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Chapter 1: The Old Peace Movement

OUT NOW!



Fred Halstead addressing mass demonstration in Washington, D.C., May 9, 1970.

With this issue we begin serializing the forthcoming book *Out Now!*, Fred Halstead's account of the American antiwar move-

ment. Halstead was one of the leading organizers of the largest national antiwar demonstrations. See page 804.

Other Features:

Rockefeller's Laundry Job on CIA

Washington's \$25 Billion Spy Network

Democracy and the Portuguese Revolution

The Predictions About an Economic Upswing

Struggle for Right to Abortion in Britain

Interview With Bernadette Devlin McAliskey

A Letter from C. Slaughter . . .

. . . And a Reply by Joseph Hansen

NEWS ANALYSIS

The Reopening of República—a Significant Victory

An important victory for workers democracy was won in Portugal June 6 when the bourgeois military regime, in response to mass pressure, decided to permit *República*, the Lisbon daily that reflects the views of the Socialist party leadership, to resume publication.

The heads of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) had shut down the newspaper and sent troops to enforce evacuation of the premises May 20 following a provocation by members of the printers union employed by *República*. The printers union is dominated by the Portuguese Communist party.

By suppressing the only daily paper expressing the views of the Socialist party, which is the largest political formation in the Portuguese workers movement, the military struck a blow against freedom of the press, setting an ominous precedent for clamping down on political parties and tendencies that offer even a semblance of resistance to the MFA's efforts to block the development of the Portuguese revolution.

The SP leaders fought the suppression of *República* by such means as withdrawing from cabinet meetings of the coalition government, in which they hold posts, and trying to mobilize international support, principally in bourgeois and Social Democratic circles.

However, what was decisive in forcing the military to retreat were the mass demonstrations organized by the Socialist party in defense of *República's* right to publish. Demonstrations mobilizing, reportedly, up to 60,000 persons were staged in Lisbon—proof of the sharpness of the issue and the awareness of many workers of its importance. That the SP leaders, thoroughly committed as they are to electoralist methods, felt obliged to mobilize the masses in the streets indicates the pressure placed on them as a consequence of the moves against *República*.

In return for lifting the ban on *República*,

the Socialist party leaders agreed to concessions demanded by the military high council, one of them being resumption of their participation in cabinet meetings.

Two arguments were advanced in behalf of the printers whose action led to the closing of *República*:

1. That they were concerned about an alleged loss of circulation because of the editorial policy, which could end by bankrupting the paper and thus causing them to lose their jobs.

The phoniness of this argument is obvious. Through the government's action, they lost their jobs at once.

2. As honest, revolutionary-minded workers, the printers had a right to a voice in the editorial policy of the newspaper on which they worked.

This argument is as false as the first one. Where they have a right to exercise a voice in editorial policy is in the newspaper of the Communist party, *Avante!*. Would the CP leaders agree to these printers closing down *Avante!* because it was losing circulation or because they disagreed with its editor?

The logic of this argument leads to odd results. If the printers employed by *Avante!* were members of the Socialist party, would the CP leaders concede that they had a right to close down the paper if its editorial policy did not meet with their approval?

Obviously every political tendency has a democratic right to determine its own editorial policy. And if rival political tendencies seek to intervene on some pretext, they are violating the democratic rights of others and laying a basis in principle for violation of their own democratic rights.

The military government's suppression of *República*, heartily supported by the Communist party, enabled a leading voice of American imperialism, the *New York Times*, to portray the conflict as evidence of the antidemocratic nature of communism. The *Times* sought to take advantage of the situation, just as it has taken advantage of the crimes of Stalin in the USSR to smear the Russian Revolution.

But it requires imperialist gall for imperialist critics of the Portuguese regime to pose as defenders of democratic rights. From South Vietnam to Brazil, Spain, and Iran—and in Portugal itself for almost half a century—they have amply demonstrated their preference for the most sordid, venal, and brutal dictatorships to defend and uphold the capitalist system. This has been the main component of American foreign

policy since the turn of the century.

The protests of publications like the *Times* are designed primarily as propaganda to smear the image of proletarian revolution and to furnish a lying, democratic cover for more direct intervention in Portugal if the MFA and the Communist party prove incapable of controlling the mass movement and blocking its development in an anticapitalist direction.

For the bourgeoisie, democratic rights are not essential to preserve their class rule; in fact, in today's world, democratic rights stand in the way of maintaining their rule—which is why we see such an erosion of democracy in the "free" world. For the working class, democratic rights are precious assets in the struggle for social emancipation.

Freedom of the press—which was directly under attack in the *República* affair—is a basic democratic right, won in long, hard struggles, which the working class has every interest to defend. The revolutionary-socialist approach to this question was explained by Leon Trotsky in succinct fashion in 1938 in an article summing up the principled position of the Bolsheviks. (See "Freedom of the Press and the Working Class," in the June 9 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 799.)

Trotsky's main argument is as follows:

1. Working people cannot free themselves from the influence of reactionary ideas by means of a ban on reactionary publications. "In reality, only the greatest freedom of speech, of the press, and of association can create favorable conditions for the advance of the revolutionary movement of the working class."

2. In capitalist society, restrictions on freedom of the press arm the bourgeois state with special means for controlling public opinion. Moreover, the restrictions are turned against working-class publications.

3. "It is essential to wage a relentless struggle against the reactionary press. But workers cannot let the repressive fist of the bourgeois state substitute for the struggle that they must wage through their own organizations and their own press."

Viewed from this standpoint, the failure of the Portuguese military regime's attempt to suppress the Socialist party press must be counted as a victory for the working class in the revolutionary process in Portugal.

The bourgeoisie ruled for a half century in Portugal through a totalitarian dictatorship. Today they are exercising their rule through a different means, the Armed Forces Movement. The MFA is relying heavily on the Communist party to "discipline" the labor movement, to control and head off strikes, and generally to contain the class forces pressing toward breaking up the capitalist system and its state

Next Week . . .

"Problems of General Concern in the Soviet Dissident Movement." A new document by Soviet historian Roy Medvedev. Topics discussed include effects of the détente on the struggle for democratic rights in the USSR, disagreements among the dissidents, and Solzhenitsyn's "new messianism." From the forthcoming book *Détente and Socialist Democracy*.

structure. But the Stalinists' usefulness is limited by the growing economic crisis, which restricts the employment of reformist tactics. In addition, the CP is becoming discredited among the more militant layers of the working class, owing to its class-collaborationist policy and its antidemocratic attitudes.

The MFA is using the time placed at its disposal by the treacherous role of the Stalinists to build a political movement directly controlled by the commanding officers of the armed forces of the Portuguese state.

A necessary part of this course is the gagging of outlets for actual or potential opposition to the MFA's goal. The closure of *República* was a case in point. It marked a new level in the series of attacks by the MFA regime on the Socialist party, Maoist groups, elections, and freedom of the trade unions.

In this respect, the action of the CP-led union in ousting the editor of *República* and censoring the newspaper's editorial content dovetailed with the course followed by the military. When the Socialist party held a mass demonstration at the newspaper's offices to protest this violation of its right to express its views, the regime stepped in and closed down the offending journal.

The relation between democratic rights and the proletarian struggle has been especially obscured by the Stalinists, whose model of "socialism" is the bureaucratic regimes in the Soviet Union, China, and the "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the antidemocratic practices of such regimes discredit socialism, thereby constituting a major obstacle to its advance. On the other hand, even many revolutionary-minded critics of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries have come to believe that the suppression of democratic rights under Stalinist regimes is the norm for a workers state, and that such rights have little or nothing to do with the revolutionary struggle for power.

The Stalinists' attack on workers democracy in Portugal is directly linked to their strategic perspective, which, despite the "socialist" demagoguery they employ, is to contain the mass movement within the limits of the capitalist system.

The Socialist leaders likewise have no intention of leading the Portuguese masses to the overthrow of capitalism. They used the mobilizations around the *República* affair to try to reinforce their position inside the government as servants of the MFA.

But whatever their subjective intentions, the Socialist party's struggle in its own defense against the combined attack from the military junta and the Communist party has helped bolster democratic rights. Revolutionists must strive to further strengthen this gain by carrying forward the struggle for a socialist Portugal. □

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OUT NOW!

Chapter 1

The Old Peace Movement

By Fred Halstead

A peace movement of sorts existed in the United States in 1960 but it had nothing to do with the war in Vietnam. It is necessary to recall that in the early 1960s the war was not a central issue in American life. It was something reported only occasionally and as far as the general population was concerned, opposed only by the more consistent pacifists and the more conscious radicals. Even within the peace movement, however, the weight of the anticommunist hysteria was so heavy that it was hard to see how serious resistance to the Vietnam venture could develop.

The word "hysteria" is used here advisedly and not as an epithet. What was involved was not criticism of policies of the Soviet government, or revulsion at the crimes of Stalinism, or honest differences of opinion or ideology. It was a question of

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reading the "communists" out of the human race. You could drop bombs on them and feel no regret. In this country "communists" were refused the elementary right to participate equally with others in social and political life. By "communists" was meant anyone belonging to the so-called totalitarian left, a term coined in Social Democratic circles and applied to any tendency that considered the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 a good thing.

The old peace movement was mainly concerned with nuclear disarmament. Its central demand was to stop nuclear tests, which were poisoning the atmosphere. Common in the early 1960s were demonstrations of women, often organized by Women Strike for Peace. These were small demonstrations, usually numbering only a few dozen participants—the movement did not have tens of thousands then. They would carry signs depicting milk bottles showing how much strontium 90 was getting into the milk.

The coalition of liberals and pacifists that organized the larger actions demanding nuclear disarmament and an end to testing excluded "communists" as such. It also excluded other peace issues such as the war in Vietnam, which were embarrassing to the liberal Democrats and others within the establishment that the movement was trying to influence.

The organizations that dominated the movement were the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy and Turn Toward Peace.¹ They insisted on excluding the embarrassing radicals and the embarrassing issues. By threatening to pull out of the coalition they generally forced others into line.

Other groups in this coalition were the traditional religious pacifist organizations like the American Friends Service Committee and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Women Strike for Peace, the much older Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Student Peace Union, the War Resisters League, and

1. Turn Toward Peace was founded in 1961 ostensibly as a coordinating center for joint activities of some sixty-six groups, including SANE. In actuality it functioned as just one more peace group with policies very close to SANE's.

the newer, radical, civil-disobedience-oriented Committee for Nonviolent Action.

Generally the only radical political groups accepted as part of this coalition were those in the Social Democratic milieu. These included the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation and its youth group the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), as well as Students for a Democratic Society. SDS was then the youth affiliate of a very respectable Social Democratic foundation, the League for Industrial Democracy.

The more consistent pacifists and some of the more militant participants in this coalition—as well as the excluded radical groups—opposed the war in Vietnam in their own names. But they were each too small to do much more than make the record. A united front of all these groups might have done something more effective, but such unity was virtually forbidden at the time.

The youth radicalization of the 1960s did not begin around Vietnam or within the old peace movement. Nevertheless, the change in mood was reflected in some of the activities of groups which were a part of the old coalition.

One of these occurred May 3, 1960, in New York City, during the annual air-raid drill. Once a year in those days in major cities like New York everybody had to get off the streets and go into subways or "shelter" buildings to practice an air-raid drill. It was against the law not to take cover, and the law was enforced.

The radical pacifists had organized resistance to these drills by standing outside after the alarm sounded. They would be arrested. At first these demonstrations involved handfuls, but in 1960 the demonstrations grew far beyond the number of people who organized them. That year, in New York's City Hall Park, a thousand people, myself among them, gathered to express solidarity with the demonstrators. When the alarm sounded, the whole crowd stayed in place. So the police picked up the few who more or less got in line to be arrested—their vans would hold no more—and the rest of us defied the drill and got away with it.

The great bulk of this crowd had come with no intention of committing civil disobedience but found a strength in their numbers and in the mood that prevailed. This mood was not connected with any particular war—no doubt some of the people there had never heard of Vietnam. It was a mood of opposition to the repressive and hysterical atmosphere of the cold war. The crowd was overwhelmingly young.

A few days later, on May 13, the famous outburst took place at the San Francisco hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC—later changed to the House Committee on Internal Security). This event also had nothing directly to do with the Vietnam war. It was a hearing to which a number of academic figures had been subpoenaed, a routine occurrence during the time of Senator Joseph McCarthy and for some years after he was censured. But on this occasion the hearing was jammed with hundreds of students protesting the thought-control atmosphere the hearing was designed to promote. Many radicals were pleasantly surprised at this news that young people were defying the norms of the "silent generation."

Just a week later, on May 19, 1960, the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy held a rally at Madison Square Garden in New

York. The meeting was entitled "A Salute to the Summit," and had been planned to support a positive outcome of a meeting between the U.S. and the USSR to work out an agreement to stop atmospheric nuclear testing.

A few days before the Garden event the summit meeting collapsed. An American U-2 spy plane had been shot down spying over the Soviet Union. So the name of SANE's rally was not very appropriate, but the determination of the audience was all the greater.

Speakers included Eleanor Roosevelt, Governor G. Mennen Williams of Michigan, United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther, and Alf Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential candidate. The rhetoric was distinctly moderate. Norman Thomas, the seventy-six-year-old leader of the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation, advocated a unilateral U.S. ban on testing, but most of the other speakers insisted on "adequate inspection" guarantees. Since this was the very point the U.S. State Department used to excuse the continuation of tests, these speakers were heckled by a large part of the audience. The rank and file, it turned out, was angrier and further to the left on this issue than those on the platform.

The head of SANE at that time—formally one of its cochairmen—was Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review* and the leading figure in the right wing of the old peace movement. But the person who had organized the promotional work on the rally was a SANE staff member, Henry Abrams, who was a veteran radical. In his fifties at the time of the rally, he was familiar with and respected by many people in left-wing circles, including the Communist Party. There was no secret about this. It was one reason a man like Abrams could be an effective organizer in the New York City of the time.

The members of SANE's governing board did not really object to getting work for building a rally, or other activities, out of radicals of various sorts, so long as they didn't fight for a position different from that of those in control of the organization and so long as no one made an issue of it. Actually, Abrams, who by all accounts had done a remarkable job on promotion, had no say in the political line or choice of speakers at the rally.

As preparations for the Garden event were under way Abrams was subpoenaed by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the upper house counterpart of HUAC. Senator Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat—Connecticut), an all-out advocate of the continuation of nuclear tests, was the subcommittee's acting chairman. Clearly Dodd was not trying to increase SANE's effectiveness in its campaign against nuclear testing.

Abrams took the Fifth Amendment in answer to questions about his political views and associations at a so-called closed hearing of the subcommittee May 13. In those days to exercise the constitutional right to refuse to testify against oneself in hearings of this kind was still, in the minds of many, tantamount to a confession of treason. Nevertheless, it was common to take the Fifth Amendment because, among other reasons, once you answered political questions about yourself you could be jailed for contempt of Congress if you then refused to answer questions about anyone else, even associates from the distant past. The committee would get more names, issue more subpoenas, and so on. That's why the analogy with the Salem witch-hunts was applied.

SANE cochairman Cousins tried to mollify Dodd by cooperating with him. By coincidence Cousins was a neighbor and personal friend of Dodd in Connecticut. He went to Washington to talk to the senator. Two days before the rally Cousins fired Abrams.

On May 25, just six days after the rally, Dodd made a Senate speech in which he took credit for the firing of Abrams, disclosing that he had told Cousins: "I don't want to release this material twenty-four hours before your meeting." Dodd also claimed that Cousins had "offered to open the books of the organization to the

Subcommittee and to cooperate with it in every way."²

In the same speech Dodd pressed hard on the opening yielded by Cousins, declaring: "On the basis of the evidence that has come to me I do not believe the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has taken the necessary measures to create a climate that is inhospitable to Communist infiltration." He said SANE would be acceptable only "if they would purge their ranks ruthlessly of Communist infiltration, and if they would clearly demarcate their own position from that of the Communists. First by stressing the need for adequate inspection."

Actually, SANE's official position could not be clearly demarcated from that of the U.S. government any more than from that of the Soviet government. The leaders of SANE tied their program to summit dealings, bringing pressure for a mutually agreed test ban. The Soviet government had already agreed to halt atmospheric tests if the U.S. would do likewise. The argument Washington gave for refusing this offer was a demand for "adequate inspection" guarantees. Just what "adequate" meant was anybody's guess, since in any case atmospheric tests could not be hidden. SANE specifically avoided a demand for unilateral halting of the tests. It was reduced to calling for a more reasonable attitude by U.S. negotiators.

In this context Dodd's ultimatum in effect was that SANE could win acceptability only by becoming an apologist for the very position it was organized to change.

SANE did not go that far, but its board upheld the firing of Abrams. It was later revealed that members of the board had held an informal meeting at which a staff member of the Senate Subcommittee was present and a purge of SANE was discussed.

This didn't satisfy the subcommittee, which publicly attacked SANE, released the Abrams testimony from the "closed" hearing, and announced the subpoenaing of thirty-eight additional persons associated with SANE.

In the course of this controversy a number of other SANE staff members quit in protest over the collusion with the subcommittee. When Youth SANE demanded Abrams's reinstatement the group was suspended by the adult organization's leadership. SANE survived, but it was badly compromised, particularly with young people beginning to become active in the peace movement.

Two articles analyzing this crisis in SANE were written that year by A.J. Muste, sometimes called the dean of American pacifists. In the second, published in the November 1960 issue of the pacifist magazine *Liberation*, he said:

"We feel that what has happened in SANE is tragic, partly because we cannot shake off the conviction that it need not have happened. Everything in our political life shows that we are at a turning point and that Americans sense it."

Muste was not given to overstatement, and he was no superficial commentator. His long career—he was then seventy-four—had substantially contributed to all the major movements for social change on the American scene since the First World War, including labor, civil rights, and antiwar. He had himself been instrumental—together with Cousins and Norman Thomas—in launching SANE in 1957, although in 1960 he was not part of its leadership.

If SANE had stood up against the Dodd attack, defending Abrams and the movement generally against cold-war congressional inquisitions, said Muste, it "might have called forth a tremendous response; might have put new heart and courage into many people, especially young people, fed up with conformism and apathy; and might have led to the development of a more radical movement against nuclear war and war preparations. Such a movement would be invulnerable to attempts at Communist control, if such were made."

The very fact that Muste—a consistent civil libertarian—felt constrained to put the argument in those terms shows the heavy

2. *Congressional Record*, Senate, May 25, 1960.

weight of the atmosphere of anticommunism that still existed. But although Muste was here appealing to the milieu of the SANE leaders, red-baiting was not his point. He was warning them that they had missed an opportunity to inspire the radicalizing youth and that they were leaving a vacuum.

He had stated this in so many words in his first article on the SANE crisis, published in the July-August 1960 *Liberation*:

"The problem of the thirties and forties was that the CP was relatively powerful and it was setting up peace fronts which it controlled. It drew people into them on false pretenses. I combatted this policy. As I have already said, I am opposed to any united front with the CP now. But the peace movement in this country today is not being built by the CP. SANE, for example, is in the hands of American liberals and pacifists. People who in any genuine sense want to work for peace have to accept this fact, and be governed by it. The fact may draw, among others, people who formerly belonged to CP fronts. It also means that they have 'nowhere else to go.' This is to say, the moment they try to establish 'control' over such a movement or to divert it from the line of firm opposition to nuclear war preparation and war-like moves by any nation, they render themselves impotent, for the movement will simply evaporate.

"They are impotent, provided that there is a vigorous, militant peace movement, which is clearly against U.S. nuclear war policy and therefore combats the Congressional political-inquisition agencies. In the absence of such a movement there would be a vacuum. I am not sure that such a vacuum could be filled, but if it were it would be by elements which profited by the default of American liberals, non-Stalinist radicals and pacifists."

In his second SANE-crisis article, Muste emphasized his own across-the-board pacifist approach, one reason he was at the time opposed to a united front including the CP, which was uncritical of Soviet nuclear tests. In the process he touched on the essential reason for the liberal default:

"In large measure, the liberals on whom SANE seeks to build still think in nationalistic terms and cling to the 'deterrence' concept with all that this implies. They have not arrived at the stage of radical criticism of the U.S. politico-economic regime and realization of the profound changes that will have to take place in it, if nuclear war is in fact to be averted. . . . In other words for them the 'enemy' is still over there. Even if they agree intellectually, they are in a sense incapable of 'feeling' that the 'enemy' is *equally* in the Congressional committees, the Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies of the Cold War and nuclear politics over here."

With regard to the Vietnam war the default by the liberals—including many of those leading the old peace movement—would continue to the point where Muste himself would become a vigorous supporter of a nonexclusive united front. But that was later.

* * *

Between 1960 and 1965 a radicalization of some of the youth in the U.S. began to appear, not around Vietnam at first, but around two other issues: the Cuban Revolution and the civil rights struggle in the South. Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista was overthrown by Castro's guerrillas on New Year's Day, 1959. The first Black student sit-in occurred at a Woolworth dime store lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, on February 1, 1960.

From the time the Cubans nationalized their major industries in 1960 through the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the U.S. perspective for military attack on Cuba was hardly a secret. The opening gambit in such an attack was launched by CIA-organized Cuban counterrevolutionaries in April 1961. It was crushed at the Bay of Pigs before the beachhead could be established. Adlai Stevenson, perhaps the country's most widely respected liberal Democratic figure, besmirched his own reputation in the eyes of many

admirers by repeating in the United Nations the cover story for that affair, later revealed by the administration itself to have been pure invention. What hurt young liberals the most was that this lie obviously had nothing to do with keeping information from "the enemy"—which knew all too well exactly what was really going on—but was designed to fool the American people. (One Stevenson admirer who was shocked by this development was a young cub reporter for the Cincinnati *Post & Times-Star* named Jerry Rubin.)

In the U.S. a series of educational meetings and demonstrations were held opposing intervention in Cuba. These were organized mainly by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This was, in a very real sense, an antiwar movement, but one which the old peace movement refused to endorse. Radical pacifist Dave Dellinger, however, played a prominent role in these activities.

At first the Cuban Revolution received widespread sympathy in the U.S., particularly among the youth, but after U.S. holdings were nationalized in 1960 and the full force of the anticommunist campaign was unleashed against the Castro regime, support by adult liberals tended to fall away. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee became a united front of American radicals and prorevolutionary Cuban residents of the U.S. (The political complexion of the Cuban-American community reversed itself over the next few years as many of those favoring the revolution returned to their homeland and many of those against it emigrated to the U.S.)

The Fair Play committee established a precedent for united activity of several sectors of the American left that had not been on speaking terms for many years. For example, at a demonstration of 5,000 in New York's Union Square protesting the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, two of the main speakers were Peter Camejo of the Trotskyist Young Socialist Alliance and Mike Stein of Advance, a youth group associated with the Communist Party. It was the presence on the scene of a new and broader force—in this case the Cuban Americans—that impelled this unity. (Both Camejo and Stein would later play significant roles in the anti-Vietnam-war movement.)

The Southern civil rights struggle was sparked by college students and gave birth to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), originally affiliated with Martin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and based mainly on Black campuses in the South. There was widespread support by Northern students including picketing of stores in the Woolworth chain. In addition some Northern students and sympathizers went South on such activities as Freedom Rides, SNCC community organizing projects, and the Mississippi summer voter registration campaigns.

A central issue in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM), which burst forth in the fall 1964 semester, was the right of students to carry out support activities on the Berkeley campus of the University of California for the Southern civil rights struggle. Jack Weinberg, a member of the Independent Socialist Club, was arrested for setting up a table for the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Several thousand students surrounded the police car in which Weinberg was under arrest and for two days used its roof as a stage for speeches while Weinberg sat inside. (Weinberg was the author of the famous comment, "Don't trust anyone over thirty," and later played a part in the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee.)

By the end of 1964, then, there existed a few thousand young people who had already begun to consider and adopt radical ideas and who had become activists to one degree or another around the Southern civil rights struggle and/or the Cuban Revolution. These youth were ready, willing, and able to enter a struggle against the Vietnam war, but they could not do so through the old peace movement coalition which was still dominated by the shibboleths of the cold war.

[Next chapter: *The Student Peace Union*]

The Struggle for the Right to Abortion in Britain

By Gwyn Davies

LONDON—A group of doctors and medical students held a sit-in at the British Medical Association headquarters here May 22, demanding that the BMA secretary, Dr Derek Stevenson, publish details of the BMA's opposition to the reactionary abortion amendment bill now through its second reading in Parliament.

The demonstrators were protesting the fact that the BMA had not actively opposed the bill despite the fact that the evidence it gave to the parliamentary Select Committee criticized almost every clause in the measure. Dr Stevenson met the protesters' demand and has now published the position of the BMA.

Since the introduction of the 1967 abortion act, abortions are allowed in Britain under certain circumstances. About 88,000 of 109,000 women who received legal abortions in 1974 were eligible on health grounds rather than under the more stringent clauses of risk to life. In February 1975, however, James White, Labour member of Parliament for Pollock (Glasgow), introduced an amendment into Parliament, supposedly to get rid of abuses under the 1967 law.

In particular, he claimed his bill would wipe out racketeering in the private medical sector, which in Britain is allowed to exist alongside the public National Health Service. However, the reason many women still use the private sector is the lack of facilities within the National Health Service. The Tories cut the budget for social services by £111 million (£1 = US\$2.32) and this has not been replaced by the Labour government.

Restrictions in the White bill would make it more difficult for women to obtain abortions. Not only would it limit medical grounds, but it would also make it impossible for women from other countries to obtain an abortion here unless they conceived on British soil: The cut-off date for obtaining an abortion (twenty weeks) would match a twenty-week residency requirement. Furthermore, the bill would require parental consent for women under the age of sixteen.

The National Abortion Campaign was set up in March to combat efforts to restrict the right to abortion. Its aim is to organize a mass campaign coordinated on a national scale to defend women's right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.

The campaign was launched at a meeting in the House of Commons attended by more



Angela Phillips/IFL

More than 1,000 demonstrators marched in London in February to protest anti-abortion bill.

than 800 persons. It has the support of several trade unions, and at the National Union of Students annual conference a resolution of support was passed that is now being translated into action. Student unions are distributing thousands of posters and have voted funds to pay for buses to bring people to a national demonstration to be held here June 21.

The Women's Conference of the Trades Union Congress passed a motion in mid-March "recognising that a woman's right over her own body should be a fundamental right." It demanded that "full and well publicised contraception facilities should be available to all women on the National Health Service and that abortion on demand should be available on the National Health Service." The conference also called on the TUC to campaign for these facilities.

The fight for legal abortions freely available from the National Health Service is part of an ongoing campaign. Even without the added threat of the White bill, many hospitals already refuse to perform abortions for women who are legally entitled to them. Facing severe cuts in

social expenditure, some hospitals are closing their abortion facilities as a non-essential service.

The Labour party leadership is trying to avoid the crisis that is building up around this question by claiming that the vote on the White bill is a matter of conscience for individual MPs, and not a question of policy on which the party has to take a clear position. At the February 7 vote in the House of Commons, the bill passed by a vote of 200 to 88, with Labour MPs split down the middle.

It does not seem as if the Labour party leadership will be able to squirm out of taking a clear stand. Whichever way the Select Committee rules, and whether the White bill stands or falls, the effect on the Labour party will be to question in a direct way its professed support to the struggle of women for their liberation.

The Wilson government must either take a position in defense of women's democratic right to control their own reproduction or be seen as standing on the side of those who seek to force women back to the deaths and mutilations of illegal abortions. □

Rockefeller's Laundry Job on CIA Murder Plots

By Caroline Lund

The Ford administration is handling the question of CIA assassination plots like a hot potato.

Administration officials said throughout the first week of June that the report of the Rockefeller Commission on the CIA, presented to Ford on June 6, would be released for publication by June 8. But after taking a quick look at it, Ford decided to keep the wraps on the report for at least a few days and ordered Rockefeller to delete the whole section covering the assassination plots.

Using the excuse that the information gathered by the Rockefeller Commission is "incomplete," Ford now wants to dump responsibility for covering up the assassination plots into the lap of congressional investigating committees, headed by Democrats.

On June 7 a spokesman for Ford tried his best to make light of the whole matter. He said Ford considered the assassination investigation as "basically an historic exercise," anyway.

"Even if you did get as close to the truth as you could, what would it mean, apart from straightening the historic record?" he asked. This did not square with the report of another "high Administration source," quoted in the June 8 *New York Times*, who said that the White House had been "anguishing for months" over how to handle this supposedly "historic" question.

Ford's moves brought immediate criticism from others in the ruling class who felt that this was too blatant a cover-up operation to be put over on the American people. The *New York Times*, for example, in its June 8 editorial, said that the one redeeming characteristic, in their view, of the Ford administration was its "openness and candor," as opposed to the "conspiratorial air of the Nixon White House."

But, said the *Times* editors, "that reputation, with its important contribution to restoring respect for governmental integrity, will be imperiled if the Administration fails to release immediately all parts of the report of the Rockefeller Commission. . . ."

