

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 14, No. 10

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March 15, 1976

75¢



SMITH: Beefs up military.

Rhodesia's Racist Regime Under Heavy Pressure

Betty Hamilton and Pierre Lambert

On Healy's Frame-up of Hansen and Novack

Mao Regales Nixon With 'Eight-Jeweled Pigeon'

America's Hottest Export Item—Watergate Scandals

PC Francés Empieza a Descartar Máscara Marxista

Livio Maitan

Problems of the Cuban Workers State

Saber Rattling Over Cuba's African Role

By David Frankel

On February 28, in an election appeal aimed at the right-wing Cuban vote in Florida, presidential candidate Ford denounced the Cuban government as "an international outlaw."

Ford, a last-ditch supporter of the imperialist intervention in Vietnam, went on to label the Castro government "a regime of aggression" because of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Ford's boundless hypocrisy can be judged from the fact that Washington has repeatedly toppled Latin American governments, subsidized dictators, and even used troops in Central America and the Caribbean. Scarcely a country in the world today has escaped the malignant effects of the corruption, subversion, and brutal violence employed by American imperialism in defense of its interests.

Ford's tirade against Cuba included a threat. He said, "... I solemnly warn Fidel Castro against any temptation to armed intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Let his regime, or any like-minded government, be assured the United States would take the appropriate measures."

Attacks in the same vein were answered by Castro at the end of last year. When Ford said that the Cuban role in Angola had canceled any chance for improving relations between Washington and Havana, Castro replied in a December 22 speech:

"What is there left to cancel that they haven't already canceled in vain? What can they take away which has not already been taken away? Nothing! The situation is one of absolute impotence on their part."

Castro's reply was to the point. Over the last fifteen years, Washington has placed an embargo on the island, mounted an armed invasion, underwritten continual counterrevolutionary efforts of right-wing exile groups, and sought to assassinate Castro. Washington still bans trade with Cuba. Yet the country has survived and grown stronger.

In a six-country Latin American tour, which ended just before Ford's February 28 speech, Kissinger echoed Ford's attacks. Kissinger was obviously assigned to reinforce Ford's electioneering handouts.

To what extent Kissinger was trying to organize reprisals against Cuba remains to be seen. Apparently he had secret objectives that did not necessarily correspond with his public statements.

It was noticeable, for example, that even the government of tiny Costa Rica felt

secure in announcing—only three days after Kissinger left—the country's first commercial deal with Cuba since 1964.

Likewise noticeable was the fact that the Peruvian government recognized the MPLA government the day after Kissinger left Lima.

Colombian President Alfonso López Michelsen announced his intention to recognize the MPLA with Kissinger sitting next to him. "We have our own position on Angola," he said.

Asked about the Cuban involvement in Angola, López, obviously referring to the U.S. role in Vietnam, said: "This is not the first time that one of the countries in the hemisphere has been involved in extra-hemisphere affairs."

Kissinger obviously acquiesced in advance to the verbal thrusts against Washington. "Kissinger, smiling and relaxed, seemed unperturbed by the Colombian's remarks," according to a dispatch from Penny Bernoux in the February 24 *Washington Post*.

One of Kissinger's objectives in his tour thus seems to have been to assure the Latin Americans that Washington would not retaliate if they recognized the MPLA government in Angola. This would accord with the State Department's decision to make a turn in Angola, a course first indicated by the permission granted to Gulf Oil to resume friendly collaboration with the MPLA as in the past.

This turn dovetails with the actions of America's imperialist allies in Europe in hastily mending fences with the MPLA.

Aside from Ford's bid to rightist Cuban voters, the attacks on Cuba's role in

Angola fall into the familiar pattern of blaming "foreign agitators" for rises in the militancy of workers and their allies. In this case, it is the upsurge in southern Africa that worries the imperialists. For this they blame the Russians and especially the Cubans.

The March 1 column by the reactionary Rowland Evans and Robert Novak offers a good example of such propaganda:

"The chilling prospect that Fidel Castro intends further use of his 12,000 Cuban troops in Angola to 'free' South African-controlled Namibia is causing far more consternation inside President Ford's White House than Cuba's original Angola intervention."

Claiming that "the question is how to stop" Castro from carrying out his supposed African plans, Evans and Novak said: "One possible answer under tentative discussion is an outright U.S. naval blockade of Cuba itself."

But the American imperialists are well aware that the basic problem they face in southern Africa is not the presence of Cuban contingents in Angola. Instead, it is the rising determination of the African masses in many countries to rid themselves of white minority rule and throw off the yoke of imperialism.

The mobilization of the African masses is now threatening the shaky racist regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, and putting increased pressure on the South Africans in Namibia. The new regime in Mozambique has been pushed by the pressure of the masses to take a more militant stand against white rule in Rhodesia, and the imperialists fear that this process may eventually challenge their control over all of southern Africa.

This is the real source of concern in Washington. The attempt to blame the Cubans for stirring up trouble in Africa is a cynical ploy in Ford's campaign for the right-wing vote in the United States. And it is part of the publicity designed to justify more intensive American intervention against the freedom-seeking movements in Africa. □

Free Desmond Trotter!

On March 18 and 19 the Privy Council in London, the highest court in the British Commonwealth, is scheduled to hear the appeal of Desmond Trotter. If the appeal is denied, Trotter faces death by hanging.

A militant on the Caribbean island of Dominica, the twenty-one-year-old Trotter has been held in solitary confinement since his arrest in May 1974 on a frame-up murder charge. Trotter was accused of killing an American tourist despite the testimony of numerous witnesses that he

had been sick at home with a severe asthma attack when the killing took place.

As a leading member of the Movement for a New Dominica, and the editor of its monthly publication, *Tuaway*, Trotter was a marked man. During the late 1960s he had been a central leader of the Black Power movement that emerged in Dominica at that time. He was an organizer and main speaker at African Liberation Day

demonstrations on the island in 1971, 1972, and 1973.

A series of strikes by agricultural workers led the Dominica Labour party government to intensify its repression against its left-wing opposition. Two days after the killing of the American tourist, then Deputy Prime Minister Patrick John made a radio speech charging that the shooting was "the handiwork of a few degenerate leaders, who see themselves as architects of a new society, projecting new standards and cultures unacceptable to the majority of our people. . . ."

The "evidence" against Trotter was the testimony of a police corporal who claimed to have found Trotter sitting on an overturned bucket with a gun beneath it two months after the killing, and the account of a fifteen-year-old woman who admitted to a lawyer that her testimony was perjured.

However, the trial went on—with "Hang Desmond" signs painted above the entry to the jury room and the entrance to the lounge where the jury took its midmorning break.

The Committee in Defense of Desmond Trotter and Political Prisoners in Dominica urges that protests be sent to Prime Minister Patrick John, House of Assembly, Roseau, Dominica. Copies should be sent to the committee at P.O. Box 231, Roseau, Dominica. □

Leonid Brezhnev—Creator of the 'Cloudless Sky'

During the Soviet Communist party's twenty-fifth congress, Leonid Brezhnev was variously described as "the most outstanding political figure of our epoch," "a bright and inspiring example of selfless service," "a passionate fighter for Communism," and "a son of the people."

Did this adulation signal a revival of the Stalin-style personality cult? Not at all, according to Eduard A. Shevardnadze, the leader of the Georgian CP.

Praising Brezhnev was not a matter of "personality," he said, but "purely party, businesslike, congress talk."

According to a report in the March 2 *New York Times*, Shevardnadze then "went on to describe Mr. Brezhnev's 'art of penetrating into the soul of a man' and said he had helped create 'a pure and cloudless sky above us.'"

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116, Village Station
New York, NY 10014

In This Issue

Closing News Date: March 8, 1976

FEATURES	393	America's Hottest Export Item—Watergate Scandals—by Steve Clark
	397	A Statement on Healy's Frame-up of Hansen and Novack—by Betty Hamilton and Pierre Lambert
	401	"Socialist Action" Denounces WRP Smear Campaign
RHODESIA	388	Why Mozambique Closed Border —by Ernest Harsch
IRAN	391	New York Rally Protests Torture of Iranian Dissidents—by José Pérez
CHINA	392	Mao Regales Nixon With "Eight-Jeweled Pigeon"—by David Frankel
ANGOLA	396	Washington Lifts Trade Embargo
BOLIVIA	401	Students, Miners Go Out on Strike
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	402	Dock Workers Fight for Democratic Rights —by José Pérez
BRITAIN	403	Steel Bosses Slash Jobs, Wages —by Tony Hodges
SOUTH AFRICA	404	South Africa: NATO's Secret Partner —by Ernest Harsch
PERU	407	International Campaign to Free Hernán Cuentas
CUBA	408	Problems of the Cuban Workers State —by Livio Maitan
SPAIN	418	Workers Debate Union Orientation
NEWS ANALYSIS	386	Saber Rattling Over Cuba's African Role —by David Frankel
	386	Free Desmond Trotter!
CAPITALISM	419	The Derwent—Australia's Lethal River —by John Tully
FOULS THINGS UP AROUND THE WORLD	422	
BOOKS	424	Hungry for Profits—reviewed by Steve Clark
DOCUMENTS	426	The Right to Hear Hugo Blanco—An Exchange of Correspondence With the State Department
DRAWINGS	396	Agostinho Neto; 405, John Vorster —by Copain
EN ESPAÑOL:		
FRANCIA	429	PC Francés Empieza a Descartar Máscara Marxista—por Rebecca Finch

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial

opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

Paris Office: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guéménée, 75004, Paris, France.

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Why Mozambique Closed Rhodesian Border

By Ernest Harsch

Pressure is mounting against the white supremacist regime now ruling Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).

In the wake of the setback to American and South African imperialism in Angola, the Zimbabwean freedom fighters have escalated their campaign to oust the colonial-settler regime of Ian Smith and to win Black majority rule.

At the same time, the American, British, and South African governments have stepped up efforts to engineer a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe before the struggle escapes control and threatens imperialist interests throughout southern Africa.

Beginning in February, the Zimbabwean guerrillas increased activity. This followed a recent influx of freedom fighters, who crossed into the country from camps in neighboring Mozambique.

Reporting from Salisbury, the Rhodesian capital, Martin Meredith said in the February 22 London *Sunday Times*, "The mountainous border region with Mozambique, which stretches for 800 miles, is ideal guerrilla territory. About 1,000 guerrillas have now infiltrated across the frontier, and the area of operation, once confined to the north-east, now extends to the south-east."

The Shona people, who inhabit northern and eastern Zimbabwe, also live across the border in parts of Mozambique, facilitating the guerrillas' ability to carry out actions from their bases in that country.

Nicholas Ashford reported in the March 1 London *Times* that the Rhodesian forces appeared to be heavily engaged on two fronts, one near Mount Darwin in the northeast, where earlier guerrilla campaigns had been carried out, and the other near the town of Chipinga in the south-east. Fighting has also been reported near the tourist area around Inyanga and Vumba.

In addition to the guerrillas already fighting in Zimbabwe, another 3,000 in Mozambique are reported ready to engage in action. Between 10,000 and 20,000 recruits, according to varying reports, are undergoing training in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, which borders Rhodesia on the north.

According to Meredith, Zimbabwean "sympathies lie overwhelmingly with the guerrillas." He added that "each week more disaffected black youths are leaving to join them."

New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm confirmed this account. He reported

March 1 from Umtali, in eastern Rhodesia, "Since last summer, there has been a steady exodus of youths and men across the Mozambique border to join the guerrilla forces. The defections have been particularly marked in the Roman Catholic mission schools, where in some classes most of the teen-age boys have gone."

The Smith regime is attempting to meet this growing challenge with force. The entire zone along the Mozambique border has been declared a "no-go" area, in which anyone can be shot on sight. The Rhodesians have built a 300-mile fence along the border, interspersing it with minefields.

A total of seventy-eight guerrillas were reported to have been killed by Rhodesian forces in the last three weeks of February, compared with thirteen Rhodesian troops killed in action since the beginning of the year.

However, the Rhodesian figure for the number of "terrorists" killed may also include civilians. For example, after investigating a reported massacre of civilians that occurred in June 1975, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia concluded that Rhodesian military forces had fired on a group of Africans at the Karima kraal (village) near Mount Darwin, killing nine children and four women.

A former Rhodesian soldier revealed in London February 26 that he had participated in a massacre of sixty African civilians.

In addition to this use of terror against the Zimbabwean population, Salisbury has sought to isolate the guerrillas from their civilian supporters by forcibly resettling the rural population along the borders into so-called protected villages. In the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land alone, the racist regime began in 1974 to herd an estimated 60,000 inhabitants into such "protected villages."

These villages, based on the "strategic hamlet" concept employed by Washington in Vietnam, are surrounded by barbed wire and kept under constant armed guard. They are placed under dusk-to-dawn curfew and all inhabitants over the age of thirteen are required to register with the authorities. Rhodesian forces have used clubs and electric prods to move unwilling Zimbabweans.

In a report in the February 26 *Washington Post*, Robin Wright quoted a prominent Zimbabwean political scientist, who had visited the sites, as saying, "It is no exaggeration to call them concentration

camps. They are rural slums—overcrowded, without basic facilities and unhealthy."

The measures against the African population and against the guerrillas proved only partially effective, however. With the new rise of Zimbabwean resistance to white settler rule, the Smith regime has been forced to begin mobilizing the entire white population, which numbers only about 250,000, compared with more than 6 million Blacks.

Reservists are being called up for active service as often as four times a year. All white males between the ages of 25 and 38 are subject to conscription, and those up to 55 may be drafted to perform clerical and guard duties, freeing younger troops for combat. The five-year draft exemption for new white immigrants has been cut to two years, and women have been encouraged to join up for small arms, signals, and logistics duties. A second battalion of African troops has been raised to supplement the white forces.

The Rhodesian regime now has 4,500 regular troops and 1,200 air force personnel, with about forty combat aircraft. They are supported by 8,000 police, 35,000 police reservists, and 10,000 army reservists. According to Meredith, these forces are now being stretched to their limit by the escalating guerrilla campaign.

Since the Rhodesian military has been unable to halt the movement of guerrillas into the country, it has resorted to preemptive strikes across the border into Mozambique.

On February 25, Salisbury announced that it had engaged in "hot pursuit" against a group of guerrillas. The raid against a base near Pafuri, Mozambique, reportedly took twenty-four lives. Rhodesian Defense Minister Pieter K. van der Byl defended this "hot pursuit" practice, calling it "time-hallowed."

The attack against the Pafuri base sparked a sharp reaction from the Mozambique regime. Calling it an "act of war," Mozambique President Samora Machel declared March 3 that he was closing Mozambique's border to all transportation and communication links with Rhodesia. He said the country was being placed on a war footing and ordered the seizure of all Rhodesian property in Mozambique, which included commercial transportation and storage facilities. A number of Rhodesian railway employees were arrested.

In defense against possible Rhodesian air strikes, Machel called on Mozambicans

to build air raid shelters in all major population centers and to staff anti-aircraft defenses during off-duty hours.

Following the Rhodesian attack on Pafuri, the *Times of Zambia*, a Lusaka daily owned by President Kenneth Kaunda's ruling United National Independence party, called on Zambians to prepare for war, declaring that "an attack on Mozambique is an attack on Zambia." The newspaper of Tanzania's ruling Tanganyika African National Union expressed its solidarity with the Mozambique border closing, declaring that Tanzania "is also at war."

The blocking of the two rail lines between landlocked Rhodesia and the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques), may be a serious blow to the Rhodesian economy. Because of the formal United Nations-sponsored economic embargo on the country, the Smith regime has kept its trade figures a secret. But it is estimated that at least 25 percent of Rhodesia's trade was transported through Mozambique at the time of the border closing.

The Smith regime had anticipated a possible embargo by Mozambique several months earlier, diverting much of its trade through South African ports. (When Mozambique gained its independence from Lisbon in June 1975, about 70 to 80 percent of Salisbury's trade passed through Mozambique.)

South African officials have raised doubts, however, about whether the already congested South African ports and rail lines can handle all of the Rhodesian trade affected by the border closing.

Although the impact of the Mozambique embargo on the Rhodesian economy may not be felt for a while, its effects on sagging white morale could be more immediate. Even before the current escalation of guerrilla actions, whites began to leave the country in greater numbers. According to official figures, 10,500 whites emigrated in 1975, the highest number since 1965.


Reporter James MacManus commented in the March 1 issue of the British daily *Guardian* that "many whites are having second thoughts about their role in a Rhodesian version of Custer's last stand."

One aim of the embargo was evidently to put more pressure on Smith in the negotiations he is conducting with a wing of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement.

The fact that Machel's action was backed by Kaunda and Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere—two of the key figures in the efforts to reach a negotiated settlement—added greater weight to this pressure.

Since mid-December 1975, Smith has been holding closed-door talks with a faction of the African National Council (ANC) led by Joshua Nkomo.

The present ANC was formed in December 1974 from a formal merger of the four



main Zimbabwean nationalist groups: the Zimbabwe African People's Union led by Nkomo, the Zimbabwe African National Union led by Ndabaningi Sithole, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe led by James Chikerema, and the old African National Council led by Abel Muzorewa.

In August 1975 the enlarged ANC split, with Nkomo gaining control of the ANC apparatus within Zimbabwe and with Sithole, Chikerema, and Muzorewa leading the ANC faction based outside of the country. Nkomo is the only one of the four leaders who has been allowed to function within Zimbabwe by the Rhodesian authorities.

So far, the Smith-Nkomo talks have been largely window dressing for Smith's attempts to stall for time. Although the details of the negotiations have not been revealed, Nkomo continues publicly to call for majority rule.

For the racist white settlers, however, the loss of political control would mean an end to their privileged social position, which is based on the dispossession and domination of the Zimbabwean population.

In his New Year's message, Smith proclaimed, "Unless the agreement guarantees the retention of government in civilized and responsible hands, not short-term, not medium-term, but for all time, then it is unacceptable and I shall have no part in it." Several weeks later he declared that "there can be no question of capitulation to demands for early black rule."

Nkomo has come under pressure from the other nationalist leaders, who have denounced his participation in the talks with Smith. Elliott M. Gabellah, a representative of the ANC faction opposed to Nkomo, declared in Salisbury February 6 that the negotiations were "a waste of time that will produce negative results."

A correspondent for the London monthly *Africa* magazine reported in the March issue, "Joshua Nkomo, on his part, is faced

with the growing militancy in his own ranks and the African population in general who have come to the conclusion that, given the regime's present frame of mind, the talks are a futile exercise."

With the negotiations deadlocked and sentiment for liberation on the rise, the British government has stepped up efforts to defuse the explosive situation.

Still officially the colonial ruler of Rhodesia (no government in the world has recognized the settlers' 1965 declaration of "independence" from Britain), London has increased pressure on Smith during the past few weeks to make concessions to the Black majority before it is "too late." British officials have stressed the danger of a war in Zimbabwe spreading into a "general race war" throughout southern Africa, in which Britain has substantial economic and political interests.

London is also concerned about the possible impact that its role in Zimbabwe could have on British investments in Black-ruled Africa—or in Zimbabwe itself after white settler rule is ended. Robert B. Semple reported in the March 8 *New York Times*, "Some businessmen have been telling Members of Parliament privately that Britain's long-term commercial ties lie with the blacks, and that these interests must not be jeopardized by diplomatic efforts that—however well intentioned, and how misperceived they may be by African militants—cast Britain in an unfavorable light."

To induce Smith to compromise, British officials have declared that London will not come to the white regime's rescue. London warned Salisbury February 18 that "no British government . . . would commit British troops on the continent of Africa in a war on behalf of the minority against the majority. It would be madness to do so." The February 21 *London Economist* commented that British military intervention was "liable to be misinterpreted by black Africans."

London, however, has not totally ruled out the possibility of sending troops to Zimbabwe. British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan told the House of Commons February 18 that troops might be sent if the Rhodesians accepted British sovereignty.

Dana Adams Schmidt reported in the March 4 *Christian Science Monitor* that should Smith accede to British authority, "David Ennals, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs dealing with Africa, has told the British House of Commons that Britain might be willing to take [an] active hand in working out a new black-majority regime—and, if necessary, to defend the whites."

As a further sign of pressure on the Smith regime, London, on March 3, declared its support for the Mozambique embargo and called for international aid to Mozambique to offset economic losses resulting from the border closing. Under

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Edward Rowlands told the House of Commons that the Mozambique action made it "even more important" for Smith to accept a transition to majority rule.

The March 3 *Guardian* indicated that London would also be ready to take part in the negotiations under certain circumstances: "If Mr. Nkomo holds in his hands an agreement to transfer power that he finds satisfactory, then Britain may be useful in easing the transition. If Ian Smith renounces UDI [the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence], then Britain again has a role as constitutional conference covenor."

Lord Greenhill, a leading British diplomat, was sent to Salisbury February 24 to confer with Smith and Nkomo. Bernard D. Nossiter reported in the February 25 *Washington Post* that if Greenhill was told by Smith that the white regime was ready to turn power over to the Black majority, "the British government will take part in talks between blacks and whites to settle the details."

New York Times correspondent Michael T. Kaufman reported in a February 24 dispatch from Salisbury, "This morning, Joshua Nkomo . . . said that he welcomed the British intervention and asserted that it had always been his view that 'only Britain could give independence to this country.' At a press conference held in a suburban black township, Mr. Nkomo declared, 'Britain must discharge her responsibility to the people of this country.'"

Other Zimbabweans had a different view of Britain's "responsibilities." On February 26 hundreds of Black supporters of the ANC faction opposed to Nkomo demonstrated in Salisbury against Greenhill's visit.

The leaders of that faction refused to meet with Greenhill while he was in the area and described his trip as "irrelevant." According to Geoffrey Godsell in the March 1 *Christian Science Monitor*, this implied "that they felt an early guerrilla victory over Rhodesia's whites led by Prime Minister Ian Smith was a certainty and might only be delayed by the British envoy's parleying."

Washington has thrown its diplomatic weight behind London's efforts to avoid a "race war" in Zimbabwe. A State Department spokesman declared February 20, "We are calling on Mr. Smith and the white regime to negotiate realistically and seize what well may be their last opportunity for a negotiated settlement."

"Mr. Smith and his minority regime cannot have any illusions that Britain, or any other country for that matter, could be called upon to rescue or protect them from armed conflict."

According to State Department sources, Secretary of State Kissinger is personally keeping a close daily watch on "critical areas" in southern Africa.

While backing Britain's diplomatic efforts, Washington has at the same time warned that it would actively oppose any attempts by Moscow or Havana to become involved in the Zimbabwe conflict as they had in the Angolan civil war. In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations March 4, Kissinger warned the Cubans to "act with great circumspection because our actions cannot be deduced from what we did in Angola."

Two days later, Kissinger urged Smith to "show flexibility" in the negotiations and reminded the Rhodesian regime that "the time for settlement is now running out." He then returned to the timeworn theme of denouncing "outside agitators," saying, "we do not accept the proposition that Cuba has the right to intervene in this country."

His primary concern, however, is that a massive freedom struggle could emerge in Zimbabwe, escaping control of the traditional leadership. This fear is shared by South Africa.

Although Pretoria was the most important backer of the Smith regime after the whites staged their 1965 coup, Prime Minister John Vorster has applied pressure on Smith since late 1974 to reach a settlement with the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. He is well aware of the impact a Black upsurge in Zimbabwe would have on the Black population of South Africa itself.

Following the closing of the Mozambique border with Rhodesia, Vorster made a speech in the South African Parliament, which, according to *New York Times* correspondent Kamm, fell far short of any South African commitment to come to Smith's aid.

Guardian correspondent Stanley Uys said in a March 3 dispatch from Cape Town, "Official circles here are expressing the fervent wish—privately—that Smith will understand the message Machel is sending him and settle quickly with

Rhodesian nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo."

The February 26 *New York Times* reported that "it was learned last week in Johannesburg that South Africa has conveyed to the Government here [Salisbury] its warning that under no circumstances would it commit its own army to the defense of Rhodesia though it might continue to supply arms."

However, an unnamed South African general, cited by *Time* magazine correspondent Lee Griggs in the March 8 issue, stated that "there will certainly be some volunteers to go and fight." □

Shah's Oil Revenues May Be Halved

According to the February 13 *Middle East Economic Survey*, Iran's potential oil exports may have been overestimated by the National Iranian Oil Company. Export potential, currently figured at 6 million barrels a day, appears "likely to slip to something like 3.5 million barrels a day by the early 1980s," according to the report.

If correct, this slowdown in oil exports could seriously cut into forecasted petroleum revenues, currently projected at about \$30 billion a year.

The report attributes the expected decline both to troubles in overall yield and to rapid jumps in Iran's internal oil consumption.

Costa Rica Resumes Trade With Cuba

Costa Rica has renewed commercial ties with Cuba with the sale of 4,000 tons of beans for \$2 million, according to an announcement by the Costa Rican Export Promotion Center February 27. It was the first trade deal between the two countries since 1964, when the Organization of American States imposed economic sanctions on Havana.

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New York Rally Protests Torture of Iranian Dissidents

By José Pérez

[The following article appeared in the March 12 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

NEW YORK—Three hundred people attended a February 26 meeting at Columbia University on "Repression in Iran," a country described by one speaker as having "the worst record on human rights in the world."

The event was sponsored by the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI). The featured speaker was Dr. Reza Baraheni, who is Iran's most prominent modern poet and literary critic and is now living in exile after having spent 102 days in the shah's prisons in 1973.

Baraheni was released and allowed to leave the country after protests from organizations such as Amnesty International; the International Association of Poets, Playwrights, Editors, Essayists and Novelists (PEN); and CAIFI.

Other speakers included former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark; Eric Bentley, playwright and literary critic; Ivan Morris, head of the board of Amnesty International, USA; Muriel Rukeyser, president of the American Center of PEN; Prof. Aijaz Ahmad of Rutgers University; and Bahram Atai, a national field secretary of CAIFI.

Referring to the long history of U.S. support to the shah since he was installed as dictator by a CIA coup in 1953, Baraheni said, "Americans should know that support to the shah is support to an illegal government that throttles all human rights."

He reported that there are 100,000 political prisoners in the shah's jails, and that executions during the past three years have averaged two a week.

In January 1976 alone, eleven people were officially executed and eight others killed in "shoot-outs" with the police.

Baraheni told of his experience in prison at the hands of the SAVAK, Iran's U.S.-trained political police.

"The torture is unavoidable," he said. "On the second day of my imprisonment I was strapped on a bed and given seventy-five blows with a wire whip on the bottom of my feet."

He described the other methods of torture meted out to political prisoners: electric shock; rape; enemas with boiling water; plucking of the nails and teeth; and



Frank Samson/CAIFI Newsletter

Speakers at meeting: Reza Baraheni (at microphone), Nasrin Pakizegi (CAIFI), Eric Bentley, Ivan Morris, Ramsey Clark, Muriel Rukeyser, Aijaz Ahmad, and Bahram Atai.

electrically wired iron bed designed to burn the person placed on it; and pressing of the skull in a vise, sometimes until it breaks.

He described how one young girl, five or six years old, was beaten so that she would disclose the identity of other prisoners placed before her.

In another incident he saw a young man brought in, tortured for four or five hours, then dumped back in the cell totally disfigured and near death. He was dragged out the following day again to be tortured, and was never seen again.

Baraheni also spoke in detail about the plight of oppressed ethnic groups in Iran, who comprise a majority of the population. Of the 34 million people, only 14 to 16 million are Persians, yet the Persian language is the only one allowed in schools and in books and magazines.

Other speakers detailed aspects of U.S. complicity with the shah's regime and outlined ways to protest repression in Iran.

Eric Bentley described how the shah uses annual arts festivals to give his regime a liberal image by inviting avant-garde theater groups. He urged "my colleagues in the theater and music" to publicly refuse to take part in such shows.

Ivan Morris urged that similar boycotts be carried out by tourists, labeling the shah's despotism "monstrous."

Ramsey Clark detailed the cases of several political prisoners. He told of a producer who was sentenced to eleven years in prison for staging a play by Maxim Gorky, and an actor who was given three years for reading lines from the same play.

Referring to the 1953 CIA coup that brought the shah to power, Clark said: "Americans are responsible for the conduct of their country. . . . It's our business here and everywhere to stand up for fundamental human rights."

Prof. Aijaz Ahmad described the militarization of Iran, explaining that the United States is supplying the regime with billions of dollars in arms each year. He urged that protests be organized against U.S. military complicity with the dictatorship.

CAIFI's Bahram Atai explained to the audience that a group of Maoists, claiming to represent the Iranian Students Association, had attempted to disrupt several of Baraheni's recent meetings. He read a statement signed by forty individuals and organizations supporting Baraheni's right to free speech.

Atai noted that although the Maoists had asserted that Baraheni was a "traitor" and a SAVAK agent, they had produced no proof of the allegation, and their statements could only be considered scurrilous slander.

The meeting voted unanimously to support Baraheni's right to free speech, and no attempt at a disruption took place.

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Mao Regales Nixon With 'Eight-Jeweled Pigeon'

By David Frankel



Conrad/Los Angeles Times

"Even for Richard Nixon, it was an extraordinary and dubious venture. There was the ex-President, thoroughly disgraced in his own country, being treated in Peking as if he still occupied the Oval Office and Watergate meant nothing more than a fancy apartment building."

Time magazine's reaction to Nixon's visit to China was typical of the comment in the American capitalist press. The *Washington Post* characterized Nixon's junket as "perverse," "irresponsible," and "intolerable."

The editors said, "... the visit is a piece of pure diplomatic and political mischief-making, half ego trip and half kowtow. Its only redeeming aspect is the evidence it offers of how wise the American people were to drum this disgraced figure out of the White House 18 months ago."

Senator Barry Goldwater, once one of Nixon's admirers, suggested February 25 that "if he wants to do this country a favor he might stay over there."

New York *Daily News* columnist James Wieghart called the trip "a monumental insult to the citizens of the United States... a sick practical joke on the United States..."

"A sleazy act" was the verdict of columnist Joseph Kraft.

There was considerable speculation in the mass media as to why the Chinese government should send a private plane to transport the despised criminal across the Pacific. The Maoist regime acted as if Nixon were a famous and respected leader,

a man who carries weight within American ruling circles.

Some bourgeois commentators have suggested that the show put on by Mao, featuring Nixon as No. 1 hero in the United States, was a maneuver in China's internal politics. China is one of the few countries in the world where such a deception could be successful. The regime is able to get away with the fraud because it has never reported the details of Watergate to the Chinese people, using the pretext that the scandal was an "internal affair" of the United States.

Whatever calculations the Maoist bureaucrats may have had on this score, it was certainly ironic that Mao was entertaining Nixon, formerly the head of the world's chief imperialist power, while Teng Hsiao-ping was being attacked as a source of the "right deviationist wind" who was "taking the capitalist road in the interests of the landlord and bourgeois classes." Teng, a member of the Chinese Communist party for decades, was one of its central leaders until his downfall during the Cultural Revolution.

Nixon's trip also coincided with the opening of the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Soviet Communist party in Moscow. It served as a forceful reminder of Peking's world role and partly overshadowed the opening of the Soviet party congress, at least in the American press.

The timing of the trip was also significant from Gerald Ford's point of view. While the bureaucrats in Peking stuffed Nixon with "eight-jeweled pigeon" and mandarin fish and displayed him in the company of Mao and acting Premier Hua Kuo-feng, voters in New Hampshire were being reminded of Watergate and how Ford came to be president in the first place.

"I don't think it hurt Mr. Ford," Senator Goldwater argued. "I don't think the average American has enough respect for Mr. Nixon anymore to really believe that what he's doing is in anybody's interest but Mr. Nixon's."

Congressman Wayne L. Hays disagreed. He claimed that Nixon's trip did hurt Ford's campaign, adding, "I think it's a little ungrateful of him, in view of the fact that Mr. Ford pardoned him."

Finally, Mao's invitation brought Nixon to Peking on the fourth anniversary of his first China visit, when Mao achieved his longtime goal of establishing diplomatic ties with American imperialism at the expense of the Soviet Union and a united

front against the aggressive aims of world capitalism.

Perhaps Mao is only trying to show today that he is willing to deal with anybody, no matter how reactionary, if it fits in with the narrow nationalistic interests of the bureaucratic ruling caste. However, the main implication of the invitation to Nixon certainly seemed to be that Mao regards Ford and Kissinger as not belligerent enough in their attitude toward the Kremlin.

That was how the *New York Times* read Mao's main objective. "What would Chinese officialdom think," the editors asked February 24, "if the White House engineered a journey to the United States by Teng Hsiao-ping (on the assumption he could be found) as a means of administering a public rebuke to the present regime?"

