthly Review*, October 1971. Though generally disposed to give Allende the benefit of the doubt, Petras provides a good deal of evidence that militates against doing so.

19. *New York Times*, March 28, 1971.

Where does he imagine that ruling-class violence will come from if not from the organized, armed, repressive apparatus of the capitalist state? If the ruling class decides to seriously dispute Allende's tenure, the army and the Carabineros can be counted on to act, but it will most assuredly not be on the side of "emancipation."

This is not mere rhetoric for Allende, flattering the generals in order to get the better of them at some more auspicious time (even if this were his intention, such a course would be totally false because it lulls the masses into placing confidence in their bitterest enemies and deters them from preparing their own defense).

At the first real crisis, after the so-called March of the Empty Pots by right-wing groups December 1, Allende's reaction was to call out the army. General



CHILEAN SLUM. The problems still remain.

Pinochet, who was placed in charge of the military occupation of Santiago, moved immediately to prohibit *all* demonstrations, of the left as well as the right. "I hope the army does not have to come out," Pinochet told a news conference, "because if they do it will be to kill."²⁰ When a bourgeois army comes into the streets to suppress a clash between the left and the right it does not take a political genius to predict against which side their guns will be pointed.

In contrast to the public trust he has placed in the generals, Allende has taken an altogether different attitude toward workers' efforts to prepare for armed self-defense. In part this is a measure of his real powerlessness. He accepted office on terms dictated by his bourgeois opponents. To win the votes of the Christian Democracy in the runoff in congress October 24, 1970, that confirmed his election, Allende agreed to a series of constitutional amendments severely restricting the powers of the presidency. These included a prohibition of all "private" armed groups—principally directed at outlawing workers' self-defense organizations. But Allende and his coalition partners have not merely acquiesced in this proscription; they have defended its political wisdom.

The rationale for this opposition to arming the workers has been provided by the Communist Party. Even before the election, Luis Corvalán, general secretary of the Chilean CP, warned against proposals to arm the masses, not on the grounds that they were premature but because they would be "equivalent to showing distrust in the army!"²¹

Castro, while not voicing an opinion on the reliability of the army, felt compelled to publicly comment on the strength of the reactionary forces today in Chile and the danger of a counterrevolution. In his farewell address at the National Stadium in Santiago December 2 he said:

"The reactionaries and the oligarchs here are much better prepared than they were in Cuba. They are much better organized and better armed to resist changes, from the ideological standpoint. They have all the weapons they need to wage a battle on every field in the face of the [revolutionary] process' advance."

He pointed out that U. S. officials would not today predict the imminent collapse of the Cuban government, but Washington felt confident enough in the strength of Chilean reaction to make such a prognostication for Allende's future. "I say that such confidence is based on the weakness of the very revolutionary process," Castro declared, "on weaknesses in the ideological battle, on weaknesses in the mass struggle, on weakness in the face of the enemy!"²²

We think that this warning is well taken, but it is false in one essential respect: Castro urges support

20. *Ibid.*, December 3, 1971.

21. *Drapeau Rouge*, January 1, 1970. This is the organ of the Belgian Communist Party.

22. *Granma Weekly Review*, December 19, 1971.

to precisely those who prevent the mobilization of the masses while he complains about the lack of mass mobilizations.

The Unidad Popular— a procapitalist coalition

Here we must deal with the question of whether the failure of the Unidad Popular represents a tactical error, a lack of revolutionary will, or an inherent *commitment* to procapitalist reform.

It must be understood that the UP is not a coalition of working-class parties. While it includes the Communist and Socialist parties, it also includes the bourgeois Radical Party, which in the past was the largest capitalist party in the country; as well as the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU), a petty bourgeois split-off from the Christian Democrats; the Social Democratic Party; and the Independent Popular Action Group (API).

The bourgeois partners in this coalition did not and will not endorse genuinely socialist measures. The official program of the UP does not call for socialism at all but projects the vague formula of a "transformation of the traditional structures of dependent capitalism, in favor of characteristics and forms which the Chilean people wish to impose."

But now that the election is over, it is the written, nonsocialist program of the UP that holds it together. As Hobsbawm puts it, ". . . anything not specifically provided for in the pre-election pact is hard and slow to get formulated, and . . . quick and unambiguous decisions are almost impossible to make."²³ In this process the bourgeois parties in the coalition are given power far out of proportion to their social weight or numbers. And the so-called left parties made their decision to accept the bourgeois discipline and program of the alliance when they agreed to enter it.

The whole history of the Communist and Socialist parties prepared them for this role of left cover for the bourgeois state. Popular Frontism is nothing new in Chile. A Popular Front government was elected to office in 1938, with the Radical Party leader Pedro Aguirre Cerda as president. Allende himself participated in that government as minister of health.²⁴

23. *New York Review of Books*, September 23, 1971.

24. In their eagerness to show how "new" the UP government is, the American Communist Party is forced to falsify the well-known facts of Chilean history. Thus in the December 1970 editorial in *Political Affairs* quoted earlier they write: "President Allende has . . . for the first time in the history of Chile brought members of the working class into the Cabinet." If this means members of the Communist and Socialist parties, as from the context it plainly does, there is hardly a capitalist country in the world with more experience with such "members of the working class" in its cabinets. It may be, however, that the American CP would like to forget the sorry record of that experience.

The participation of the two major working-class parties in this bourgeois reform government served to demobilize and derail the radicalization of the 1930s in Chile and redirect it from the streets to electoral channels. The coalition then was so "broad" that its presidential candidate was even endorsed by the leader of Chile's Nazi Party, Gonzales Von Marees.

The Aguirre regime was followed by a series of Popular Front-type governments with Socialist or Communist participation, that moved further and further to the right.

In the 1942 elections the CP and SP supported the openly anticommunist candidate of the Radical Party, Juan Antonio Rios.

During the postwar strike wave, the Socialist Party was invited into the government provided it would help call off a general strike. It accepted, although the government proved to be short-lived.