The June 6 White House news briefing on the commission report was in fact described by some reporters as comparable in its atmosphere to those under the Nixon administration during the Watergate cover-up. One reporter asked Ford's press secretary Ron Nessen whether Nixon himself had been "consulted on this cover-up." Another journalist called Nessen a liar.

Unable to divert questions to another subject, Nessen finally "stalked angrily from the White House briefing room," reported James Naughton in the June 7 *New York Times*.

The commission headed by Vice-president Nelson Rockefeller was set up last January to investigate widespread charges of massive illegal CIA spying on the American people, especially on those who were actively opposed to U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese civil war.

In recent months the issue of domestic secret-police operations has been largely eclipsed in the mass media by revelations of CIA assassination plots against leaders of other countries, especially Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

After five months of secret hearings, the Rockefeller Commission announced on June 2 that its report cleared the CIA of any widespread pattern of illegal activities. "There are things which have been done which are in contradiction to the statutes," said Rockefeller, "but in comparison to the total effort they are not major."

This cover-up artist of Attica prison massacre fame went on to assert: "There've been no stones left unturned, there's no punches pulled."

But apparently even the White House feared that the report would not hold up under scrutiny, thus holding off its publication. There was much speculation about why Ford decided to bar any release of the section of the report on assassination plots. Naughton in the *New York Times* said that one explanation being discussed in Washington is that in coming weeks "Congressional investigators might produce hard evidence that would make an inconclusive report from Mr. Rockefeller's panel appear to have been a whitewash."

Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives are conducting their own separate investigations of illegal CIA activities.

The Rockefeller report's conclusion on the Castro assassination plots was leaked to reporters before Ford's suppression of this section. According to a report in the June 3 *New York Daily News*, the original report admitted that the CIA had been involved in a plot against Castro but claimed that the plot had never been approved by the White House and was never put into motion.

This is contradicted by overwhelming evidence that has come out in past months.

As of June 5, published reports cited at least fifteen attempts to murder Fidel Castro. These took place under the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.

Other reports have charged CIA involvement in the murder of Congolese liberation fighter Patrice Lumumba, as well as of Rafael Trujillo and Ngo Dinh Diem.

Here is a sampling of the disclosures that have come out so far:

- Retired Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, a former U.S. counterinsurgency expert, revealed that Robert Kennedy ordered him to prepare contingency plans to "eliminate" Castro.

- Memorandums the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department sent to the Rockefeller Commission admit that Mafia gangsters were recruited for assassination attempts against Castro. The mobster attacks included attempts to poison Castro as well as the use of snipers.

- Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis said on television that he recruited a team to assassinate Castro.

- A former air force officer and CIA liaison agent, L. Fletcher Prouty, reported that he knew a team of killers was secretly flown into Cuba to get Castro.

- A leak from the Rockefeller Commission to the Associated Press revealed the content of minutes of a secret, high-level meeting held in the Pentagon on August 10, 1962, at which Kennedy administration officials discussed the desirability of killing Castro.

- McGeorge Bundy, national security assistant to former President Kennedy, told reporters that in his White House days it was commonplace to discuss "how nice it would be if this or that leader" were eliminated.

- Former CIA director John McCone, a witness at hearings of the Senate investigating committee, told reporters that top officials of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had ordered "actions" against Castro.

A description of the way U.S. ruling circles discuss cold-blooded murder was given more than ten years ago by former Florida Senator George Smathers. Smathers, a close friend of John Kennedy, told an interviewer in 1964 how he and Kennedy discussed whether Washington could get away with killing Castro:

"We had further conversation of assassination of Fidel Castro, what would be the

reaction, how would the people react, would the people be gratified. I'm sure he had his own ideas about it, but he was picking my brain. . . . As I recollect, he was just throwing out a great barrage of questions—he was certain it could be accomplished."

The Democrats on the House and Senate investigating committees, led by Senator Frank Church of Idaho, have been trying to make some partisan hay over the Ford administration's difficulties in covering up the CIA gangster operations. On June 4 Church announced that the investigating committee he heads already has "hard evidence" of CIA involvement in assassination plots. He accused the Rockefeller Commission of trying "to lead the public to believe that any misdeeds of the CIA were minor, and that the agency had been relatively without guilt."

But while the Democrats are ready to put a little more blame on the CIA, they are not interested in looking further into who gave the CIA its orders, because that was primarily Democrats Kennedy and Johnson.

Church insisted at his June 4 news conference that "the question about whether the CIA was following orders has yet to be determined."

When Senator Edward Kennedy was asked to comment on charges that his brother John ordered plans to assassinate Castro, the senator said he was "satisfied to a moral certainty that any kind of suggestion is inaccurate." He accused "certain agencies" of "trying to pass the buck."

Senator Church's lack of interest in a full investigation was also indicated by his response when reporters asked whether his committee would accept an offer made by Fidel Castro to provide documentary evidence of CIA murder plots.

Church refused, with the remark: "I think we can get all that information without having to rely on Mr. Castro."

During the 1960s the Cuban government made repeated charges of CIA assassination attempts against Castro and offered to provide proof. But the White House ignored or denied these charges.

Other leading Democrats are no more likely than Church to dig up the truth about the CIA murder plots. It was revealed on June 4, for example, that Lucien Nedzi, who heads the House committee investigating the CIA, was informed more than a year ago about CIA assassination plots and domestic spy operations. He did not raise any objection to these crimes or inform the public about them.

Nedzi was told about the CIA crimes in secret briefings by CIA officials to the House Armed Services subcommittee that is charged with overseeing the CIA. Asked why he didn't at least call for an investigation, Nedzi said: "we received assurances



'Assassinate? Oh, Please Don't Use That Awful Word!—Say, Rather, We Act With Extreme Prejudice..'

[from the CIA] that these things no longer took place."

Other Democrats on the House committee investigating the CIA are calling for the ouster of Nedzi as chairman because of his compromised position.

As Congress and the White House continue their "investigations" and cover-up maneuvers, a wide-ranging debate is taking place over the role of secret political police in the United States.

Although it has previously been reported that the CIA overthrows governments and murders political leaders abroad, such actions are now seen by many Americans in a different light. For one thing, the Watergate and later revelations showed that the CIA and FBI were using some of the same methods in this country, against the American people.

One reflection of this growing consciousness is the reemergence of questions among Black people about who was really responsible for the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. If the CIA had spent so much effort to try to kill Castro and pin the blame on the Mafia, what compunctions would they have about organizing the murder of Malcolm X and pinning the blame on a feud in the Black Muslims?

This questioning about the role of U.S. secret police agencies is intertwined with the continuing debate over the Vietnam War and U.S. foreign policy in general.

The implications of this public discussion have the U.S. ruling circles worried. Their concern was voiced in an unusually frank way in a cover story titled "Why We Need the CIA" in the June issue of *Fortune*, an authoritative business publication.

The basic thesis of the article is that what it calls the "investigative hysteria in

Washington" is extremely dangerous to U.S. "security." The author, Charles Murphy, says that the question Congress should be addressing itself to is "whether the U.S. can remain 'a free, democratic society' without the kind of secret organization that the CIA has to be in order to do its job effectively."

Murphy says that the basic problem is that, unlike other countries, in the United States secret police agencies are formally subject to oversight by Congress. This encourages the public to think it should have a say over what the secret police can do. Murphy looks longingly at the secret police setup in Britain, where "M16, the [CIA's] counterpart on the clandestine side, is lodged discreetly and impenetrably inside the Foreign Office and serves the Prime Minister directly."

With all the recent investigations into the CIA, Murphy explains, one problem is that foreign secret police have been reluctant to cooperate with the CIA. They fear that their crimes might also be exposed.

Fortune, however, can see that it is not so easy for the Ford administration to keep the CIA revelations under control. Murphy outlines the problem before the American ruling class:

"In President Ford's defense, it should be said that he does not have enough fingers to plug all the leaks in the dike. The CIA has an excess of troubles these days. It is a victim of, among other things, the pervasive mistrust of government secrecy. Watergate, along with all its other bad consequences, tipped the balance in the contentious issue of the government's right to secrets. Some people apparently believe that the government has no right to *any* secrets, a view that, if it prevails, will be fatal to the function of intelligence." □

Washington's \$25 Billion Spy Network

By Robert Dumont

Washington's worldwide and domestic secret intelligence apparatus costs the American taxpayers about \$25 billion a year—close to 8 percent of the federal government budget—Tad Szulc reports in an article on "Kissinger's Secret Empire" that appeared in the June issue of *Penthouse* magazine.

Szulc is a former *New York Times* correspondent who last year published an informed account of Washington's behind-the-scenes maneuvering with Moscow and Peking over the Vietnam accords.

"It would not be too difficult to establish a police state in America today," says Szulc, "given the 200,000 employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the various military intelligence services and local police departments, and the web of over twenty official agencies—including the Internal Revenue Service—that form what is euphemistically known in Washington as the 'Intelligence Community.'"

These agencies play a key role in the elaboration and execution of U.S. diplomatic and trade policy, he says. "For example, the CIA is invisibly involved in major U.S. government economic negotiations—oil is a case in point—and has special 'arrangements' with big corporations."

Overseeing it all is Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who "resents having to answer for his actions to anyone, except—possibly—the president."

Most of this \$25 billion Washington spends on military and diplomatic spying, says Szulc, "is artfully hidden under innocent-sounding line items in the federal budget. It is another of Henry Kissinger's many secrets. The \$25 billion figure may sound excessively high—most published estimates have set it at around \$10 billion—but in calculating the real total one must take into account the huge sums spent through military appropriations for the Intelligence Community's ever-growing technological requirements." An example is the billions spent on satellite reconnaissance.

Another is the National Security Agency, "the Pentagon-linked electronic intelligence organization that covers the world with its 125,000 employees and a \$11 billion annual budget. . . ." The NSA selectively monitors and transcribes each day "uncounted thou-

sands of international telephone calls between the U.S. and foreign points."

"Transcripts of *all* monitored overseas calls—and, in many cases of intercepted radiograms and telegrams—are given to the CIA and the FBI and, when requested, to Kissinger's National Security Council."

In addition to these overseas operations one of the most important—and until recently least known—aspects of Washington's intelligence operation is the extensive surveillance of American citizens within the United States itself. Szulc provides an informative report on the scope of this domestic spying.

The "board of directors" of the spy establishment is the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), headed by the director of Central Intelligence, currently William Colby. Colby made his mark in the field as supervisor of the infamous "Operation Phoenix," which Szulc describes as "nothing less than a wholesale program for assassinating over 20,000 real or suspected Vietcong sympathizers in South Vietnam."

As USIB's chairman, Colby is directly responsible to the National Security Council and, through it, to President Ford. "In practice, however, Colby's real boss is Henry Kissinger (in his separate incarnation as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and thus manager of the National Security Council)."

Kissinger also chairs the top-secret "Forty Committee" of the NSC, a five-man body in charge of major covert intelligence operations abroad. And he runs the NSC Intelligence Committee and the Net Assessments Group.

The USIB includes the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the FBI, and the Treasury Department. "The Treasury," Szulc explains, "was added because of its participation in the antinarcotics program (the CIA is also working on narcotics though, ironically, its agents often collaborate with heroin smugglers in Indochina) and because of the fact that it runs the expanded Secret Service."

Here is a breakdown of these various components of the "Intelligence Community":

- *National Security Agency.* "Established in 1952 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is the biggest and richest and most secret

of them all. Its annual budget of \$11 billion includes the special funds for research and overhead reconnaissance; and it employs 25,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel at its headquarters at Fort George G. Meade in Maryland, and 100,000 more Americans all over the world."

The NSA also employs between 10,000 and 15,000 foreign personnel abroad. Its present director, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., has worked both for the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

NSA officials, Szulc says, contend that there is nothing illegal in the agency's extensive wiretapping, conducted from the seven locations in the United States where the American Telephone and Telegraph Company operates international phone exchanges. They cite a provision in the 1968 wiretap law that nothing in it "shall limit the Constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or potential or other hostile acts by foreign powers. . . ."

(A similar-sounding clause adopted by Congress in 1964 gave Lyndon B. Johnson a cover to escalate the Vietnam war step by step without having to abide by the constitutional requirements of a formal declaration of war.)

The transcripts of the thousands of telephone calls monitored by the NSA alone "account for a large part of the hundred tons of paper the NSA uses up each day at its headquarters," Szulc reports. "The transcriptions are stored in huge computers for instant retrieval. . . . The computers . . . can immediately identify voices through 'voice prints.'"

Other foreign surveillance is conducted from secret installations in the United States, the Aleutians, Iceland, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Indian Himalayas, Ethiopia, Turkey, Morocco, and a score of other locations, Szulc says.

"There are some 2,000 secret 'intercept positions' around the world. They are supplemented by . . . ships and planes—such as the *Liberty*, mistakenly sunk by the Israelis in 1967, the *Pueblo*, captured by the North Koreans in 1967, and the EC-121 plane shot down off North Korea in 1969. NSA teams in Vietnam and Cambodia help to direct air strikes by everything from B-52 bombers to helicopter gunships. . . ."

NSA also works closely with the CIA and the air force's top-secret National Reconnaissance Office, which launches the Samos satellites and the SR-71 planes. A Samos camera, Szulc says, "can spot a golf ball from 100,000 feet or more."

(The highly sophisticated nature of these spying operations was indicated by published reports in 1969 of how the Pentagon had tracked and killed Che Guevara. By maintaining a spy ship off Havana harbor

that monitored all radio communications in and out of Cuba, Washington was apparently quite well informed about Che's whereabouts after he dropped out of sight in Cuba in 1965. And later, in Bolivia, it was able to follow the movements of his guerrilla force with heat-seeking aerial reconnaissance techniques so sensitive, according to one report, "that a picture of a man chewing a warm cigar stub in a pitch-black jungle clearing, taken from as high as 1,500 feet altitude, will give . . . a good guess about how recently the man's face has been shaved."*)

- *Central Intelligence Agency.* The CIA's annual budget is estimated at \$6 billion and its U.S. staff stands at about 8,000 persons. In addition, several thousand foreign agents are "controlled" by CIA case officers.

Judging from the large number of offices the CIA maintains throughout the United States, the agency is heavily involved in domestic spying operations.

The Foreign Resources Division of the Directorate of Operations, which together with the Counterintelligence Staff handles domestic spying, has offices in eight U.S. cities.

The Domestic Collection Division, which supposedly interviews citizens who may possess information of intelligence value to the CIA, has offices in thirty-six cities.

The Office of Training works closely with local police departments.

The Office of Security, with eight field offices in the United States, conducts security investigations of prospective agency employees, and is responsible for protection of intelligence sources and methods.

The Recruitment Division has twelve domestic offices.

The Cover and Commercial Staff directs the CIA's corporate activities and arranges cover for the agency's operatives in U.S. corporations abroad.

"The full list of these corporations would be a *Who's Who* of American business and industry," Szulc says. "American businessmen are instinctive ideological allies of the CIA—and there are reasons to think that the agency often reciprocates with economic information that the corporations could not otherwise obtain."

- *Defense Intelligence Agency.* Created by the Pentagon in 1962 to centralize the intelligence work of the three branches of the armed forces, the DIA has grown to a force of 50,000 military intelligence specialists and support personnel with an annual \$3 billion budget.

- *Federal Bureau of Investigation.* The FBI spends about \$2 billion a year and

employs about 6,000 agents. In addition to serving as "the principal arm of the government in domestic political spying," the FBI has representatives abroad who



serve in American embassies as "legal attachés."

- *State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).* This department spends about \$5 million annually analyzing foreign intelligence.

- *Treasury Department.* Szulc reports that the Treasury has recently formed its own National Security Affairs Office.

Below the level of the U.S. Intelligence Board, he says, Washington has additional intelligence sources, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Customs, the Internal Revenue Service, the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the State Department's Passport Office, "which has monumental files on American citizens based on passport applications."

The activities of these organizations are obviously not limited to the gathering of "intelligence." Szulc notes the long record of known CIA involvement in the overthrow of governments around the world. In addition to "selective assassinations" of foreign political leaders, he adds, the CIA "has been indirectly responsible for thousands of deaths in such foreign operations as the war waged by its 'Clandestine Army' in Laos, the Phoenix program in Vietnam . . . , the 1954 Guatemala Civil War, the Bay of Pigs, the secret air operations in the Congo in the 1960s, and supporting the Indonesian rebellion in 1965."

The CIA has trained right-wing Cambodian and Ugandan guerrillas at secret bases in Greece and Tibetan guerrillas in the mountains of Colorado.

Police experts provided by the Agency for International Development supervised Thieu's "tiger-cage" prisons for political opponents; the cages themselves were designed and built by the U.S. Navy in California under an AID contract.

"In short," Szulc concludes, "wherever there is a nasty dictatorship in power, you can be certain of finding CIA representatives in bed with the local executioners and

prison-masters, many of whom were trained in the United States by the CIA and federal police academies."

Szulc cites many examples of how this huge intelligence apparatus is used to spy on American citizens within the United States. Army counterintelligence agents have built a computerized data bank that reportedly contains around 100,000 names. The CIA has compiled secret files on members of Congress. The CIA has trained domestic police forces in such cities as Washington, New York, and Chicago, "in complex intelligence crafts so that local cops could better anticipate, monitor, and control antiwar demonstrations and other civil disturbances."

All these practices were well established by the time Nixon took office in 1969. He just carried them a bit further—for example, through the creation in 1970 of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, which was aimed at expanding domestic intelligence activities.

This project was later known as the Huston plan, after its author, Nixon aide Tom Charles Huston, who drafted a memorandum "For Eyes Only" urging that "present restrictions on legal coverage should be relaxed" in order "to permit intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security."

Szulc observes that "the Intelligence Community has not reformed since Nixon left the White House." Among recent examples of covert operations he cites are CIA involvement in Portugal and the use, beginning in September 1974, of Birdair, part of a network of CIA-linked "airlines," to ferry ammunition and other supplies from Thailand to Lon Nol's regime in Pnompenh.

The sabotage and subversion carried on by the U.S. "Intelligence Community," in short, is simply an extension of U.S. imperialism's foreign and domestic policy.

"It is a common error to think of either the CIA or the whole Intelligence Community as an independent and irresponsible body—running completely wild on its own," writes Szulc.

"But the CIA will be—and has been—only what the rulers of this country want it to be. . . ."

"The CIA's current illegal foreign and domestic activities are approved by the highest officials in our government—by Kissinger and Ford." □

Oh, for the Good Old Days

"Diplomacy, alas, is no longer a chess game in a sealed room. For better or worse, the people, rancid and unwashed, want to play too."—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in an article on the current situation in Portugal in the June 3 *Wall Street Journal*.

* See "How the U.S. Intervened in Bolivia Against Che," *Intercontinental Press*, April 7, 1969, p. 338.

Democracy—a Key Issue in Portuguese Revolution

By Gerry Foley

By resisting the attempt of the military government and the Communist party to restrict its influence and its role, the Portuguese Socialist party not only created a crisis of governmental authority in its own country but on an international scale raised some fundamental questions about the nature of socialist revolution.

In the context of the world economic crisis and the rapidly reviving interest in socialism among the masses in the developed capitalist countries, especially the less stable ones concentrated in Western Europe, the question of the relationship between socialism and democracy was bound to take on a crucial importance.

The closing down, through the combined action of the military government and a Stalinist-controlled union, of a daily newspaper associated with the party that got by far the largest vote in the April 25 elections raised this issue dramatically. The way in which the government, the Communist party, the Kremlin, the West European Stalinist parties, and a whole spectrum of left groups responded to the protests of the Socialist party brought out all the implications of the question.

The arguments the military and the Stalinists used against the Socialists showed that the seizure of *República* on May 20 only brought into the open a political conflict that had been generated by the class struggle.

The Stalinist Portuguese Communist party gave a clear answer to the questions that were raised, and its attitude was echoed and supported by the Soviet bureaucracy. Alvaro Cunhal, the general secretary of the Portuguese CP, was quite frank in explaining this position to *Le Monde* reporters in Lisbon on May 27. Apparently he expected the European capitalist press to appreciate the "reasonableness" and "realism" of his propositions.

The reporters asked him whether, if the Socialists—who won 38 percent of the vote in the April 25 elections—were excluded from the government, an alternative coalition could be built with small satellites of the CP, such as the MES (Movimento da Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left), which won slightly over 1 percent in the same poll.

Showing political realism, Cunhal went to the heart of the matter and ruled out any coalition that did not include the SP. In such a case, clearly, the facade of parlia-

mentary rule could not be maintained, and the alternative of the military sharing responsibility for running the country with the CP alone was neither likely nor desirable.

"I do not think that for the moment any governmental coalition linking the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] and other parties could leave out the SP. Likewise, the CP could not be left out. A coalition between the CP and what is called the left of the MFA is very unlikely."

If, however, the SP continued to prove intractable, a purely military government would be an acceptable solution:

"If a coalition government proves impossible, an alternative will have to be found—for example, a government comprising officers and civilians who do not represent parties as such."

The CP general secretary explained that a government installed by the armed forces over the heads of the people should not necessarily be considered a dictatorship:

"A military government is not on the horizon at the moment. But in any case, I should make it clear that such a government would not be incompatible with the exercise of liberties in Portugal. It was, in fact, the MFA that established the freedoms that exist in this country. It is a slander to try to identify an extension of the role of the MFA in the process going on in the country with a military dictatorship."

The veteran Stalinist leader also drew clearly the implications of this position. The most immediate one was that if the SP did not subordinate itself sufficiently to the military regime, then the Constituent Assembly no longer had any purpose.

"We have said that if the parties in the coalition government break with the pact they signed with the MFA by leaving the government, then the Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of this pact no longer has any reason for existence. If there is a coalition government, there will be a Constituent Assembly; but without a coalition, there will be no Constituent Assembly. That is our opinion."

Why CP Is Vulnerable

Cunhal assured the reporters that the Portuguese CP favored democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. However, his real attitude toward democra-

cy was revealed when he tried to explain why he was opposed to the holding of elections soon for the municipal governments, where the CP has gained many positions by virtue of its machine and its special relationship with the MFA. He said:

"The Socialist party wants to set up an anti-Communist holy alliance. Blocs designed to isolate the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] would, in fact, have every chance of winning. You see, there are two roads coexisting in Portugal today—the electoral process and the revolutionary dynamic. Sometimes they run parallel, at others they diverge. In a revolution, sometimes you have to defend a policy that may not always be popular. Supporting wage demands that our economy cannot afford, calling for cutting the workweek to thirty-five hours can help get you votes. But in view of the state of our economy, this is demagoguery, and can lead to disaster for us."

Cunhal was setting up a straw man. He did not give real examples of the "demagoguery" he had in mind, because the CP's role in holding back workers struggles and breaking strikes in order to defend the economic policy of the government has become a scandal among the most militant sections of the Portuguese working class. This is one of the main reasons why "blocs designed to isolate the PCP would, in fact, have every chance of winning." This is why the CP has in fact been badly defeated in some elections by blocs opposing the Stalinist machine. This occurred, for example, in the bank workers union in Oporto, where the former CP minister of labor in the first provisional government was buried by a 2-to-1 vote.

The French CP apparently felt freer to refer to actual cases where its Portuguese comrades had shown more "responsibility" than the SP. An editorial in *l'Humanité* said:

"Organizing production is the primary task. But while Mário Soares talks about everything and nothing, he has been maintaining a total silence on this subject. His friends and allies are involved in fomenting strikes and disorders under various bad pretexts in TAP [Transportes Aéreos Portugueses—Portuguese Airlines], in the chemical industry, and in other key sectors. Mário Soares remains silent. And in any case he is taking no practical steps to get the Socialist party to participate in

the economic struggle, which is the prerequisite for the survival of democracy and freedom in Portugal.

"From Washington to Bonn, they are relying on a collapse of the Portuguese economy. They are preparing the way for a financial and industrial collapse such as occurred in Chile.

"So, what side is Mário Soares on? What side are the Socialist parties and the Socialist International on?"

The SP Rejoinder

Actually, the SP leaders have not remained silent about the "Battle of Production." They have indignantly rejected the accusations of the CP, while responding with a pained defense to similar charges from the military government. For example, Soares said at a May 22 news conference in Lisbon's Hotel Altis:

"We support the Battle for Production. And, to the contrary of what has been suggested, we Socialists are involved in waging this battle of production. But for this purpose, it is necessary to organize discipline on the job, to have a plan. And the Portuguese people must be conscious of the choices made and not feel constantly insecure, not knowing what fate holds in store for them."

The paper *República* itself made this point very strongly in an editorial May 10 before it was silenced:

"It should never be forgotten that a revolution is not celebrations. It is work by all of us. One of the ways in which the socialist system is superior to the capitalist one is not that there are more celebrations and demonstrations but that it means doing more work, that everyone must work."

On the other hand, Soares pointed out (from a Social Democratic point of view) the contradictions that arise from trying to use socialist-sounding appeals to get the workers to work harder to save the capitalist economy in Portugal, and the utilization of Stalinist methods to enforce "labor discipline."

"On the other hand, the Battle for Production requires the involvement of all the workers, and if some workers have transformed themselves into policemen over other workers and discriminate in a partisan way against other workers, obviously this battle will be weakened.

"I will cite one example that is extremely illustrative. In a tomato-concentrate factory in Alvalade do Sado, where there are 160 workers, one worker, a Communist party member, was beginning to make life difficult for the rest by his intolerance for the other workers. Some workers made preparations to get him out. About 2,000 workers came from outside and forced an intervention by the armed forces. The result was

that 20 Socialist workers were purged. Now, purges cannot be carried out under partisan pressure, and if this happens, it is *obvious* that a division will arise among the



CUNHAL: Claims that rule by military junta in Portugal would not be dictatorial.

workers. Such divisions are harmful and extremely serious for the Battle of Production."

Not only was the attempt to create a "labor police" divisive and unacceptable, the appeals to the needs of "socialist revolution" and "national liberation" used to justify such methods could be dangerous themselves, if the limitations of this rhetoric were not made clear.

"We know that without domestic investment and without investment from abroad," Soares continued, "it will not be possible to create new jobs. But in order to encourage domestic investment, it is necessary to inspire confidence in individual saving. On the other hand, in order to get investment from abroad, it is necessary, as Minister of Economic Affairs Melo Antunes has said very well, to create a Code for Foreign Investors that can give guarantees to potential investors, and we must know also where those investments are going to come from. Will they come from the Third World? Or will they come from the European Free Trade Agreement or Common Market countries? Or will they come from the East European countries? Yesterday a question was asked on television—but not answered—about our trade balance with the East European countries, whether it was

favorable to Portugal, or as the interviewer said, favorable to the East European countries. There was no definite answer.

"And there is a problem that we would like to see clarified for the country. What are the sources of potential investments?"

"This naturally raises another problem, which is the viability of our socialist experiment. Because we do not want to install a socialism of poverty here! No, we certainly do not want to reduce the standard of living of the Portuguese people! We do not want to 'Albanianize' Portugal! We want our socialist experiment to contribute to developing the economy and solving the essential problems of the Portuguese people! And how are we going to solve these problems? Are we aiming for a 'Cuban-type' solution, that is, a Cuban model? Then we should know who is going to foot the bill. In the case of Cuba, we know that it was the Soviet Union. So, we need to know whether the Soviet Union is prepared to pay such a bill for us. We have good reason to doubt it."

Obviously potential investors either inside or outside of Portugal would be more reassured by the kind of "labor discipline" the Stalinists have been trying to enforce than by any "code for investors." In reality, the point Soares was trying to make was that since most financial help was going to come from Western Europe, the government would be in a better position to get the credits needed to relieve the pressure on the Portuguese capitalist economy if it gave a bigger role to the SP, with its good political connections in Europe.

At the same time, Soares made a more profound point. The Portuguese workers want to catch up with West European standards; they are not looking forward to a "great national effort" or a "socialist revolution" that would mean dropping further below the level of West European bourgeois democracy.

This means that the totalitarian methods of the Communist party, monolithic control of the press and the trade unions, along with massive intimidation of the workers by government and party transmission belts could not "win the battle of production" in Portugal. And so, the SP was a better political partner for the military government than the CP. It could achieve the same results by more flexible means.

It is hard to say whether Soares is correct about this, in view of the worldwide economic crisis and the narrow limits in which Portuguese capitalism has to operate. It may be that in these circumstances and in the conditions of the détente, the Communist party can better defend capitalism in Portugal by its methods. But it is clear that in a real sense, the Communist party's policy is certainly no less demagogic than that of the SP.

The demagoguery of the Communist party

has been so obvious that the ousted dictator Marcelo Caetano himself could score a point in the apologia he published in Brazil under the title *Depoimento* (Testimony for the Defense).

