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Nixon Threatens Four More Years of Bombing

'Economist' Smears Fourth International

Japan, China Close Deal at Expense of Vietnamese

Trotsky 40 Years Ago in Copenhagen

Market Vote in Denmark Leaves Deep Divisions

A Big Garbage Can

The U.S. government is financing an oceanic survey, in which ten American universities are participating, to trace the path and extent of flow of a newly discovered submarine current of enormous size that runs along the East Coast of the United States, beneath and counter to the Gulf Stream, then along the South American coast until it turns eastward, goes around South Africa, across the Indian Ocean, and finally into the South Pacific, where its further course is unknown.

The purpose of the survey is to investigate the possibilities of utilizing the giant stream for the disposal of industrial wastes.

The survey, called the Geochemical Ocean Sections Study, represents a major part of the American contribution to the International Decade of Ocean Exploration.

Meanwhile the Water Pollution Control Advisory Board set up by President Nixon expressed alarm over the growing problem of ocean dumping. A prime example is the incapacity of the ocean to absorb the amount of sewage sludge currently being dumped outside New York Harbor.

The board recommended studying the possibilities of hauling the sludge inland where it might be used beneficially to grow crops or rehabilitate abandoned strip mines.

Samples of sludge from Chicago's sewer system are already being transported 400 miles to the Shawnee National Forest to see if the nutrients can bring back areas destroyed by strip mining.

A recent incident in Honolulu suggests still another way of disposing of garbage beneficially. The United Press International reported that Thomas Finney, who was walking on the terrace of a twenty-two story building, inadvertently stepped over the edge.

He was rushed to the hospital, but it turned out that he had suffered only scratches and bruises. He had landed on a pile of garbage, which cushioned his fall.

The account by the wire service failed to mention how many stories high the pile of garbage was. \Box

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Nixon Plans Four More Years of Bombing

By David Thorstad

President Nixon held a news conference on October 5. In it he not only defended - and even praised his merciless bombing of Vietnam, but he also cynically stated his intention to continue that bombing if he is reelected. His statement can only be interpreted as an effort to claim a mandate for four more years of war: "I will only say that the bombing and mining was essential to turn around what was a potentially disastrous situation in South Vietnam. The back of the enemy offensive has been broken. They hold no provincial capitals now at all.

"This could not have been accomplished without the mining and the bombing, and the mining and the bombing will continue, of course, until we get some agreements on the negotiating front."

He referred to Lyndon Johnson's bombing halt prior to the 1968 elections as a "very, very great mistake" and insisted that "we are not going to make that mistake now."

Nixon's ghoulish cynicism reached a high point with his proud reference to the fact that the liberation forces have been driven out of Anloc and Quangtri City. Both have been wiped out at a cost of thousands of lives and hundreds of thousands of refugees.

". . . Quang Tri is no longer a city," wrote Peter Kann from Saigon in the October 4 Wall Street Journal. "It is a field of rubble, and circling over it in a helicopter recently, one searched the landscape less for any sign of life than for any sign that there had once been life.

"Quang Tri wasn't so much destroyed as obliterated... The war has progressed a stage beyond destroying cities to save them; the strategy now seems to be destroying cities simply so the other side can't have them."

In the October 8 New York Times, Craig Whitney described what remains of the Quangtri Citadel, which South Vietnamese marines entered, to Nixon's great pride, on September 15: "The Citadel, only six months ago a splendid if crumbling 19th-century fortress with thick red-brick walls surrounded by a moat, is no more. It is possible to see where the walls stood, but they are chewed up and broken by the force of countless 750- and 2,000-pound bombs that American planes dropped between late June and September to enable South Vietnamese troops to fight their way back in.

"Inside the walls nothing—not one tree, no building, not even a bunker—is left standing.

"Outside, stretching east, west, and south as far as the town once did, there is nothing but rubble, bomb craters and shredded trees.

"The marines who reoccupied the town this September put up yellow South Vietnamese flags on the shattered telephone poles, because almost nothing else stands higher than a man in Quangtri city now."

