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**Nicaraguan
Dictator Somoza
Fights to Save
Brutal Regime**



SOMOZA: Seeks help from Carter.

Demonstrations Throughout Iran

Free the Black Student Leaders in South Africa!

By Ernest Harsch

On September 18, one of the most important political trials in South Africa in recent years is scheduled to begin. On that day eleven Black student leaders will appear before the Supreme Court in Kempton Park near Johannesburg on charges of "sedition" for their role in leading the massive Black rebellions that shook Soweto and other Black townships in 1976.

All eleven are members of the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC), the organization that spearheaded the struggle in Soweto, the largest Black township in the country. The SSRC was banned in October 1977, along with many other leading Black political organizations.

At the top of the list of defendants is Sechaba Daniel Montsitsi, the president of the SSRC at the time of his arrest in June 1977. Until his appearance in court July 28, he had been held incommunicado for 422 days, amid reports that he and other student activists were assaulted and tortured. Montsitsi is twenty-two years old.

The other ten defendants, ranging in age from eighteen years to twenty-three years, are: Sandile Seth Mazibuko, Wellie C. Twala, Khotso J. Lengaane, Sibongile S. Mthembu, Mafison Morobe, Thabo Ndabeni, Kennedy Mogami, Teboho Mngomezulu, Michael Khiba, and George Twala.

In addition to the eleven, several prominent Black exiles have been named as "coconspirators," including Tsietshi Mashinini, Khotso Seatholo, and Tromfomo Sono, all former presidents of the SSRC; and Drake Koka, a founder of the Black People's Convention and currently secretary general of the Black Allied Workers Union.

When the eleven defendants first appeared in court July 28, they were accused of demonstrating for the release of political prisoners, "forcing" workers to strike, and allegedly distributing petrol bombs. The charge of "sedition" that they face has not been used in South Africa since 1927. Conviction carries a possible death sentence.

The defense lawyer, Shun Chetty, objected when the judge set the trial date for September 18, stating that there was not enough time to prepare the defense.

After the student activists were taken from the courtroom and loaded into a police van, they gave clenched-fist Black power salutes.

Christian Science Monitor correspondent June Goodwin described the trial of the

SSRC leaders as perhaps "the most important political trial in South Africa since the 1964 trial of African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela. . . ."

In an interview in the August 24 issue of the London weekly *Socialist Challenge*,

Hua and the Shah

By Matilde Zimmermann

It was hardly an opportune time to pay a visit to the shah of Iran. His rule had never been shakier, after eight months of antigovernment demonstrations and in the midst of protests blaming his police for the murderous Abadan theater fire.

But Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng had become a consummate diplomat on his short world tour, and the less-than-jovial atmosphere around the palace presented him with no problems.

Hua's friendly call on the despised Iranian ruler showed just how far Peking is prepared to go in its search for allies against the Soviet Union. At a royal banquet to welcome him to Tehran August 29, Hua toasted the common interests of China and Iran and praised the shah for standing up to "the policy of expansionism and hegemonism by the big powers." ("Hegemonism," one of Peking's most unhappy contributions to the English language, refers to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.)

Hua's two-week jaunt to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran was only the fourth time since 1949 that a Chinese ruler has ventured out on a foreign visit: Mao went to Moscow twice, and Hua made a short

Peruvian Miners Stand Firm

By Fred Murphy

Forty thousand persons marched through central Lima August 24 to protest the imposition of martial law in five mining districts and to support the strike by 48,000 miners that began August 4.

On August 29, the struggle between the miners and Peru's military rulers sharpened further. An assembly of the National Federation of Miners and Metalworkers of Peru (FNTMMP) voted to reject token concessions offered by the mining companies and the government and to

exiled SSRC member Majakathata Mokoena declared that "what is needed now *urgently* is a mass campaign in Britain and internationally to force the Vorster regime to release these prisoners.

"We appeal to all people internationally to come out on 18 September to show their solidarity and prevent the child slaughter which is being carried out by the South African repressive system.

"We need demonstrations and rallies leading up to that day involving as many people as we can."

Statements of support can be sent to: Majakathata Mokoena, c/o 1 Cambridge Terrace, London N1, England. □

trip to North Korea last May. The purpose of the official tour was to embarrass and isolate the Soviet Union, which has become Peking's overriding foreign policy objective. Peking sees the anticommunist monarchy in Iran as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the area and cannot be pleased with the current instability of the shah's regime.

In both Bucharest and Belgrade, crowds of several hundred thousand flag-waving spectators were mobilized to welcome the Chinese leader. (The shah is understandably nervous about calling large numbers of people into the street and mobilized only the troops and police needed to seal off the palace).

The Chinese premier's trip produced few surprises, either in the antihegemonistic communiqués issued or in the slavishness of Hua's support for the shah. But a gala cultural event in Bucharest did at least provide journalists with comic relief. They soon realized that the assembled 150 singers and musicians were simply miming their performances, and that the entire concert had been prerecorded on tape.

Hua was probably not upset about the deception. He understands that it is always wise to avoid unpleasant surprises. □

continue their nationwide strike. The regime responded the same day with an ultimatum to the striking miners: return to work by September 1 or be fired.

The FNTMMP rejected the ultimatum August 30, scoffing at the idea that tens of thousands of highly skilled miners and metallurgical workers could be replaced so easily.

The regime has also moved to derail the FNTMMP's efforts to build mass support for the strike by suspending constitutional

liberties and imposing direct military rule throughout the central region of the country. Martial law was extended August 29 to the departments (provinces) of Huánuco, Pasco, Junín, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho.

Another ominous move against the miners was the terrorist bombing of the home of Ricardo Díaz Chávez, the FNTMMP's chief legal adviser, during the night of August 29-30. No one was injured, but extensive damage was done to the attorney's house. Government complicity in the bombing is suspected, since it is located directly across the street from a hospital that normally has round-the-clock police protection.

Díaz Chávez is also a deputy in the Constituent Assembly, where he has joined with other worker deputies to demand action against the government's intransigent stance toward the miners. These deputies have also been speaking at rallies in support of the strike and helping to organize workers at nonunion mines into the FNTMMP.

The bombing of Díaz Chávez's home came in the midst of a sustained campaign in the government-controlled news media against the miners and the worker deputies. The Lima daily *La Prensa*, for example, warned August 19 that "parliamentary immunity offers no protection to those who commit flagrant crimes; in doing so they forfeit their protected status"—an indication that the regime may be preparing arrests or other action against the worker deputies.

The miners have stood firm for their demands: reinstatement of 311 union leaders fired after the July 1977 general strike; a 25 percent wage hike; and the abrogation of two harsh antilabor decrees. The government has offered compensation to the fired unionists and "revisions" in the decrees, but these concessions have been rejected by the FNTMMP.

Despite the disastrous impact a prolonged miners strike will have on Peru's economy, the regime fears more the further struggles that a miners' victory would encourage. But by trying to break the FNTMMP, the military could easily touch off a broader mass upsurge.

Defending the miners has become the top priority of the Peruvian workers movement. Pressure is now building for a new general strike. □

No-Nonsense Approach

Although improper disposal of nuclear waste at the Palisades nuclear power plant in Michigan may have exposed some workers to excessive radiation, U.S. officials said they had no immediate plans to fine the company involved.

Instead, Associated Press reported August 23, "the utility was given 20 days to report on the corrective measures taken."

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Nicaragua—Somoza Fights to Save Brutal Regime

By Fred Murphy

Calling for a "democratic and pluralist government, freely elected by the people," Nicaragua's Frente Amplio de Oposición (FAO—Broad Opposition Front) initiated a general strike and business shutdown August 24.

"The movement must end only when the regime of Anastasio Somoza has fallen," the FAO's call said. The front's stated goal in the strike is "to deal the final blow to the regime, which suffered its greatest defeat with the operation of the Sandinista commandos, who occupied the National Palace in Managua for two days."

The FAO seeks to put an end to the forty-year-long rule of the Somoza family in Nicaragua. It includes both forces of the workers movement such as the country's three trade-union federations and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (the pro-Moscow CP), as well as the Conservative Party (the only legal opposition) and groups of businessmen and industrialists from the anti-Somoza wing of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. The FAO also includes "The Twelve"—businessmen, attorneys, and religious and academic figures closely linked to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).

The FAO called the general work stoppage shortly after the spectacular takeover of the National Palace in Managua by FSLN commandos. This action acutely embarrassed the Somoza regime, and led to the release of all FSLN prisoners held in Nicaraguan jails.

The FSLN invaded the palace August 22, taking hostage almost sixty members of the Chamber of Deputies and several top officials from Somoza's cabinet. Two days later, Somoza agreed to pay the FSLN \$500,000, free the prisoners, and widely publicize three Sandinista communiqués—one of which reportedly called on National Guard troops to arrest their officers or desert.

The guerrillas' success was greeted enthusiastically by the people of Nicaragua. Bernard Diederich of *Time* magazine described the scene in Managua on August 24 as the commandos were taken by bus from the National Palace to the airport:

With the black-and-red Sandinista flag flying from the bus and the guerrillas waving their rifles, it looked like a victory parade. All along the eight-mile route, thousands of Nicaraguans assembled to catch a glimpse and cheer them on like conquering heroes. "Down with Somoza!" and "Viva Sandinista!" they shouted. Thousands of others waited at the terminal. "Yes,

they are our heroes," said one youth. "To hell with Somoza!"

It is this mass defiance of the dictatorship that the FAO hopes to bring to bear and pressure Somoza into giving up his control. But during the first week of the FAO-called general work stoppage, the masses began to show that they are ready to go beyond the bounds the bourgeois opposition would like to set—ready to do more than cheer from the sidelines.

The anti-Somoza shutdown started slowly in the capital, Managua, but was almost immediately effective in most cities in the interior. At first the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, which represents about 40,000 businesses, hesitated to join the movement, but they did vote to support the strike on August 27. On August 29, the Nicaraguan Development Institute, which represents the country's big industrialists, also lent its support.

The shutdown thus far seems to be on a comparable scale to the one called immediately after the murder of opposition leader Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January. That general work stoppage lasted two weeks, at which point it was called off by the businessmen and industrialists who had initiated it.

Rebellion in Matagalpa

In at least one city, however, the present movement went far beyond what happened in January. Matagalpa, Nicaragua's third-largest city, was taken over for a five-day period by radical youth. A UPI dispatch in the August 31 edition of the New York City Spanish-language daily *El Diario* reported:

An irregular army of about 500 students took control of two-thirds of the city of Matagalpa and engaged in a merciless battle against National Guard troops that were trying to break their rebellion. . . .

Two days ago the government forces utilized military aircraft to bomb and strafe insurgent redoubts, in a frustrated attempt to silence the fire of snipers that were harassing the infantry troops. Helicopter gunships of the army sought to achieve the same objective yesterday, attacking sniper bastions in the nearby hills with rockets and heavy machine-gun fire. . . .

The battle, initiated on Sunday [August 27] gained force two days ago and continued intensely yesterday. . . . The students used homemade bombs, rifles, pistols, and machetes against the firepower of government troops that were trying to smash the rebellion with heavy machine guns, mortars, and airplanes. . . .

Many older residents, openly supporting the

rebellion of the youths, offered the young fighters shelter, food and water, and other aid.

For several days the government's troops were confined to a few square blocks surrounding their garrison in the center of Matagalpa. *Washington Post* correspondent Karen DeYoung was in the city on August 31 when the National Guard, "armed with [U.S.-made] M1 rifles, and Israeli-made submachine guns," launched a counteroffensive:

The assault began at 11 a.m. local time when approximately 60 soldiers marched from the National Guard post in the center of the city, under leadership of the Guard's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Armando Fernandez, and Interior Minister Antonio Mora.

Only three blocks to the south, crouching behind sandbag barricades and armed primarily with .22-caliber pistols and homemade bombs, was the enemy—local young men and women, mostly of high-school age and some as young as 12, who have vowed to fight the Guard and overthrow the government of President Anastasio Somoza. [*Washington Post*, September 1]

The rebel youth held out for several hours against the National Guard's elite "Black Berets" unit, which had been sent to relieve the local garrison. Finally, during the night of August 31-September 1, many of the young fighters fled into the hills surrounding the city, leaving Matagalpa in the hands of Somoza's forces. Associated Press correspondent Tom Fenton reported from Matagalpa:

"About 2 a.m. [September 1] most of the firing stopped and the guard went in with jeeps, armored cars and a front-end loader and began tearing down the barricades," said a Red Cross volunteer who asked not to be identified.

An armored car equipped with a 40mm cannon opened fire repeatedly during the night to dislodge the rebels, said one Red Cross worker. . . .

A young man fleeing from the city said the guard had staged "a violent assault with rockets and armored cars." He said "people without number" had been shot.

Another refugee, Red Cross nurse Esperanza Mesa de Lanza, said she had been working in a temporary morgue in the city where she had seen the dead "stacked one on top of the other like wood. There must have been fifty dead." [*Washington Post*, September 2]

Fenton also reported that more than 200 persons had been wounded in the Matagalpa fighting.

While Somoza's crack troops were being hemmed in by the high-school students of Matagalpa, street fighting was also reported in the cities of Jinotepe, León, Coctal, La Trinidad, Estelí, and Diriamba. Demon-

strators were said to have erected barricades in some of these areas, although events apparently had not reached the same scope as in Matagalpa.

Agence France-Presse reported August 31 that five guardsmen had been killed in Matiguas, a small town forty-five miles north of Matagalpa. "Insurgents then took over the town and sowed nails in the streets to impede the passage of army vehicles."

In Managua, fewer businesses and stores shut down during the first week of the strike, and the streets were heavily patrolled by the National Guard. On August 30, however, the 2,000 employees of Banic, Nicaragua's largest bank, took over the bank's offices and held a mass meeting. They voted to go on strike despite threats of reprisals from the bank's officers.

As the anti-Somoza shutdown entered its ninth day September 2, there were contradictory reports as to its breadth. But opposition newspapers in Managua were claiming that 90 percent of industry and commerce in the capital remained paralyzed, and that the work stoppage still enjoyed near-100 percent support in interior cities and towns.

Somoza's 'Bunker'

The National Guard has begun building a wall of concrete blocks around General Somoza's suburban Managua residence and office complex—a material symbol of the acute and growing isolation his regime now faces. A further measure of Somoza's untenable position is the fact that he has now outlawed both the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and the Nicaraguan Development Institute—two key organs of the capitalist class itself.

Somoza hopes to ride out the storm, but to do so he will need the continued backing of what have long been the bulwarks of his family's power—Washington and the National Guard. Both could now be in question.

On August 28, the Nicaraguan government announced that twelve senior guard officers and seventy-three enlisted men had been arrested and would face court-martial for plotting a coup against Somoza. Other reports put the arrest figures as high as 200. These were reportedly elements who were furious at Somoza's capitulation to the FSLN commandos, but the arrests do indicate that the guard's stability has begun to crack.