"And suddenly a demand arose, promoted by a group of agitators, that was designed to undermine any reasonable effort by the government—the demand for a minimum wage of 6,000 escudos [US\$249 a month]. From that point on, whatever the government did would be insufficient. The worst thing was that the maneuver dreamed up by Communist elements to embarrass my government was to produce unexpected results when a Communist took over the Ministry of Labor [in the first provisional government installed in May 1974]. There were some who took him seriously and demanded what it had been claimed was easy and just to grant. Then this was found to be neither just nor easy. It was the justice of fate."

In fact, the CP dropped the demand for a 6,000 escudo minimum wage after joining the first coalition government set up as a facade for the military. Not only did it oppose this as a statutory minimum, but the CP machine in the trade unions opposed this demand in contract struggles and pushed for settlements as near as possible to the minimum wage of 3,300 escudos (US\$137) set by the military government.

Only after the mass upsurge touched off by the March 11 coup attempt did the government increase the minimum wage to 4,000 escudos (US\$166), an increase of 21 percent, while inflation has remained above 30 percent a year under the new regime.

When I interviewed the leader of the SP's labor work, Marcelo Curto, in May 1974, he told me: "The Communists think the capitalists can't pay higher wages, but I think that with all the superprofits they piled up in the years of fascism that they can pay."

Curto was thinking like a trade-union leader. And as such he has a good reputation among militant workers. It was true that the Portuguese monopolies could pay much higher wages. It was also true that a huge backward sector of businesses had been maintained by keeping wages low. But at the same time, it was true that in the international and political context, the survival of Portuguese capitalism depended on limiting wage increases as much as possible. The Stalinists had a clearer understanding of the needs of capital and were more prepared to follow the logic of class collaborationism to its final conclusion, as well as more able to implement this line with ruthless consistency.

There were also opposite pressures on the SP and CP. The Stalinists were obliged by the needs of the détente and their strategy of alliance with the "progressive" bourgeoisie to prove that they could be reliable labor

lieutenants of capitalism. The SP was not under as much pressure in this respect. Furthermore, the CP already had a well-developed machine in the unions, whereas the SP had to build one. But there was no fundamental difference in policy between the two reformist parties.

Both parties were in the government. And unless the Portuguese government were ready to abolish capitalism altogether, establish a planned economy, and promote a revolutionary campaign in Western Europe that could mobilize the working class and the radical movement in its defense and break the economic and political isolation that would inevitably result from such moves, there was in fact no realistic hope of raising the standard of living of the Portuguese workers substantially or changing their condition. This was all the more true in a climate of worldwide economic crisis.

Neither the CP nor the SP had any intention of leading a socialist revolution. This was specifically excluded by both groups in their own way, the SP stressing the "unviability of a people's democracy in Portugal," the CP stressing that what was on the agenda was "national liberation on the road to socialism."

However, the CP had both the capacity and the willingness to act as a transmission belt and police for the government in the labor field; while the SP did not.

Stalinists Oppose Democracy

The Stalinist training of the CP activists made them resistant to pressure from the rank and file. They were inculcated with the idea that only an omnipotent machine can lead the workers toward a socialist transformation. Despite the electoralism of the Stalinist parties, their fundamental conception remains that revolution can never win the support of the majority of workers, that revolutionary policies cannot be popular, that "discipline" must be imposed on the masses by the party machine and the government.

Otherwise, how could the iron-fisted dictatorship that exists in the bureaucratic workers states, to which the Stalinist parties remain inseparably tied, be justified? The leadership and the members of Stalinist parties may idealize the situation in the Soviet Union and similar countries, but they are neither complete idiots nor deaf, dumb, and blind. They know that a dictatorial regime exists in those countries and justifying it is one of the fundamental components of their political outlook.

This attitude was revealed very clearly in Cunhal's statements May 27 to the *Le Monde* reporters. Elections were a tool of the right, because the workers would inevitably succumb to "demagogy," even in a country like Portugal, where the Communist party already dominates the deci-

sive sections of the press and heavily influences most of the rest.

The logic of this attitude was already clear at the time of the struggle over the "trade-union unity" bill. Because of the way in which it had subordinated the interests of the workers to the needs of the bourgeois military government, the CP had lost a series of key union elections. No doubt this confirmed Cunhal's fears about the susceptibility of workers to "demagogy."

Thus, it was essential to preserve the foundation of the CP machine's power, its control of the national federation. In order to do this, it was necessary to prevent the SP from going around the CP-controlled structure. For this the government's help was needed and was forthcoming. The result was the "trade-union unity" law.

The bourgeois regime, essentially a repressive apparatus, as all who call themselves Marxists should know, was entrusted with keeping the workers from succumbing to "demagogy," that is, attempts to "divide" them by setting up another federation. This law was the first attack on a fundamental democratic right under the new regime—the right of association. It was complementary to the attack on trade-union rights that began with the antistrike law of September 1974. It was an indication of the antidemocratic direction in which the regime and its Stalinist defenders had to move in order to safeguard their demagogic hold—that is, the control they claimed to exercise for the benefit of the workers but which was not subordinated to the workers or to the immediate or historic interests of the workers.

The demagogic campaign in support of the "unity" law was momentarily effective. In the first place, the claims that the SP's alleged moves to establish a rival federation represented a CIA plot provoked the kind of "patriotic" reaction the government had sought to foster since it took power. This fitted in also with the rulers' strategy of presenting their government as a kind of "national liberation front." The accusation hurled at the Socialists by Admiral Rosa Coutinho shows the advantages of such a formula. He claimed that by making such noisy protests against the shutdown of *República* they had, at least partially, "betrayed the country."

Secondly, there was a large layer of workers and the left outside the Communist party who shared a certain outlook of the Stalinist ranks. They wanted to fight imperialism and capitalism and were quick to align themselves with forces linked to noncapitalist states and insurgent military officers, against Social Democrats with ties to openly procapitalist parties, some of which have been, or are, in power in imperialist countries. This tendency, which first appeared at the time of the controversy over the trade-union "unity" bill, was

reinforced by the CP-SP conflict following the elections and took on a very acute character in the crisis touched off by the seizure of *República*.

Ultimately such a view springs from illusions in Stalinism similar to those held by the ranks of the Stalinist parties, illusions reinforced by reactionary anti-Communism. However, both the Stalinist and the Social Democratic parties represent bureaucratic forces in the working-class movement and as such are allied with capitalism on a world scale.

This alliance is a contradictory one, especially in the case of the Stalinist parties, which were formed historically on the basis of the socialist revolution and the abolition of capitalist property in Russia. But it does not follow from this that they will always be in sharper conflict with capitalism than the Social Democratic parties. The opposite, in fact, has been true at times.

Because of its search for accommodation with international capitalism and because of its antidemocratic nature, Stalinism may subordinate the interests of the workers completely to the needs of deals with the bourgeoisie of individual countries or with the imperialist powers. During the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Kremlin press actually defended fascism.

One example of this logic was the attitude of the Portuguese CP toward strikes opposed by the military government. The CP, too, opposed them.

Another example was the no-strike pledge of the CP in the United States during the Soviet-American wartime alliance. At that time, the Social Democrats, although they were thoroughly proimperialist and later become enthusiastic red-baiters and cold warriors, were less subservient to capitalism and more responsive to the demands of the workers than the Stalinists. It was largely because the Social Democrats were dependent specifically on their base in the labor movement rather than on identification with the Soviet Union that workers struggles could develop at all in that period.

Likewise, it is clear that if the Stalinists could unite the Portuguese trade-union movement under their control, they would—as long as they remained allied to the regime—turn it into a labor police for the government and ruthlessly purge the very forces that supported them in the mistaken belief that they were more anticapitalist or anti-imperialist than the Social Democrats.

Democracy—a Sharp Issue

The most immediate danger is that by succumbing to the illusions held by a section of the workers vanguard in the Portuguese Communist party, the militant youth and workers who are breaking from

reformism will isolate themselves from decisive sections of the masses.

The majority of the workers and radical petty-bourgeoisie are looking for a better life now, including not only a better standard of



SOARES: Out to convince MFA that SP would be a more useful partner than CP.

living but more political and cultural freedom, all of which are being fervently opposed by the CP in the name of the needs of the "national revolution."

It is not surprising that such layers tend, as they run up against the antidemocratic attitudes and practices of the CP, to draw anti-Communist conclusions, to suspect the CP of intending to impose a dictatorship on them like that existing in the East European countries. These masses can hardly be expected to understand that the CP is using totalitarian methods precisely to preserve capitalism in Portugal, to maintain a capitalist government. Every kind of reformist and proimperialist demagoguery is focused on preventing them from seeing that. However, this anti-Communism tends to trigger a reflex in the groups to the left of the CP, which are used to being red-baited themselves, and to bring them to the support of the Stalinists.

Such a reflex helps to assure that the response of these masses to the Stalinist policy will take a right-wing form, since they cannot see any democratic alternative on the left. This response can deepen in particular if the demagoguery of the CP and the MFA is not challenged, and the present, increasingly repressive government is allowed to masquerade as a revolutionary or potentially revolutionary regime.

The revolutionary government of Lenin and Trotsky explained the need for sup-

pressing a bourgeoisie that, with its allies, had risen in arms against a revolution supported by the majority of workers and a regime democratically elected by the majority of workers. If Stalinists and centrists get away with using the same arguments to defend a bourgeois dictatorship, elected by no one, against the economic and democratic demands of the majority of workers and against the very principle of popular sovereignty, obviously the Social Democrats' claims are going to instill a fierce aversion to Leninism in broad masses and probably the bulk of the proletariat.

Mário Soares, moreover, is a good deal more astute than the general run of European Social Democratic leaders. For one thing, he, like many or perhaps most, of the SP leadership served an apprenticeship in the Stalinist movement. He was quick to expose the demagoguery of some MFA leaders who talked about basing the government directly on soviet-like bodies so as to be able to avoid the pitfalls of "bourgeois democracy" and "partisan conflict" revealed by the SP's "provocations."

In the Hotel Altis news conference, Soares said: "There has been a lot of talk about certain people's committees, such as tenants committees and various associations that we think should play a role in the revolutionary process. Of course, they should. But aren't these committees made up of supporters of political parties? Obviously they are."

In fact, the soviets in Russia included all the workers parties and initially the Social Democrats had a majority. The Bolsheviks won control of these bodies precisely through elections, which both the CP and the military government find such an unreliable method of determining the wishes of the masses.

"It is a simple fact of political life that the AFM [Armed Forces Movement] never had any intention of gambling the as yet unconsolidated achievements of the antifascist revolution on the uncertainties of the ballot box," the veteran Stalinist apologist Wilfred Burchett wrote in the June 11 issue of the American Maoist weekly the *Guardian*.

The fact is that any political democracy is incompatible with the survival of the military regime—either simple bourgeois democracy or workers democracy. And although some elements in the regime have invoked workers democracy against the SP to counter the effect of its electoral victory, the fact is that any development toward genuine soviets would be most immediately and directly in conflict with a continuation of their rule.

Some CP representatives also have tried to claim that it was the petty bourgeoisie and the passive workers that gave the SP its victory. In fact, the evidence indicates that the SP vote cannot be characterized so

simply, and furthermore by no means all the support of the CP is working-class. But if the CP were seriously interested in counterposing workers democracy to "bourgeois democracy," it would stimulate the development of united, democratic workers organizations in the plants, a tendency that it has resisted with all the strength of its machine.

The Portuguese CP is no different essentially from other Stalinist parties. Its attacks on electoralism and thus on bourgeois democracy do not mean that it is taking a more revolutionary line than other CPs, any more than did its resorting to terrorism under the old regime. This tack simply represents the needs of Stalinist reformism in the specific Portuguese situation.

Nor was the PCP's attack on the SP in contradiction fundamentally with the *détente*, despite Soares's adroit use of this issue. This is indicated by similar attacks in the Soviet press and by the French CP. Such methods are made necessary by the very nature of Stalinism and the needs of Stalinist parties in popular-front maneuvers, as the recent tactics of the French CP show also. These parties have to be able to keep a tight grip on their ranks to prevent other workers parties from taking advantage of their open conciliationism and outflanking them. Furthermore, in order to play their role, the CPs need to maintain their image of being more "left" than the SPs.

This is not to say that the attitude of the PCP did not cause problems for the European CPs. In fact, it reopened a serious split among them, but that was because of the internal contradictions of Stalinism itself, because of the nature of Stalinist opportunism. It does not arise from any tendencies moving away from their Stalinist moorings. This is shown, among other things, by the fact that while the Italian and Spanish CPs were obliged to condemn the PCP because of their own political needs, other "liberal" CPs, such as the Greek CP "interior," which remains virtually excommunicated by the Kremlin and is totally committed to parliamentary perspectives, has avoided taking a stand on this question. The superloyal American CP has also avoided the question.

The capitalist press took advantage of the antidemocratic operations of the PCP to rehash some old slanders about the "original sin" of socialist revolutions and the forces identified with them. But the capitalists themselves have found the Stalinists and their methods useful in the past for holding back mass upsurges. During the U.S.-Soviet alliance, top American officials even justified Stalin's purges.

Unfortunately, some of the weaknesses of the colonial revolution have tended to give some plausibility to the antidemocratic

demagogy of the Stalinists and the MFA. The history of the colonial struggle so far has tended to reinforce the Stalinist concept of "controlled revolution."

Portugal Is an Imperialist Country

Most of the nationalist leaderships that have struggled against imperialism since World War II have permitted less political democracy than proimperialist regimes. Furthermore, there has been a tendency among nationalist militants in colonial and semicolonial countries to regard democratic rights as a luxury of the rich.

In the first place, because of the desperate poverty of the colonial countries, Stalinist dictatorship has not had the same repellent effect on the masses as it has had on the working class of the more advanced countries. So, democracy has seemed to be a banner and an argument of the imperialists. In colonial and semicolonial countries, the parliaments and press have generally been tightly controlled by proimperialist interests.

Moreover, most of these nationalist regimes have been demagogic, that is, they were based on mobilizing the masses in the interests of a section of the bourgeoisie or protobourgeoisie, who understood that any free play of political forces would endanger their bonapartist equilibrium. The most radical nationalist regimes have come to power through prolonged guerrilla warfare, which is not favorable to democratic forms of mass organization. The most prestigious of these regimes that came to power this way, the Cuban, has tended to adopt Stalinist ideas.

All of this has reinforced the Stalinist-inspired notion that democracy and democratic rights are a luxury of imperialist nations and a lure and snare in underdeveloped ones. In fact, the backward aspect of the colonial revolution has tended to become identified with the revolutionary dynamic, since this has been the major struggle against the imperialist and capitalist status quo for the last thirty years.

This error takes on disastrous proportions in the case of Portugal, which although backward is an imperialist country, not simply by virtue of its political control of overseas territory but by the structure of its economy, which is dominated by native monopolies. Here an idealization of the backward aspect of anti-imperialist movements is being used to revive bourgeois nationalism in an imperialist country, where nationalism was completely discredited by a reactionary dictatorship and long colonial war.

Whereas the backwardness of Portuguese capitalism was previously a factor discrediting bourgeois nationalism, now it has been made into an argument for class collabora-

tion in a "great national effort" by presenting Portugal as a Third World country oppressed by imperialism.

Furthermore, the revolutionary process in Portugal is occurring in a different context from that of struggles in colonial and semicolonial countries. What this process represents precisely is the shifting of the axis of world revolution from the underdeveloped countries toward the imperialist centers, beginning with the weakest and most parasitic imperialism. The most positive side of this for Portuguese revolutionists is that there has already been a more extensive democratic opening in Portugal than in any of the colonial or semicolonial countries.

However, if the revolutionary process in Portugal becomes identified with repression and totalitarian methods, the anti-Communist fears of the West European workers, fears that have a basis in the reality of the Stalinist regimes, will be increased tenfold, and the obstacles to socialist revolution in the advanced countries in like proportion. This is certainly one reason why the capitalists have seized on the *República* case to whip up a little campaign around the theme of "red terror." It's like taking out insurance.

Is 'Tough' Stalinism Revolutionary?

It is pretty much inevitable that the Stalinist parties will become further discredited because of the role of the Portuguese CP. However, there is also a danger that sections of radical youth breaking from Stalinism will also become discredited by identifying themselves with an apparently more militant CP that seems to be locked in struggle with defenders of "bourgeois democracy."

In Portugal itself, starting with the conflict over the "trade-union unity" law, groups that previously stood to the left of the CP, such as the centrist *Movimento da Esquerda Socialista*, began to be drawn, in effect, into the CP strategy. They offered a romantic left interpretation of the CP's Stalinist dogmatism and sectarianism, and seem in fact to have been used by the CP as advance patrols and pawns in sectarian maneuvers. The role of the MES and a similar group with even less political moorings, the *Frente Socialista Popular* (FSP—Socialist People's Front), in the May 1 incidents is one example.

The FSP participated in the attacks on the SP contingents. The MES denounced the CP for "making concessions" to the SP. It has been the MES also that has developed the most extensive "left" defense of the CP's antidemocratic line, trying to carry it a step further, apparently believing that "tougher" Stalinism equals a more revolutionary approach. For example, in its May

28 issue, the MES organ *Esquerda Socialista* said:

"Holding elections for the Constituent Assembly, with the foreseeable results, was a victory for domestic and foreign reaction, which are now using the vote registered in these bourgeois elections to try to reverse the political process. To this end they have utilized provocations (such as the May 1 incidents) and pretexts (such as the struggle of the workers at *República* against the counterrevolutionary line of the paper)."

These small centrist groups have no perspective of building a revolutionary party; they are not even interested in this. By their very nature, they are parasitic formations and must attach themselves to some large reformist current in one way or another. The FSP, made up of disgruntled office seekers from the SP, who discovered that the party was bourgeois after they failed to get the positions they expected in the leadership, is very clearly a left opportunist formation. The danger, however, is that these groupings will serve as a conduit leading revolutionary-minded youth back into the Stalinist orbit.

This process could also create the impression among many sections of the working class in other West European countries that the youth breaking with Stalinism are simply more aggressive, more impatient Stalinists, that their differences with Stalinism are only tactical.

In fact, there is no reason why revolutionary-minded youth should let the Social Democrats or the bourgeois press seize the issue of democracy. If Soares wants a more flexible alternative than the CP and the MFA leadership at the moment, he is no less committed to supporting the bonapartist military regime. As a reformist, he could hardly be. He is committed to class collaborationism, and the MFA is at present the only viable bourgeois political leadership in Portugal.

In his Hotel Altis news conference, Soares made quite clear that he really would not mind an outright military dictatorship as long as it allowed the SP to function.

"One thing the Communist party general secretary has said I think is correct. That was, if there is a completely military government, it doesn't mean that a military dictatorship has been established in Portugal.

"The government can be military, but if public freedoms are respected, if we have pluralism in the media, elections in the unions and in the municipalities, etc., if Portuguese political life continues to operate normally until there is a new constitution, and then, within the terms of the pact-program [which gives the effective power to the MFA], elections are held for the legislative assembly, there will not in fact be a military dictatorship here in my opinion."

That is, a dictatorship is not a dictatorship when it does not interfere with business as usual for the politicians. Respect for the principle of popular sovereignty has nothing to do with it.

Washington's Attitude

Nor is popular sovereignty what Washington is worried about. One of President Kennedy's former advisers, Arthur Schlesinger, warned U.S. officials in the June 3 *Wall Street Journal* not to shout too loudly about dictatorship lest they reduce their options unnecessarily:

"Portugal going Communist is not a happy prospect. It is also a considerable exaggeration. The immediate prospect, if the democratic forces fail to sustain themselves, is not a Communist takeover. It is rather the establishment of a military regime, Nasserite in its model and neutralist in its foreign policy, using the Portuguese Communist Party for counsel and support. Such a regime might well deny military bases to the United States, but there is no reason to suppose that, any more than Egypt or Peru, it would turn overnight into a Soviet satellite. . . .

"But, where the Communists are giving the dominant Armed Forces Movement unconditional support, the Socialists, under the leadership of Mario Soares, have irritated the military by their demands for democratic liberties."

Other well-informed bourgeois commentators have noted that the conflict between the Socialists and the military officers is not exactly based on irreconcilable differences of political principle.

"The clashes between the officers and the Socialists have been more conspicuous, but public and private statements by most leading members of the Movement show strong suspicions of Communist efforts at infiltration and a cold appraisal of a Communist party drive for power," Richard Eder cabled from Lisbon to the May 27 *New York Times*.

"Most of our members are ideologically closer to the Socialist than to any other group," a leading officer said not long ago. "But the party's leaders give us trouble; they criticize us and want to take over from us. The Communist leaders support us consistently."

Moreover, the military are not in a position to push the Socialists completely aside, nor are the more intelligent MFA leaders going to let the SP reap the advantages of dissociating themselves somewhat from the government at a time of rapidly deepening economic crisis. "Strikes and agitation are continuing despite appeals to work and the military is having difficulty making its authority felt," Henry Giniger reported in the May 30 *New York Times*. "There is a feeling that this problem

would be aggravated if the armed forces also found the political parties ranged against them."

Le Monde reporters offered the following explanation of the MFA's decision to seek a détente with the SP in the May 29 issue of the Paris daily:

"This moderate [General Costa Gomes], who has been frequently criticized by his more advanced fellow officers for his moderation, was able by his subtlety to adopt an attitude toward the Socialists that appeared to combine a firm call to order with a fundamental flexibility. Pushing the Socialists aside, he argued, would only serve their objective, which was to go into opposition. If they were made martyrs, they might be considered saviors later on. By such language, the president helped considerably to promote the present solution."

The reporters failed only to note the irony in this, since at the time of the first provisional government the SP had insisted on bringing the CP into the cabinet for precisely the same reason.

The very fact of the existence of two mass workers parties, which between them have the support not only of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese workers but the absolute majority of the entire population, is a factor absent in all the colonial countries where authoritarian bonapartist regimes have been established.

In fact, the most revolutionary aspect of the Portuguese development has been precisely the democratic opening, the ferment of ideas, the challenging of all authority, tradition, and rules of the game. So far there have been no massive industrial struggles or lasting mass mobilizations or permanent organs of real or potential dual power. The Socialist party, for its own interests, has obstructed attempts to close off this opening. And the anti-Communism of many of its supporters is obviously a reaction to efforts to restore a "tough" kind of discipline and authority.

It would be tragic if revolutionary-minded youth aligned themselves with the anti-democratic and fundamentally counterrevolutionary attitude of the Communist party in the name of opposing "anti-Communism" or because of drawing dubious lessons from national liberation struggles that are absolutely misleading in the case of Portugal. □

Demonstration in Azores Demands Independence

The civilian governor of the main Azores island resigned June 6 after thousands of persons demonstrated in front of his palace demanding independence from Portugal. Demonstrators also occupied the local radio station, and farmers blocked the runway of the airport with trucks.

Why Britain Should Get Out of the Common Market

[Ernest Mandel, a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, spoke at a public rally sponsored by the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International, at the Roundhouse, London, on April 30. *Red Weekly*, the IMG newspaper, printed major excerpts from his speech, which we are reprinting below.]

[The London rally, held under the theme "No to the Capitalists' Common Market, for a United Socialist Europe," was one of several rallies held by the IMG throughout Britain in the run-up to the June 5 referendum on continued British membership in the European Economic Community (Common Market). In that referendum 67.2 percent of the voters cast a ballot in favor of Britain remaining in the Common Market.]

[Mandel was the principal speaker at all these rallies and drew large audiences. About 850 persons came to hear Mandel at the London rally, which was also addressed by Cabral Fernandes, a leader of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League), the Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International; a representative of the London-based Portuguese Workers Coordinating Committee; and a militant of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria-ETA(VI) (Revolutionary Communist League-Basque Nation and Freedom [VI]).]

[The attendance at other rallies was 250 in Sheffield; 350 in Birmingham; 300 in Manchester; 160 in Bristol; and 250 in Oxford. Mandel also spoke in Glasgow and Edinburgh.]

[At the Oxford meeting, Mandel debated Evan Luard, Labour member of Parliament for Oxford, who is a supporter of British membership in the EEC.]

[Mandel shared the platform at the Manchester rally with Ernie Roberts, assistant general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. Labour MP Dennis Skinner sent a solidarity message to the rally. The Manchester rally received wide support despite attempts by the British Communist party to sabotage the planning. Bernard Panter, a member of the Manchester District Committee of the CP, who had agreed to chair the meeting, withdrew at the last moment; and in a letter to the Stalinist daily, the *Morning Star*, he falsely accused the IMG of using the rally as a "front."—Tony Hodges]

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We first of all have to understand what

the Common Market is all about and what this referendum is all about.

It is the contention of many people who agitate in favour of Britain remaining in the Common Market that it is just what it says it is: a common market, an agreement between independent capitalist governments to allow the free circulation of commodities, of capital, and of migrant labour within their boundaries.

That view is incorrect and purely formalistic, because it takes the Treaty of Rome by which the EEC was set up—and a lot of institutions which have been set up around it—at face value. It does not look at the problem of the emergence of the Common Market in the light of the dynamics of economic, social, political, and military development on the continent of Europe since World War Two. More especially, it does not answer the question *why* this specific institution arose at a specific moment, why it stays at a given stage of its development, and where it is going.

I would approach the question of the nature of the EEC in an entirely different way—not from the point of view of analyzing treaties and juridical forms and contents, but from the point of view of a stage in the development of decaying capitalism.

I would say that what the Common Market expresses is an attempt by the European capitalist class—or at least important sectors of that capitalist class—to overcome within the framework of capitalism one basic contradiction of the system: that between the growing international character of the productive forces, the growing international character of capital and production on the one hand, and the survival of the capitalist nation state as the basic form of political organization of the capitalist class in Europe.

The fact that capitalism as a world system is unable to overcome that basic contradiction—of that I have not the slightest doubt—does not imply at all that parts of the capitalist class can make no efforts towards a partial solution of that contradiction. The longer capitalism survives under conditions of decay, the more such kinds of attempts become absolutely unavoidable.

In the context of the present world, this means something very precise. Today you have increasing international competition between multinational corporations, between the big international monopolies, and in this competition the American-based multinational corporations have a tremen-

dous advantage of size. Their average size is twice or three times that of the biggest nation-based European or Japanese monopolies.

Under these circumstances the basic historical trend which leads to the emergence of the Common Market is the trend towards international interpenetration of capital on a European scale, the emergence of European multinational corporations going beyond the frontiers of the former nation states, trying to amalgamate on a semicontinental basis, in order to get the minimum of financial, economic, and political power necessary to stand up against their American and Japanese competitors.

If we understand the problem in that way, we can immediately draw a conclusion: that the present form of the Common Market is to a large extent irrelevant because it is completely transitional. The Common Market as it is today is not an adequate instrument of self-protection and self-defense of the big European monopolies against their American and Japanese competitors. What is lacking is a key factor of imperialist self-defense and self-protection in an epoch of growing economic difficulties and crisis: a strong state power.

When you have expansion, when you have a big rate of growth of the economy, then of course the decisive role of the state for protecting the rate of profit, for defending the particular, specific self-interests of each specific group of the world bourgeoisie, is less pronounced.

But once we understand that the economic climate has changed, then it is clear that the Common Market cannot stay at this transitional stage.

Let me give a very concrete example to show what I'm talking about. We all know what the British Labour government is doing today to rescue shattered capitalist combines like British Leyland. But these firms are basically small-fry, and it is precisely because they are small-fry that they still can be saved by the British bourgeois state. If you go into a higher category—if you look at ICI or Fiat or Siemens or Phillips, and if you look at banks of the same size—then it is absolutely certain that the British government (not to mention the Italian government, or the Dutch government) is absolutely incapable of saving that kind of firm from a threat of bankruptcy. Yet given the economic perspectives which we have, such threats are not at all out of the question in the coming period.

To save *that* kind of multinational corporation, with *that* kind of tremendous capital accumulation, you need such powerful means—monetary, financial, social, political, and economic means—that not a single European government as it is today would be able to do the job. Only a

superstate on the level of the Common Market would conceivably be adequate to save the biggest multinational European corporations should they be threatened during the coming economic difficulties of international capital.

So that's one of the possible outcomes of the trend which has led today to the emergence of the Common Market: the further transformation of the Common Market into an imperialist superpower in Western Europe. The steps towards this are very well known: the setting up of a common currency reserve fund in the Common Market, leading to a common European currency—which could even substitute itself partially for the dollar if the decline of the latter continues as one of the props of the international monetary system of decaying capitalism—leading obviously to a common European budget and then to a common European economic policy. All that implies a strong European state power and government, that is to say a political superstructure which expresses the particular interests of these big European multinational corporations.

Obviously there is also another possible outcome: that confronted with a grave recession of the kind we are witnessing today, the basic trends of European capitalist economic development would be towards a disintegration of the Common Market, with each capitalist class trying to defend its smaller, immediate peculiar self-interest even over and above the interests of the European multinational corporations, leading to a surge of protectionism and economic nationalism.