On the other hand, Mao's message to the American ruling class was backed up by none other than the *Wall Street Journal*, which has reasons of its own for advocating greater military spending and a harder line toward Moscow.

In its February 20 editorial, the *Journal* suggested that "closer Sino-American relations have altered the world balance of power, presenting a formidable counterweight to Soviet expansion. But this accomplishment is jeopardized by the apparent inability of the United States to stand up to the Soviets at Helsinki, in Angola, in the strategic arms negotiations



Herblock/New York Post

and elsewhere."

In what way the American ruling class may turn Mao's move to account remains to be seen. As for the supporters of the Mao regime, they have tended to remain silent. For all their dexterity in defending "Mao

Tsetung Thought," they find it difficult to paint up the reception given Nixon, the perpetrator of the most savage bombing campaign in history, as a victory for socialism.

What are the views of the Vietnamese,

who suffered under Nixon's B-52 bombers and napalm? What about the millions throughout the world who took to the streets against the imperialist slaughter in Vietnam? What do they think of Mao's warm reception for the butcher? □

Japanese Executive Admits Receiving '100 Peanuts' From Lockheed

America's Hottest Export Item—Watergate Scandals

By Steve Clark

"You are exporting your Watergate," a former Dutch official complained to *New York Times* correspondent Clyde H. Farnsworth. (*New York Times*, February 24.)

He was referring to the series of corporate bribery and payoff exposures that have been in the headlines since early February. The spectacular details of international bribery engaged in by American multinational corporations came to light in hearings of a Senate Subcommittee chaired by Senator Frank Church.

Between 1958 and 1972, it was learned, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation paid \$12.6 million in bribes to various Japanese government officials to create a "climate of goodwill" toward their sales efforts. Lockheed also paid \$1.1 million between 1961 and 1972 to Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands—husband of Queen Juliana. The regal influence-peddler is a director of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and the Fokker Aircraft Company.

These revelations led to further admissions and accusations. Nearly forty major American corporations have now been implicated in payoffs to officials of no fewer than twenty foreign governments. The sums involved range from hundreds of thousands of dollars to *hundreds of millions of dollars*. (See accompanying box.)

Many businesses hope to stem inquiries by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Internal Revenue Service into their tax reports in those years. By publicly admitting some of their misdeeds, these corporations would like to create the impression that henceforth everything will be on the "up and up."

The latest revelations have direct links with the Watergate investigation. While looking into corporate giveaways to Nixon's 1972 campaign, special prosecutors unearthed the existence of large, shadowy overseas payments.

Several sensational disclosures were made before the present round of scandals. Payments of \$1.25 million by United Brands ("Chiquita Banana") to government officials in Honduras were revealed early last year, leading to two notable results: the corporation's chairman, Eli



Herblock/Washington Post

Black, escaped further investigation by leaping from a top floor of a New York skyscraper; and the government of Honduras President Oswaldo López Arellano was toppled by the military.

Following other revelations linking Gulf Oil and the Northrop Corporation to foreign payoffs, the boards of directors of both companies fired their chairmen.

The Lockheed disclosures, however, have been the most far-reaching in their ramifications.

In the United States, Lockheed's chairman, Daniel J. Haughton, and its president, A.C. Kotchian, have both resigned. More importantly, these revelations and their spinoffs struck yet another blow at the pretenses to honesty of a ruling class already hard hit by numerous domestic scandals.

The CIA, FBI, and virtually all other American governmental institutions have

suffered a considerable decline in public esteem.

Many Americans cannot help but remember Washington's bailout of Lockheed in 1971. To save their No. 1 defense contractor from bankruptcy, Nixon and Congress guaranteed up to \$250 million of taxpayers' money to back up Lockheed's outstanding loans. Now the American people discover that this figure is just a little more than Lockheed shelled out for its overseas bribes and "commissions."

On top of that, the government's General Accounting Office predicted in February that Lockheed may be unable to meet its 1978 repayment deadline, and that Washington may again come to its rescue. The corporation's financial health was certainly not helped by the current scandal. Already it stands to lose its \$1.3 billion contract with Japan for Orion antisubmarine aircraft; the government of Colombia has announced that it will purchase no more Lockheed products until the company discloses the names of officials it bribed; and other cancellations may follow.

"The implications for the stability of other countries could be extremely serious," Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned in mid-February.

The biggest impact so far has been on Japan, where parliamentary hearings on the payoffs are now under way. According to a report in the March 8 *Newsweek*, "It was the most intense investigation in the nation's postwar history, and it showed what the Lockheed scandal had become for Japan—as the mass-circulation newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* put it, 'literally a matter of life and death for its politics and government.'"

Lockheed's \$12.6 million dealings in Japan are the largest payoffs yet disclosed. For its "efforts," Lockheed received a government contract for 230 F-104 Starfighters in 1959 (a 300 million dollar catch); the sale of six Tristar jets in 1972 to All-Nippon Airways, a private corporation; and that same year a \$1.3 billion government deal for a fleet of Orion antisubmarine planes.

Former Lockheed President A.C. Kotchi-

Ten of the Biggest Spenders

Nearly 40 large American corporations have been accused of paying bribes or questionable "commissions" to win contracts overseas. Ten of the biggest admitted spenders:

Ashland Oil, Inc.	Admits paying more than \$300,000 to foreign officials, including \$150,000 to President Albert Bernard Bongo of Gabon to retain mineral and refining rights.
Burroughs Corp.	Admits that \$1.5 million in corporate funds may have been used in improper payments to foreign officials.
Exxon Corp.	Admits paying \$740,000 to government officials and others in three countries. Admits its Italian subsidiary made \$27 million in secret but legal contributions to seven Italian political parties.
Gulf Oil Corp	Admits paying \$4 million to South Korea's ruling political party. Admits giving \$460,000 to Bolivian officials—including a \$110,000 helicopter to the late President René Barrientos Ortuño—for oil rights.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.	Admits giving \$202 million in commissions, payoffs and bribes to foreign agents and government officials in the Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Turkey and other countries. Admits that \$22 million of this sum went for outright bribes.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.	Admits paying \$2.5 million in commissions and consultant fees between 1970 and 1975 to foreign government officials.
Merck & Co., Inc.	Admits giving \$3 million, largely in "commission-type payments," to employees of 36 foreign governments between 1968 and 1975.
Northrop Corp.	Admits in part SEC charges that it paid \$30 million in commissions and bribes to government officials and agents in Holland, Iran, France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Malaysia and Taiwan.
G.D. Searle & Co.	Admits paying \$1.3 million to foreign governmental employees from 1973 to 1975 to "obtain sales of products or services."
United Brands Co.	Admits paying a \$1,250,000 bribe to Honduran officials for a reduction in the banana export tax. Admits paying \$750,000 to European officials. Investigators say the payment was made to head off proposed Italian restrictions on banana imports.

Newsweek

an estimated in testimony before the Church committee that about \$2.8 million had been paid directly to high-ranking Japanese officials. He said that Hiro Hiyama, chairman of the large Marubeni Corporation in Japan, was among the top Marubeni officials who "urged" Lockheed to make the payoffs.

Marubeni has served as Lockheed's agent in Japan since the late 1950s, and it "laundered" many of its American client's bribe payments through those years. One Marubeni executive acknowledged receipt of a Lockheed fund shipment by signing a note that read, "I received One Hundred Peanuts." (A Lockheed auditor has reported that "100 peanuts" meant 100 million yen, the equivalent of US \$333,000.)

Another \$7 million of Lockheed money was funneled to Yoshio Kodama, a right-wing nationalist and militarist who exer-

cises considerable influence within Japan's ruling bourgeois party, the Liberal Democrats. Kodama was scheduled to receive \$9 million more for helping to clinch Lockheed's Orion deal. Part of the money was reportedly targeted for Kodama himself, while part was set aside for bribes.

A news release from the Pacific News Service by Akio Yamakawa and Martha Winnacker provides some interesting background on Kodama:

"Kodama—considered by many the undisputed 'godfather' of Japan's two-million strong underworld—is also a key figure in the right wing of the LDP [Liberal Democratic party]. . . .

"Kodama heads two federations including some 30 underworld organizations—from dedicated nationalists who train rigorously for future military action to

gangsters running prostitution rings and hotels. . . .

"His money helped found one of the two LDP predecessors—whose main platform was support for the wartime emperor and many of whose members were on lists to be purged by the U.S. occupation for their wartime role.

"And he was instrumental in choosing at least two prime ministers in the 1950's, continuing as a major financier and power broker in the party."

These disclosures have placed the current Liberal Democratic government in a quandary. Two former premiers from the party—Kakuei Tanaka and Nobusuke Kishi—have been implicated in the affair, and as Yamakawa and Winnacker point out, "Now Kodama is in the spotlight, and his dual role as underworld leader and behind-the-scenes political manipulator threatens to bring the entire post-war relationship between the right-wing underworld and the LDP into the open."

Japanese Premier Takeo Miki is attempting to make a big show of his determination to get to the bottom of the scandal. He has demanded that the U.S. government turn over the names of all current and former officials implicated in the Lockheed payoffs—a demand that has not yet met with a positive response in Washington. "Grave concern has spread throughout Japan," Miki wrote President Ford in late February, "that if the issue is not solved with the names of the officials involved remaining in doubt, democracy in Japan may suffer a fatal blow."

There is good reason to believe, however, that Miki's request may not be entirely sincere. According to the March 5 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Miki's "Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa also indicated later that 'full disclosure' without all relative facts would jeopardize the 'basic human rights' of those exposed."

The March 1 *Newsweek* reported that a high Japanese government official expressed concern that pursuing the identities of the bribed officials could "start a fire that might grow too big for us to control."

Meanwhile, hearings are taking place before the Japanese parliament, and—reminiscent of the Watergate hearings in the United States—they are being televised and watched by millions of viewers.

So far, however, the hearings have uncovered little more than a string of denials by secondary figures in the scandal. Neither Kodama, who recently suffered a stroke, nor Kitchian, who as an American citizen is not obliged to comply with his subpoena, are likely to appear before the committee. Former Premier Tanaka will reportedly not be called to testify.

On February 24 the government staged well-publicized police raids on the Tokyo offices of Lockheed and Marubeni, and on the homes of Kodama and others implicat-

ed in the payoffs. Despite the crates of documents carried off by police, the raids were primarily a government publicity stunt.

"The sweep was given big headlines in tonight's papers," a *Washington Post* dispatch from Tokyo reported, "and television film of the searches seems certain to create a favorable impression on the Japanese public, which has grown impatient for a strenuous investigation."

According to the March 1 *Newsweek*, "...the country's largest labor union, Sohyo, rallied masses of snake-dancing workers demanding a thorough probe and disclosure of the names." Other demonstrations and protests have also occurred, demanding a full airing of the links between government, big business, and the right-wing underworld.

"The Lockheed affair had the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in disarray," the March 8 *Newsweek* reported, "with two large factions openly threatening to bolt and form new parties of their own. . . ." Since the end of World War II, the Liberal Democrats have been Japan's only major bourgeois party, and both the Socialist and Communist parties have gained ground on them over the years.

The specter of a broadening public reaction to the Lockheed affair is terrifying to the Liberal Democrats because of the growing social unrest. Unemployment is at its highest level in sixteen years.

The payoffs scandal has also had reverberations elsewhere in Asia and in Europe and Latin America.

- In the Netherlands, the Dutch cabinet has empowered a special commission to investigate the charges against Prince Bernhard. "If the commission cannot clear the Prince, the Queen might have to abdicate," one cabinet member said, according to the February 23 *Newsweek*.

By itself this consideration would most likely stir only minor worries, but the cabinet member added, "If we don't handle this carefully, the government will fall."

- In Italy the former president of the Campania regional assembly has been sentenced to seven years in prison for accepting \$125,000 in bribes from Mobil Oil Corporation; a search has been launched for the former president of a state-affiliated concern who is suspected of funneling bribe money for Lockheed; and Luigi Gui, a former defense minister, has been forced to step down from his current post as minister of the interior.

- In Germany the government is investigating allegations that Franz Josef Strauss, head of the rightist Christian Social Union in Bavaria, received Lockheed funds in 1958 when he was defense minister.

- In Venezuela that country's delegate to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was forced to resign and stand trial along with seven other persons on charges of accepting bribes



Japanese workers demonstrating to demand an investigation of Lockheed payoff scandal.

from the Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

- Probes, trials, or calls for investigations have occurred in Turkey, Belgium, Greece, Egypt, Colombia, Spain, Australia, Iran, and Switzerland.

"It has been members of the ruling establishment in foreign lands who have expressed the deepest resentment [against the payoff disclosures by U.S. corporations]," *New York Times* correspondent Farnsworth reported February 23, "and they have spoken of 'destabilizing' political effects."

He said that West German Finance Minister Hans Apel "has spoken of the 'drift and self-destruction' in Washington." Strauss, himself implicated in the affair, called the Church subcommittee hearings the "monthly American passion play."

The reaction of many politicians and business figures around the world was summed up quite well by the complaint of one Japanese business executive: "As a result of Lockheed, businessmen have lost their trust in the honor of these big American companies who will squeal on their partners and agents."

American capitalists, in turn, have piously responded that they are simply victims of the "standards" of other countries, where bribery is supposedly a "way of life." Chase Manhattan's David Rockefeller said in Iran recently, "I think this has been a custom in many parts of the world for decades, maybe centuries, and that American companies have only been among many others that have done it." (*New York Daily News*, March 4.)

Despite these charges and counter-

charges, what really worries the wealthy rulers throughout the capitalist world is their declining moral and ideological hold on radicalized workers and youth.

Disclosures of gross government and corporate corruption make it more difficult for the capitalist governments to carry through austerity measures smoothly, and for major corporations to justify layoffs, speedups, and cuts in real wages.

Such revelations also increase the likelihood that militant workers and students will draw radical conclusions as they engage in struggles to defend their democratic rights and living standards.

An editorial in the February 12 *Le Monde* put it this way:

"Young people in many countries find it much harder to get used to this sort of realism. When political classes or even systems of government become discredited, the attraction of revolutionary parties, despite their dogmatism, stems to a large degree from a rather refreshing concern for moral purity. . . ."

"When 'very realistic' democracies elevate political immorality to the level of an institution, then virtue recovers all its subversive powers." □

Wave of Arrests in Uruguay

A government crackdown on dissidents in Uruguay has led to the arrest of "hundreds, perhaps thousands," of persons and driven at least thirty to take asylum in the Mexican embassy in Montevideo, according to a March 3 Associated Press dispatch.

Washington Lifts Trade Embargo Against Angola

The State Department announced March 2 that it was ending the embargo on commercial U.S. shipments to Angola, where the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) has defeated its nationalist rivals.

The move came a little more than a week after the White House approved Gulf Oil's efforts to negotiate with the MPLA for resumption of its drilling operations in Angola. Gulf is the largest foreign investor in Angola.

The Ford administration has also okayed Boeing's delivery of two jets to the Luanda regime.

In December 1975, when Washington was funneling arms and money to the MPLA's rivals, the State Department blocked the delivery of the two Boeings and pressured Gulf into suspending operations and placing royalty and tax payments to the MPLA in an escrow account. By that time, Gulf had already paid the MPLA \$116 million.

In addition to allowing the resumption of trade, the State Department has also begun preparations to provide technical and economic assistance to Luanda, if such a course is agreed on by Ford and the Congress.

The February 25 *Christian Science Monitor* reported, "Daniel Parker, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), says in an interview that while no specific requests for assistance have come from the MPLA, the U.S. agency had already made a 'computer print out' of officials with background and language training who could serve in Angola."

Washington has made it clear, however, that these steps do not mean that it is ready to grant diplomatic recognition to the MPLA regime at this time. State Department officials have stressed that a prerequisite for recognition would be the withdrawal of Cuban troops now in Angola.

Secretary of State Kissinger said March 4 that Washington would be "having consultations in an open-minded way" on possible diplomatic recognition of the MPLA "once it is clear they are indeed a government of African origin and not totally beholden to foreign influence."

The regime of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre, one of Washington's main allies in Black-ruled Africa, has already come to terms with the MPLA. Mobutu signaled his intentions in this regard as early as January 24, when he said, "... sentimentally, we support the F.N.L.A. of Holden



AGOSTINHO NETO

Roberto." But, "things having turned out the way they have, no more sentimentality on our part."

The official Zaïrean news agency Azap announced February 28 that Mobutu was "normalizing" relations with the Luanda regime. The announcement followed a meeting in Brazzaville, the capital of the Congo Republic, between Mobutu and MPLA leader Agostinho Neto. The meeting was arranged by Congolese President Marien Ngouabi, a longtime backer of the MPLA.

Only a few days earlier, the foreign ministers of Angola and Zaïre had attacked each other during a meeting of the Organization of African Unity. Each charged that the other's government had committed acts of "piracy" during the Angolan civil war.

After the meeting with Neto, however, Mobutu declared, "We have gone beyond a simple recognition. We have both reached our objective—the respect for the territorial integrity of each state." As part of their accord, both Mobutu and Neto agreed not to allow military activity to be carried out against the other from their territories.

A communiqué signed by the two presidents stipulated that the MPLA's main rivals, the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—Angolan National

Liberation Front) and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), must leave Zaïre immediately. The FNLA has maintained a headquarters in Zaïre since the early 1960s and was backed by Mobutu throughout the Angolan civil war.

The communiqué stated that the two groups were being expelled "in order not to undermine relations between the two countries."

The Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC—Cabinda Liberation Front), a Cabindan separatist group based in Zaïre, was also ordered to cease its activities.

In return, Neto agreed to turn 6,000 former Katangese gendarmes over to Mobutu. The Katangese in Angola had been supporters of the Belgian-backed Katanga secessionist regime in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaïre) in the early 1960s and are opposed to Mobutu.

Neto and Mobutu also agreed to allow the estimated one million Angolan refugees in Zaïre "freely" to return to Angola. Most of the refugees are Bakongos, the traditional base of support of the FNLA, who had been driven out of Angola in the early 1960s by the Portuguese colonialists. The Zaïrean regime had complained recently that the refugees were a burden on its economy, which is now in a severe slump.

One of the causes of Zaïre's economic difficulties was the closure during the civil war of Angola's Benguela railway, which in normal times transported about 70 percent of Zaïre's copper exports. The Mobutu-Neto accord included a pledge by Luanda that it would guarantee common communications between the two countries, an apparent reference to the reopening of the Benguela railway.

The Zambian regime of Kenneth Kaunda remains the only major Black African government not to have recognized the Luanda regime. Kaunda has indicated, however, that such a recognition may be forthcoming.

Before returning to Angola, Neto declared in Brazzaville March 1 that the MPLA would aid the liberation movements in Namibia (South-West Africa) and in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). "We cannot limit ourselves to our own independence," he said. "Our people . . . will extend their action to liberate other countries like Namibia, at present occupied by the racists, and Rhodesia, which can achieve independence only through armed struggle."

An MPLA representative clarified Neto's remarks the following day. While confirming that the MPLA would give assistance to other independence forces, he denied that this would involve the use of MPLA troops in those countries. "We have no intention," he said, "of crossing our own borders. . . ." □

A Statement on Healy's Frame-up of Hansen and Novack

By Betty Hamilton and Pierre Lambert

[The following article, translated by *Intercontinental Press*, appeared in the February 27-March 4 issue (No. 740) of *Informations Ouvrières*, the weekly publication of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI), whose headquarters are in Paris.

[Betty Hamilton, who has been in the revolutionary Marxist movement for fifty years, was one of the founders of the Socialist Labour League (later the Workers Revolutionary party). She is thus able to speak of the methods followed by Gerry Healy from years of firsthand experience.

[Pierre Lambert is editor of *Informations Ouvrières* and one of the leaders of the Comité d'Organisation Pour la Reconstruction de la Quatrième Internationale, the international formation to which the OCI adheres. Together with Healy, he was one of the leaders of the sector of the International Committee that rejected joining in the reunification of the Fourth International in 1963. However, because of deepening political and organizational differences, the OCI broke from the Healyite wing in 1971.]

* * *

We have read the indescribable articles written at the orders of G. Healy attempting to prove that Joseph Hansen and George Novack are agents of the CIA and the NKVD.¹ We confess that we found it very difficult to force ourselves to read these "articles." But we considered it our duty as representatives of our organizations in the International Committee of the Fourth International—which was formed in 1953 by the Socialist Workers party (SWP), the Socialist Labour League (SLL), the PCI (Parti Communiste Internationaliste, now the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste), and the Swiss and Chinese organizations—to express our solidarity and sympathy with the SWP. We decided to draft this statement not only as founding members of the International Committee but also as representatives of the SLL and the OCI (PCI), which, in disagreement with the SWP, decided in 1963 to maintain the International Com-

mittee.

We accuse Gerry Healy of unscrupulously rigging up a whole scenario in the hope that it would prove difficult to unravel such a tangle of lies, baseless insinuations, and gratuitous suppositions from facts no one denies. He did this to try to create an impression of "impartiality" so as to justify the slanderous amalgam he is putting together against the SWP and two of its leaders.

False accusations, slander, and lies have always been a specialty in which the representatives of ruling and oppressor classes have excelled. But the direct representatives of the ruling class have clearly been surpassed in this by those in the workers movement who subordinated themselves to the interests of the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks, for example, had to maintain that Lenin was an "agent of the Kaiser," just as later the Stalinists were to claim that Trotsky was an "agent of the Gestapo." So, in a historical period when the struggle for the emancipation of humanity is inseparable from the fight to free the working class from leaderships chained to imperialism, through the struggle to rebuild the Fourth International, it is extremely important to keep this counterrevolutionary tradition of lies and slanders from filtering into the ranks of the vanguard.

The only justification for the monstrous accusations raised against Joseph Hansen and George Novack—and, in fact, as we will show later, against the SWP leadership and against Leon Trotsky himself—would be if they were based on grave evidence against them, on proofs, on documents from which it could logically be deduced that whether or not they were guilty of the crimes charged against them that at least an inquiry was necessary.

A Very Peculiar Logic

However, the elaborate fabrication of G. Healy collapses like a house of cards the minute you begin to apply this basic criterion. When it comes to Hansen and Novack (the nominal targets of this attack), the scheme is reduced to a very peculiar brand of logic which Vyshinsky tried to make respectable but which certainly has nothing to do with the traditions of our movement.

Joseph Hansen had a meeting with the U.S. consul in Mexico. Well, an American consul has to be an FBI agent. So, Hansen, since he had a meeting with an FBI agent,

is himself one, or could be.

What conclusions, then, should we draw from the fact that after the murder of L. Sedov, Leon Trotsky not only filed a complaint with the French authorities but also ordered activists to testify to the police who were conducting the investigation? If we followed the same line of reasoning that G. Healy does, we would have to conclude that since L. Trotsky made a complaint to the French imperialist authorities, since he called on comrades to testify to the police of French imperialism, L. Trotsky was an agent of imperialism and of the French police! The procedure G. Healy has resorted to is typically Stalinist.

The slanderer G. Healy does not stop there. He turns to arguments appealing to authority (because I say it is so, it is so).

For example, in 1938, a GPU agent entered into contact with Hansen. Hansen explained that Trotsky told him to "maintain the contact." How does Healy respond to this?

"We state categorically that Hansen is lying when he says that Trotsky told him to consort with the GPU agent 'John' Rabinowitz. It is inconceivable that the Bolshevik leader would instruct the head of his security arrangements at Coyoacan to meet a GPU agent over a period of three months." No evidence whatever is offered to support this assertion. It is enough that Healy thinks that what Hansen says is "inconceivable." You have to believe G. Healy because he has spoken. Has G. Healy ever thought about this: The international apparatus of the Kremlin and its national agencies are controlled by the GPU. At every step, at every moment, Trotskyists have come in contact with CP leaders who are often agents of the GPU. Hidden under Healy's virtuous indignation is petty-bourgeois philistinism.

Some may say that we are judging the "basis" for this case in advance when we speak in a general way of the monstrousness of the accusations raised against Joseph Hansen. In fact, we do not think that Comrade J. Hansen in any way stands "in the dock," or that he is a man "on trial" who must prove his innocence. When Trotsky had to face the abominable lie-machine of Stalinism, he offered, as the first proof of the absurdity of the accusations lodged against him, the record of his public political activity.

Joseph Hansen's continuous activity, for more than forty years now, as a member and leader of the American Trotskyist

1. In *Workers Press*, the organ of the Workers Revolutionary party (WRP) of Great Britain, three series of articles devoted to the question of "security in the Fourth International" have been published—seven, beginning with the April 19, 1975, issue; nineteen, beginning with the August 14, 1975, issue; and finally eight, beginning on January 5, 1976.

organization, his role in the history and debates in the Fourth International—where, although there have been deep differences between us, he has always stood within the framework of Trotskyism—are in themselves the best answer to the allegations of those who are impugning his honor as a revolutionist.

Is this to say that because of this work Comrade Hansen enjoys a kind of immunity? By no means. But if the “trial” in which Healy wants to play the role of prosecutor were not rigged from start to finish, it is this aspect that he would have attacked first, while he does not mention it even once. And, what is more, in the long pages of *Workers Press*, which if they were all put together would make a book, Healy has not been able to offer a trace of evidence or a single document coming either from Hansen or from the former GPU agents who went over to the FBI (whom Healy, without any verification, seems to regard as the bearers of the truth) that can support his monstrous charge that Hansen is “an accomplice of the GPU.”

So, if we spend a little more time dealing with these charges—before coming to the political conclusions—it is not in order to defend Comrade Hansen, it is to show that the method used by Gerry Healy stands in fundamental contradiction to the principles and traditions of the Fourth International and the workers movement.

An Incoherent Detective Thriller

The serial that has filled four pages in each issue of *Workers Press* in the last month before it ceased publication takes the form of an incoherent detective thriller in which any precise facts that can be gleaned have been long known, and where unfounded speculations, gratuitous assertions, and contradictions abound.

Let's take one example. *Workers Press* makes a big to-do about a visit Joseph Hansen made to the American consul McGregor, a visit he made as Trotsky's secretary eleven days after Trotsky was murdered. The fact that it took place on Saturday and not on a workday is used to justify an insinuation that there was something odd about it, that Joseph Hansen might be linked to the FBI (as if, by the way, Trotsky's murder was not an event of sufficient international importance for the American consul to give up part of his Saturday morning!).

Let us follow the curious line of “reasoning” of *Workers Press*. From this “proof,” which is no proof at all, it concludes that Hansen could very well have maintained relations with the FBI, and then it goes on as if such a link had been established. But this curious line of “reasoning” is itself contradicted by the charges its authors make against Joseph Hansen. What did Hansen tell the consul—according to the latter's report? That the GPU was respon-

sible for the murder and that the crime must have been engineered from the United States. He pointed out that “Mornard had made a journey to the United States between the dates of the first attempt upon Trotsky's life and the second successful one,” and so he insisted that the American police check out the hotel where Mornard stayed in New York.

What conclusion was drawn by *Workers Press*? That Joseph Hansen was trying to deceive the Fourth International, because the murder was engineered in Paris by Zborowski and not in New York. But if this had been the case, according to the previous accusations, Hansen would have been deceiving his alleged “employers.”

But, the imaginative editors of *Workers Press* might reply, what if Hansen was an agent of the GPU? Then one would wonder why he insisted on the guilt of the GPU. But (slanderers always have a ready comeback), his role as a Trotskyist leader obliged him to do this.

Then (if we agree to accept a trial framework briefly for the sake of clarity), in any case, this was an official conversation with the U.S. consul and precisely because it was official, it proves nothing, it is outside the framework of the debate! In fact, we will have to come back later to the reasons for using this conversation.

Let us add that Gerry Healy “forgot” that J. Hansen gave his reason for this visit—to try to establish the exact identity of the murderer, which was then unknown—and that from this standpoint the approach to the consul produced results.

Cynical Disregard of the Truth

Let's be serious. The center where Trotsky's murder was decided on and prepared was the Kremlin. As his confessions in 1956 have since shown, Zborowski acted in Paris, operating as an agent provocateur in the Fourth International, playing a central role in setting the stage for the crime. In this, however, other links in the chain were needed in the United States and in Mexico. At the stage where the investigation stood eleven days after the death of Trotsky, no one endowed with a minimum of good sense and honesty could find anything “reprehensible” or “strange” in the fact that Joseph Hansen pressed for the American police to make an investigation in the United States. He was only doing his duty as a revolutionist. In this respect, he was following the example of Trotsky, who advised Ignace Reiss to place himself under police protection.

But the spirit in which *Workers Press* has conducted its investigation is indicated by the thread running through all the attacks on Comrade Hansen; that is, that he is supposed to have tried to divert attention from—to “cover up”—Stalinist agents planted in the SWP and operating in the United States.

The consul's report establishes the contrary. With his very special brand of logic Gerry Healy finds in this fact a new “indictment.” Such contradictions can no doubt be resolved by Healy's version of dialectics, which is on a par with his logic! But this contradiction establishes very clearly that what is involved here is not an attempt to uncover the truth or to clarify the problems of “security in the Fourth International.” On the contrary what we see here is an application of the method that “anything goes,” and the old maxim that “if you throw enough mud, some of it will stick.”

Other examples testify to a cynical disregard for the minimum requirements of telling a credible story. The main thing is to pile up enough disparate elements to, if not convince, at least sow doubt.

In the case of Robert Sheldon Harte, the young bodyguard who was found murdered after the assassination attempt on May 24, 1940, while not categorically asserting that he had a responsibility in this, *Workers Press* implies that he might have been an accomplice of the assailants, who later got rid of him. The SWP leadership maintains the position it took after the crime—which was held, moreover, by Trotsky. Robert Sheldon Harte remained faithful to Trotskyism and was a victim of the GPU. Once again, one might wonder what Healy is trying to prove, and what relationship this question has to the charges made against Joseph Hansen.

If it were shown (and we note that *Workers Press* offers no new evidence) that Trotsky and the SWP leadership were mistaken about Sheldon Harte and that he was a GPU agent, how would this prove that Hansen and other SWP leaders “covered up for GPU agents,” how would this justify advancing even as a “hypothesis” this infamous charge, which, inasmuch as Trotsky did not think Robert Sheldon Harte was a provocateur, is directed jointly against Hansen and L. Trotsky?

Criminal Irresponsibility

However, what interests us here, again, are the methods of Gerry Healy. He quotes the following passage from Julian Gorkin's book on Trotsky's assassination:

“If it were admitted that Sheldon was a spy, that would place the question of responsibility in the chief Trotskyists in New York, who had sent him to Mexico. We do no more than mention this aspect of the question. Let each one draw his own conclusions.” And he describes Julian Gorkin as “an authority on the crimes of Stalin.” He neglects to say that from the standpoint simply of historically verifiable facts, much new evidence has come to light since Gorkin wrote this book. He also neglects to say that Julian Gorkin was one of the leaders of the POUM (which he left while in exile) most hostile to the Fourth

International and that his book was written in collaboration with General Salazar, the chief of the Mexican police, who sought to pin as much of the blame as possible on Trotsky's entourage.

It was this aim of the book that *Workers Press*, to use a term it is fond of, "covered up." This did not prevent him from presenting in another article, for his purposes, statements—which were rather confused—of a former bodyguard of Trotsky's, Harold Robins, who accuses Hansen of covering up the slanders of the Mexican police!

One final example: *Workers Press* plays up the fact that it was the SWP leadership that helped Zborowski return to the United States.

Do we have to point out how absurd it is to blame the SWP comrades for the fact that Zborowski was among certain cadres of the Trotskyist movement who were brought to the USA through the work of members and leaders of the SWP at the time of the Hitlerite victories in Europe? As *Workers Press* notes, moreover (as an "argument" against Joseph Hansen), Zborowski's area of activity was Europe. It was by integrating himself among the cadres of the Trotskyist movement in Europe that he became a member of the international leadership, recognized by Leon Trotsky as a close collaborator of Leon Sedov. As the leader of the Fourth International, Leon Trotsky entrusted Zborowski with organizing the founding conference of the Fourth International in September 1938.

The absurdity of this slander is striking. In 1940, Zborowski had not been unmasked as the GPU agent he was. If he blames the SWP leadership and Hansen for organizing his trip to the USA, G. Healy should naturally put the blame for this on L. Trotsky and draw the conclusion that the latter, like Hansen, was an agent of the GPU. Let us note again that it is hard for revolutionists to force themselves to dig through all the mud thrown by G. Healy, who in his irresponsibility pays no attention to the damaging blows he is dealing to the Fourth International, to which he still claims to adhere.

We repeat: What particular guilt can be attributed to the SWP cadres? And even if it were maintained that they should have been more "vigilant"—which, we stress, would be a gratuitous remark—how would this justify calling them "accomplices"? Unless the mere fact of associating with Zborowski, as L. Sedov and L. Trotsky himself did, without immediately identifying him as an agent provocateur constitutes guilt within the "Healyite theory of evidence." But, then, we repeat, Healy's search of "accomplices" would take him far beyond Joseph Hansen and George Novack, and even the leadership of the SWP.