This is the kind of thing Nixon is promising to give the Vietnamese four more years of unless they capitulate. It is apparently the fate that he holds in store for other cities, including Saigon, if the liberation struggle should erupt there.

But the obliterated cities are only part of the president's proud tale. His bombing policy has accomplished a great deal in other ways too.

Since the Vietnamese offensive and Nixon's massive bombing escalation began, Kann noted, well over 1,000,-000 persons have become refugees. In addition, "a dozen or so 'mini-Quang Tris' — devastated district towns - are scattered around the country. The army of South Vietnam is estimated to have suffered 36,000 dead and another 70,000 or so wounded. Communist casualties are estimated at two to six times those of Saigon. Civilian casualties, as always, remain largely untabulated."

If bombs were falling on the United States—with six times the population of North and South Vietnam—at a comparable rate, Kann estimated, it would mean a minimum of 2,000,000 Americans dead and wounded and



The New York Post

6,000,000 homeless—all within a sixmonth period.

Information on Nixon's bombing and other policies in Indochina has been finding its way into the U.S. press with greater-than-usual frequency as the presidential election campaign draws closer to voting day, November 7. These reports from sources inside the imperialist establishment are undoubtedly being leaked by individuals who support the candidacy of George McGovern and hope to embarrass Nixon.

The New York Times, which has backed McGovern, ran two such reports in its October 4 issue—one on the bombing, the other a United Press International story on the so-called Phoenix program.

The first, written by Tad Szulc, provided "up-to-date figures on United States air operations in Indochina" supplied by the Pentagon to the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and then "made available" to the *Times*. The subcommittee is chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy, a leading Democrat and McGovern backer.

The Pentagon statistics showed that the bombs—dubbed "air ammunition" by the Defense Department—dropped by the United States in Southeast Asia during the first nine months of 1972 exceeded in tonnage the bombs dropped in the entire year of 1971—800,000 as compared to 763,160.

"Aggregate figures for the last seven and a half years showed that United States aircraft launched 7,550,800 tons of bombs and other ordnance rockets, cannon missiles and machinegun bullets—on Indochina between February, 1965, and Aug. 30, 1972," wrote Szulc.

"This is roughly three-and-a-half times the tonnage of explosives used during all of World War II by all the allies in all the war theaters. The World War II total was 2,056,244 tons."

An analysis of the figures showed that during the forty-eight months of the Johnson administration, 3,225, 808 tons of bombs were dropped, while during the forty-four months of the Nixon administration, the figure was 3,829,992.

Further figures on civilian casualties were provided by Herbert Mitgang of the Times's editorial board in a column October 2. Mitgang found the session of the Kennedy subcommittee he attended a "despairing sight" because of the callousness and evasiveness of administration spokesmen. The assistant secretary of state, for instance, explained his lack of statistics on how many hospitals, schools, churches, and other civilian installations have been hit by U. S. bombs by dismissing them as "regrettable by-products" of the war, not "military targets."

From other sources, the subcommittee has assembled such information, Mitgang wrote. "The 'regrettable byproducts' include these statistics: In the last two years about 400,000 people have been killed throughout Indochina—a frightening number that is an actual 'bloodbath,' as distinct from the theoretical one predicted by President Nixon in the event that American support was withdrawn from the Thieu Government. Since the North Vietnamese do not divulge their casualties, the real figures could well exceed this estimate.

"The people displaced from their homes by the war's continuation in the last two years include: 1,850,000 South Vietnam refugees; 2,000,000 Cambodian refugees; 250,000 Laotian refugees and an unknown number of North Vietnamese."

Since the war began, the total number of refugees in the South alone is estimated at 8,000,000—almost one-half the South Vietnamese population!

Mitgang added that, "based on hospital records, about one-fourth of the wounded civilians in South Vietnam are children under 12."

The UPI story on the Phoenix program was based on a "private report" of the House Foreign Operations and

Government Information Subcommittee. The Phoenix program is an extensive one of organized terror and assassination that the U.S. government began in 1968. It is an example of a genuine "terrorist international," in contrast with the purely fictitious one that same government has lately been making so much noise about.