Up to now this has not happened. I do not say that it cannot happen. It could happen, and I would even say it will happen if the efforts of the multinationals in pressing towards the setting up of a real integrated superstate on a European scale are not successful. But these alternatives will be decided by strong struggles inside the capitalist class between the contending interests. And when you look at those interests which stand on the side of the amalgamation, which are rather stronger, and those which stand on the other side, which are rather weaker, then you can make some kind of prediction as to what will occur *if*—the big *if* underlying this whole analysis—capitalism continues to survive for a long period, and *if* all these processes continue to develop without being combated, neutralized, or overthrown by the forces of the working class.

That is the starting point of the analysis. But because certain trends under conditions of capitalism are more or less inevitable in the long run if capitalism survives, that does not mean at all that we have to take them for granted and do nothing to oppose them. On the contrary, we have to approach

the problem not from the point of view of economic fatalism but from the point of view of an assessment of the political and social relationship of forces.

The basic question is not "what are the



WILSON: Joined British capitalists in calling for a "Yes" vote on referendum.

long-term economic trends of development of capitalism if it survives," but "what are the trends of the class struggle today in Britain and in Europe and how, by basing ourselves on these trends of the class struggle, can we intervene in the Common Market debate and referendum in such a way as to help and further struggles to overthrow capitalism."

Once you approach the problem in that way, the answer is absolutely obvious: the referendum in Britain today is part and parcel of a political class struggle. It is sufficient to see the facts of life—that the British capitalist class, that the European capitalist class (with the exception of a small and completely negligible fringe), stands nearly as one man in favour of Britain remaining inside the Common Market. Nobody can deny that. All the big organizations of the employing class in Britain and Europe ask you to vote "Yes" in this referendum.

And you have a second fact of life which is no less important than the first one—namely that again practically without exception all the militant sectors of the British working class are against Britain staying inside the Common Market, and

express in however confused and wrong a way a *class* opposition to this capitalist outfit.

Or you can approach the question from a second point of view—what will happen after the referendum. Suppose by accident—one could even say under the present circumstances, by a miracle—the "No" were to win, it would be a political disaster for the bourgeoisie.

Such a political defeat for the Tories, for the Liberals, for the CBI employers association, and for the right-wing capitulationist Wilson wing of the Labour party would help the development of a militant class struggle, not only on the issue of the Common Market but against the attempt to impose a new incomes policy; against the attempt to make the workers pay the costs of the crisis of capitalism; and against all the treacherous policies which the right wing of the Labour party will try to get this government to apply in the coming six to twelve months.

On the other hand, a victory for the "Yes" campaign would shift the relationship of forces not only between the classes in Britain, but also inside the labour movement. And by no stretch of the imagination can anybody prove that a victory for the "Yes" campaign will shift the relationship of forces inside the trade unions or inside the Labour party in favour of the left.

So we cannot be abstentionist or indifferent to the outcome of this referendum. We have to take a clear-cut stand in favour of "No."

When I say that we have to be an active force in the "No" camp, I do not mean that we can limit our struggle just to that "No," because we have to accuse those who organize the struggle to get Britain out of the Common Market inside the Labour party and the labour movement of both reactionary and utopian ideology.

If they had put before the British working class a clear-cut case—"this is a class conflict between capital and labour, and we have to join with the workers against the capitalists both in Britain and on an international scale, and for that reason we are against the Common Market"—the outcome would at least be unsure, given the relationship of forces between the classes today in Britain. But once they started a campaign for national sovereignty—that is to say, on a nationalist basis against the Common Market—the outcome was not very unsure. On that basis you're not going to mobilize tremendous enthusiasm in the British working class, you're not going to unify the class forces against the supporters of a "Yes" vote, and it's nearly certain that you're heading for defeat unless there is some miracle.

Why is such a campaign utopian? It is utopian because the whole emergence of the

Common Market proves that to defend national sovereignty today within the framework of capitalism against the international amalgamation of capital is the same thing as to defend small capitalist combines against big capitalist monopolies. That's completely hopeless, it's utopian, it is trying to turn the wheel of history backwards.

And it is utterly reactionary because instead of a class lineup, it creates an interclass combination with many innuendos which are not only nationalist but racist, and with many innuendos which can lead to very serious consequences if workers are taken in by this type of reasoning. Once you give such a big importance to *national* sovereignty, to *national* parliament, to *national* economy, then you will be caught very quickly in the trap of being called upon to make sacrifices at the expense of the class interests of the working class to uphold these shining "national" institutions—the capitalist parliament, capitalist law, capitalist national sovereignty, the capitalist government, and the capitalist state apparatus.

For all these reasons we say that a successful campaign for a "No" vote in the Common Market referendum is only possible from the point of view of the class interests of the working class if it is an internationalist campaign, if it counterposes to the capitalist Europe of the bankers and the monopolies a socialist Europe of the workers. But when we say we have to make an internationalist campaign, a campaign for the United Socialist States of Europe opposed to the Common Market, we don't oppose a "socialist" European-centered type of approach to a capitalist European-centered type of approach.

We are internationalists on a world scale. We know for example that if today there is a tremendous opportunity for a victorious socialist revolution in Western Europe, this is due in the first place to the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people, who have created that possibility on a world-wide scale. We know today that if there is a tremendous upsurge of the Portuguese revolution, this is due to a large extent to the heroic struggle of the peoples of Angola, of Mozambique, and of Guinea-Bissau—because it was their struggle which created the political preconditions for the upsurge of the proletarian revolution in Portugal today.

When we call for the United Socialist States of Europe, we only call for that because we think that the political and social relationship of forces between the classes in Western Europe today is more favourable for a breakthrough towards socialism than anywhere else in the world. We would consider that only as a platform out of which the struggle for the United Socialist States of the World would start,

because you have really no basic problems today in this world which can be solved on a continental basis.

We are not going to create socialist plenty in Western Europe while millions and millions of people are starving in India, in Bangladesh, in Pakistan, in Sri Lanka, in the Sahel area of Africa or anywhere else in the world. That kind of socialism would be unworthy of conscious workers anywhere in any country.

Nor is the struggle for a United Socialist States of Europe something abstract which remains at the level of very vague, general propaganda. We think that there are two basic thrusts inside the class struggle in Europe which push in this direction in rather an immediate sense.

The first is the growing awareness among militant workers everywhere on our continent that against the multinationals which operate on an international scale—which divert orders, production, and the setting up and closing down of factories on an international scale—nationally limited trade-union activity, not to mention nationally limited revolutionary activity, will become less and less efficient.

When the British firm of Plessey wants to close its Portuguese subsidiary, and when the shop stewards from the Portuguese factory—among whom we are happy to see Trotskyists, indeed one of our candidates in the Portuguese elections was a Plessey shop steward—come to Britain to see the Plessey workers in Britain to say we have to make a *common* struggle against the international operations of that combine, then you have the beginning of a concrete trend in the class struggle which leads in the direction of the United Socialist States of Europe.

We will have more and more occurrences of that type in the coming months and years, and revolutionary socialists should be in the forefront of all concrete practical attempts to create a new instinct, if I can call it that, among radical militant shop stewards right through Europe. Over any new demand which is raised in a factory which is part of a multinational combine, over any attack by the employers against the workers in such a factory, the first reaction of a socialist shop steward should be to pick up his telephone and contact his comrade, the socialist shop steward in Belgium, in Holland, in England, in France, in Italy, in Spain, or in Portugal who is working for the same combine.

The second thrust is still more important, though less immediate than the first one, because it is a political one. The United Socialist States of Europe means the overthrow of capitalist *state* power, means the overthrow of the capitalist state machine, means the conquest of power by the working class, the setting up of a real workers republic based on democratically

elected workers councils—first in one, then in two and then in many other countries throughout our continent.

We are convinced—and that is one of the other reasons we are opposed to the Common Market—that while the building of socialism cannot be achieved in one country, nor will the overthrow of capitalism be simultaneous in all countries, because you have different social and political relationships of forces at different moments in different parts of the continent.

Today the Portuguese workers are at the forefront of this struggle, much more advanced than any other working class in Western Europe, although they were so much behind a couple of years ago. Tomorrow we are sure—as are the Portuguese comrades—that the Spanish workers will step in their place and be in the forefront of this struggle, because they have greater objective strength, they have higher class consciousness, more experience of struggle, a better relationship of forces, once they succeed in overthrowing the dictatorship.

And the day after that, probably France and Italy will line up on the same plane, and that will give you a very powerful combination of which we hope the results will be felt very quickly in countries like Britain, my own country, Belgium, and other countries in Western Europe.

This concrete way in which the revolution will spread throughout Western Europe in the coming months and years implies again a concrete content for the struggle for the United Socialist States of Europe, because we will need to spread these revolutions in order to protect them, we will need to organize huge solidarity movements which can become a powerful impetus in different European countries to get the revolution itself on a higher level.

Under these circumstances what we have to say is: don't join the Europe of the trusts; don't join the Europe of the bankers; don't join the Europe of the riffraff of the generals and the admirals and the police chiefs; don't join the Europe of those who are organizing a strong state, who are starting on the road of torture, who are starting on the road of limiting and suppressing workers' rights and democratic rights all over the place.

But by all means join the Europe of the workers commissions in Spain and Portugal; join the Europe of the factory occupations; join the Europe of the soldiers committees and soldiers organizations in Portugal, in Spain, in France, in Holland, and in many other countries; join the Europe of the big rise in working-class struggles; join the Europe of the workers councils, which we will see as the new emergence of the new implantation of the *soviet* idea in the coming months and years throughout our continent. □

London Marchers Demand, 'Drop Charges Against Iranian 21'

By Marian McManus

LONDON—About 300 persons demonstrated May 26 demanding that all charges be dropped against twenty-one Iranians who were arrested April 29 during a peaceful sit-in at the Iranian embassy. The sit-in was held as part of the international protest against the recent execution of nine political prisoners by the Iranian regime (see *Intercontinental Press*, May 12, p. 616).

The twenty-one protesters are charged with "conspiracy to trespass." If convicted they would be subject to deportation under the British Immigration Act. This would mean near certain imprisonment and torture, and possibly death, at the hands of the Iranian dictatorship.

At a rally before the demonstration several organizations pledged their support for the Committee for the Defence of the Iranian 21, and their solidarity with political prisoners in Iran. Speakers at the rally included a representative from the Confederation of Iranian Students in Britain, the president of the Bradford Student Union, and representatives of the International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International) and the International Socialists. Speakers from a number of Palestinian, Iraqi, and Arab organizations also addressed the rally, as did one of fourteen members of the British Withdrawal From Northern Ireland Campaign who were arrested on a similar "conspiracy" charge.

Everywhere placards could be seen carrying the slogans, "End Labour Government Collaboration With the Shah," "Defend Iranian Political Prisoners," "End SAVAK [the Iranian secret police] activities in Britain," "Abolish Conspiracy Laws," and the main slogan of "Drop all charges against the Iranian 21."

The demonstration scored the Labour government's support for the Iranian regime. In the last five years alone, the shah has been armed to the tune of £8 billion (£1 = US\$2.32) to take over from Britain the role of crushing liberation struggles in the Arab-Persian Gulf area. The Labour government, in doing nothing to stop the arrest and trial of the twenty-one Iranians, is carrying out the shah's dirty work by attacking his political opponents in this country. The Wilson government has consistently refused to put an end to the activities of SAVAK agents against Iranian students living here.

Following the rally the demonstrators (some wearing hoods) marched past Downing Street and Trafalgar Square to the Iranian embassy. □

Drought in Gujarat Worst in Century

The western Indian state of Gujarat has been hit by the worst drought in a century, as the monsoon rains failed for the fourth year in a row. Fourteen of the nineteen districts in the state have officially been declared drought-stricken. Lack of work in the fields has driven millions out of the rural areas in search of jobs and food. The output of grain in Gujarat for 1975 is predicted to reach 1.4 million tons, far short of "normal" output of 4 million tons.

Widespread food shortages in Gujarat sparked an upsurge in that state that led to the downfall of the state government in February 1974. It has since been under the direct rule of the federal government, with new elections scheduled for June.

At least four other Indian states—West Bengal, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Rajasthan—have also been hit by drought this year.

June 16, 1975



Workers Press

London demonstration May 26 declares solidarity with Iranian 21.

The Conflict Between the IRSP and 'Official' Republicans

[The following interview was given to Gerry Foley in Cookstown, Northern Ireland, on May 15 by Bernadette Devlin McAliskey. Along with Séamas Costello, a former leader of "Official" Sinn Féin, McAliskey is the most well known leader of the Irish Republican Socialist party, which was founded in December 1974 primarily by persons who left "Official" Sinn Féin. McAliskey has not had an opportunity to check the transcript of the interview.]

* * *

Question. What involvement if any did the IRSP have in the shooting of Billy McMillen, the "Official" IRA commander in Belfast, who was killed at the end of April?

Answer. We don't think we have any responsibility for the McMillen shooting. We accept that there may be a remote possibility that on an individual level, somebody either sympathetic to or connected with the IRSP may have had a hand in it. But we think what is of overriding importance is that as an organization the IRSP condemned the killing of McMillen and saw the shooting as a disaster, while recognizing McMillen's position and therefore his responsibility in the conflict in Belfast. His shooting was completely disastrous and was recognized by the movement as such, particularly in political terms.

In the broad struggle it did nothing but add further confusion and regenerate the factional differences between the two organizations in Belfast. Particularly since at the time it happened we felt we were at least making some kind of progress towards bringing the "Officials" in Belfast to a position where they were prepared to discuss the issues and possibly work out some program of temporary cessation of the violence.

From our point of view, the killing of McMillen fits in with the pattern of the shooting of Garland,¹ which we've had more time to investigate and quite definitely had absolutely no connection with at any level. And it seems from the developments

that the most likely explanation—although the "Officials" do not officially accept it—is that it was the activities of someone with a vested interest in keeping the feud going, someone whose interest certainly wasn't either republican or socialist.

I think that one good thing may have come out of this, however. It has forced our own members to take a hard look at what the consequences will be if the conflict continues and at what must be done to stop it. We have to accept the fact, especially given Billy McMillen's position, that the "Officials" in Belfast will not be satisfied until some member of the IRSP has been killed in retaliation.

Tragically, we have come to the realization that inevitably we are going to lose at least one person in Belfast as a result of the McMillen shooting. We have decided, and there is now no disagreement, politically at least, in the organization that if and when that happens our reaction has got to be to assure the "Officials" and to assure the people in Belfast that there it ends, that we will not in return seek retaliation for the killing of that person.

Now even some of our members who could not see it before can see very starkly that retaliation simply means an escalation of the kind of activity that completely demoralizes both organizations and prevents us from moving politically in any progressive direction. In such a situation, it is impossible to bring out the political differences that after all are our point of issue with the "Officials." It's simply that we have a different political approach. And we want to argue on the political differences and to organize in accordance with our own political principles.

If we allow ourselves to become increasingly bogged down in a tit-for-tat situation, it will end with the destruction of both organizations, and more important than simply these organizational consequences, with the weakening and demoralization of the entire anti-imperialist struggle.

Q. In your opinion, what started the conflict?

A. I think the origin of the conflict was very simple: The "Officials" refused to accept the right of people to disagree with their political line—and not only to disagree with it, but to organize along different political principles. Right from the beginning they stated that because we didn't accept their political approach to the

Protestant workers that we were "sectarian" [i.e., anti-Protestant].

This charge was based on the fact that we refused to see the UVF [Ulster Volunteer Force, an ultraright Protestant paramilitary group that has claimed responsibility for the random murder of many Catholics] and the UDA [Ulster Defence Association, another ultraright Protestant terrorist group] as some sort of progressive working-class organizations. It was based on our refusal to accept the essentially economist road of the "Officials," that the way forward is to ingratiate yourself with the Protestant workers solely on the question of the Ring Road² and redundancies, and ignore the political aspects.

Their concept is that by fighting on an economic front solely you can ingratiate yourself with the Protestant workers, and once you have done that they will then automatically be converted to republicanism [that is, to support for a united, independent Ireland].

We see this economist road as a blind alley and we think that any unity achieved on a purely economic basis is a false unity. That is, if you give up everything but economic reforms and then after that try to tell the Protestant workers that in the next stage we are all going to be republicans, it will all fall apart. That kind of unity is a false unity that will immediately fall down when it comes to any real test, as has been shown in the past.

The falsity of this approach is shown by the political irrelevance of the trade-union movement in the north of Ireland, which in fact abandoned all political principle in the interests of economic unity on the factory floor, as the "Officials" are now doing.

As a result of their political line, in particular in Belfast, the "Officials" have been losing support and their organization has been weakening. So, they saw the formation of the IRSP as a deadly threat, a threat to their very existence as an organization. They saw large numbers of their members, and persons who had previously left or fallen into inactivity because of political disagreement, coming over to the IRSP. They explained this away by saying that these people disagreed with the ceasefire [declared by the "Official" IRA in May

2. A highway project in Belfast that involved demolition of both Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. The "Officials" claim that they were able to achieve some degree of cooperation between Catholics and Protestants in resisting the plan.—IP

1. Seán Garland, the national organizer of "Official" Sinn Féin, was shot and severely wounded on March 1. The "Official" leadership immediately blamed the shooting on the IRSP. The IRSP denied any involvement, saying that the most likely possibility was that Garland had been shot by British provocateurs. When Garland recovered, he admitted that he had not recognized his assailants. No evidence of IRSP involvement has yet been produced.—IP

1972] and that they joined the IRSP because we were militarists who wanted to shoot Protestants.

It is true that persons joined the IRSP looking for some political road forward after becoming dissatisfied with the "Officials" for many reasons as that organization was becoming stuck in its blind alley. But you certainly can't explain their coming over to us by claiming that they were looking for a chance to shoot Protestants. The problem was that the "Officials" refused to accept the right of another organization to challenge their power base.

Particularly in Belfast, the "Officials" felt that when the Provisional split occurred they had made a mistake in allowing the organization to develop and not crushing it physically at the start. They were particularly adamant about this because they blame the Provisionals for everything that has gone wrong in the last five years. They thought that this tolerance created all the problems for them that the Provisionals did create, and that it should not be repeated.

So it was essential to smash the IRSP before it got off the ground. I think that it was as hard and as crude as that: A decision was taken to smash our organization before it had an opportunity for weakening any further the "Official" base in the North, or in fact in the whole of the country.

Q. In that context, how do you think the conflict can be ended?

A. It's very difficult to see how it can be ended. We have got to accept the fact that part of the penalty for organizing and attempting to create a new political organization will be repression from the "Officials." Right from the beginning, the last thing we wanted to get involved in was this vicious circle of retaliation which obscures all political arguments. All the politics gets lost in what appears to be a gunman's feud between two organizations, a power battle.

I think that the only way the conflict can be ended is if we continue to put forward our political arguments in the belief that politics will win out in the end, that people who have the right political approach and who argue politically will at the end of the day be listened to and accepted or rejected on the basis of their politics.

We have to go against enormous odds to do that. But I think that if we do, and continue to build the organization, the time will come when we are too big for the "Officials" to continue to attack us—because essentially it's a bully-boy tactic they're using—and they will have to accept that the result of their activities will not be to destroy our organization but to accelerate the collapse of their own. At that point they'll cut it out.

In the meantime we have been trying through every channel—the liberals, the pacifists, the trade unions—to get talks going with them. I made it clear that we don't want to negotiate a political compromise between the two organizations; the only thing we want to discuss is how we can guarantee the right of the two organizations to follow their own political approach without interfering with each other.

On a different level, we are quite prepared to work with the "Officials" in a broad, anti-imperialist struggle. We have said from the outset that there is a great need for a principled united front of anti-imperialist organizations. We would be quite happy to work with the "Officials" in that framework. But we would continue to argue our political differences with them everywhere, in print or in public discussion.

However, at the moment the only real point we can discuss with them is our right to organize. That is the issue between us and the "Officials": whether they will accept the fact that however much we may disagree with them politically we have the right to organize in Belfast and in the rest of the country. Essentially, the only way the conflict can be ended, the only way we can have peace, is if they accept that right.

Q. It's apparent from the kind of articles that the "Official" paper has been running and the kind of statements they have been issuing that the "Officials" have cast aside many of their essential principles. How accessible do you think the "Officials" still are to political pressure?

A. Well, I think that to some extent the "Officials" are still concerned about their reputation. I think that particularly groups that have worked with them ought to attempt to explain to them that they are in fact hell-bent on a path of self-destruction. Again this is on two levels. It's not only because of the conflict, but because of the way their politics are developing.

It is very difficult to explain this to them because, given the nature of the "Official" movement, they view any criticism as siding with the opposition, or as total opposition to them. They seem to be, particularly at the moment, incapable of understanding fraternal criticism. To make any criticism of them at all, to them, is to attack them, is to betray them. Because they see themselves as the socialists, the revolutionary organization, they draw the conclusion that any criticism of them is counterrevolutionary, is antisocialist.

This makes it very difficult, but I think that an effort has got to be made and can be made by people outside of Ireland who are not part of these internal problems to point out to both organizations where this kind of problem leads, how destructive it is in the context of the overall class struggle, and

how in fact such a conflict can solve nothing.

Q. How do you think this conflict has affected the overall struggle against British imperialism?

A. Well, I think that the shooting of Seán Garland and the killing of Billy McMillen have shown that the very existence of this kind of conflict gives sufficient cover for the British army, Loyalists [ultraright Protestants], reactionaries, or anybody else, simply to destroy both organizations. Because if things keep on developing the way they have, it simply requires some agent provocateur to go in and kill a member of the IRSP or a member of the "Officials" and then sit back and watch it grow until four or five people are dead on each side.

Something comparable happened in America. Certain sections of the Black liberation movement allowed the same sort of situation to develop. You just have to set the ball rolling and two organizations can destroy themselves. It has a completely demoralizing effect on what anyway is a minority.

People who have consistently, against all the odds, stuck by republican principle, attempted to work and develop progressive class politics, find that two left-wing organizations are killing each other. You can see the effect on the Provisionals. People have tried to explain to them that there was no purely militarist way forward, that you can't defeat British imperialism purely by traditional military methods.

Now their reaction is understandable when they look at the situation and see that here are the people who could think of 150 good reasons for not firing guns at the British army, here are the people who had 150 good reasons for not killing British soldiers, and now they don't even need a reason to go out and shoot each other.

This completely devalues all of the work the left has been trying to do. It gives an opportunity to the Social Democratic and Labour party [the traditional Catholic parliamentary party], which they have already seized on, to say: "Look at the people who claim they are different. They claim they want the same thing and they're shooting each other. What kind of an answer do they have for the problems of the people?"

This simply adds to the weight of propaganda against the left and completely cripples the development of political work in this situation. We keep getting bogged down further and further into the old traditional traps of personalities and issues that have nothing to do with the real political problems.

Q. Do you think it is a major part of the

British strategy in Northern Ireland to encourage a pattern of gang warfare—in the Belfast ghettos in particular?

A. I think it is. I think it is significant—and it is a fact that people outside Belfast find it difficult to understand—that in areas that are suffering from British military repression you can have a situation where gangs of “Official” active service units are driving around the Catholic ghetto looking for IRSP members and not being picked up by the British army. It’s almost unbelievable that the amount of weaponry can exist in the ghettos that must exist at the moment to support the conflict.

British army intelligence have a fair idea of who the members of both organizations are, and they know that the conflict exists. Therefore, the only logical explanation is that they are quite happy to allow people to walk around the ghettos armed, so long as they’re shooting each other.

Q. Do you think there is a difference in the way the capitalist press and the British authorities are treating your people and the way they are treating the “Officials”?

A. Well, the weight of propaganda has certainly been against our organization. We also seem to have had more people arrested than they have, and despite the fact that they seem to have more people on the ground than we have and that certainly they are the aggressors, they come looking for our members.

But I think the most important thing is that the British army is prepared to turn its back on what’s happening, as long as it’s confined to one group shooting the other.

Q. Do you think there is a chance the “Officials” may change their line? Are there people in the leadership who are not Stalinists?

A. I think there are. I personally think that the “Officials” politically are fighting for their own survival, that the majority of them have drifted into their present position. The problem, I think, is that they don’t have sufficient political capacity, they just don’t have the political awareness (a) to realize where they are and therefore (b) to get themselves out of it. But I think there are sufficient people who do know where they’re drifting and who, if they were prepared to do it, could call a halt to it and could try to reverse the direction. I don’t know whether they could succeed or not, or whether even the attempt would further decimate the organization. As for the conflict, I think there are certainly people in the “Official” leadership who can put a stop to it.

But it’s a self-perpetuating process. The

longer the conflict goes on, the more the individual members of the “Officials” simply believe what they are told, the more they accept the party line, and therefore the more difficult it becomes to get any sense or reason out of them. And certainly things like the shooting of Billy McMillen makes it doubly difficult to talk reason with people.

Q. What about the charges the “Officials” make that violent and irresponsible types have gone into the IRSP in Belfast and that this shows that the organization is basically an adventurist one?

A. Well, with the kind of circumstantial evidence they cite, you can put a gloss of proof on anything. When the IRSP was formed, the bulk of its initial membership was ex-“Official.” The “Official” republican movement, the Republican Clubs, is a political organization, and the IRA is an army. The chances are when people pull out of the republican movement that if they are not militarily active at least they have a willingness, since they are in the republican tradition, to envisage the use of arms, and many of them have a capacity to use arms. Certainly, therefore, we would have people in the IRSP who when in the republican movement were either members of the IRA or members of the Republican Clubs.

A lot of these people and a lot of members of the “Officials” saw a change in the movement in 1972, and part of the change was the cease-fire. From that time on, people drifted out of the “Officials,” were expelled, or left on principle, and fell into inactivity. They joined the IRSP because they saw the possibility of being involved in something that at least had a possibility of finding a way forward, of making some political progress. And the “Officials” looked at this simplistically and said: “A, B, and C left the movement in 1972; in 1972 we had a cease-fire. Now they have joined the IRSP, so the difference between us and the IRSP must be over the cease-fire.”

It was just a series of things like that which led them to that conclusion. We accept in the IRSP that there is a wide-ranging difference in the political levels of our members. There are people like myself who come out of small socialist groups and kids who have come out of the republican movement because they have been instinctively dissatisfied, but don’t have a high degree of class consciousness. We would be the first to accept that there are different political levels of consciousness and different tendencies within the IRSP, and we can see what problems this could create. Therefore, we don’t say that we are the revolutionary party.

One thing we do say is that what we all have in common is a commitment to finding the correct relationship between the

class struggle and the national question as it exists today, and we all accept the need to create a revolutionary party, the need to discuss the political issues, the need to develop a class organization. We appreciate how difficult that is and we realize that our biggest immediate problem is the education of our own members.

It’s not true, as the “Officials” simplistically say, that if you don’t accept their line on the Protestant working class you’re a bigot; if you don’t accept their line on the national question, you’re a gunman. We are neither sectarian bigots nor are we gunmen. We simply do not accept that the way forward for a socialist organization in Ireland is to ignore the national question. It poses a lot of problems. It raises all the contradictions in the class question. But that doesn’t say you can run away from it.

Because we refuse to run away from it—we don’t claim to have the answer to it, but we do claim we’re looking for the answer—because we are prepared to confront it and try to find the way forward, we are accused of being militaristic, nationalistic, and sectarian [anti-Protestant].

Q. Why do you think the “Officials” have developed their economist approach to the national question and look for working-class tendencies in the Protestant murder gangs?

A. I don’t know, maybe the reason is wishful thinking. Personally I see it as an attempt to find something that works. Everybody accepts that the biggest stumbling block to class unity is the sectarian division [between Catholics and Protestants]. The biggest stumbling block to Irish unity is the fact that a million Protestants don’t want it. So, you are faced with the problem of how to deal with the Protestant working class.

In the past, the “Officials” have had a measure of temporary success in working on economic issues. They have found that they can, in fact, establish a rapport, a working relationship, with Protestant workers. And therefore they have mistaken the swallow for the summer, if you like. They assume that because working on a housing program involves the local Protestant in the area, extending that into a whole political perspective, we can take the whole Protestant working class in the direction we’re going. In fact, it is a lack of politics, a lack of political understanding on the “Officials’” part, that leads them into that kind of illusion.

They don’t understand the nature of working-class politics. As I see it, they still have very much of an elitist attitude, the idea that the republicans are going to free Ireland for the working class, that the republicans are going to create a socialist

workers republic for the working class.

Their present activities are geared to making the working class either sympathetic to what the elite are going to do for them or at least preventing any negative reaction. It's that sort of outlook that leads them into the positions they get into and leads them into mistaking temporary, economic reform for revolution.

Q. To what extent do you think the "Officials" can be described as a Stalinist organization?

A. I think the broad mass of "Officials" don't have any hard politics. The only hard political line inside the "Officials" is the Stalinist line. I think that the number of people who consciously hold it is very small but that the line is quite powerful because it has been developing for the past five or six years especially. The individual Stalinists are, I believe, essentially in a position where they control the middle leadership of the organization; they control the publication.