Further evidence of fissures in the National Guard was reported by James Nelson Goodsell of the *Christian Science Monitor* August 29. He referred to an "unnamed National Guard general who said, in effect, that the time had come to reassess whether a new political arrangement should be worked out in Nicaragua."

Goodsell also reported that there is "concern in Washington that events in Nicaragua so far this year not only could lead to



Washington Post

a civil war within the country but also could have a spillover effect into other Central American countries." His report continued:

The feeling among top diplomatic personnel is that General Somoza has been isolated from reality by corrupt associates and a personal megalomania. . . .

Observers say that two previous general strikes . . . as well as the willingness of the business community to join with the largely

leftist terrorists indicate the strength of opposition to General Somoza and the anger of a majority of his people. The feeling is that General Somoza underestimates both of these forces.

Somoza's strategy to avoid being unceremoniously dumped by Washington is to paint himself and his regime as the only force capable of preventing another "Cuba" in Central America. UPI reported September 2 that the Managua government's daily, *Novedades*, had "warned Washington against trying to oppose Somoza, saying his strong leadership is what Nicaragua needs to fend off the threat of leftist Sandinista guerrillas.

"The blindness of the State Department foments the communists," it said."

In reality, Washington has so far shown little inclination to drop its basic support for the Somoza regime, although some military aid has been suspended in hopes of forcing the dictator to work out a compromise solution with his opponents.

What the U.S. imperialists fear most is the deepening radicalization among the Nicaraguan masses. The dilemma they face is becoming increasingly obvious: the longer Somoza stays, the greater the hatred of the masses toward him and his regime. But if he should go, there is little guarantee that the bourgeois opposition could consolidate a government, hold the masses in check, and prevent the destabilization of the other dictatorial regimes in Central America.

The problem facing Washington and Somoza—and the bourgeois opposition as well—was put succinctly by a striking Managua bank worker August 30. "Nobody here says 'Viva the Broad Front' or 'Viva the Conservative Party,'" he told the *Washington Post's* Karen DeYoung. "What we say is 'Viva el Frente Sandinista!'" □

Mandel Cracks West German 'Wall'

Belgian Trotskyist Ernest Mandel will no longer be barred from entering West Germany, his country of birth.

The decision by the West German interior minister to lift the six-year entry ban against the internationally known Marxist economist and leader of the Fourth International followed a series of protests by academics and intellectuals.

The news made the front page of the *Frankfurter Rundschau's* August 26 edition.

Mandel has been barred from entering West Germany since 1972. At that time the West Berlin Senate ruled he could not accept an appointment by the Free University of Berlin to a chair in its economics department, citing his membership in the Fourth International as grounds for the decision.

This measure followed similar decrees

passed by the French government in 1968 and the U.S. government in 1970. The Swiss government closed its borders to Mandel a few months later. However, as a result of protests, Washington, Bern, and now Bonn have been forced to lift their bans. France is now the only country that continues to deny Mandel permission to enter.

Amnesty in Dominican Republic

An amnesty law that will reportedly result in the release of 185 political prisoners was approved by the Chamber of Deputies of the Dominican Republic on August 29.

The law had previously been approved in the Dominican Senate. It was submitted to the parliament by newly elected President Antonio Guzmán, who took office August 16.

Demonstrations Throughout Iran

By Parvin Najafi

Since the theater fire in Abadan on August 19, in which an estimated 600 persons were incinerated,* events in Iran have moved at a dizzying pace.

The shah blamed his opponents for the fire and sought to use it to create a witch-hunt atmosphere.

The funeral ceremonies for the victims developed into one of the biggest actions against the shah's despotic rule yet seen. Although tanks, armored cars, and soldiers were brought in, they could not calm the city down, even after a week.

Blaming the shah for the fire, protest demonstrations spread from Abadan to Tabriz, Qum, Hamadan, Rasht, and many other cities.

These demonstrations came after a month of social upheaval. For the shah's regime the danger signal was loud and clear: His army and police might not be able to calm the situation, as they failed to do in Abadan.

Feeling the hot breath of revolution, the monarchy ordered a hasty retreat.

On August 27, the shah shuffled his entourage, as in the game of musical chairs. Jamshid Amouzegar, the prime minister, resigned, and Jaafar Sharif-Emami took his place. Sharif-Emami was president of the Iranian senate, the shah's rubber-stamp parliament, for the past thirteen years. He was the shah's prime minister from 1960 to 1961. His most important qualification for the post of prime minister, as the *Christian Science Monitor* put it, is: "Membership in the inner group of 10 or a dozen people who have long constituted the select handful most trusted by the shah and most supportive of him" (August 28).

Sharif-Emami formed what he called "a government of national reconciliation." In his first statement he said he wants to "bring peace between the different classes of Iranian society." He announced that he wants to negotiate with the political and religious leaders of the opposition. The government announced its intention to send delegations to Qum, Najaf, Meshed and other religious centers to hold talks and negotiate with opposition leaders.

While making strong overtures to religious leaders, one of Sharif-Emami's first acts as prime minister was to order the Iranian calendar changed from the "impe-

rial calendar" to the Islamic solar calendar.

In 1975, when the shah unleashed a massive wave of terror, he changed the traditional Islamic solar calendar, dating from the beginning of the Islamic religion, to the "imperial calendar," dating from the coronation of the Persian king Cyrus the Great, more than a thousand years earlier.

In another move the new prime minister ordered all the gambling houses in the country closed. These moves hardly amount to concessions to the massive and powerful movement for democratic and civil rights in Iran.

In his first statement as prime minister, Sharif-Emami also promised "free elections in the next parliamentary elections to be held in June 1979," "freedom of activity for 'legitimate' political parties," and a government campaign against corruption in the government bureaucracy.

William Branigin, reporting from Tehran, writes in the August 28 issue of the *Washington Post*:

"According to well-informed diplomats, as the shah offers concessions to the moderates, measures of tough repression appear to be in the works for the radicals. Already, they say, some of the extremist Moslem prayer leaders are being rounded up or exiled to remote parts of the country and future violence is likely to be met with more force than at the present.

"In one sign that a tougher line is in the offing, the hard-nosed chief of the National Gendarmerie, the country's regional police force, Gen. Abbas Gharabaghi, was named as minister of the interior."

But what the regime may be able to do does not depend so much on its wishes and schemas as on the relationship of class forces, which have changed greatly in the past weeks.

The change in the cabinet was intended by the regime to stem the tide of mass mobilization. But instead of subsiding, the upsurge has mounted higher.

Since the Abadan fire, a new wave of demonstrations has begun and has spread to every city, town and village in Iran.

There are dozens of demonstrations each day in every city. A crowd of a few thousands pour out in one corner of the city, the police and army rushes in to disperse the demonstrators. While they are battling with the demonstrators, another crowd pours out in another corner of the city. A few hours later the scene is repeated in still another area. For example, *Kayhan* of August 30 reported about a dozen demon-

strations in Tehran alone. It said the demonstrations began just after noon and continued until the early hours of the next morning. At night the demonstrators would light up a fire on street corners, a crowd would gather, and then they began demonstrating.

The situation has been more or less the same in other cities throughout the past week. The press in Iran is reporting the demonstrations by cities and towns and even by the streets in different places.

While this massive, sporadic, and spontaneous outpouring of the masses into the streets is continuing, there have also been outstanding demonstrations in different cities. An example is the march of 40,000 in Meshed on August 31. The police and the army opened fire on the peaceful demonstrators.

In Qum on August 29 a huge demonstration took place. The national press did not estimate the crowd, but *Kayhan* reported August 30, "The city of Qum from the early hours of last night until dawn today was the scene of one of the biggest demonstrations ever."

Kayhan reported that while the crowd was getting bigger every moment, the demonstrators circled around the city twice, going to the outskirts of the city and coming back.

Despite all the promises of the new prime minister about reconciliation and "bringing peace between the different classes of society," the police and army have been ordered out against the peaceful protesters just as before, and they open fire on the crowd as fiercely and savagely as ever.

These demonstrations are occurring just as a massive strike movement of the workers has begun. The workers are demanding higher pay, better working conditions, longer vacations, and so on.

Up to a few weeks ago the government kept a tight censorship on news about any protests or strikes by the workers. Now the national press is covering news about strikes. Two of the most important strikes reported involve 2,000 auto workers in Tabriz and the 1,700 textile workers in Behshahr.

The strike in Tabriz began on August 10, and lasted only two days, according to the account in the Iranian press. The workers walked out, complaining that their annual bonuses had not been distributed equitably. They also complained about short vacations and insufficient housing assistance.

The workers reportedly returned to work after the deputy governor-general intervened and assured them that the disputed bonuses would be paid.

After the strike the workers issued a statement saying that the present auto workers union (the union imposed by the government) is from their point of view dissolved, and they will soon hold elections to elect their representatives.

*See "Shah's Arsonists Claim 600 Victims" in *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, September 4, 1978, p. 980.

In Behshahr 1,700 textile workers walked out of their jobs on August 19, demanding higher pay, higher pensions, longer vacations and also in protest of the owners' refusal to pay into the fund for overtime and distribute the annual bonuses owed them according to the profit-sharing plan instituted by the government a few years ago. They also protested the owners' refusal to pay into the fund for those workers who have retired.

Despite the savage reprisals by the regime, the mass movement has scored some significant victories.

The censorship of the press has been considerably weakened. The government has backed down on its decision to close Aryamehr University and its threats against other universities. It was officially announced that no university will be closed down and that the new freshman class of Aryamehr University will be admitted for the coming school year.

According to the labor policy announced by the new labor minister, the workers will get three days more on their annual vacations.

The regime has cut off government funds for publication of Rashtakhiz Party papers and journals.

Since the fall of the Amouzegar administration, the national press has been interviewing prominent leaders of the opposition, running extensive articles about different opposition political parties, civil-rights groups, lawyers, writers, and teachers associations, introducing their leaders, reporting their past activities, and publicizing their underground papers.

Taking advantage of the opening, fourteen political parties have declared themselves publicly, are opening up headquarters, and have already begun public activities. Most of these parties are ultra-right or bourgeois liberal parties. The press has not given coverage to the activities of any leftist parties.

Several prominent leaders of the opposition including Ali-Asgjar Haj-Seyed Javadi, a leader of the writers association, Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, the Majles deputy from Tabriz, and several leaders of the National Front, a coalition of several bourgeois liberal parties, have called for the dissolution of the present Majles and the holding of free elections for parliament. Their call was given front-page coverage by the largest dailies in Iran, *Kayhan* and *Etela'at*.

The question of dissolving the Majles and holding free elections, as was stressed by *Kayhan* and *Etela'at* and admitted implicitly by the new prime minister, is at the center of attention of the Iranian masses at the present time.

The Iranian Trotskyists, addressing themselves to this question, have called for a constituent assembly. In their theoretical journal *Barrasi Socialisti*, they write: "Thousands upon thousands who have poured into the movement against auto-



Kayhan

Peaceful demonstration of thousands in Yazd, August 28.

cracy are becoming aware of their massive suppressed strength—the strength of millions of toilers. The need for a political manifestation of this strength has already expressed itself in the demand for the right to a universal and free vote." They continue:

"A unitary assembly based on universal direct, equal and secret elections must be convened—a constituent assembly, combining both the legislative and executive power within a single body."

Despite the conciliatory gestures of the new prime minister, his administration lacks any authority or credibility among the Iranian masses.

Kayhan and *Etela'at* interviewed a few dozen ordinary people in the streets, asking their opinion about the new cabinet. Probably whatever critical remarks they voiced about the shah were not printed, because criticizing the shah is not yet legal in Iran. But none of those interviewed expressed any faith in the new administration.

The present movement in the streets of Iran—the movement against autocracy—is directed against the monarchy, as was demonstrated by the shouts of angry people in Abadan: "We want an end to fifty years of Pablavi tyranny."

From the very beginning of the mass demonstrations, the most popular slogan was "Down with the shah," reflecting the growing realization among the Iranian masses that their aspiration for democratic and civil rights, for a government truly of the people and for the people is incompatible with the existence of a monarchy in Iran.

No matter what the ruling class does, it will not be able to stem this movement. This worries the imperialist powers. The undermining of the monarchy also weakens imperialist control of the country.

Already one of the most popular demands of the movement is the ouster of 30,000 American military advisers, nationalization of the holdings of the imperialist companies, and driving the imperialists out once and for all.

At the same time, more than ever before, the imperialists find it difficult to explain to their own populations why they are defending a despot like the shah.

In the past decade, through the tireless efforts of thousands of Iranian students, the reality of the shah's regime, its dungeons and torture chambers, have been exposed in the West. And public opinion in the imperialist powers has been largely won to the side of the fighters for democratic and civil rights in Iran. This has helped lay the basis for a strong response to any move by the imperialists against the mass movement in Iran. □

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China-Albania Partnership Breaks Up

By Matilde Zimmermann

The growing rift between Albania and China became an open break July 7 when Peking told its only European ally it was suspending economic aid and withdrawing all technical assistance. Tirana responded with an open letter dated July 29, bitterly attacking Peking's foreign policy and accusing its rulers of trying "to make China an imperialist superpower."

The relationship that Albanian leader Enver Hoxha used to like to call "the apple of our eye" had been souring for several years. Without ever mentioning China by name, Albanian leaders in 1976 and 1977 began to criticize the "theory of three worlds" Peking uses to justify its foreign policy. Rumors circulated during 1977 of specific cutbacks in China's economic aid. In the summer of 1977, all the Albanian students in China left for home on a "vacation" from which most apparently never returned. Albania has supported Vietnam, first in its border war with Cambodia and more recently in its conflict with China. On June 24 the Albanian CP newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* wrote:

... anyone who thinks they can impose their point of view or objections by pressure or blackmail can be certain that the Vietnamese people will never accept it and no other nation will approve.

A major source of tension has been Peking's growing rapprochement with Yugoslavia, Albania's much larger neighbor to the north. Tirana broke relations with Belgrade in 1948 and considers Yugoslavia the greatest threat to its independence. Hoxha chose the occasion of Tito's visit to Peking in August 1977 to republish a major attack on the reconciliation between Krushchev (a stand-in for Hua Kuo-feng in this case) and Tito. Peking's announcement of an official state visit by Hua to Romania and Yugoslavia was calculated to infuriate the Albanians, and it did. Peking has decided that Yugoslavia and Romania are much more impressive allies against the Soviet Union than little Albania. In Peking's global approach to foreign alliances, there is no longer much importance attached to a special relationship with Albania.

Peking's July withdrawal of aid produced a long protest letter from the Central Committee of the Party of Labor (the Albanian CP), listing a dozen different criticisms of the Chinese line. The sharpest concern the hospitality extended President Nixon in 1972, and the Maoist "theory of three worlds."