Let us repeat again, in the voluminous inquiry of *Workers Press*, there is not the

slightest document or fact that would justify raising—even as a possibility that would still have to be proved—the infamous accusations lodged against Comrades Joseph Hansen and George Novack.

What is infamous—and degrading for the authors—is having raised such charges. The method they used, their cynical contempt for the truth, disqualifies them politically. This is criminal irresponsibility contrary not only to the principles of the Fourth International but also to the most basic traditions of the workers movement.

We should, however, take up G. Healy's strange brief from another standpoint.

At the beginning of this statement we referred to the way that G. Healy and his "investigators" used the visit Joseph Hansen made to Consul McGregor. In this case, Joseph Hansen quite correctly said that G. Healy stirred up a "geyser of mud." But the mud has only washed over G. Healy himself.

In the first place, the way this episode was exploited illustrates G. Healy's political perfidiousness. He, as much as any comrade holding responsibilities of leadership in the revolutionary workers movement, knows that the contact Joseph Hansen had to maintain with the American consulate was only a particular expression of a much more general reality. Political activity must involve all aspects of the struggle, that is, also the need for diplomacy, for "contact" with the enemy camp. It is this that for Gerry Healy constitutes the proof of Joseph Hansen's "guilt." But can anyone fail to see that such "guilt" would have to be assigned first of all to Leon Trotsky? As the official reports indicate, other members of Trotsky's guard, Charles Cornell and Walter

O'Rourke, were in touch with the consul, as well as Leon Trotsky (and, in the case of the founder of the Fourth International, the consul visited him in his home!). There were, thus, to divulge a "dreadful secret," regular contacts between the U.S. consulate and Trotsky and his entourage. It is not so difficult to understand what could be grasped by the representatives of American imperialism, who banned Trotsky from their territory with ferocious determination. In view of what Trotsky represented, relations with this isolated exile took on a certain government-to-government nature. And, from the standpoint of his security, Trotsky had a stake in such relations.

As Comrade Hansen correctly notes, G. Healy and his investigators are on a path that tends to converge with that of Trotsky's murderers.

The Old Method of the Amalgam

There is yet another aspect, which may appear minor but which we think is significant, since it shows how rotten something is in the little kingdom of Clapham High Street (the national headquarters of the WRP in London).

This is the practice of the "classical"-type Stalinist amalgam. The articles in *Workers Press* talk about a Stalinist agent planted in the SWP, Floyd Miller, who was later unmasked. Since this agent functioned in the maritime fraction of the SWP, *Workers Press* says that his work enabled him to point out to the GPU who the Trotskyist sailors were that were on their way to the USSR. On this question Hansen says simply, in passing, that this Miller never occupied a leadership position, even at the level of the maritime fraction, and that in any case no Trotsky-

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ist sailor ever disappeared. And he adds: "Several Trotskyist seamen, whose ships were sunk by the Germans, managed, along with other members of the crew, to launch lifeboats and eventually make their way to Murmansk. Because of exposure in open boats in those waters, several of them had to spend months in the hospital. They were given first-rate treatment, and the staffs were very friendly."

This is the comment these lines inspired from *Workers Press*:

"Soviet Weekly", the English language Stalinist newspaper produced by the CPSU, has a two-page article on wartime Murmansk in its edition for December 20-27, 1975.

"It is a putrid piece of public relations for the Stalinist bureaucracy concerning a visit to Murmansk by one Ian Highet, a radio officer on board a British ship.

"Of Murmansk I have happy memories despite the bitter cold of January and the indescribable devastation. The cold was more than matched by the warmth of the Soviet people who extended to us a most tremendous welcome with typical Soviet hospitality, a hospitality that had to be seen to be believed."

"The only thing to match this gushing description of wartime Murmansk comes from the pen of . . . Joseph Hansen. . . .

"The similarity between these two excerpts shows an affinity which should not pass the attention of any class-conscious worker or youth."

This sort of thing requires no commentary, or rather only one. There is scarcely any need to call the attention of any conscious workers and youth to the similarity between this kind of proof and those of the Stalinist apparatus.

Who Is the Target?

One of the rare new elements reported by *Workers Press* is that the Sylvia Callen who was cited in 1969 as a codefendant in the trial of the Stalinist agent Robert Soblen was none other than Sylvia Franklin who was the secretary of James P. Cannon, the leader of the SWP. She had been accused by Louis Budenz, an ex-Stalinist leader in the United States who went over to work for the FBI. An SWP Control Commission was, after investigation, to reject these charges. Moreover, James P. Cannon denounced Budenz, assuring that Sylvia Franklin was "an honest comrade who gave years of valued service to the cause."

We do not know if the Sylvia Callen *Workers Press* talks about is really Sylvia Franklin, but we are convinced that if new facts require it, the SWP will review the conclusions of its Control Commission.

However, supposing that *Workers Press* were right and that Sylvia Franklin, James P. Cannon's secretary, were a GPU agent, how would this justify writing: "Joseph Hansen and George Novack have protected and covered up for SYLVIA

FRANKLIN, the GPU agent in the Socialist Workers Party . . .?"

It was James P. Cannon who denounced Budenz's statements as lies. An SWP Control Commission confirmed this position. Why doesn't *Workers Press* follow its argument to the logical conclusion? Why didn't it say that James P. Cannon "covered up for a GPU agent"? There is more so-called "evidence" against him than against Hansen and Novack. Why doesn't it accuse the SWP leadership and J.P. Cannon for "covering up" for a GPU agent?

It is true that the fact that Cannon is remembered as the founder and builder of Trotskyism in the United States and as a major figure in the international workers movement makes this a difficult job. It is more expedient to make insinuations than to take the risk of making such a statement.

Nonetheless, this is where the logic leads. Naturally, this would also mean that Lenin covered up for Malinovsky, and was therefore the latter's accomplice, and that Trotsky and Sedov covered up for Zborowski and were his accomplices.

Behind Hansen and Novack, other targets can be seen. The first that comes to view is the SWP. The introduction to the last series of articles published in *Workers Press* said:

"WE ACCUSE Joseph Hansen and leaders of the Socialist Workers Party (USA) of deliberately covering up GPU murder and penetration of the Trotskyist movement. . . ."

This vague article by unknown authors is one more outrage, but the target of the slander is clearly indicated. It is the SWP, which they try to represent as a hotbed of GPU agents, an organization with a number of leaders who were "deliberate" accomplices of the GPU. Clearly, they try to represent the SWP as an organization "kept" by the Stalinist apparatus.

But the SWP has played a considerable role in the history of the Fourth International. It was not only one of the strongest sections but the one whose leadership had the most direct ties with Leon Trotsky. The SWP was the battleground of a struggle decisive for the future of the Fourth International, the one over the question of the defense of the Soviet Union. If we had to accept Gerry Healy's standards for determining the truth, we would have to conclude that this struggle was conducted by a group, a majority of whom were "accomplices" of the GPU.

An Attack Against the Fourth International

Behind the SWP, the real target is the Fourth International itself, Leon Trotsky and his work. The Fourth International appears to be an organization "manipulated" by the GPU, in fact a creation of the GPU.

It would be unfair to compare Vereecken's book with the articles in *Workers Press*.² But it is interesting to note that *Workers Press* often quotes this work without reservation or comment. While it is undeniable that provocateurs such as Zborowski poisoned relationships inside the international movement, they could not conjure away the real political questions. It was on these questions that the break occurred between Vereecken and Trotsky. And what makes Vereecken's book a false and biased brief is that he wants to prove that it was the maneuvers of these agents that explain his break with Trotsky.

Referring to Vereecken, *Workers Press* writes:

"Today the International Committee of the Fourth International is getting the same slanderous treatment that others in the pre-war years in Europe endured."

Should we conclude that the decision to found the Fourth International was inspired by the GPU?

The abominable campaign conducted against the leaders of the SWP can only serve the enemies of the Fourth International and facilitate the work of those who in the interests of imperialism or Stalinism are trying to undermine and disrupt our movement.

An index of the profound political degeneration of the WRP leadership, this campaign is dealing a grave blow to Trotskyism in England. It is more than a coincidence that the publication of *Workers Press* ended almost immediately after the appearance of this series of slanderous articles.

Rejection of such methods, and the kind of politics that allows them to develop, is indispensable for moving forward to the reconstruction of the Fourth International.

As Trotskyists who have been in the fight since the prewar years when the program of the Fourth International was elaborated under the leadership of Leon Trotsky, we considered it necessary to make this public statement. We think that all the militants, whatever differences may exist between their organizations, who claim to adhere to Trotskyism, who have participated in the fight for the Fourth International, must take a position on this question. We think that all organizations that claim to be Trotskyist must also condemn the methods of G. Healy, methods that serve only the enemies of the Fourth International. This is the same struggle that was taken up in 1923 against Stalinism, which L. Trotsky denounced as a dreadful sickness afflicting the world workers movement. □

2. *La Guépéou dans le mouvement trotskyste*, G. Vereecken, Éditions de la Pensée Universelle. Vereecken was a member of the Left Opposition in Belgium, with whom Trotsky was forced to break because of his sectarian positions.

'Socialist Action' Denounces WRP Smear Campaign

[The following statement appeared in the February-March issue of *Socialist Action*, the newspaper of the League for Socialist Action, a group based in London.]

* * *

The Workers' Revolutionary Party (WRP) is hardly known for its savoury polemics with other left tendencies. Its latest offering is, in most respects, even less savoury than previous ones. In a recent series of articles, entitled "Security and the Fourth International," the Healyites open an investigation into the death of Leon Trotsky.

Such an investigation is not inspired, as in the case of an honest biographer like Isaac Deutscher, by a real desire to discover the facts but by far more sinister motives. Its aim is to "indict" former Trotskyist secretary, Joseph Hansen, of "criminal negligence" in Trotsky's death, if not of being an "accomplice of the GPU."

It may seem strange that the Healyites should devote more space in their fast-ailing "daily" to witch-hunting a leading Trotskyist militant than to covering key issues such as the national struggle in Ireland. The answer is not so strange, however, as it may at first appear.

Set-backs

Since its split with the OCI, its sister organization in France a few years ago, the WRP has suffered some severe set-backs. It recently lost several leading members of the Workers' League, a sympathising section in the USA, and, closer home, launched a witch-hunt against over 200 trade union members in its own ranks who had the audacity to oppose the leadership's sectarian political line.

The cause of these set-backs—which have left the WRP more isolated than ever before—was analysed by Joseph Hansen in a hard-hitting article in *Intercontinental Press* (Vol 13 No 12). In particular, Hansen singled out the politically sectarian course followed by the WRP and its well-known organisational "thuggism" which denies its own members elementary rights—like thinking for themselves.

Unable to reply politically to such an argument, the Healyites have reverted to the level of politics where they feel most at home: personal slander. Healy no doubt hopes, by concocting frame-ups in the Stalinist tradition against his critics, to cloud the issue and divert the members of the WRP from probing the real reasons for

these set-backs and the lack of rights they possess in his monolithic set-up.

New Victim?

The slanders directed against Joseph Hansen, a leading member of the world Trotskyist movement for over 30 years, need not be refuted. They are based on rumours culled from self-confessed GPU and CIA agents. A clear, factual reply to them can be found in the pages of *Intercontinental Press* (Vol 13 No 42).

What is worth refuting is the method used by Healy in dealing with political tendencies he has differences with. It can serve as an object lesson for young radicals as to the ultimate logic of sectarian politics.

Hansen himself, in his reply, notes how, for the Healyites, "All other political tendencies . . . are regarded as agencies of the bourgeoisie to be dealt with accordingly." This attitude on the part of the WRP is, of course, merely a substitute for taking up and arguing against the political ideas advanced by rival tendencies. There is no point, after all, discussing with ones' political opponents if they are "agencies of the bourgeoisie." On the contrary, the task is to "expose" them, even if this means juggling with the facts.

Such a premise leads, quite inevitably, to the wildest slanders and frame-ups (in the

Stalinist tradition) to prove the "case." The accusations against Joseph Hansen are not new, in this respect, but merely the spiciest dish yet to be seen from the Healyite kitchen.

The April 23rd issue of *Workers' Press* tried to "smear" Bala Tampoe (leading Trotskyist and head of the Ceylon Mercantile Union) as "associated with the CIA." Tim Wohlforth, last year expelled from the Workers' League, was accused of "harbouring and covering for a CIA agent" and, most recently, Alan Thornett, who was expelled from the WRP for exercising the right to think for himself, was described by the General Secretary as a "police agent."

'Big Lie'

The fact that Healy should be reduced to labelling every political opponent—inside and outside the WRP—as some form of police agent is not just a simple question of paranoia. It is an attempt to "shield" the dwindling membership of the WRP from the political arguments of rival tendencies by the use of what can only be called Stalinist methods.

It is an attempt to divert attention away from the fact that the leaders of the WRP have turned a once-promising group into a barren sect unable to relate to the real issues facing working people and unable to tolerate any real criticism of this course.

We can assure the WRP however that the time when it could pass such false coin as "Trotskyism" is long past. The WRP broke with Trotskyism, politically and in its organisational practice, long ago. The technique of the "big lie" will not hide this fact. □

Students, Miners Go Out on Strike in Bolivia

The upsurge of the Bolivian working class touched off by the strike of the Manaco shoe workers in January has continued to pick up steam.

The latest chapter in the unfolding events was initiated by the students at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz. These students had been in the forefront of those organizing support for the Manaco strikers. As a result, their campus was attacked by the police on February 5, and many of their leaders were arrested or exiled.

On February 18, in the wake of the triumph of the Manaco workers in Cochabamba, the students called for "a dialogue" with the government-appointed education officials. When this was refused, they detailed their demands for the release of political prisoners, the return of those exiled in the last few months, and an end to persecution on the campus. The students threatened to go on strike if their demands were not met within forty-eight hours.

President Hugo Banzer responded by

closing down the school and ordering police to ring the campus. The following day, the police invaded the campus once again, arresting more than 300 students.

According to the February 27 issue of the London weekly *Latin America*, the strike was soon joined by students at the universities in Potosí, Oruro, and Cochabamba. On February 21 the 30,000 members of the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Trade-union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers) also joined in the strike, and they were followed by the Manaco shoe workers. In Huanuni, the tin miners met to demand the legalization of the Confederación Obrera de Bolivia (Federation of Bolivian Workers), which was banned in 1971. □

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Dominican Dock Workers Fight for Democratic Rights

By José Pérez

[The following article appeared in the February 27 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

Despite the release last December of three labor leaders who had been in jail since last summer, trade-union rights remain in a precarious state in the Dominican Republic.

Nothing illustrates this better than the case of the Sindicato Portuario de Arrimo (POASI—longshoremen's union). The union's headquarters has been occupied by police since October 1973.

In January the *Militant* interviewed José Martínez Vargas, the legitimate general secretary of POASI. The union leader was visiting the United States to publicize the case of POASI. He met with several trade unionists and civil libertarians here to seek their support for the democratic rights of union members in the Dominican Republic.

Martínez Vargas explained that government attacks against POASI go back a decade. Before the imposition of the Joaquín Balaguer regime following the occupation of the Dominican Republic by 20,000 U.S. Marines, POASI had been the sole longshore union in Santo Domingo, capital of the Caribbean country.

However, in 1966 the government passed a law establishing itself as a middleman between the companies and the longshore workers. Wages were cut through the abolition of a per-hour wage scale and establishment of a per-ton wage scale. The government brought in a "yellow union" and decreed that out of every five ships that come in, three would be handled by POASI and two by the government's union.

These measures were decreed by the government without warning. "They didn't even notify us in advance. We found out by reading the newspapers," Martínez Vargas said. Nevertheless, a struggle was waged against this abrogation of the contract, although the POASI leadership at the time was composed of Balaguer supporters.

In 1971, a new leadership defeated the pro-Balaguer officeholders in the union. This group, which called itself the Blue Slate, included supporters of various political parties.



Arnold Weissberg/Militant

JOSE MARTINEZ VARGAS

The Balaguer government, according to Martínez Vargas, intervened in the election, backing the old leadership, which was called the Red Slate.

But the Blue Slate won the election, receiving 750 votes from a total membership of 1,300. In the following year's election, the Blue Slate won once again, increasing its total vote to 890.

Elections were to have been held again in 1973, but they coincided with the declaration of a state of emergency by the Balaguer government. The pretext for the declaration was the landing of a band of guerrillas in the country.

The leadership of the union decided to call off the scheduled elections. "Under the state of emergency," Martínez Vargas said, "the members couldn't campaign because you couldn't put up posters or you might get shot by the police thinking that you are a subversive."

Nevertheless, the pro-Balaguer minority in the union went to the secretary of the interior and obtained a promise from him that the election could be held.

"Seeing this," Martínez Vargas continued, "we thought that a whole maneuver

was being planned against us and we decided to hold elections."

A mass membership meeting was held to pick the commission that would conduct the election. However, before the commission elected by the union ranks had a chance to be certified by the government and schedule the balloting, a rump commission—handpicked by the progovernment union minority—registered itself and scheduled an immediate election.

"We refused to accept that," Martínez Vargas said, "and the members paid no attention to the rump commission."

The progovernment commission had its election. They declared that their Red Slate had won, but most of the union members just ignored them.

"A few days later," Martínez Vargas continued, "ten busloads of police and guards showed up. They broke the lock on the union headquarters and went inside."

"A number of the officials had been arrested that morning at 3:00 a.m.," he said, "so the police were able to break into the headquarters without a struggle because there was no leadership."

Every attempt at a protest was met with government repression. The old leadership of the union was blacklisted from the docks for a year. At one point, forty-five members were in jail. Martínez Vargas himself has been arrested seventeen times since police seized the union headquarters in October 1973. Two other POASI leaders have been forced to leave the country because of the repression and harassment.

To this day the imposed leadership has made no attempt to legitimize its rule by trying to function as a leadership that defends the economic interests of the workers. No membership meetings or elections have been held. The headquarters of the union is still occupied by the police.

What steps were taken to protest this undemocratic situation? For a long time the membership was demoralized and afraid of the repression, Martínez Vargas said. But in the past year an effective campaign has been mounted.

Fifty-two trade-union organizations in the Dominican Republic—including the Central General de Trabajadores, one of the two trade-union federations in the country, have protested the police occupation of POASI's headquarters. Last October, 1,200 of POASI's 1,300 members published an advertisement in a Dominican

daily demanding immediate withdrawal of the police from the union headquarters and the holding of free elections.

POASI leaders have now extended this campaign to the international arena, obtaining statements of support from unions in various Latin American and European countries.

In the United States, the defense effort is

being coordinated by the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA)* as a continuation of the work that group carried out on behalf of the three union officials who had been jailed. □

*853 Broadway, New York, New York 10003.

Rank-and-File Steelworkers Strike in Protest

British Steel Bosses Slash Jobs, Wages

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—Late last year, Bob Scholey, chief executive of the state-owned British Steel Corporation (BSC), gave an ultimatum to the corporation's 220,000 workers: He wanted 44,000 jobs axed within two years and £170 [£1=US\$2.01] million knocked off the annual wages bill.

Steelworkers were astounded at the scale of Scholey's proposed assault on wages and jobs, to be carried out in violation of a nineteen-month agreement with the steel unions signed only nine months earlier.

The 44,000 jobs on the firing line, Scholey warned, were "just for starters." Up to sixteen open-hearth steel plants would be run down and eventually closed. In addition, BSC announced that from January 4 it would end all weekend shift working (which threatened many workers with a £15, or 33 percent, weekly wage cut), and that from January 11 it would suspend the industry's guaranteed week agreement (which guarantees workers 80 percent of their weekly wages). This would allow the corporation to put thousands of workers on short-time.

Steelworkers, particularly in Wales, immediately took action to express their rejection of the BSC's ultimatum. In defiance of the corporation's suspension of weekend shift working, 5,000 workers turned up to work January 4. Thousands of workers at Port Talbot, Ebbw Vale, Trestre, Velindre, and other plants began unofficial strikes.

But, the *Economist* noted January 24, "union leaders in the steel industry are largely a moderate bunch and most accept the need for cuts." The 110,000-member Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) and the eighteen other unions in the Trades Union Congress (TUC) Steel Committee refused to call a nationwide strike. They urged those steelworkers already on strike to go back to work.

"Mr William Sirs, general secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation," the *London Times* reported January 5,

"has gone on record as being opposed to official stoppages, but he has also acknowledged that the executive is under strong pressure from a number of branches to call a strike."

After receiving a "back to work" appeal from the ISTC bureaucrats, the Port Talbot strikers voted by 400 to 7 on January 11 to keep the strike going.

On January 23, having failed to mobilize the unions' full strength to defeat the BSC's offensive, the TUC Steel Committee signed an agreement with the corporation, conceding most of BSC's job-cutting, wage-slashing measures. The few gains made were due solely to the action of the rank and file and were achieved in spite of the craven collaborationism of the union leaders.

The BSC agreed to uphold the guaranteed week; to "stabilize" open-hearth plants rather than close them down; to restore weekend shift working for two weeks in order to seek local plant agreement on reducing it; and to discuss the job reductions at a plant level.

But the union leaders agreed in principle that weekend shift working should be cut back, and they accepted the need for a massive reduction of employment levels in the industry. The agreement provided for immediate redundancies within three months on account of the recession and a two-year programme of further redundancies to reduce long-term employment levels.

The BSC, the *Financial Times* commented January 24, "has obtained a greater degree of union commitment at national level to a reduction of manning levels and cuts in workers' earnings than ever before." In addition, the paper pointed out, "the unions have agreed to bring their full weight to bear on members at individual plants who are refusing to cooperate with the agreement."

But, the *Financial Times* warned, "the success of the package will now largely depend on the unions' determination and

ability to make it work in the plants. If they fail, and many steel workers are in a highly militant mood, the next confrontation seems inevitable." Though the unofficial strikes petered out January 25 after the agreement had been signed, it is too early to forecast steelworkers' response when the BSC tries to implement its terms.

The immediate cause of the confrontation was the BSC's massive financial losses and the corporation's wish to bail itself out at the expense of steelworkers. It was given the go-ahead by the Labour government. The BSC's losses in the present financial year (which ends in March) are estimated at £340 million. Weekly losses in 1975 ran at £5 million and have recently risen to about £8.4 million.

The British steel industry has been hit by the worldwide recession in steel. The government announced January 15 that steel demand slumped 14 percent in 1975. Output is now at about 17 million tons a year, far below the industry's capacity of 26 million tons. According to figures published by the International Iron and Steel Institute January 21, British steel output dropped 11.5 percent last year.

Steel production was down throughout the capitalist world (by 19.5 percent in the nine countries of the European Economic Community and by 19.7 percent in the United States), prompting protectionist trade-war measures by the imperialist powers. In January, the United States imposed restrictions on the import of foreign steel.

By contrast, the superiority of the planned economies of the workers states (despite their bureaucratic deformations) was strikingly illustrated last year by steel output increases of 4.3 percent in the Soviet Union, 9.6 percent in the other Comecon* countries, and 11.1 percent in China.

While the rival capitalist steel producers scramble for a shrinking market, the BSC is at a terrible disadvantage. According to the January 4 *London Sunday Times*, BSC's annual output per worker is now around 77 tons. If the BSC produces at full capacity, this still rises to only 118 tons. Meanwhile, Nippon Steel in Japan can turn out 520 tons of steel per year for each worker, Thyssen in West Germany can achieve 370 tons per man-year, and National Steel can produce 280 tons per man-year. This is why Bob Scholey wants to axe 44,000 jobs "just for starters"; reduce jobs levels; and raise BSC's productivity to levels already achieved by the corporation's main competitors.

But as the big imperialist steel monopolies fight for their share of the world market, it is the steelworkers who lose out. A socialist planned economy would guarantee jobs for all. □

*Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an economic confederation linking Moscow with its satellite governments in Eastern Europe.—IP

South Africa: NATO's Secret Partner

By Ernest Harsch

[Second of three articles]

In early 1970, when the White House adopted the "Tar Baby" policy committing Washington to greater support for the white minority regimes of southern Africa, the National Security Council decided to bolster its military positions along the shores of the Indian Ocean. The move, made in coordination with NATO, was ostensibly directed against a possible increase in Soviet naval activity in the region.

The NSC decision, combined with the steps taken by individual NATO members to protect their military and economic interests in southern Africa, led to a more synchronized "tilt" by NATO as a whole toward the South African regime.

A resolution passed by a meeting of the NATO Assembly in Bonn, West Germany, in November 1972 recommended to the NATO Ministerial Council that it give SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic) "authority to plan for the protection of NATO Europe's vital shipping lines in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic including surveillance and communications."

It also stated that "the naval threat to NATO's vital sea lines of communication now comes largely from outside the limits of the North Atlantic Treaty area."⁴

Less than a month after the April 25, 1974, Portuguese coup, a NATO press secretary admitted that SACLANT had been given authorization to conduct such contingency planning. The instructions to SACLANT, which is based in Norfolk, Virginia, were issued by the NATO Defense Planning Committee in June 1973.

Michael J. Berlin reported in the May 10, 1974, *New York Post*, "So far, The Post learned from an informant, SACLANT has reached the conclusion that NATO itself does not have sufficient forces to deal with that area. And the corollary to this is that a defense arrangement involving the white minority regimes of southern Africa, South Africa in particular, is required."

An unnamed NATO official, quoted in a report prepared by Sean Gervasi, L.W. Bowman, and Ellen Frey-Wouters for the UN Special Committee on Decolonization

in early 1974, said that the contingency planning was designed to make it possible "to go to the aid of our potential allies in southern Africa if the need should arise." The NATO press secretary who revealed the SACLANT authorization stated that the planners were considering not only NATO options for wartime, but also for "crisis situations."

NATO's moves toward broadening its area of operations to include southern Africa was formalized at the annual meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held in June 1974 in Ottawa. Although the NATO region was defined in 1940 as including Europe, North America, the North Sea, and the North Atlantic (above the Tropic of Cancer), the Ottawa Declaration of June 19, 1974, pointed out that NATO "interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world."

In an article on the Kissinger "Tar Baby" policy, Tad Szulc commented in the October 1974 issue of *Esquire* magazine:

This, of course, is a carte blanche for N.A.T.O. to become involved wherever it wishes. It may mean the Middle East, or the Indian Ocean—or southern Africa. The uncertainty is whether the United States and some of its allies, encouraged by the license issued in Ottawa, may choose to regard South Africa's internal security in the face of black pressures as a justification for direct air or naval support, using SACLANT's contingency planning.

The Portuguese coup unexpectedly led to the end of white rule in Angola and Mozambique, prompting the imperialists to press forward with their plans to bolster the remaining white regimes. "My own impression from Washington conversations," Szulc reported, "is that SACLANT and the Pentagon planners will proceed with their contingency planning, perhaps with even greater urgency than before."

By the end of 1974, the initial planning stage appears to have been completed. Significantly, South African newspapers were among the first to note that fact. Correspondent Tim Patten reported in a dispatch from Brussels published in the December 14, 1974, issue of the South African *Star Weekly*:

NATO Defence Ministers are maintaining an agreed cloak of secrecy but it has been made clear privately that the defence of the Cape sea-route is "well covered" in a contingency plan, and that South Africa would receive naval assistance if the oil route was threatened.

This conclusion was given to me in the lobby

halls of NATO headquarters this week while the Defence Ministers of the 15 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member countries met in restricted session of the Defence Planning Committee.

... it is the first hint that the report and contingency plan have been given a nod of approval.

Details of the contingency plan, as well as SACLANT's obvious dealing with the South African Defence Force through "a member country," will certainly never be given.

The assurance, from a well-placed NATO source, has however, unveiled that contact was made with South Africa during the study, and that the conclusions have almost certainly been relayed to Mr Vorster's Government.

High-Level Contacts

One indicator of the greater coordination between Pretoria and its NATO allies has been the increase in high-level contacts between South African military and government officials and their counterparts in Europe and the United States.

In January 1974, Cornelius P. Mulder, South African minister of information and of the interior (who is considered a possible successor to Prime Minister John Vorster), spent five days in Washington. He met with then Vice-president Ford, various congressional leaders, and Vice Adm. Ray Peet, a top Pentagon planner in charge of International Security Affairs and the Indian Ocean. Mulder made another trip to the United States in June 1975.

A month after the coup in Portugal, Adm. Hugo H. Biermann, commander in chief of the South African military, also visited Washington after Kissinger overruled a recommendation of the Africa Bureau of the State Department that Biermann be denied a visa. Biermann then met with J. William Middendorf, acting secretary of the navy, and Gen. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to Szulc, Biermann dined with seventeen admirals at the home of a Republican congressman.

In January 1975, a group of six U.S. congressmen visited South Africa. According to Congressman Bob Wilson, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, the sanctions against South Africa, "such as the arms embargo, were the central theme of our discussions." Wilson added, "Radicals broadcast a lot of misinformation about South Africa, but from what we have seen we would all choose South Africa as our second country."

This trip was followed up two months later by Congressman John Dent, who was accompanied to South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) by Harold Runnels of the House Armed Services Committee and by Richard Ichord, also a member of the House Armed Services Committee, as well as chairman of the witch-hunting relic, the House Internal Security Committee, until it was dissolved in January 1975.

"Obviously South Africa has developed

4. Quoted in "NATO and Southern Africa: On Our Way to Euro Vietnam," a paper presented by Frank Janzen of the Angola Comité, Amsterdam, at a conference in Oxford, England, April 12-15, 1974.

into a powerful economic and strategic force in the world community, and as such deserves our attentions. For this reason most of our interest was in economic and strategic developments in South Africa," Dent said in a report to Congress.

He also pointed to Ichord's qualifications for participating in the visit: "I felt that Congressman Ichord was probably one of the best informed men on subversion and Communism, which rumors had told us were being applied in South Africa and Rhodesia by both Red China and Communist Russia."

During their visit, they met with Mulder, Commander of Naval Operations D.K. Kinkead-Weekes, Chief of the South Africa Navy Adm. J.J. Johnson, and Director of Strategic Studies Maj. Gen. J.H. Robertze.

Washington was not the only NATO member to establish direct contacts with South African military figures. The October 6, 1975, issue of the German weekly *Der Spiegel* reported:

German military officers are certainly acting in agreement with their brothers-in-arms in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly with British and French officers, who cultivate close contacts with the military forces of the South African Republic. NATO considers a militarily strong South Africa useful in safeguarding the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. . . .

Despite the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations, Bonn is prepared to strengthen the defense capabilities of South Africa.

The South Africa ambassador to Bonn, Donald Sole, used the South African embassy to coordinate links between South African and West German military and nuclear authorities. West German government officials cooperated in this effort, according to *Der Spiegel*.

For instance, when three South African officers asked permission to inspect the German Defense Ministry computer center in Bonn because they wanted to set up a similar computer system in South Africa, they were given permission within twelve days.

NATO Looks Toward Simonstown

While the details of SACLANT's contingency plans for southern Africa have not been publicly disclosed, Pretoria has already begun preparations to take on a greater role in "protecting" the Cape sea route, apparently under NATO's encouragement.

On September 1, 1974, it was revealed that the NATO Military Committee had decided to negotiate with Pretoria for the possible use of Simonstown as a NATO base. Although the results of those negotiations are not yet known, Pretoria has launched a program to expand its port facilities far beyond the present needs of the South African navy.

On November 7, 1974, Prime Minister Vorster announced that work to expand

the Simonstown base to accommodate forty to fifty warships would begin immediately. The Simonstown dockyards are to be tripled in size at a cost of \$45 million.



VORSTER

An additional \$17 million worth of equipment is to be installed over the next five years. The South African naval base at Durban is also being enlarged.

Vorster pledged that South African port facilities would be "open to all other friendly nations." Pretoria even launched a publicity campaign stressing that theme. For instance, an advertisement placed in the May 20, 1975, *Christian Science Monitor* asked: "Could an organisation like NATO have a base in Simonstown, South Africa?"

Noting that Washington had already begun expanding its naval facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, Anthony Harrigan, an American military specialist and coauthor of *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West*, pointed to the next logical step Washington should take. Writing in the September 1975 *South African Scope*, he said:

The immediate United States need is to proceed rapidly with the Diego Garcia installation and then begin right away to negotiate with South Africa for those facilities which Diego Garcia cannot provide, namely missile-loading facilities, major repair facilities, landing rights for naval reconnaissance aircraft covering the Cape area, and well-protected intelligence data collection and analysis facilities.