And the problem is that even at leadership level, many of the national leaders lack politics, so that they don't recognize the Stalinist influence for what it is. They regard the terms Stalinist and Trotskyist as labels that you throw at the opposition, without ever investigating what they mean. I sincerely believe that if Tomás Mac Giolla [the president of "Official" Sinn Féin] were asked what Stalinism was, he would not know. Therefore, if he doesn't know what it is, how does he know he doesn't have Stalinists in his organization?

The "Officials" are oriented towards organization and things that work. They are quite prepared to let people like Dessie O'Hagan [who has turned the "Official" organ into a dogmatic Stalinist sheet] run the *United Irishman* if they get the job done. They don't seem to be aware of where his way of doing the job is leading them and what kind of politics it is putting into them, the leadership, what kind of politics are being accepted into the organization.

Q. Does this turn toward a dogmatic form of Stalinism represent a direct influence from the Irish Communist party?

A. I would tend to believe that it's an independent development inside the republican movement. I think if you go back you can certainly see the Communist party influence. But I think that at this stage even the Irish Communist party is embarrassed by the crudeness of the Stalinists in the republicans. They actually out-Stalinize the CP.

Particularly after the formation of the IRSP, when the opposition element left the organization, the Stalinists saw a clear

road forward. Some of them went full steam ahead and are making it increasingly difficult for anyone to pull back. I think there are people like McGurran [the most well known Northern leader of "Official"



Andrew Wiard/Report

BERNADETTE DEVLIN MCALISKEY

Sinn Féin] and Cathal Goulding [the man most recently identified as chief of staff of the "Official" IRA] who could not pull back, not essentially because of their politics but on a personal basis, because that's the way the organization has worked.

They still have the ability to pull the organization back, but they don't have the motivation. At the minute, they don't see the necessity for doing it. Maybe somebody like McGurran does, but he doesn't see it as sufficiently urgent. If I were Malachy McGurran, I would think the threat to the "Officials" from the Stalinists within was a much bigger threat to the existence of the organization than the threat of the IRSP organizing outside them.

But they don't see that. And because they don't see it, everything that goes wrong is attributed to outside sources, to the lack of political awareness of the people, to the sectarianism [anti-Protestantism] of the Provisionals, to the ultraleftism of the IRSP. Everything is to blame for the decimation of the "Officials" except the "Officials" themselves, except their policy, their politics, the direction in which they're going. And thus they abandon any self-criticism in a process of self-justification.

Q. What do you think is happening to the "Official" organization? Do you think the "Officials" are a declining force?

A. I think everywhere they are. I know some people in our organization have claimed rather optimistically that we are the cause of this, that the progressives are moving in their hundreds and thousands to the IRSP. I think that to be truthful—and in any case we number in hundreds, not in thousands—we have to admit that we are only part of the cause, and certainly not even the biggest part.

The main reason lies within the "Officials" themselves. If you look at the external signs, their papers are gradually disappearing. They just don't seem to be sold anymore. Their active paper-sellers just seem to be disappearing. Their branches, their clubs, seem to be falling into disarray. They are active only in propaganda. The formation of the IRSP is only one factor in this, and it was probably the last to develop. It is an attempt by people to find an alternative to the bankruptcy of the "Officials."

Q. What progress do you think the IRSP has made in developing a revolutionary program for Ireland and the kind of organization that can put it into practice?

A. Well, we were formed originally in the middle of December and we've had our first national conference, which I think pointed very clearly to the massive job of internal education that we have to do. I think we also realized that we grew too quickly in the initial stages and have taken a more conscious step now towards organizing much more slowly and carefully and working more with the membership we now have, working out our policy and educating ourselves, educating our members, before we attempt to grow at that rapid pace again.

I think that the IRSP is probably about the healthiest development on the Irish political left over the past five years.

Q. Healthy in what sense?

A. In the sense that the IRSP is the only group that is developing, that is not frozen.

Q. You mean that it is healthy because there is a political discussion and new thinking going on within it?

A. Yes, in the political sense, in that things are being discussed, there is a process of self-evaluation, self-criticism, a reappraisal of issues, combined with a determination to be active, to organize, to work towards the building of a revolutionary party. Although we accept that, as of now, we are not the revolutionary party. We are probably the only group on the Irish left that currently does not lay claim to leading the revolution. I think that is why the IRSP

has attracted into its ranks people of different political levels.

It probably has one or two ultraleftists in its ranks, one or two militant republicans, and various trends that reflect the fact that people have come from different traditions. But what we all have in common is this realization that a process of discussion must be gone through, that the revolutionary party must be built. And I think that the IRSP is the only place currently where any political progress is being made towards this.

Q. Does the IRSP identify with any international current in the workers movement?

A. It doesn't at the moment, in the sense of having links with other organizations.

Q. Has it had any political contacts or discussions with organizations in other countries?

A. No. But we accept the necessity of moving in that direction. We accept the necessity of not being purely another republican [i.e., militant nationalist] organization, or another Irish socialist organization, which demands solidarity from the world at large but doesn't want to become involved in the issues.

We see ourselves as an integral part of the working-class international movement and see the necessity ultimately of being part of that international struggle, not simply in terms of everybody struggling in their own country, but building links with international organizations.

Q. Do you have any program for the Irish communities abroad? Any idea for how to link them with what is going on here? Any plans for utilizing their support in an organized way?

A. We have a short-term program that involves essentially maintaining links with various solidarity movements where they have previously existed. Basically the short-term program around which we accept the solidarity of these groups is the demand for the immediate withdrawal of British troops, an end for repressive legislation, and the right of the Irish people to self-determination.

That's a program that was already in existence, and there were problems with some groups because some people said, for example, that you can't take the troops out of Northern Ireland immediately, or we must not raise the issue of self-determination because it doesn't have class content. But essentially that is the immediate short-term solidarity program which people who have supported us demand. □

Political Prisoner Faces Death Sentence in Dominica

Campaign in Britain to Free Desmond Trotter

By Jo O'Brien



Manchester Guardian

LONDON—Dominicans living in Britain are spearheading a campaign here to force the release of Desmond Trotter, a Dominican militant sentenced to death in November 1974 after being framed up for the murder of a white tourist.

The victimization of Trotter highlights the wave of political repression carried out against the Black Power movement on the island of Dominica, a small British colony in the Caribbean, by the Labour government of Prime Minister Patrick John. Under the John government's "Unlawful Assemblies Act" of 1974, it is legal to shoot anyone suspected of belonging to an "illegal organization." There have been widespread arrests under the act. Trotter was singled out for attack because of his activity as a leader of the Movement for a New Dominica and editor of its monthly bulletin, *Tuaway*.

Although Dominica has a population of only 70,000, unemployment is so high (60 percent) that 15,000 to 20,000 Dominicans have emigrated to Britain. One year ago Dominicans resident in Britain founded "Dominicans in Support of Progress" to support the Movement for a New Dominica and to publicize the part played by the British government in backing the John regime.

British aid for John has come largely in the form of "development aid." This really benefits only the British monopolies Cadbury-Schweppes and Van Geest, which control the majority of agricultural production in Dominica. Nearly all the land is owned by these two companies, the British

Crown, and a number of private landlords, many of whom live outside Dominica.

Despite being an agricultural country, Dominica has to import almost all its food. The foreign-owned estates concentrate exclusively on producing limes and other goods for export.

As an "Associated State" of the British Commonwealth, Dominica is still a British colony. It is evident, however, that the British Labour government of Harold Wilson is unwilling to take any action to halt the repression in Dominica. The Save Desmond Trotter Campaign has been formed to mobilize people in Britain to win Trotter's release and to force the British government to act.

The campaign has mounted weekly pickets at the Eastern Caribbean High Commission in London and held demonstrations in several British cities. Public meetings have been held in London, Manchester, Birmingham, and Nottingham. Support has come primarily from the Dominican community but also from several trade-union groups, including branches of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.

The campaign has been sponsored by Labour members of Parliament Bruce George, Sidney Bidwell, Jock Stollard, Harry Selby, and Stan Newens. Support has also come from Black organizations, the International Marxist Group (the British section of the Fourth International), the Communist party, International Socialists, and Labour party Young Socialists.

On March 19, Trotter lost his appeal to the British Caribbean Court of Appeal. His case will now go to the Privy Council in London, the highest court in the British Commonwealth. It is of vital importance now to mobilize the broadest possible support for Trotter to force the Privy Council to accept his appeal.

Messages demanding Trotter's freedom can be sent to Patrick John, Prime Minister, Government Headquarters, Roseau, Dominica, Windward Islands; and to James Callaghan MP, Foreign Secretary, House of Commons, Westminster, London, SW1, Britain.

Copies should be sent to the Movement for a New Dominica, 6 Canal Lane, Goodwill, Dominica, Windward Islands. Messages of solidarity can be sent to Trotter at HM Prison, Stockfarm, Roseau, Dominica, Windward Islands. □

ILO Denounces Torture of Chilean Labor Leaders

By Judy White

A commission appointed by the International Labor Organization (ILO), an agency of the United Nations, has accused the Chilean military junta of having tortured labor leaders to death because of their trade-union activities.

The charge is documented in a 122-page report released by the ILO May 29, following a four-week investigation in Chile at the end of 1974. Members of the fact-finding commission were José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, a former president of the International Court of Justice; Harold S. Kirkaldy, professor emeritus of industrial relations at Cambridge University; and Jacques Ducoux, a member of the French Council of State.

"It is an established fact that many trade union officials or former officials died or were executed since 11 September 1973," they said. "It appears from the information supplied and the evidence that they died either by execution, with or without trial, or in application of the law concerning fugitives, or as a result of torture inflicted upon them. . . ."

Making it clear that its list was "nonexhaustive," the ILO commission attached to the report the names of 110 persons who had been killed. It charged that the junta "has failed to prove that these deaths took place for reasons other than that these persons were trade unionists or that they exercised trade union activities."

Another section, accompanied by a list of 120 persons, dealt with the arrest of trade-union officials.

Among the jailed trade-union officials interviewed by the ILO were five who had been held without charge since September and October 1973. They were being "detained at the pleasure of the executive power and had no opportunity to file an appeal or seek legal advice," the commission said.

Another matter of "utmost gravity," the report stressed, is "the disappearance, in some cases without trace, of persons arrested by the authorities and who cannot be identified."

The ILO report condemned the dissolution of the CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores—United Federation of Workers). There was clear evidence, the report said, that one of the government's aims was to "eliminate or prevent any large-scale opposition to its policy" by trade unions or their leaders.

Earlier in May, Chilean Interior Minister



PINOCHET: Butcher of Chilean workers.

César Benavides claimed that his government was holding no more than 3,811 political prisoners. A dispatch in the May 18 *Washington Post* reporting Benavides's statement added: "Other sources say the number of those held in prisons around the country is much higher, that 1,450 persons were arrested between May and December 1974 in Santiago alone, and that nearly 800 of them do not appear on any government list but have simply disappeared."

The junta itself admits that more than 41,000 people—one of every 250 Chileans—have been detained at least temporarily for political reasons since the coup. Representatives of the Catholic church put the figure at about 95,000.

Although news of what these victims experience at the hands of the junta has been less publicized in recent months, the following cases make it clear that the Pinochet regime's policy remains the same:

- Guillermo Herrera, twenty-eight years old, was arrested in Santiago May 3 by the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA—National Intelligence Office). The charge was suspicion of being a courier for the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left). Eight hours later he was brought home, only to die vomiting blood thirty-six hours later.

- Cedomil Luis Lausic Glasinovic, twenty-eight years old, was arrested in Santiago April 4. After unsuccessfully at-

tempting to discover his whereabouts for more than a month, Lausic's family was notified by church authorities May 8 that his body was in the city morgue. The body showed severe head wounds. The family, which reported that Lausic was not a member of any political party, has charged DINA with responsibility for his death.

- One of Chile's best-known painters, Luis Guillermo Núñez, opened an exhibition in Santiago March 19. His paintings dealt with the themes of alienation and loss of freedom. The following day Núñez was arrested by secret police. He has not been heard from since.

Disappearances of this sort are common. In the May 24 *Washington Post*, columnist Jack Anderson reported receiving a list of 231 persons who have met this fate in Chile. "They range from a 16-year-old student to a 64-year-old architect," Anderson said.

"They disappeared into prisons and never came out. It is assumed that many of them were tortured to death. . . ."

A few victims are lucky enough to escape. Sergio Zamora, a longtime member of the Socialist party, was arrested by DINA on May 15. For at least five hours he was "interrogated" with beatings, cigarette burns, and electric shock treatments. He finally told DINA he would cooperate if they would take him to the offices of the church-run Committee for Cooperation and Peace in Chile. As Zamora and his interrogators arrived, Zamora escaped from the car into the arms of clergymen. Twelve days later he was still recuperating in a hospital. □

Prostitutes Occupy Church in Lyons

More than 200 prostitutes occupied St. Nizier Church in Lyons, France, in an action that began June 2. The women are protesting police harassment. They said they would remain in the church until their case was heard by the highest authorities in the country and the police end the crack-down.

In particular they demanded a meeting with Françoise Giroud, the state secretary for women's affairs. Some of the prostitutes report having received as many as five or six \$40 fines a night, and they are subject to frequent arrest.

The protest quickly spread to other cities. In Marseille, a church was occupied June 6 in solidarity with the Lyons sit-in. In Nice, prostitutes voted a sympathy strike for the weekend of June 7. In Paris, a delegation representing 5,000 prostitutes delivered a petition to the daily *France-Soir*, demanding an end to police harassment.

The protesters in Lyons received support from the women's branches of France's two largest trade-union confederations, from women activists elsewhere in Europe and the United States, and from homosexual militants in France.

The Predictions About an Economic Upswing

By Dick Fidler

Has the depression "bottomed out"? Is an upturn about to begin? If so, how long will it last? Will there be a new slump? These are some of the questions now being discussed by economists and political leaders.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has predicted an average growth of 3% in output of goods and services in its twenty-four member countries during the next six months, compared with zero growth during the last twelve months.

But this prediction is based largely on the expectation that the governments of the strongest countries—in the first place, the United States, West Germany, and Japan—will be forced to "reflate" their economies in coming months to combat the most severe slump since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

At a news briefing in Paris May 21, OECD economists reported that the steepness of the current decline had exceeded their expectations. They said that industrial production in the OECD's five largest members—the United States, West Germany, Japan, France, and Italy—would show a drop of between 10% and 20% for the first half of this year from the level for the last half of 1973.

Unemployment, they said, had doubled to an official 14 million in member countries, approximately 5% of the combined labor force. They estimated that during the first half of 1975, total output of goods and services will register a decline of 3%.

"A slow pick-up in economic activity is still expected for the second half, continuing through next year," reported Clyde H. Farnsworth in the May 22 *New York Times*. "But the experts conceded there has as yet been little evidence of an upswing, a point that is worrying some officials."

While all the major imperialist countries have been affected by the depression, the impact has been uneven.

The prospects for recovery depend very much on the U.S. economy, which accounts for one-third of the output of the OECD member countries. The decline in the United States was deeper than most economists had predicted. In the first quarter of this year, the U.S. gross national product dropped at an annual rate of 10.4%. Gross private domestic investment declined 21% (in current dollars) during the same period. Most of this decline in investment resulted

from a drop of more than \$35 billion in inventory investment. But spending on plant and equipment was down by \$4 billion, and on housing construction by \$5 billion—indicating little likelihood of a rapid turnabout. According to McGraw-Hill Business Publications, U.S. industry is currently operating at only 65% of capacity.

The waste in human lives and productivity entailed by this underutilization of industrial capacity is revealed in the extraordinarily high rates of unemployment—currently more than 9% of the work force by official statistics, and probably close to 12% if the millions of working people are included who in desperation have dropped out of the labor market.

The 8.5 million workers listed as unemployed in the United States today represent almost two-thirds of the total unemployment in the major capitalist countries. And despite all its rosy predictions of an economic upturn just around the corner, the Ford administration holds out no hope of a substantial reduction in unemployment *before the end of this decade*.

"Revised projections" for the economy published May 30 predicted a growth rate of 6.3% in 1976, but estimated that even if such growth were sustained for the rest of the decade, unemployment, expected to average close to 8% next year, would not fall below 5% before 1980.

However, Washington officials have pointed to a slowing of the rate of inflation. Consumer prices rose by less than 6% in the last three months, compared with a peak rate of more than 13% last year, and wholesale prices have barely increased in recent months. This, they claim, is evidence that an upturn is "imminent." The administration has therefore loosened bank credit and cut taxes somewhat to encourage a modest increase in investment and consumer spending.

West Germany, with the lowest rate of inflation of the major imperialist countries, has been "reflating" its economy for some time. But unemployment, which peaked in February at almost 1.2 million jobless, or 5.2% of the labor force, still remains above the 1 million mark. Another million workers are on reduced hours.

In the first quarter of 1975, Germany's exports to the United States sank 46% below last year's levels, and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is publicly urging Washington to step up its expansionary policies. Neverthe-

less, with nearly \$40 billion in gold and foreign-exchange reserves, the West German economy is by far the strongest in Western Europe.

Japan, accustomed to annual growth rates of 10% or more throughout most of the postwar expansionary period, saw its economic output decline 1% or 2% in the fiscal year ended March 31. For the current fiscal year, growth has been officially forecast at 4.3%.

The major source of optimism for Japanese officials has been a recent sharp decrease in the rate of inflation. Wholesale prices are expected to rise only 5% in the current quarter, compared with rates as high as 35% last year.

Businessmen are also encouraged by the fact that wage settlements in the *shunto*, or annual spring labor offensive, averaged only about 15%, well below the unions' stated objectives of 25% to 30% increases.

No doubt a major factor in the unions' weakened combativity was the pressure on wages exerted by 1.3 million unemployed. This 2.5% unemployment rate is unprecedented in recent decades.

Italy has experienced the most remarkable turnaround. With the help of \$9 billion in loans last year from the International Monetary Fund and West Germany, a domestic austerity program, and an expansion of exports, Italy has reduced its huge payments deficit and has made a substantial improvement in its trade balance. In early April international banks removed Italy from the list of countries from which they demand a high-risk premium on loan interest rates.

But this relative stabilization of Italian capitalism has been achieved at the cost of heavy unemployment—officially more than 1 million, or 5% of the work force, and well above previous official estimates. And this will be first year in twenty-five that Italy's economic output will actually decline; the GNP is expected to register a net drop of 2.5% in 1975, in contrast to an increase of 3.4% in 1974.

Britain's economic situation continues to worsen. Prices have climbed at a record rate of over 20% in the last twelve months, and the rate of inflation is expected to go above 25% this year. Unemployment, now at 800,000, is expected to climb to a million or more in coming months.

The major worry of businessmen is that so far the British working class has shown no inclination to slacken its combativity. Many recent wage settlements have provided for annual increases of more than 30%. Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey responded in April by bringing in a harsh austerity budget, denouncing wage claims in "excess" of "increases in prices" and "improvements in productivity."

Meanwhile the depression has more deeply affected certain countries that for one reason or another had previously escaped the full brunt of the downturn in the major capitalist centers. An example is Canada, which last year took advantage of the high prices on the world market for its raw materials—oil, wheat, pulp, and paper—to register an increase of about 4% in real output.

The U.S. slump has caught up with Canada, which exports almost 20% of its production to the United States. The Trudeau government recently threw out previous predictions of modest economic growth in 1975 and is now forecasting no increase in output this year. The official unemployment rate of more than 7% is the highest since 1961.

The Canadian bourgeoisie, concerned that the combativity of Canadian workers has virtually eliminated the longstanding wage differential with American workers, is now campaigning for "voluntary" wage and price controls—the prelude to a mandatory freeze if Canada's international competitive position continues to deteriorate.

Most semicolonial countries, hit by a simultaneous decline in orders for raw materials and sharp escalations in the prices of imported manufactured goods, have been especially affected by the international depression. A handful of oil-exporting countries alone have experienced any substantial increase in revenue from exports.


The signs taken to mean that the slump has bottomed out in some of the major capitalist countries have encouraged optimistic predictions of a major upturn just ahead. OECD ministers ended three days of closed-door discussions on May 29 expressing "confidence" in a quick recovery of output and employment, and a "further reduction in the average rate of inflation."

U.S. Treasury Secretary William Simon predicted that the U.S. growth in the second half of 1975 "may well be the highest" among member countries.

However, the forecasters' hopes for an upturn in the next six months are clouded by signs that the underlying sources of the current depression have not disappeared, and may indeed be exacerbated by a partial recovery.

Most ominous is a marked slowing of the rate of increase in world trade. The OECD reported May 21 that imports for the group declined by an estimated 10% for the first half of 1975 from the last half of 1973—the sharpest drop since World War II. Although no figures were given, it was reported that the decline in exports was partially offset by demands from semicolonial oil-exporting countries for Western goods.*

*Notwithstanding Kissinger's bomb rattling about the "disastrous" effects of high oil prices on



Vadillo/Siempre

"This slowdown of world trade," an OECD official said, "is a new thing in the world economy and provides some reason for doubting the strength of the recovery."

In previous postwar depressions, the effects of the downturn in some countries could be compensated by expanding exports to countries that continued to go through expansionary phases. In a generalized depression, as at present, this becomes impossible. The downturn in the major national markets reinforces the decline in all.

The continued high levels of inflation—and the uneven rates of inflation among various countries—are another ominous indication that the underlying instability in world capitalist economy is far from ended. Inflation during the first four months of 1975 averaged less than 10% for the twenty-four OECD countries, as compared with 15% for the whole of last year. But the situation varies widely from country to country, ranging from a probable 25% or more this year in Britain, to 5% in West Germany.

"It's anyone's guess," an economist at the International Monetary Fund in Washington told the *Wall Street Journal* in February, "whether we're witnessing a lasting change in the international price situation or simply a hiatus" in a long-term pattern of worsening inflation everywhere.

According to the Keynesian concepts that have guided capitalist economic and monetary theory in the postwar period, inflation

the economy of the industrialized countries, the trade and payments deficits of the major imperialist oil-consuming countries would have been much bigger last year if it were not for the fact that the oil producers spent more than expected on imported goods—one-third more in 1974 than the year before. Another factor limiting payments deficits was the lower world demand for imported oil, itself largely a result of the general slump.

Sales to members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were the one bright spot for exports of the imperialist countries. The share of West German exports to oil-producing countries, for example, has risen to 8%, making that market as important to German industry as to U.S. industry.

can be countered by slowing the economy's growth through such means as restricting the money supply, raising taxes, and allowing unemployment to increase. Now economists are increasingly worried that a renewal of expansion will bring on a new round of double-digit inflation and result in a new slump, possibly one more serious than the current downturn.

The massive government deficits projected for 1975-76 practically assure a resurgence of inflation more virulent than ever during the next upturn. The Ford administration's predicted deficit of \$60 billion for this fiscal year is widely regarded as understated; the actual deficit could be as high as \$100 billion or more. Bonn has budgeted a deficit of 50 billion Deutsche marks (more than US\$20 billion). Tokyo's budget for fiscal 1975 calls for a 25% increase in government spending, to be supplemented by increases later in the year.

Fears that the recovery will be partial and short-lived are being openly voiced by many officials and commentators in the business press.

Alan Greenspan, chairman of Ford's Council of Economic Advisers, warned a recent meeting of investors from major Wall Street financial institutions that there is a serious danger of another "big cyclical swing"—one more boom-bust cycle—resulting from inflation imbalances.

Reporting on the meeting in the April 30 *New York Times*, economics analyst Leonard Silk noted that "internationally, some observers foresee the next crash as being the really devastating one. Frances Cairncross and Hamish McRae, economics correspondent and financial editor of The Manchester Guardian, have offered the following scenario in their new book, 'The Second Great Crash':

"As the next expansion gathers pace, inflation is sure to accelerate. There is a grave danger—indeed, a near certainty—that the boom of 1977-8 will see a number of major countries lose control of their currencies."

"Many businessmen, such as Reginald

Jones, chairman of General Electric, share the view that the United States economy is in a long, depressed cycle in which recoveries will not carry through to put employment at the high levels reached earlier and recessions will be deeper than heretofore."

Silk cited a study by Prof. Hyman P. Minsky of Washington University in St. Louis, who attributes the economy's weakness to the "fragility" of the financial structures. "...many businesses and banks are still relatively illiquid, straining to meet heavy payment commitments out of diminished cash flows from operations. This has forced them to cut back on investment and other outlays."

In other words, a major hindrance to long-term recovery is the "liquidity crunch" facing banks and corporations—their massive burden of accumulated debt.

The editors of *Business Week* described the amount of debt in the United States in their October 12, 1974, issue:

"The U.S. economy stands atop a mountain of debt \$2.5-trillion [thousand thousand million] high—a mountain built of all the cars and houses, all the factories and machines that have made this the biggest, richest economy in the history of the world. . . .

"The numbers are so vast that they simply numb the mind: \$1-trillion in corporate debt, \$600-billion in mortgage debt, \$500-billion in U.S. government debt, \$200-billion in state and local government debt, \$200-billion in consumer debt. To fuel nearly three decades of postwar economic boom at home and export it abroad, this nation has borrowed an average net \$200-million a day, each and every day, since the close of World War II."

Servicing this debt stokes the fires of inflation. As interest burdens increase—the result of larger debt as well as higher interest rates stimulated by the huge demand for loans—capitalists raise prices to meet these obligations. Price increases spread throughout the economy, increasing the need for further borrowing. Debt obligations, interest charges, and prices chase each other in an upward spiral of inflation.

Furthermore, the banks themselves, in their quest for profits, have loaned out such a high proportion of their assets that their own liquidity is endangered. In the February issue of the radical journal *Monthly Review*, the editors pointed out that since 1950 the ratio of loans to deposits has more than doubled—from 36% in 1950 to 82% in 1974 for the large commercial banks (banks with total deposits of \$100 million or more on December 31, 1965), and from 39.4% in 1950 to 84.4% in 1974 for the large New York City banks.

In his April 30 article, Leonard Silk noted that the traditional remedy for a liquidity



Gurbutt/London Sunday Telegraph

crisis is a depression. Businesses reduce capital spending, dispose of inventories, liquidate relatively unprofitable branches—at the cost of bankruptcies and mass unemployment.

But today such a cure is politically very difficult to apply, the *Times's* expert observed. "Both threatened unions and failing businesses—the bigger the organization, the heavier the political clout—insist that the fiscal and monetary authorities pump in enough money to float the economy off the rocks.

"Thus arises the danger that slump will give way to inflation."

The bourgeois economists hold out little hope of overcoming stagflation in the near future. Professor Minsky advocates a "depression without a depression," Silk said. This he defines as "a period—perhaps as long as a decade—of low investment and high consumption in which employment is maintained by devices like the Works Progress Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps and National Youth Administration of the nineteen-thirties rather than by increased inducements to finance private investment in a speculative manner."

Greenspan and other Washington officials, Silk said, recommend "a long spell of underemployment that would both sweat inflation down and make the financial system more robust again."

Both approaches assume that private industry will be unable to restore high levels of employment in the foreseeable future.

In its May 26 issue, *Business Week* took issue with OECD economists who forecast a sharp upturn in the second half of 1975. "This conventional approach to forecasting. . .," it said, "which assumes that future cycles will be more similar than different from the past, clashes with evi-

dence that the new maturity is taking its toll."

By "new maturity" *Business Week* indicated it was referring to a generalized turn in the postwar economic situation. It cited the views of Kurt Richebaeher, chief economist for the Dresdner Bank in Frankfurt, who "views the recession as part of a genuine structural crisis and interprets the recent flatness of output not as a prelude to recovery but merely as a temporary pause in a longer downturn."

According to Richebaeher, the current problems are not "just the downward phase of a typical cycle. Our problems are more deeply rooted in unusual debt and cost imbalances."

Business Week argued that the "new maturity" of the West European and Japanese economies would inhibit the growth of U.S. exports and thereby the potential for recovery in the United States itself. In particular, it drew attention to world trade, which is expected to increase this year by only 1% to 3% in real terms, compared with 5% last year and 15% in 1973. This, the magazine said, "could exacerbate trends toward various forms of protectionism."

"Fish, eggs, wine, and textiles have all provoked protectionist activity in recent weeks in the European Economic Community," note international economists at Data Resources, Inc., the Lexington (Mass.) consultants. The president of the French Steel Federation called some time ago for a declaration by the European Commission of 'manifest crisis' in the European steel industry, which if approved would have triggered production quotas, minimum prices, and import restrictions. The request was rejected by the commission, but in any case, it was mainly viewed as an indirect cry for help aimed at the French government itself. . . ."

Finland and Italy have imposed import controls. Britain may do likewise.

In its March 3 issue, *Business Week* noted "some striking similarities" to the 1930s. "The formation of the Deutschmark bloc is a tentative throwback to the currency blocs of the 1930s, as are the tendency of countries to manipulate their exchange rates in 'dirty' floats and the move toward the kind of bilateral deals that have been made with the OPEC nations, or are in the early stages of negotiation with OPEC by some of the Western countries."