In 1946 the Communist Party joined a coalition government under Gonzalez Videla of the Radical Party

**". . . now that the election is over,
it is the written, nonsocialist program
of the UP that holds it together."**

which included the CP, the Radicals, and the far right-wing Liberal Party, with the cabinet posts divided equally among the three. Videla, then the latest incarnation of the imaginary and long-sought progressive bourgeoisie, turned on his allies in October 1947, outlawed the CP and threw hundreds of its leaders into prison. At the same time, Videla cynically invited the SP back into the government to fill the posts involuntarily vacated by the CP. The Socialists, in violation of the most elementary principles of class solidarity, accepted the offer. As might be expected, these crass betrayals by the traditional working-class leaderships resulted in the demoralization of the masses and a sharp electoral shift to the right in 1952.

The measurable achievements of the fourteen years of Popular Front and class-collaborationist regimes were an increase in industrial profits, a decline in real wages, and a decline in the dues-paying membership of the trade unions. It took eighteen years for the reformist workers' parties to build up enough strength to try the whole thing all over again.²⁵

It is the reformist, class-collaborationist politics of the Socialist and Communist parties that block the road to revolution in Chile. Even if the government of Chile were entirely in the hands of these parties there would be little difference in its program. It would not be the first time that reformist workers' parties had

25. For a fuller treatment of the history of Popular Frontism in Chile see Peter Camejo's *Allende's Chile: Is It Going Socialist?* pp. 21ff.

governmental power but "ruled" to maintain the bourgeois state and system—we need only think of the Labour governments in Britain and the various Social Democratic administrations in Western Europe. There are differences, of course, between all-working-class governments, even of reformist parties, and the kind of multiclass regime that exists in Chile, known commonly as a Popular Front.

What is the Popular Front?

What are the origins of this disastrous strategy—and it is a strategy, not a tactic—of Popular Frontism? The pro-Moscow Communist parties have long tried to palm off this policy of class collaborationism as an application of Lenin's united front tactic. This is a complete falsification. The united front aimed to bring together in common action all of the working-class parties in opposition to the whole of the bourgeoisie. It was to be organized around specific concrete issues and all the participants were to maintain their organizational independence and right to criticize the other tendencies involved. The only application of the united front tactic to a coalition with a full program on all social questions was the call for a workers' government—in the Russian Revolution this took the form of the demand "All power to the Soviets!" Specifically rejected was any coalition with bourgeois parties to administer the state power.

The Popular Front line of the Stalinists never had as its aim the creation of a socialist government, by peaceful or any other means. It was proclaimed at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935, along with the doctrine of "collective security." The latter postulated that the way to prevent war was to seek military alliances between the Soviet Union and the "peace-loving" imperialists primarily against German imperialism. Subordinated to this aim was the independent struggle of the working class in any country the Kremlin sought ties with.

The People's Front was a corollary to collective security. The Communist parties were instructed to proclaim their political support for any wing of the ruling class or government willing to do business with Stalin. In the middle thirties this led to panegyrics on the virtues of French and British democracy. After the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939 it meant abandonment of the struggle against fascism around the world. In the end, none of Stalin's allies, democratic or fascist, proved of the slightest use in preventing war or in the last analysis in defending the Soviet Union (which finally had to bear the main brunt of the war with Nazi Germany).

Popular Frontism was revived in the West after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Its main interest for the Kremlin since then has been to secure amiable diplomatic and trading partners in the capitalist world with which it can peacefully coexist.

Whatever dubious blessings such regimes may have

provided for the Kremlin bureaucracy, they have a record of unmitigated disaster for the working class. Stalinists and Social Democrats, despite their willingness to restrain the workers' movement within bourgeois channels, are hardly the bourgeoisie's favored executives for its state. For a "left" Popular Front to come to power, as in Chile, there must be a deep social crisis and radicalization of the masses that precludes an electoral victory by mere capitalist liberals. Such a regime is almost always a precursor to revolution or counterrevolution.

There is always the danger for the bourgeoisie that the masses, taking the demagogic promises of the Popular Front for good coin, will begin to implement socialist expropriations on their own. The capitalist class never relies wholly on its "proletarian allies," but begins from the first day of such a class-collaborationist regime to prepare its reserves, whether this means a military coup, a fascist movement, or simply the economic and political sabotage of the Popular Front regime.

The election of Allende marked the opening of such a revolutionary crisis in Chile, and revolutionists must know how to meet it if it is not to end in a terrible defeat for the Chilean masses.

Perspectives for socialism in Chile

A popular front regime poses unusually favorable opportunities for the revolutionary forces, *provided* they place no trust whatsoever in the government and succeed in time in winning the masses to the creation of their own independent organs of dual power.

The prime example of revolutionary strategy in countering class collaborationism was the Russian Revolution of October 1917. All of the socialist and workers' parties on the Russian left supported or participated in the Kerensky government—except the Bolsheviks. Even when they defended Kerensky militarily against the military coup of Kornilov in August, the Bolsheviks did so through their own independent armed organizations and openly proclaimed their political hostility to Kerensky in their press.

What is tragically missing in Chile is a mass revolutionary-socialist party capable of playing the role that Lenin's Bolsheviks undertook after the February revolution. Within the UP there are forces in the left wing of the Socialist Party that seek a revolutionary alternative. But while many of the specific positions and intentions of these left currents are correct, they are caught in the trap of supporting and working inside the Popular Front coalition and its bourgeois government.

Outside of the UP the most promising formation is the MIR. Although it lacks the mass base of the reformist Socialist and Communist parties its influence is growing. It too has been seriously compromised by its policy of supporting the Allende government,

although it has been moving toward a break with the "Marxist president" in recent months.