The July 29 letter condemns Peking for hosting Nixon "at a time when the US was waging its predatory imperialist war in heroic Vietnam, when it was using all its most up-to-date means of war, except for the A-bomb, to kill the fraternal heroic Vietnamese people and to reduce Vietnam to ashes. This monstrous alliance and the Sino-US contacts were condemnable acts of disastrous consequences for the peoples."

Only seven years after the fact, the Albanian government released selections of its August 6, 1971, letter opposing the Nixon visit. Addressed to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the letter says in part:

... We regard your decision to welcome Nixon in Peking as incorrect and undesirable, we do not approve of, nor do we support, it. We also hold the view that Nixon's announced visit to China will be inconceivable to, and will not be approved by, the peoples, the revolutionaries and the communists of various countries.

The Albanians condemn as anti-Marxist and counterrevolutionary the "three worlds" theory Peking uses to justify alliances with colonial and semicolonial countries (world three), capitalist countries (world two), and even U.S. imperialism (world one), against the demon of world one, Soviet "social-imperialism."

The theory of "three worlds" ... seeks to dampen the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and its class struggle, advocating an alliance with the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Alleging that time is not ripe for revolution, the theory of "three worlds" seeks to preserve the status quo, the present situation of capitalist, colonialist and neo-colonialist oppression and exploitation. ...

By fanning up the armaments race of the superpowers and relying on such instruments of war of US imperialism as NATO and other military blocs, the theory of "three worlds" instigates imperialist world war. ...

The implementation of the theory of "three worlds" led the Chinese leadership to unite even with the "devil," to unite with the US imperialists and the monopolists of Europe, with fascists and racists, kings and feudal lords, most rabid militarists and warmongers. Pinochet and Franco, former nazi generals of the German Wehrmacht and the Japanese imperial army, dyed-in-the-wool criminals like Mobutu and bloodthirsty kings, American bosses and presidents of multinational companies, became its allies.

A critique of the theory of three worlds was published in the Albanian CP newspaper July 7, 1977, exactly a year before the aid cutoff. The 1977 editorial quotes Hoxha as saying that both U.S. imperial-

ism and Soviet social-imperialism are "the main and greatest enemies of the peoples," and as such "they pose the same danger." Without ever naming China, the 1977 editorial takes its distance from the theory that the Soviet Union is more dangerous than U.S. imperialism.

Distorting the truth and deceiving the peoples, they [advocates of the theory of three worlds] claim that US imperialism is allegedly no longer warmongering, that allegedly it has been weakened, is in decline, that it has become a "timid mouse," in a word, US imperialism is turning peaceful. Matters have reached the point that even the US military presence in various countries, such as Germany, Belgium or Italy, in Japan and other countries, is being justified and described as a factor for defence. Such views are extremely dangerous to the freedom of the peoples, and the fate of the revolution.

Albania still chimes in with Peking, however, when it comes to labeling the Soviet Union an imperialist superpower where capitalism was restored through Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

Many of Tirana's recent criticisms of Peking, in fact, concern its alleged lack of steadfastness in the fight against "Krushchevite revisionism." Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping are blasted for their 1962 suggestion that the anti-imperialist front should include the Soviet Union. The Chinese leaders are called counterrevolutionary for having suggested that Albania attend the November 7, 1964, celebrations in Moscow or consider the advisability of a military defense pact with Yugoslavia and Rumania. Peking's 1964 border dispute with the Soviet Union is attacked for implicitly casting doubt on the infallibility of Stalin:

... by calling into question the rectification of the borders of the Soviet Union with some European countries following the Second World War, J.V. Stalin was unjustly attacked, and the accusation levelled by international reaction against him for creating "spheres of influence" was backed up.

Albanian documents are liberally sprinkled with quotations from Stalin, and a bust or statue of Stalin still stands in every Albanian town.

Tirana's protest letter also accuses Peking of being stingy with military assistance and of interfering in Albanian domestic affairs.

The aid cutoff jeopardizes more than 100 Chinese-funded economic projects in Albania and means the withdrawal of technicians said to number over 500. One-third of Albania's foreign trade in recent years has been with China.

The dispute also leaves the small Mediterranean country in total diplomatic isolation. The only other communist party with which the Albanian leadership is on speaking terms is that of Vietnam. Both Vietnam and Cuba have issued strong statements of support to Albania in its current conflict with China. □

Storm of Protests Over Arrests in Brazil

By Russell Morse

A wave of arrests by the Brazilian political police has touched off a series of protests, including the largest student actions in São Paulo so far this year.

On August 22, the São Paulo unit of the DOPS—one of Brazil's numerous political-police agencies—arrested twenty-two persons and charged them with violating Article 14 of the draconian National Security Law. All were held incommunicado for forty-eight hours, and their arrests were only announced by the cops on August 24.

The day after the arrests became known, 2,000 students held an assembly at the São Paulo campus of the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC). They voted to hold a protest demonstration the next day. That action was banned by the Military Police, but the students were still able to carry out three "lightning marches" in the center of the city before being dispersed by cops firing tear gas.

The Rio de Janeiro daily *O Globo* reported August 25 that the twenty-two persons are suspected of "involvement with the Liga Operária [Workers League], an organization of Trotskyist tendency linked to the Communist Fourth International."

But according to Alberto Goldman, a representative in the São Paulo state Legislative Assembly who protested the arrests, the accused "are members of Socialist Convergence, which is in the process of formation." For its part, the national coordinating committee of Socialist Convergence denounced the imprisonment of the activists as "without any legal basis" and pointed out that the group is "broad, legal, and democratic."

Socialist Convergence has been functioning openly and legally in Brazil since its founding meeting in January of this year. On March 19, Socialist Convergence held a public rally in São Paulo that drew 1,000 persons (see *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, May 29, p. 633).

The organization's stated purpose is "to build a movement to centralize Brazilian socialists, one that would permit the development of common positions through systematic discussions and that would organize the common struggle for a socialist workers party." One of the group's main activities is to help with the production of a supplement to the legal monthly newspaper *Versus*. The supplement, known as *Convergência Socialista*, reports on activities in the labor and student movements and on the effort to organize a new socialist party.

The August 22 arrests were part of a

series of repressive moves that have recently hit not only Socialist Convergence but *Versus* and another independent newspaper, *Em Tempo*, as well.

Between July 18 and 20 six Socialist Convergence activists were arrested in Brasília by the Criminal Investigations Unit and tortured for many hours. They are still being held.

Around the same time, police and right-wing paramilitary bands invaded *Versus*'s offices in Brasília and *Em Tempo*'s offices in Curitiba and Belo Horizonte.

On August 23, Socialist Convergence activist Marcos Faria de Azevedo was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro along with a high-school student, Ronaldo de Almeida. Azevedo later turned up as a prisoner at the DOPS headquarters in Rio, but Almeida's whereabouts remain unknown.

These attacks on socialists and the press by Brazil's military government have not gone unanswered. In addition to the student meetings and demonstrations in São Paulo, there have been a large number of other protests:

- On July 31, the Brazilian Amnesty Committee (CBA) sponsored a vigil in São Paulo attended by 300 persons representing more than thirty organizations. Similar actions were held in Rio de Janeiro and other cities, with the support of a number of trade unions and well-known artists and intellectuals.

- Journalists in São Paulo and Brasília have denounced the attacks on *Versus* and *Em Tempo*. In an August 30 statement, the Union of Professional Journalists of the Federal District (Brasília) said that "these constant violations of the rights of the human individual and the curtailment of the professional activities of journalists contradict the government's stated intentions of liberalization."

- Three hundred persons rallied in Belo Horizonte August 24 to protest the attacks on *Em Tempo*.

- Five hundred marched in Rio de Janeiro a few days after the August 22 arrests.

- Deputies in the Brazilian Congress and in the state Legislative Assemblies of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have protested the repression against Socialist Convergence and the two newspapers.

- A "Night of Vigil for the Worker Prisoners," protesting the August 22 arrests, was held in Santo André, a working-class suburb of São Paulo, on August 29. In attendance were workers and relatives of prisoners, along with representatives of

the Central Student Councils of São Paulo University and Pontifical Catholic University, the State Union of Students, Socialist Convergence, and the CBA.

- Students in the architecture and engineering department at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro State (UFF) went on strike August 25 to protest the disappearance of fellow student Marcos Faria de Azevedo. Twenty UFF architecture professors denounced Azevedo's kidnapping by the DOPS as "flagrant disregard for human rights."

As of August 31, it was known that ten of the persons arrested August 22 had been released, although it remained unclear whether the charges against them had been dropped. The others were still being held, along with the six activists arrested in July and Marcos Faria de Azevedo. The whereabouts of high-school student Ronaldo de Almeida, kidnapped along with Azevedo, remained unknown.

According to a report in the August 31 edition of the daily *Folha de São Paulo*, Socialist Convergence was proposing to student organizations and to the CBA that a nationwide hunger strike be initiated to demand the release of all prisoners still being held.

The following are the names of the activists arrested July 18-20: Mário Gonçalves, Beliza Maria Gonçalves, Vera Lúcia, Alcides Bartolomeu de Faria, and Flávio Lúcio de Faria. The name of the sixth person is not available.

Those arrested August 22 included Waldo Mermelstein, Aldo Schreiner, Maria José da Silva Lourenço, Bernardo Viana Marques Cerdeira, Oscar Itiro Kudo, Maria Marta Dangelo Cretton, Justino Lemos Pinheiro, José Aziz Cretton, Maria Gerbi Veiga, Hilda Machado, Maria Cristina Salay, João Carlos Agostini, José Maria de Almeida, José Welmowick, Edson Silva Coelho, Celia Regina Barbosa Ramos, Ana Maria de Moura Nogueira, and Maria José Costa Girardi.

Also arrested August 22 were a Portuguese citizen, Antônio Maria Sá Leal; an American, Esther Tenzer; and two Argentines, Hugo Miguel Bressano and Rita Luzia Estrasberg.

The U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA) has issued an appeal on behalf of all these victims of the Geisel regime's repression. USLA urges that letters and telegrams be sent to President Ernesto Geisel, Palácio Presidencial, Brasília, Brazil, demanding the appearance in good health of Ronaldo de Almeida, the immediate release of the Socialist Convergence activists still being held, and the dropping of charges against all thirty persons.

Please send copies to USLA, 853 Broadway, New York, New York, and to the editors of the following newspapers: *O Estado de São Paulo*, São Paulo, Brazil; and *Jornal do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. □

Police Harassment Has Failed to Halt Support to Charter 77

[In July two Swedish Trotskyist reporters, Jan Larsson and Ken Karlsson, were able to interview Petr Uhl in Prague. The latter, a leader of the left wing of the Czechoslovak student movement during the Prague Spring, was sentenced to four years in prison in 1971 on the accusation of being a Trotskyist. The interview was published in the August 18 issue of *Internationalen*, the weekly newspaper of the Communist Workers League, Swedish section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press /Inprecor.*]

* * *

Petr Uhl. The regime's tactic is to force oppositionists out of the country. It denies them a chance to make a living, and then it can threaten to jail them for "parasitism." I myself was fired from my former job in the fall of 1977. The only reason for firing me was that I signed Charter 77.

Since then, I have been looking for a job and, finally, I found one. If the police get wind of it, I will probably be fired again.

Question. How long can you keep out of sight?

Answer. According to Czech law, no reason has to be given for firing a worker within thirty days after he or she is hired. So, I want to keep my job a secret for a month. After that, it will be harder, at least from the formal standpoint, to get me fired.

Q. What is the situation of the Charter 77 movement today?

A. There are about 950 signers of Charter 77 today. And, although there is not a rush to sign it, there is a steady increase of signers. And this is despite all the police harassment. I could mention some things that are going on now to show how the police work.

Signing Charter 77 is no grounds for arrest according to Czech law. But the police don't let that hold them back.

A few days ago, they arrested Ladislav Lis. During the Second World War, Lis was active in the fight against Nazism. In the 1930s, he was a leader in the Komsomol, the Communist youth league in Czechoslovakia. Up until 1968, he held important posts in the Communist Party. After 1968, he was ousted from all his posts, and today he earns his living as a lumberjack. He lives in a cottage in northern Czechoslovakia, where he also has a few sheep.

These sheep are important in this. Ladis-

lav Lis was arrested specifically on the charge that his sheep ate state property, namely grass! The same charge could be made against any sheep in Czechoslovakia!

Another case concerns a signer of the charter who lives here in Prague with her husband. This is an elderly couple, and her health is not good and so she doesn't work actively in the charter.

When she was walking her dog in a park near her home recently, she was suddenly surrounded by five men in civilian clothes. They demanded the keys to the couple's home. She refused. They took her to a car, searched her pockets, and took the keys.

Her husband was at home writing poems for a samizdat publication, when seventeen police suddenly charged in. They were able to come in unexpectedly with the help of the keys they had taken. They searched the apartment. He was arrested, but released after being held two hours.

Q. What are the chances for a process in Czechoslovakia now similar to what happened ten years ago?

A. The chances for victory are small if a revolutionary process is once again confined to one country. But if there are upsurges at the same time in a number of East European countries, it will be harder for the bureaucrats to crush the struggle.

In any new revolutionary process, the initiative will certainly not come from the party but from the masses. But impetus has to come from the countries like Romania, Hungary or Albania for such a process to occur here in the near future.

Q. What influence do the Soviet troops here in Czechoslovakia have on political life?

A. Naturally, they could play the same role today that they did in 1968. But it is a gross oversimplification to say that Czechoslovakia today is an occupied country. Husak and company are not puppets who get their orders from Moscow through the Soviet military here. Husak and the whole bureaucracy have their own interest in making sure that oppression continues.

When ordinary people in Czechoslovakia talk about "the occupation," they are usually referring to the weeks immediately after the invasion in 1968. Or they may use this term to refer to the Nazi occupation during the Second World War, when German troops controlled everything directly.

The Soviet soldiers are not allowed out of the barracks and they are not given Czech money. In this respect, they are more oppressed than we.

The worst enemies of the Czechoslovak workers are the bureaucrats in their own country.

Q. Do the Czechoslovak people really want socialism?

A. I think that it would be impossible in fact to restore capitalism in Czechoslovakia. But as a curiosity, I might mention that an opinion poll was carried out in 1968 in which this question was asked. Some 80% were for socialism; 10% were against; and 10% did not know. But you have to remember that "socialism" and other such words are part of the bureaucrats' vocabulary and thus tarnished in the eyes of the masses.

The youth movement in Czechoslovakia, which has focused around music and cultural questions, is naturally against the "establishment" here, but it is also opposed to the "consumer culture" and commercialism in the capitalist countries in the West.