In the program, U.S. soldiers have been sent to South Vietnam to "neutralize" suspected members of the NLF through imprisonment or death. According to official figures, 20,587 "suspected Vietcong" were killed under the program between 1968 and May 1971. The subcommittee found it very likely that many of these victims were actually innocent civilians whose "targeting" was "often based on faulty intelligence, sometimes supplied by individuals having ulterior motives."

After holding hearings on the program over an entire two-year period, the subcommittee finally decided to question "the serious moral considerations of U.S. support for a program that has allegedly included torture, murder and inhumane treatment of South Vietnamese civilians."

A former agent in the Phoenix program, K. Barton Osborn, testified before the subcommittee that reconnaissance units sent out to find their victims "had the primary mission of assassinations." From his experience, he said, suspects who were captured were either tortured to death or thrown from helicopters, frequently by American soldiers.

"The former agent also said he had seen Americans slowly starve a woman to death and that some suspects had had rods slowly tapped into their ears until their brains were penetrated," UPI reported.

"He said that Americans 'knew unofficially' it was preferable to kill suspects rather than go through the 'administrative problems and procedure' of detaining them."

Nixon's escalation of the air war has led to an important U.S. military buildup in the Pacific. In an October 7 dispatch from Guam, New York Times correspondent Joseph Treaster said that Andersen Air Force Base had been transformed "into the biggest and busiest center for B-52 operations over Indochina." Three-quarters of the approximately 200 long-range heavy bombers are stacked up wing to wing there and

fly out in formations of three on an around-the-clock schedule.

The air force has sent some 10,000 men to Andersen to fly and maintain the B-52s, increasing the base's population to 14,000 excluding dependents.

Additional forces have also been sent to other locations in the Pacific, Treaster reported—about 5,000 to Okinawa, several hundred to Taiwan, and an unspecified number to the Philippines. Other bases that have reportedly received no reinforcements have nevertheless "dropped or reduced some of their former missions so that they can make a greater contribution to the war in Indochina."

One of the things U.S. pilots have been doing over Vietnam besides bombing is seeding clouds with rainmaking devices. Although Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has denied or refused comment on reports of such activity, a lawsuit was filed in Washington in September by a manufacturer of cloud-seeding equipment charging that the United States is using its devices in Indochina in violation of patent rights. Bernard A. Power, president of the Weather Engineering Corporation of Canada Ltd. and its United States subsidiary, Weather Engineering Corporation of America, estimated that 1,900,000 explosive canisters filled with silver iodide crystals had been produced for use in Southeast Asia. The company is seeking \$95,000,000 for the "full recovery of profits" for the devices, said to cost \$50 each.

Lon Nol's Shredded Rabbit

Lon Nol, the puppet president installed by the CIA in Cambodia, has uncovered a dastardly Communist plot. In a message to the nation at the end of September he called on all patriotic citizens to arrest anyone offering to buy rabbits at high prices. He said that agents of the Communists had been paying \$125 to \$175 for rabbits.

"They have insinuated that their doctors need rabbit blood to inject into wounded men," he said.

However, the real motive of the Communists, according to Lon Nol, is to use the rabbits as bombs. This is done by attaching plastic explosives to them and releasing them near Cambodian army positions. "The lights attract the rabbits," and they explode, he said.

Lon Nol did not explain why, as a counter measure, he has not used CIA money to buy anti-Communist rabbits. Wired with explosives, they could be turned loose near the enemy positions with devastating effect.

Japan-China Deal at Expense of Vietnamese

By Jon Rothschild

World reaction to Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka's trip to Peking this September rivaled the response to Nixon's voyage. "Japan has now leapfrogged ahead of the United States in the world rush to tie new links with the one-time international pariah, mainland China," the New York Times editorialized on October 1. This leapfrogging was greeted somewhat cooly in Washington. The U.S. press generally echoed the Nixon administration's ambiguous stand, cautiously praising the détente, but warning that it should not proceed at Uncle Sam's expense.

Sections of the Western European press, the authoritative Paris daily *Le Monde* for example, were more enthusiastic, hailing Tanaka's trip as an important demonstration of Japanese independence from the United States.