The MIR is further handicapped by its ultraleft past in which it advocated a strategy of guerrilla warfare by a small elite rather than the construction of a mass revolutionary party. It is paying heavily today for its consequent weakness in the organized working class. Nevertheless, it has recognized that the old state power has yet to be overthrown and it has committed its resources to actions such as the independent land seizures. On the question of arming the masses, however, it still maintains its old concept of clandestine small armed groups. Such groups cannot substitute for the organization of factory defense guards and peasant militias, which must be advocated and organized in an open and massive manner.

The key in Chile is recognizing the procapitalist character of the Unidad Popular. Nevertheless, it is just as true that revolutionists must avoid the danger of sectarian abstentionism which could cut them off from the radicalizing masses. It is not enough to counterpose to Allende's reforms the abstract slogan of socialist revolution. Ways must be found to intervene in the mass movement with concrete demands, around which struggles can be built.

Revolutionists should distinguish between political support to the government and support for specific reforms instituted from above which can be fought for by the mass movement through its own methods. The land occupations are a good example of this.

The creation of factory defense guards to protect industrial installations from right-wingers and to protect the democratic rights of the working class could lay the basis for establishing popular militias and the genuine arming of the masses. The "participation" committees authorized by Allende can be transformed into real factory councils around the fight for workers' control. These could be extended to citywide workers' and peasants' assemblies based on democratically elected councils. The demand for a national congress of workers' and peasants' organizations could lead to a national workers' and peasants' political structure in opposition to the bourgeois congress (including Allende's single chamber "People's Assembly").

The demand for democratic rights in the army could be used to create rank-and-file soldiers' committees that would weaken the authority of the officer corps and lay the basis for winning a section of the army ranks to the revolution. The MIR's raising of the slogan "democratic rights for soldiers," who in Chile do not even have the right to vote, is a positive step in meeting the essential need of political work aimed at the army ranks.

Workers', soldiers', and peasants' committees must insist on the right of internal democracy and not become subordinate to the apparatuses of the reformist parties.

All of these demands must be implemented in action, with the expectation that the government will oppose them.

Politically the revolutionary left should demand the ouster of all the bourgeois parties and ministers from the UP coalition. In this way, masses still not ready to break with Allende can be won to the conception of a workers' and peasants' government, even if initially it should be dominated by the reformists. If the SP and the CP refuse, it will help expose them as defenders of the capitalist class.

At a certain stage in the struggle for a workers' state, the masses are certain to respond to the slogan of a government based on a Workers' and Peasants' Assembly, directly responsible to the local workers' and peasants' committees.

All the objective conditions are present for the success of such a revolutionary venture. Whether the crucial subjective factor, the revolutionary party, can be consolidated in time remains the ultimate determinant of socialist victory in Chile.

January 1, 1972

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independent mass actions. For instance in 1964 the Black liberation movement was the major protest movement in this country. But the so-called "Big Six" leaders of the Black movement got together and proclaimed a "moratorium" on demonstrations until the elections. They felt demonstrations would weaken Johnson, and that the most important thing for the movement to do was to unite behind Johnson to defeat the dreaded Goldwater.

In 1968 there was McCarthy, who stated very openly that he was running to draw the young people off the streets and into "constructive" activity through the ballot box. And to a large extent he succeeded. The antiwar movement experienced a big decline during 1968.

So what we see reflected in the perspectives of NOW and the Women's Political Caucus is this "lesser-evil" orientation. The Women's Political Caucus does not give wholehearted support to the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition because they see the prospect of big abortion actions as an embarrassment to the candidates they intend to support—just as demonstrations in 1964 would have been a problem for Johnson, demonstrations in 1968 would have been a problem for Humphrey, and demonstrations in 1972 are going to be a problem for Humphrey, Lindsay, Kennedy, or Muskie, whoever it may be.

The Socialist Workers Party is the only relatively large organization in this country which clearly has a principle of opposing Republican and Democratic Party candidates. And for this reason, people who support those candidates often do not want us around during the election periods to put them on the spot and help provide an alternative to their perspective. Not only do we build a socialist election campaign and support such efforts as La Raza Unida Party as alternatives, but we also help build alternatives in action which can involve women who still support the Democrats but who are willing to struggle around specific issues. And the dynamic of these demonstrations can help to show people the nature of the Democratic Party and destroy their illusions in it.

Exposing the capitalist parties

So what conclusions should we draw regarding a strategy for the women's movement during 1972? If we want to be effective we must turn in exactly the opposite direction that NOW and the Women's Political Caucus have chosen. Instead of orienting towards the elections *on the terms of our oppressors*, we should remain completely independent of them, both in actions and in the elections. Instead of allowing the Democratic and Republican parties to define the issues for us, we must define the issues ourselves. We must remain visible—through street demonstrations, debates with anti-abortion people on radio and television, teach-ins and speak-outs on campuses and in communities, leaflets, talking to new women. We must unite as many women as possible in their own organizations so that in 1972 we can project the women's liberation movement as an independent force, challenging the sexist and racist parties that now dominate this society, and exposing the government for not meeting the needs of women.

And those of us who are socialists, or who are sympathetic to socialism, have a broader task. The reason socialists place so much importance on mobilizing masses of people around concrete issues—such as war, pollution, racial oppression, restrictive abortion laws, etc.—is because these are life and death problems facing the American people, problems which are products of capitalism. When people begin to move against all these forms of oppression that are rooted in this capitalist system, they will begin to see that a change in the system is necessary. And they will begin to see the necessity for the full organization and participation of the masses of people in running the government. This is what the struggle for socialism is all about.

We cannot build such a socialist movement by working in parties like the Democratic and Republican parties that are rigged to exclude participation and control from below, parties that are run by the capitalist class.

The Socialist Workers Party is serious about our fight for a socialist America, and we know that 1972 is just one stage in the battle to change this society into a rational, humane one. We aim to help organize, over time, the independent power of the oppressed. To organize men and women—whatever their background—who want to take the side of the oppressed: the masses of working people in this country.