Q. What do you think about the possibilities for building a new revolutionary party in Czechoslovakia?

A. Every revolutionary process in history has had its vanguard. That will be true here in our country as well. What form this vanguard will take is harder to say. One thing is clear. It is a mistake to set up a little group and call it a revolutionary party, as some East German comrades did recently. The party has to grow naturally out of a broader movement. Otherwise there is too great a danger that a "new revolutionary party" will be driven into political isolation and have to spend most of its time fending off the police.

A new revolutionary party is not on the agenda today. That is the music of the future.

Q. So, what's going to happen on August 21 [the anniversary of the Soviet invasion] here in Czechoslovakia?

A. Not much, unfortunately. As at the time of Brezhnev's visit, several hundred persons are certainly going to be arrested and held in "preventive detention." There may be some writing of slogans on walls.

The authorities, for their part, have no intention of celebrating the "liberation" in any other way than I described above. They have recently reissued a stamp from

1955 with Stalin's picture and the caption "1945-1955." So, an old ten-year anniversary [of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army] is apparently going to be celebrated again.

Q. What's your view of the solidarity with Czechoslovakia in the West?

A. All forms of support are important, naturally—demonstrations, statements. Information about that reaches us here in Czechoslovakia.

The most important form of solidarity in

Polish Farmers Send Angry Message to Warsaw

[The following document was published in the August 4 issue of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

Polish farmers are angry. In twenty or so villages in the Lublin area, they have refused to deliver their milk to the state. The strike was nearly total during the deliveries of July 28-30.

A resolution passed by a voice vote of the strikers states their demands. We are publishing below this document, which was published yesterday [August 3] by *Libération*.

The farmers movement represents a new factor in the political situation in Poland, even though it is not the first action of this kind. Twenty-five percent of Poland's active population works on the land, but this is the first time that there has been an attempt to organize such a massive protest movement nationwide.

* * *

We, the farmers of the Lublin region, including the villages of Zalesie, Kajetanowka, Kolonia Górne, Wolka, Lancuchowska, Lancuchów, Ciechanki Lancuchowskie, Antoniów, Trzeciaków, Kolonia Ostrowek, Jaszczów, Ostrowek, Maryniów, Szpica, Poplawy, Wola Korybutowa, Zawadów, Subczyn, Klucz, and others, who have gathered together on July 30, 1978, at a public meeting in Ostrowek of about 200 persons, demand the purging of secret agents from our region, cancellation of orders for payment, and the recall of the marshals.

Last year, the parliament of the People's Republic of Poland passed a law on retirement affecting farmers and their families. This law requires the farmers to make payments to the retirement fund. In our villages, we all refused to make these payments. The government responded by sending marshals after us, who seized the livestock and pens against our will. At the

my opinion is the support of the trade unions and the left. For example, I myself have been "adopted" by the Renault local of the CGT [the CP-dominated union federation] in France.

I would add that many oppositionists are in need of economic support. As I said earlier, the authorities are trying to drive oppositionists out of the country by preventing them from making a living. Economic support, especially from unions, would make it possible for many oppositionists to hold out and continue to be active. □

same time, many of us were subjected to interrogation by the Department of Security, which demanded to know the reasons for our nonpayment.

To fight back against these maneuvers, we began a farmers strike and sat in to prevent milk deliveries on July 28-30. The following villages took part in the strike: Zalesie, Wolka Lancuchowska, Ciechanki Lancuchowskie, Ostrowek, Kolonia Ostrowek, Subczyn, Klucz, Kolonia Górne, Kajetanowka. In these villages, the strike was observed almost 100 percent. The container truck in Ciechanki, for example, which usually collects about 3,500 liters of milk a day, collected 160 liters on the days of the strike. We warn that if the authorities persist in their actions against our villages, they risk provoking longer and more widespread strikes.

We also demand the suspension of the law on retirement until a genuine debate is held on retirement for farmers; the talks conducted so far have been nothing but a fiction. We did not have access to the bill in its entirety and so we could not give our opinion of it. When the first payment fell due which we let lapse, we awaited the arrival of government representatives with whom we wanted to discuss the law on retirement and the situation in agriculture in general. Instead, they sent us marshals and stool-pigeons.

With our strike we want to call the government's attention to several problems:

- We will not stand for a law being passed that transforms the agricultural system without a special mandate being given by the farmers to their elected representatives.

- Such a law, including the procedures for its implementation, should be discussed beforehand in its entirety, and the demands of the voters should be respected.

- The situation in agriculture requires consulting the farmers about state policy in regard to the farmer and the catastrophic results of this policy.

- The government should put a stop to

police terror against the community.

During this session, we have elected representatives of the farmers in our region. They constitute the Provisional Committee for Farmers Self-Defense. The committee consists of: Piotr Dudziak, from Trzeciaków; Kazimierz Danieluk, from Wola Korybutowa; Zbigniew Kosiarski, from Ciechanki Lancuchowskie; Stanislaw Kura, from Antoniów; Jerzy Mazur, from Kajetonowka; Michal Niesel, from Jaszczów; Wladyslaw Kollender, from Lancuchów; Edward Paczkowski, from Kolonia Ostrowek; Stanislaw Roczo, from Ostrowek; Janusz Rozek, from Kolonia Górne; Jan Skoczylas, from Wolka Lancuchowska; Wladyslaw Skorda, from Maryniów; Wladyslaw Szczepanski, from Szpica; Jan Pracz, from Zalesie; Celina Wojtal, from Poplawy; and Alina Zablotna, from Zawadow.

We authorize the said committee to conduct negotiations with the authorities about the current strike, its results and the situation of farmers in our region. We compel it to organize our self-defense in case of possible reprisals. We have decided that not a single village will negotiate separately with the authorities. We call on farmers from all over Poland to get in touch with us. The unjust law that does us injury can be changed if all the farmers jointly demand it. If we want to win, we must act together, consult one another, and elect committees to present our demands to the government.

The foregoing resolution was passed by voice vote.

We are submitting it:

- To the Primate of Poland.
- To the parliament of the People's Republic of Poland.
- To the Council of State.
- To the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR).
- To the Movement for Human and Civil Rights.
- To the Club of Seniors of the Agricultural Movement.

Ostrowek, July 30, 1978

Papal Sweepstakes

A British bookmaking firm that took wagers on the election of the new pope reports that betting was slow, particularly after a public outcry that such gambling was in poor taste.

"We took in less than 1,000 pounds," said a spokesman for the Ladbrooke's chain of bookmakers shops, but it was all profit.

Nobody picked the winner, Cardinal Albino Luciani, a long shot at 33-1.

Brightening the Morning News

To boost morale, the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith has simply forbidden the news media to make any reference to the Patriotic Front, which currently has about 7,000 guerrillas under arms in the country.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

Narita Airport—Japan's 'Bermuda Triangle'

By Mutsugoro Kawasaki

TOKYO—Narita Airport has finally opened, despite the protests of local residents and farmers, whose land had been seized for it, and their thousands of supporters all over Japan. The unfinished airport, badly planned from the start, is proving to be every bit as noisy, inconvenient, and dangerous as the opposition movement has always claimed it would be. The ill-fated facility has already had to close unexpectedly twice since opening day May 20, due to fog in one case and because two balloons were flown at the end of the runway in the other. But what is alarming is that the safety of the flight paths to and from Narita has been seriously called into question.

The Japanese daily *Asahi Shimbun* reported on June 14 that there had been two "near miss" incidents over Narita only ten days after the opening. They both involved passenger jets taking off from the new airport and intruding into Haneda airspace. (Haneda, the former international airport serving Tokyo, is now used only for domestic flights and China [Taiwan] Airlines international flights.) There has been another similar incident since that report.

These close encounters cannot be dismissed lightly as mere "teething troubles"—as were some of the other problems that have so far disrupted operations. (Passengers being stranded for hours due to airport buses not being available, and the door of one of the boarding tunnels dropping off and crashing to the ground are two examples.) These near misses are inevitable given the crowding of airspace in the skies over Tokyo, and are certainly the first of many to come.

Narita is situated between two other airports—Haneda and the ASDF [Air Self-Defense Force] jet fighter base at Hyakuri. Its airspace had to be squeezed in between theirs, and in one area, aircraft from all three facilities must fly over one another. This is one of the *inherent faults* of this airport. Despite the assurances of government and Transport Ministry officials, pilots claim that it is impossible to observe the specified flight paths exactly. Many Japanese recall the incident in 1971 when an ASDF jet fighter on a training flight collided with a Tokyo-bound passenger jet, killing all on board. That incident took

place in clear blue skies. The risks involved in having high-speed fighters maneuvering near a commercial airport are obvious, and the planes at Hyakuri are on permanent standby to "scramble."

The problems of navigation at Narita are extreme. Approach requires many more turns and course adjustments than is usual at international airports, and take-off requires a steep climb above the Hyakuri area, but it must not be so steep as to intrude into Haneda airspace above. These requirements put a great strain on flight personnel, and Narita has been heavily criticized by both Japanese and foreign pilots.

Unlike Haneda, Narita is not equipped with the latest ARTS-J radar system, which indicates the altitude, ground speed, and other information about aircraft on the radar screen, and makes the work of air traffic controllers much easier. At the "new" airport, staff have to obtain such information by radio from each airplane. Claiming this gives them less time to concentrate on other things, Narita air traffic controllers have requested the ARTS-J system, but the Transport Ministry claims that there isn't enough traffic at the new airport to justify it. This shows how far the authorities are prepared to compromise on safety, despite all the talk about "safety at any price" when they were beefing up security and repressing the airport opponents and workers' organizations.

Another inherent danger is that the three airports have no centralized air-traffic control system, as at, for example, New York. Transport Ministry officials say that when Narita was designed they did not possess the necessary technology, but now that they do, such a system is not needed. Nevertheless, they have installed a telephone "hot line" in case of emergency.

Air traffic controllers at Narita now bleakly refer to the area around the airport as *Ma no kuiki*, which loosely translates as "Devil's Area." The name comes from a legendary strait where ships disappeared without trace—a Japanese "Bermuda Triangle."

On June 14 Narita Airport disappeared without a trace as a thick fog settled over the area. The airport was forced to close,

and a total of seventeen flights were redirected to Haneda, where passengers had to sit around for up to eight hours while immigration and customs officials rushed over from Narita by car. The last passengers cleared immigration at 4 a.m. This wasn't an isolated incident either. Narita, along with the whole Sanrizuka area, is very prone to dense fog—*eleven times* as frequently as the Tokyo Bay (Haneda) area in fact. Crosswinds are also going to close Narita, as it has only one runway.

At present, affected flights are being diverted to Haneda, but this will not always be possible. In the future, passengers may find themselves having to travel to Tokyo from airports as far away as Osaka, Fukuoka, or Sendai.

Narita is totally inadequate to serve as an international airport, but the Fukuda government was faced with a dilemma. The strong opposition movement had already delayed the opening for five years, in addition to putting the construction schedule way behind. The government desperately needed to restore business confidence in its ability to force through development projects—especially against popular opposition movements. The Sanrizuka struggle had become the focus and inspiration for hundreds of similar protest campaigns, against nuclear power plants, U.S. and Self-Defense Forces bases, polluting industries, and so forth. They had to defeat the growing opposition, and in the face of rapidly declining popularity, Fukuda had to do it quickly, even if the airport was not complete.

However, the opening has not demobilized the opposition, as Fukuda hoped. On the contrary, many residents in the area who had been satisfied with the government's promises about noise are angry—the airport is much noisier than they had been led to believe, and the soundproofing of their homes which the government provided is inadequate. According to television reporters, many of these residents have declared their intention to oppose the second stage of construction.

To complete the airport, the authorities need to obtain land belonging to seventeen farmers who are all staunch supporters of the Anti-Airport League. They managed to get enough land for the first stage only by



violently and forcibly evicting the farmers and demolishing their homes. These evictions were carried out by thousands of riot police and Airport Corporation officials. Pitched battles raged for days, and hundreds of farmers and their supporters were injured and arrested. Now the eyes of the world are on Narita and the government is naturally reluctant to stage a repeat performance of those bloody scenes. It seems increasingly unlikely that the airport will ever be completed.

Demonstrations against the airport have been continuing, with a torchlight procession around the perimeter on June 10. It was during this demonstration that the balloons were flown at the end of the runway, closing the airport for two hours and disrupting several cargo flights.

This torchlight procession marked the start of the Opposition League's "100 days of protest," which they intend as an intensive period of struggle, propaganda and rallies.

On July 1, a funeral rally for Niiyama Yukio was held. This young man was a member of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League and one of the demonstrators who took part in the action that postponed the previously scheduled opening on March 26. During this incident, after his clothing accidentally caught fire, he was beaten unconscious and arrested by riot police. Despite his serious injuries, he was kept in custody for more than four hours before being released for medical treatment. He died in the hospital after fighting for his life for eighty days.

The next day, a rally and demonstration attended by some 15,000 persons was held. Demonstrators marched to the airport

where they were confronted by 10,000 riot police.

The airport, in fact, still resembles a martial-law zone, with thousands of riot police and security personnel permanently on duty. The government has always tried to divert attention from the airport's inherent defects by pretending that attacks by "terrorist groups" or "radical elements" are the main problem.

No matter how often they may assure the public that Narita is an improvement over the old airport, they obviously don't believe it. Japanese and foreign VIPs, including members of the emperor's family who visited Brazil recently, continue to use

Haneda. When Foreign Minister Sonoda flew in to Narita recently, a personal helicopter was used to save him the three-hour journey to Tokyo.

The priority for the movement in the near future is to defend the protesters arrested and awaiting trial at present. The defendants are demanding to be tried together, but Chiba District Court, which has been handling most of the cases, claims that it is at capacity and is trying to send defendants to other courts in Tokyo. It is important to mobilize international support against the charges the defendants face, and to demand their immediate release. □

Why Air Traffic Controllers Are Nervous

[The following article appeared in the July 10 issue of *Sekai Kakumei* (World Revolution), weekly newspaper of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International. The translation is by Dan Dickenson.]

* * *

The Transport Ministry Workers Union, which includes all of the country's air traffic controllers, has just released the results of an opinion poll it carried out among the 291 controllers who direct air traffic in the Tokyo region. The figures are shocking. They reveal the dangerous con-

ditions around the defective new airport at Narita.

Twenty air traffic controllers stated that they had seen a near-miss [an incident in which two aircraft approached so closely that there was danger of collision]. Yet the Transport Ministry has publicly reported only three near-misses up to now. In fact there have been seven times that many.

Furthermore, one out of every ten air traffic controllers reported having observed some kind of "frightening" incident since the new airport was opened.


And when asked about "nervousness or shakiness on the job due to problems such as near-misses," two out of three responded that they had had such feelings. As for why they felt nervous, these controllers cited reasons such as "the way airspace is divided" (50.6%), "poor communication" (36.8%), and "takeoff and approach patterns at the new airport" (29.4%).