Prospects for a major upturn in Western Europe and Japan are also clouded by the long-term decline in capital spending. In West Germany, for example, new plant and equipment outlays, stagnant from 1971 to 1973, dropped sharply in 1974 and will fall again this year. Pressured by a severe credit squeeze, West German capitalists are making a bigger proportion of their investments abroad. Volkswagen, for example, is laying

off workers and threatening to close plants in Germany even while it considers plans to build cars in the United States.

All these pressures are felt most strongly in sectors that helped to fuel Europe's postwar expansion—autos, steel, machinery, rubber, and glass.

"For U.S. businessmen," the May 26 *Business Week* said, "the economic crisis in Europe and Japan will mean intensified competition for world markets and raw materials. Foreign business will be looking to increase its penetration of the U.S. market both through exports and construction of plants on the scene. And U.S. investors will meet vigorous competition in such critical new areas as the Middle East, Latin America, and East Asia."

Thus the long phase of postwar capitalist expansion, characterized by an enormous inflation of credit and expansion of trade, and based on the U.S. dollar as a stable international medium of exchange, has given way to a phase of intensified trade rivalry, double-digit inflation, reduced capital spending, and increasing instability in international monetary policy.

These developments dominated the meeting of OECD ministers held in Paris at the end of May. Their discussions, held in secret, were characterized by Britain's Denis Healey as "extremely frank."

With only Portugal dissenting, the ministers adopted an agreement not to set curbs on imports or to artificially encourage exports—but not without appeals from weaker countries like Britain, which argued that they could not resist further protective action unless the stronger economies adopted more extensive antirecessionary measures.

France reiterated its objections to floating exchange rates, arguing that they had resulted in undesirable declines in the value of the U.S. dollar, weakening French exports.

But every capitalist government is well aware that in the last analysis the main point in an upswing is the renewed flow of profits it assures. But this occurs at the cost of the workers, that is, a relatively lower level of real wages.

That is why a modest upturn in production in the next period—if it occurs—is hardly cause for cheering among working people. They face continued high rates of unemployment and underemployment, and increased attacks on living standards and democratic rights. □


It Was a 'Great Debate,' They Said

"Senators of both parties and various ideologies appeared to take the debate [on U.S. military policy] with extraordinary seriousness. Throughout the day, there were always 15 to 20 Senators on the floor. . . ."—*New York Times*, June 3.

June 16, 1975

More Than 1,000 Workers Arrested

Police Smash Miners' Strike in Papua New Guinea



New York Times

The giant copper mine on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea resumed production May 18 after a militant six-day strike. In the course of the strike, riot police arrested more than 1,000 miners and effectively smashed the Bougainville Mine Workers Union.

Demonstrations by miners on May 12 were sparked by the dismissal of George Pompon, a vice-president of the union, and by the company's failure to pay a wage increase that was promised last year.

The miners marched on the pay office, carrying placards demanding their money and denouncing the company. Armed police, including 220 riot cops from Port Moresby and Rabaul, were rushed to the mine, and company guards began evacuating the staff. When the demonstrators refused to disperse, the police charged with batons and fired hundreds of tear-gas shells at the miners.

In response to the police attacks, the

miners blocked every road on the mine site with overturned vehicles, boulders, and oil drums. They used bulldozers to dig up those roads that were not blocked. They also set a bulldozer in motion and directed it at a police riot squad.

Police rounded up miners for three days. "We are going to make as many arrests as possible," said the deputy police commissioner. Bougainville police superintendent Jim Grey justified the police charge against the miners: "We gave them a lesson not to try tangling with police."

On May 18 the Bougainville district commissioner ordered the magistrates processing the charges to release 756 of the detainees pending the hearing of the charges. This was most likely done at the request of the company, Bougainville Copper Limited, which would otherwise have suffered a severe labor shortage. The company sent buses to pick up those released and take them back to the mine.

Eighteen miners pleaded guilty to the charge of riotous behavior and were sentenced to six-months hard labor, the maximum penalty. According to Christopher Ashton, writing in the May 19 *Australian Financial Review*, about 100 "hard-core leaders" were still being held.

"Half a dozen office bearers of the Bougainville Mine Workers Union, including George Pompon, junior vice-president, whose dismissal by the company and attempts to reinstate him sparked off the riots, will face the Supreme Court on a charge of inciting riots," Ashton said. "As from Monday night a week ago [May 12], BCL no longer recognises the Bougainville Mine Workers Union. With its executive jailed the union is to all intents, disbanded." □

B-52s Leave Thailand

The Pentagon's last B-52 bombers remaining in Thailand—a contingent of sixteen based at U Taphao Air Base—began flying home June 6. At the height of the Indochina war, more than fifty B-52s flew 792 bombing missions a month out of both U Taphao and Guam, in the Pacific. A large fleet of B-52s remains based on Guam, and about 350 U.S. planes, including F-111 and F-4 fighter-bombers, remain at three bases in Thailand.

A Thai officer presented each of the departing plane crews with a garland of flowers.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

'It Is Completely Wrong to View Ecology As a Secondary Issue'

[The following is an interview with Brice Lalonde, a leader of the ecology organization Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth) in France. It appeared in the April 25 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly *Rouge*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Where does the ecology movement in France stand today? How would you analyze it?

Answer. I can't really make an analysis; this will be more of a description. The ecology movement has four currents that engage in specific actions.

The first is the *scientific current*, mainly the naturalists and ecologists from the universities. Their activity consists of both fieldwork and theoretical studies. Today in France we see the emergence of a current of scientists of the kind that is well known in the United States, people like [Barry] Commoner. These scientists are generally reformist, but they are militant and are radicalizing rapidly.

Next, there is the *"quality of life" current*, roughly defined. This might include anything from a tenants committee, to a "summer cottages" committee. Over the past year such committees have been springing up on all sides in France. They are usually sponsored by prominent figures. But they are beginning to band together geographically or around a single demand (protection of a forest, for example). And when they enter into a struggle they radicalize quickly, because they come up against the state and at that point they usually lose the big sponsors.

The third current is what I would call the *current of new revolutionary hope*. It consists mainly of young people, and also includes commune movements. Its inspiration is libertarian but confused. It is changing, however, because more and more "classical" revolutionary militants are active in it.

The last current is composed of the *ad hoc organizations*: organic food, natural hy-

giene, and so forth. This is the most diffuse of the currents.

Q. Where does "Amis de la Terre" place itself in this movement?

A. Sort of where it comes together. At the beginning the AT was a transplant on the American model (a pressure group of experts, lobbying, publishing things). But in France we quickly counterposed to this perspective the strategy of building a mass movement, seeking to promote actions that directly pose political questions. That is why we chose to focus on the automobile and nuclear energy.

The movement arose in the early 1970s. The year 1972 was an important one, the year of Stockholm [international environmental conference sponsored by the United Nations], the year of new awareness of the dimension of the Third World. Nuclear energy also played an important role in creating an awareness of the unity of the living world, of the biosphere.

Q. Now I want to bring up a fundamental question. The capitalist class makes use of environmental problems to its own advantage. Very often workers are blackmailed in the following way: "If you don't accept unhealthy working conditions and the destruction of the environment, we will move our plant elsewhere, and for you that will mean unemployment."

A. I could outline some points of an answer. First, unemployment and living conditions cannot improve radically within the framework of capitalist society. At the same time, we attach great importance to the search for technical alternatives, to questions of reconversion.

Two examples will clarify this. During the Dumont campaign [René Dumont ran as the candidate of the ecology movement in the May 1974 national elections in France] we made contact with the SNIAS unions [Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale—National Association of the Aerospace Industry]. We thought that their accumulated experience in the field of aerodynamics could make possible the

relatively rapid launching of production of wind-driven engines. We had another idea to take up with the workers of Piron-Bretoncelles: the production of solar cells.

But basically, it is not up to revolutionary activists to furnish jobs for people; the problem is in the first place political. Everyone must have an income, but we should always have this concept in the back of our minds: The goal is that everyone should be able to choose their work. To be more precise, self-management (and decentralization) is a very important idea. We think it is dependent on specific alternative technologies (solar energy and so forth).


It all comes down to the question of developing the productive forces, the production of the entire economy, "human and natural."

Q. It seems to me that one of the main weaknesses of the ecology movements is their lack of connection to the working class and the workers organizations. Doesn't this open the risk of the ecology movement becoming subordinated to the ideology and policies of the bourgeoisie?

A. Certainly, you are right. The social layers that have been attracted to the ecology movement are first the youth, then professionals and teachers, then small farmers and fishermen, and finally a few workers. But generally these are marginal workers, such as, for example, the street sweepers who came to have discussions with us. Still, this was symbolic for an ecology movement. I would stress the importance of teachers, because they have played a decisive role in the organization of the ecology movement. I would also stress the farmers. In fact, I think the revolutionary movement has made a mistake in regard to the farmers; it has underestimated their potential for struggle.

Q. In the last analysis, don't your problems result from a certain political fuzziness? Fuzziness in regard to the working class and to its political organizations, revolutionary or reformist?

A. We are not out to change the course of



the other revolutionary organizations. At the present time our activity is often confused, but it is concrete. What we really want are actions that can serve as examples. As for the danger of co-optation by reformism, this is not what is happening now. The danger is always there, but you shouldn't make a bogeyman out of it. Movements such as *Survivre et Vivre* [Survive and Live] made such a point out of this that they have stopped all activity.

No, we think the best guarantee is to say: "It is up to those who struggle, who are directly involved in such actions, to take charge themselves, to decide."

But at the same time, I would be very happy if the ecology issue were co-opted by all those who fought during May 1968. What I want is to make the revolution. The problem is the lack of experience of the ecology movement. There is a certain weakness linked to a clear lack of political maturity. But there is also a new experience: building an activism based on a network of groups rather than an organization in the usual sense of the term, and the desire to always be concrete.

Q. I would like you to explain the main reasons for the struggle you have launched against nuclear power stations.

A. What convinced us was the irreversible aspect of the decision; also the scope of the danger, which truly threatens to create new political problems; and then the fact that it is possible to win. To us, what is important is to smash the Machine, to cut the bond between the populace and the Machine. This is a weak link in the system.

Look at what has already happened: In Sweden they have begun a debate on energy; in Holland, a moratorium; in the United States the consumption of energy is declining and contracts with power stations have been canceled. Nuclear power stations will probably be built. But that is not the problem.

Our approach is the following: This question concerns everyone and touches all aspects of social life (including science and technology). If they succeed in the case of nuclear power, a breach will be opened for all the problems of the environment.

What arouses our enthusiasm is that since we can win on this, there is an additional reason for taking up the task. If the capitalists can be blocked here, it means moving two steps ahead.

To use a familiar analogy, we are against the omelet that is proposed, because capital threatens to break the eggs without ending up with an omelet at all.

What does nuclear energy mean? We can easily point to its ecological, economic, and political limits. We can show that it creates a more and more dramatic dependence of the Third World countries, and that it

implies new urban concentrations, massive reconversion.

To sum up I would like to return to the general question of the ecology struggle. I think it is completely wrong to view ecology as a secondary issue. Perhaps this could be said about the struggle against the power stations, but not ecology. Ecology is a fundamental issue that must be joined with the workers movement. Historical materialism is the theory of the mode of production,

but what is lacking is a link between this theory and that of the ecosphere. For our part, we are not trying to make up for this lack. The solution of this problem must really await associations and regroupments that are more specifically political. At that point there will no longer be any reason to maintain an independent ecology movement if the revolutionary organizations show themselves capable of taking up the struggle in the field of ecology. □



Mundo

May 9 march in Huesca, Spain, protesting proposed nuclear power station.

Spanish Farmers Protest Nuclear Plant

Plans to establish six nuclear power plants along the Ebro River in the province of Aragón in north central Spain sparked a protest of hundreds of farmers in early May.

Men, women, and children took to the streets in the town of Huesca May 9 carrying signs and chanting their opposition to the construction of a plant scheduled for Chalamera. "A nuclear plant means danger and destruction" was the central theme of these farmers, who saw their livelihood threatened by the danger of radiation from the installation.

At the end of last year a meeting was held in the nearby city of Zaragoza. Residents of the towns that would be affected attended and unanimously decided to oppose the government's plan.

Hundreds of telegrams were sent to federal authorities expressing opposition to the plan. When this protest got no response from the Franco regime, signs, slogans painted on walls, and leaflets began to appear in the towns of the region. Then

came the decision to organize a peaceful demonstration.

On May 8 hundreds of cars were driven in a caravan from one town to the next, seeking support for the next day's march. One bore the hand-lettered sign, "No to the nuclear plant. We are young and we don't want to die or emigrate."

On May 9 marchers filed peacefully through the streets of Huesca carrying signs appealing to the governor to stop construction of the proposed plant. The demonstration was not stopped by the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard), which halted traffic so the demonstrators could proceed.

The farmers are demanding a delay in construction of the plant so they can present to the public reports they are preparing on how such an installation will endanger towns in the area. They have raised funds to send a busload of local residents to an operating nuclear power plant to obtain information from the technicians employed there. □

AROUND THE WORLD



Famine Strikes Haiti

Half a million Haitians are threatened with starvation in the poverty-stricken northwest region, which has been affected by severe drought conditions for nearly a year. Although this is the area hardest hit, famine conditions are spreading across the rest of the north.

On May 22 the Duvalier regime said 306,889 persons were in a desperate situation because of the "natural catastrophe." International relief agencies place the figure at closer to 600,000.

Christian Democrats Attack Pinochet's Economic Policy

Speaking out for the first time since the September 1973 coup, Eduardo Frei Montalva, the former Christian Democratic president of Chile from 1964 to 1970, said that the country's current economic crisis "is as grave as a war." According to a report in the June 5 *Christian Science Monitor*, Frei called for price controls to curb inflation, which officially hit nearly 300 percent last year.

U.S. Bombers Withdrawn From Taiwan

The State Department announced June 7 that the last squadron of U.S. jet bombers based in Taiwan had been withdrawn, and that the remaining U.S. military force there would be reduced by 30 percent to 2,800 men by the end of June.

Booming Business in Mideast for U.S. Merchants of Death

The cost of U.S. imports from the Middle East more than tripled in 1974, owing to the higher price of oil. At the same time,

American exports to that part of the world rose even higher, exceeding imports by \$400 million. The accompanying chart shows why.

Journalist Jorge Money Killed by Argentine AAA

Jorge Money, a financial reporter for the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*, was found shot to death near Ezeiza airport on May 18. His death set off a wave of protest that included a day-long work stoppage by Buenos Aires journalists. Printers joined the job action, shutting down most of the daily papers of the city on May 20.

The assassination was immediately condemned by numerous professional associations and trade unions. The Senate debated the threat to freedom of the press posed by such terrorist actions. Some senators also criticized the campaign waged by the Peronist regime against *La Opinión* and *El Cronista Comercial*, accusing the two papers of favoring left terrorists by their coverage of acts of political violence. *La Opinión* had reported on several occasions the unchallenged fact that not a single member of the right-wing terrorist Argentine Anticommunist Alliance has been arrested.

Public pressure resulting from the Money assassination has been great enough to force a public statement on right-wing terrorist actions from Interior Minister Alberto Rocamora. On May 26 he promised an exhaustive investigation of Money's death.

Thousands Starve to Death in Ethiopia and Somalia

Famine relief officials estimate that more than 800,000 persons in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and in Somalia are suffering from the effects of extensive drought. From October 1974 to mid-May 1975, a total of 16,685 deaths were recorded in the Somalia relief camps.

Although total figures are not available for Ethiopia, relief workers say that in one hospital alone there are between three and seven deaths a day, reaching into the hundreds over the past two months. Moreover, these estimates do not include the

famine victims who perished before reaching the relief camps.

Some relief officials predict that the famine in the Somali-populated desert region of Ethiopia and Somalia may become worse than the famine that took hundreds of thousands of lives in Ethiopia's Wollo Province in 1973.

While the Ethiopian regime of Emperor Haile Selassie tried to cover up the Wollo famine in the initial months, the new military regime has organized a relief campaign. But the measures taken so far are inadequate. According to one relief official who witnessed the Wollo famine, "At Kebri Dehar [in the Ogaden] there are 14,000 people in a camp with two nurses. It is just not equipped to cope with the situation."

About 350,000 persons in Ethiopia are estimated to be receiving some famine assistance, with 70,000 living in the country's fourteen relief camps. Shimelis Aduga, the commissioner for relief and rehabilitation, said that 1 million persons are suffering from the drought.

In Somalia, about 250,000 persons are being housed in twenty relief camps. Several hundred thousand more outside of the camps are receiving food from relief agencies.

Senate Strategists Debate Overkill

According to figures cited by Senator Edward Kennedy, the Pentagon now has 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled around the world, including some 8,500 strategic weapons virtually in full deployment. Alert to possible wastefulness, Kennedy suggested that "we have nuclear weapons in excess of our security needs."

Senator Barry Goldwater disagreed, saying that ten more army divisions were needed as well.

200 Arrested in Dominican Republic After Report of Guerrilla 'Invasion'

More than 200 persons were arrested in the Dominican Republic June 5 following a government announcement of an alleged imminent guerrilla invasion of the island. Those arrested included leftists, opposition leaders, labor leaders, and students. Among them were CGT (Central General de

U.S. Foreign Military Sales

Top 10 Countries in Fiscal 1974 In millions of dollars

Deliveries	Orders*
ISRAEL \$985	IRAN \$3,800
IRAN 510	ISRAEL 2,100
W. GERMANY 417	SAUDI ARABIA 588
SAUDI ARABIA 200	GREECE 435
AUSTRALIA 173	W. GERMANY 219
GREECE 104	SPAIN 148
TAIWAN 99	CANADA 94
BRITAIN 65	TAIWAN 88
CANADA 53	KOREA 81
VENEZUELA 26	CHILE 68

*Some orders cover more than one year Source: Department of Defense

The New York Times/April 14, 1975

Trabajadores—General Workers Federation) leader Francisco Antonio Santos and MPD (Movimiento Popular Dominicano—Dominican People's Movement) leaders David Onelio Espallat and Julio de Peña Valdez.

A June 7 Associated Press dispatch quoted Dominican officials as saying that a group of guerrillas had "clandestinely entered the country from Cuba to perform terrorist acts, including kidnappings and sabotage, against public and private property."

The officials said that the group, all Dominicans, had landed June 7 and was believed to be near San José de Ocoa, about fifty-two miles west of the capital. The guerrillas were reportedly led by Claudio Caamaño, nephew of slain Dominican freedom fighter Francisco Caamaño Deñó.

An AP dispatch in the June 8 issue of the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario* quoted unofficial sources as saying that news of the guerrilla landing was false, that no landing took place.

Nonetheless, troops were reported stationed at the entrances to Santo Domingo and key points across the country to check the identification of all travelers. Hundreds of homes were reportedly searched.

Rat-Infested Wheat for Famine Victims

About 10,000 tons of wheat destined for famine-stricken Ethiopia and Somalia were held up in Montréal after Canadian officials discovered that at least part of the shipment was infested by rats. Four hundred tons were removed from the shipment. As of June 7, the rest was being examined to determine if it could still be sent to the famine victims.

Gobbled Up by Some Rats on the Way?

Two Spanish grain importing companies have protested to the U.S. embassy in Madrid about "habitual" short-weighting of cargoes of soybeans from the United States. One company cited the example of a ship loaded in Philadelphia that arrived with a shortage of 425 metric tons, representing a loss of 2.79 percent of the total cargo. Another ship loaded in New Orleans had a shortage of 522 tons, or 3.79 percent of the cargo.

"We cannot accept these losses as a regular procedure, particularly when they are of this size," one company said. "As the deficiencies are always for short weight you can suppose what is happening."

Washington's 'Listening Post' in Laos

Washington has indicated it wants to retain its embassy in Vientiane. By the end of June about fifty Americans will be left in Laos. "It is better to have a small listening

post here than to break off entirely as we did in Peking and have a total break in communications. . .," said a senior diplomat in Vientiane quoted by David Andelman in the June 7 *New York Times*.

Support for a continued U.S. presence is coming from some unexpected quarters. Andelman reported that the growing influence of North Vietnam in Laos "bothers both China and the Soviet Union."

"The result is that these countries apparently would like to see the United States stay as a counterweight in the area and have begun to hint as much to members of the American mission."

Argentine Regime Scraps Effort to Set Limit on Pay Increases

Argentine President Isabel Martínez de Perón abandoned efforts to enforce a 38 percent wage guideline June 6, stating that any increases would be decided between the unions and the companies. With inflation running at more than 80 percent a year, the General Confederation of Labor, Peronist-led labor federation, had already rejected the government guideline, and auto workers in Córdoba had walked off their jobs to protest the wage ceiling.

The day before the president's speech, Economics Minister Celestino Rodrigo announced a 100 percent devaluation of the peso, doubled the price of gasoline, and called on workers to produce more and consume less.

French General Who Recommended U.S. Planes Was on Northrop Payroll


Gen. Paul Stehlin, a former vice-president of the French National Assembly who strongly recommended that France purchase American military planes, was on the payroll of the U.S. aircraft manufacturer Northrop Corporation. According to a report released June 6 by the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations, Stehlin received \$4,500 in 1971, \$6,000 in 1972 and 1973, and \$3,000 in 1974 for his services.

Stehlin was forced to resign from the French National Assembly in November 1974 when the French daily *Le Figaro* disclosed that he had circulated a thirty-page memo arguing that France's Mirage F-1 jet fighter planes were inferior to those of the U.S. companies General Dynamics and Northrop.

The day the Senate report was released, Stehlin was severely injured in a Paris traffic accident. His wife denied that he tried to commit suicide.

U.S. Unemployment Hits 34-Year Peak

Unemployment in the United States rose to 9.2% in May, up from 8.9% in April. This was the highest level since 1941, when it



Pierotti/New York Post

averaged 9.9%. Among the hardest hit are teen-agers (21.8%) and oppressed minorities (14.7%).

Senator Lloyd Bentsen, citing a study by the Urban Institute, said the actual jobless rate would be 10.5% if more than a million workers who have stopped looking for jobs were included in the statistics. Officially, more than 8.5 million persons are listed as unemployed.

Moscow Replies to U.S. Threat of Preemptive Nuclear Attack

Pentagon head James Schlesinger said in a report to Congress last month that the United States is ready to make use of its 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe against the Warsaw Pact countries. In the report, released in a censored form on May 29, Schlesinger said it is "impossible to rule out NATO first use of theater [battlefield] nuclear forces. . . ."

"If the alternative is, for example, major loss of NATO territory or forces, NATO political leaders may choose to accept the risks of first use."

The Pentagon spokesman advised that "the attack should be delivered with sufficient shock and decisiveness to forcibly change the perceptions of the Warsaw Pact leaders. . . ." He admitted that such an attack would carry "grave risks of escalation."

The Kremlin responded to this threat June 1. An article in the Soviet Communist party newspaper *Pravda* attacked Schlesinger for ignoring "the agreements concluded by a Government of which he is a member and of that course of politics that was formulated in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States"—meaning the détente.

¿El MFA o Democracia Obrera Revolucionaria?

Por Livio Maitan

[El siguiente artículo apareció en el número del 25 de mayo de *Bandiera Rossa*, periódico quincenal del Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari, sección italiana de la Cuarta Internacional. Una traducción en inglés de este mismo artículo apareció en el número de 9 de junio de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La traducción en español es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

La situación post electoral en Portugal y, en particular, el incidente del Primero de Mayo y las relaciones entre el PCP [Partido Comunista Portugués] y el PSP [Partido Socialista Portugués] no han podido menos que hacer que también en el movimiento obrero italiano se tomen posiciones en la polémica. Es necesario analizar, aunque sea brevemente, para clarificar mejor qué posición en el debate actual deben tomar los marxistas revolucionarios de la Cuarta Internacional.

Al PSI [Partido Socialista Italiano] le ha tocado la tarea más fácil. El éxito electoral del PSP le ha permitido presentarlo como una victoria de todos los socialistas, y las posiciones del PCP ofrecen un blanco fácil de atacar en la polémica. El PCI [Partido Comunista Italiano], en cambio, se ha encontrado y se encuentra en serias dificultades: no sólo, y no tanto por lo modesto del voto recibido por el PCP, sino por el hecho de que este último ha desarrollado una orientación que se diferencia notablemente de toda una serie de posiciones del PCI. Además, el proceso revolucionario total que se delinea en Portugal somete a dura prueba ciertos dogmas del reformismo constitucional del grupo dirigente del PCI, que no obstante la afirmación de la "vía nacional," no esconde la ambición de hacer de la experiencia del PCI un ejemplo rico de enseñanzas para todo el movimiento obrero en Europa Occidental.

Pero lo que más interesa en estos momentos es hacer algunos señalamientos al respecto de los temas que han surgido en las últimas semanas en las publicaciones de los grupos centristas (en parte recordando lo que se ha dicho en artículos previos).

En primer lugar, han aparecido interpretaciones erróneas del significado de las elecciones. Es verdad que, al menos en el papel, el resultado del 25 de abril ha creado la posibilidad de un bloque entre el PSP y el PPD [Partido Popular Democrático, un

partido burgués] electoralmente mayoritario y de maniobra para las fuerzas políticas capitalistas y socialdemócratas europeas en un intento para restabilizar Portugal siendo esto la base del bloque. Pero, aparte del hecho—que por cierto no es casual—que Soares, en la situación actual, haya tenido que excluir esta solución, de aquí no se deriva, de ninguna manera, que el resultado sea un abril 18* ni que el voto dado al PSP sea necesariamente un voto favorable a una solución conservadora. Tratar de liquidar el problema hablando de la influencia del viejo anticomunismo, de las tácticas reformistas de Soares o, peor, aplicando al PSP la etiqueta de partido burgués (¡o de social fascista!) es rehusarse a hacer un balance de la fuerza real (del cual el balance de la fuerza electoral es una expresión distorsionada mas no arbitraria) o caer en concepciones paternalistas y stalinistas de la lucha por el poder. Es un hecho que no podemos desatender, pensamos nosotros, que una parte importante—quizá numéricamente mayoritaria—de la clase obrera ha visto en el PSP el instrumento de su lucha. Esto puede ser considerado—correctamente—como el resultado de la experiencia insuficiente que la clase obrera ha podido hacer del reformismo social demócrata en Portugal y de una falta de claridad de los papeles que realmente juegan las varias formaciones del movimiento obrero. Hay que estar conscientes que actualmente el PSP ha sabido tomar ventaja de la aversión de sectores del proletariado a los métodos burocráticos del PCP, por su abierta oposición a una serie de luchas, por la imposición desde arriba de sus hombros a las direcciones de sindicatos. Aun más ha sabido aprovechar la exigencia general de demandas democráticas, totalmente normal para una clase obrera que surge de medio siglo de dictadura y que seguramente, al menos en algunos de sus estratos, no ha visto favorablemente el famoso pacto impuesto por el MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas] que le quita casi todo contenido a la Asamblea Constituyente.

En esta cuestión, el órgano de Avanguardia Operaia [*Quotidiano dei Lavoratori*] ha asumido la posición más "consecuente." No solamente ha suscrito en gran medida la

*Las elecciones del 18 de abril de 1948 en Italia, en las cuales fue derrotado el PC, señalaron la conclusión de la restabilización en el país del sistema capitalista y del parlamentismo burgués después de la crisis de la posguerra.—IP

interpretación errónea del resultado electoral, sino que ha dicho claramente—por medio de su corresponsal Renzo Rossellini—que las elecciones no se debieron haber llevado, y el que se hayan efectuado ha sido el mayor error del MFA. La inclinación por los métodos paternalistas autoritarios no podría haber sido expresada más claramente. Casi no es necesario reafirmar que los marxistas revolucionarios no hacemos un fetiche de las elecciones de tipo parlamentario burgués. Sabemos que los bolcheviques, después de la toma del poder, tuvieron que disolver una asamblea constituyente y creemos que había suficientes razones para hacerlo. Pero aquéllos que, más o menos explícitamente, se refieren a este precedente histórico, olvidan un pequeño detalle que el gobierno soviético tenía una legitimidad revolucionaria que el gobierno portugués—que sigue siendo un gobierno de coalición con fuerzas burguesas—no tiene en lo más mínimo. Una cosa es disolver una constituyente contraponiéndole la realidad de una democracia proletaria, basada en sus consejos obreros y campesinos, dotada de poder efectivo, otra cosa es decir que no se debieron haber llevado a cabo las elecciones para no crearle problemas al MFA y a sus aliados (dejemos aparte el cierto tono que usa Rossellini cuando se refiere a los partidos en general y a la idea subyacente sobre la falta de madurez de las grandes masas, que impregna su posición).