For people whose main goal is to win the elections in the short run, for people who have personal political ambitions, the perspective of the SWP is not the one for them. But for those who are concerned about winning true freedom for women in this society, about changing society in a fundamental way, about creating a just society, then the only realistic perspective is that of socialism, and of uncompromising independence from the parties that perpetuate injustice.



with British and French imperialism. Hitler and his allies received either a silent treatment or were touched lightly. The heavy artillery of Stalinist propaganda was aimed at the "democracies," yesterday's "antiaggressors" and the hope for "collective security" and world peace. The Stalinist parties quickly organized "peace" demonstrations in the United States and the other Western nations, while in the countries occupied by the Nazis they refused to participate in the initial armed resistance movements (they would change their minds very suddenly on both of these questions after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union).

The worst result of Stalin's policies was to confuse and demoralize millions of workers who were in or under the influence of various Communist parties, as well as countless sympathizers of the Soviet Union who could not understand or approve the abrupt change on Stalin's part. First they had been told to give up the fight for socialism in order to defend bourgeois democracy against the ultimate evil of fascism. Now they were told that bourgeois democracy was the worst threat to the Soviet fatherland and fascism wasn't too bad after all. As Molotov said at the time, it was "a matter of taste."

Even from the standpoint of the military defense of the Soviet Union it was a poor bargain to throw away the support of the Western European working classes in exchange for a piece of Poland and the Baltic countries.

The pact with Hitler knocked another Stalinist credo into a cocked hat. That was the charge made at the Moscow Trials, still fresh in everyone's minds, that the defendants, including Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov, were agents of the Nazis. With Stalin himself now working as Hitler's quartermaster it would never do to embarrass Russia's new allies by repeating charges that both sides knew were sheer fabrications. For the duration of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Left Communist opposition to Stalin were branded as agents of British Intelligence!

"Two years of peace"

Maisky, in final justification of the bloc with Hitler, writes: "In this way a split was made in the alliance of aggressors, and almost two years of peace were ensured for our country in the most difficult time."

The pact is alleged to have driven a wedge between Germany and the "democracies" who Maisky here views *en bloc* as an "alliance of aggressors." This is in the same series of articles where he describes the British and French as "antiaggressors" and advertises them as the upholders of democracy, peace, and other good things. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.

The fact is that all of the imperialist powers, democratic or fascist, were aggressors in World War II and fought not for abstract ideals, good or bad, but for a redistribution of the material wealth of the world. There is nothing in principle wrong with a workers' state seeking to protect itself by seeking military blocs with one side or the other in such an interimperialist conflict. What is impermissible is the Kremlin's practice of telling the world's workers that whatever imperialist regime has temporarily entered some agreement with Moscow has thereby been transformed into a "progressive" friend of peace and socialism.

Worse still, the Kremlin was taken in by its own propaganda about the good intentions of whoever its present allies happen to be. This is the only possible interpretation that can be placed on the use Stalin made of his "almost two years of peace." Maisky tries to suggest that Stalin very cleverly maneuvered the Nazis into signing the nonaggression pact to give the Soviet Union time to prepare militarily for the eventual confrontation. He does not openly say this because he knows that Stalin did no such thing. Maisky's own memoirs, published in Moscow in 1964-65, reveal that Stalin was totally unprepared for the Nazi invasion. As ambassador to Britain, Maisky himself was given extensive details of the German plans by the British government. He passed these on to Stalin who dismissed even the suggestion that Germany might violate the nonaggression pact as a British provocation. *These revealing admissions, along with all criticisms of Stalin, have been deleted from the most recent edition of Maisky's memoirs.*

That Stalin saw his pacts with bourgeois governments as a sure way of avoiding war and not as an expedient in preparing to meet imperialist aggression is shown by his purges of the armed forces from 1937 onward and his refusal to mobilize the forces at the command of the Soviet government when the German invasion threatened in the late spring of 1941.

As an extension of the Moscow Trials directed against his opponents, real and imagined, in the party and government, Stalin supervised the beheading of the Red Army. By 1937, when the military purge began, all supporters of the Trotskyist Left Opposition and of the Zinoviev and Bukharin tendencies had long been ousted from command posts. The victims of the firing squads this time were all members of Stalin's own faction. These included virtually the entire general staff: Marshals M. N. Tukhachevsky, V. K. Blücher, and A. I. Egorov; army commanders I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir. In all some 20,000 officers were arrested, 25 percent of the officer corps, and thousands

of these were shot.⁴ Special vengeance was exacted against those who had loyally carried out Stalin's orders in Spain. This latter group, not incidentally, were the only section of the Soviet armed forces that had seen action in recent years.

In his ruthless drive to eliminate any potential claimant to leadership Stalin rendered the Red Army virtually unfit for service. The rest of the world, watching this bizarre performance, correctly concluded that the Soviet armed forces were considerably weakened. This was confirmed in November 1939, after the war had begun, when the Soviet Union invaded Finland. The Red Army put up such a poor performance in the Finnish war that Stalin was forced to remove many of his surviving cronies who proved to be worthless military commanders and replace them with newcomers from lower echelons. The vast extent of the incompetence

“. . . Stalin supervised the beheading of the Red Army. . . . In all some 20,000 officers were arrested, 25 percent of the officer corps, and thousands of these were shot.”

and disorganization in the commanding staff only became fully apparent during the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler almost two years later.

Isaac Deutscher and others have speculated that Stalin carried out the purges in the expectation that the Soviet Union would eventually be drawn into the impending world conflict, as a means of insuring that no new opposition could take advantage of the wartime dislocations to make a bid for power. Whatever case can be made for this view in regard to the party purge it seems unreasonable to assume that, if Stalin really anticipated war, he would have decapitated the military machine on which defense of his rule against a foreign aggressor depended.

It is certainly beyond dispute that Stalin did not expect the German invasion in 1941 and made no effort to deploy his forces in advance to meet it. The Soviet bureaucracy itself supplied ample testimony to this fact during the tentative "de-Stalinization" of the late 1950s, whatever Brezhnev's efforts may be today to refurbish Stalin's tarnished war record. In his famous "secret speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 Khrushchev declared:

During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the Germans against the Soviet

4. These figures are given by Isaac Deutscher in his *Stalin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 381.

Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. . . .