Seven out of ten also said they felt uneasy about the future operation of the airport, again citing problems with airspace (62.1%), communication (38.3%), and takeoff/approach patterns (32.3%) as the reason for their concern.

Asked about the division of airspace, over 85% of all those questioned answered that it is "troublesome."

There are regions where the airspace assigned to two or even all three airfields overlaps, and planes from one airfield have to fly through "tunnels" between flight lanes assigned to the other two. Planes taking off from Narita airport and heading north must climb directly over the airspace of the Self-Defense Forces base at Hyakuri. The altitude of that airspace zone increases in several steps, so that commercial airliners on takeoff fly about 300 meters above the flight paths of jet fighter planes descending to land at Hyakuri.

When asked about this situation, seven-



Sekai Kakumei

teen out of eighteen air traffic controllers answered that these flight lanes, more than being "too narrow," were simply "too complicated."

Why are the air traffic patterns so dangerous? The answer is simple. As can be seen from the diagram, the division of airspace is very complex. Flight paths at different altitudes assigned to Narita Air-

port, Haneda Airport, Tokyo ACC [Aviation Communication Control, for aircraft passing over the Tokyo area but not landing there], and the Hyakuri fighter base—four control zones in all—overlap each other.

The problem is further complicated by the tricky takeoff and landing trajectories that pilots are instructed to follow in order

to reduce the noise level in communities near the airport. If takeoff and landing trajectories were decided on the basis of safety alone, aircraft noise would be far in excess of the government's limits.

Narita Airport has been forcibly opened and is operating even though it is plagued by dangers like these. □

Interview With Bala Tampoe

'Democratic Rights in Sri Lanka Are Still Threatened'

[In its July 31 issue, *Dagens Nyheter*, the most respected Swedish daily newspaper, published an interview with Bala Tampoe, leader of the Ceylonese section of the Fourth International and one of the main leaders of the Ceylonese labor movement. The text is given below. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

"In its first year in office, the rightist government in Sri Lanka has managed to break all its election promises. J.R. Jayewardene and his party are steadily losing their popular support."

This was said by Bala Tampoe, one of Sri Lanka's best known and most militant union leaders. He is now visiting Sweden.

Bala Tampoe's organization, the Ceylon Mercantile Union (CMU) is playing the leading role in the attempt to build a united front of the unions to resist the attacks of the government.

In July 1977, the National Party led by J.R. Jayewardene won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections. The former ruling party, the Freedom Party of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, lost almost all its seats. The other left parties were totally frozen out of parliament.

The simple-majority system for elections partially explains this abrupt shift, but the results also represented a protest vote. It was a protest against deteriorating living conditions, rising unemployment, and the previous government's attempt to suppress its critics.

"Jayewardene promised to put everything right," Bala Tampoe said. "He promised to increase the grain rations; he promised jobs; and he promised to restore democratic rights."

The question of grain rations is particularly important in Sri Lanka. The system was introduced by the British during the Second World War, and no government has dared to abolish it. There is a saying that any government that lowers the grain ration is finished.

Faced with growing economic problems,

the Bandaranaike government cut back the rations. Jayewardene promised to increase them, and he won.

But the rations have not been increased, Bala Tampoe said. Since the National Party took office, the opposite has happened. They lowered the rations! When the regime presented its budget last fall, it was revealed that they were taking guaranteed rations away altogether from persons earning more than 300 rupees a month [US\$46.50]. The ones mainly hit were industrial and public workers.

"Never before has any government dared to take away the rations," Bala Tampoe said. "They have been an important right for the worst off. The government's measure has produced unprecedented discontent among the people. But according to the reports in the press, the World Bank is satisfied."

The government has not been able to do much about unemployment either. And it has also violated its promises with regard to democratic rights. This has been felt, for example, by the Tamils (a minority of Indian origin), trade unionists, and supporters of the former regime.

The Tamils, who make up about 20 percent of the population, live mainly in the northern and northeastern provinces but also on plantations and in cities around the country. In the elections, the Tamils in the north put forward a program calling for a separate Tamil state, and won all the seats in these districts. They became the second largest party in the parliament.

Only a few weeks after the new government took office, provocateurs created disturbances in the northern provinces. Unrest spread, but the police failed to act. The situation soon became threatening, and thousands of Tamils living in the south fled to the northern provinces.

Since many of the Tamil refugees held key positions in administration and in economic life, difficulties increased, and it was only at that point that the government intervened.

Bala Tampoe does not accuse the gov-

ernment directly of being behind the attacks on the Tamils, but he accuses it of standing by and taking advantage of the development.

"The Tamils had to go to the government and ask for protection, and so the demand for a separate state was pushed into the background."

Later the government exploited the situation among Tamils to pass antiterrorist laws that, in Bala Tampoe's opinion, are so elastic that they can be used against other opposition groups.

Tampoe himself is a Tamil, but his union is 90 percent Sinhalese. He himself does not want a Tamil state, but he defends the Tamils' right to demand self-government.

The supporters of the previous regime in various positions have also suffered as a result of the change in regimes. For example, many teachers who supported Bandaranaike have been transferred, and some normal schools have been closed.

Bala Tampoe is most concerned, perhaps, about the antiunion measures the government is trying to carry through. Although it is split between many federations, the labor movement in Sri Lanka has long been a strong and militant one.

Among other things, the unions have opposed the government's plans to set up a duty-free zone on the model of Hong Kong and Singapore. They argue that a duty-free zone is no solution for the country's problems but simply represents an attempt to attract foreign industrialists with promises of economic advantages and cheap labor.

In January, a government committee presented a proposal for regulation of trade-union activity. In the labor movement, this is seen as an attempt to limit the right to strike, increase the government's ability to intervene in the life of the unions, and reduce the workers' job security.

Faced with this threat, major sections of the union movement joined to mount a common protest. And in this, the CMU, which is not bound to any party, was able to play a leading role. Bala Tampoe wrote the draft of the protest statement, which

was signed by thirty unions. Throughout the country, protest meetings and demonstrations were held, and drew a large attendance.

This forced the government to retreat. It announced that the new rules would apply only to the public sector and not to the private one.

But the union movement is not going to

accept the new laws, even in this scaled-down form. They remain unacceptable to the workers in the public sector. Moreover, Bala Tampoe is still to be convinced that the government's retreat is anything more than temporary.

"Trade-union and democratic rights in Sri Lanka are still threatened." □

An Open Letter

In Defense of Fausto Amador

By Plutarco Elías Hernández

[The author of the letter below is in charge of the international work of the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua. He was arrested last April 11 in San José, Costa Rica, for his role in 1969 in freeing Sandinista leader Carlos Fonseca Amador from jail in Costa Rica.

[A vigorous campaign in behalf of Hernández was opened and the government issued a pardon, releasing him from prison May 31. For details see the account in the June 19, 1978, issue of *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, page 732.

[For details on the case of Fausto Amador, which Hernández discusses in his open letter, see the interview "How I Came to Be a Trotskyist," in the June 27, 1977, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, page 741.

[Recently fresh attacks of a scurrilous nature have been leveled against Fausto Amador. These aroused the indignation of Hernández as he reports in his letter.

[The letter was published in the Costa Rican weekly journal *Pueblo* dated August 14-21, 1978, from which we have taken it. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.]

* * *

Before getting on to the topic of this letter, I would like to make clear what my purpose is in writing it.

Although my own political interests revolve around Nicaragua, I have always been interested in the political life of my own country [Costa Rica]. And I start out from the premise that unity of the entire left is indispensable to achieve the great social transformations that are needed in Costa Rica as well as the rest of Central America. If we want to swell our ranks we have to win over forces for the common struggle; we have to build up revolutionists, not tear them down.

Obviously, we are not always going to agree with each other. Because important political differences exist, there are also different political parties. But there is no

justification for our failing to unite in action against our common enemies.

I want to make these principles clear because I am concerned about something in the Costa Rican left and I feel morally obliged to speak out about it. In this matter that I am going to take up, the honesty that should distinguish a follower of Sandino takes precedence over all other considerations. So, the purpose of this letter is to express my opinion about Fausto Amador.

Comrade Fausto Amador committed two very serious political errors in the past, one of them in 1969 and the other somewhat later. We Sandinistas all criticized those errors at the time.

And I know that later on, Comrade Fausto Amador acknowledged those errors publicly and internationally. The first time was at an international press conference attended by a number of journalists from various countries around the world, where he strongly attacked the Somoza regime and the actions of American imperialism in Nicaragua.

After that Fausto Amador acknowledged his errors in international magazines, and most recently he did so once again here in Costa Rica on Dr. Burstin's television program, which was apparently watched by very many people.

I share few of Comrade Amador's political ideas. But I know that for quite a number of years he has shown a devotion to what he believes in, struggling daily on the side of the left, on the side of the people's movement, on the side of the revolution. Comrade Amador has helped to educate many revolutionists and also to bring about the emergence on the Costa Rican left of a dynamic and effective party with its own political positions. But instead of taking him up on the basis of his ideas today, some people are attacking him for his past errors, the same errors that he has already acknowledged several times.

I don't think that's honest. It seems to

me a malicious way of avoiding a frank and open debate about the real positions of Comrade Amador and his party. I think it is time the comrade was left alone.

Comrades of the Costa Rican left parties, we must be responsible. We must learn to apply criticism and self-criticism, rather than sinking to such a level. Let us stick to the sound principle of recognizing our brothers' and sisters' good points, while criticizing their errors in a firm and fraternal manner. Let us proceed in this way so that we can help each other and thereby improve ourselves.

Comrades of the left parties, let me speak frankly: If anybody has a score to settle with Fausto Amador it is the Sandinista National Liberation Front. But my organization places great value on political principles. We think that all have the right to correct their mistakes. We have all committed political errors.

The high ideals of the Sandinista movement would never tolerate anything so low as trying to make it impossible for a comrade to return to the ranks of revolutionists. Fausto Amador stands in the ranks of the revolution, and it is high time for people who don't like his ideas to focus their fire on them instead of trying to dredge up the past. It is immoral to go on slandering the comrade on the basis of mistakes for which he has already made a definitive and public self-criticism.

In writing this letter, I am not seeking to insult or criticize anyone in particular, although I'm more than angry enough, and I would certainly have more than enough good reasons to do so. I only want to address myself in a fraternal way to all those who are struggling for a revolutionary transformation of society, calling on them to act in accordance with our moral principles, and leave such personal vilification out of the political discussions of the left.

Now, I am not saying that people should stop attacking Fausto Amador for what he is doing or saying now. I hope that Costa Rican leftists will discuss their differences with Comrade Fausto Amador in a loyal way. But let us not have people taking it upon themselves for opportunistic reasons to do what only the Sandinista National Liberation Front has a right to do—that is, to settle accounts with Fausto Amador. This is especially bad when his mistakes are presented again and again in a deliberately distorted way in order to make them appear more serious than they were.

In writing this letter I seek not so much to defend Fausto—who, in my opinion, does not really need to be defended today—as to save his slanderers from the contempt they are bringing upon themselves by these methods. I want to help clean up the political debate within the left and thereby strengthen the camp of the revolution.

With warm greetings,
Plutarco Elías Hernández

Vietnam Defends Border Against Cambodia-China

By Matilde Zimmermann

Border clashes between China and Vietnam erupted at a rate of more than one a week during July and August, and the skirmishes were of increasing severity. Both sides have been reinforcing their troops along the border.

The most serious incident occurred August 25, when at least six persons were killed and a number wounded. Peking's version of the clash is that 200 Vietnamese troops drove 2,000 Chinese refugees across the border at Friendship Pass and proceeded to occupy a hill on the Chinese side. Hanoi has denied that its forces are holding any Chinese territory.

The war of words has also escalated. In a single day (August 20) the New China News Agency carried at least eight articles against Vietnam.

Negotiations between China and Vietnam, which started in Hanoi August 8, were broken off after the August 25 clash. The talks had been little more than a forum for leveling charges and countercharges and showed no progress toward resolving the conflict.

Among the immediate victims of the conflict are the Chinese refugees from Vietnam. When ethnic Chinese began to flee Vietnam after the nationalization of private commerce last March, Peking was quick to seize upon the issue to mount a propaganda offensive against Hanoi. The Vietnamese were accused of ostracizing, persecuting, and expelling Chinese residents. Peking even sent two ships to Vietnam in a much-publicized mission to "rescue" Chinese who wanted to leave.

In mid-July, however, Peking effectively closed its border with Vietnam, claiming that the 160,000 refugees who had already fled were more than it could handle. As refugees continue to gather at the border, Hanoi is demanding that China admit them, and Peking is insisting that Vietnam take those waiting to leave—and many of those already in China as well—back to their former homes and stop "persecuting them." Peking voices great concern for the fate of the Chinese "stranded" at the border but continues to exclude them.

No one wants or trusts the refugees. Peking has accused Hanoi of sending spies and "other bad elements" across as refugees. Hanoi claims to have proof "that many of . . . the people whom the Chinese authorities plan to send back to Vietnam have been entrusted with the duty of causing trouble or spying and disturbing

Vietnam's security."

The conflict between China and Vietnam has another front, and there, too, military conflict seems to be escalating. Although reliable information is hard to come by, the border war between Vietnam and Peking-backed Cambodia seems to be growing in intensity.

In the last two months, Hanoi radio has claimed victories that involved the killing or capturing of thousands of Cambodian troops. Cambodian Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, on the other hand, claims that his army has "heavily crushed the Vietnamese enemy, annexationists and swallowers of territory."

According to Hanoi, Chinese troops are involved in the fighting alongside the Cambodians. U.S. intelligence sources (hardly the most reliable or impartial source of information) estimate that there may be more than 10,000 Chinese civilians and military advisers in Cambodia and that the Chinese have sharply increased their shipment of artillery, tanks, and arms to Cambodia in recent months.

There have been unconfirmed reports of uprisings within Cambodia, backed by the Vietnamese. Hanoi radio reports regularly on the progress of what it calls the "revolutionary forces" within Cambodia. U.S. newspapers have said that Hanoi is supporting the anti-Pnompenh guerrillas with air strikes.

The troop buildups and the cutoff of Chinese aid last July have put strains on the Vietnamese economy, already hit by several bad harvests and the need to scale down industrial production. On July 25, Hanoi radio announced that more than 350,000 additional men and women had just joined the armed forces, bringing the total number in the military to about one million.

In this context, Vietnam is putting increased emphasis on "normalizing" diplomatic relations with the United States. Hanoi has dropped its demand that the U.S. come across with promised war reparations as a precondition to diplomatic relations. The Vietnamese leaders may feel that improved relations between Vietnam and the U.S. would help to restrain Peking from military campaigns against Vietnam.