The emergence of a new Japanese foreign policy, one in which Tokyo plays a more active role in Asia, was no doubt a feature of Tanaka's trip. But any talk of a break in the U. S.-Japanese alliance is wide of the mark. The Chinese bureaucracy did not demand such a rupture in exchange for the "normalization" of Sino-Japanese relations and an expansion of trade. Chou En-lai did not even press Tanaka for a definitive break with Taiwan, and he was silent on Japanese complicity in the U. S. war against Indochina.

The Maoist bureaucrats, after betraying the Vietnamese revolution and the international antiwar movement by wining and dining Nixon while his bombs fell on Indochina, took a further step down the same road with the Tanaka festivities. But in this case, more groundwork had been previously prepared, and Japanese capitalism was thus able, at least temporarily, to get the jump on the U.S. ruling class in extracting economic concessions from Peking.

Tanaka, known in Japan as the computerized bulldozer, was carried to power in Japan by those sections of the ruling class fed up with Eisaku Sato's reluctance to reach an accommodation with Peking. The new premier was in office less than three months before he carried out this important assignment.

Accompanied by Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and fifty other officials, Tanaka arrived in Peking on September 25 and was greeted at the airport by Chou En-lai, fifty-three other Chinese officials, and a 360man honor guard of the People's Liberation Army. It was his first visit to China since he served as a private in the Japanese army of occupation during World War II. The Chinese band played the Japanese national anthem, the first line of which is, "Long last the Emperor's reign until pebbles become rocks and moss grows on them."

Tanaka headed straight into private talks with Chou, the purpose of which, according to a statement released a week before the trip, was "to negotiate and settle questions of normalization" of relations between the two countries.

That night, the Japanese premier was banqueted like another Nixon. In Peking's Great Hall of the People, Chou rose to a toast. After noting that in the past "Japanese militarists" had caused "tremendous disasters" for the Chinese people and adding that relations had been improving for several years, Chou came to the point:

"The social systems of China and Japan are different. However, this should not be an obstacle to our two countries living together as equals and in friendship. The restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and the establishment of friendly and good neighborly relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence will open up broad prospects for the further development of friendly contacts between our two peoples and the expansion of economic and cultural exchanges between our two countries. Sino-Japanese friendship is not exclusive; it will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace."

Tanaka's responding toast contained an apology for the second world war, apparently one of Peking's preconditions for the trip: "... it is regretful that for several decades in the past relations between Japan and China had unfortunate experiences. During that time our country caused great trouble to the Chinese people, for which I once again make profound self-examination. After World War II the relations between Japan and China remained in an abnormal and unnatural state. We cannot but frankly admit this historical fact."

But the two countries, Tanaka went on, should not "linger in the dim blind alley of the past. . . . Of course the two sides have their own basic positions and peculiar conditions. But despite the fact that some minor differences exist between the positions and views of the two sides, I believe it is possible for Japan and China to overcome their divergence of views and reach agreement in the spirit of seeking common ground on major questions and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation."

The central stumbling block to the establishment of diplomatic relations was the question of Taiwan. Japan, which had always recognized Chiang Kai-shek as representing the legitimate government of China, signed a treaty with the defeated dictator in 1952. Formally, this pact ended the state of war between Japan and the "Republic of China" and established an alliance between them. The Western and Japanese press had speculated that the Chinese leaders would demand formal abrogation of the treaty as part of the price for a Tokyo-Peking rapprochement.

Related to the Taiwan question was the problem of World War II. Would Peking demand a formal peace treaty? Would war reparations be requested? What about Japan's military alliance with the United States? Could Tanaka, already under pressure from the right wing of his Liberal-Democratic party, afford to pay Peking's price?

On each question, the Maoist bu-

reaucrats demonstrated understanding, if not outright sympathy, for Tanaka's difficulties.

The first indication that Tanaka was making headway in the talks came on September 27, when he was invited to an audience with the Great Helmsman. Mao's meeting with Tanaka was played up in the Chinese press, with the standard front-page photograph of the two leaders shaking hands. At the same time, the *People's Daily*, official organ of the Chinese Communist party, reported that the Tanaka-Chou talks had been "serious and amiable." (The corresponding description of the Nixon talks had been "serious and frank.")