Documents which have now been published show that by April 3, 1941, Churchill, through his Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union. . . .

We must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with reservation.⁵

This self-induced blindness did not end even with the Nazi thrust into the Soviet heartland. As Khrushchev testified:

When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that the German fire was not to be returned. Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of several undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.⁶

In just a few short months the Nazi armies overran vast territories of the Soviet Union containing its most important industrial and agricultural resources and captured huge numbers of troops and amounts of matériel. In July and early August the Wehrmacht crossed the Dnieper. Kiev fell in late September. By 1942 one-third of the Russian population was under German occupation and the Nazi forces stood at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad.

These defeats cannot be explained by German numerical or technical superiority. Soviet Major General Pyotr Grigorenko, who held high command posts during the war, provides the following figures in his article "The Soviet Collapse in 1941":

"USSR: 170 divisions; 14,000-15,000 tanks; 8,000-9,000 warplanes.

"Germany and its allies: 190 divisions; 3,712 tanks; 3,000-3,500 warplanes. . . .

"Our air force already had more than 2,700 to 2,800 warplanes of the most modern make, that is, only a little less than the total number of planes Nazi Ger-

5. *Soviet Society*, edited by Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), pp. 278-9. This revealing speech of February 25, 1956, has to this day not been published in full in the Soviet Union. Released to the world through a still unnamed foreign Communist party, it had such a shattering effect on the Stalinist monolith that the Kremlin bureaucrats quickly decided that it was not practical to make Stalin the sole scapegoat for the crimes in which they had all been accomplices. The last fifteen years have seen a steady drift back toward Stalinist orthodoxy on the part of the late dictator's heirs.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

many had. The situation with our artillery was still better."⁷

The initial collapse under the Nazi thrust proved that the two-year period since the pact with Hitler was signed was used by Stalin not to prepare the country for war but rather to prepare it to believe in the sanctity of treaties with Hitler. Absolutely no other conclusion is permissible in the light of what happened in the summer and fall of 1941.

The "war against fascism"

It is beyond the scope of this article to deal at length with the course of the war after June 1941. I want to dwell on only one aspect of these developments: the political attitude of the Stalinist bureaucracy toward its new-found Western allies. The British quickly came to an agreement with the Soviet government after the German invasion and the United States made arrangements for material aid to Russia. After Pearl Harbor the U. S. entered the war as an ally of the British and the USSR.

Stalin joined Churchill and Roosevelt in depicting the war as one between the forces of democracy and the forces of fascism. This was supplemented by large-scale propaganda around the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and other fine-sounding things.

The Kremlin cannot be faulted for accepting aid from, or seeking a military pact with, any government in its life-and-death struggle with the German armies. But Stalin went much further than that by endorsing the war aims of his imperialist allies, just as he had done in his previous pact with Hitler.

For the capitalist nations that were involved, with the exception of those in the colonial sphere (principally China), it was an imperialist war in which a redivision of the world's wealth was sought. The richer imperialists tried to hold on to what they already had. This applied especially to the British and French who were surfeited with vast colonial possessions. On the other side the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were trying to get a larger share of these sources of wealth for themselves. For the United States government, it was a problem of putting down the upsurge of the Axis rivals and, in addition, taking over in one way or another much of the colonies held by its allies in Europe.

7. This article was reportedly first submitted to the Soviet journal *Voprosy Istorii*. It was rejected as too critical of Stalin and later circulated in *samizdat*. An English translation appeared in the November 10, 1969, issue of the New York weekly *Intercontinental Press*. Grigorenko is best known as an outspoken leader of the new Left Communist opposition to the Soviet bureaucracy in recent years. He was fired from his post as a teacher at the Frunze military academy in 1961 and arrested by the secret police on May 7, 1969. He is presently confined in a Soviet mental institution, a common fate of recalcitrant critics of the Kremlin leadership.

Washington in the postwar period has indicated on innumerable occasions that it has no intrinsic aversion to military dictatorships or fascism and today sustains scores of such totalitarian regimes as part of its world empire.

The aims of all the advanced capitalist nations in the Second World War were similar, that is, imperialist and reactionary from any standpoint. The fact that on one side there were dictatorships while on the other there were bourgeois democracies did not determine the nature of the conflict. This merely indicated that the poorer imperialist powers could no longer afford the luxury of democratic forms with their parliaments, elections, and other trappings, limited as these were.

The imperialist character of the war did not, however, extend to all the participants. The exceptions were China and the Soviet Union. China, a semicolonial

". . . it was precisely around the question of the second front that the U. S. and Britain demonstrated the consciously anti-Soviet character of their calculations."

country, was fighting against Japanese imperialism, against colonialism, and for national independence. China had no designs upon any other nation.

The Soviet Union, a workers' state which had fallen under bureaucratic rule, also had no imperialist aims. Its struggle was against a foreign occupier, for national independence, and for the defense of the nationalized, noncapitalist property forms established by the 1917 revolution. These property forms do not rest on private ownership of industry, production for profit, and the concomitant need to export capital and control foreign markets that characterize the economies of all the advanced capitalist countries.

In exchange for his alliance with the "democratic" imperialists, Stalin instructed the Communist parties of the world to pledge uncritical support to the whole social and military program of "their own" imperialist governments. In the colonial sphere this meant abandonment of demands for national independence, as in India. In the United States this meant the enforcement of a no-strike pledge in the unions, the tying of the union structure to Roosevelt's Democratic Party and the abandonment of support for the Black struggle. The ultimate concessions were the outright dissolution of the Comintern during the war and Communist Party support for the restoration of capitalist regimes in Western Europe *after the war was over*, particularly in France and Italy where the armed workers' resistance movements had considerable power.