Adm. John McCain, the director of the United States Strategic Institute and a former navy commander in chief in the

Pacific Ocean, expressed a similar opinion nearly a year earlier. He was quoted in the October 25, 1974, *South African Comment and Opinion* as saying, "What has happened in Mozambique and Angola, makes our possession of Diego Garcia more important than ever. But it also means that we absolutely need access to Simonstown and Durban."

It would be politically difficult, however, for Washington openly to use the Simonstown base at this time. As a result of opposition among the American people to the apartheid regime, particularly among Blacks, U.S. ships have not used any South African ports since 1967, except in emergencies.

Consequently, one of the goals of American policy in southern Africa is to find a political "solution"—such as a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and closer ties between Pretoria and some of the Black African states—that would enable U.S. ships to use Simonstown and other bases without jeopardizing American interests in the rest of Africa or provoking protests by Blacks in the United States.

'Project Advocaat'

Closely related to the construction of additional South African naval facilities is Project Advocaat, a highly sophisticated and far-ranging communications and surveillance center located at Silvermine in the mountains about twenty miles north of Simonstown.

The surveillance radius of Silvermine is some 5,000 miles, covering much of the Indian Ocean, almost all of the South Atlantic, and the entire African continent. Using aerial reconnaissance, radio monitoring, and other sources of information, the computerized center can plot the course, size, armament, number of personnel, and other statistics of virtually any ship or plane within that radius. According to Cmdt. Georg Brits, who heads the Silvermine center, the system also has facilities to organize convoys in war situations.

The surveillance system, according to a lieutenant commander at Silvermine cited in the July 31, 1975, *Wall Street Journal*, is linked via the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius to Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, and by way of the British Admiralty in London to the U.S. naval communications station in Derry, Northern Ireland, and from there to the United States. Also by way of the British Admiralty, the system is tied into NATO headquarters in Brussels.

As with Simonstown, the capabilities of Silvermine are far greater than Pretoria can use for its own purposes. Moreover, South Africa does not have the necessary surveillance equipment to provide all the information that goes into Silvermine.

Hermanus Brink, Silvermine's operations officer, has said that the surveillance

center received "inputs from other navies," which he did not name. The July 1975 *Africa* reported, "Some military digests have said that *Project Advocaat* is directly linked to Washington and London, and informed sources believe that from these capitals come vital satellite photographs to make Vorster's picture complete."

The construction of Silvermine was directly related to NATO's "tilt" toward Pretoria. A report presented to the NATO Assembly session in November 1972 (where the recommendation that SAC-LANT begin its southern Africa planning was first made) stated that "there is a high priority requirement to develop a submarine and surface ship surveillance capability under NATO throughout the area."

The May 24, 1975, *Star Weekly* of South Africa reported that at a NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels, U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was thought to have made a proposal "to establish a major monitoring installation in South Africa for NATO intelligence purposes."

"It can only be assumed at this stage that America put forward the plan," reporter Tim Patten said, "although in the corridors of NATO headquarters it was firmly believed this was the case." Patten reported that it was also assumed that the British and French representatives had supported the proposal.

The UN Special Committee on Apartheid acquired a set of documents from the Anti-Apartheid Movement detailing part of NATO's involvement in *Project Advocaat*. *Africa* magazine reported in its July 1975 issue that according to the documents, South African officials used NATO computers to calculate the types and quantities of spare parts that would be needed for Silvermine.

They also used NATO's purchasing codes to buy equipment from such countries as Denmark and the Netherlands, which have publicly refused to sell arms to Pretoria in the past. French, British, and American parts are also known to have been ordered for *Project Advocaat*. The orders were made with NATO forms and were thought to have been delivered to Pretoria in September 1973.

Africa reported:

South Africa also received active assistance from the West German Defence Ministry—and although the exact scope of this is not yet known, it is believed that the Germans acted as middlemen, buying equipment from some unfriendly NATO countries and re-routing them to South Africa. However, from the photostat of a letter from AEG-Telefunken [a German company that has a contract with South Africa] to the German army supply department, it is clear that, in 1970, a meeting was held at which the Defence Ministry agreed to "process" spare parts ordered for *Project Advocaat*.

This purchasing arrangement between Pretoria and NATO was not a recent development. A NATO representative

admitted June 18, 1975, that South Africa had been using NATO codes since the early 1960s. He said that at the request of the French government NATO had given South Africa the special identification code number 18, which it continues to use.

Parallel with Pretoria's military preparations, South African officials have called on Washington and the other NATO powers to extend their alliance with the South African regime even further. For instance, speaking before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on June 6, 1975, Mulder said:

We are not asking the United States to police our waters. Despite embargoes we have managed to keep abreast in the military field. Our navy has expanded to an extent where it satisfies our medium power needs.

No, we do not need others to do our work, but we do require friends in the Western world to shoulder their own responsibilities in the oceans around us. In the process South Africa is able to supply them with harbor, drydock, and other support facilities instead of their having to go to considerable expense in creating their own bases in the area.

In mid-1972, Admiral Biermann stressed another "responsibility" that he thought the Western powers should shoulder in southern Africa. Biermann said that "it is imperative that a superpower should be involved in the strategy for the southern hemisphere and that as a final defence the strategy of deterrence with the threat of nuclear destruction and escalation has to be applied in this region as well."

A Member of the Nuclear Club?

Pretoria may soon not need to call on its Western allies to provide such a "deterrent." During the past decade and a half its scientists—with help from Europe and the United States—have been feverishly developing South Africa's own nuclear capability.

South Africa and the occupied territory of Namibia have some of the richest uranium fields in the world. But nuclear weapons technology requires much more than simple access to the raw materials. To be of use either as fuel for nuclear reactors or in atomic warheads, natural uranium must first be enriched, a process in which the lighter U-235 is separated from the heavier U-238.

This enrichment process is extremely complex and expensive. The enrichment technology, moreover, is usually kept a closely guarded secret by the nuclear powers—both to cut down competition in the field of nuclear fuel production and to slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries.

These obstacles notwithstanding, Prime Minister Vorster declared in 1970 that Pretoria had developed its own nuclear enrichment process. Two years later Minister of Mines P.J. Koornhof claimed that the process could produce the "cheapest enriched uranium in the world," costing

approximately 30 percent less than other methods. In April 1975, the first South African pilot enrichment plant went into operation at Valindaba, near Pretoria. The government also plans to build a large-scale commercial plant, at a projected cost of more than \$1 billion, by the early 1980s.

While Pretoria's desire to compete on the growing world market for nuclear fuel was probably an important consideration in its decision to launch the enrichment project, it was far from the only factor.

In fact, the military potential of the country's nuclear industry was so central to Pretoria's plans that in August 1965 Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd had to remind South African officials that it also had an economic value. Speaking at the inauguration of the country's first nuclear reactor, he said, "It is the duty of South Africa not only to consider the military uses of the material, but also to direct its uses to peaceful purposes."

Reporting in the November 1975 *Africa*, Peter Enahoro said, "Various South African spokesmen have from time to time publicly envisaged the day when their country will have its own atom bomb. Ten years ago, Andries Visser, a member of the South African Atomic Energy Board, suggested that the Republic should establish a nuclear arsenal not only for prestige purposes, but also because 'we should have such a bomb to prevent aggression from loud mouthed Afro-Asiatic states. . . .'"

Although Pretoria has muted such bellicose pronouncements during the past several years, and Vorster now claims that the country's nuclear research program is aimed entirely toward "peaceful" purposes, the development of a nuclear weapons capability is still very much on the minds of government and military officials.

In 1971, A.J.A. Roux, the president of the South African Atomic Energy Board, wrote that "if a country wishes to make nuclear weapons, an enrichment plant will provide the concentrated fission material if the country possesses the necessary natural uranium to process in the plant."

Shortly after India exploded its first nuclear device on May 18, 1974, Louw Alberts, the vice-chairman of the Atomic Energy Board, remarked that "our nuclear programme is more advanced than that of India."

Correspondent James Baxter said in the March 22, 1975, *Star Weekly*, "Indeed, some [American, British, and Soviet] authorities would not in any way be surprised if the South Africans already have reached the threshold of nuclear arms production, possessing, as they do, uranium in considerable quantities. . . ."

"Technically, too, South Africa's know-how in the field is considered to be sufficiently developed to produce this sort

of weapon if and when a political decision to do so is taken."

In addition to the aid given to the South African regime for its conventional military force, the major imperialist powers, Washington and Bonn in particular, have helped establish its nuclear industry.

Shortly after the South African Atomic Energy Board was set up in 1949, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission opened its facilities to South African engineers and nuclear scientists. In 1957, Washington and Pretoria signed a fifty-year bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement.

In a 1967 article, Africa scholar John Marcum reported:

[Despite] widespread African fears and international speculation that uranium-rich South Africa may try to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, the American Atomic Energy Commission [has] trained South African technicians at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and loaned the South African Atomic Energy Board a reactor consultant (Thomas Cole of Oak Ridge National Laboratory) to whom the South Africans consider themselves "largely indebted for the successful commission of Safari I," their first nuclear reactor which was dedicated in August 1965 in the presence of Dr. Alvin Weinberg, director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.⁵

Pretoria received help in developing its nuclear enrichment process from West Germany. Although the South African government has not yet revealed its enrichment technique, it is believed that it is based on the nozzle separation method developed by the West German Steinkohlen Elektrizität AG (STEAG), a state-controlled company, and the West German Nuclear Research Society (GfK—Gesellschaft für Kernforschung) at Karlsruhe.

South African scientists were allowed to visit the Karlsruhe center. And according to Tony Hodges in the November 1975 *Africa*, "Professor E.W. Becker, who has been working on the nozzle technique at Karlsruhe for 15 years, is now working in South Africa."

In August 1973, it was revealed that STEAG and the South African Atomic Energy Board were negotiating an agreement to collaborate on nuclear enrichment. In April 1974, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa and STEAG signed a contract "to carry out a joint feasibility study of two uranium enrichment processes."

"The mastermind behind the South African success in the nuclear field in West Germany is Donald Sole, who arrived as Ambassador to Bonn in 1968," Enahoro reported. "A past member of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board, he served as chairman of the International Atomic Energy Organization in Vienna in 1959

and 1960 and continued to be a member of the Organisation's Council of Governors until the end of 1972. With such qualifications his appointment to West Germany was obviously not an accident."

In addition to the contacts Sole established with STEAG and GfK, he managed to enlist the collaboration of high military officials.

In October 1974 Sole organized a visit to South Africa by Lt. Gen. Günther Rall, at that time West Germany's top air force officer and its representative on NATO's military committee. Traveling under the pseudonym of "Mr. Ball," Rall inspected South African military installations, as well as the nuclear facilities at Palindaba.

Within two days after the secret trip was revealed in September 1975 by a German magazine, Rall was forced to resign. Al-

though the trip had been approved by Defense Minister Georg Leber, he later claimed that he had not known of the "special circumstances" of the visit.

A statement by the African National Congress of South Africa, quoted by Hodges, pointed out that nuclear weapons would allow Pretoria to "use its nuclear muscle to weaken boycotts, embargoes and sanctions; it could blackmail Africa and the international community into acquiescence in its apartheid policies at home and the expansion of its economic stranglehold over the continent."

South Africa's nuclear potential could be a serious future threat to Black-ruled Africa. But as shown by its intervention in Angola, Pretoria's powerful conventional military might is an immediate danger.

[Next: The Gendarme of Southern Africa]

International Campaign to Free Hernán Cuentas

An international campaign is being waged to free Peruvian miners union leaders Hernán Cuentas and Víctor Cuadros, and four labor attorneys—Ricardo Díaz Chavez, José Oña Meoña, Arturo Salas Rodríguez, and Genaro Ledesma Izquieta. The six were arrested in December 1975 but have yet to be charged with any crime.

The February 19-26 issue of the Paris weekly newspaper *Informations Ouvrières* devoted an entire page to reporting protests from France. Messages have been sent from scores of trade unionists and locals of the major trade-union federations—the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor), Force Ouvrière (Labor Force), and CFDT (Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor).

Protests have also been sent by members and leaders of the Communist party, Socialist party, League for the Rights of Man, Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization), Alliance des Jeunes pour le Socialisme (AJS—Alliance of Youth for Socialism), and Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (UNEF—National Union of Students of France).

The French section of Amnesty International, groups of university professors and other professionals, and a number of student organizations have voiced protests as well.

In Peru, according to a report in the February 18 issue of the Buenos Aires weekly *Política Obrera*, a rally of 30,000 persons was held in Lima to protest the arrests. This was followed by work stoppages by miners and a twenty-four-hour strike in Lima and Callao called by the Communist party-led Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP—

General Confederation of Peruvian Workers).

Cuentas, a leader of the Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (POMR—Revolutionary Marxist Workers party), had returned from forced exile only three months before his arrest. Upon his return, he became part of the leadership of the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú (National Federation of Miners and Metalworkers of Peru). He served as a leader of miners at Cuajone, an important mining site in the south of Peru.

Along with Cuadros, Cuentas is being held in Lurín, a city near Lima. The four labor lawyers face harsher conditions—they are imprisoned in the Amazonian penal colony, El Sepa.

In an open letter published in the February 12 issue of the Peruvian newsmagazine *Marka*, Cuentas and Cuadros pointed out that the attorneys face "a grave risk to their own lives." They cited in particular the case of Arturo Salas, who is elderly and suffers from a spinal condition that requires constant medical attention.

Cuentas and Cuadros also explained what lay behind the arrests:

"No one doubts that what is behind the attack against us is the fear the imperialists and reactionary bourgeois have of the miners and metalworkers organized in the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú. Nor does anyone doubt that this attack is the same kind as that being experienced by the compañeros of Plásticos El Pacífico; the printers in the El Virrey, Simac, and Sider case; the fishermen; and so many other assaults the reactionary forces use to try to behead and demobilize the Peruvian proletariat so that later they can try to defeat it, forcing it to bear the entire brunt of the crisis of the capitalist system." □

5. Quoted in *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, by Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Problems of the Cuban Workers State

By Livio Maitan

[The last world congress of the Fourth International, held in February 1974, opened a public discussion on the internal situation in Cuba and the foreign policy of the Cuban government. The following article, translated by *Intercontinental Press*, is a contribution to that discussion.]

* * *

Recent developments—in internal as well as international politics—have again posed the problem of an analysis of the overall situation in Cuba. Militants are questioning the nature of the Cuban state at the present stage. Is the characterization advanced by revolutionary Marxists since 1960 still valid or must it be rectified? Before offering an answer let's cast a look back.

The Formation of the Workers State

"The Cuban revolution," says the text of the Sixth World Congress of the Fourth International (January 1961), "has roughly speaking gone through three phases up to now: the first, in which, after having limited its goals and its methods to a program of 'cleaning up the system' and of armed action carried out by a small group that tried to win over a sector of the army, the Fidelista movement developed a program of struggle against the system itself, centering mainly on bourgeois-democratic demands and on more and more advanced peasant demands; the second, marked by the first revolutionary gains and especially the agrarian reform; and the third, whose culminating points were the mortal blows against imperialist property in the summer of 1960, and the decisive wave of nationalizations, including those of native capitalist properties, in October of the same year.

"On the specifically political level, in the first phase the people's revolutionary forces signed (July 1958) a pact with the representatives of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy; the second phase was marked by the formation (January 1959) of a government including liberal-conservative elements, with Urrutia as president. Finally, the inevitable break with the latter occurred—a break caused above all by the promulgation of the agrarian reform.

"In its first two phases, therefore, the Cuban revolution developed as a radical anti-imperialist democratic revolution, whereas in the third it completed the process of 'growing over' into a socialist

revolution, eliminating not only the economic bases of imperialism but also of native capitalist property. On the level of political leadership, this evolution was more in form than substance, for the real power was in the hands of the Ejército Rebelde [Rebel Army] and the Fidelista team, even during the period of dual power sui generis that ran from the taking of power to the fall of Urrutia." [See "On the Nature of the Cuban Revolution," *Fourth International*, Winter, 1960-61, No. 12.]

The specific forms of the armed struggle for power and the character of the Fidelista leadership—as analyzed in the resolution cited above—contributed to making a fundamental difference between the Cuban revolution and the Russian revolution of 1917. In spite of the active participation of broad layers of the peasantry and in the later stages of the urban proletarian masses, the destruction of the bourgeois state did not go hand in hand with the emergence of soviet-type proletarian democratic structures. That is why, in the context of cultural and economic backwardness and the impossibility Cuba faced of integrating itself into a homogeneous supranational economic system, tendencies toward bureaucratic degeneration existed from the beginning. However, unlike Yugoslavia and China—and even more unlike the countries of Eastern Europe occupied by the Red Army, which were quickly brought into a process of structural assimilation with the USSR—the revolution in Cuba did not develop under a leadership historically linked to Stalinism, trained in this school and deeply scarred by bureaucracy even before the conquest of power. In the period of the revolutionary war and right after the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship, the Castroist leadership suffered the limitations and contradictions stemming from its petty-bourgeois origins and its Jacobin ideology. But it was inspired by a determination to maintain its ties with the driving forces of the revolution, by an understanding that such a link was needed in order to counteract bourgeois restorationist tendencies and to counter the attacks of American imperialism.¹ Another obstacle to adopting the Stalinist model and a factor

1. The problems of the nature of the Cuban revolution since the period of the struggle against Batista, of the role of the different social classes, of the ideology of the revolution, and of its international context have been treated on several occasions by the Cuban leaders. To limit

promoting an awareness of the problems of the degeneration of the revolution were the distrust of the Stalinists of the PSP [People's Socialist party], who after collaborating with Batista on several occasions opposed the guerrilla struggle for a whole period, and the thinking that certain leaders of the July 26 Movement were able to undertake on the negative evolution of the USSR and the bureaucratized Communist parties.

ourselves just to a recent period, here is what Armando Hart said in October 1974:

"The far-reaching base of social support that was provided by different sectors of the urban population, the resistance struggle, sabotage, and strikes that were unleashed all over the country, the fact that the Cuban guerrillas faithfully reflected the essentially democratic demands of the whole nation and correctly interpreted the political methods of unity employed by Fidel, are aspects of the history of our revolution, which must be carefully studied in order to understand the reasons that led to the victory of the revolution on January 1, 1959.

"Because, although the guerrillas and the Rebel Army played the key role in the victory, the support of different social sectors and especially the students in urban areas and the peasants in rural areas, combined with the way in which Fidel handled certain aspects of the struggle, also constituted factors of great importance without which the guerrillas might have been isolated." (*Granma*, November 3, 1974.) All the quotations from *Granma* are from the weekly Spanish edition.

For his part, Fidel said several months earlier: "The social revolution could never have been carried out with the peasants alone; this revolution would have been absolutely impossible without the working class! Since, for topographical reasons, there were no industries or concentration of workers in the regions where the war had begun, since all there was were dispersed groups of peasants, it was logical for the peasants to play the main role at the moment. But the agricultural workers on the big plantations in the Sierra Maestra soon began to join the rebel forces; cane cutters, rice harvesters, and agricultural workers of other kinds began to turn up.

"However, Cuba was not made up of only mountains and countryside; there was the capital and other big cities where there were no peasants, just workers.

"Later the revolution would have to confront its foreign enemies; and in that decisive struggle, that life-or-death struggle, in which the nation had to confront its foreign enemies, the working class necessarily played a decisive role." In the common struggle, in the alliance with the peasantry, the working class "brought its own ideology, the ideology of the working class: Marxism-Leninism, the struggle for socialism, the struggle for communism." (*Granma*, May 26, 1974.)

"On the other hand, we have had a real and sincere friend who has always shown us great generosity, unselfishness and fraternity. Thus, we have said that the Cuban revolution came forth at the very moment—and not a minute sooner—when the international balance of power and the big changes taking place in the world could make possible this reality." (*Granma*, January 14, 1973.)

Thus the Cuban workers state was born without the deformations that from the beginning marked countries like Yugoslavia and China where the taking of power was the outcome of prolonged revolutionary mobilizations. As a result of the decisions made at several points by its leading group, the Cuban revolution for a long time after its victory did not experience a substantial process of bureaucratic degeneration. That is why the Fourth International adopted an attitude toward the Cuban leadership qualitatively different from its attitude toward the leaderships of other workers states, not including in our program either the struggle for an antibureaucratic political revolution or the building of an alternative leadership.

Three Crucial Episodes

All these aspects did not prevent the Fourth International from highlighting the objective factors likely to stimulate forms of bureaucratization or from taking note over a long period of fifteen years of contradictory tendencies and crucial moments in the struggles against these phenomena.

On the whole we can distinguish three important episodes between 1960 and 1970.

The first came in 1962 when the pro-Stalinist faction around Aníbal Escalante was defeated. At that time some fairly well defined tendencies had set out to introduce administrative methods and to impose forms of bureaucratization involving a growing weight of the apparatus, the emergence of relatively privileged conditions, and the imposition of Stalinist-like cultural practices. This resulted in the creation of a dangerous gap between the leaders and the masses. A speech by Guevara in 1961 and Castro's speeches against falsification of history and above all against Escalante were the most important testimony to the fact that at least a small part of the leading group was perfectly aware of the dangers and had decided to fight resolutely against them.

In fact the most representative elements of the bureaucratic current were placed in a position where they could do no harm, and a difficult phase was overcome.

The second episode occurred in 1967. In this year the Cuban polemic against the international line of the bureaucracy of the CPs and of the Soviet bureaucracy itself came to its fullest development. One of the culminating points of this polemic was Fidel Castro's March 13 speech, in which, among other things, he explicitly criticized the visit of a Soviet commercial delegation to the Colombian government then engaged in repressing the guerrillas, and in which he made an extremely clear and vehement attack on the opportunistic line of the Venezuelan CP. Guevara's message, coming from an unknown field of battle, which was published in April, was along the same lines. The OLAS conference in

July gave additional sanction to a line in opposition to the reformist conceptions of the Communist parties, and rejected any subordination to the politico-diplomatic needs of the bureaucracies of the degenerated workers states.

But 1967 was also the year of a new attack by the leading Castroist group against the bureaucratic positions and against the tendencies and men from the former PSP who had not ceased to represent a brake on, and a danger to, the revolutionary process. Already, the year before, an attack had been launched on a stronghold of some bureaucrats of the old school, that is, the national union federation. The apparatus headed by Lazaro Peña, whose responsibility cannot be wiped out by apologetic postmortem commemorations, was largely replaced. In the same period, a campaign was launched around the need for actively mobilizing the masses as a condition for achieving economic objectives. Likewise another campaign was started up against the overgrown administrative apparatus and against bureaucratic methods of management and leadership. These campaigns prompted a broad theoretical debate in which even economists from other countries, including revolutionary Marxists, were able to express their views. The criteria used in other workers states were explicitly criticized, and a general conception was outlined, which differed both from the Soviet theories based on the absolute primacy of material incentives as well as from certain Chinese formulations marked by oversimplification and abstract idealism (in addition to being largely out of line with the actual practice in China).

In the summer of 1970 the failure of the ten million ton *zafra* [sugar harvest]—a prime objective to which everything had been subordinated, creating extreme tension throughout the country—touched off a dramatic critical rethinking. Once again this was most explicitly expressed in Fidel Castro's speeches. These speeches drew a mercilessly self-critical balance sheet on the shocks and contradictions the Cuban economy was suffering; they denounced the preponderance of administrative methods over political methods of leadership and an extremely insufficient participation by the masses in economic management.

Let me cite what I wrote at the time in an attempt to take advantage of the opening the Cubans had made.

"We know whatever the specific solutions adopted, above all starting off from the level of a country condemned to backwardness by imperialist exploitation, that difficult problems will remain. It is hard to develop all the necessary trained personnel in a short period of time, and the cultural limitations of the masses constitute a major obstacle to their participating in a real way in administering the economy and the broader society.

"But to break out of this vicious circle,

there is no other way than to strive by every means right from the start to tap the creative potential of the masses. Only by experience can the masses acquire the necessary capacities and concepts, and produce the cadres essential for the overwhelming tasks of real socialist construction.

"It is precisely for this reason—and not out of fetishistic attachment to any scriptures or experiences of the past—that we have always held that a revolution in Cuba, as elsewhere, must find expression in the creation of political structures arising from below, which alone can assure maximum democracy for the workers and peasants.

"The absence of such structures, let us repeat once again, has been the Achilles' heel of the Cuban revolution. Now the consequences of this lack should be evident to everyone. If these structures had been built; if instead of relying primarily on their instinct and their direct experiences the Cuban leaders had learned more from the fundamental lessons of the past half century of struggles by the workers movement in the countries where capitalism has been overthrown, it would have been less difficult to achieve coherent planning and avoid the ravages of bureaucratic disorder. It would have been easier to achieve a much more substantial increase in production, to assure a more rational allocation of resources.

"What is more, the creation of such structures would have erected much more substantial barriers than the mere combative spirit of a leading nucleus to the tendencies towards bureaucratization which, in a context such as the one in Cuba, is inherent in the phase of transition from capitalism to socialism.

"Among the causes of the economic failures and dangerous social developments, the absence of a revolutionary-democratic organization of the state must, then, be assigned first place." ("A Crucial Stage for the Cuban Revolution," *Intercontinental Press*, November 30, 1970, p. 1043.)

In a general way two alternative solutions to the problem posed by the failure of the *zafra* were counterposed within the leadership itself: a solution of a bureaucratic and authoritarian kind, based on domination by technicians and specialists and on much stricter discipline, possibly accompanied by repressive measures; and a solution based primarily on the mobilization and active participation of the masses in economic and political development.

"The stakes in this confrontation, which is shaping up to be very sharp, is, in the last analysis, fundamental for the future of the Cuban revolution. Will Cuba be condemned to growing bureaucratization, or will it prove possible to open up a new chapter in the history of the struggle the masses have waged against the bureaucracy? The answer depends in very large

measure on the results of the present confrontation." (*Quarta Internazionale*, No. 1, 1971.)

The choices outlined by the Cuban leadership did not include an overall solution to the problems that had been present since the day following the victory of the revolution. For example, the conception that called for achieving active participation by the masses through the existing mass organizations did not resolve the problem of building and coordinating structures of real proletarian democracy, nor did it resolve, by itself, the problem of assuring the effective democratic functioning of these mass organizations. As for the party, no concrete step was taken with a view to eliminating in the near future decisive obstacles to internal democracy (lack of any room for freely expressing different or opposing positions, failure to call a congress, etc.).

But, in spite of all that, Fidel Castro's self-criticism and certain decisions outlined by the leading group revealed a clear potential for fighting bureaucratism and showed, in any case, that the group around Fidel was conscious of what was at stake and wanted at any price to avoid becoming the instrument of forces and interests different from those it has represented since the period of the armed struggle against the dictatorship.

Five years afterward, is it premature to ask ourselves, Did the battle announced in 1970 really take place? In what forms was it conducted and with what results? What tendencies are now operating and what are the perspectives?

At the moment, we do not possess all the analytical elements required to give a complete answer (for example, at least in the official publications we have been able to consult, we have not found any overall statistics that would permit a thorough evaluation of the economic situation). Nevertheless, certain general lines of analysis can be established, from which some definite conclusions can legitimately be drawn.

If our interpretation in 1970 correctly recognized the general trends, in practice the situation has evolved in a much less clear fashion. The results to date indicate that neither of the two solutions mentioned got the upper hand. Instead, we have to record a partial implementation of certain features of the second alternative, in combination with features of the first. Let us look at this in more detail.

Economic Problems and Tendencies

Throughout the first ten years of its life, the Cuban workers state was rudely compelled to periodically take account of how much the economic development of a small country dependent on one crop is conditioned by the world market. The political factors, i.e., the blockade and sabotage, made the economic effects of this

pressure still more negative.

After the initial illusions about the possibility of a fairly rapid diversification, the leading group had to conclude that for an indeterminate period sugar cultivation would remain the backbone of the country's economy, the primary source of accumulation, and the principal means of acquiring currency for foreign trade (as Castro noted, for example, in a January 1973 speech, the products assuring foreign exchange are nickel, tobacco, fish, and sugar, but sugar overshadows the others).

In a context where Cuba remained isolated in Latin America, and could not pin its hopes on integration into an effectively unified economic system of the workers states (even leaving aside the specific difficulties of incorporating Cuba, since the Comecon does not constitute a fully developed system of economic integration), maintaining sugar cultivation as the principal economic lever was an unavoidable choice. Only utopians or irresponsible people could question the necessity of such a decision. In the last analysis, the origin of the ten million ton campaign is to be located in this reality. Regardless of propagandistic distortions or conjunctural rhetoric, this goal was not regarded as an end in itself but as a means to acquire resources needed for other sectors and to lessen a number of dangerous tensions. We cannot go back here over the causes of the failure.

In retrospect it can be said that in his self-criticism Castro put too much emphasis on the socio-political causes (which were certainly a factor), compared to the more specifically economic ones, especially the largely voluntarist nature of the option taken: That is, the fact that, in view of the available labor force, technical know-how, and general organization, such a large-scale, concentrated effort could not be made without creating grave bottlenecks in other sectors as well as a series of highly negative effects.

The failure was dramatic in any event, insofar as it seemed to compromise possibilities for rapid growth, or relatively rapid growth, and seemed destined to increase dependence on foreign countries.

However, the results obtained in the years following 1970 were better than could have been expected at the time. By 1972 there was already a modest but real improvement. And the agreements with the USSR, which, among other things, involved long-term payments and credits without interest, guaranteed the essential margin for maneuver.²

It should be noted, moreover, that what

has historically been an economic tragedy for Cuba—that is, its dependence on the world market price of sugar—in the recent period has turned into an unexpected opportunity. This is the result of a rise, particularly noticeable in certain phases of the economic conjuncture, in the price of raw materials. Of course, world inflation also exerts pressure on Cuba, and what is still more important, the rise in sugar prices could experience a brusque change, likely to reduce seriously if not wipe out the gains made. This does not alter the fact that the rise of sugar to 40 and 50 cents a pound (end 1974, beginning 1975) represents a considerable advantage for Cuba (increases in the prices of industrial products have been more than compensated for). To get an idea of what this means, it is enough to note that even as late as mid-1973 at the International Sugar Conference, Cuba proposed 6 cents as the minimum price, 9 cents as the maximum price, and 11 cents as the so-called administrative price.³ As Castro pointed out in December 1974, in the coming season a six million ton *zafra* at year-end 1974 prices would correspond in terms of 1970 prices not to a ten million ton, but to a twenty million ton, *zafra*.

This means that Cuba already has, and will likely have in the next stage, a much larger margin of economic maneuver than could legitimately be expected after the failure in 1970. This makes it possible for the Cuban leadership to tackle a number of problems without having to contend with such serious tensions.

During the traditional balance sheet speech at the last July 26 anniversary, in giving some indicative facts, Castro pointed out that between 1970 and 1973 the overall economic growth had been on the order of 26 percent, that agriculture had scored considerable advances;⁴ and that industry had maintained a particularly steady growth (in particular, the construction industry had had an "extraordinary" dynamism). According to certain estimates, obviously from an official source, that have appeared in the international press, the rate of growth after 1973 reached 10 percent, with an increase in exports from 768 million pesos to 2,193 million pesos (*Le Monde*, January 14, 1975). In a speech in February of this year, Castro calculated that production in the construction sector had tripled since 1970.⁵ As for

3. Eleven cents is also the new price accepted by the USSR, although with a reduction of the volume at the same time. (*Le Monde*, January 14, 1975.)

4. This in spite of two years (1973 and 1974) of drought.

5. The construction materials industry recorded a rate of growth of 11 percent in 1974 compared with 1973.

2. At the beginning of 1974 the Cuban debt to the USSR was estimated, according to the *Documentation Française* (No. 231-32, 1974) at \$4 billion to \$5 billion. Repayment is due within twenty-five years, beginning in 1986. (For the agreement, see *Granma*, January 14, 1973.)

the perspectives, 1976 will mark the beginning of the first five-year plan. Its general lines will be established definitively after a discussion among the masses. But, in theory, it is to involve an annual rate of growth of 6 percent. This figure, already put forward in 1973 by Castro as attainable in the following decade, was confirmed in the balance sheet of last year mentioned above. If the favorable prices for sugar last, the percentage of growth could be increased. The investments foreseen by the plan are on the order of \$12 to 15 billion, that is, \$2.5 to 3 billion per year (cf. statement by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in Paris, January 15, 1975).