On the morning of September 29, Tanaka and Chou signed a joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations. The section of Chou's September 25 toast on peaceful coexistence and the reduction of tension was reproduced verbatim; the "abnormal state of affairs" between Japan and China was "declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement."

Article 2 stated: "The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China."

In Article 3, Japan acknowledged that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation." (That article reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which stipulated that Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, Manchuria, and other territories seized by Japan should revert to China.)

In Article 6, Peking "renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan."

Article 7, which was widely interpreted to be a message to the United States and the Soviet Union, affirmed that the "normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."

The final article calls for the convening of negotiations "aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc."

The Taiwan problem was handled in a way to satisfy both sides. On September 28, the day before the communiqué's release, Acting Japanese Premier Takeo Miki revealed in Tokyo that simultaneously with the publication of the communiqué Tokyo would break diplomatic relations with Taipeh. A statement to that effect, Miki said, would be released in Peking in the form of a Foreign Ministry announcement.

Shortly before the signing ceremony, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Shinasaku Hogen summoned Peng Meng-chi, Taiwanese ambassador in Tokyo, to the Foreign Ministry to inform him of Japan's decision. Hogen then briefed U. S. Ambassador Robert Ingersoll.

Immediately after the signing of the communiqué, Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira announced that the 1952 Japan-Taiwan treaty was "considered to have expired," a formulation that avoided the touchy question of abrogation

The Chiang Kai-shek regime reacted instantly, announcing on September 29 that it was cutting off diplomatic relations with Japan because of Tanaka's "perfidious action," which was described as a "stab in the back."

Making up for its weak position with strong rhetoric, the Taipeh regime noted that it had accepted Japan's surrender in 1952 and that this could not be revoked. Taiwanese officials called for expulsion of all Japanese economic interests from the island; a boycott of Japanese goods was suggested; there were threats to interrupt Japanese shipping and air transport, and the 4,000 Japanese residents of Taiwan were instructed by the Japanese embassy to stay indoors so as to avoid risking physical violence.

From all this one could get the impression that Peking had driven a hard bargain with Tanaka, that the Japanese ruling class had been forced to actually break with the Taipeh regime.

But the content of the Sino-Japanese communiqué was just the opposite. In reality, the Peking bureaucracy tacitly approved continuation of the Taiwan-Japan alliance and even turned a blind eye to the U. S.-Japan bloc. Japanese concessions to Peking were purely formal. Following in the footsteps of the Kremlin bureaucracy, the Maoist leadership continued to sell out the Asian revolution in the interests of passing diplomatic needs. This is most clearly

seen in Peking's stand on two points— Taiwan and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Chiang's rhetoric to the contrary. it is doubtful that Taipeh could break with Tokyo even if that were the generalissimo's real desire. Some 42 percent of Taiwan's imports come from Japan; 12 percent of Taiwan's exports are sold to Japan. One-fourth of all investments in Taiwan since 1954 are Japanese; more than 300 technical agreements link the two countries. Taiwan depends almost wholly on Japan for steel, chemicals, and textiles. Nearly all Taiwanese exports, even those not sold to Japan, are channeled through commercial houses in Tokyo and Osaka. There are many joint-Japan-Tawain corporaownership tions. And all this leaves aside the revenue supplied Taiwan by the more than 100,000 Japanese tourists that visit the island yearly.

From the viewpoint of the Japanese ruling class, relations with Taiwan are quite important. The September 23 issue of the U.S. magazine Business Week noted that Japanese investment in Taiwan totals \$404 million; during 1971 Japan shipped \$1,000 million worth of exports to Taiwan.

The Taiwan-Japan bond can be broken only if Taiwanese capitalism is broken. Since the Maoists have ruled out anticapitalist struggle in Asia, generally, they have no intention of pressing the Japanese ruling class to jettison its Taiwan alliance.

On the other hand, Japanese trade with China has been far from insignificant. Japanese exports to China totaled slightly more than \$578 million in 1971. That figure is expected to rise considerably in the wake of the Tanaka-Chou communiqué.