Han surgido, en segundo lugar, juicios al menos parcialmente positivos sobre el PCP. Citemos de nuevo al *Quotidiano dei Lavoratori*, no porque haya estado solo en esto, sino porque ha sido de nuevo el más explícito (ver artículo de Gamba del 8 de mayo y de A.D. del 11-12 de mayo, donde se llega a afirmar que "el PC, con un dinamismo inaudito, ha llevado adelante, en estos últimos meses, una política coherente y rigurosamente anticapitalista").

La aspereza burocrático stalinista de Cunhal y socios ha sido tomada por radicalismo e intransigencia, callando la función de freno que han cumplido el PCP y sus hombres—en algunas de las más importantes luchas—en su estrategia total que de ninguna manera incluye en el orden del día la dinámica socialista de la revolución.

Sin embargo, el elemento central que se destaca es el de atribuirle al MFA el papel de principal garante del desarrollo del proceso revolucionario en Portugal, aunque indudablemente hay varios grados y tonos. Lotta Continua, en sus comentarios más recientes, parece dotar la función que podrían asumir los elementos que se consideran más avanzados del MFA, tipo Otelio de Carvalho o inclusive Rosa Coutinho. Avanguardia Operaia cuenta, como lo hemos visto, con el radicalismo del PCP y llama al MFA a buscar el apoyo en las "estructuras del poder popular." II

Manifiesto—en particular el artículo de Rossana Rossanda del 10 de mayo (aunque contiene algunas anotaciones justas)—hecho con un poco de fantasía, como de costumbre, desarrolla un proyecto para el sector más avanzado del MFA, basado en “sus tres niveles de poder: el de las fuerzas armadas, el de los partidos y de las instituciones formales de la asamblea como catalizadores del sufragio universal, el del poder directo de la base.”

Si este proyecto se realizara, la visión gradualista de la toma del poder que *II Manifiesto* ha concebido para Italia, se habrá verificado en la práctica en Portugal, o para decirlo con la terminología rossandiana, se habrá verificado la tesis de la “procesualidad del surgimiento de un nuevo bloque histórico en la clase dirigente.” Lo admita o no, sea consciente o no, todas estas evaluaciones implican que la función, que bajo la concepción leninista le toca jugar a un partido revolucionario, puede ser llevada a cabo—al menos por toda una fase decisiva—por la fuerza política militar representada por el MFA. En último análisis, es esta hipótesis sobre la cual es necesario pronunciarse.

No hay duda que el fenómeno del MFA por muchos de sus aspectos es original y no puede ser caracterizado a la ligera. Es un movimiento de oficiales que surge de la experiencia de una derrota militar de la guerra colonial y que, en el contexto internacional e interno después del 68, asume un signo bien distinto, si no es que totalmente opuesto, de movimientos igualmente determinados por la reflexión de la derrota. Es claro que después del 28 de septiembre, y más aún después del 11 de marzo, que el MFA ha experimentado una notable radicalización, por la cual no ha podido cristalizarse alrededor del proyecto que parecía prevalecer poco después del 24 de abril de 1974 (gobierno de coalición, preparación para la transición a un régimen “normal” de democracia burguesa, “racionalización” del capitalismo portugués y su integración en el Mercado Común, etc.)

Hoy, el MFA debe tener en cuenta mucho más al movimiento de masas y debe aprovechar mucho más el margen de maniobra internacional, buscando contactos y acuerdos en toda dirección posible. La lógica de autodefensa y la lógica de su actual juego de equilibrio lo han llevado a golpear a algunos sectores importantes de la burguesía, a delinear formas de participación de base, a radicalizar la propia ideología socializante. (Digamos, entre paréntesis, la evaluación de esta ideología no puede hacerse en base a declaraciones episódicas de tal o cual miembro del MFA; el texto más importante hasta ahora, el pacto dado a firmar a los partidos, habla en general de la “construcción de una verdadera democracia, política, económica y social.”)

Todo esto no ha implicado y no implica una ruptura del mecanismo fundamental de la economía capitalista ni del aparato de estado burgués en el sentido amplio. Los proyectos económicos—de los cuales la campaña por la producción sin lugar a dudas es significativa junto con las posiciones hostiles a ciertas huelgas—no proveen ningún cambio cualitativo desde el punto de vista estructural y, por otro lado, el pacto que le garantiza al MFA la hegemonía política por algunos años en sí excluye la construcción de un verdadero poder democrático revolucionario de los obreros y campesinos.

Se dirá que el MFA podrá evolucionar. Por nuestra parte estamos convencidos que, si el proceso de radicalización de las masas continúa, tendría toda una serie de repercusiones en el mismo MFA que harían que una parte de éste pudiera llegar a hacer causa común con los obreros y con las otras clases explotadas. Pero éste es un problema diferente. Lo que algunos tratan de plantear está encuadrado en un proceso de transformación al socialismo bajo la hegemonía de MFA, y la transformación del ejército tradicional en un “ejército popular.”

Para nosotros, sin embargo, esta hipótesis no tiene una base real y el concebirla significa en realidad transferir a este terreno la lógica del gradualismo reformista. En cuanto a nosotros, el ejército portugués como tal no podrá “cambiar de naturaleza” ni tan siquiera bajo el impulso de la combinación de factores excepcionales. La línea que los revolucionarios debemos seguir es la disolución de este ejército por medio de la organización democrática revolucionaria de los soldados y los marineros, organizados en consejos elegidos y sujetos siempre a ser revocados y no confundirlos con organismos como los que ha creado y auspiciado el MFA, en los cuales los soldados son y están destinados a permanecer en minoría. El nuevo ejército, el ejército revolucionario, no puede nacer más que de las ruinas del antiguo. Si oficiales, ya sean del MFA o no, quieren construirlo, no es cuestión de principios oponerse a su participación (después de todo, ¡muchos oficiales zaristas contribuyeron a la creación del ejército rojo!).

Análogamente, el eje central de una estrategia revolucionaria en Portugal debe residir en la construcción *desde ahora, desde la fase en que estamos*, de organismos de democracia proletaria como expresiones de la clase obrera y el campesinado explotado. La creación, la generalización y la coordinación nacional de organismos similares debe ser la preocupación más importante de los revolucionarios. La única garantía real contra otros inevitables intentos de la reacción, contra todas las maniobras del capitalismo interno e internacional, reside en la solución de esta tarea y no

en el reforzamiento de la autoridad y el poder del MFA. Al mismo tiempo los revolucionarios deben luchar para que se satisfagan todas las demandas democráticas de las grandes masas. Lo que significa, en primer lugar, que las organizaciones sindicales sean renovadas completamente, que exista al interior de éstas la máxima democracia interna, que la elección de sus dirigentes y el derecho de expresión de diferentes orientaciones y tendencias constituyan dos elementos irrenunciables. Es sobre esta base, y no sobre una obligación legal, como se pueden colocar los fundamentos sólidos de la unidad sindical de la cual los revolucionarios somos los defensores más convencidos.

La hipótesis de que en Portugal se puede avanzar hacia el derrocamiento del capitalismo gracias a la garantía de un movimiento como el MFA, sin una organización de democracia revolucionaria obrera y campesina que no esté subordinada o sea accesoria, sin un partido revolucionario, esta hipótesis puede seducir a aquéllos que no aceptan el criterio esencial del leninismo y ceden a la influencia del “proceso.”

Sin embargo, el proletariado portugués no puede confiar en tal golpe de suerte. □

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Campaña Internacional por Presos Políticos Uruguayos

Por Joaquín Canales

Muchos piensan que los "gorilas" no necesitan justificar su desprecio total por los derechos humanos. Sin embargo, uno de los aliados de la "democracia" norteamericana, Juan María Bordaberry, actual dictador de Uruguay, se vio en la necesidad de defender su posición.

Debido a una campaña a favor de diecisiete presos políticos, Kenneth James Golby, profesor adjunto de la Universidad de York en Toronto, Canadá, envió una carta de protesta al mandatario uruguayo.

La Cruz Roja Internacional, la Comisión Internacional de Juristas y la Federación Internacional de los Derechos del Hombre han atestiguado sobre la tortura y malos tratos que reciben los presos políticos de Uruguay.

Bordaberry, haciendo gala del peor cinismo, expuso su punto de vista en una carta al profesor Golby con fecha del 12 de febrero. Por supuesto, no podía faltar la vieja historia de la conjura internacional:

"Las personas que usted menciona en su carta, Raúl Sendic, Julio Marenales, Jorge Zabalza, Mauricio Rosencoff, etc., formaron parte en nuestro país, desde los más altos puestos de dirección, de un movimiento sedicioso que asoló al Uruguay durante los años 1969 a 1972, de origen netamente extranjero, ya que formaba parte del movimiento insurreccional latinoamericano liderado y dirigido desde Cuba, lo que hoy es notorio."

Por supuesto, a "nacionalistas" tipo Bordaberry nunca les ha preocupado la verdadera conjura internacional del imperialismo norteamericano. Nunca han levantado la voz para denunciar la intromisión en América Latina de las compañías transnacionales y de las agencias de espionaje como la CIA. La razón es bastante sencilla: Bordaberry y los de su calaña viven de esa conjura.

Más adelante, Bordaberry no se explica cómo alguien quiera subvertir el orden en Uruguay, ya que éste se encuentra en la abundancia y la libertad:

"... [Uruguay] es un país que desde largo tiempo atrás goza de una avanzada legislación social; que tiene uno de los ingresos per cápita más altos de América y aun del mundo; lo que es más importante aún, tiene una distribución de ese ingreso que es nuestro orgullo, porque es una de las más justas que se conocen. En el Uruguay no hay grandes distancias entre los distin-

tos estratos sociales y hay un constante trasvasamiento de unos a otros, no existiendo por tanto castas o niveles privilegiados e impermeables. . . . No tiene problema de población indígena, que no existe; sus habitantes son todos descendientes de los primitivos colonos españoles, aumentados luego por fuerte inmigración europea de distintos orígenes."

Bordaberry, orgulloso descendiente de los que exterminaron a la población indígena de Uruguay, también es un hombre con profundos sentimientos humanitarios. He aquí una prueba:

"Así también, hombres secuestrados por los sediciosos, emergieron de las cuevas donde eran retenidos, como cadáveres macilentos, lastimados por un sol que ya habían desesperado de ver. Algunos de ellos nada tenían que ver con la problemática uruguaya, como un anciano experto norteamericano que, paradójicamente, estaba en el Uruguay para colaborar en un programa dirigido a aumentar la productividad de la tierra a través del sistema de impuestos."

Lástima que Bordaberry no habla de otro "experto" norteamericano, Dan Mitrione, que también fue secuestrado. ¿Quizá la profesión de éste sería un tanto difícil de defender para un patriota como Bordaberry?

Sin embargo, a pesar de todo lo que hicieron los "sediciosos," nos relata Bordaberry, éstos son tratados según la ley y el único problema por el cual no han sido enjuiciados es por falta de jueces:

"Olvidan [Amnesty International y la Comisión Internacional de Juristas], en mi opinión, que el aparato judicial uruguayo estaba previsto para pocos casos con sólo tres jueces normalmente, conforme al carácter pacífico y respetuoso de las leyes de los uruguayos. Sobre esa estructura le cayeron encima de improviso más de 3,000 procesos."

Bordaberry no sólo es un hombre humanitario sino que también es un hombre con un alto sentido de la moral:

"... usted que invoca las normas cristianas de conducta, puede estar seguro que son las que inspiran la nuestra."

"Usted no tiene porque conocer en detalle el carácter de mi país y, tal vez por eso, la información tendenciosa haya podido llegar a engañarle en una primera instancia. Pero nuestra fuerza invencible descansa precisamente en nuestra fuerza moral y en la

rectitud de nuestra conducta como nación."

Se necesitaría no saber absolutamente nada de lo que sucede en Uruguay para poder creer en tanta falsedad. El Sr. Bordaberry ha de pensar que sus mentiras son como anuncio de Coca Cola: si se propagandiza lo suficiente, el pueblo terminará consumiéndola.

Pero las mentiras son mentiras y siempre habrá quien las exponga. El Comité de Defensa Por los Prisioneros Políticos en Uruguay (CDPPU)¹ con sede en Toronto se ha encargado de esto. Contesta las acusaciones anticomunistas de Bordaberry (ya que para éste y los de su calaña sólo hay dos tipos de personas en el mundo: los que apoyan a la dictadura y los comunistas):

"Sólo una mente enferma de anticomunismo puede llegar a imaginarse que todas las personas y organizaciones que se oponen a las barbaridades del régimen uruguayo puedan definirse como comunistas. En el caso del Sr. Bordaberry, esta fiebre llega a tal punto que acusa indirectamente de agentes del comunismo a organizaciones internacionales tan prestigiosas como la Comisión Internacional de Juristas y Amnesty International."

El CDPPU se encarga también de refutar a Bordaberry al respecto del verdadero nivel de vida del trabajador uruguayo y al respecto de las libertades políticas en Uruguay:

"Luego Bordaberry hace 'su' descripción de la realidad uruguaya, pero se olvida decir que esa realidad corresponde a varias décadas atrás."

"El Uruguay gozaba de una avanzada legislación social que era nuestro orgullo, pero ésta ya no existe más. Los sindicatos han sido disueltos y sus dirigentes perseguidos o encarcelados; no existe el derecho de reunión; no existe el derecho de huelga; la Caja del Seguro de Paro, como en el caso de los obreros textiles, paga con varios meses de atraso; no existe seguridad de trabajo, ya que cualquier obrero o empleado puede ser despedido arbitrariamente; etc."

"Uruguay ocupaba el tercer puesto en América Latina en cuanto al ingreso per cápita, pero en los últimos 15 años este ingreso se ha disminuido o estancado de acuerdo al artículo 'Uruguay's Continuing Dilemma' del Prof. Arturo C. Porzecanski

1. CDPPU, P.O. Box 277, Station "P," Toronto, Ontario, Canadá.

de la Universidad de Pittsburgh, publicado en la revista 'Current History' en enero de 1974.

"Más adelante Bordaberry agrega: 'tiene (el Uruguay) una distribución de ese ingreso que es nuestro orgullo, porque es una de las más justas que se conocen.' Afirmar esto es una falta de respeto pues implica catalogar de ignorantes al Prof. Golby y a todos los que leyeron su carta, además de una bofetada a todos los uruguayos que hacen malabarismos para subsistir con los sueldos de hambre que reciben. El sueldo mínimo en la actividad privada es de 120 mil pesos mensuales (poco más de 52 dólares) y un Auxiliar Administrativo de la UTE (Usinas y Teléfonos del Estado) recibe mensualmente—antes de los descuentos—85 mil pesos (¡37 dólares!). Claro que los Generales y Coroneles de las Fuerzas Armadas reciben un millón 300 mil pesos mensualmente (565 dólares), además de préstamos ilimitados de la banca para construirse mansiones y adquirir todo lo que se les ocurra. . . .

"La economía uruguaya se basa fundamentalmente en la producción agropecuaria, por lo tanto sería útil informar sobre la distribución de la tierra. El 4% de los propietarios poseen el 60% de la tierra, los medianos propietarios representan el 36% y detentan el 25% de la tierra, y el 60% de los propietarios poseen solamente el 15% restante. . . .

"Más adelante Bordaberry se refiere al porcentaje que el Partido de izquierda logró en las elecciones presidenciales, pero se olvida mencionar que él sólo alcanzó el 22% de los votos. Luego habla de la pureza del acto electoral pero tampoco menciona que esas elecciones fueron cuestionadas por fraudulentas (Prof. Arturo C. Porzecanski, obra ya citada).

"Tampoco entendemos este repentino impulso a defender las 'elecciones libres y puras' que caracterizaban al Uruguay, cuando en un reciente discurso justificaba la suspensión de las próximas elecciones argumentando que no reflejaban el anhelo popular y presentando a las Fuerzas Armadas y a él mismo como representantes genuinos de los intereses del pueblo.

"Transcribimos textualmente un párrafo de dicho discurso: '... todos los que invocan el plazo constitucional de noviembre de 1976, soñando con volver a la caza de votos, pensando que van a volver a utilizar su desnaturalizado aparato político para prevalecer, esperanzados en que van a torcer esta revolución nacida en el más hondo anhelo popular... que hoy, esta noche, pierdan toda esperanza.'

"También debemos mencionar su discurso del 30 de diciembre de 1974. Entre otras cosas expresa textualmente: '... esta conducta de las FFAA no puede entrar en la zona de lo opinable, no puede ser expuesta

al juicio de la ciudadanía, porque no es un partido político que asumió determinada conducta, sino que es la Institución Armada cumpliendo con su deber. Y ésta no es materia de juicio: la democracia no llega hasta eso, porque no puede ser opinable la conducta de las Fuerzas Armadas actuando en defensa del honor de la República.' Y más adelante agrega: '... pienso que pretender juzgar por los clásicos procedimientos de la democracia la conducta de las Fuerzas Armadas de defender lo más sustancial, lo más esencial de la nacionalidad, sería como pretender juzgar a un hombre que ha violado normas jurídicas formales por defender a su madre, en este caso, la Patria. Y esta actitud no puede ser objeto de juicio.' Luego vuelve a repetir: '... es mi obligación darles esta tranquilidad, con el compromiso personal de que la conducta de las Fuerzas Armadas, ni directa ni indirectamente, podrá ser sometida a juicio de la ciudadanía como si fuera una actitud política corriente.'"

Y termina la respuesta a Bordaberry exigiendo que se compruebe la veracidad o no de los cargos. CDPPU desafía a Bordaberry a que demuestre lo que afirma de la siguiente manera:

"Permitiendo que un abogado—enviado por los Comités de Defensa o una organización internacional—se entreviste privadamente con cada uno de los 17 rehenes,² se le dé acceso a los expedientes judiciales de los mismos, y que las autoridades uruguayas le

2. La referencia a estos diecisiete presos políticos como "rehenes" es porque se encuentran detenidos incomunicados y sin habérseles hecho cargo judicial alguno. Los diecisiete presos políticos son: Raúl Sendic, Julio Marenales, Jorge Zabalza, Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, Mauricio Rosencoff, Jorge Manera, Adolfo Wassen, Henry Engler Golowchenko, José Mujica, Jessie Macchi, Elena

brinden toda la colaboración que él requiera.

"Permitiendo que una junta de médicos—perteneciente a un organismo internacional—examine el estado de salud de los 17 rehenes y las condiciones de detención en que ellos se encuentran."

Este caso demuestra una vez más la necesidad de campañas de solidaridad internacional para defender las vidas de los presos políticos latinoamericanos. Bajo la presión de la opinión pública mundial, dictaduras como las de Bordaberry o Pinochet tienen que justificarse.

Hugo Blanco, conocido revolucionario peruano, en una entrevista que se llevó a cabo a principios de año, hizo hincapié en este problema. En esa entrevista publicada en el número del 7 de abril de *Intercontinental Press*, Hugo Blanco dijo al respecto de las organizaciones de defensa de los presos políticos latinoamericanos:

"Yo creo que son muy importantes para contrarrestar la represión en América Latina por medio de la opinión pública mundial. Lo hemos visto en caso de Chile inclusive, que es el caso más bárbaro que hemos vivido en las últimas décadas en América Latina. Si se ha permitido la salida de varios refugiados, si inclusive, se ha dado la libertad a algunos presos y si no se ha matado a más gente, es por la presión de la opinión pública mundial en gran medida.

"Por lo tanto, hay que prestar atención a este aspecto e impulsar, organizar y propiciar mayores movilizaciones de masas, mayores manifestaciones de la opinión pública internacional en contra de ese tipo de crímenes." □

Curbelo, Raquel Dupont, Grazia Dri, Alba Antúñez, Estela Sánchez, Cristina Cabrera y Flavia Schilling.

MEMO

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A Letter From C. Slaughter . . .

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Thursday May 29th 1975.

To: Unified Secretariat/SWP

Dear Comrades,

On April 7, 1975, Joseph Hansen, one of the leaders of the SWP (USA) wrote an article in his weekly magazine 'Intercontinental Press' entitled 'Red Lion Square - where were the heroes of the WRP?' The following allegations were made against leading members of the Workers Revolutionary Party, British section of the International Committee of the Fourth International:

' Has the WRP been infiltrated by agents of the Special Branch? What are the identities of those in the WRP who suggested that the best course was to have nothing to do with the demonstration against fascism in Red Lion Square?

' Didn't this advice fit in with what the WRP admits - that "manipulation of the left played an important role in police preparations for June 15"? What are the names of those members who gave advice that played into the hands of the police and the capitalist state? Who are these "shadowy figures"? Why does the WRP remain silent on this? Why doesn't it name those involved in this "sinister affair"? What is the WRP trying to cover up? Still another question must be asked. Is it possible that agents provocateurs like these are responsible for the campaign undertaken by the Workers Press of trying to follow up Scarman's work, of even improving on Scarman in attacking the IMG?'

The London Area Committee of the Workers Revolutionary Party, acting under the decisions of the Central Committee of the WRP, with G. Healy as general secretary taking the main responsibility, took the decision (not 'advice' or 'suggestion') not to participate in the Red Lion Square demonstration; the same comrades were responsible for decisions not to participate in earlier, similar demonstrations, and also for the decisions not to participate in the 1968 Grosvenor Square demonstrations on Vietnam.

Joseph Hansen says, ' These questions, we insist, must be cleared up'. We entirely agree.

Acting on the decisions of the Sixth Congress of the International Committee of the Fourth International, held in May 1975, the IC proposes to the Unified Secretariat the immediate setting up of a parity control commission (say three members from each committee) to conduct this investigation.

CONT'D...

-2-

Any comrade from either side could be called as witnesses, or could if they felt it necessary give evidence. G. Healy will present himself for questioning before the joint committee if Joseph Hansen will do so as well. They would have the right to question each other and be expected to answer questions from members of the commission.

The Parity Commission should also declare itself ready to receive all evidence from members of the sections of the International Committee and of the Unified Secretariat concerning provocations, not only in relation to Red Lion Square, but on the whole period since and including the so-called 'Tate Affair' of 1966. While recognizing that Joseph Hansen and the SWP are not affiliated to the Unified Secretariat for legal reasons, he is in political sympathy and we trust that he can be prevailed upon to co-operate.

Yours fraternally,

C. Slaughter
(for the International Committee of the
Fourth International)

186a, Clapham High Street
London SW4, 7UG.

. . . And a Reply by Joseph Hansen

June 5, 1975

C. Slaughter
186a Clapham High Street
London SW4, 7UG

Dear Comrade Slaughter,

Your letter of May 29 has been referred to me for reply.

I would note, first, that the letterhead of the "International Committee of the Fourth International" is typewritten. Of course, this rump body may be so moribund as not to require a regular letterhead, it being sufficient for the comrade in charge to type one up on the rare occasions when he needs it. On the other hand, it may be an indication that the letter is not bona fide.

Secondly, the author exhibits rather surprising ignorance. He addresses the letter to the "Unified Secretariat" and not to the United Secretariat. How is this to be accounted for?

Thirdly, the signature of the author is an indecipherable hieroglyph. It could be a forgery.

These are small items. However, I am sure that your Central Committee, in view of its expertise in such matters, will acknowledge the necessity to be alert to seemingly insignificant clues like these. They can lead to identifying an agent planted in the organization by the police or the CIA. Just in case the letter is a fake, I am enclosing a photocopy of it. Perhaps it will help you locate the police agent if it was written by one.

Unfortunately, the political line of the letter speaks for the conclusion that it is genuine. It coincides, for example, with the content and tone of recent articles in the *Workers Press*. Thus, taking the letter in that context, I would offer the following observations:

The sentences quoted from the article "Red Lion Square—Where Were the Heroes of the WRP?" were intended to illustrate the logical conclusions that follow from using the Healyite method of thinking, which is tainted with "subjective idealism."

You used that method in attacking the International Marxist Group, the British section of the Fourth International, for participating in the demonstration against the fascists at Red Lion Square. Your method led you to conclude that in all likelihood police agents played a role in working out the policies of the IMG. However, if precisely the same method is used in weighing the WRP's refusal to join in demonstrating against the fascists, equivalent results are obtained concerning the shaping of its policies. I thought I had provided a good illustration of this.

It is disappointing that you, as the leading methodologist of the WRP, did not recognize the point I was making. I am sure that almost everyone else in the left saw it, although I admit that there are always some for whom it would be helpful to have a special typographical sign, such as a pointing finger, to indicate *irony*.

I recognize the honesty of your explanation that the WRP's decision to abstain from the demonstration against the fascists was made by the top committees of the WRP "with G. Healy as general secretary taking the main responsibility." However, in this explanation you proceed as an empiricist, disregarding what you would have found had you been searching for signs of "subjective idealism" in your top committees and in your general secretary.

Of course, I have no real quarrel with your empiricism in this instance. It is a fact—G. Healy's decision was a consequence of his ultraleft sectarian line, as is universally recognized outside of the WRP and its sister organization in the USA, the Workers League.

In light of this, it is clear that the "Parity Commission" you call for could only ascertain (1) whether the top leader of the WRP is still on an ultraleft binge, as Comrade Cannon correctly called it, and (2) whether the sentences I wrote—and the charges you leveled against the IMG—constitute examples of the kind of conclusions to be expected from succumbing to "subjective idealism."

Under these circumstances, it is superfluous—and ridiculous—to set up a

"Parity Commission." The evidence is already public knowledge, open to inspection by the entire working-class audience.

I note your indication that you are willing to reconsider the stand you took in the beating of Ernest Tate by stewards of the Socialist Labour League in 1966. If you mean this in good faith, you could hardly do better than to begin by making a public self-criticism, particularly over having followed up the beating by taking legal action in the bourgeois courts against the victim.

An additional indication of good faith would be restitution of the money that you wrung from the *Socialist Leader and Peace News* in retaliation for their having printed correspondence from Comrade Tate protesting the beating he had received.

Another welcome move would be a public apology for the violation of proletarian morality involved in using the bourgeois courts to penalize working-class publications in such a matter.

On one question, I think an inquiry might prove fruitful; namely, the circumstances of your general secretary's hunt for CIA agents in the Workers League and his disruption of the leadership of that organization.

As to the practical side of such an inquiry, the difficulties of selecting an impartial and competent commission might prove insuperable. However, if you would like me to become involved in trying to overcome these difficulties, I am sure I could be prevailed upon to cooperate.

Fraternally yours,

Joseph Hansen

CC: United Secretariat
Enc.

For Unconditional Amnesty to U.S. War Resisters

[The following appeal appeared in the May issue of *Zócalo*, a monthly newsletter published in Tucson, Arizona.]

After more than thirty years, the Vietnamese people are now the voice of their own destiny; their land is no longer a colony of some rapacious western civilization. In view of this victory, it is appropriate that we become somewhat introspective and attempt to take control of our own destiny. For we too have been colonized by the same people against whom the Vietnamese struggled. However, many of those who already have attempted to govern their own lives cannot be here to participate in the new commitments.

At the same time that the American governmental system is welcoming Thieu and Lon Nol with open arms, no mention has even been made of the people who resisted the American military regime. There are still many American prisoners of

the Vietnam war; prisoners of the American governmental bias whose only "crime" is that they realized the immorality inherent in the war before the rest of America saw the senselessness of the war.

American war resisters meeting in Canada last year stated three necessary points for an acceptable amnesty: first, an end to the hostilities in Vietnam; second, release of the more than 200,000 political prisoners being held by the Thieu regime; and third, a total, universal and unconditional amnesty for those who participated in war resistance activities.

The Vietnamese, in their victory of independence, have already fulfilled the first two points; it is the very least that we can do, during our own new struggle for self-determination, to see that the third point, an unconditional amnesty, be quickly enacted. □

Correspondence With President Bordaberry on Torture of Political Prisoners in Uruguay

[The following documents were made public by the Toronto-based Comité de Defensa por los Prisioneros Políticos en Uruguay* (Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Uruguay). The documents consist of a letter sent by Kenneth James Golby of York University to Uruguayan President Juan Bordaberry, the president's reply, and a rejoinder by the CDDPU.]

[The latter two documents have been translated from the Spanish by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

January 23, 1975

His Excellency
J.M. Bordaberry,
President of the Republic,
Montevideo,
Uruguay.


Most Distinguished Sir:

Please allow me to present myself. I am a professor with this university and the present head of this department. My academic specialty is the Spanish language and culture.

I am pleased to be able to write to you on this occasion because I should like to present my most energetic protest against the treatment being accorded by your government to the seventeen arrested individuals who are being considered as hostages. I am referring to Raúl Sendic, Julio Marenales, Jorge Zabalza, Eleuterio Fernández, Mauricio Rosencoff, Jorge Manera, Adolfo Wassen, Henry Engler, José Alberto Mujica, Jessie Macchi, Elena Curbelo, Raquel Dupont, Gracia Dri, Alba Antúnez, Estela Sánchez, Cristina Cabrera, Flavia Schilling.

According to very trustworthy sources (among them being the International Red Cross, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Human Rights) these people have been methodically tortured and they are being held in conditions that are comparable only to those of the Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War. All of this is inhuman and totally in disagreement with the UN's International Treaty on Human Rights.