The elements of the balance sheet and the summary forecasts should not make us forget, in the first place, that the 6 percent average rate of growth is a relatively low one for a still largely underdeveloped country (all the more if you consider the rate of population growth).⁶ In the second place, the results of the plan will themselves be largely shaped by the evolution of the world market (evolution of raw materials prices, of the terms of trade in industrial products and of agricultural products, and the results of the inflationary process at the international level, etc.).⁷ It is necessary, in the third place, to take into account the choking bottlenecks that exist and serious contradictions that we can summarize as follows:

1. Problems created by the shortage of manpower, which results primarily from the seasonal character of the harvest and limited progress in mechanizing the cultivation of the main crop. (The special experiment of the microbrigades, employed to stimulate housing construction, had a bad side to it, in that it, at least partially, drew off manpower from the production sector. This forced other workers to do unpaid overtime work.)⁸

6. Population growth would be 200,000 a year. (*Granma*, May 26, 1974.) In 1975 total population reached 9 million; it was 7,256,267 in 1964 (1.5 million more than in 1953).

7. At the Twelfth Trade Union Congress, Castro cited significant facts about the goods imported by Cuba.

8. Some facts to indicate the nature of the problems: In 1974 there were 280,000 construction workers. For 1980 a doubling of production is foreseen with an increase of 140,000 workers. In the same year there would have to be fewer workers engaged in the *zafra* than in construction. (*Granma*, December 5, 1974.) The tensions flow from the development of sectors whose growth incontestably represents a gain scored by the revolution: At the end of 1975 workers in education will number 250,000 and those in public health 150,000 (the two together numbering around 400,000, that is, one worker in six. (*Granma*, February 16, 1974.) In other cases the tensions are produced by a relative abundance of money—caused by wage increases in a situation of relative scarcity of means of consumption—

2. Insufficient training in regular work habits, resulting in relatively low productivity, especially in certain sectors, and the persisting absenteeism (even though, according to official statements, the trend has definitely been toward a drop in this).⁹

3. Shortages of certain essential materials (for example, cement for building) that has repercussions on production as a whole (the bottlenecks that exist in construction in spite of increases noted also involve industrial construction). Shortages of consumer goods (including restrictions on sugar, in view of the need to save as much as possible for export).¹⁰

Finally, the radical shift in the norms for organizing work and stimulating productivity has not, by itself, made it possible to overcome the difficulties, the tensions, and the contradictions that prompted the leaders to make this turn. This came out very clearly, for example, in the national union congress debates.

As we have already mentioned, these problems have been discussed on several occasions since the revolution. Different conceptions have been counterposed, and there was a succession of various methods.

But 1970 marked a break even on this ground. The leading group started to adopt a more realistic conception of the problems of the transitional stage and their solution. In the first place, they made much clearer the necessary distinction between the socialist phase and the communist phase and stated flatly that there was no possibility for a socialist revolution "jumping over stages." (*Granma*, February 16, 1975.)

While not completely renouncing politico-ideological incentives and assigning a major importance to the level of consciousness attained by the working class and the toilers in general, the Cuban leadership staked more and more—in practice still more than in explicit theorization—on material incentives. The

that leads women to leave their jobs. Castro denounced this trend at the November 1974 union congress, attributing it also to machismo and "supermanism."

9. Cases of a lowering of productivity of labor below the level of the capitalist epoch have been denounced, for example, in many repair shops in the sugar sector. (*Granma*, November 25, 1973.) A form of absenteeism, which may be termed deepgoing, was the relatively frequent trend not to look for or accept work. It was in order to fight against this trend that the law against vagrancy was adopted in 1971. Its adoption rapidly resulted in the integration of about 100,000 persons into production.

10. The Congress of Cuban Women approved the proposal to reduce the sugar ration to a pound per month in order to get an additional surplus of 50,000 tons, which, according to Castro's estimate, would permit the purchase of a textile factory. (*Granma*, December 8, 1975.)

system of norms became the rule.¹¹ Its extension went hand in hand with a reorganization of the system of wages and bonuses involving an attack on positions of privilege (first of all, ending so-called historic salaries). This included annulling Resolution 270, which granted bonuses to workers who individually or collectively accomplished exceptional tasks and demonstrated a revolutionary attitude. Social security was reorganized, and retirement at full pay was granted only in exceptional cases. Voluntary work was reduced (in view of its inadequate economic return in most cases). Overtime work was reorganized (in this case also because of a questionable economic return from overtime work that was unpaid or demanded without a specified purpose). The "*escalafones*" (job and salary classifications) were reorganized. "*Compromisos colectivos de trabajo*" (collective labor agreements) were concluded between the administrators and the workers in each unit of production as the basis of relations between the two categories.

The generalization of norms and the emphasis on material incentives, together with other measures mentioned, no doubt helped to increase productivity (Castro pointed to this also in the last session of the National Council of the Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos [*Granma*, February 16, 1975]), and helped as well to introduce some elements essential for rationalizing production. But this did not proceed without difficulties and dangerous tendencies likely to create tensions.

The practical application of a system of norms itself created serious problems, since, to use some of Castro's formulations, certain norms were "basic," others "more accurately adjusted" (*más ajustadas*), others still "less accurately adjusted" (*mal ajustadas*). The workers who were given higher quantitative and even qualitative norms were disadvantaged, inasmuch as they had to make a greater effort, and could get the bonus for overfulfilling the norm only by a greater effort. Where, on the contrary, the norms had been fixed at too low levels, it could have two kinds of results. This could result in higher pay, in view of the greater ease of exceeding the

11. "Tying pay to fulfillment of norms and adopting forms of payment that make it possible to step up production and productivity is a decisive task for our economy," stated Roberto Veiga, general secretary of the CTC last May 1. He added: "The material incentive represented by linking norms and wages does not deny but on the contrary reaffirms the need to strenuously exalt the high moral values that exist among our working people." These same ideas were expressed in the thesis of the Thirteenth National Union Congress: "Each must be remunerated according to the quantity and quality of his work. Whoever works more and better must be compensated. Those who through regular work give more to society must be compensated for it, in proportion to their contribution."

norm. Or productivity could remain very low if the workers, fearing that it were noticed how undemanding these norms were, and that new ones would be set, kept under the established threshold. Besides, a system of material incentives and norms tends in general to produce marked wage differentiations in the working class itself, from sector to sector and even among different shops in the same plant.¹² In the case of bonuses and promotions, the danger of arbitrariness, inequalities, and injustice is still greater, and in fact there have been some exposés of this. (At one time, the idea was raised of exempting the most active and disciplined workers, whose family income did not exceed a certain ceiling, from the rent payments required by the urban reform law, as well as of giving priority in the distribution of electrical appliances to the most meritorious workers.)¹³

Socialist emulation itself—which was particularly stressed in the theses of the last union congress—risks being compromised by organizational inadequacies that would make it difficult to keep the necessary controls. Problems of this nature were bared several months ago by the general secretary of the national union federation.¹⁴ We should not forget as well that the workweek is still fairly burdensome. The union congress set an average of forty-four hours a week (with a maximum of fifty-five a week and of ten hours a day with the exception of very particular sectors). In the proposed constitution, the eight-hour day is established (Article 45).

According to official sources, Cuba registered an increase in overall volume of wages as well as rising wage levels. In the balance sheet made in his last speech at the union congress, Castro cited the following statistics on total wages: 1967—2,773 million pesos; 1970—3,111 million; 1971—3,187 million; 1972—3,367 million; 1973—3,690 million. At the same time, spending by the population rose because of the commodities in distribution as well as the higher prices of certain “nonessential” products. Throughout the same speech Castro drew attention, however, to a fundamental danger to the Cuban economy at this stage, that is, the danger that

the quantity of commodities available might not correspond to the volume of money in circulation and that inflationary tendencies would thus be stimulated. In view of the shortages that persist despite the progress that has been achieved and the prospects for the blockade being relaxed, Cuba will face this problem for a long while.¹⁵

The Social Context

Owing to the thoroughness of a series of revolutionary measures and some shrewd tactical decisions by the leading group, the problem of domestic conflict with layers of the former ruling class and restorationist tendencies was posed from the beginning years in a notably milder form in Cuba than in other workers states.

In fact, the representatives of the exploiting classes and their supporters have, for the most part, left the country for exile in the United States. The leading group did not place any obstacles in the way of this massive emigration; it even encouraged this in a certain way. The result was that, while there was a broad base for reactionary maneuvers outside the country, inside Cuba the representatives and the surviving layers of the old system found themselves rapidly isolated.

In the second place, following the two waves of agrarian reform in 1959 and 1963, the Cuban countryside underwent structural changes sharply reducing the chances for capitalist accumulation and for dangerous political counterattacks from well-to-do peasants, the potential kulaks. Let us remember that four and a half years after the fall of Batista and three years after the birth of the workers state—which followed the expropriation of the native capitalists—the state sector, in the form of state farms (*granjas estatales*), already covered more than 60 percent of the agricultural land. Less than 40 percent was left in the private sector (the reform in 1963 lowered the ceiling on the amount of land that the peasant could keep from 30 to 5 *caballerías*, that is, to about 67 hectares, since one *caballería* equals 13.4 hectares). Before the second wave of the reform, according to official statistics of June 30, 1962, there were 915,000 persons employed in agricultural production. At that time, small peasants, beneficiaries of the reform, organized in the ANAP (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—National Association of Small Farmers), represented about 200,000 families (today it would be 180,000 according to information obtained by a *Le Monde* correspondent in January 1975).¹⁶ In

15. One of the means adopted to counter the imbalance has been to raise the price of certain commodities—cigars and drinks. Other increases, for example in electricity, were aimed above all, according to official statements, to combat wastage. (*Granma*, November 25, 1973.)

January 1967 the government decided to integrate individual plots into the state farms, because, according to official statements, the workers were devoting too much attention to them to the detriment of collective work. At the end of the same year, the ANAP decided to sell its members' produce only to the state.

It is obvious that such a social layer cannot represent either by its size or its dynamism a force hostile to the regime. On the one hand, it is too strongly conditioned by the leading role of the state in the agricultural sector. On the other, after the 1963 shake-up, the Castroist leading group adopted a careful attitude, aiming for a gradual and long-term absorption of existing peasant property and strongly stressing the principle of free choice by the peasants—a principle that, insofar as it is possible to judge, has been respected in practice.¹⁷ The problems that arise, creating tensions are—on the whole—fairly usual for a transitional phase, but, let us repeat, they present themselves in a much less serious form than in other transitional societies.

Tendencies to the development and consolidation of differentiation have arisen above all from the more or less favorable location of farms, differing productivity, and size. There is also the phenomenon of an exodus from the mountainous or poorer areas. As in other workers states, this is tied up with the spread of education and higher cultural levels. In certain cases the plots are left without the necessary manpower to work them, and a trend has developed toward combining previously separate farms. Some of the top layers of this peasant stratum can attain relative wealth and even employ wage workers.¹⁸ Finally, the breaking up of the small farms poses the classical problem of the use of agricultural machinery.

16. For a recent estimate, see *Le Monde*, January 16, 1975.

17. See, for example, *Granma*, May 25, 1974. The principle of voluntary choice is also written into the draft constitution (Article 20), which among other things establishes a constitutional ban on renting out land, on introducing forms of rent in kind, etc., and use of land as security for loans. (Article 21.)

18. Regarding the exodus—especially of youth—see Castro's speech to the ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers) at the end of 1971. In this speech Castro also denounced the activities of black market speculators that damage farmers' interests. Regarding differentiations among the peasants, a *Le Monde* analysis already quoted refers to a proprietor from the area between Havana and Pinar del Río who produces cottage cheese and tobacco and who employs a manager and six employees in his business. Peasant production of meat, fruits, vegetables, and milk is increasing. Tobacco is one of the main products of the sector. (*Granma*, March 10, 1974.)

12. According to information given by the director of the Alquitex factory near Havana, wages range from 80 to 250 pesos a month with a maximum of 350 for the best paid technicians. (*Le Monde*, January 24, 1975.)

13. In his report to the February plenum of the National Council of the CTC, Roberto Veiga gave figures on the fulfillment of the plan for distributing household electrical appliances in 1974. (*Bohemia*, No. 7, 1975, p. 55.)

14. Ibid. According to Veiga in 1974, 1,511,185 workers participated individually in the emulation campaign.

As for petty-bourgeois urban layers—linked to the trading sectors—they were hard hit by the March 1968 expropriation measures. These steps had unquestionably negative effects on the distribution of certain products and provoked a certain discontent. At the time, they were criticized as “ultraleft.” Nonetheless, they prevented the reinforcement and consolidation of a business layer capable of becoming a political threat.

We already mentioned the problems that most directly concern the working class when we spoke of work organization, incentives, wages, etc. It is enough to add here that the working class is growing in industry proper as well as in construction, and that there is a tendency for manpower engaged in the *zafra* to decline (thanks to more efficient mechanization). We already pointed out the considerable expansion in the educational and public health sectors. As for the differentiations within the working class that we have also mentioned, they arise—to put it in the most simple terms—from two sources: Either they flow from preexisting conditions (note the polemics over the “historic” wages) or they involve differences in sectors and productivity. Especially after the discussions of the 1973 union congress, the differentiations of the second type weighed more heavily. The decision to favor a system of norms and to emphasize material incentives could only work in the same direction.

During the polemics over the failure of the ten million ton *zafra*, we explained once again our fundamental position on the problem of bureaucratic tendencies and the hardening of bureaucratic forms. These tendencies and these forms, however limited they might be, were favored by the absence of political structures such as would enable the working class to actually play the leading role it must play and enable layers allied to the working class to actually participate in the management of the economy and the state. The void was filled by an apparatus of middle and upper cadres provided, notably in some stages, by the army, or belonging to the state or party administration. It is precisely these cadres who have been taking on more and more actual administrative functions and have largely adopted paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes.

Inevitably they have tended to consolidate their positions of power, at the same time gaining privileged social status. Such privileges, it must be noted once again, are limited in comparison with those existing in other workers states. However, the members of this layer enjoy a living standard notably different from that of the masses. Thus, privileges in consumption, housing, means of transport (in addition to advantages associated with positions of leadership, such as trips abroad), have had a significance beyond their intrinsic value.

Compared with five years ago the

picture does not seem to have changed much. The layer represented by the cadres of different apparatuses—of the state, administration, the economy, the unions, the army—has maintained its leading political position with all the privileges that flow from it, although these are still relatively limited. The most important decision-making powers are firmly concentrated in the hands of a very small group in which Fidel Castro still plays the preeminent role. This group remains much more tied to the masses than the apparatus in general and it strives subjectively to defend the immediate interests of the masses without losing sight of the long-term perspectives of the revolution. However, the broader leadership layer—that is, the expression of the apparatus at different levels—is decisive in applying the orientations of the Castroist group, and it can, thus, in the last analysis, seriously affect even the choice of these orientations. Moreover, as we have seen, these options are also conditioned by international factors. We should not forget that in the USSR in the 1920s there were similar layers that played a decisive role in the process of bureaucratic degeneration.

The Political Structures

In view of the nature and the limits of the forms of bureaucracy that had crystallized at the end of the 1960s, the struggle against tendencies toward bureaucratic degeneration was bound up almost entirely with the struggle for creating political structures that could assure the masses real exercise of their sovereignty.

As we have seen, at the time of his self-criticism over the campaign for ten million tons, Fidel Castro showed that he was to a large extent aware of this and that he was ready, however empirically, to set out on this path. What kind of a balance sheet can be drawn up now?

On the theoretical level, starting from recognition of the need to renovate the mass organizations such as the unions, the CDRs (Committees in Defense of the Revolution), the women's organizations, and others, and to increase the weight exercised by these bodies, the Cuban leadership came to realize the need for building organs of people's power and reached a better understanding of the dialectical interrelationship of the various organs and instruments of a transitional society.

In a particularly important article in the October 20, 1974, issue of *Granma* we read: “In a socialist revolution, the working people, headed by the working class, are sovereign. And this sovereignty, this right, this function of governing, must be explicitly delegated by the working people, it must be expressed and not simply be supported by them. The people must have the possibility of deciding whom to delegate their power to, and moreover, the

channels should be established through which every member of society may, to the greatest possible extent, participate directly in the governing of that society. . . . In our country we still lack the primary institutions through which the people govern directly, the institutions that emanate directly from the people, that are elected by the people.

“All secondary institutions must be based on these primary institutions.”¹⁹

On the practical level, the leading group worked out a systematic plan including the following: reorganization of the government and its branches in 1972; restructuring of the party apparatus, from the Central Committee to the municipal committees; reorganization of the judicial system and holding of a trade-union congress in 1973; creation of organs of local power at the provincial level in Matanzas Province in 1974; convocation of a party congress in 1975. Until now, this calendar has been observed. The result has been, however, that the adoption of an at least questionable order of priorities and of careful gradualism has put off the solution of the No. 1 problem. (According to official plans, the Matanzas experiment is to be extended to the national level next year, following adoption of a new constitution.)

All the same, the present picture can be summarized as follows:

The first experiment with organs of people's power unquestionably represented a kind of participation by the masses in the exercise of power on a local scale. The methods by which they were prepared and carried out clearly distinguished the Matanzas Province elections from the purely formal operations that occur periodically as a stereotyped ritual in the USSR or in other workers states.²⁰ It was, however, a

19. See also Castro's speech of July 26, 1974, and a speech by Raúl Castro. (*Granma*, September 8, 1974.) In the speech by Raúl as well as in the article quoted, there is a justification of the past: In the first years of the revolution the necessary conditions for the creation of organs of “people's power” did not exist and there were other, more urgent tasks concerning the economy and military defense. The argumentation, it is hardly necessary to say, is anything but convincing. It is enough to note that, according to the Cuban leaders themselves, the economic setback of 1970 was determined in large measure by faulty relations with the masses. Many difficulties would obviously have been avoided if soviet-type organs had existed.

20. Each constituency—about 1,000 electors in the urban areas and somewhat fewer in the rural areas—elected a representative. The elected bodies—whose members were subject to recall—had about 20 members. The candidates were chosen—by highly varied methods of voting—in public assemblies at various levels (in which more than 70 percent of the electors participated). There were 4,712 candidates, of whom 1,014 were elected. More than 41 percent did not belong to the party or to its youth organization. In half the constituencies a second ballot was necessary.

limited experiment that could not have a decisive effect in running the government in general or in deciding on political options. Therefore these elections did not mark a qualitative change from the previous situation. Other mass organizations, even leaving aside how they function, cannot compensate—it is worth pointing out again—for the void left by the absence of these “primary institutions” of proletarian democracy. That is, of organs elected and subject to recall actually holding power at all levels.²¹

Other organs, finally, do not go beyond essentially consultative functions. This is the case of production assemblies, sanctioned by the theses of the last union congress. Over and above consultation at different levels, making the decisions on each year's economic plan is the prerogative of a restricted circle of party leaders (the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, and the Executive Committee). (See *Granma*, July 7, 1974.)

The unions have undergone a revitalization and a renewal at the local level, despite the reconfirmation of former Stalinist bureaucrat Lazaro Peña in the top post up until his death. Moreover, the theses and debates of the last congress introduced a series of theoretical definitions pointing in the right direction (a clear distinction between the unions and the state, the need for their representing a counterbalance to the administration, etc.).²² However, the unions could not but reflect in their structures, the education of their cadres and leaders, in their functioning, the same deficiencies and distortions and general conceptions of management that mark Cuban society at this stage. Thus, the banning of tendencies and groupings, even temporary ones, involves an inevitable mutilation of internal democracy. No less detrimental is the conception, which has been tested at various stages of its history by the working class and found to have negative results, that, while unions must be independent from the state, they must, on the other hand, be strictly subordinated to the party and take their orientation from it. (See the Union Theses, paragraph 9, 1.b.)

The party has continued to develop and organize in accordance with standards for

admission and leadership that differ markedly from those applied by the Communist parties. Such standards may offer a certain guarantee against opportunist and careerist elements filtering into the ranks. They may also promote participation by workers and peasants who have the confidence of their comrades. However, the party has been built essentially from the top down, with the apparatus inevitably playing a dominant role. It is symptomatic that the first congress was called for this year and that another is not to be summoned before the end of another five-year period. This fact alone indicates that the powers exercised by this assembly will be quite relative. The preparations for the congress and the organization of the discussion will be an important touchstone. On the other hand, the way in which the congress has been conceived, which tends to follow a monolithic pattern, with a ban on tendencies and groupings and with activists unable to get adequate information about the discussions and possible disagreements at the top, presents serious obstacles from the start to applying Leninist democratic centralism.

As for the youth organization, it has held two congresses, ten years apart. In any case, the role assigned to it is purely that of an instrument for propaganda and mobilization. And such work is based on ideological themes of a moralistic and pedagogical nature.

The way the party is built and the way it operates are all the more important—and have still worse implications—in particular because the Castroist leadership conceives of the party as playing the absolutely predominant role in transitional society. We have already noted this fact in relation to the unions. The same paragraph already cited from the union federation's theses is unambiguous in this regard: “The party politically orients and leads the unions as it does all organizations and institutions.”

By comparison with Soviet and even Chinese documents, one might note a better feel for the overall dynamic of the new society. The important article already mentioned in fact explains that the party must not play its leading role by means of administrative or coercive methods but by virtue of its “enormous political authority.” It says that “the party is not expressly delegated with the powers of governing society. It has not been expressly delegated to govern even the working class itself.” (*Granma*, October 20, 1974.) Fidel Castro, for his part, has used the following formula: “. . . the party, in accord with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, regulates and guides society and the state. The party does not administer the state. The state must be administered by the masses through their organs of people's power.” (*Granma*, August 4, 1974.)

But these specifications and others of the same tenor are counterbalanced by

repeated statements about the party as “unquestionably the maximum agency of leadership within our society,” which “directs not only other party organizations and their members, but also the state organs and mass organizations, and, therefore, must also direct the organs of people's power.” (Raúl Castro, *Granma*, September 8, 1974.) The statements that the party plays a role in society comparable to the heart and brain in the human organism are in the same vein. (Armando Hart, *Granma*, December 22, 1974.)²³

In practice, the dominant role and real leadership belonged originally to the political-military organization, the Ejército Rebelde, and was then transferred to the party. And for the moment, there is no reason to suppose that in the future actual practice will resolve in a different way the ambiguities of certain formulations that are subject to various interpretations. To judge from the statements by Fidel quoted above, forming organs of people's power would not bring about any substantial change as regards the actual center of political power.

The “*anteproyecto*” [preliminary draft] text of the constitution, recently published for discussion in and outside the party, does not in itself offer any clarifications or any of the necessary particulars. Article 4 states that “all power belongs to the working people, who exercise it through the intermediary of the People's Power Assemblies and other organs of the state that derive from them, or else directly.” The following article says that “the CPC, the organized Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working class, is the main leading force of society and the state. It organizes and guides the common efforts toward the lofty end of building socialism and of advancing toward the communist future.”

Thus, not only is the primacy of the party written into the constitution but also the one-party concept. This is a decision that is at least highly debatable. In fact, it cannot be excluded absolutely that the working class might organize itself in a single party, and in certain conditions revolutionary Marxists might advocate such a solution. But in general, the right to form tendencies and organizations within the working class committed to strict respect for revolutionary legality represents a fundamental guarantee of proletarian democracy, of real dialectical discourse within the transitional society.

Regarding the organs of people's power, the powers of the people's assemblies at the local level have been established for the most part by the terms of the Matanzas Province pilot project (with mandates lasting two and a half years). The Nation-

21. The task of organs of proletarian democracy cannot be accomplished—as some have claimed—by the CDRs. The limitations of these bodies emerge clearly from the official documents themselves that define them. (For example, a document by the national leadership of the CDRs and a speech by Fidel in *Granma*, October 8, 1972.)

22. “The union organization is not part of the state apparatus, it is not a state organization. It does not depend on any ministry or other body of the state apparatus. The union must serve as the counterpart of the administration.” (*Granma*, September 2, 1973.)

23. Hart stresses at the same time that nonparty members enjoy all the rights guaranteed to the workers, but they do not have “the honor and the social prestige that the people accord members of the party.”

al Assembly of People's Power, whose members will be subject to recall and who serve a term twice as long as that of the lower bodies, that is, five years, is designated as the supreme body. The mode of election will be determined by statute. However, the text of the constitution indicates that these representatives will be elected directly from constituencies, and as we have seen, for a fairly long period. That is, the National Assembly of People's Power will not be seen as crowning a soviet-type structure. (Nominations by elected assemblies to higher assemblies, are, however, foreseen for the local level, Article 106.) If our interpretation is correct, there must have been a change in thinking about this, because a year and half ago Castro outlined a system much closer to that operating in the USSR in Lenin's time.²⁴

Finally the picture would not be complete without taking into consideration the more and more marked tendency, beginning at a certain point, to impose strict ideological and cultural monolithism. In this area, there has unquestionably been a regression from a whole earlier period of the revolution. Ideological training today is predominantly based on texts from the USSR, founded on the interpretations of history disseminated by the Kremlin bureaucracy. This has led to the acceptance of a series of traditional ideological obfuscations as well as the adoption of methods of argument similar to those that won the late Andrei Zhdanov a dubious reputation. Some far-left cultural and political tendencies are often the favored target of such polemics.²⁵ The family code adopted several months ago did eliminate a series of reactionary legal principles. However, it endorsed as an unchanging fact the idea that the family is the "basic nucleus of society." Thus it failed to

recognize that the dynamic of building a new society must bring radical changes in relations between the sexes and in bearing and raising children, changes that lead ultimately to the destruction of the "family nucleus" as traditionally conceived.²⁶ In the name of a rigorous revolutionary spirit, attitudes have been adopted toward homosexuals and the sexual behavior of the younger generation that in fact are permeated with conservative philistinism.

International Policies

The ideological-cultural guidelines, as we have already mentioned, are in large measure the reflection of international pressures—that is, the relationship the Cuban leadership established with the Kremlin bureaucracy in 1969-70.

When American imperialism launched its attacks in 1959-60, Fidel Castro quickly realized the need for economic and military collaboration with the Soviet Union. However, leaving aside a few temporary oscillations, up until 1968 this need and the conclusion of a series of important agreements did not prevent the Cuban leaders from adopting clearly independent attitudes, from denouncing Moscow's policies in Latin America, and from polemicalizing openly against the most orthodox pro-Moscow Communist parties, or from criticizing certain kinds of contradictions in the way the transitional society has been built in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist USSR. Even the attitude taken toward Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 did not mark, in itself, a total change. While Fidel accepted Moscow's obfuscations about the need for blocking a purported restoration of capitalism, at the same time he did not hesitate to point out the responsibility borne by the bureaucracy.

In the subsequent period, however, following a series of developments in Latin America—defeats of guerrilla movements, emergence of military reformist governments in Peru and Bolivia, the victory of the Unidad Popular in Chile, new approaches in the foreign policy of other Latin American countries—the Castroist leadership made a rather profound shift in international policy. The first change was summed up as follows by Fidel Castro in July 1972:

"We must integrate ourselves with the workers, farmers, and revolutionaries when the inevitable hour of the revolution arrives in Latin America.

"But that will take time. We can't make plans based on an integration that could take 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 years—this last for the most pessimistic.

26. Certain articles in the code have a markedly paternalistic character. Article 25, for example, reaffirms in fairly traditional terms paternal power, and it indicates the duty to educate children to have respect "for the authorities, their teachers, and other persons."

"Meanwhile, what do we, a small country surrounded by capitalists and blockaded by Yankee imperialists, do? We integrate ourselves economically with the socialist camp." (*Granma*, August 6, 1972.)

From the premise that the situation could not be opened up by extending the revolution to other countries in Latin America in a short, or relatively short, time, flowed a readjustment of the central axis of Cuban policy along the following lines:

1. Every effort was made to tighten collaboration with the USSR and the other workers states (to a much lesser extent with China), and Cuba entered Comecon. The absolute primacy of the Soviet Union in the "socialist camp" was recognized. Not only were the criticisms and reservations dropped, but a practice of fulsome apologies for Soviet actions was adopted, in sharp contrast to the trend in the attitude of Communist parties in other countries.²⁷

2. Alliances and points of agreement were sought not only with regimes such as the Chilean Unidad Popular but also with Velasco in Peru, Torrijos in Panama, Perón in Argentina, as well as governments such as those of Ecuador and Venezuela.²⁸

27. In the draft constitution the idea of the primacy of the USSR is expressed in the formula "the USSR and the other socialist countries." After his last trip, Castro made some highly laudatory speeches about the USSR, going so far as to say that Marxism-Leninism prevails there in the spirit of the October revolution. On several occasions unconditional support has also been given to the superbureaucratic Husak regime in Czechoslovakia. Castro recently said:

"When the revolutionary processes become institutionalized and consolidated through institutions that fully respond to their needs—as happened with the Bolshevik revolution, which is now more than fifty years old and is and will continue to be steadily moving forward—we see the great stability this gives these peoples, the great stability these nations and groups of nations and groups of people have when they are well organized, when they are well institutionalized, when they have the organizations they need for moving forward!" (*Granma*, June 8, 1975.)

28. There is no need to repeat that diplomatic accords with countries like Peru are not as such condemnable. What is inadmissible, from the point of view of the interests of the workers movement, is to present as "revolutionary" a reformist bourgeois leadership. As for the attitude to the Chilean Unidad Popular, the political resolution of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International specified: "... at a stage where there were real possibilities for revolutionary development—the Cuban leadership gave practically unconditional support to the reformist Popular Unity leadership. The critical remarks Castro made on several occasions were not of a sort to help the maturing of the vanguard and clarification among the masses." (*Intercontinental Press*, December 23, 1974, p. 1744.)

24. "The delegates will be elected by the constituencies, and they will elect the delegates of the regions, who will choose the delegates to the National People's Power." (*Granma*, August 4, 1974.)

25. To give an example: The union theses as well as the projected constitution proclaims "the socialist principle 'each according to his abilities, to each according to his work.'" Castro attributes this formula to the "Critique of the Gotha Program." Actually, Marx never used such a formulation. It was, to the contrary, written into the 1936 Stalinist constitution in an obfuscation denounced at the time by Trotsky (in an appendix to *The Revolution Betrayed*). As for Zhdanovian-type polemics, their victims are, for example, intellectuals like Marcuse, Dumont, and Karol, whose analyses are grossly falsified and who are often characterized as CIA agents, without the slightest attempt to offer proofs. The "ultralefts," toward whom the Cubans in the past held an attitude different from that of the Stalinist bureaucrats, are also the object of summary condemnation. Trotsky suffered the same fate. (See *Granma*, June 16, 1974, for a ridiculous distortion of the theory of permanent revolution.)

More generally, Cuba followed a policy of friendly relations with the so-called nonaligned countries (on occasion they used the expression "Third World" that had been formerly criticized for good reason). According to statements made by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Cuba now favors a Latin American economic integration and does not regard a "similarity of economic and social regimes" as a necessary precondition for this. The first example of this orientation is the collaboration between Mexican state enterprises and Cuban enterprises involving the machine industry. (*Le Monde*, January 16, 1975.)

3. Cuba continued to express its solidarity with the movements that are struggling in Latin American countries oppressed by dictatorships (besides Chile, particularly those in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil). However, the Cubans have given up making specific political analyses and, all the more, offering any tactical or strategic advice. Insofar as it lays out any guidelines, these do not differ from those of the Latin American Communist parties, with which relations have been normalized. All trace of polemics of the 1965-67 kind has disappeared.

In recent months, finally, Cuba has made considerable efforts to reestablish relations with the United States. The crisis in the OAS, where Washington's line meets with greater and greater hostility, and the difficulties that imperialism is faced with globally, offers some margin of maneuver on a world scale that the Cuban government is correctly exploiting. A normalization between Havana and Washington would rather probably result, on the other hand, in further accentuation of certain tendencies that developed after 1968-69.

The general conclusion to be drawn from the analysis I have outlined (unfortunately, I repeat, on the basis of incomplete information) is that there has been no qualitative change in the structures of the Cuban state by comparison with 1970. This is the result not of relative stagnation or immobility but of the operation of different and partly contradictory trends.

More concretely, on the one hand certain political initiatives and measures have been taken that have impeded the crystallization of the apparatus in a conservative direction and prevented a further increase in the privileges of the bureaucrats. These steps have also maintained the mobilization of the masses, which have even been encouraged, within certain limits, to show a critical spirit. On the other hand, the prolonged lack of organs of proletarian democracy at the national level, the accentuation of certain forms of work organization, the growing influence of the USSR (which among other things trains a considerable number of technicians and military cadres), have worked in favor of forces that could lead to a bureaucratic degeneration.

More generally, the Cuban experience of these years seems to highlight the fact once again that, aside from some differences stemming from specific factors (socioeconomic context before the revolution, the formation and evolution of leading groups), largely analogous conceptions and methods have tended to prevail in the transitional societies that have emerged to date. We refer not only to the obvious structural similarities (nationalization of industry, the survival of an uncollectivized sector in the country, etc.) but also to more specific features. Economic planning is done from above in certain restricted circles. Norms, material incentives, and "socialist emulation" are the basis of work organization. The party exercises leadership and control over all institutions and organizations, from organs of "people's power" to the unions, while other working-class political organizations respecting revolutionary legality are banned as are tendencies and groups within the leading party.