Writing in the September 30 Washington Post, Don Oberdorfer reported that the secret negotiations for the Tanaka trip, which had gone on for four months prior to the trip itself, had been backed most strongly by Japanese businessmen, who have proposed a private "Japan-China economic joint committee" that would foster "orderly economic relations" and prevent "excessive competition" among Japanese companies.

"Japanese sources said tonight [September 29]," Oberdorfer wrote, "that the government hopes to conclude a trade agreement with China in the second half of next year at the latest, including most-favored-nation treat-

ment for each other and trade quotas for major items. Negotiations are expected to begin when Yasuhiro Nakasone, Minister of International Trade and Industry, visits Peking this fall."

Japanese business is, for the moment, more favorably situated in regard to Chinese trade than U.S. business, which is restricted by the still existing boycott of China.

Business Week noted that in the first two months after Tanaka took office "Japanese businessmen have been virtually stumbling over one another in their comings and goings to the Chinese mainland." Several examples were cited: Hitachi, Ltd., a giant electrical corporation, will sell two thermal power plants to China. Each is worth \$14.6 million and they will be the largest in China. Six Japanese steel companies have agreed to sell \$17 million worth of rolled steel to China; Komatsu, Ltd. has a contract for \$6.5 million worth of construction equipment.

Chemicals, autos, freighters, and even an off-shore oil-drilling rig are also on the sales list. "Japan's exports to China for the first five months of this year were up 25.7% from the same period in 1971. And bigger deals are planned. Mitsubishi Petrochemical is negotiating an ethylene plant sale."

The Japanese trading-house Mitsui and Company, according to *Business Week*, estimates that by 1977 Japan will be buying \$2,000 million worth of Chinese goods per year while selling China \$3,000 million worth.

Some Japanese businessmen expect total trade between China and Japan to expand to \$5,000 million a year by 1977. (The current rate is nearly \$1,000 million.) The Economist suggested that by 1982 Chinese-Japanese trade may stand at a yearly \$11,000 million. To facilitate this expansion the Bank of Tokyo has reached a currency agreement with Peking whereby it will open a yuan account with the Bank of China, while the Bank of China will open a yen account in Tokyo.

Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising that the September 29 communiqué was greeted with elation in Japanese financial circles. That afternoon, the Tokyo stock exchange climbed to the highest level in its history, only to surpass that record during the next few days.

In economic terms, then, Japanese

motivation for the China détente is transparent enough. Anti-Japanese rumblings from the U.S. ruling class, especially since August 15, 1971, and protectionist threats from both the United States and the Common Market had alarmed Japanese capitalists. The Chinese market increased in importance to them.

Apart from the political climate in Japan itself, two factors prevented the Japanese turn to Peking from occurring earlier—Tokyo's ties to Taiwan and U.S. opposition to any gestures in Mao's direction.

In the summer of 1971, the Nixon regime set in motion the forces that led to Tanaka's trip and to Japan's consequent "leapfrogging" ahead of U.S. imperialism. In the September 30 Le Monde, in an article appropriately entitled "Embarrassed Silence in Washington," Jacques Amalric suggested that Washington might have been caught somewhat by surprise.

Amalric noted that though there has been no open criticism of Tanaka's trip in Washington, U. S. officials have privately expressed reservations about the Japanese premier's "impatience" and "precipitousness." Last August, Tanaka went to Honolulu, where he met with a Nixon "still intoxicated by the Miami Beach festitivities." U. S. officials, Amalric said, now speak of that meeting with "a certain stupefaction." Tanaka wanted to discuss only China and he left the problem of Taiwan squarely up to Nixon.

When Nixon announced his Peking trip without informing the Japanese in advance, State Department bureaucrats explained in private that Tokyo needed "a lesson." Now it is Washington that is being given a lesson, according to Amalric. Even after Nixon's trip, the Sato administration held steadfastly to the "two-China" concept. The Japanese delegation was the only one of the major powers to go further than the United States representatives in defending Taiwanese membership in the United Nations. Suddenly, the position is reversed. Tokyo is moving ahead of Washington in building ties - not only economic, but diplomatic as well - with Peking.