If these individuals have committed any crimes they logically deserve to be brought before a tribunal so that they may be tried



JUAN MARIA BORDABERRY

according to Uruguayan law. This is what occurs in any civilized and democratic country. Torture and the dehumanization of prisoners are not worthy of a nation with a history such as that of Uruguay.

I ask that Your Excellency use his power to immediately better the lamentable situation of the above mentioned people and that these shall be henceforward treated according to the international norms of civilized and Christian conduct.

I take this opportunity to send you my greetings and I remain

Yours truly

(signed:) Kenneth James Golby

c.c. (in English)

Mr. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

Mr. Alan MacEachen, Minister of External Affairs.

Bordaberry Answers Golby

Montevideo
February 12, 1975

Dear Sir:

I received your letter on the situation of several persons who have been detained and tried for seditious activities. Contrary to my customary practice, I have decided to answer you to clear up the erroneous information that you seem to have obtained, in the hope that my reply will serve to free our small nation, which has struggled silently and energetically to reestablish peace, from the frustrating effects of an ongoing international campaign of falsehoods and calumnies.

I repeat that it is not my usual practice to answer letters such as yours, since generally they are inspired by just such campaigns, and since our Uruguay, which has no capital other than the unrestrained free spirit of its men and women, does not find itself in suitable circumstances to face and combat the propaganda offensive of world Communism, which is backed by resources and means beyond our reach.

The titles after your name and your professional position permit me to suppose that this is not so in your case and that convincing you of your error would have positive results for our country. In any case, it is worth trying.

The persons you mention in your letter—Raúl Sendic, Julio Marenales, Jorge Zabalza, Mauricio Rosencoff, etc.—were among the top leaders of a rebel movement that plagued Uruguay during the years 1969-1972. The movement clearly originated abroad, since it was part of the insurrectionary Latin American movement led and directed from Cuba, as is widely known today.

Uruguay did not deserve such betrayal from some of its children, who were following international orders. It did not deserve it because for a long time Uruguay has had advanced social legislation; it has one of the highest per capita incomes in America and even in the world; even more important, we are especially proud of our income distribution, which is one of the most equitable ever known. In Uruguay there are no big gaps between the various social strata and there is constant mobility between them, since there are absolutely no privileged or entrenched castes. Uruguay has the highest literacy rate and life expectancy in Latin America; they are among the highest in the world. Its people have access on a per capita basis to communications media (press, television, telephone) equal to that of residents of the most developed countries.

There is no problem of a native population, which does not exist. All Uruguayans are descendants of the original Spanish colonists, later augmented by heavy immi-

*CDDPU, P.O. Box 277, Station "P," Toronto, Ontario.

gration from several European countries.

Uruguay can boast of one of the lowest rates of population growth in the world, similar to that of the industrialized countries.

Thus, nothing really justifies such an attack on Uruguay. It was simply chosen to be the object of an international conspiracy. An attractive objective in the South Atlantic, at the mouth of the Plata River Basin, set between two immense and powerful South American nations.

This sedition never had any popular support, nor did it represent any popular sentiment or aspiration. Its participants generally came from the middle class, from among intellectuals, artists, or university students and graduates. In the 1971 elections the leftist party only got 17 percent of the vote and its extremist tendency—representing the rebel elements—did not even get one-third of that. They were open and free elections, as traditionally occur in Uruguay. The very watchful presence of activist left militants certifies their openness.

We are fighting sedition with all possible weapons and it is true that although we are many, our weapons are few. We have no wealth to give, nor petroleum to exchange, for arms. Quite often, the rebel elements, supported and financed from abroad, were better armed than our soldiers and police.

Those men and women you are interested in today did not wage an open fight. They used all the methods of common criminals: stealing, murder, betrayal, kidnapping, and killing innocent victims in order to intimidate the population. For example, a poor peasant paid with his life for having inadvertently discovered a rebel hiding place; the "mercy" of his captors only extended to giving him a big dose of pentothal so that he would not feel his passage to another life. So too, men who were kidnapped by these seditious individuals emerged from the cave-prisons looking like sickly cadavers, their eyes hurting from the sun that they had since given up hope of seeing. Some of them had nothing to do with Uruguayan problems, for example, a U.S. consultant who paradoxically was in Uruguay to collaborate in a program to increase land productivity through a system of taxes.

But the alien nature of the sedition, the lack of domestic motivation and popular support for it, and the rebels' cruel and inhuman methods would not have justified our using the same methods on them, nor would it justify cruelty to prisoners today. We fought them with the law, with the legal tools of the constitution and laws of the land; these persons were and are being judged by the appropriate courts and sentenced following trials in which they had every opportunity for defense. Those

who are still serving their sentences are in a model prison, constructed with millions of pesos that were sorely needed elsewhere.

None of them are hostages, as you have been told: All of them are serving their sentences or are under the jurisdiction of the court that is trying them.

As a person who thoroughly knows our language, you must know that a hostage is "a person of value or esteem who has been taken and remains in the hands of the enemy or hostile forces while some agreement or arrangement is being negotiated."

There is no agreement or arrangement to be negotiated with the rebels because we have no relations with them, nor do our laws permit such methods.

During the struggle rebels have died; so have military officers, soldiers, policemen, and civilians. But whenever a rebel was wounded, he was treated like any other human being. Raúl Sendic himself, shot in the face during the gun battle in which he was captured, was operated on in the Central Armed Forces Hospital. His life was saved thanks to the skills of the surgeons who operated on him and on many others.

It is true that not all prisoners can be held in the same establishment. Elementary defense considerations force us to keep them separated. This happens in all parts of the world. But that does not change the kind of treatment given them.

You mention the testimony of the International Red Cross, the International Federation of Human Rights, and the International Commission of Jurists. In April 1974 the International Red Cross visited only the detention centers for common criminals. Of necessity, there are some rebels there, but the percentage is very low (less than 5 percent).

The report specifically states that in no case did they note mistreatment or receive complaints of this character. It describes the bad conditions in some of these establishments, which are not especially planned for political prisoners but rather are for the general prison population. Unfortunately, the resources earmarked to improve these institutions instead rightly went into the construction of new facilities for political prisoners, who were placed in the most modern of those just constructed. This has set back our plans in this field and we are applying ourselves to this problem again. But it can be seen that this has not affected the prison conditions of the rebels; on the contrary, they have been granted the best conditions.

The joint report of Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists does not demonstrate ill treatment in a single case. Their main objections revolve around the judicial procedure, particularly the pretrial waiting period.

In my opinion, they forget that the

Uruguayan judicial apparatus was set up in accordance with the peaceful, law-abiding character of the Uruguayans; since few cases were foreseen, there are usually only three judges. Unexpectedly, more than 3,000 trials have loaded that structure. We have been correcting this situation, adding judges and prosecutors to speed up the trials.

Moreover, the testimony of these two organizations does not inspire my confidence, since I cannot remember hearing them condemn the crimes, tortures, and loss of freedom brought on by the rebels. Nor have they condemned such occurrences in the countries that supported the rebels. Despite this, my government allowed all these organizations to visit the country and independently carry out their investigations.

None of the persons you mention have been denied access to the appropriate court as you claim; all have been tried or condemned by such courts.

None of them are hostages, because this is a practice we are not permitted to use and because we have nothing to negotiate with an international conspiracy. None of them are subject to methodical torture or inhuman treatment.

I believe that you have been misinformed by the campaign of lies of international Communism, and I hope that my report will help you revise your concepts.

Perhaps it would also be useful to alert you to another bit of misinformation that is being circulated. A short while ago the Uruguayan military attaché, Col. Ramón Trabal, was murdered in Paris. Responsibility for the crime was taken by the so-called "Raúl Sendic International Brigade." Colonel Trabal was a distinguished military man, an outstanding figure in the struggle against sedition, a man of intelligence, capability, and bravery. He was esteemed by all—civilians and military—as a man of many ideas and lofty ideals.

For these reasons, it was an error to murder him; it caused general indignation and protest, and profound sadness and bitterness to those of us who knew him.

Those in the international conspiracy realized immediately that they had to rectify their error quickly. The first signs of this rectification are already appearing: The ever-present propaganda apparatus has begun to attribute the crime to us. The accusations begin, veiled at first; they test the ground, then progressively step them up. The international wire services begin to send out anonymous testimony, in cowardly fashion putting the allegation in quotation marks to exonerate themselves of responsibility for its authorship, as happened recently in a cable from Prague.

Soon the apparatus will be functioning at full force and men like you, absorbed in your studies and research, will register the

accusation subconsciously. Then one day, without knowing exactly why, you will accept it as a proved and undebatable fact.

And it is false, Doctor; you who invoke Christian norms of conduct can rest assured that these same norms are what inspire our conduct.

There is no reason why you should know my country's features in detail. Perhaps as a result you have been deceived by biased information at first. But our invincible strength resides precisely in our moral strength and in our upright conduct as a nation. Perhaps the events occurring around the world today will serve to corroborate the story of this worthy nation that is not resigned to submit to what is undoubtedly an international plot of violence and terrorism.

I trust that you will send a copy of this letter to the same persons to whom you sent your accusation.

My most respectful greetings,

Juan María Bordaberry
President of the Republic

Defense Committee Replies to Bordaberry

The letter that Bordaberry sent to Prof. Kenneth James Golby, in answer to Golby's energetic protest, is vague in describing the present situation in Uruguay and in answering the accusations against him. He limits himself to denying the existence of hostages and mistreatment without providing proof to back his assertions.

In his statement he tries to evade precise answers and presents a very subjective description of Uruguayan reality in general and of the guerrilla movement in particular.

It is not hard to prove him wrong, since we have a very effective weapon on our side—the truth. The same truth that hundreds of thousands of Uruguayans are aware of, including Mr. Bordaberry and his cronies. The difference is that we shout it out for all to hear, while they try to hide and disguise it.


To make this clear, we are going to go point by point over the president's inaccuracies.

First we want to make it clear that there is no international Communist campaign to undermine Uruguay's reputation. On the contrary, it is "the unrestrained free spirit of its [Uruguay's] men and women" that is rebelling against the atrocities of the dictatorship and making them known to international public opinion, so that people will know the truth and judge for themselves.

The Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Uruguay is an independent organization for the defense of human rights. Thus it is not aligned with any particular political tendency. The committee's members and collaborators are in-

spired by and work within a framework of humanitarian sentiments.

Only a mind affected by a phobia against Communism could imagine that all persons or organizations that oppose the atrocities



of the Uruguayan regime are Communists. With Mr. Bordaberry this sickness reaches such a pitch that he indirectly accuses such prestigious international organizations as the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International of being Communist agents.

We believe that this is a gratuitous accusation, which deserves a most serious public retraction by the president.

"The unrestrained free spirit" of Uruguayans is one of our main endowments and thus we will never accept a dictatorship as the norm in our society. But to say that this spirit is the "only" resource we have is to insult all Uruguayans.

By saying this, Bordaberry proves that his government is the only cause of Uruguay's loss of international prestige. It alone is guilty of arbitrary actions; we limit ourselves to making them known to the public.

We agree that it does not have resources or means to counter this propaganda. The letter to Professor Golby is a good example of this. The truth is always stronger than a thousand lies.

We are not going to dwell at length on Cuban infiltration of the "Latin American insurrectionary movement" since this is part of the sickness of the Uruguayan regime, which we already described.

What we do want to make clear are the means used to obtain the "proof" of "Cuban

interference," which Uruguayan Minister of External Affairs Dr. Juan Carlos Blanco presented at the OAS assembly: Twelve leaders of the National Liberation Movement [the Tupamaros], who were tried more than two years ago, were taken out of Libertad Penitentiary and forced to undergo savage torture again to obtain this "proof." In solidarity and corroboration of the use of torture in this questioning, the other prisoners at the penitentiary went on a hunger strike in September 1974.

This is not the time to demonstrate what countries have a real influence over our country's internal affairs, but American and Brazilian intervention in Latin America, and particularly in Uruguay, is well known.

Later on, Bordaberry gives "his" description of Uruguayan reality, but he neglects to point out that that reality is several decades old.

Uruguay was proud of its advanced social legislation; it no longer exists. The unions have been banned and their leaders persecuted and imprisoned. The rights of assembly and to strike do not exist. The Caja del Seguro de Páro [unemployment insurance] is several months behind in making payments to the textile workers, to give only one example. There is no job security, since any worker or employee can be arbitrarily fired.

Uruguay used to have the third highest per capita income in Latin America. In the last fifteen years this income has declined or stagnated. ("Uruguay's Continuing Dilemma" by University of Pittsburgh Professor Arturo C. Porzecanski in the January 1974 issue of *Current History*.)

Further on, Bordaberry adds that Uruguay is "especially proud of our income distribution, which is one of the most equitable ever known." To make such a claim is to say that Professor Golby and all those who read his letter are ignorant. It is a slap in the face to all Uruguayans who are reduced to groveling to survive on the starvation wages they receive. The minimum wage in the private sector is 120,000 pesos monthly (a little more than \$52) and an administrative assistant at UTE (Usinas y Teléfonos del Estado—State Gas and Telephone Company) gets a monthly salary of 85,000 pesos before deductions (\$37). Of course, the colonels and generals of the armed forces get 1,300,000 pesos a month (\$565) along with unlimited loans from the banks to construct mansions and acquire anything they please.

We will quote a paragraph from an article published by the Economics Institute:

"What is certain is that 1972 saw a formidable shift away from the salaried workers to the capitalists. The figures on the decline in real wages and the increase in surplus value are unbelievable. The distribution of income, which in 1969-70

was 43% and 57% for the workers and capitalists respectively, rose to 38% and 62% in 1971, and fell to 49% and 51% in 1972."

It adds further: "This change was brought about through a smooth and even transfer of money from the hands of the workers to those of the capitalists. This was produced because average wages increased at a much slower rate than the aggregate of prices within the economy." (Published under the title "1972: A New Adjustment" in *A Conservative Readjustment*, Economics Institute, University Culture Foundation, Montevideo, 1973, pp. 215-217.)

The Uruguayan economy is fundamentally based on farm production. Thus it would be useful to say something about land distribution. Four percent of the landowners hold 60% of the land; medium-sized producers make up 36% of the landowners and 25% of the land; and the other 60% of landowners are left with the remaining 15% of the land.

With regard to the "nonexistence" of big gaps between the "various social strata," there is not much to be said. The ruling classes live better every day while the working class sees its purchasing power decline in an ever increasing way. As a result, workers are forced to emigrate to other countries to satisfy the essential needs that their own country does not meet. According to the official figures of the Argentine Immigration Office, more than 400,000 Uruguayans took up residence in that country during 1974. To this number we must add those who emigrated in previous years and those who settled in other countries (between 15,000 and 20,000 in Canada).

According to studies by the IADB (Inter American Development Bank), the present population of Uruguay is less than 1.9 million inhabitants, while the official 1963 census showed a population of 2.6 million.

It is true that Uruguay boasts a literacy rate and "life expectancy" that are the highest in Latin America, but the cultural level of the Uruguayan people is dropping slowly. Since the government intervention, the level of education in general has regressed half a century (there is no academic freedom; renowned scholars have been fired to be replaced by inept professors who sympathize with the regime; etc.). Moreover, parents have found it impossible to keep supporting their children in secondary school, not to mention the university.

Ninety-two percent of Uruguayans know how to read and write, but the number who attend secondary school has declined considerably. It is now common for a child of thirteen or fourteen to have to quit to look for work to help his parents support the home and feed the younger children. The university now belongs to the rich. Even though this has been the case for many years, there was always quite an important percentage of exceptions.

With regard to the mass media, this too is an old story. Another thing we used to be proud of was freedom of the press and expression, today nonexistent. All opposition newspapers have been closed indefinitely and Uruguayans can only read the official press, which is full of lies and omissions. Every week the Argentine and Brazilian newspapers commonly sold in Uruguay are confiscated for containing articles that speak against the Uruguayan government.

It is true that Uruguay had one of the highest per capita indexes of television sets, but that is ancient history now. On the basis of the earnings described above, what worker could buy a television set that costs more than 1 million pesos?

If a Uruguayan who does not have connections inside the government wants to have a telephone installed in his home, he must wait more than a year until there is one available and pay 500,000 pesos (\$218). Who can pay that much?

Then Bordaberry touches on an unusual theme, showing himself to be a hidden racist: Uruguay does not have a "problem of a native population, which does not exist." What luck! We are all white! He says no native population exists, but he does not mention that it once did, that it was exterminated by the "whites" after we had become a republic.

Another thing the president is shamelessly proud of is that Uruguay has "one of the lowest rates of population growth in the world, similar to that of the industrialized countries" (1.3 percent annually). Of the 187,000 square kilometers in Uruguay, 87.6 percent is suitable for the production of foodstuffs. Less than 2 million persons live on this land while 88 percent of the population resides in cities (1.3 million in Montevideo).

It is not for us to approve or disapprove of the existence of guerrilla movements in Uruguay—if that is what Bordaberry is referring to when he says that nothing justifies "such an attack on Uruguay"—but any person more or less aware of the situation in Uruguay or Latin America (since it does not differ much from that in Uruguay) can adopt his own position on its existence. However, if Bordaberry means by "such an attack on Uruguay" the informational activities of the Uruguayan defense committees and other organizations, then there is room for discussion.

How can he expect to silence Uruguayans who cherish liberty and justice in view of all the atrocities being committed by the Uruguayan government? The Toronto Comité de Defensa por los Prisioneros Políticos en Uruguay will continue seeking more effective means to express condemnation of the government and solidarity with the political prisoners that populate the jails and barracks of the regime. We do this

without regard for the prisoner's political affiliation, in the conviction that no person should be persecuted for his political ideas, not to speak of being mistreated by the authorities.

Further on, Bordaberry refers to the percentage that the leftist party won in the presidential elections, but he forgets to mention that he got only 22 percent of the vote. He speaks of the purity of the electoral process, not mentioning that those elections were disputed as fraudulent (Professor A.C. Porzecanski, in the work cited above).

Nor do we understand this sudden move to defend the "free and pure elections" traditional in Uruguay. In a recent speech Bordaberry justified the suspension of the upcoming elections arguing that they did not reflect the popular will, and instead he put forth the armed forces and himself as the genuine representatives of the people's interests.

We will quote a paragraph of that speech:

"... today, tonight let all lose hope who invoke the November 1976 constitutional deadline, those who dream of a return to electoral politics, thinking that they are once again going to prevail with their inhuman political apparatus, hoping to warp this revolution born of the deepest popular aspirations."

We must also mention Bordaberry's speech on December 30, 1974. Among other things he said, "... the conduct of the armed forces cannot be disputed, it cannot be judged by the citizens, because we are not dealing with a political party with a set line. We are dealing with a military institution fulfilling its duty. And this is not a debatable matter; democracy does not extend to this, because the actions of the armed forces in defense of the republic's honor cannot be debated." Further on he added, "I think that to attempt to use classical democratic procedures to judge the conduct of the armed forces in defending that which is most fundamental and essential to our nationality would be like trying to judge a man who has violated formal juridical norms by defending his mother, in this case the Fatherland. This action cannot be judged." Later he repeated: "It is my obligation to reassure the armed forces with my personal pledge that their conduct will not directly or indirectly be subject to the control of the citizenry as if it were an ordinary political matter."

Mr. Bordaberry is not satisfied with disregarding the constitution of the republic. Rather he tries to theorize about the function of the armed forces, placing them above the people—the true declared sovereign power according to all democratic constitutions, including the Uruguayan.

As for the arms possessed by the repressive forces in Uruguay, they have no reason to envy any other country. The Brazilian and American governments have taken on

the task of getting the most advanced equipment to them. You do not have to be an expert to realize that the arms and vehicles used by the armed forces are new and come from Brazil or the United States. It is true that Uruguay does not have the wealth to exchange oil for arms, but more than 20 percent of the national budget is destined for repression.

Further on, after describing the violence of the Tupamaros—without mentioning Dan Mitrione's execution (October 1970)—Bordaberry said that their "cruel and inhuman methods" would not justify "our using the same methods on them, nor would it justify cruelty to prisoners today."

The same president, who now denies the existence of mistreatment of prisoners, wrote to Monsignor Carlos Parteli, archbishop of Montevideo: "I defend the severity and requirements of interrogation, which avoids deaths in this war and permits bloodless gains. . . ." (June 15, 1972.)

The report presented by the World Council of Churches after its visit to Uruguay (June 10-14, 1972) said in paragraph two: "We believe that convincing evidence exists that, as part of the violation of human rights, the Joint Forces (military and police forces) use physical and psychological torture on political prisoners. This is part of the present political repression supposedly directed against the Tupamaros but in reality amply extended to broad sectors of the population.

"Although we did not witness torture, in answer to our frequent questions no one during our visit denied that such tortures are practiced.

"An important leader of the government whom we spoke to excused the practice of torture as defense of the state or as a necessary countermeasure to the tortures presumably used by the Tupamaro guerrillas.

"We spoke with some lawyers trying to defend political prisoners and with the families of those prisoners. All spoke of frequent incidents of torture, the results of which they themselves witnessed.

"The minutes of parliamentary debates during recent months were full of accounts of torture, and of deaths resulting from torture, presented by respected members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies."

The May-June 1974 report alluded to by Bordaberry from the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International stated:

"Torture and Mistreatment.

"Negligence in these proceedings is serious from the point of view of suspects' legal protection against mistreatment. We received many complaints of torture and other forms of mistreatment. It is the general opinion of defense lawyers that almost all persons detained in military prisons and some of those held in police

stations continue to be severely mistreated before and during interrogation. The most conservative estimates we heard were that this occurs in about 50 percent of all cases.

"The authorities declared that they had given strict instructions to all units prohibiting all forms of mistreatment and that, in general, these instructions had been carried out. In the few cases where there was evidence of mistreatment, those guilty had been severely punished. Although we requested them, they did not give us additional details on these instructions or punishments. Military judges told us that hundreds of complaints of torture had been presented to them but that they had been unable to verify a single case. In such cases the burden of proof falls on the accuser.

"On the other hand, the president of the Supreme Court told us that this was not a new problem in civil jurisdiction. It was not rare for a civil judge to find cases in which it was proved that the police had been abusive during questioning."

The same report added: "We were denied authorization to visit any of the barracks where interrogation takes place."

The claim that all those arrested are tried is not true: Jorge Selves, a student, was arrested August 23, 1973, and has never gone before any judge; he has not been allowed visits from his family or lawyer. There are hundreds of political prisoners in this same situation.

We quote another paragraph of the report from the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International:

"The total inefficacy of Habeas Corpus as a recourse in determining the place or motives of an arrest has been proved."

The main objective of Bordaberry's reply should have been to prove that the seventeen hostages do not exist, but he limits himself to denying it without presenting any proof. He maintains that "we are not permitted to use such methods" [as holding hostages—IP], but who can he convince with such a poor argument? How many things forbidden by the constitution and the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights happen every day?

Moreover, Bordaberry expressly recognizes that these seventeen hostages were removed from Libertad Penitentiary and transferred to different establishments:

"It is true that not all prisoners can be held in the same establishment. Elementary defense considerations force us to keep them separated. This happens in all parts of the world. But that does not change the kind of treatment given them."

We realize that Bordaberry has clarified absolutely nothing about the situation of the seventeen hostages. What is more, the falsehoods that his letter contains disqualify him as a moral authority whose word alone is convincing proof.

We challenge Mr. Bordaberry to prove what he has said and to show us that his letter is not a simple game of words:

- Permit a lawyer sent by the defense committees or an international organization to interview each of the seventeen hostages privately. Give him access to the judicial files for each of them. Have Uruguayan authorities offer him all the required collaboration.

- Permit a board of doctors belonging to an international organization to examine the state of health of the seventeen hostages and the prison conditions in which they are held.

Until this is carried out, until the nonexistence of the hostages and good prison conditions for all political prisoners have been demonstrated, we will continue demanding *all* the planks in our platform:

- As described in the memorandum presented by the committee, the seventeen prisoners have been subjected to discriminatory treatment in comparison to others held for similar reasons. *Thus, we demand the abolition of the status of hostage, which is the situation of these seventeen political prisoners.*

- It has been proved that these seventeen hostages, along with 50 percent of all the regime's political prisoners, have been subjected to all kinds of physical and psychological torture. *Thus, we demand the total cessation of torture.*

- The state of health of the hostages has been noticeably affected and they require adequate medical care and assistance. This is not possible without the intervention of an important international organization that will assure the meeting of this objective. *Because of that, it is urgent that the seventeen hostages get medical attention, under the control of an international organization.*

- The existence of hostages and the treatment they receive, like the violation of individual guarantees, shows the outrages that the Uruguayan government is committing. *Thus, we demand that all international treaties signed by Uruguay concerning human rights be respected.*

- Understanding that the existence of political prisoners is a permanent attack on human rights, and that every person has the right to express his ideas, *we demand freedom for all political prisoners.*

March 1975

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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FROM OUR READERS

A report on New Year's resolutions is hardly at the top of our agenda so far as fast-breaking events are concerned—it's like keeping up to date on what happened to last winter's snows. Nonetheless, the following letter from Holly Harkness of Minneapolis, Minnesota, sounded timely to us.

"When I got my first six-month subscription to the IP at the 14th National YSA Convention last December, I made a New Year's Resolution I would read it every week. It's probably the only New Year's resolution I've ever carried through on. In order to fulfill my resolution (as well as keep up with your excellent news coverage), I am renewing my sub for another 6 months.

"I'm sending you an article from a local paper which I thought might interest you. It's about how one of our Twin Cities corporations is doing their bit to extend hospitality to those Vietnamese who have come to the 'land of the big PX.'

"I enjoyed reading 'So They Say' in the May 26th issue on the Mayagüez incident, but I wondered why there was no quote from 'Scoop' Jackson. As a declared candidate for President I would think he'd want to get in on the 'victory celebration.' Or is it possible he happened to notice that no one outside of Congress or the Administration was celebrating?"

The clipping was a good one, telling about a food corporation's moves to help the Vietnamese refugees live it up. Watch for our handling of it—if not this week then next.

And in return for the clipping and the encouraging words, here's "Scoop" Jackson's contribution to "So They Say":

Hawk Keeps His Cool. "But Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, who is regarded as one of the more hawkish members of Congress, said: 'This is the time for cool heads. Because we are a strong and powerful nation we must exercise restraint in the use of force. A failure to show restraint could lead to a Tonkin Gulf situation.'—May 14 Washington dispatch published in May 15 *New York Times*.

Hawk Loses His Cool. "Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, expressed relief at the release of the men and said he supported the use of military force to obtain their freedom."—May 15 Washington dispatch in May 15 *New York Post*.

We continue to get reports of the interest displayed in *Intercontinental Press* by some

of the many foreign students in the United States, particularly those from colonial and semicolonial countries.

Carol Kroll of Cleveland wrote us that recently a well-known figure in one of the African student organizations on a campus in the area took out a subscription, mentioning the "excellent coverage" of the Eritrean struggle as one of the reasons he found *Intercontinental Press* attractive.

K.H. of Sanger, California, indicated one of the features of interest to him in *Intercontinental Press* when he sent \$5 for the book of drawings by Copain: "Hopefully it will enable you to start publishing more articles in Spanish."

Grady W. Vandiver of Morongo Valley, California, in writing for the book of drawings by Copain, said: "I especially am interested in one of our very own true Marxist James P. Cannon whom I knew very well.

"I am sending \$5.00 for the book. If you

are out of supply just send me something I can frame to hang on my picture wall. If you don't have anything, keep the five dollars or turn it over to the Socialist Workers party."

We hope that besides the drawing of Cannon, you found some of the other drawings just right for a spot on the wall.

For some years we have campaigned for a speedier mail service. Lest some of our readers think we are a bit one-sided in this, we would like to make clear that we think the U.S. Postal Service, for all its slowness, offers a dependable service on the whole.

A case in point was recently reported by Associated Press. On May 16, 1975, Gertrude Horgan, a professor at Aquinas College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, received a package mailed to her by her sister in Newton, Massachusetts. The two-by-three-foot box contained the professor's Irish tweed coat, left behind during a Christmas visit in 1962. The package was mailed on January 10, 1963.

According to calculations made by the Associated Press, the coat was en route 4,509 days.

While styles may have changed in the intervening years, the coat is no doubt still serviceable. On the Mothball Express it's slow but sure, as they say. □

Special Offer



Larissa Daniel, anti-Stalinist dissident.

To help celebrate the tenth anniversary of *Intercontinental Press*, reproductions of sketches by Copain, artist for *Intercontinental Press*, were published by the New York Local of the Socialist Workers party and bound in an 8.5" x 11" book. The aim was to use the money gained from sales to help us begin publishing articles in Spanish.

The drawings, of various sizes, include portraits of Hugo Blanco, Malcolm X, James P. Cannon, Che Guevara, Cesar Chavez, Leon Trotsky, and many more, some of which are suitable for framing.

A limited number of copies of this collection of drawings are now available for only \$5.

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