The State Department is in no hurry to establish diplomatic ties with Hanoi, however. Washington has indicated that the ban on trade with Vietnam will not be lifted when the current embargo expires September 14. The U.S. Congress has outlawed aid to Vietnam and even moved

to cut allocations to the International Monetary Fund when the IMF approved a loan to Vietnam.

Some bourgeois news commentators attribute the reluctance to recognize Vietnam to a fear of domestic political repercussions. They try to suggest that a groundswell of anti-Vietnam sentiment exists in the United States. In fact, just the opposite is true. There is hatred for Vietnam, but it comes from the government still smarting from the defeat it suffered. Elsewhere there is widespread admiration for the Vietnamese and even broader realization that the U.S. has a responsibility to help repair the country its bombs devastated.

A more likely reason for Washington's hesitation to open relations with Vietnam concerns the debate over how to respond to Peking's diplomatic overtures. An August 31 editorial in the *Washington Post* presents one point of view on this question, urging Washington to "tread water" on Vietnam "while the larger question of China is worked out."

"What is beyond cavil," says the *Post*, "is that the United States has no interests in Hanoi even faintly of an order with those it has in Peking." □

Interim Verdict

When the supertanker *Amoco Cadiz* went down off the coast of France March 16, dumping 236,000 tons of oil in one of the world's richest fishing areas, it produced "the greatest killoff of sea life ever witnessed after an oil spill," Jim Browning reported in the August 30 *Christian Science Monitor*.

"The oil slick, together with the powerful fumes from the evaporating oil, killed about 20,000 birds outright. Within two weeks, millions of dead mollusks, sea urchins, fish, and other sea animals were washed up on shore. Ecologists were surprised to come upon some fish they had not known to exist so far south and that apparently hide in deep, protected coves. The effect of the oil had reached even there."

Even these grim statistics do not reflect the full impact of the disaster, which will affect marine life in the area for years to come. One-sixth of the oil, an estimated 40,000 tons, has sunk into the sand and sediment of the beaches, with consequences that "scientists still do not understand well."

Why It Was Negotiated Behind Closed Doors

By Dan Dickeson

The long-delayed treaty of peace and friendship was signed by representatives of the Chinese and Japanese governments in Peking August 12.

The treaty formalizes the expansion of diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries that began in 1972. It will open the way for further trade agreements between major Japanese corporations and the Chinese workers state.

Although the treaty itself does not call for any specific changes in policy by either government, it is significant as a formal pledge by the Chinese leadership to continue its foreign policy aimed at maintaining "peace and stability in Asia," while siding with the major imperialist powers against the Soviet Union.

Sino-Japanese Détente

Until 1972, the People's Republic of China had no formal diplomatic relations with Japan, and there was very little trade between the two countries. Japan was occupied by U.S. troops until 1952, and after that the new Japanese government pursued a foreign policy strictly in line with the American aim of isolating and if possible rolling back the Chinese revolution. The Kuomintang regime, Japan's wartime enemy, was recognized as the "legitimate" government of China, and Japanese capitalists made extensive investments in Taiwan.

Japanese policy toward China changed only after Washington turned to a policy of détente, symbolized by Richard Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972. Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka went to China in September of that year, and diplomatic relations were established between Tokyo and Peking. The first in a series of major trade agreements was signed.

A joint communiqué signed by Tanaka and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai called for negotiations to draft a treaty of peace and friendship that would formalize the new relationship between the two countries. But a long list of problems remained to be settled before a treaty acceptable to both sides could be drafted.

The Chinese government had a long-standing policy of opposition to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which codified Japan's military alliance with American imperialism. At the same time, the powerful right wing of Tanaka's Liberal Democratic Party was opposed to any treaty with China so long as the China-Soviet

Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty (calling for joint military defense against the United States and Japan) remained in effect.

The Chinese regime was also calling for the liberation of Taiwan and the reunification of Korea. The Japanese government, on the other hand, was a strong backer of the dictatorships in Taiwan and South Korea, and Japanese capitalists had invested huge sums in both countries.

There were also unresolved territorial disputes. The Chinese government claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands near Taiwan, although the islands have been occupied by Japan since the withdrawal of American troops. This issue took on added importance when offshore oil deposits were discovered near the islands. In addition, the Japanese government was preparing to sign a treaty with South Korea regarding the exploitation of undersea mineral resources on the continental shelf below the East China Sea, in spite of the fact that China claimed jurisdiction over much of the continental shelf.

With the unfolding of détente, however, the Chinese regime began to align itself with major imperialist countries against the Soviet Union, which it denounced as the "main danger." Mao Tsetung spoke out in support of the Japan-U.S. military alliance, and Chinese diplomats let it be known that they were willing to sign a treaty with Japan that omitted any mention of Taiwan or Korea.

When formal negotiations on the treaty finally began in 1975, attention focused on a clause denouncing "hegemonism" in the draft treaty submitted by Chinese negotiators. This was viewed as an attempt to secure official Japanese endorsement of the Chinese leadership's accusation that the Soviet Union was an expansionist "superpower" seeking to establish "hegemony" in Asia. Soviet officials condemned the proposed treaty, and the Japanese government, which was then trying to settle territorial and fishing-rights disputes with the Soviet Union, rejected the Chinese draft. Negotiations were broken off, and did not resume for more than two and a half years.

By early 1978, however, the situation had changed. A Japan-Soviet fisheries agreement had been signed. In addition, U.S. President Carter had made it clear in summit talks with the new Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda that the American government's long-range foreign policy would be based on a strategy of

playing off China against the Soviet Union.

At the same time the Chinese regime, having failed to draw the Vietnamese leadership into a bloc against Moscow, cut off its economic aid to Vietnam and launched a bitter propaganda campaign against the Vietnamese government. In an apparent maneuver to further isolate Vietnam, Peking indicated its willingness to reopen negotiations on the treaty with Japan. Negotiations were resumed, and when Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister Phan Hien visited Tokyo in July, he was unable to arrange any new Japanese loans.

Once the treaty talks resumed, progress toward an agreement was rapid. Chinese officials agreed to shelve the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, and issued only a token protest when the Japan-South Korea Continental Shelf Agreement was signed. Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda was assured that the China-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty would be abrogated when it expires in 1980. While the final draft of the treaty included the "antihegemonism" clause, Chinese negotiators agreed to the insertion of another clause stipulating that "the present treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party in its relations with third countries."

The treaty was signed by foreign ministers of both countries in a ceremony in Peking August 12, and arrangements were made for Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping to travel to Tokyo in October for a formal ratification ceremony to be held once the treaty is passed by the Japanese Diet [parliament].

Expanded Trade

The opening of diplomatic relations in September 1972 was followed by a dramatic expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, from a total volume of \$0.9 billion in 1971 to an estimated \$5.6 billion in 1978. In February 1978, a delegation of Japanese business leaders signed a long-term trade contract totalling over \$20 billion. This will make Japan China's largest trading partner.

Japanese exports to China have consisted mainly of steel products, machinery, and chemicals, including petrochemical feedstocks for the production of synthetic fibers. These are being used to build up China's basic industry and transportation

system, paving the way for development and stepped-up exports of minerals and textile products.

Chinese exports to Japan, on the other hand, have consisted mainly of oil, coal, iron ore and other minerals, along with raw silk and certain other foodstuffs. Chinese oil and coal exports are especially important to the Japanese economy, since Japan relies almost entirely on imported oil for its energy. Up to now, over 80% of that oil has come from the Middle East. This represents one of the most vulnerable elements of the Japanese capitalist economy, since its main source of energy is far away and under the control of American and European capital.

This trading relationship, in which China exports mostly raw materials and imports manufactured goods, has left China facing a problem typical of most semicolonial countries: a chronic trade deficit and shortage of foreign currency. To cope with this problem, Japanese banks and other corporations have extended credits in various forms, based on the expectation that development of Chinese mineral resources will lead to increased exports in a few years.

Japanese firms are currently negotiating contracts for joint development of offshore oil deposits. In addition, several trade agreements have involved Japanese corporations exporting whole plants to China. In particular, Japanese textile firms, faced with rising labor costs at home, are studying the possibility of exporting textile products to China for processing and re-exporting from China. The new treaty, with its promise of long-term, stable economic ties, will undoubtedly increase the willingness of Japanese bankers and industrialists to make deals of this kind.

Japanese corporations have welcomed these new opportunities for trade with China at a time when the worldwide economic recession tended to restrict the growth of trade with the major capitalist countries. They have moved fast in order not to be beaten out by American and West European competitors who have also been negotiating trade deals with China.

But from the point of view of Japanese capitalists, the attractiveness of the "Chinese market" is limited by the monopoly on foreign trade exercised by the Chinese workers state. All agreements on the export or import of commodities, development of natural resources, or building of factories in China must be negotiated with the Chinese government, and can only be concluded on terms that are acceptable to Chinese economic planners. This is in contrast to Japan's economic relationship with South Korea, Taiwan, and the capitalist countries of Southeast Asia, where Japanese corporations have virtually free reign in investing capital and taking out profits with the cooperation of the various semicolonial regimes.

Japanese capitalists' hopes for the future

are pinned above all on the prospect of increasing their economic penetration and exploitation of the semicolonial countries of Asia. Thus, for them, the significance of the new treaty with China lies not so much in its direct economic impact as in its crucial political meaning—a pledge from the Chinese leadership to help preserve the status quo in Asia.

Roots of China's Policy

The conclusion of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty represents a watershed in the development of Sino-Japanese relations. At the same time, it is symbolic of the whole evolution of Chinese foreign policy since 1972. That foreign policy of alliances with capitalist governments against socialist revolutions and against the Soviet Union and Cuba is perhaps the most undisguised expression of the reactionary nature of the Chinese Stalinist leadership.

The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is a bureaucracy—a grouping so thoroughly corrupted by material privileges, and enjoying a standard of living so far above that of the workers and peasants, that it has become a distinct social layer with material interests of its own that are diametrically opposed to those of the masses. To defend its privileged position, the bureaucracy carries out policies that conflict with the objective needs of the workers state on which it is based.

The efficient operation of a planned economy requires democratic self-management by workers at all levels. As communication and coordination of the economy improve, economic planning can become increasingly decentralized, with more and more decisions being left to the informed judgment of workers' committees on a local level. But in a democratically controlled economy, workers would never tolerate the kind of inequality and privilege that exists in China today. Therefore, to defend its own existence, the bureaucracy has to prevent workers from exercising any real decision-making power.

The Stalinist leadership in China has set up a police state in which workers have no right to speak out or organize independently of the regime. Economic planning is extremely centralized in order to preserve the bureaucracy's monopoly on decision-making, and the masses of people are not even allowed access to basic information about the working of the economy. The result is grossly inefficient management of the economy and waste of the talents and creativity of tens of millions of workers.

On a broader scale, the most effective operation of the planned economy requires an extension of economic planning across national boundaries, leading eventually to merging the economies of China, the Soviet Union and the other workers states into a single unit. But the separate national states are the basis of the power and

privileges of the various national bureaucracies, and a merger of the planned economies would imperil the top-dog position of the leading group in each country. This is why even in the best of cases their economic cooperation takes the limited form of trade, rather than real economic integration with a division of labor across national boundaries.

When it became clear in the late 1950s that the Chinese bureaucracy would not subordinate itself to its Soviet counterpart, the Soviet leadership responded by withdrawing Soviet aid from China and trying to isolate the impoverished Chinese workers state. The Chinese leadership is now doing the same thing to Vietnam. National boundaries are an obstacle to the development of a planned economy, but they are vital lines of defense for the interests of the bureaucracies.

The Stalinist theory of socialism in one country, which claims that China can overcome its economic backwardness alone through peaceful coexistence and trade with Japan and the other capitalist countries, is an ideological rationalization for the bureaucracy's inability to give up the outmoded national form of state.

In the final analysis, to overcome the economic hardships of the Chinese workers state it will be necessary to break China's isolation by overthrowing the remaining capitalist regimes in Asia, especially Japan. Policies which weaken imperialism and help extend the world revolution are in the objective interests of the Chinese workers state. But from the standpoint of the Chinese bureaucracy, a successful socialist revolution even in a small country like Vietnam creates not an ally, but just another rival bureaucracy.

So the CCP leadership finds it in its own interests to try to maintain the international status quo by helping capitalist governments defeat revolutionary movements and isolate the other workers states. In adopting an openly reactionary foreign policy that aligns them with the imperialist powers, the Chinese Stalinists are being entirely true to their own nature as a conservative social layer that lives in fear of the Chinese people and of other workers states, while feeling a certain community of interests with the ruling classes of capitalist countries like Japan.

Imperialists Turn Toward Détente

Prior to 1972, the policy of American imperialism was based on a strategy of

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isolating and if possible rolling back the Chinese revolution, and the imperialists themselves firmly rejected any kind of collaboration with the CCP leadership. The military threat from the Pentagon forced the Chinese bureaucracy to take defensive measures, which were accompanied by lots of anti-American rhetoric.

This tended to obscure the reactionary character of the CCP leadership in the eyes of millions of people, who were subsequently shocked by the evolution of Chinese foreign policy after 1972. But there has been no basic change in the nature of the Chinese bureaucracy, nor in its fundamental political outlook, which is determined by its social position.

It was the imperialists who made a major shift in their strategy. By 1972 the accumulated contradictions of the world capitalist economy, combined with the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people and the impact of the international antiwar movement, had seriously eroded the former strength of U.S. imperialism. The CCP leadership, rather than aiding the Vietnamese in order to further weaken imperialism and help break China's isolation, instead offered to help preserve capitalism in South Vietnam in exchange for diplomatic relations and trade with the United States.

It was only out of weakness that the American capitalists decided to postpone their long-term goal of restoring capitalism in China. Yet the Chinese bureaucracy struck a deal that helped to reinforce the sagging position of the same capitalists who had threatened them militarily for twenty years.

The Sino-Soviet Split

The historic shift in imperialist policy signaled by the opening of détente has intensified the bitter rivalry between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships. Since each bureaucracy wishes to collaborate with imperialism at the expense of the other, the capitalists have been able to play them off against each other. The negotiations over the Japan-Soviet fisheries agreement and the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty were striking examples of this.

The Soviet leadership conceded liberal fishing rights to Japanese ships in Soviet coastal waters, in hopes that the Japanese government would seek improved ties with Moscow instead of Peking. Then the Chinese regime put aside its claim to the Senkaku Islands and to mineral rights in the East China Sea in order to quickly conclude its own treaty with Japan and block the granting of more Japanese loans to Vietnam. In each case, Japanese capitalists were the ones who benefited from conflicts among the workers states.

There is nothing wrong in principle with China maintaining diplomatic ties or trading with Japan or other capitalist countries. The industrial products and technol-

ogy that Japan has to sell are badly needed to develop China's economy. Trade with the capitalist world has its drawbacks as well, since with the expansion of trade, China will be more directly affected by the ups and downs of the world market, and more susceptible to direct economic pressure from its trading partners. But these are the risks that an economically underdeveloped workers state has to take in order to obtain needed commodities from abroad.