Nevertheless, for Japan, the relatively underdeveloped Chinese market, while potentially of enormous importance, can in no way replace the U.S. market in the foreseeable future. Tokyo will remain bound to Washington by a thousand cords, both political

and economic. The U.S.-Japan alliance rests on common class interests.

The Chinese bureaucracy is well aware of this, and herein lies the great betrayal of the Maoist leadership.

No revolutionist would deny that a workers state is entitled to expand its trade with capitalist countries. In one sense, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Tokyo represents an achievement for the Chinese revolution, as does the formal break in Japanese-Taiwanese diplomatic relations. However, what was left out of the September 29 communiqué should be carefully noted.

The U. S.-Japan Security Pact, which serves as the legal justification for Japan's complicity in the Vietnam war, was not mentioned. Japanese commitments to the military "defense" of Taiwan and South Korea were not mentioned.

One would think that Chou En-lai might have at least raised these particular Japanese violations of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Japanese ruling-class politicians had been convinced that Chou would at a minimum suggest a cooling off of Tokyo's military ties to U.S. imperialism in exchange for such a favorable trade agreement. At least, for example, a removal of U.S. military bases—essential to the prosecution of the Indochina aggression—from Japanese soil. They were wrong.

The October 3 New York Times reported that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had assured the State Department that Chou was more than conciliatory about the Tokyo-Washington axis. State Department officials said that "it appeared to be significant in terms of Chinese foreign-policy interests and priorities that Premier Chou En-lai refrained in the Peking conversations from even mentioning Japan's treaty obligations to cooperate with the United States in the defense of Taiwan and South Korea.

"State Department officials said that the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which provided the United States with a full account of the Chou-Tanaka talks, conveyed the impression that China's overriding policy concerns at this time were the Soviet Union and the need for a prompt settlement of the Indochina war.

"'Their concern is to get going in practical relations with Japan,' a State Department official said, 'which is why

they did not make it a precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations that Japan should renounce its defense arrangements with the United States.'"

Japanese imperialism has embarked on a general economic and political offensive throughout Asia, functioning both in conjunction with and in competition with U.S. imperialism. Because that offensive does not run counter for the time being to the narrow nationalistic goals of the Chinese bureaucracy, the Maoists have chosen to disregard it. Japan may continue to serve as a quartermaster for the U.S. armed forces in Southeast Asia: U.S. military bases may remain on Japanese soil: Peking is not concerned -the Chinese market will be thrown open to Japanese capital anyway. And if the Japanese ruling class can be balanced against the Kremlin bureaucrats as well, so much the better.

Now that Tanaka has shaken hands with Mao, other Asian allies of the United States can be expected to extend their hands—Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, etc.

On September 26, Tanaka wrote a poem celebrating the new era in Chinese-Japanese relations. It concluded:

"Our neighbors welcome us with warmth in their eyes.

"The Peking sky is clear and the autumn air is deep."

The Hitachi company's power plants may help change that clear Peking sky. As for the sky over Indochina, that is not an overriding concern of Chinese foreign policy.

Fourth International Smeared Once More

British 'Economist' Joins U.S. 'Newsweek' in International 'Anti-Terrorist' Conspiracy

The imperialist-organized international witch-hunt against supporters of the Arab revolution has moved from words to deeds. In the United States, in Germany, and in France, governmental action and unofficial physical violence has hit persons of Arab origin. And from Great Britain has come another piece of propaganda aimed at foisting onto the Fourth International and the revolutionary movement in general responsibility for the terrorist tactics employed by isolated guerrilla formations.

On October 4, in Paris, a bomb exploded in a Palestinian bookstore. The glass in the shop's front door was shattered, windows were broken, and a piece of metal paneling was torn off. No one happened to be injured.

The French police said that an organization calling itself the "Massada Action and Defense Movement" had claimed responsibility for the blast. An anonymous letter received by a newspaper just after the explosion threatened more attacks: "To anti-Semite terror, Jewish terror will respond. This is our first warning."