It was for such "patriotic" support to bourgeois governments in World War I that Lenin declared the Second International to be a "stinking corpse" and set out to build a new world revolutionary organization. In his

entire international dealings with imperialism of all stripes from 1935 on, Stalin imposed a policy on the world Communist parties hardly distinguishable from that of the Social Democrats in World War I.

The Kremlin's rationale was in effect that it was necessary to sacrifice all other Communist parties to the defense of the Soviet Union. But even from the viewpoint of this narrow and cynical trading off of the rights of the workers in other lands for Soviet survival the Kremlin did not realize much on the deal. It was not Stalin's political capitulation that brought Britain and the U. S. into the war on Russia's side—interimperialist rivalries had already taken Britain (with U. S. backing) into the war with Germany.

German submarines severely restricted the amount of direct military material the U. S. was able to ship the Soviet Union on lend-lease. The principal aim of Stalin's pro-Western diplomacy was to secure the opening of a second front in Europe that would take the pressure off the beleaguered Red Army. But it was precisely around the question of the second front that the U. S. and Britain demonstrated the consciously anti-Soviet character of their calculations. For three years the Soviet Union was left to face the overwhelming bulk of the German forces. John Bagguley writes that from June 1941 to June 1944, "the Soviet Union withstood, contained and eventually repulsed an average of about 180 German divisions."⁸ Bagguley estimates that twelve Allied divisions engaged about the same number of German divisions in Italy and North Africa. Stephen Ambrose put the number of German divisions involved in the Italian campaign, the major Anglo-American military operation of 1943, at twenty. Ambrose concludes: "The Russians, alone, stemmed the Nazi tide, then began to roll it back."⁹

The Normandy invasion did not come until June 6, 1944, a year and a half after the Red Army had turned back the Germans at Stalingrad. A major aim of British and U. S. policy was the establishment of right-wing governments in Italy and France (in the former, the occupation government was headed by a military leader of the fascist regime, Marshal Pietro Badoglio), and to prevent the whole of Germany from falling to Soviet troops.

The casualty figures show what Stalin's allies were actually worth in "fighting fascism" and also the terrible price the Soviet Union paid for its unpreparedness for the Nazi invasion. U. S. Defense Department statistics (notoriously understated in the case of Soviet deaths) list 6,115,000 Russian dead against 403,195 for Britain and 545,108 for the U. S. France, which collapsed almost without a fight and whose bourgeois government collaborated with the Nazis throughout the rest of the war, lists 245,000 dead, far less than in World War

8. John Bagguley, *Containment and Revolution* (London, 1967).

9. Stephen Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), p. 53.

I. The figures for Germany are slightly over 3,000,000.¹⁰ Soviet estimates for Russian deaths are 20,000,000.

That the Soviet Union ultimately triumphed over the Nazi invaders, at such a terrible cost, was taken at the war's end as evidence of Stalin's brilliance in meeting the challenge of World War II. However, this victory was won in spite of Stalin and showed more than anything else the devotion of the Soviet masses to the conquests of 1917 and the vitality of the system of collective property even when saddled with an incompetent, short-sighted bureaucratic leadership.

Of all the contending theories regarding the nature of the war and how it could be averted only one tendency in world politics had an accurate view in the years beforehand. In 1934, more than five years from the outbreak of hostilities, the International Communist League, the world Trotskyist organization of that time, proclaimed in a document entitled "War and the Fourth International":

The same causes, inseparable from modern capitalism, which brought about the last imperialist war have now reached infinitely greater tension than in the middle of 1914. The fear of the consequences of a new war is the only factor which fetters the will of imperialism. But the efficacy of this brake is limited. The stress of inner contradictions pushes one country after another on the road to fascism which, in its turn, cannot maintain power except by preparing international explosions. All governments fear war. But none of the governments has any freedom of choice. Without a proletarian revolution a new world war is inevitable.

Stalin sacrificed the possibility of proletarian revolution in Spain and in France during the 1930s and relied instead on his pacts with imperialist powers to keep the Soviet Union out of war. The people of the Soviet Union know only too well what they paid for this opportunist course.

10. Cited in *Collier's Encyclopedia*, 1970 edition, Vol. 23, pp. 606ff.

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constabulary, was called upon. Why? He himself would have been the last one to be able to explain his appointment.

The political physiognomy of this statesman manifested itself most clearly in his interviews on policy with foreign journalists.

The correspondent of the *Echo de Paris* asked what the prince's view was regarding the opinion held by the public that Russia needed ministers responsible to parliament. The prince smiled. "Any such responsibility would be artificial and merely nominal."

"How do you stand on the religious question?"

"I am an enemy of religious persecutions, with some reservations, however, . . ."

"Is it true you are inclined to give the Jews more freedom?"

"With kindness one can obtain good results."

"In general, are you a partisan of progress?"

Answer: The minister intends "to see that his actions conform to the spirit of true and general progress, at least *in so far as this does not stand in contradiction to the existing order of things.*" Literally, this was his answer!

Moreover the prince himself did not take his program seriously. Of course, the "most immediate task is the well-being of the population which is entrusted to our care." He admitted to the American correspondent Thomson, however, that he actually did not know what use he would make of his power.

"It would be untrue," said the minister, "if I were to say that I already have a set program. The agrarian question? Yes, yes, there is an incredible amount of material on this question but I am only acquainted with it from the newspapers."

The prince reassured the court, comforted the liberals, and gave the foreign correspondents assurances which did honor to his kindly heart, but hopelessly discredited his talent as a statesman.

And this inept aristocratic figure adorned with the braid of a special police-force general seemed not only in the mind of Nicholas, but also in the imagination of the liberals, called upon to loosen the centuries-old chains that had bitten deep into the flesh of the huge, unhappy nation.