A workers state with a revolutionary leadership would use the state's monopoly of foreign trade to minimize these risks, and in addition would look to the working class in the imperialist countries as an ally to help it counter the capitalists' pressure for concessions. In the early years of the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik leadership sought to help build mass revolutionary parties in the imperialist countries of Western Europe at the same time that they made trade agreements with those countries. The Bolsheviks clearly explained the problems faced by the Soviet economy, and appealed to the labor movements in Germany and Britain to force their own ruling classes to trade with the USSR on better terms, thus easing the pressure on the young workers state.

The CCP leadership, in contrast, has negotiated in secret with Japanese business leaders, leaving the workers of both China and Japan in the dark. The masses were told that the years-long delay in concluding the peace and friendship treaty was due solely to semantic differences over the wording of the "antihegemony" clause. The real issues in dispute were not even mentioned in the treaty, and the secret agreements or "understandings" that finally broke the deadlock in the treaty talks were never spelled out publicly. Even though there is considerable sympathy for China within the Japanese labor movement, Japanese workers were made to feel that they had no role to play in the development of relations between the two countries.

The risks involved in trade with capitalist countries, which are considerable even under the best of circumstances, are multiplied when a workers state is led by corrupt bureaucrats who are inclined to make political concessions to imperialism. Japanese negotiators have learned how to use the threat of "turning to the Russians" as a way of wrangling bigger concessions out of their Chinese counterparts.

The Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Union, wishing on its part to isolate China, denounced the proposed treaty as "anti-Soviet," and tried to persuade the Japanese government not to sign it. The treaty, with its much-discussed "antihegemonism" clause, has come to be seen as a symbol of the Chinese regime's policy of treating the Soviet Union as the "main enemy." And the CCP leadership clearly

regards the conclusion of this treaty as a major diplomatic victory.

A Shot in the Arm for Fukuda

But in the long run, from the standpoint of the workers and peasants of China, the treaty symbolizes a historic betrayal. By defending the status quo in Asia, the Chinese leadership is helping to strengthen the power of Japanese capitalism—objectively the most deadly enemy of the Chinese workers state in that part of the world. At the same time, it politically disarms China's potentially most powerful ally in Asia—the working class of Japan.

The signing of the treaty has been used to portray a reactionary politician like Takeo Fukuda as a great peacemaker and statesman who opened an era of friendship between the peoples of China and Japan. A public opinion poll published in the Tokyo daily *Yomiuri Shimbun* showed that Fukuda's popularity, which had declined to less than 20%, got a much-needed boost from the conclusion of the treaty.

Public interest in China is now very high in Japan, and the forthcoming visit of Teng Hsiao-ping to Tokyo will be an enormous media event. Fukuda will use it for all it's worth to try to con Japanese workers and farmers into returning a Liberal Democratic Party government in the elections later this year.

Except for the Japanese Communist Party, which has taken no position, all parties in the Diet have come out in favor of ratifying the treaty. In contrast to this, the Trotskyists of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League have condemned the treaty as "a thoroughly reactionary accord, contrary to the interests of working people."

An editorial in the July 31 issue of the JRCL's paper *Sekai Kakumei* explained that if the Chinese regime followed a policy of real friendship toward the Japanese people it would demand abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, oppose the current expansion of the Japanese military, and solidarize itself with anti-imperialist struggles throughout Asia. "The fraternal unity of the working people of China and Japan will only be forged in the struggle against all bourgeois regimes, including the struggle to overthrow Japanese imperialism." □

At Home, We Ask the Questions

Imelda Marcos, wife of the Philippines dictator, described a recent meeting in Washington with fifteen U.S. congressmen as "the hours of inquisition," with many of the representatives firing questions at her at the same time.

Even worse, she complained, most of the legislators arrived at the meeting with "a pile of newspaper clippings . . . written by the fashionable left of U.S. media and pseudo-intellectual writers who are overnight experts on the Philippines."

The Coming Revolution in Taiwan—Problems and Perspectives

[The following theses, drawn up by a group of overseas revolutionary Marxists from Taiwan and the mainland of China, have been presented for discussion in the Fourth International.]

* * *

1. The problems of the Taiwanese revolution warrant the attention of international revolutionary Marxists. They concern not only the future of the Taiwanese people, but also the further development of the revolution in Mainland China. The potential for revolution in Taiwan is very great, and can be expected to become a reality at any time.

2. After the end of World War II, the Kuomintang (KMT) bourgeoisie came to the island of Taiwan as conquerors. Grafting all their greed and corruption onto the governing machine left by the defeated Japanese imperialists, they ruthlessly oppressed and plundered the people of Taiwan. As a result, the Taiwanese people rose in rebellion throughout the island on February 28, 1947. In reply, the KMT oppressors suppressed the uprising in a bloodbath, thus committing a monstrous crime.

When the workers and peasants of the mainland overthrew the KMT regime in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek, under the protection of U.S. imperialism, fled to Taiwan. Thus the whole weight of the reactionary old regime was shifted onto the six and a half million Taiwanese. This greatly intensified the hatred of the people toward the new ruler from the mainland and at the same time greatly increased the possibility of revolution in Taiwan.

3. It would have been possible for the Taiwanese people, under the influence of the victorious revolution on the mainland, to annihilate the remaining forces of the KMT which had been evacuated to Taiwan. They did not do so mainly because the military forces of U.S. imperialism intervened directly (especially after the outbreak of the Korean War), and Washington gave enormous economic aid to Taiwan, engineering a series of social changes there.

Among the measures adopted, the following were the most important:

a. They helped the KMT carry out the so-called agrarian reform.

b. They transfused great quantities of financial aid into the dying political and economic organizations of the KMT in the form of grants and loans. (From 1951 to



Los Angeles Times

1965 American aid amounted to US\$100 million a year.)

c. After 1965, the year the U.S. aid program ended, Washington continued its support for the Chiang regime through a special office, and encouraged investment in Taiwan by private firms.

d. Over the same period, i.e., since 1965, Japanese monopoly capital has begun to make a comeback in its former colony, acting as both competitor and assistant to American capital.

These factors afforded the corrupt rule of the KMT a breathing space, bringing about a temporary stability and even a false sense of prosperity. But in reality, this did nothing to resolve the problems of the Taiwanese revolution, or to dampen its fuse. On the contrary, it only sharpened and deepened the various contradictions. As a result, the Taiwanese revolution will erupt more strongly and have a more clearly socialist character.

4. The KMT's much-vaunted "land reform" (the program of reducing farm rents to 37.5% of the annual main crop yield, and the "land to the tiller" program), did not resolve the deep contradictions between exploiter and exploited in the Taiwanese villages, but only slightly altered the form of that contradiction. According to an official government periodical, *The Chinese Economy*,¹ in Taiwan: "Taiwanese

1. See Chen Che-shan, "The Crisis of the Taiwanese Villages and How to Solve It," in *The Chinese Economy*, No. 27, August 15, 1969.

villages are on the verge of collapse"; "a new system of tenant farming is prevalent"; "the tillers have lost their land." The government exchanges fertilizer for grain, but grain is cheap and fertilizer is dear; peasants suffer hardship all year long, yet what they earn is not sufficient to meet tax payments. Various government organizations, more vicious than the traditional landlords, prey on the peasants, usury is rampant, forcing an exodus of strong and healthy peasants away from the villages. Consequently, dissatisfaction and resentment among the Taiwanese peasantry is no less than that of their counterparts in the mainland in the years before the revolution. The only difference is that the immediate enemy of the Taiwanese peasantry is no longer the big landlords but the government and its agents at various levels who control the peasantry.

Today, the only substantial result of "land reform" is that a number of landlords have, as a result of land purchase, been transformed into industrialists or merchants.

5. With imports of American and Japanese capital, and under its control, the industrialization of Taiwan has been very rapid over the last decade or so. Since the latter part of the sixties, the economic structure of Taiwan underwent visible changes—from agriculture as the basis to agriculture-industry. In 1952 there were 9,966 registered factories, and in 1968 33,057. By 1977, this figure had grown to 45,000, a 350 percent increase in twenty-five years. This is, of course, a big economic advance.

But if we examine the nature of the various industries, the proprietors of individual factories, and the distribution and utilization of industrial profits, the picture is by no means rosy. This type of industrialization does not benefit the nation nor improve the livelihood of the people; it benefits only imperialism and its closely connected junior partner, the Taiwanese bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

6. The industrialization of Taiwan is of a completely different sort from that on the mainland, where such development, no matter how severe the rule of the bureaucracy, will in the long run increase the productive forces of the nation, lead to an eventual improvement in the livelihood of the workers and peasants, and consolidate the sovereign independence of the country—provided the system of state ownership remains. However, the industrialization of Taiwan is geared primarily to the

interests of foreign monopoly capital and requires the suppression of the worker and peasant masses; the price it has exacted is the further subjugation of the people to imperialism. In other words, it is a surface prosperity achieved at the price of complete colonization.

Owing to its traditional comprador nature and its complete alienation from the Taiwanese masses, the KMT regime has actively accelerated this process of colonization. Ever since 1966, with the establishment of a so-called "special district for the processed goods export industry," the KMT has of its own free will ceded new-style settlements and concessions to imperialism, thus giving free play to foreign monopoly capitalism in Taiwan.

7. First and foremost, the industrialization of Taiwan was bought with the sweat and blood of the Taiwanese workers. According to one survey, Taiwanese workers receive only one-fifteenth as much as American workers for equivalent work, and roughly two-thirds as much as Hong-kong workers. This industrialization is also at the expense of the sweat and blood of the Taiwanese peasants. The KMT regime, in its position of slave driver, has in fact robbed the peasants of their agricultural produce, reducing them to abject poverty—thus keeping down wages, depressing the prices of raw materials, and enabling international capital to reap big profits. This industrialization is also at the expense of the middle and small industrialists in Taiwan: in view of the combination of imperialist, bureaucratic, and capitalist elements within the big industrial and commercial institutions, small entrepreneurs have no chance of survival.

8. However, industrialization has also created the future gravediggers of imperialism and the KMT regime—the rising Taiwanese working class. In the early 1950s, the Taiwanese working class, including those in industries, mining, and transportation, was roughly 300,000 strong. At present, it is estimated that this working class has expanded to a total of 1.8 million—one indication of the rapidity of industrialization.

This is an extremely beneficial factor for the self-liberation of the Taiwanese people. During the long years of revolutionary struggle on the mainland, the Chinese working class never exceeded four million²—four million among a total population of 600 million, or roughly 0.6 percent. But today in Taiwan there are 1.8 million workers out of a population of sixteen million, i.e., well over 10 percent. In the past, moreover, the Chinese working class on the mainland, with the exception of a few big cities, was scattered all over the country. But in Taiwan, due to its

geographical narrowness, the degree of concentration is much higher than on the mainland in those years.

From this vantage point, the coming proletarian revolutionary party in Taiwan will proceed under much more favorable objective conditions.

Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always posed as the self-appointed representative of the proletariat, in reality its membership has never incorporated many workers. This was one of the main reasons for the tortuous path traversed by the Chinese revolution, as well as the specific configuration of the CCP before and after the victory, especially its deformed bureaucratic character.

As an old hand at suppressing the working class, the KMT government has long kept a watchful eye on the rapidly growing strength of the working class in Taiwan, and has managed to bring it under its strict control, preventing the workers from organizing themselves and forbidding them to strike. The regime has done everything possible to block the development of their class consciousness and politicalization. We believe that these counterrevolutionary efforts will ultimately prove vain.

9. The inevitability and the potential explosiveness of the Taiwanese revolution are ascribable not only to the above social factors, but also to the "nationality" problem.

Actually, from the perspective of history, culture, and "blood ties," the population of sixteen million³ in Taiwan, (apart from the

3. According to a survey by the Civil Office of the Taiwan government in 1957, the population of Taiwan in 1947 was 6,490,734.


200,000 to 300,000 people of the aboriginal race) are not different from the Han people. The majority are Fukienese and Haka people whose ancestors emigrated from mainland China to Taiwan some 300 to 400 years ago. Their language and beliefs have been preserved in their original form. Before the occupation by Japanese imperialism in 1895, their cultural, economic, and political structures were closely related to those of mainland China.

During the fifty years of their occupation the Japanese imperialists did not succeed in their attempt to culturally change the "nationality" of the broad masses of the Taiwanese. Politically and economically, colonial oppression failed even more conspicuously in that respect. It simply caused the Taiwanese to demand national liberation with ever greater insistence. The rule of Japanese imperialism helped inculcate a strong sense of national identity in the Taiwanese people—an identity with mainland China but in opposition to Japan.

Therefore when a certain section of the Taiwanese bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia insist that the Taiwanese people constitute a specific nationality, they are at variance with history.

10. But that does not mean that in the long struggle against outside rule (including the Dutch occupation, conquest by the Manchus, cession to the Japanese, and the rule of the KMT), the Taiwanese people never developed a particular sense of "national feeling." Over the last 400 years, a common feeling grew up against all oppression and exploitation by foreign ruling cliques, and demands were increasingly voiced that the Taiwanese people should be in control of their own fate.

Taiwanese antiforeign regionalist senti-



Christian Science Monitor

Oil refinery in Kaohsiung. According to one estimate, Taiwanese workers are paid one-fifteenth of U.S. pay for comparable work.

2. See Mao's talk at the Chengchow Conference of the CCP on February 17, 1959.

ment is different from provincial regionalism on the mainland. It is much stronger and has a firmer basis. It reflects progressive resistance rather than reactionary backwardness.

11. The return of Taiwan to China after World War II was at first accepted by most Taiwanese. The older generation of Taiwanese were happy to see "the return of light to the land." The lower strata and youth, especially the more politically conscious ones, were willing to link up with their mainland brothers and sisters in order to win joint liberation. (This was the attitude of the Taiwanese Communist Party).

But because of the utter corruption and tyranny of the KMT, this attitude soon changed. The change was similar in some ways to the disillusionment and resistance shown by people in the formerly Japanese-occupied areas on the mainland. But there is also a difference—apart from class antagonism, the resistance of the Taiwanese people to suppression by the KMT was also inspired by "national" hatred.

After 1949 the KMT seized Taiwan as a base to continue its desperate struggle for survival. In its death agony, the KMT has turned the whole island into an enormous prison,⁴ one of the worst kind of police states. Special agents have been planted in every walk of life, and the overwhelming majority of the people are deprived of elementary democratic rights. At the same time, the KMT practices extreme racial discrimination against the aboriginal people of Taiwan, and regional discrimination against those Chinese who had originally inhabited the island, forbidding them, among other things, to speak their own dialect. The Taiwanese people therefore not only bitterly hated their direct oppressors, the KMT, but also reacted against the sudden influx of people from the mainland, looking upon them as a race of oppressors.