Establishing genuinely collectivist relations throughout the countryside is put off for an indefinite period. A high degree of ideological and cultural monolithism is made into a theoretical principle and imposed in practice. Building a collectivist economy is conceived of the framework of special relations with other workers states (this is less true at this stage for China), but not on the basis of a genuine supranational economic integration. To sum it up, the interests of the world workers movement and the masses of other countries are subordinated to the self-interests of a single state and its governing layer.

If all of these elements, which are present in the degenerated workers states, also take a hardened form in Cuba, if Cuba remains isolated in the American hemisphere for a long period, subjected at the same time to strong influence from the bureaucratized USSR, the Cuban workers state in its turn will inevitably undergo a process of degeneration similar to that of other countries where capitalism has been overthrown.

For the reasons indicated in our analysis, which were also pointed out in previous analyses, such a degeneration did not occur before 1970 and it has not reached that point at present. I have sought to show in what way Cuba is different from the other workers states. Let's recall here briefly that in no other country has the necessary role of the organs of "people's power" been reaffirmed so clearly, both in theory as well as in political agitation. Moreover, no other country has undergone an experience so significant, limited as it was, as the one in Matanzas Province (with the obvious exception of the USSR in the time of the October revolution and in the years immediately following). Even the concept of the primacy of the party is expressed with nuances and with an understanding of the overall dynamic of a

transitional society quite different from that of the Soviet and Chinese leaders.

Similar observations can be made in the case of the unions, both as regards the theoretical definition of their role, as well as the active participation of the masses. More generally, in spite of paternalism and of bureaucratic-authoritarian tendencies, the leading group has succeeded in maintaining fairly close relations with the masses. It still has their confidence, and in important moments, can count on the readiness of the masses to mobilize actively and consciously. The privileges that the leaders and cadres of the apparatus enjoy remain much more limited than those of the bureaucrats in other workers states.

Even Cuba's international political line, despite the retreat, still has some positive features that set it off from that of the USSR and the other workers states. The critical way the Cubans presented the Nixon visit to Peking comes to mind, along with the following examples: the interpretation, quite different from that given by the Kremlin, of the accords between the USSR and the United States; their correct interpretation of the Paris Accords on Vietnam as being an "initial victory"; their reflections on the Chilean defeat that involved explicit reaffirmation of the need for a revolutionary leap forward through armed struggle and "people's dictatorship"; the adoption of an unambiguous position on oil, opposing other "non-aligned" countries in defense of the underdeveloped countries, which were the hardest hit by the decisions of the producer countries and the international trusts; Castro's expressions of solidarity with the Eritrean liberation movement; and the Cuban rejection of any tendency toward "national messianism."²⁹

All this shows that a difference exists between Cuba and the other workers states. Moreover, the whole picture we have sketched justifies rejecting the idea that bureaucratic degeneration is an accomplished fact in Cuba, bureaucratic degeneration that would make it necessary to struggle for the overthrow of a leadership representing the interests of a privileged caste, for an antibureaucratic political revolution.

A few general considerations should be noted here. In a process of bureaucratic degeneration, the qualitative leap cannot be pinpointed as clearly as it can in the case of the transition from a bourgeois state to a workers state. The fundamental reason for this is that, according to the Trotskyist conception, bureaucratic degen-

29. In a September 1974 speech, Castro concluded an appeal for solidarity with Venezuela by saying: "Perhaps fate is again reserving for the people of the illustrious liberator a significant and decisive role in the definitive independence of the nations of Latin America." (*Granma*, October 6, 1974.)

eration occurs within the framework of the new society, of a transitional society in which collective relations of production exist that are not put in question immediately by the bureaucratization. (In certain conditions, bureaucratic degeneration can involve a dynamic of capitalist restoration, but that, of course, is another problem.)

The experience of the USSR, and making allowance for different circumstances, of the other transitional societies, for over half a century, enables us to distinguish three types, or three phases, of bureaucratization. There are, in the first place, the almost inevitable bureaucratic deformations in the period immediately following the overthrow of capitalism. These deformations flow, in the last analysis, from the fact that immediately after the conquest of power it is impossible to achieve full mass participation in managing the economy and the state, from the fact that unavoidably those in the key positions in the government can be only partially controlled, from the fact that it is impossible to rapidly assure egalitarian living conditions and thus to cut off at the root any growth of even relative privileges.

Obviously, this rule holds all the more for economically and culturally backward countries, where the conquest of power takes place in particularly difficult conditions (prolonged civil war, the consequences of the devastation of a war, serious economic crises, etc.). We remember that this concept of a workers state with bureaucratic deformations was already used by Lenin to describe the USSR at the beginning of the 1920s.

There is also a type, or phase, of bureaucratization that already represents, so to speak, a pathological problem. In this case, the organs of the workers state, the party, the union organizations, etc., function less and less democratically, and the apparatus and the leading groups at different levels exercise their power by more and more eliminating mass participation. A leading layer enjoying material privileges begins to take form and to harden. At the same time the defense of acquired positions becomes the main-spring of international policy to the detriment of the necessity of expanding revolutionary struggles on a world scale.

However, the separation between the bureaucracy in formation and the masses is not yet so clear, the political structures are not yet so petrified, the privileges not so vast or consolidated that it is necessary to exclude all possibility of a renewal through corrections and reforms, of an internal struggle to establish proletarian democracy and real leadership by the working class. It was such a phase of bureaucratization that the USSR went through roughly between the death of Lenin and the end of the 1920s.

Finally, there is the phase where the bureaucracy becomes an actual ruling caste, has politically expropriated the working class and the toiling masses, has transformed the party and the organizations into instruments of its domination by destroying all internal democracy, has acquired relatively secure economic and social privileges. In such conditions—which correspond to those that came into being in the USSR beginning with the 1930s and which were analyzed by Trotsky in *The Revolution Betrayed*—the working class and the peasantry have no other way out but to struggle for an antibureaucratic political revolution that will overthrow the ruling caste and rebuild proletarian democracy. Likewise, they must create the political and organizational instrument needed to give effective leadership to this struggle. What is decisive for the strategy of revolutionists is to determine when a transitional society has reached the stage of bureaucratic degeneration that requires a radical change in the objectives and methods of struggle.

In order to define the social nature of a state, you have to view all factors together and in their dynamism. If you single out this or that factor, you risk making arbitrary extrapolations, or at least jumping to premature conclusions. This is why in his analysis, Trotsky tried to grasp the direction of the overall development of the state that emerged from the October revolution. He polemicized with opposition groups that wanted to change their basic characterization with each turn in Stalin's policies. In fact, after a certain point in the mid-1920s, the process in the USSR proceeded more or less in a straight line, encompassing all areas.

The bureaucrats began by cutting back internal democracy in the party and reducing the soviets to an empty form. Then they crushed every opposition group and expelled from the party all those who most consistently resisted their usurpation. They grabbed bigger and bigger privileges, detaching themselves economically and politically from the working class and the peasants. Not only did they abandon the revolutionary strategy of the Communist International and the Bolshevik party of Lenin's time, but by their neo-Menshevik or adventurist policies they directly shared in the responsibility for terrible defeats of the world workers and Communist movement, as in China and Germany.

It was at the culmination of this combined process that Trotsky came to the conclusion that a bureaucratic caste was in power and that a struggle had to be waged for a new international and a political revolution. Significantly he was prompted most directly by the defeat of the German proletariat at the hands of Hitler, for which the German CP and the Stalinist International bore a very heavy responsibility.³⁰

It is not possible here to go back over the process that unfolded in the workers states of Eastern Europe and Asia. It is enough to note that in the Eastern European case, the decisive role was played in general by Soviet politico-military control and a tendency to structural assimilation with the bureaucratized USSR. In China, the fact that the old state apparatus was only partially dismantled, that bureaucratic methods and conceptions had already been imposed in the areas of the country wrested from Chiang Kai-shek, and that the leading group and key cadres were educated in the school of Stalinism all weighed heavily.

In both these cases, the evolution was, thus, different from that in the Soviet Union, with much less discontinuity between the starting point and the stage at which the bureaucracy hardened into a ruling caste (since a period of proletarian democracy comparable to that of the revolutionary period in the USSR never existed). The various stages or forms of bureaucratization tended to merge without clear distinctions.

On the basis of the analysis outlined, we estimate that the Cuban workers state has not yet gone through the stages traversed by the Soviet Union and has not undergone a process similar to those in the East European countries or China. It is debatable whether the existing situation might correspond to the first or second stage. But in any case, it does not correspond to the third. It cannot in fact be said that a hardened bureaucratic caste enjoying substantial privileges has imposed its domination over the masses by authoritarian and repressive measures, or that this caste has played a role on a world scale resulting in major defeats for the workers movement or systematically conflicting with the interests of the workers movement.

That is why revolutionary Marxists are not obliged to change their position. They need not orient toward a struggle in Cuba for the overthrow of the leading group and for the formation of a new party. Rather they must support trends and initiatives that can promote revolutionary democracy and the fight against bureaucratic meth-

30. In "The Workers' State, Thermidor and Bonapartism," Trotsky wrote:

"Thus, the present-day domination of Stalin in no way resembles the Soviet rule during the initial years of the revolution. The substitution of one regime for the other occurred not at a single stroke but through a series of measures, by means of a number of minor civil wars waged by the bureaucracy against the proletarian vanguard. In the last historical analysis, Soviet democracy was blown up by the pressure of social contradictions. Exploiting the latter, the bureaucracy wrested the power from the hands of mass organizations." (*Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1934-35*, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1974, p. 172.)

ods and conceptions. They must denounce any attitude that subordinates the need for revolutionary struggle by the masses of other countries to the diplomatic and political requirements of the Cuban workers state and its leadership. They must develop a critique of non-Leninist conceptions, of tendencies to ideological and cultural monolithism, of the tendencies to adaptation to the reformist strategy of the bureaucratized Communist parties.

However, in the final analysis, revolutionists can make the best contribution to

building socialism at this stage, too, in Cuba by struggling against imperialism and for the overthrow of the capitalist system in other countries of the world, especially in Latin America.

May 20, 1975

Since this article was written, an important joint document signed by the Latin American Communist parties was released in Havana. The general line of this document confirms the estimate made in the section "International Policies." □

they must begin a process of reconversion. . . ."

Carrillo was joined by others who asked, "Isn't it better to meet in the company or in the union hall instead of in the woods or in the church?"

The debate heated up even more when the January 5 issue of the underground Catalan publication *Treball* appeared with an unsigned article entitled "Workers Commissions, Yes."

The January 31 issue of the weekly newsmagazine *Mundo* reported, "According to experts, the article is not the work of just any editor, and its style gives rise to speculation that it was written by a top figure of the 'Partit.'" The article severely chastised those with "liquidationist concepts of the COs," which arose "from the false idea that in the current legal unions a qualitative change has taken place as the result of the union elections." This "fundamental error leads Boix to defend a legalist orientation in the workers movement, which raises negotiations with the bosses to the level of mythology . . . and underestimates or forgets the fundamental role that—now as always—the pressure from the workers plays in the struggle. . . ." □

Illegal Commissions or Falangist Formation?

Spanish Workers Debate Union Orientation

The Spanish workers are debating a key issue: Is it possible to convert the state-run Central Nacional Sindicalista (CNS—National Federation of Syndicates) into a genuine tool of struggle for the working class or is it better to place reliance on the illegal Comisiones Obreras (COs—Workers Commissions)?

The debate got under way in July 1975, when 83 to 88 percent of the eligible voters participated in elections to the CNS, sweeping several leaders of the Comisiones Obreras into office as delegates in the Francoist federation. Many of these delegates were members of the Communist party, which for the first time adopted a position favoring participation in CNS elections.

Most other tendencies in the workers movement, including the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Spain, the Liga Comunista (LC—Communist League) and the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI (LCR/ETA-VI—Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-VI), called for a boycott of the CNS elections. The LC and the LCR/ETA-VI say that in the months since the CNS elections, the CP has virtually abandoned the Comisiones Obreras, which the Trotskyists view as class-struggle organizations.

Recently in Barcelona the debate centered on a book entitled *Conversaciones Sindicales con Dirigentes Obreros*. The book went on sale in November 1975. Its authors are two members of the PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya—United Socialist party of Catalonia, the Communist party's branch in Catalonia), Isidor Boix and Manuel Pujadas.

The book includes an article signed by Boix and Pujadas, in which they say: "It is not a question of settling accounts with the organizations of the workers movement that have been active the last fifteen years. We are simply confronting certain claims

that have historical legitimacy but that must reestablish their legitimacy for the present period and, above all, for the trade-union future of our country."

This veiled questioning of the COs led to Boix's suspension from all "rights of membership" in the PSUC.

But it also brought to light the depth of the dispute within the workers movement as a whole, as well as within the Communist party itself.

The main figures in the debate are Marcelino Camacho, the best-known leader of the COs, and Santiago Carrillo, the exiled general secretary of the CP.

A statement by a group of labor leaders headed by Camacho was printed in the November 10, 1975, issue of *Mundo Obrero*. It said:

"... what is involved is not capturing trade-union posts in order to 'transform' the vertical union into a democratic one, but politically assaulting the vertical union and through its breakup creating a completely new one, on a totally different basis. . . . In short, it is a question of a political revolution and thus a trade-union revolution with a constituent period and a constituent congress, as the COs have been proposing for years."

Carrillo, insisting that the CP's orientation toward the CNS had nothing to do with abandoning the Comisiones Obreras, nonetheless stated in the November 1975 issue of *Nuestra Bandera*, "... in the period we are going through since the union elections, the COs have encompassed the entire totality of the movement, ranging from the factory assemblies and the extralegal structures to the legally elected representatives."

Three months earlier, Carrillo had said: "We think it is necessary for the COs to understand that . . . the way out of the present situation is not to call for the reinforcement of the traditional structures of the COs. . . . To our way of thinking

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Capitalism Fouls Things Up

The Derwent—Australia's Lethal River

By John Tully

[The following article appeared in the February 19 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in Sydney.]

* * *

In 1971 the mining industry capitalists, worried by the growing public anger at their arrogant pollution of the environment, organized a seminar in Melbourne. This seminar, entitled *Progress—Mining and Environment*, was a cynical attempt to cover up the responsibility of the industry for much of the air and water pollution in this country.

Among the "experts" on the panel was N.C. Ashdown, superintendent of the zinc department at the Risdon Works of the Electrolytic Zinc Company of Australasia Ltd. Ashdown explained that zinc concentrates containing "chiefly zinc and sulphur" had been roasted at the plant for fifty-three years, "recently at rates of 1,100 tons per day." The zinc content of the ores is converted to zinc calcine, "a dusty material," which is then leached with acid to make zinc sulphate, which is then electrolyzed to make zinc. Ashdown went on to say that part of the sulphur derived from the roasting was converted into sulphuric acid, and that another part was dissolved into estuarine water and discharged into the Derwent Estuary.

During his talk Ashdown waxed lyrical about the beneficial aspects of the plant. According to the report, "Slides showed the unaffected green flora of the nearby hills, of clear exit stacks, of green lawns, and a well-kept nine hole golf course within the works boundary."

He went on to explain "... how a careful, logical approach and continual improvement over many years can produce a mining industry adjacent to a population of 5,000 people per square mile near a plant. ..."

Later it was the task of Sir Henry Somerset to sum up. (Somerset is a director of Associated Pulp and Paper Mills, EZ Industries, Goliath Cement, Humes Ltd., Tioxide Australia, a member of the board of the CSIRO and chancellor of the

University of Tasmania.)

Somerset had the job of doing the biggest whitewash of the whole proceedings. His technique was to boldly and shamelessly tell the biggest lies, to introduce red herrings, and to belittle his critics.

"The mining industry is aware of the problems involved and can handle the situation. It has, however, become the target of ill-informed critics who give little credit for what has been done already."

"It is time that emotion was removed from the scene and some sanity was brought to bear upon the problems." Some people were making political capital out of the situation, he said. "It is a pity that little has been said about beer cans on the roadside and broken bottles on the beaches: and bullet holes in the road signs. This is an intolerable situation. ... etc., etc., ad nauseum."

Finally, with truly breathtaking gall, Somerset said: "This seminar will certainly have been successful if the man-in-the-street has become better informed by the publicity which the proceedings have engendered." (All quotations are from the pamphlet *Progress—Mining and Environment*, published by the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy.)

What this double-talk means is "We know what we are doing, but we don't want you to know. This seminar will have been successful if we have whitewashed places like the EZ Works."

And what is the real truth behind Somerset's wafflings and Ashdown's glowing descriptions? Sure, the vegetation is intact: EZ hasn't done for Hobart what the Mt. Lyell smelters did for Queenstown on the West Coast—that is, completely denude the surrounding mountains. The reason for that is simple—the people of Hobart wouldn't have allowed it. The silvertails of Lower Sandy Bay wouldn't like Albion Heights stripped of foliage!

Four Great Stains in the River

But if you fly over the Risdon area, you will see four great stains in the water. The Prince of Wales Bay treatment works is

first, with a murky cloud of sewage (only 35 percent of all sewage poured into the Derwent is treated even to this standard). Next is the bloodstain from the nearby abattoirs, followed by the two plumes of liquid matter which gust out twenty-four hours a day from the zinc works.

What the EZ Company has been doing for the years since World War I is less readily apparent—and therefore more insidious than what happened at Queens-town. For years the EZ Company has been able to deny that anything bad was happening.

But in late 1975, Professor Harry Bloom of the University of Tasmania chemistry department published a report which fingered the EZ Works for turning the Derwent into one of the most heavily polluted rivers in the world, particularly in respect of toxic metals. (*Heavy Metals in the Derwent Estuary*, September 1975.)

The accompanying table, reproduced from Professor Bloom's report, gives an indication of the seriousness of the situation.

In his conclusion, Bloom states, "The study indicates that the main mechanism of heavy metal pollution in the Derwent River estuary is very likely a cause also for contamination of Hobart and its environs by the same toxic metals. Stockpiled concentrates and residues at the zinc refining company are being swept into the atmosphere by wind action. Leaching of metals into the river takes place by rain action. Other mechanisms such as liquid effluent discharge must add also to the contamination of the estuary." (*Heavy Metals in the Derwent Estuary*, p. 21.)

In the late 1950s at Minamata Bay, in Kyushu, Japan, there was an outbreak of what has become known as "Minamata Disease" among the fishing people. The cause was traced to a factory producing polyvinyl chloride.

The inhabitants of the area began to display the classical symptoms of chronic mercury poisoning (familiar in the nineteenth century in the hat-making trade, hence the expression "mad as a hatter"). They had such symptoms as tunnel vision,



numbness, headaches, weakness, insomnia or drowsiness, loss of memory, intellectual deterioration, slurring of words, trembling, ulceration of the gums, chronic diarrhea, and loosening of teeth. The cats went mad. Children were born with congenital mercury poisoning even though the mothers involved showed no signs of being affected (alkyl mercury can pass through the placental barrier in mammals).

Professor Bloom has said that "although the highest mercury concentration in Derwent muds is second to the highest in Minamata Bay, the many times larger area of the Derwent Estuary . . . together with their relative concentrations data, can be shown to indicate that the Derwent muds contain many times more total mercury than is present in Minamata Bay." (p. 21.)

Mercury is therefore present in the Derwent estuary in alarming proportions. It is readily absorbed into the human body through the mucous membranes, and even through the unbroken skin. In 1967 it was discovered that mercury can be converted into a far more toxic form, methyl mercury, by anaerobic bacteria. This is to say it is produced in conditions where there is an absence of oxygen—a state of affairs to be found in the silt and decaying vegetable and animal matter in the Derwent estuary, particularly with the high discharge rates of raw sewage.

And the damage is permanent. As Margaret Merlini, in an article entitled *Heavy Metal Contamination* (contained in *Impingement of Man on the Oceans* edited by Professor Donald Hood), says:

"Heavy metals are insidious due to the fact that they are practically indestructible in an aqueous environment. Even if precipitated or absorbed, the process can be reversible and the metals return to ionic form. If not, the precipitate or particles settle on the bottom to be ingested by benthic organisms. Dilution and dispersion helps minimise the danger to some of the biota, but filter feeding organisms [such as Derwent oysters and mussels—J.T.] are notorious for their ability to concentrate many polyvalent ions—in particular copper, zinc, iron and manganese—from very dilute solutions. . . ." (p. 467.)

Ten Percent Zinc in Oysters

Mercury is not the only heavy metal present in large quantities in the River Derwent. Others include: arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, zinc, chromium, cobalt, iron, manganese, and nickel. As we have seen from Professor Bloom's table, the Derwent leads the world in the amounts of some of these metals. A few years ago the Ralphs Bay oyster farms were forced to close when it was found that 10 percent of

Metal	Environment	Comment
1100 ug/g mercury	Sediments	Exceeded only by Minamata in Japan (2010)
More than 10,000 ug/g zinc	Sediments	Higher concentrations than any other well known region
862 ug/g cadmium	Sediments	Higher than any reported value elsewhere
1500 ug/g cadmium	Dust fallout over Lutana	No report known as high elsewhere
More than 200 ug/g cadmium	Dried oyster	Among highest ever reported
100,000 ug/g (10 per cent) zinc	Dried oyster	Highest ever reported
14-16 ug/l mercury	Filtered water	Equivalent to worst 12 per cent of direct industrial discharges in USA
15 ug/l cadmium	Filtered water	More than 10 times as contaminated as Lake Ontario
1500 ug/l zinc	Filtered water	Far exceeds highest value reported elsewhere
Zinc, mercury, lead and cadmium	Suspended particulates (mainly phytoplankton).	Phytoplankton so overloaded by metals as to be unable to prevent spread of metals beyond the Derwent Estuary
Cadmium, lead, mercury	Mussels	Far in excess of concentrations reported in mussels from around most of UK coastline
Mercury	Fish	Flathead, whiting, bream and shark from the Derwent Estuary should not be eaten: flounder, cod, perch, trumpeter and mackerel are not contaminated

Note: One sample of suspended particulates near the zinc refining plant had a mercury concentration of 5550 ug/l. This may have arisen from a single particle of mercury contaminated waste. Further sampling and analysis is necessary at this point and the nature of the particles should be determined by electron microscopy.
[In this report, the signs ug/g and ug/l mean micrograms per gram, and micrograms per litre respectively.]

the dry weight of the oysters was zinc—the highest ever recorded anywhere.

Perhaps even more sinister than the mercury is the presence of the highly toxic cadmium in quantities never before recorded. This was present in the Ralphs Bay oysters along with the zinc. Attention should also be drawn to the phenomenon of synergism. Briefly this means that the toxic effects of one trace metal are intensified by the presence of another toxic substance; they make each other worse. It is believed that there is a synergic reaction between zinc and cadmium.

In his report, Bloom draws attention to the outbreak of itai-itai disease among nutritionally deficient people in Japan. This was traced to cadmium fallout from the atmosphere poisoning rice fields. The cadmium fallout on the Hobart suburbs of Lutana and Lindisfarne is the highest ever recorded—and the fallout over Hobart generally is greater than that in the itai-itai disease area of Japan. Bloom expresses concern at the possibility of a cadmium buildup in Hobart soils.

Cadmium is probably more lethal than any other toxic metal—more than lead and mercury, which are also found in phenomenally large quantities in the Derwent area. The most immediate effects of

chronic cadmium poisoning are damage to the kidneys and the central nervous system, hypertension (high blood pressure), and cancer (on inhalation). Other effects are complete sterility and impotence. It is a particularly nasty substance because it may lie dormant for a long period before overt ill effects are felt on the body. It also causes dental caries, destruction of the sense of smell, and a perpetual watery discharge from the nose.

Work by doctors V.H. Fern and S.J. Carpenter on hamsters has shown that cadmium is a teratogenic substance, that is, it induces monstrous deformations of the fetus. (Teratogenic Effect of Cadmium and Its Inhibition by Zinc, *Nature* 1967.)

Another practice of the EZ Company is the dumping of "jarosite" (waste material from the plant) in Storm Bay. The company would doubtless justify this vandalism by reference to the great size of the oceans. And there are any number of hack "experts" who are willing to sell their souls to the highest bidder and testify to the fact that heavy metals are already present naturally in the environment. But as Margaret Merlini writes: "The vastness of the ocean is often used as an argument for its use in the disposal of man's waste products. *It is because of its vastness that care must be taken not to damage the biota since small and often large derangements are not as perceptible as in restricted environments such as lakes and streams.*" (Hood, p. 467, emphasis in the original.)

EZ Industries is registered in Melbourne. It lists on its board of directors such familiar names as M.L. Baillieu and Sir Henry Somerset. The health and welfare of 150,000 people in southern Tasmania is directly menaced by the activities of this small number of capitalists. They are answerable to no one for their activities. As we have seen earlier in this article, their response to criticism is to lie and to attempt to belittle anyone who dares question their right to despoil the environment.

It is obvious that strong measures are necessary to attempt to clean up the mess and to prevent its recurrence. The chief secretary in the Tasmanian state Labor government is Doug Lowe. Following the release of Professor Bloom's report, Lowe acknowledged that it was a "true, accurate and significant document." He was quoted in the *Mercury* of October 21, 1975, as saying that enforcement of the act covering waste discharge would be stepped up, and that strengthening of the act *could* follow. He also announced the setting up of what he called a Heavy Metal Pollution Ad Hoc Committee, with Professor Bloom on it in an advisory capacity.

Lowe is well known for his committees. To many local workers he is known as "the

mirror man" (whenever a problem arises he is forever "going to look into it"). Other inventions of this former EZ electrician include the "Redundancy Monitoring Committee," set up following a massive rash of sackings by the EZ Company in early 1975.

There are many rumors circulating in Hobart at present which whisper that the EZ Company will close down its operations and move to another country if there is any serious attempt made to force it to clean up its mess. Because of this, and because of the state Labor government's well-known reverence for the "rights" of capitalist private property, it is quite likely that the government will adopt the approach of burying its head in the sand and hoping the problem will go away. In 1975 it revealed how thoroughly servile it was when it made a halfhearted attempt to impose mining royalties on the big mining companies.

In clear contrast to the timid cover-ups of Lowe and Co., *Direct Action* puts forward a real program to attack the problem of Derwent pollution.

Firstly we demand that the proceedings of the Heavy Metal Ad Hoc Committee be made public.

Secondly we demand that the trade unions be made a party to the proceedings.

Thirdly we demand that all of the EZ Company's material on Derwent pollution be made public.

Fourthly we demand that the company be forced to immediately take steps to rectify the damage it has already done and that it be forced to institute a crash program to curb its pollution.

Fifthly we demand that if the EZ Company does not do as it is told, that it be nationalized without compensation under workers control. The confiscated profits could then be used to finance a massive cleanup to rectify the mess created by this antisocial monopoly.

Somerset and his ilk have demonstrated that they are concerned purely with private profit at the expense of the health and well-being of the EZ workers and the people of Hobart as a whole. He stands condemned by his own words. "The mining industry is aware of the problems and can handle the situation. . . ." The plant must be taken away from them before they do still further damage.

In 1804 the first convict ships sailed into the River Derwent. They arrived into what one convict, the Tolpuddle martyr George Loveless, transported for organizing a union branch, described as a "verdant prison." Below the snowy summit of Mt. Wellington stretched the clear waters of one of the most beautiful harbors in the world.

Now, only 170 odd years later, untram-

meled capitalism has managed to transform the water into poison and showered the foothills of the mountain with deadly dust. The once crystal-clear waters of the estuary used to be inhabited by marine life which ran the whole gamut from plankton to whales. Now, in Professor Bloom's words: "Inside the estuary, at Taroona and in Ralphs Bay, shellfish were less numerous, with mussels predominating. Further upstream, on the western shore, shellfish became impossible to find, until Elwick Bay and further north where mussels could be found. On the eastern shore there was a similar but less dramatic depletion of all species. Along the western shore between Macquarie Point and Dowsing Point, no sign of aquatic life could be found." (Bloom, p. 9.)

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More on India's Tarapur Reactor

T.N. Kaul, India's ambassador to the United States, claims that charges of serious health and safety violations against his country's Tarapur nuclear reactor are baseless.

In a letter to U.S. Senator Alan Cranston, dated February 5, Kaul attempts to rebut accusations against the atomic power plant leveled by Paul Jacobs in the February-March issue of a new magazine, *Mother Jones*. (See *Intercontinental Press*, March 1, p. 306.)

Contrary to Jacobs's account, Kaul contends that there have been "no instances of death or illness attributable to radiation exposure either of workers at Tarapur or of any member of the general population in the villages surrounding the Station." According to Jacobs's sources in India, the deaths of at least two workers from such causes have been documented in a suppressed government report.

Kaul continues, "In the near shore region up to 30 kilometers, the concentration of radioactivity in sea water beyond the station is not significantly different from normal background," that is, from the radiation exposure caused by natural sources such as rocks in the earth's surface, rays from outer space, and others.

"No individual exposure from all routes (that is water, land and air) amongst the most exposed groups in the public domain, has been found to exceed even half that due to natural background level which, before we started operating the Reactor, was 60 millirem per annum in that area."

The above paragraph deserves careful rereading. What Kaul has actually admitted is that some individuals living in the area surrounding the reactor are exposed to as much as 50 percent more radiation than normal for the area, thus increasing their likelihood of suffering from cancer or producing malformed children.

A line of reasoning similar to Kaul's was commented on by Gordon Rattray Taylor in *The Doomsday Book: Can the World Survive?*

"If any public authority proposed to double, say, the number of road accidents he would be condemned as a monster or a madman, yet radiation authorities make such statements all the time."

What Could Be Worse Than an Earthquake?

The almost completed Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant near San Luis Obispo, California, stands only 2.5 miles from a geological fault that has in the past been responsible for earthquakes.

A powerful earthquake could potentially rupture the protective container around the radioactive reactor core, releasing deadly particles into the atmosphere.

The \$1 billion California reactor was constructed by Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the nation's second largest privately owned electric utility. When the plant was begun, only its twenty-mile proximity to the Rinconada fault and forty-five-mile proximity to the San Andreas fault were known.

Now, however, the Hosgri fault has been discovered, and studies by the U.S. Geological Survey have revealed that it was probably responsible for a 1927 earthquake that registered 7.25 on the Richter scale.

The core container at the Diablo Canyon plant was built to withstand a quake registering at most 6.75.

Watch Those City-Grown Vegetables

Excessive quantities of lead, apparently from automobile exhausts, showed up in fruits and vegetables grown in garden plots in a number of American cities last year, according to a report in the February 22 *New York Times*.

"In St. Louis," said ecologist Gil Friend, "produce from one community garden showed levels of lead so high that eating large amounts of it would be of questionable safety and a clear danger to children."

AROUND THE WORLD



Spanish Police Kill Five

Five persons have been killed by Spanish police since February 25. One demonstrator was shot to death near Alicante on February 25, and on March 6 a worker died in the Catalan city of Tarragone as a result of injuries received when he fell from a balcony trying to escape a police attack on a demonstration.

In the Basque city of Vitoria, two workers and a seventeen-year-old student were shot to death by police March 3. About 100 persons were estimated to have received gunshot wounds as a result of the police attack on striking workers.

The killings have given rise to bitter protest demonstrations, and a general strike was called in the Basque region for March 8. In a March 5 statement, the cabinet of King Juan Carlos I defended the police, saying their actions were "directed toward protecting the exercise of individual freedom and toward responding to situations of coercion and physical violence."

Whitlam Denies Seeking Iraqi Funds

The Australian capitalist press has been raising a hue and cry over allegations that former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam tried to get a contribution of A\$400,000 (A\$1=US\$1.27) from the Iraqi government for the Labor party campaign fund.

Although Whitlam has denied the charge, stating that he "never discussed with any Arabs or with any foreigners contributions to party funds," the furor in the press continues.

The affair was described as "perhaps the single biggest scandal in Australia since the war" by correspondent Christopher Sweeney in the March 1 issue of the British daily the *Guardian*.

Sweeney said:

"Even before today's allegations [in the February 29 Sydney *Sunday Telegraph*], Mr Whitlam's position had been hopelessly undermined by the disclosures last week that he had met two armed Iraqi representatives concerning the campaign contribution. In private he has conceded that his political career has been destroyed by the incredible affair."

The *Sunday Telegraph* reported that Whitlam had met with persons who admitted trying to negotiate campaign contributions from the Iraqi government.

Most of the information reportedly came from the alleged main go-between, Henri Fischer.

According to Sweeney, a former Whitlam aide explained that the approach to the Iraqis was necessary because it was the only hope the Labor party had of matching the money they believed the U.S. and British mining companies were pouring into the coffers of the capitalist Liberal party.