Part IV

It seemed as if everyone looked forward with enchantment to the deeds Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii would perform. There was no lack of anticipatory laurels. Prince Meshcherskii, publisher of the reactionary *Grazhdanin* [Citizen], wrote that a great day had arrived for the "immense family of respectable people in Russia," because a "perfect man of honor" had finally been appointed to the most important ministerial post. "Independence is closely related to nobility of character," wrote old Suvorin, "and our pressing need is for nobility of character." Prince Ukhtomskii pointed out in *Petersburgskii Vedomosty* [Petersburg News] that the new minister "was the scion of an ancient noble family that went back through Monomakh all the way to Rurik." With satisfaction the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* singled out as the prince's salient traits, "humanity, justness, objectivity, and sympathy for enlightenment." The *Birzhevyye Vedomosty* [Stock-Exchange News] reminded us that the prince was only forty-seven years old and therefore had not had enough time to be thoroughly infected with the bureaucratic routine.

In verse and in prose it echoed throughout holy Russia, that "we were fast asleep," that we had been awakened by a liberal gesture from the former commander of the gendarmery, and that he pointed us the way to a "rapprochement between the people and the government." In reading all of these gushings one cannot escape the impression of breathing in stupidity under twenty atmospheres pressure!

Only the extreme right remained

cold during this "bacchanal of liberal delight." *The Moscovskii Vedomosty* [Moscow News] severely admonished the prince that along with Plehve's portfolio he had undertaken his responsibilities. "If our enemies in the secret print shops, in the various public organizations, in the schools, in the press, and on the streets bomb in hand impudently raise their heads ready to storm our internal Port Arthur, they can do this only because they have undermined society and a certain portion of the ruling circles with their completely false theory of the necessity of removing the firmest pillars of the Russian Empire—the autocratic rule of the czar, the orthodoxy of its church, and the national consciousness of its people."

Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii tried to take a middle course—absolutism tempered by law, a bureaucracy based on social forces. *Novoe Vremya* [New Era], which supported the prince while he was at the helm, assumed the task semiofficially of pimping for the government and the liberals. A good opportunity presented itself just then.

The minister, whose goodwill found a corresponding reception with the camarilla which led Nicholas around by the nose, made a timid attempt to gain support from the members of the Zemstvos.

For this purpose he intended to use the projected conference of Zemstvo representatives. *Novoe Vremya* invited the representatives to exert a careful pressure from the left.

But the excitement that had taken hold of liberal society and the aroused mood of the press awakened increasing fears about the outcome of the Zemstvo conference. On November 13 *Novoe Vremya* firmly sounded the call for retreat. "However interesting and instructive the decisions reached by the members of the Zemstvo conference may be, it must not be forgotten that because of its composition and the manner in which it

was called, the conference will be seen quite rightly as officially a private gathering. Its decisions will have only an academic significance and carry only moral weight." Finally, this conference, which the "progressive" minister had chosen as a basis of support, was banned on his own orders. It met semi-officially in a private home.

Part V

In the time from October 19 to 21, 1904, a hundred of the better known Zemstvo members decided by a vote of seventy to thirty to raise the demand for bourgeois liberties—the inviolability of persons and popular representatives sharing legislative power. They managed to do this without mentioning the dread holy word "constitution."

The European press saluted the Zemstvo resolution's tactful restraint with profound respect. The liberals had had the acumen to express what they wanted without using any words that would have prevented Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii from taking up their demands.

The silent tactic of the Zemstvo members can be explained quite aptly in this way. They had formulated their demands with only the government in view. It was the government's support they wanted, not that of the mass of the people, to whom they might have appealed.

They had worked out the points of a political compromise deal, not the slogans of a campaign for political freedom. In this they remained true to themselves. "Society has done its part; now it is the government's turn." That was the cry—at once challenging and servile—raised by the press. The government of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii rose to the bait. It responded to even this obsequious "challenge" by issuing a warning to the liberal journal *Pravo* [Law]. The newspapers were forbidden to print or discuss the resolutions of the Zemstvo conference. The Chernigov

Zemstvo's modest, humble petition was declared to be "impudent and tactless." The government's "spring" was coming to a close and the liberals' spring was beginning.

The Zemstvo conference had opened a vent for the oppositional mood of "high society." The congress was not comprised of official representatives of all the Zemstvos, but it did include the heads of many bureaus and many men of "authority," whose very weight and importance derived from their sluggish and lukewarm character. The government bureaucracy did not authorize the conference, but it was aware that it took place. Was there any wonder, then, that the intelligentsia, who had been thoroughly intimidated by the repression, now believed that their most secretly cherished dreams of a constitution, the most carefully hidden thoughts of their sleepless nights, had been given a quasilegal sanction by the resolutions of this semiofficial congress? There was nothing that gave this frustrated liberal society as much courage as the realization, however dim, that their desires had a legal basis. This began the era of banquets, resolutions, declarations, appeals, and petitions. Every possible interest group and meeting, taking as their starting point their professional needs, local events, or jubilee celebrations, came to formulate constitutional demands like those set forth in the now famous "points" of the Zemstvo congress. The democracy hastened to form a chorus around Zemstvo coryphees in order to amplify these decisions and strengthen their impact on the bureaucracy. Liberal society's entire political task of the moment consisted of putting pressure on the government under the cover provided by the Zemstvo members. At first it seemed that the resolutions in themselves could blow up the bureaucracy like one of Whitehead's mines. But this was a false impression. Both the authors and the objects of the resolutions began to take them for granted. Without any apparent cause, the press, increasingly strangled by the

The film strip graphic contains three panels of protest signs:

- Top panel: A sign that reads "REMEMBER BROTHER MALCOLM" and another partially visible sign that says "LIBERATION BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY".
- Middle panel: A sign that reads "FREE OUR SISTERS" and another that says "FREE OURSELVES".
- Bottom panel: A sign that reads "RAZA SI GUERRA NO".

In the center of the film strip is a large text box that reads:

YSA. join. now.

Below the text box are three checkboxes:

- I WANT TO JOIN THE YSA
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Writings of Leon Trotsky [1934-35]

edited by George Breitman and Bev Scott. The French government, under pressure from both the fascists and the Stalinists, ordered Trotsky's deportation from France in April 1934. But the order could not be carried out because no country would accept the revolutionary.