Under the influence of the struggle of the Taiwanese people against the "outsiders," a section of the Taiwanese bourgeoisie, in particular those who had had some previous relationship with Japanese imperialism and then became closely linked to American imperialism, together with a part of the petty bourgeoisie launched a movement for Taiwanese independence, under the banner of Taiwan "nationalism."

12. Revolutionary Marxists fully understand the struggle of the broad Taiwanese masses against "national" oppression. We not only recognize that it is to a large degree justified, but think that, once linked to the various social antagonisms, it can become progressive and revolutionary. Past experience of mass movements in Taiwan suggests that the revolutionary

movement there will most likely begin as an "antiforeign" struggle. If proletarian revolutionists should ignore, overlook, or belittle this type of struggle, they will most certainly be ignored by the rising masses, and fall into a position of utter isolation, never able to participate in and provide leadership for the Taiwanese revolution.

Hence, the problem of how to deal with the "national struggle" of the Taiwanese people is an extremely important problem of tactics for revolutionary Marxists—both in Taiwan and on the mainland.

First, we must tirelessly point out to the toiling masses of Taiwan the following fact in connection with any political event that may occur on the island in the future:

Owing to deliberate arrangements between the KMT and American imperialism over the last thirty years and as an inevitable result of the economic development of Taiwan over this same period, the largest and most important sector of the indigenous bourgeoisie and landowning class has long since fused both politically and economically with its counterpart from the mainland, and thus come to form an integral part of the Taiwanese ruling class.

Moreover, the two million people who initially came to Taiwan, mostly under coercion, with the KMT (their numbers have increased substantially over the last thirty years) have long since been abandoned by the ruling clique. Many of the soldiers, low-ranking officials, and civilians, who made up the majority, have fallen into abject poverty. The oppression, political as well as economic, to which they are subjected under the rule of the KMT is no less severe than that of the original inhabitants of Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, if the revolution in Taiwan takes as its main target merely those of non-Taiwanese origin, objectively it can only weaken itself. It would also serve to deliver in advance the fruits of the revolution to the native Taiwanese rulers (thus in reality aiding the KMT), or to the extreme right wing of the Taiwan independence movement.

13. Second, we must clarify both to ourselves and to the Taiwanese people that the Taiwan independence movement advocated by a section of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie not only has no affinity, in terms of class base, with the mass resistance movement in Taiwan, but differs greatly from the latter in terms of its orientation and its possible objective effects.

These two movements differ greatly in nature, and we must do our best to distinguish between them in practice.

The resistance of the broad masses to "national" oppression will be aimed first at the rule of the KMT and its backer, American imperialism. As the struggle develops, its class content will inevitably transcend its national content, and its anticapitalist character may well break through to the surface. In practice, this

struggle will weaken the position of American imperialism in Asia and lead to the growth of revolutionary forces outside the island. It will rekindle the struggle against bureaucratic rule on the mainland as well as stimulate the rise of workers struggles in Japan.

Conversely, the bourgeois independence movement can only consolidate the rule of imperialism in that part of the world. In order to free itself from the rule of "foreign nationals" (the KMT), or merely to gain concessions from them, the Taiwanese bourgeois independence movement is ready to pay the price of further colonization by American or Japanese imperialism, from whom it hopes to gain assistance. The movement is certainly not willing to allow risings by the broad masses of workers and peasants in Taiwan to jeopardize the existing social system. It will regard the new regime on the mainland with hostility, and will also be antagonistic to the emergent anticapitalist revolutions in Japan and other countries.

Therefore, revolutionary Marxists in Taiwan must carefully distinguish between the two movements. Neither ideologically nor organizationally must the struggle of the Taiwanese people against "national" oppression be influenced or controlled by the bourgeois class and its Taiwan independence movement.

14. But should Marxist-Leninist revolutionists oppose the call for independence initiated and supported by the broad masses themselves? No. On the basis of the Marxist theory of the national question as developed by Lenin, and of both positive and negative experiences on this question over half a century, we recognize that the majority of the Taiwanese people, though not constituting a separate and distinct nationality, have the complete right, as a result of special historical circumstances, to self-determination in seeking to resolve the Taiwan problem. (There is an analogy here with the movement for American independence from Britain.) If the majority of the Taiwanese people firmly request separation from China into an independent country, we should support them, first, because self-determination is a basic democratic right; secondly, because, as long as this movement has a broad mass base, its immediate result will at least be the downfall of the KMT; and, thirdly, because, aside from the beneficial or nonbeneficial nature of independence to the Taiwanese people and the Taiwanese revolution, it is the Taiwanese people themselves who must seek their own answers in the course of the struggle.

Needless to say, revolutionists in mainland China and in Taiwan must be free from the narrow prejudices of nationalism. They must inculcate the Taiwanese working class with the revolutionary spirit of internationalism and unite them with the international working class—first, with those of the mainland and then with the

4. According to a very conservative estimate (see the Tokyo dispatch of the French News Agency, July 24, 1977), more than 8,000 political prisoners are being held in Taiwan without trial.

Japanese and American workers, in order to impel the Taiwanese national-democratic revolution in the direction of socialist revolution. Taiwan then becomes, in relation to China, an independent unit in a united socialist society; while in relation to the world as a whole, Taiwan first becomes part of a united socialist Asia and finally part of a united socialist world.

15. The errors of the CCP on the Taiwan question are as follows: first, it basically ignores the deep feeling of the Taiwanese people against the rule of "outsiders," and mistakenly identifies this feeling with the "independence movement" of a small section of the upper classes who are capitulating to imperialism; secondly, the CCP fundamentally denies the possibility of the Taiwanese solving the Taiwan question through a revolution of their own, and thus completely ignores and refuses to understand the demands they put forward.

The two slogans: "Taiwan has always been part of China" and "the Taiwanese people are brothers of the Chinese people," which have been consistently advanced by the CCP, are completely useless in face of the demands of the Taiwanese people for self-determination or independence. They will in no way aid the true liberation of Taiwan. To the contrary, they will only strengthen the regional prejudice of the Taiwanese people, assist the extreme right wing of the Taiwanese independence movement, and worse still, even help the KMT carry out its deceitful campaign of "defending Taiwan through reforms."

The CCP's claim that the Taiwanese problem is merely a problem concerning the CCP and the KMT, or concerning China and the United States, that it has nothing to do with the Taiwanese masses, and that the fate of the people of Taiwan can be decided only by the CCP and the KMT, especially by China and the United States, is thoroughly reactionary and erroneous. It is aptly described (as some Taiwanese revolutionists have put it) as "Great Han chauvinism" and "another form of national oppression."

16. True, from the point of view of the whole course of the Chinese revolution, which began around 1949, the future revolution in Taiwan can be regarded as a continuation of the same revolution, especially as the final step toward the completion of one of its unfinished tasks—national unification. In posing the question in this way, however, the most important thing is precisely *how* to continue the revolution and *how* to accomplish the unfinished task, so that we help rather than hinder the cause of the Chinese revolution in general, and of the Taiwanese revolution in particular.

The CCP has been trying to bring about the reunification of Taiwan with China, first and foremost through resort to military strength backed up by political and



R. Norman Matheny/Christian Science Monitor

Taiwanese textile mill. Massive infusion of foreign capital has increased size of working class from 300,000 in early 1950s to 1.8 million today.

diplomatic pressure. It is typical of Maoism and Stalinism to "liberate" oppressed people by armed force from *outside* and *above*. Liberation of this kind might result in some social reforms in the occupied areas, but it invariably at the expense of a genuine revolution of the local masses, and will give rise to extreme social contradictions. Such was the case in most parts of China that were liberated by the CCP. And it was much worse in those areas mainly populated by minority nationalities. If the same kind of liberation is carried out in Taiwan, the contradictions will be extraordinarily intensified because of the Taiwanese "national feeling" analyzed above.

Therefore for the liberation of Taiwan to be of benefit to the Chinese revolution as a whole, the workers and the masses of Taiwan must be allowed to rise up by themselves. The primary task of revolutionary Marxists on the mainland is to help to inspire such a revolution in every respect, and *not* to rely on an external force to substitute for it. They must support every genuine revolutionary demand by the workers and peasants of Taiwan *including the demand for self-determination*.

This question should also be approached from the perspective of improving the existing political system in mainland China. If a thoroughgoing revolution is carried out by the workers and peasants in Taiwan, its momentum will certainly stimulate their mainland brothers and sisters to rise up in an antibureaucratic political revolution and carry out a real "cultural revolution" from bottom to top. If, conversely, the liberation of Taiwan is achieved solely by the dispatch of military forces from the mainland, then the result will only be the consolidation of the Pek-

ing regime, which has already bureaucratically degenerated to a high degree.

17. The erroneous policy pursued by the CCP on the Taiwan question has now been recognized and criticized by not a few Taiwanese revolutionists. What they have failed to understand, however, are the deep roots of this CCP policy. Actually, the errors committed by the CCP on the Taiwan question, as well as on many other questions, are fundamentally due to its acceptance of the Stalinist theory of socialism in one country. Starting from this theory, it is impossible not to travel along the path of "Great Russian chauvinism" and "Great Han chauvinism."

Revolutionary Marxists in Taiwan must fundamentally oppose the Stalinist and Maoist theory of socialism in one country so that the CCP's errors on the Taiwan question may be corrected. Only when we have eradicated the idea of socialism in one country (socialism in one island) from within ourselves, can we correctly map out the tasks and orientation for the workers and peasants revolution in Taiwan.

18. It is clear from the above analysis that the coming revolution in Taiwan will be socialist in character. This is determined not only by the social contradictions in Taiwan, but also by the driving force and the perspective of the revolution itself. In the turmoil of its first period, the revolution will most likely go through a "national" and democratic stage, based on the "whole nation." But at the very outset, struggle along class lines will surely develop. As soon as the revolution gathers a genuinely broad mass base, its striking power must be directed at the capitalist class, which is integrated with imperialism and represented by the KMT regime. Thus, to win and consolidate a real victory, it is necessary to orient the revolution toward

the dictatorship of the proletariat. For only the dictatorship of the proletariat can resolve the democratic "national" tasks of the revolution; once the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established, it certainly will not limit itself to the framework of bourgeois democracy.

Some Taiwanese revolutionists oppose this view. According to them, Taiwan today is similar to the mainland before liberation; it is a semicolonial and semifeudal society. The tasks of the revolution are to overthrow imperialism and feudalism, and hence its driving force must be a bloc of four classes, including the revolutionary bourgeoisie, and its aim should be the establishment of the people's democratic dictatorship. In other words, they wish to apply to Taiwan the same set of theories the CCP devised for the mainland. This position, in our opinion, is both erroneous and dangerous. The actual process of the third Chinese revolution disproved the CCP's theory of "new democracy." In fact, one of the main reasons for the victory of the CCP was that, under the pressure of revolutionary developments, it forsook the long-held theory of "new democracy" and unconsciously practiced what it had previously attacked and criticized—the Marxist theory of permanent revolution.

If in those days, the CCP had carried their theory into practice and persisted with the theory of "new democracy," that is, if they had not dared to base themselves on the poorest in the countryside during the civil war; if they had not established the dictatorship of the party (which in a certain sense was the dictatorship of the proletariat) after victory, but had actually shared political power with the capitalist class; and if they had gone ahead and developed capitalism on a long-term basis under the people's democratic dictatorship, then not only would victory have been quite inconceivable, but the revolution would have been crushed after it was achieved.

Marxist-Leninists have pointed this out for a long time, and it has even been acknowledged by the leaders of the CCP (theoretically by Liu Shao-chi,⁵ and in practice by Mao Tse-tung) as a historical fact.

Taiwan today is much less semifeudal than the mainland before liberation. One could even say that it is thoroughly capitalist. As to whether or not its semicolonial status will cause its capitalist class to become firmly anti-imperialist and join the revolution, the capitalist class in China and other semicolonial countries has shown clearly enough, over the last fifty years, that once its interests are even slightly threatened by the revolutionary

5. See Liu Shao-chi's political report to the 8th National Congress of the CCP (September 15, 1956). Among other things, he said: "... in essence the People's democratic dictatorship has become a kind of dictatorship of the proletariat."

masses, it will go unhesitatingly over to the side of imperialism.

19. In order to prepare for and accelerate the approach of the Taiwanese revolution, we propose the following program:

(1) Immediately annul all those laws which violate human rights, liberty, and democracy. Immediate release of all political prisoners. For freedom of speech, the press, the right to assemble, to organize, and to strike.

(2) Guarantee not only in words, but in deeds, the equality of all peoples in Taiwan (especially that of the indigenous people—their right to self-government must be affirmed) and the right to education, employment, and participation in political life.

(3) No to racism and provincial prejudices; no to forceful implementation of the so-called "national language"; no to discrimination against the Taiwanese dialect.

(4) Down with the KMT-administered trade unions, let workers elect their own union leaders. Substantially improve the standard of living of all workers, and establish a comprehensive system of social welfare for them. Down with all company spies who oppress and inform on the workers; guarantee the right to strike. All workers, irrespective of their original provincial differences, should unite.

(5) Immediately dissolve the official peasant associations, irrigation associations, and other organizations that exploit the peasants. Allow all poor peasants to elect their own federations to regulate the marketing of their produce, and to govern their own villages. Remit all public and private debts. Redivide the land without compensation.

(6) Establish urban neighborhood committees to guarantee the livelihood of the poor laboring masses.

(7) Down with the policy of "rewards to the foreign investors," which surrenders

the interests of the Taiwan people to American and Japanese imperialists. Confiscate those firms and factories jointly owned by imperialists and KMT bureaucrats and put them under workers control.

(8) Annul all economic, political, and military treaties concluded between imperialists and the KMT. Immediate and complete withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

(9) For an all-powerful national congress elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage to replace the reactionary and corrupt KMT government, to carry out the above revolutionary demands and to decide the status of Taiwan and its relation to the People's Republic of China.

(10) Unite with the working class of the world, especially the working classes of the mainland, the U.S., and Japan, to defend the revolution against the inevitable attacks from imperialist reactionaries. □

Luisa Segura Released

Argentine Trotskyist Luisa Segura has reportedly been released from prison, after being held without charges for almost four years. Segura's name was included on a list of freed prisoners that was published by the Argentine government April 21.

Segura had been arrested under state of siege legislation in November 1974, along with a number of other student leaders from the University of Tucumán. She was held in Villa Devoto prison.

At the time of her arrest, Segura was a member of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers Party). Among a large number of PST activists who have "disappeared" or who are still being held in Videla's jails are the following: José Francisco Páez, the PST's vice-presidential candidate in the September 1973 elections; Arturo Apaza; Federico Alvarez Rojas; and Charles Grossi.

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