Fischer reportedly said that Iraqi President Hassan al-Bakr was willing to aid the Labor campaign because his government agreed with "their Australian comrades that there had been a grave coup d'etat in Canberra." (The Labor cabinet was brought down in November by the governor general, exercising the power that still legally belongs to the British Crown in the dominions.)

The Labor party sought Iraqi contributions, Sweeney said, "despite the fact that money from the left-wing dictatorship in Iraq was politically far more explosive than money from Britain or the United States." Such comments suggest that this affair is being used in the "anti-red" campaign against the Labor party, and that a wave of enthusiasm for honest politics is not sweeping the capitalist parties.

Madrid Withdraws From Sahara

Spain withdrew its last officials from its former colony of Sahara on February 26, two days ahead of schedule. In November 1975 Madrid signed an agreement with the Moroccan and Mauritanian governments pledging to leave the country by February 28 and turn over administration of the phosphate-rich territory to them.

In an effort to give their occupation and division of Sahara the appearance of legitimacy, the Moroccan and Mauritanian regimes staged a vote by an assembly of Saharan tribal chiefs February 26 approving the annexation of the territory.

Only 65 of the 102 members of the assembly took part in the voting, however. The rest had fled the Saharan capital of El Aaiún and were thought to be supporters of the Frente Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación del Sahara y Río de Oro—People's Front for the Liberation of Sahara and Río de Oro).

The Frente Polisario proclaimed Sahara

an independent republic February 27. The announcement, made from the front's exile headquarters in Algiers, said the country had been named the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The Algerian government, which has given some backing to the Frente Polisario, called on the Organization of African Unity to recognize the front as the legitimate government of Sahara.

Israeli Doctors Group Takes Reactionary Stance on Abortion

The Israel Obstetric and Gynecology Society, which represents 400 doctors, has declared its opposition to a proposed law that would permit abortions during the first three months of pregnancy. The society announced that its members would not perform abortions under the terms of the law if it was passed.

"We don't think a woman has the right to interrupt her pregnancy without her husband's agreement," one gynecologist said.

British Students Protest Cutbacks

Thousands of students marched to a rally in London's Hyde Park February 27 to protest planned cutbacks in educational spending. The National Union of Students, which organized the demonstration, estimated the attendance at 25,000. Police estimated between 8,000 and 15,000.

The cutbacks were projected in a government white paper released the previous week. In addition to the London march, large student protests took place in Swindon, England; Cardiff, Wales; and Glasgow, Scotland.

Obedience Is Freedom

Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, known in Vietnam as the "Zap-Zap General" because of his favorite subject, the killing of "communists," handed over his command February 12 after serving in Korea for the last two and a half years.

Hollingsworth was the commander of the 185,000-strong South Korean I Corps, plus one U.S. division. He explained his "nine day scenario" to put the North Koreans "through the meat grinder" in an article by Russell Spurr in the February 27

Far Eastern Economic Review.

The way Hollingsworth sees it, "This isn't just a contest for territory. We are fighting for popular support in the Republic of Korea."

What about the repression carried out by the Park Chung Hee dictatorship?

"For Christ's sake," the general said, "all you got to do here is obey the rules. Then nothing happens to you. I call that complete freedom."

Soviet Political Prisoners Demand Right to Be Heard at Party Congress

More than eighty Soviet political prisoners staged a hunger strike in late February and said they would continue for the duration of the twenty-fifth congress of the Soviet Communist party.

According to a February 29 United Press International dispatch from Moscow, dissident sources "said the prisoners had been denied the right to present their demands directly to the congress. They complained of harassment, undernourishment and threats of 'psychiatric repression.'"

The hunger strike involved thirty prisoners at Vladimir jail, near Moscow, and about fifty inmates of prison camps in the Urals and Siberia.

Unemployment in Puerto Rico Hits Record High of 21.9%

The official rate of unemployment in the American colony of Puerto Rico was 21.9% in January—the highest level recorded by the Puerto Rican government's Labor Department since it started keeping jobless statistics. In January 1975, unemployment stood at 17.1%.

Figures reported in the February 28 issue of *Claridad*, daily newspaper of the Puerto Rican Socialist party, showed that unemployment among those classified as "heads of families" was climbing faster than the overall rate. In January it stood at 18.4%, up from 12.5% a year earlier.

Puerto Rican government unemployment figures do not include so-called discouraged workers, who are not counted as unemployed because they have stopped looking for work. The government estimates that if these workers were included, the rate would be 5% higher.

Hunger as a Weapon

One of the dangers of chronic malnutrition is that it "leaves people so physically and intellectually stunted as to be easily exploited by better-fed individuals." That, according to George Alexander in the February 20 *Los Angeles Times*, was one of the points brought out in the discussion at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Boston during February.

An anthropologist, Dr. Lawrence Greene

of the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, gave an example. He had studied a village in Ecuador where 78 percent of the population suffered neurological deficiencies, stemming from lack of iodine and proper protein and calories in the diet, that went from hyperthyroidism to deafness-muteness and severe mental retardation.

The fact that such a large proportion of the inhabitants in the village were neurologically handicapped had profound social effects.

"The concept of normality," Dr. Greene said, "is greatly lowered, and all individuals who can hear or speak are considered normal."

Alexander summarized:

"Still, many of the neurologically handicapped have been taught to perform simple agricultural tasks and they constituted a large pool of cheap and easily manipulated labor for the three large haciendas, which own more than 50% of the cultivated land in the area, to exploit."

Prices in Argentina Shoot Upward

On March 5 the Argentine government announced an emergency program to curb inflation. The next day, it announced price increases that included an 82% rise in the price of gasoline, a 135% rise in the price of tractor fuel, and a doubling of electricity rates.

Postal rates went up 100%, telephone rates increased by 70%, milk went up 50%, and wine rose 90%. In addition, a 70% devaluation of the peso will increase the cost of all imported goods.

In a further attempt to squeeze the working class, Minister of Economy Emilio Mondelli offered workers a mere 12% wage increase while demanding a 180-day "truce" from any more wage demands.

The Argentine regime has bills of \$1.1 billion due to foreign creditors by May, but less than \$300 million in reserves.

Inuits Demand Separate Province

The 15,000 Inuits (Eskimos) of northern Canada have claimed formal ownership of 250,000 square miles of the country. They have also demanded special hunting, fishing, and trapping rights to an additional 500,000 square miles of land and 800,000 square miles of ocean. These special rights are to include a 3 percent royalty payment on any natural resources exploited in the region.

The Inuits have demanded that the entire area be separated from the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory, to eventually become a new province, called Nunavut (Our Land).

The demands were presented to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau February 27 by James Arvaleuk, the president of the Inuit Tapirisat (Inuit



New York Times

Brotherhood). "This may sound as though the Inuits are claiming an enormous area of land," he said, "but rather than looking just at the size of it, consider the contents."

"Most of it, by southern standards, is a barren desert. It supports life but it takes a lot of land to support a little bit of life."

"We can't put a fence around a quarter section of land in the Arctic and grow wheat or barley. We can't raise cattle or sheep or hogs. It can take up to 10 square miles of tundra to support a single caribou."

In their proposal, the Inuits rejected a cash settlement for their claims similar to the \$1 billion settlement obtained by the Inuits, Indians, and Aleuts in Alaska from the U.S. government in 1971. An Inuit representative said at the meeting with Trudeau that "there is just no way that you can attach a cash value to the Arctic real estate in terms that are meaningful to the Inuit."

The Inuits demanded that the Canadian government reply to their demands within three months. □

17 South Korean Dissidents Jailed

Seventeen opponents of the Park dictatorship in South Korea were reported under arrest March 4, following the circulation of a statement demanding Park's resignation, the release of all political prisoners, restoration of full democratic rights, and changes in economic policies.

Among those being held are the wife of former South Korean President Yun Po Sun; Ham Sok Hon, a writer and critic of the regime; and Rev. Yun Ban Ung, a Protestant minister active in Amnesty International.

The statement was read to an audience of 500 persons attending a mass in Seoul March 1. It was signed by twelve of the most prominent political dissidents of the country, including Yun Po Sun and Kim Dae Jung, who ran against Park in the 1971 presidential election.

Under a state of emergency declared in May 1975, making such demands on the government is punishable by a minimum of a one-year jail sentence.

Hungry for Profits

Reviewed by Steve Clark



The topic of Robert J. Ledogar's *Hungry for Profits* is stated in its subtitle: "U.S. Food & Drug Multinationals in Latin America." Its aim is summarized with equal clarity in the author's preface: "to illustrate some of the human consequences of a distinctly modern phenomenon called multinational enterprise."

That is the kind of book that Ledogar has written: brief, straightforward, and informative.

The larger part of the book consists of eight, self-contained case studies researched by the author and five co-workers. "The overall impression left by these case studies," Ledogar says, "both in food and drugs, is that the benefits of multinational activity in Latin America have accrued to a minority, while the majority—those who most need the food and drugs that the multinationals produce—gets little of either."

The remainder of the book contains a short introduction and conclusion; a chapter on the "U.S. Government's Helping Hand" to the multinationals; and a brief introduction by consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Nader's contribution adds very little to this useful collection, but it may help boost the book's sales, which is a good enough justification for its inclusion.

Ledogar himself is a former Roman Catholic priest who has served as a consultant to Consumers Union and now works for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Before zeroing in on the food and drug multinationals, *Hungry for Profits* provides a rundown of the overall impact of foreign investment on the economies of Central and South America.

"A recent list of the 422 largest corporations in Latin America revealed that Latin Americans had controlling interest in only 182," Ledogar says. "The rest were under foreign control. One third were wholly or substantially owned by U.S. investors. In 1968, U.S. multinationals were responsible for 40% of all manufacturing exports from Latin America. By 1971, multinational corporations accounted for 70% of total net profits in five major sectors of the Brazilian economy: rubber, motor vehicle, machinery, household appliance, and mining."

He says, "There are those in Latin America who believe that even many of

their so-called 'national' corporations, whose major stockholders bear the most respectably indigenous names, are really controlled by foreign capital."

American and European domination of the Latin American pharmaceutical market—the topic of the first three case studies—is similarly startling. "U.S. and European firms control over 84% of private-sector drug sales in Brazil and

Hungry for Profits: U.S. Food & Drug Multinationals in Latin America, by Robert J. Ledogar. Introduction by Ralph Nader. New York: IDOC/North America, 1975. 209 pp. \$7.95 cloth.

reportedly an even larger share in Venezuela," Ledogar reports. "In Colombia, it was found in 1970 that foreign firms controlled 70% of antibiotic sales, 65% of analgesics, 80% of vitamins, 45% of hormones, and 70% of antacids."

The bulk of Ledogar's account, however, centers not on the extent of imperialist control, but on the human cost of that control. Ledogar shows that the huge drug multinationals push overmedication among the wealthier classes in Latin America, while their pricing policies deny adequate medication to the working people and peasants of those countries.

In Brazil—as in many other Latin American nations—most drugs can be obtained without a doctor's prescription. This has provided fertile ground in which the market for drugs has flourished—backed up by an ongoing promotional effort that extends all the way down to the aggressive sales pitch of the pharmacist behind the counter.

Meanwhile, disease flourishes just as widely among Brazil's masses as does drug consumption among the affluent. "Of every 1,000 Brazilians born, 720 (compared to only 200 in the United States) die before the age of 50, 105 of them before their first birthday," Ledogar tells us.

"The majority of these premature deaths are caused by communicable diseases, aggravated by malnutrition," he reports. "Many of the killing diseases . . . can be prevented by vaccines or treated by vari-

ous drugs. But there is no money to buy medicine."

The callous attitude of the multinationals was summed up by one top corporation executive. Roberto Schneider, president of the Brazil division of Pfizer Incorporated, explained why in his opinion most Brazilians have so little access to medication:

"Well, it is because they are not economically active. Only 20 million Brazilians, in a population of over 100 million, are economically active; all the rest of them do not lead an active life; they just vegetate; they suffer from diseases induced by the environment, by lack of basic consumption; they do not buy clothes, shoes, and least of all medicines."

According to Ledogar, the pharmaceutical industries have profited handsomely from the inequitable situation in Brazil. The fifty-six largest drug firms—of which the top twenty are controlled by foreign capital—averaged a 16 percent profit rate in 1972.

Hungry for Profits also documents quite painstakingly the ways in which the multinationals exploit lax drug regulations in Latin America to market dangerous products that are restricted or banned altogether in the United States and Europe. Among the practices of these profit-gougers are the following:

- Recommending risky drugs for a far wider range of ailments than is allowed in the United States. Ledogar cites several examples, including the drug dipyrone.

Because of the drug's danger, the Sterling Drug company—for example—does not sell it in the United States. But the company does actively push dipyrone in Latin America and Puerto Rico. In Brazil the drug is sold across the counter, almost like aspirin, with package instructions recommending its use for "migraine headaches, neuralgia, muscular or articular rheumatism, hepatic and renal colic. . . . Toothaches and pain after dental extractions."

- Failure to explain situations in which a drug *should not* be used. Ledogar cites the example of the antibiotic tetracycline, which can harm the fetus of a pregnant woman and is dangerous for children under eight years old. Warnings to this effect are required in the United States, but the product is sold by drug companies

throughout Latin America with a greatly watered-down word of caution.

- The concealment of adverse side effects of drugs packaged for sale in Latin America, especially birth-control pills and certain pain-killers.

- The prescription of larger than advisable dosages in order to sell larger quantities of a drug. Bristol-Myers, for example, markets an antibiotic called Kanamycin under the brand name KANTREX. KANTREX can cause serious side effects, leading to deafness and kidney damage.

In the United States and Britain, laws have established a maximum daily dosage that must be included on the drug's package. In Venezuela and Colombia, however, Bristol-Myers advises up to twice this daily dosage.

Hungry for Profits also explains how the multinationals keep drug prices in Latin America outrageously inflated. It exposes how these giants use patents, royalties, and licensing agreements—as well as their monopoly of technique and raw materials—to preserve their stranglehold over the drug market.

Ledogar reports, for example, that a study in the late 1960s found that "Merck Sharp & Dohme of the United States had been selling dexamethasone to its Colombian subsidiary for \$31,900 per kilogram, while the drug cost \$7,500 per kilogram on the European market. In another case, eight European laboratories quoted a price of \$45 or less per kilogram of diazepam; Roche [its Colombian subsidiary] was paying its parent company \$2,500 for the same quantity."

The impact of foreign food corporations on Latin American economies is the subject of five of the book's eight case studies. As Ledogar points out, the problems created by these multinationals "are just as serious as those associated with pharmaceuticals but much more complex: diversions of agricultural production from subsistence crops to more lucrative cash crops, resulting in poorer diets instead of better ones for the hungriest people; failure to reach the poor with commercial high-protein food ventures, contrasted with extraordinary success in selling proteinless beverages [Coca Cola, Pepsi Cola, Fanta, etc.] to people who do not need and cannot afford them; persistent efforts to sell inappropriate milk products to mothers who can neither afford nor use them properly."

Hungry for Profits explores the case of two countries in which agricultural modernization has taken place at the expense of the masses of peasants and working people.

In the Dominican Republic, Gulf + Western Industries, Inc., an American multinational conglomerate, has vastly expanded acreage devoted to sugar production during the past two decades. About 90 percent of the resulting sugar crop is exported, mostly to the United

States.

"The problem for most of the Dominican people, however," Ledogar explains, "is that those foreign earnings have not been transformed into more food on their plates."

To the contrary. Greater wealth for G+W and for the Dominican comprador bourgeoisie has not meant better times for the masses of Dominicans. For them, the expansion of sugar production has simply diminished the land available for subsistence farming, cutting into their daily diet. A nutritional survey in 1969 revealed that the average calorie intake was only 79 percent (450 calories short) of the amount recommended by the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama. The average protein intake was 62 percent of the recommended level, and only 34 percent in some particularly poor communities.

Hungry for Profits condemns the role of Washington's 1916 and 1965 invasions of the Dominican republic in maintaining this exploitative situation.

"Officials of the United States, President Gerald R. Ford among them, have insisted on the need to encourage the poor countries of the world to become self-sufficient in food," Ledogar concludes. "But while the President laments the failure of countries like the Dominican Republic to feed themselves, the major share of the food produced in that country goes not to the people who live there but into the export market to increase foreign earnings—and profits for Gulf + Western."

Ledogar outlines a similar situation in Colombia. There, the shift in land usage toward animal feed for the country's developing poultry industry has led to a decline in the intake of protein-rich vegetable crops such as peas, beans, lentils, chickpeas, and broad beans.

"In other circumstances this breakthrough in poultry and egg production might have meant a significant improvement in the national diet," Ledogar says. "Most non-vegetarian peoples would add eggs and meat to their diets if they could afford it. But the poorest and most malnourished sector of the Colombian population still cannot afford to eat chicken and eggs very often, despite their great availability. For Colombia has one of the worst income distributions in the world."

He points out, for instance, that for at least a quarter of the population a dozen eggs and one kilogram of chicken cost the equivalent of one week's earnings. The bitter irony of capitalist agricultural production in Colombia has meant that the expansion of the poultry and egg output has gone hand in hand with a decline in the protein intake of the majority of the population.

Ledogar concludes, "... the experience of the last 20 years has taught nutritionists that dramatic production increases do not automatically result in more food for

the really hungry people of this earth. Very much depends upon the kind of food produced, the social and economic conditions under which it is produced, and the ultimate consumer for whom it is produced."

Hungry for Profits convincingly demonstrates that the problems facing peoples of the semicolonial world cannot be solved within a capitalist framework, although the book does not explicitly draw this conclusion.

Ledogar points out that the regimes throughout Latin America are hopelessly dependent on Wall Street and Washington, which use their enormous economic and political power to keep their client states in line.

As the experience of the Allende government in Chile proved, imperialism has enormous resources to bring to bear against even limited challenges to its prerogatives: investment "strikes," denial of loans and development funds, and outright subversion.

Latin American regimes that may initially reflect nationalist aspirations of certain native capitalists soon find that in order to survive they must develop a "favorable climate for foreign investment." And as Ledogar aptly reminds us:

"An 'investment climate' attractive to multinational enterprise has far-reaching ramifications. It not only dictates a minimum of government interference in matters like product safety and quality, it also means guaranteeing large pools of cheap labor—preferably not unionized or at least not militant; it means tax incentives, freedom to compete with (and/or buy out) local industries, and a limit to price controls; and, above all, it means giving the corporations the freedom to produce and sell not necessarily what is most needed in the country, but what is most economically efficient from the standpoint of profits."

Ledogar argues that the abuses of the multinationals cannot be corrected "if developing countries do not get together to eliminate or control the competition among themselves for foreign capital investment. . . ."

It is certainly no accident, however, that the *only* country in the Western Hemisphere that has been able to tackle any of these problems is Cuba, where a mass-based socialist revolution expelled imperialism altogether and nationalized the means of production as the basis for sound economic planning.

This path—the path of socialist development—is the only escape from the vicious circle described in *Hungry for Profits*. For as Ledogar concludes in the chapter entitled "Ambivalent Hosts," "Governments which appear to have the people's interests at heart when they initiate some effort to control corporate activity somehow lose their will along the way." □

The Right to Hear Hugo Blanco—An Exchange of Correspondence With the State Department

[An Immigration department ruling last November denied the American people the right to hear the views of Peruvian peasant leader Hugo Blanco. Blanco, who had been scheduled to conduct a speaking tour of a number of major American universities, was refused permission to enter the United States.

[As part of the campaign to overturn this undemocratic exclusion, well-known backers of civil liberties have asked individual members of Congress to press for action against the decision. One result of this effort is the following exchange of correspondence between New York Congressman Edward Koch, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, which was entered into the March 1 *Congressional Record*.

[In reprinting the correspondence we do not, of course, take responsibility for assertions contained in it. A case in point is the claim by the State Department that Blanco admitted "responsibility for the murder of three policemen" while leading the peasant struggle in Peru.

[The charge of murder, originally made by the Peruvian dictatorship in its frame-up trial against Blanco in 1966, has been answered by Blanco in his book, *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru*. The book, published by Pathfinder Press, is widely available in bookstores and libraries across the United States.

[In his book Blanco explains that during police operations initiated by the government to suppress the peasant movement, the forces under his leadership did everything in their power to prevent bloodshed.

[During his trial, Blanco said, "... I explained that in all senses and at all times, we had acted only in self-defense; that not only had the origin and activity of the guerrilla band been defensive acts in the face of the repression, but also that in our encounters with the police we had saved our lives by firing. This was indisputable. Nor could anyone deny that we never intended to kill anyone, as we proved by our treatment of the policeman who had fired at us in Pujiura—after we had disarmed him, we set him free. Nor could our concern in helping the wounded be denied, as was shown by the fact that we forced the town doctor (after getting him out from under his bed, where he had been hiding) to treat the wounded policeman, and that we offered our own scanty medical supplies for first aid; all this was done at grave risk to our safety and lives."]

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING HUGO BLANCO

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the *RECORD* and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, during the course of a year many Members of Congress receive requests from constituents and organizations seeking their aid in bringing individuals, who have been barred by the State Department, into the United States to lecture and engage in other organizational activities.

It is my practice to pursue these matters so as to ascertain whether the Department of State has proceeded in a reasonable manner. One such matter came to my attention in September 1975 concerning Hugo Blanco. I think the correspondence on this matter will be of interest to our colleagues:

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS,
New York, N.Y., September 22, 1975.

Mr. Ed KOCH,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KOCH: Plans for the important tour of Hugo Blanco, author, internationally known Peruvian peasant-union leader and refugee of the Chile coup have been threatened by the U.S. State Department. For two months the State Department has stalled issuing a visa to Mr. Blanco. Many prominent individuals (see Enclosures) have sent messages to the State Department urging that a visa be granted with no further delay.

In spite of these protests and the growing number of invitations for Mr. Blanco to speak at universities across the nation, the visa still has not been granted. Recently, we have been told that Secretary of State Kissinger has the visa application for review.

Your message protesting this anti-democratic harassment and calling on Mr. Kissinger to immediately issue the visa can be of substantial aid in assuring Mr. Blanco's right to enter and speak in this country.

Yours,

STEVE SCHMUGER,
NYC USLA.

[Newsletter of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, September 1975]

STATE DEPARTMENT DELAYS BLANCO TOUR

The long awaited tour of Peruvian peasant leader Hugo Blanco, due to begin Sept. 25th, is being seriously threatened by delaying tactics of the U.S. State Dept. The facts of Mr. Blanco's application for a visa reveal a shockingly deliberate campaign by the State Dept. to prevent his views from being heard here. After receiving numerous invitations from academic depts. of leading universities Mr. Blanco applied in mid-July at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, for a visa to enter the U.S. on Aug. 15th.

Mr. Blanco complied with all the for-

malities and was told he would receive an answer in early August. When he checked back in early August he was told that no decision would be made until late August because of unspecified "problems". On Sept. 4th he was told the decision was being put off for another three weeks, which would be the first day of his scheduled tour, Sept. 25th.

With these delays the right of many of the individuals and organizations who have invited him to speak is jeopardized. It also raises the possibility that they may deny him a visa altogether. When it became clear that delay was the policy of the State Dept. many of those who had originally invited Mr. Blanco to speak were joined by prominent individuals in addressing inquiries and protests to the State Dept. over the latter's harassment of the tour. Among those sending protest letters or telegrams were:

Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Chairman, Latin American Lecture Series, San Diego State.

Richard Fagan, Prof. of Political Science, Stanford University.

Richard Falk, Acting Director, Center of International Studies, Princeton Univ.

Rev. G. G. Grant, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago, Jesuit Community.

Congressman Michael Harrington (Massachusetts).

Yates Hofner, Dean, Montelith College, Wayne State University, Detroit.

Tom Hayden, Democratic Candidate for Senator, California.

Phyllis Kahn, State Representative, Minnesota.

Sidney Lens, author.

Froben Lozada, Chicago Studies Dept., Merit Community College.

Rev. David McGowan, AGAPE House, Univ. of Illinois.

Congressman Parren Mitchell (Maryland).
Deen Peerman, Managing Editor, *Christian Century*.

Michael Predmore, Professor, Univ. of Washington, Seattle.

Leland Rayson, State Representative, Illinois.

Ramona Ripston, Executive Director, ACLU, So. California.

Joining the campaign to defend Blanco's right to tour the U.S. is his U.S. publisher, Pathfinder Press of New York. In a letter to the State Dept. Pathfinder explains that they plan to meet with Mr. Blanco to discuss business matters and express concern over delays or a denial of his visa, pointing out that "continued delay or denial would violate the recent Helsinki Agreement ('The Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Final Act,' issued by the U.S. State Dept., 1975). The Agreement is quite specific regarding the rights to cultural exchange. On page 123 of the Final Act, the first item discussed under the section on access to books we find twelve paragraphs outlining the rights of authors, publishing houses, and audiences to free access, co-operation, and exchange. We find that our rights and Mr. Blanco's have been abridged under seven of these paragraphs (See paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10; Final Act, p. 123 and 124)." Pathfinder plans a big campaign in the publishing industry and media in general to defend the right of its author to enter the U.S.

WHY THE STATE DEPT. FEARS BLANCO'S IDEAS

This shocking delay can probably be traced to the fact that Blanco's eyewitness accounts of the Chile coup with its brutal repression and the U.S.'s role in it would prove embarrassing to the government at a time when congressional investigations of the CIA machinations in Chile and other sources reveal an ever widening and sinister pattern of U.S. intervention in that country.

HOW TO WIN THE VISA FIGHT

The government must not be allowed to trample on the democratic right of Blanco to speak, or the right of those who invited

him to hear him. We can and must defeat this anti-democratic harassment. USLA supporters and other defenders of civil liberties will want to increase the effort to mount pressure on the State Department to grant Blanco's visa. Here are some of the actions that can be undertaken:

Send a telegram or letter of protest to: Leonard P. Walentynowicz, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20020

Get other prominent individuals and organizations to do the same. Be sure to send a copy to USLA!

Send a financial contribution to meet the ballooning expenses of the defense effort. Thousands of dollars are needed to mount this effort, in addition to the cost of actually touring Blanco, when the visa is approved.

Ask other supporters of civil liberties for contributions.

Help organize and build the meetings for Blanco in your area. Continue to build large meetings with broad co-sponsorship. This will do two things. First, it will generate more pressure on the State Department since that many more individuals and groups will be angered by the State Department harassment. Secondly it will assure that we will not be caught unprepared when the visa is approved.

Media work is quite important. A special effort to get a press release into the local media, including the campus and Spanish press, will generate much public support for the effort.

WHO SHOULD BE APPROACHED FOR THIS DEFENSE?

There are people from many walks of life who will want to know about Blanco's tour and who will protect efforts to delay granting him a visa. Latin American Studies professors, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and international student groups (especially those of Latin American students), student government and other student groups will have a natural interest. Farm Worker and other unions will be interested after learning of Blanco's extensive work in organizing peasant unions for land reform, or of his history as a trade union organizer in Argentina. Church groups, who often have affiliates in Latin America will prove receptive. Organizations of Native Americans should be approached since Blanco is well known for his work among the Quechua Indians of Peru. There are many who will simply be concerned about any violation of civil liberties who should be approached.

Visit your local Congressperson or their aides and seek their support. A number have already endorsed the campaign. They will often call the State Department right on the spot and register a protest.

With a quick response to the State Department's harassment and stalling by a broad range of individuals and groups we can assure Blanco's right to enter the country and speak.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 1975.
STEVE SCHMUGER,
USLA Justice Committee,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SCHMUGER: I have your letter of September 22nd regarding Hugo Blanco.

I have written to the Secretary of State on this matter and as soon as I have any further information, I will be in touch with you again.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 1975.
Hon. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I received the en-

closed letter from the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners regarding Hugo Blanco.

I have no knowledge concerning the facts in this case and would appreciate your supplying me with whatever background material is available so that I can become more familiar with this subject.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
September 30, 1975.

Congressman Ed KOCH,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR ED: I feel indignant about the State Department's denying admission to a speaker whom many want to hear, presumably because he will testify to the brutality of the repression in Chile, and to our government's complicity in bringing it into power.

Kissinger has all the instincts of a thug, coated over with professional pomposity.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN SPOCK, M.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., October 9, 1975.
Hon. EDWARD I. KOCH,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KOCH: Thank you for your letter of September 24 on behalf of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners regarding the nonimmigrant visa case of Mr. Hugo Blanco.

Mr. Blanco, a Peruvian citizen, presently residing in Sweden, is ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a)(28)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which is quoted in the enclosed information sheet. A decision as to whether to recommend a waiver of his ineligibility to the Attorney General is receiving active consideration. I will write to you again as soon as a decision is reached.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1975.
STEVE SCHMUGER,
USLA Justice Committee,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SCHMUGER: Enclosed is the response I received from the Department of State regarding the problem with Hugo Blanco.

Apparently the matter is still being given consideration. When I receive the ultimate decision, I will send it on to you.

All the best.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., October 21, 1975.
Dr. BENJAMIN SPOCK,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR BEN: I apologize for not answering your letter of September 30th until now, but it was not brought to my attention until today. As I understand the matter is still pending, I have sent a letter to the State Department urging that Mr. Blanco be permitted to come to this country.

I do want to note at this time a paradox. I get mail from those on the left supporting the admission into this country of speakers who are on the left and, in many cases, communist. Some of those same people who write me object when someone identified with right wing causes or, in a recent case, Italian fascism seeks to come here. I take the position that with the exception of terrorists who publicly advocate murder in pursuit of their goals, those who want to have a full and free discussion of ideas should not be impeded in coming to this country for that purpose. I further believe

that in the forum of discussion democratic ideals can establish their superiority over the totalitarian ones of the right or the left. What do you think?

All the best.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., October 21, 1975.
Mr. ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MCCLOSKEY: I am writing with regard to Mr. Hugo Blanco, a Peruvian who I understand has encountered difficulty in obtaining a visa to enter this country because of his outspoken political beliefs. Though I have no personal knowledge of this case, I believe that, with the exception of terrorists who publicly advocate murder in pursuit of their goals, those who want to have a free discussion of ideas should not be impeded in coming to this country for that purpose. I would, therefore, urge you to allow Mr. Blanco to enter the United States without further delay.

I would appreciate any comments you might care to make regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., November 13, 1975.
Hon. EDWARD I. KOCH,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KOCH: Thank you for your inquiry of October 21 about the visa application of Mr. Hugo Blanco.

Mr. Blanco applied for a nonimmigrant visa in order to visit the United States to conduct a lecture tour. He was found to be ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because of his previous terrorist activities and his affiliation with certain communist organizations. Consideration was given as to whether the circumstances of his case would justify the approval of a waiver of his inadmissibility under Section 212(d)(3)(A) of the Act. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, with which ultimate authority rests, has concluded it would not be in the public interest to authorize his temporary admission into the United States. A waiver of his inadmissibility will not, therefore, be granted in his behalf.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE TO
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS,
New York, N.Y., November 18, 1975.

Representative Ed KOCH,
U.S. House of Representatives, Longworth
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN KOCH: On October 10 Hugo Blanco was scheduled to address students at the University of Minnesota in the first stop of a tour sponsored by the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA). Instead, the audience listened to a taped message from the Peruvian peasant leader, author and revolutionist.

On the day before the tour was scheduled to start, a State Department spokesperson announced that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had personally decided to bar Blanco from the United States.

Shortly after this decision, the State Department made a similar pronouncement on the visa of Sergio Segre, Italian Communist Party leader. At almost the same time the same State Department gave VIP treatment to Giorgio Almirante, a leader of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI—Italian Social Movement).

There is an obvious question: how could one person, Hugo Blanco, so threaten the security of the United States that he is denied entrance? Blanco has just finished a tour of Sweden and Canada where no endangering of the public welfare of those countries was reported. The threat, instead, is what Blanco has to say.

Blanco was forced to flee the repressive regime of Chile following the coup there—a coup aided by the CIA as revealed, despite Kissinger's denials, in recent Congressional hearings. The subject of Blanco's tour is "Latin America, a Continent without Justice." Clearly he would have taken up the issue of CIA involvement not only in Chile, but in Argentina, Brazil and Peru.

Blanco's case has received front-page coverage in a Southern Black newspaper, the *Atlanta Voice*. Editorials and stories have appeared in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *St. Paul Dispatch* and *Pioneer Press*, *Atlanta Journal*, *Library Journal*, *San Antonio Light* and numerous campus papers.

Protests from prominent civil libertarians and organizations were directed at Kissinger's office. These protests include messages from Senator Hubert Humphrey; John Ervin, Jr., publisher of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Candle in the Wind*; Jules Feiffer; Congresswoman Bella Abzug and Dr. Benjamin Spock.