At the end of 1934 Serge Kirov, a Stalin lieutenant, was assassinated, and Moscow staged a sensational trial accusing various oppositionists, including Trotsky, of conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government in collaboration with the imperialists. This, the fifth volume in a series of eleven, contains Trotsky's expose of the frame-up by the Soviet secret police.

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"government of confidence at home," spoke in a sharpening tone. At the same time, the opposition began to undergo a process of differentiation. With increasing frequency, turbulent radical figures with rough, intolerant manners began showing up at banquets. Sometimes they are "intellectuals," others, workers. They attack the Zemstvo members sharply. From the "intelligentsia," they demand clarity of language and decisiveness of action. People motion to these disrupters to calm down, they try to flatter them, they scold them, they shut them up with fine phrases, they try to lull them, to cool them off. Finally they throw them out. But these outcasts from the temple fulfill their mission. They bring the left-wing element of the "intelligentsia" onto the road of revolution.

The right wing of "society," materially or ideologically bound to the liberalism of the property-owning classes on the restricted electoral register, assumed the task of proving the moderation and loyalty of the Zemstvo congress. They appealed to Prince Sviatopolk's rational sense of statesmanship. At the same time, the radical minded "intelligentsia," chiefly the student youth, joined the November campaign in order to force the moderates out of their narrow channel, to endow them with a more militant spirit, and unite them with the revolutionary movement of the urban workers. In this way, two street demonstrations developed—one in Petersburg on December 10 and one in Moscow on December 18-19. These demonstrations by the radical "children" were the direct and inevitable conclusion of the slogans put forth by the liberal "fathers." If the liberal "fathers" had had the courage to demand a constitution, they should have determined to fight. But the fathers did not show the slightest inclination to such consistency in their political thinking. To the contrary, what they feared most was that the gossamer web of "confidence" might be torn by

excessive haste or energy. The "fathers" did not support the children, rather they delivered them up to the Cossacks and gendarmes of the liberal prince.

The students found no support for their activities among the masses of workers either. Here it became clear what an essentially limited character the banquet campaign of 1904 had. Of the workers only a thin layer of the aristocracy joined in, and the "real workers," whose appearance brought forth mixed feelings of hostile fear and curiosity, showed up in ones and twos during this period of the banquets. That deep inner process that was being consummated at this time in the consciousness of the popular masses naturally did not accommodate itself to the hastily declared attack of the revolutionary students. Thus the student youth was finally forced to rely almost entirely on itself.

Nevertheless after the long political silence caused by the war and in the critical situation resulting from the smashing defeats in battle, because of their *political* character and the fact that they took place in the principal cities and were reported to the whole world by means of the telegraph, these demonstrations made a far greater impression on the government than all the sage remonstrances of the liberal press. The government was shaken out of its slumbers, and moved quickly and decisively.

Part VI

The constitutional campaign that began with a few dozen Zemstvo members meeting in Korsakov's stylish apartment and ended with a few dozen students in the Petersburg and Moscow jails was answered by the government in two ways—with an ukase on reforms and with a police bulletin. The supreme ukase of December 25, 1904, which will remain as the best fruit of the spring, sets forth as the unalterable condition for further reform preserving the firm foundations of the imperial system. In gen-

eral the ukase was a repeat of Sviatopolk-Mirskii's conversations with the foreign correspondents, chock full of good will and vagueness. The government bulletin which appeared two days later was of incomparably greater political clarity. It points to the Zemstvo congress of November as the source of the movement beginning shortly thereafter, characterizing this movement as "alien to the Russian people." It admonishes the Zemstvo members that insofar as they bring up the Zemstvo decisions for discussion they are breaking the law. Further, the government reminds the Zemstvo members that it is their legal duty to uphold the laws of the state and civil peace. Therefore the government will use all legal means at its disposal to disperse gatherings inimical to the state. Even if these declarations of the prince were crowned with little success, he had accomplished the general task for which history had placed him for a time at the head of the government—the task of thoroughly shattering the political illusions and prejudices of the middle strata, the petty bourgeoisie.

Sviatopolk-Mirskii's term in office, beginning with the dulcet tones of a trumpet of peace and ending with the whistle of the *nagaika* [the Cossack whip], kindled extreme hatred of absolutism among all elements of the population that thought at all. Political interests were better defined, dissatisfaction deeper and more principled. Yesterday's unschooled minds today throw themselves passionately into political analysis. All instances of malice or arbitrariness are quickly traced back to their source. Revolutionary slogans no longer frighten anyone. On the contrary they find a thousandfold echo, they are taken up among the people. Like a sponge, public consciousness sucks in every word of negation, of condemnation, every curse upon absolutism. The autocracy can no longer get away with anything, and

every clumsy move is mercilessly reckoned against it. Its attempts at conciliation are met with laughter, its threats inspire hatred.

Of course the regime of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii granted significant freedom of expression, but the scope of the press's interests grew much more rapidly than the indulgence of the Central Administration for Press Affairs. The same thing occurred in all other areas. Half freedom bestowed as a boon was no less enraging than complete slavery. That is always the fate of concessions in a revolutionary epoch. They do not satisfy, they just awaken new demands. These demands were raised in the press, in meetings, at congresses, and provoked the government which soon lost the "confidence" it enjoyed and sought help in repressive measures. Meetings and congresses were broken up. A hail of blows rained down on the press. Demonstrations were dispersed with bestial cruelty. Finally in order to make the exact worth of the December 25 ukase clear to the petty bourgeoisie, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii issued a circular in which he declared that the revision of the peasant statutes announced in the liberal ukase would be carried out along the lines of Plehve's project.

That was the last act of the government in the year 1904. The year 1905 began with events which meant a fateful break between past and present. They drew a blood-red line under this "spring," the childhood of political consciousness. With a single blow Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii, his good nature, his plans, his "confidence," his circulars—all were hurled aside and forgotten.

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