On November 11 we received word that we had won a victory. Kissinger was forced to reverse himself and recommend to the Justice Department that Blanco's visa be granted. Now it's the Attorney General, Edward Levi, who stands between the American people and our right to hear Hugo Blanco.

What is needed now is a large meeting to focus attention on the issue—that the American people have a "right to know" the full story about "Latin America, a Continent without Justice."

We would like to propose that this meeting take place the evening of Thursday, February 19 at Columbia University and that you and your organization co-sponsor this meeting. Initial sponsors include Americans for Democratic Action; Father Kennedy of the Catholic Council of Churches; Michael Harrington, National Chairman, Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee; Ruth Gage-Colby and Kate Millett.

Clearly what's at stake here is not just one visa case. What's at stake is our right as Americans to hear and consider all views. What's at stake is our right to know—without government interference—the facts about Latin America. Watergate has shown that our right to know is being threatened. We must demonstrate the increasing unwillingness of Americans to accept this kind of censorship.

Sincerely,

JAN GANGL,
USLA Staff.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., December 1, 1975.

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. McCLOSKEY: I have your letter of November 13th concerning the visa application of Mr. Hugo Blanco.

I am particularly interested in knowing something about his "previous terrorist activities" so that I can refer to them when responding to the various letters that I am receiving which are initiated by groups and individuals espousing his cause.

All the best,

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

DECEMBER 5, 1975.

HON. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. O'NEILL: Thank you for your inquiry of November 21 on behalf of Ms. Lorraine Lyman about the visa application of Mr. Hugo Blanco.

Mr. Blanco applied for a nonimmigrant visa in order to visit the United States to conduct a lecture tour. He was found to be ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because of his previous terrorist activities and his affiliation with certain communist organizations. Consideration was given as to whether the circumstances of his case would justify the approval of a waiver of his inadmissibility under Section 212(d)(3)(A) of the Act. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, with which ultimate authority rests, has concluded it would not be in the public interest to authorize his temporary admission into the United States. A waiver of his inadmissibility will not, therefore, be granted in his behalf.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., December 11, 1975.

HON. EDWARD I. KOCH,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KOCH: Thank you for your letter of December 1 about your continued interest in the nonimmigrant visa case of Mr. Hugo Blanco.

The information which renders Mr. Blanco ineligible to receive a visa under Section 212(a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is confidential. I regret therefore that the information you requested cannot be divulged.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., December 22, 1975.

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. McCLOSKEY: I have your letter of December 11th and I must say your response was unsatisfactory and leaves me in a position where I am not able to respond responsibly to those who have written to me concerning Hugo Blanco.

While I would oppose allowing an individual who has engaged in terrorist activities so as to make him suspect that his coming here will enhance those terrorist activities, I cannot in good conscience say to those writing that the nature of his terrorist activities cannot in any way be described and must be confidential. I think your actions and response give unnecessary support to those who criticize our system and make it unnecessarily difficult for those, like myself, who support our system to defend it in cases of this kind.

I urge you to reconsider this matter and provide me with the information bearing upon Mr. Blanco's alleged terrorist activities so that I, at least, can be better informed on the matter.

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., January 29, 1976.

HON. EDWARD I. KOCH,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KOCH: Thank you for your letter of December 22 about your desire to obtain more information in connection with the refusal of a visa to Mr. Hugo Blanco.

Much of the information available to the Department is classified for reasons of security and therefore cannot be divulged

under the provisions of Executive Order 11652 dated March 6, 1973, a copy of which is enclosed.

A part of the public record, however, is his declaration that he took full and sole responsibility for the murders of three policemen which occurred during a raid he and his followers made on a police station in Peru during 1962. The *Congressional Record* of December 19, 1975, contains further information about his affiliation with the Fourth International and other groups, as well as quotations from his writings in which he has advocated the use of violence.

I can assure you that Mr. Blanco's case was carefully reviewed. The finding of ineligibility under Section 212(a) (28) (C) and (F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is mandatory. Mr. Blanco may also be ineligible under Section 212(a) (9) of the Act, which is quoted in the enclosure, because of his conviction for murder.

I hope that this additional information will be helpful.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C.

DR. BENJAMIN SPOCK,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR BEN: Enclosed is the response I received from the State Department which, if accurate, would in my judgement be grounds for not allowing Hugo Blanco entry into the United States. Don't you agree that if, in fact, he admitted responsibility for the murder of three policemen and advocates the use of violence that those are grounds for rejection?

In your original letter to me your reference to Secretary Kissinger was "has all the instincts of a thug, coated over with professional pomposity." My question is how would you now characterize Hugo Blanco? If I do not hear from you within two weeks, then I shall assume that the information provided me is correct.

All the best,

Sincerely,

EDWARD I. KOCH,

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
February 18, 1976.

Congressman EDWARD I. KOCH,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR ED: Thank you for looking into the Hugo Blanco issue. I have no idea where the truth lies. The plea for his entry came from a responsible organization.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN SPOCK, M.D.

Two Political Prisoners Executed by Iranian Regime

The shah of Iran's secret military tribunals have imposed two more death sentences, Iranian officials announced March 7. Hamid Riza Fatemi and Mohammed Ali Movahedi, executed by firing squad on that day, were the latest victims. The two were charged with "subversive activities" and alleged terrorist acts, although not even the dates of the supposed actions were made public.

Eight other prisoners were sentenced to life imprisonment. According to Iranian officials, five of these were originally sentenced to death but were saved by the shah's "clemency."

PC Francés Empieza a Descartar Máscara Marxista

Por Rebecca Finch

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "The French CP Begins Discarding Its Marxist Mask" que apareció en el número del 8 de marzo de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

PARIS—El Vigésimosegundo Congreso del Partido Comunista Francés, llevado a cabo los días 4 al 8 de febrero en el suburbio obrero parisino de St. Ouen, atrajo una atención poco usual este año. Calificado por los dirigentes del partido como un acontecimiento "histórico," el congreso ratificó algunos cambios en la postura del partido, mismos que hacen resaltar más claramente la política colaboracionista de clase de la dirección. También reafirmó un curso que fue comenzado en 1968, consistente en echar por la borda la retórica marxista que venía usando para encubrir sus traiciones a la clase trabajadora.

Estas medidas incluyen la decisión de abandonar la frase "dictadura del proletariado." Se aprobó una campaña en contra de "la inmoralidad, la pornografía, la perversión, la violencia y la criminalidad." Esto fue con la intención de complementar los esfuerzos tendientes a ganar hacia la "Unión del Pueblo Francés"—la versión del PC francés del frente antimonopolista—a un sector de la jerarquía de la iglesia católica.

Los delegados también reafirmaron el reforzar una campaña de propaganda, lanzada en mayo de 1975, para presentar al PC como el "mejor luchador" por los derechos democráticos en Francia. Todo esto dentro del marco de la continuación de la "Unión de la Izquierda" como alianza electoral con el Partido Socialista y la reiteración del "Programa Común" con éste.

En los meses que precedieron al congreso el Secretario General del Partido Comunista Georges Marchais firmó una declaración común con Enrico Berlinguer, del Partido Comunista Italiano, trazando la vía "democrática" al socialismo y los dirigentes del PC francés emitieron dos declaraciones en las que se distanciaban de algunas de las represiones más escandalosas de Moscú contra los disidentes.

Las raíces de estos cambios pueden ser trazadas a ciertos desarrollos sorprendentes que tuvieron lugar en años recientes. El PC francés, que con mucho es todavía el partido de los trabajadores más fuerte en

este país, ha experimentado cierto crecimiento desde el ascenso de mayo a junio de 1968 aunque con el recambio en su membresía no ha gozado de un avance considerable. En 1966 el partido afirmaba tener 425,000 miembros. Hoy dice tener 491,000 y todavía está lejos de su apogeo de 900,000 alcanzado después de la Segunda Guerra. A nivel electoral ha sufrido cierta baja, decayendo del 22.46 por ciento de los votos en las elecciones de 1967 a cerca de un 20 por ciento el día de hoy.

Por otra parte, los socialdemócratas franceses han experimentado un crecimiento hasta cierto punto impresionante después de reorganizar la estancada Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (Sección Francesa de la Internacional Obrera, la Segunda Internacional) bajo la forma de Partido Socialista Francés en 1969. El principal dirigente del PS, François Mitterrand, hoy clama que su partido es el más grande de la izquierda, ya que representa a un 30 por ciento del electorado.

El PS afirma tener 150,000 miembros y mantiene una fuerte influencia en dos sindicatos: Force Ouvrière y la Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT). Comenzó a construir secciones del partido en los lugares de trabajo en 1969. Para 1973 clamaba haber alcanzado 253 de éstas y su objetivo para 1975 era de 700.

El PS trata de presentar una imagen de animada actividad y de ser más democrático internamente que el PC. Por ejemplo, dentro del PS hay una creciente ala disidente llamada el CERES,* que publica su propio periódico.

Todo esto representa una amenaza potencial a la posición dirigente del PC en la clase obrera y ha conducido a una creciente polémica entre estos dos partidos. En una entrevista por televisión el día 7 de enero, por ejemplo, Georges Marchais atacó a las secciones del PS en los lugares de trabajo, afirmando que "no ayudan ni un centímetro al progreso del movimiento obrero. Lo que la clase trabajadora necesita es un partido revolucionario. . . . Si no hay una sección del PS en una empresa, no importa. Pero cuando carecen de un organismo del PC, a los obreros les falta una pierna para poder caminar."

El PS, por su parte, le ha dado los más fuertes golpes al PC cuando denuncia la represión a los derechos democráticos en la

Unión Soviética y cuando asocia al PC francés con los "termidorianos de octubre," que es el adjetivo que usa para designar a la burocracia soviética. El PS prestó su nombre al gran mitin del 23 de octubre en París que fue llamado para pedir la libertad de Leonid Plyushch, el matemático soviético que fue internado durante tres años en un hospital psiquiátrico. Dice que este fue uno de los factores que condujeron a la publicación de un editorial en la edición del 25 de octubre de 1975 de *l'Humanité* que llamaba a liberar a Plyushch.

Mitterrand también dice que el crecimiento del PS es responsable por muchos de los cambios que está llevando a cabo el PC. El 18 de enero apareció en televisión diciendo: ". . . el actual ascenso del Partido Socialista ha sido un factor determinante en la evolución del Partido Comunista, que debe tomar en cuenta nuestra presencia y nuestro crecimiento."

La competencia con el PS en la obtención de apoyo entre los obreros es uno de los problemas que actualmente afectan al PC. Pero también cuenta con otros. Por ejemplo, la burguesía francesa se inclina cada vez más a ver al PS como si se estuviera moviendo hacia la posición que le permitirá jugar el papel clave en mantener bajo control el descontento de las masas francesas. Volver a ganar la posición que mantenía ante los ojos de la clase dominante en Francia fue una de las razones del último giro del PC.

Para los gobernantes capitalistas franceses estos desarrollos son importantes. Si la tendencia combativa entre las masas continúa, se va a requerir algún tipo de gobierno de colaboración de clases para contener y desviar las cada vez más profundas aspiraciones de éstas.

La clase en el poder se resiste todavía a realizar un cambio hacia un gobierno de frente popular pero reconoce que esto puede llegar a ser necesario. En este contexto, la burguesía francesa acoge con beneplácito el giro del PC hacia una mayor "moderación," dado que esto puede achatar la combatividad de los trabajadores que siguen al PC. Y la dirección del PC, sin duda, está previendo con el objetivo de preparar a sus partidarios para que acepten concesiones económicas y sociales menores que sus aspiraciones.

Sectores importantes de la burguesía internacional, particularmente el imperialismo alemán, el británico y el norteamericano, sostienen una posición contraria a la

*Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes (Centro de Estudios, Investigaciones y Educación Socialistas).

que favorece el cambio hacia gobiernos de frente popular. Temen que tales gobiernos darán un renovado ímpetu a las expectativas de los trabajadores franceses, italianos y españoles, lo que a su vez se extendería entre los trabajadores de otros países.

Esto ha producido desacuerdos en el seno de la socialdemocracia. La división se desarrolla de acuerdo a las líneas del "norte" y las del "sur" del continente. El Canciller de Alemania Occidental Helmut Schmidt y el Primer Ministro Harold Wilson repiten como pericos las palabras de Henry Kissinger cuando éste enfatiza que el Mercomún y la OTAN peligrarían en caso de una participación comunista en los gobiernos de Europa Occidental. Su preocupación estriba en que los PCs se van a subordinar a la Unión Soviética y no a las burguesías nacionales en lo que respecta a la política exterior y militar.

En el otro lado de esta disputa se encuentran los partidos socialistas del Sur de Europa—especialmente los de Francia, España e Italia—, los cuales arguyen que los partidos comunistas de Europa Occidental están llegando a ser más independientes de Moscú y que, en cualquier caso, van a ser los partidos socialistas y los partidos burgueses los que van a jugar papeles decisivos en las coaliciones gubernamentales, siendo relegados los partidos comunistas a ministerios de menor importancia tales como salud pública, agricultura y del trabajo, más que a los de relaciones exteriores o de defensa. Argumentan que en sus países la participación de los partidos comunistas en tales gobiernos es necesaria para mantener la "estabilidad" social.

Aun en Portugal, ahora que recuperó el "lugar que le correspondía," el PS habla acerca de lo valioso que es su bloque con el PC. Por ejemplo, Mário Soares, que visitó recientemente los Estados Unidos, declaró a los reporteros de la revista *Time* que el mantener al PC en el gobierno portugués no sólo había escindido a ese partido, sino que había servido para que compartiera la responsabilidad de las impopulares medidas de austeridad.

Este es el trasfondo de los cambios ratificados en el Vigésimosegundo Congreso del PC francés, que tanto se propagandizaron. Lo que está involucrado aquí no es un giro para distanciarse de una política que previamente haya sido revolucionaria, sino que más bien se trata de un mero cambio de postura e imagen.

El cambio comenzó el pasado noviembre con la declaración conjunta de los partidos comunistas italiano y francés, firmada por Enrico Berlinguer y Georges Marchais. El PC italiano ha tratado de recuperar su puesto en el gabinete, del que fue excluido en mayo de 1947. Berlinguer ha tratado de ganar este objetivo por medio de la traición sistemática a las luchas de masas y proclamando la capacidad de su partido para apuntalar la estabilidad social en Italia. Este es el significado de las prome-

sas del PC italiano en torno a garantizar la economía "mixta," el sistema pluripartidario y la sucesión de poderes a través de elecciones, en caso de que llegara a ganar el gobierno.

La declaración conjunta tenía como intención mostrar que el PC francés había adoptado la fórmula de Berlinguer. Marchais también deseaba deslindarse de la postura pseudorevolucionaria del PC portugués.

"Un dirigente del Partido Comunista en París dijo ayer que el documento no sólo subrayaba las diferencias entre los partidos del este y los del oeste, sino que también estaba dirigido a ciertos partidos occidentales, tales como el de Portugal. . .," informó el *International Herald Tribune* en su edición del 19 de noviembre.

Pero está claro que no bastaba con una declaración conjunta con el PC italiano que prometiera el respeto a la democracia burguesa. En vista de la reputación del PC francés como uno de los más arrastrados entre los agentes del Kremlin, Marchais también tenía que declarar su independencia de Moscú. Este es el contexto en el que se dió la decisión del PC para pedir la libertad de Leonid Plyushch y condenar los campos de concentración soviéticos.

El llamado por la libertad de Plyushch fue emitido el día 25 de octubre, sólo dos días después del mitin en la Mutualité en París, un gran acto que atrajo a 4,000 personas y que constituyó la culminación de una campaña auspiciada por la izquierda francesa para lograr su libertad. Un editorial en *l'Humanité* declaró: "Si es cierto . . . que este matemático está internado en un hospital psiquiátrico sólo por haber adoptado una posición en contra de ciertos aspectos de la política soviética, o en contra del mismo régimen, nosotros sólo podemos expresar nuestro repudio y pedir que sea liberado tan pronto como sea posible."

La declaración del Buró Político el 12 de diciembre sobre los campos de concentración soviéticos apareció después que salió en la televisión francesa una película de la BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation, Corporación Difusora Británica] sobre ese tema. La declaración decía: ". . . el Buró Político del Partido Comunista declara que si la realidad corresponde con las fotografías que han aparecido—y no han sido desmentidas por las autoridades soviéticas—, expresa su profunda sorpresa y la más severa condena."

Esta no es la primera ocasión en que el PC francés ha tomado su distancia con respecto a la política soviética de represión de los disidentes. En 1968, el partido se deslindó abiertamente de la invasión soviética de Checoslovaquia; en 1971 pidió clemencia para los judíos que habían sido condenados en Leningrado por haber buscado cómo salirse de la URSS, y en 1973 atacó la decisión por parte de Moscú de no publicar las obras de Solzhenitsyn en la Unión Soviética.

Mientras el periódico *Pravda* criticaba indirectamente al PC francés por su declaración sobre los campos de concentración por haber prestado credibilidad al "antisovietismo y al anticomunismo," y mientras que también en *Pravda* han aparecido otros artículos implícitamente críticos del PC francés por romper abiertamente con el marxismo, esto no significa que ya tuvo lugar su ruptura fundamental con Moscú.

Todo lo contrario, aunque del PC de la Unión Soviética se pueden esperar denuncias de las críticas hechas por el PC francés, la postura "crítica" adoptada por este último facilita el enfoque colaboracionista de clases hacia el imperialismo occidental, que ha sido promovido por la burocracia soviética desde que Stalin usurpó el poder. Confirma—como si esto fuera necesario—la adaptación de los partidos estalinistas al parlamentarismo burgués.

Vale la pena hacer notar que el compromiso oral del PC francés con los derechos democráticos está muy lejos de ser profundo. No tiene nada que decirnos acerca del rechazo a los derechos de los grupos de oposición a formar tendencias dentro del PCUS, o su derecho a organizar sus propios partidos o a imprimir y distribuir su literatura dentro de la Unión Soviética. Aprobar los derechos democráticos de estos grupos, después de todo, entraría en contradicción con la prohibición del mismo PC francés para la formación de tendencias dentro de este partido o en la Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), la gran federación sindical que domina.

Así de reveladora es la reciente condena del PC francés a la lucha de los conscriptos por comités y sindicatos, a través de los cuales los soldados esperan ganar los derechos de expresión y de asociación en los cuarteles. Apoyar tales luchas cortaría las promesas del PC en torno a que su entrada en el gobierno no pondría en peligro la política exterior y militar burguesa.

Así que el PC francés ha condenado la lucha de los soldados por sus derechos democráticos como si se tratara de una provocación "ultraizquierdista," dañina a la disciplina. Como concesión a la creciente presión de masas, el PC ha salido en defensa de los militantes que han sido encarcelados o procesados por su actividad. Pero la dirección del partido todavía apela al chovinismo nacional y llama a mantener un ejército fuerte y disciplinado que pueda defender la "independencia nacional" de la Francia imperialista.

Este tema chovinista figuró prominentemente en el discurso de Marchais al Vigésimosegundo Congreso del partido. Denunciando el "Atlantismo" del Presidente Giscard d'Estaing, declaró: "Una cuarta parte de la industria francesa está ahora en manos de capitalistas extranjeros. Su deuda exterior va en aumento. . . . Están destrozando su soberanía pedazo

por pedazo; el destino de nuestros campesinos hoy en día es decidido en Bruselas y el de nuestra moneda en Washington; y mañana, si nuestro pueblo no se cuida, el destino de nuestro país será decidido en Luxemburgo, o aun en Bonn, por el estado mayor de las fuerzas reaccionarias y trusts multinacionales de la Europa Atlántica. . . ."

Para contrarrestar esta amenaza apeló al patriotismo. "Fiel a su tradición, el Partido Comunista Francés lucha y luchará con todas sus energías para salvaguardar la independencia y la soberanía de Francia. . . . Lejos de ser una idea pasada de moda, la independencia nacional es una gran aspiración de nuestro tiempo. Ganarla, defenderla, consolidarla: he aquí tareas que están en la orden del día del mundo contemporáneo. No hay nada más inmediato, o más moderno, que la lucha por la independencia, la soberanía y el florecimiento completo de Francia."

Estos temas, por supuesto, fueron diseñados para llamar la atención particularmente del ala gaulista de la burguesía francesa. No debe sorprendernos el que esta línea coincida también con los intereses de Moscú, que quiere ver una mayor independencia de Francia con respecto a los Estados Unidos.

Esta posición del PC francés ha sido bien recibida en los círculos a los cuales estaba dirigida. Como dijo un escritor gaulista en *Le Monde* el 3 de febrero: ". . . los comunistas proporcionan los batallones pesados entre aquellos que rechazan cualquier intento de hacer virar a Francia hacia donde perdiera su independencia. . . ."

Las cautelosas reprimendas a Moscú por parte del PC, en lo que respecta a la represión de disidentes políticos, no despertó tanto interés como la discusión precongreso en torno a la proposición de eliminar la frase "dictadura del proletariado" de los estatutos del partido. En una "columna de discusión" se publicaban las polémicas diariamente en *l'Humanité* y semanalmente en *France Nouvelle*, una revista noticiosa semanal del PC. Sin embargo, ésta fue una caricatura de lo que debería ser una genuina discusión democrática.

Los editores de estas publicaciones tenían el derecho de seleccionar y editar lo que se publicaba. Y aunque individualmente se podían escribir contribuciones, el derecho a formar tendencias estaba estrictamente prohibido. Al mismo tiempo que esto dificulta evaluar la verdadera extensión de la oposición en el partido, la discusión es interesante porque revela algunos problemas que encara la dirección en cuanto a mantener la unidad del partido en torno a los cambios.

El proyecto de resolución publicado por el Comité Central, titulado "Qué Quieren los Comunistas para Francia," no mencionaba la "dictadura del proletariado." Durante su mitin público en Epinay-sous-Senart el 27 de noviembre, Pierre Juquin,



GEORGES MARCHAIS

miembro del Comité Central, dijo que la frase estaba "passé" [pasada de moda].

Dos miembros protestaron en contra de esto el 5 de enero en *l'Humanité*, pidiendo que al menos una referencia a la "dictadura del proletariado" apareciera en el proyecto de resolución. El 7 de enero, Georges Haddad, secretario de una célula en Epinay-sous-Senart, propuso que aunque la cuestión de los estatutos del partido no estaba en la orden del día del congreso, éstos deberían ser modificados para quitar la frase. Pero otros miembros del partido se quejaron en el sentido de que el lenguaje del proyecto no era lo suficientemente marxista.

El 9 de enero Marchais apareció en un programa de televisión donde le pidieron su opinión acerca de la idea de Haddad. El secretario general dijo: "Estoy de acuerdo con la idea de este secretario de célula. . . . Estamos en 1976. . . el Partido Comunista no es rígido. No es dogmático. Sabe como adaptarse a las condiciones de sus tiempos. El día de hoy la palabra 'dictadura' no corresponde con lo que deseamos. Tiene un significado inaceptable, contrario a nuestras aspiraciones, a nuestras tesis.

"Aun la palabra proletariado ya no es apropiada. . . ."

El 16 de enero Marchais y el Buró Político llevaron a cabo una conferencia de prensa en la cual anunciaron que había una "casi total unanimidad" en el partido para abandonar la frase.

La maniobra de Marchais no quedó sin ser cuestionada dentro del partido, pero el

resultado final era inevitable. M. Guerpillon de París se quejó sobre esto de la siguiente manera, en la edición del 24 de enero de *France Nouvelle*: "De acuerdo al buen método periodístico, las cartas de los comunistas que protestaban contra la desaparición de la [frase] dictadura del proletariado de los estatutos eran primero impresas en las 'columnas de discusión.' Luego el secretario general habló públicamente en televisión y comprometió al partido, haciendo la concesión de que [el cambio] todavía podría ser discutido. ¿Pero quién va a soñar con discutirlo ahora? Quien lo hiciera sería masacrado."

La identificación del término científico marxista "dictadura del proletariado" con los crímenes del régimen de Stalin facilitó a los dirigentes del PC llevar a cabo la desaparición de la frase sin discutir realmente su significado. Para los marxistas, la frase significa el gobierno de la clase obrera y de sus aliados; esto es, el gobierno de una mayoría en vez del actual régimen de unos cuantos. El significado que Marx y Engels le dieron fue el de la democracia más amplia y efectiva que se haya conocido jamás.

Aunque la intención de la dirección del PC al quitar la frase era la de subrayar su oposición al cambio revolucionario, entre las filas del PC puede haber quienes no hayan tenido los mismos motivos. Debido a la estrangulación de la democracia obrera y de todos los derechos democráticos elementales en la Unión Soviética, la frase se ha desacreditado entre las masas de obreros, y aun entre los miembros del partido comunista. Entonces, en *l'Humanité* aparecieron contribuciones confusas en las columnas de discusión, que acusaban a aquellos que se oponían a abandonar la frase de estar "en contra de la forma y el contenido de la democracia socialista, especialmente la libertad de expresión para las diversas corrientes ideológicas y políticas, la existencia de una prensa de oposición, etc."

Pero aparentemente fue otra parte del proyecto de resolución, la que llamaba a luchar contra la "inmoralidad," la que despertó el máximo de oposición activa entre las filas del partido.

La sección del proyecto titulada "Queremos Fraternidad" dice en una de sus partes: "Nosotros los comunistas . . . estamos luchando por un nuevo mundo. Luchamos en contra de la violencia, los odios, el racismo, la inmoralidad.

"La sociedad que queremos reconocería el derecho de cada quien a vivir plenamente su vida. Esto no tiene que ver con ensalzar la brutalidad o exhibir la perversión."

En una conferencia de prensa que fue relatada en *l'Humanité* el 15 de enero, le preguntaron a Marchais: "Hay un debate sobre la sexualidad. ¿Tiene su partido una posición sobre la moral en este campo?"

Marchais contestó: "La sexualidad es un gran problema; pero es un problema que no

puede tener primacía sobre las cuestiones económicas y sociales. Es necesario hacer más por la educación social. Las parejas deben tener el derecho a decidir ellas mismas si es que quieren o no tener hijos. . . . El aborto debe ser gratuito. . . . Todas estas cuestiones deben ser juzgadas y puestas en su lugar, su verdadero lugar.

"También existe el problema de la pornografía. Yo digo que eso es inmoral. . . ."

Estas declaraciones son cínicas en vista de que vienen del principal dirigente del partido que fue uno de los principales obstáculos a la lucha por la libertad de aborto en Francia y que denunció vigorosamente la decreciente tasa de natalidad en Francia durante su discurso principal en el Vigésimosegundo Congreso. Mientras que Marchais se ha manifestado por el "aborto gratuito," no ha dicho nada acerca de la necesidad de derogar la ley francesa que permite el aborto bajo solicitud sólo hasta la décima semana de embarazo y que todavía forza a miles de mujeres a salir del país para obtener esta operación o las empuja hacia los abortos ilegales.

Marchais tampoco hablaba acerca de la necesidad de construir un movimiento independiente de mujeres para luchar en contra de la denigración de la mujer en las películas y en la literatura. Su verdadero objetivo al llamar a luchar en contra de la "inmoralidad" era ganar a un sector de la jerarquía del clero católico al frente antimonopolista denominado "Unión del Pueblo Francés," y así distraer la atención de sectores del PC que han sido afectados por la radicalización juvenil y el movimiento de liberación de la mujer.

Las declaraciones de Marchais y las proposiciones del proyecto de resolución coinciden con las nuevas declaraciones del Vaticano en contra de las prácticas sexuales premaritales, la homosexualidad y la masturbación, y se han dado vivas polémicas en la jerarquía católica francesa acerca de la "crisis moral" y las relaciones entre la iglesia y los comunistas y socialistas.

En su discurso al congreso Marchais dijo: "Estamos muy interesados en ciertas posiciones que ha adoptado la iglesia en Francia, expresando su emoción ante las consecuencias morales y sociales de la crisis, su comprensión del compromiso político de los cristianos hacia el socialismo. . . ."

Aunque los acercamientos del PC a las altas jerarquías de la iglesia han sido echadas a un lado por el momento, el partido ha llevado a cabo conferencias a nivel local con personalidades religiosas y desea que éstas continúen. De esta manera, las columnas de discusión en *l'Humanité* estaban plagadas de contribuciones con títulos tales como: "Cristianos y Comunistas Unidos" y "Sí, Estamos contra la Inmoralidad."

Las objeciones a la campaña en contra de la "inmoralidad" fueron planteadas principalmente por los miembros más

jóvenes y nuevos en el partido, quienes sospechaban que el verdadero blanco de estos ataques era el nuevo estilo de vida de los jóvenes; esto es, el rechazo creciente a las normas morales burguesas, que es una amenaza a la glorificación que el PC hace de la familia.

Le Monde informó que en el debate oral a nivel de la federación de Bouches-du-Rhône, la dirección del partido fue apoyada por una animada corriente "obrerista" que atacaba a los "intelectuales de cabellos largos" que piensan que "los obreros son objetivos fáciles."

En respuesta, de acuerdo a *Le Monde*, los "intelectuales" dijeron que el partido había cometido serios errores en el campo de la moral en el pasado y que tenía que reconsiderar su posición. En el debate en la federación de Moselle, la conferencia decidió, con una votación de 101 a favor y 79 en contra, recomendar que toda referencia a la "inmoralidad" fuera quitada. El autor de la enmienda pedía que la resolución explicara que la pornografía se apoyaba en "la explotación de la miseria sexual" y que "estaba basada en gran medida sobre el desprecio a la mujer."

La oposición a esta cuestión fue tan fuerte que 4 de cada 34 federaciones que habían llevado a cabo sus reuniones para el 24 de enero adoptaron enmiendas con el objetivo de modificar la resolución. Aunque la columna de discusión se cerró el 24 de enero, el Buró Político sintió que era necesario continuar la discusión durante dos días más debido a la reacción crítica que esta proposición había encendido en casi todas las federaciones. Debido a que las polémicas fueron muy acaloradas, la dirección tuvo que cerrar algunas reuniones a la prensa, siendo que antes habían sido abiertas.

Si hubo otros temas que fueron cuestionados abiertamente, tales como la posición del partido en contra de los derechos democráticos de los soldados y a favor de un fuerte ejército burgués, éstas no pudieron traspasar el control de la censura, antes de llegar a las "columnas de discusión." Pero es claro que al menos parte de la membresía del PC ha sido afectada por la radicalización en Francia desde mayo-junio de 1968. Por ejemplo, estadísticas de la reunión del 24 de enero de la federación de París mostraron que la edad promedio de los 500 delegados era de treinta y un años y que el 70 por ciento se había unido al partido desde 1968. De hecho, el PC dice haber reclutado nacionalmente casi 94,000 miembros sólo de 1974 a 1975. Estos nuevos reclutas es seguro que no son todos estalinistas endurecidos.

Claramente, existen grandes oportunidades para que los trotskistas expliquen el verdadero carácter de la política estalinista y para que ganen nuevos miembros entre este medio. La Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), Sección Francesa de la Cuarta Internacional, está tratando de tomar toda ventaja posible de estas

aperturas. Cada semana, su periódico *Rouge* ha publicado artículos que están dirigidos a los militantes y simpatizantes del PC, proporcionándoles la visión trotskista de los problemas claves planteados en la discusión.

La LCR ha puesto un énfasis especial en defender el concepto de la dictadura del proletariado y la genuina democracia socialista, en contra de los conceptos y prácticas de la dictadura burocrática que gobierna en Moscú. Si el fermento y el interés generado hasta ahora continúan en los círculos de influencia del PC, una presentación sistemática de la posición trotskista sobre estas cuestiones seguramente que va a rendir sus frutos. □

Esperar Taxi en Tehrán, Riesgoso

La contaminación atmosférica en Tehrán ha alcanzado niveles tan peligrosos que, de acuerdo al principal dirigente de la Organización de Protección Ambiental de Irán Dr. B. Soraya: "Si no se comienza a aplicar un remedio, la gente va a tener que salir de sus hogares usando máscaras de oxígeno."

Cuando habló durante una reciente conferencia de prensa en Tehrán, el Dr. Soraya dijo que una parte substancial de la contaminación en esa ciudad es causada por las emanaciones de los escapes de más de 700,000 automóviles que hay en Tehrán.

Atestiguando sobre el peligro que tales niveles de contaminación plantean para la salud de los residentes de Tehrán, el Dr. Soraya informó que "en más de 1,000 casos de muerte relacionados con enfermedades en los pulmones, la mayoría fueron causados por el aire contaminado de la ciudad."

Dijo que la cantidad de dióxido de carbono en el aire es "diez veces mayor a la normal," y agregó que esta es la razón por la cual "la gente algunas veces se desmaya mientras espera en las colas por los taxis."

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