The Israeli government disclaimed

knowledge of the Massada Action and Defense Movement.

Also on October 4, West German Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced that his government had declared illegal the General Union of Palestinian Students, which has 800 listed members in West Germany, and the General Union of Palestinian Workers, which has 1,000 members. Genscher claimed that the two organizations threatened violence in Germany, that material had been found indicating the two groups had decided "to act conspiratorially" and "to use violent means."

He did not elaborate, most probably because he was lying. The General Union of Palestinian Students is a worldwide organization. It has never before been accused of carrying out terrorist actions. It has, however, conducted many political activities in defense of the Palestinian resistance movement; included in its membership are some of the most advanced elements in the Palestinian revolutionary movement.

Genscher also announced that "well under 100 Arabs" had been expelled from West Germany since the Munich events and that 1,990 Arab travelers had been denied entry into Germany during the same period—allegedly because they did not have proper papers or because they were suspected of having "unacceptable connections."

The October 5 New York Times reported that in half a dozen cities West German police conducted raids on Arab students living in university dormitories. There were said to have been "a number of temporary arrests."

On October 4 a spokesman for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service announced that "a very touchy" operation had been initiated throughout "the land of the free." With the cooperation of the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and all federal agencies involved in suppression of terrorism, the Immigration Service had begun to screen all Arabs resident in the United States.

The purpose was, according to the Nixon administration, to fulfill a promise "The President" had made to Golda Meir that "adequate security measures" would be taken to protect Israeli citizens living or traveling in the United States. Sol Marks, who is director of the Immigration Service in New York, claimed that the operation was directed only against individuals the government felt might be planning terrorism. Since the government suspects every Arab of planning terrorist acts, Marks was telling the truth.

The October 5 New York Times reported that employees of the Arab Information Center, a group affiliated to the League of Arab States, which has existed for ten years and has never yet conducted any terrorist actions, said that they had "been aware of FBI surveillance for about 10 days."

One Arab League official said his car had been stopped in a Washington, D. C., suburb by two men identifying themselves as FBI agents. "They took me to their office, took my picture and my fingerprints and interrogated me," he reported. "They said, 'You are terrorists, you are planning violence'—they made some kind of threat that if something should ever happen all of you will be in trouble, things like that."

The official, who asked not to be identified, said that friends of his had had similar experiences. The FBI refused to comment on the incident, "citing the bureau's policy of not discussing any investigation it might be undertaking."

Thus far, the witch-hunt attacks have hit only Arabs. But that is unlikely to be the case indefinitely. In the Western press, the process of foisting the terrorist tactics of isolated groups in the Palestinian movement on the radical movement in general is continuing.

The most recent, and most flagrant, example is a lie in the September 23 issue of *The Economist*, which speaks for a significant sector of British finance capital. The article, called "Terror through the mails," is largely devoted to blaming Arab governments for the recent series of letter bombs that have been sent to Israelis.

The line followed by the anonymous author of the article is the same as that used by Newsweek, the first major Western magazine to take up the cry of "terrorist international," although it must be said that The Economist shows a distinct incapacity—or unwillingness—even to distinguish among Palestinian groups. Fateh, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine are hopelessly mixed up in the article.

"The trotskyite Fourth International, with its headquarters in Brussels," says *The Economist*, "is said to have helped with transport and supplies and to have co-ordinated the complex operation that flew Japanese terrorists from the Red Army Fraction around Europe and supplied them with the Czech weapons they used to mow down passengers at Lydda airport in May."

The Economist has gone Newsweek one better! Newsweek claimed that the Fourth International was coordinating terror in general, keeping its accusations deliberately vague. The Economist ties its slander to a specific case. Where Newsweek's "information" came from anonymous "European specialists," the Economist's comes from a disembodied rumor—it is said.

What is the truth? Rouge, the official organ of the Ligue Communiste, the largest section of the Fourth International, clearly stated its political opposition to the Lydda operation and, unlike the liars on the Economist's editorial board, explained why the Palestinian movement had made such a mistake.

The Militant, which reflects the views of the U.S. Socialist Workers party, a group in political solidarity with the Fourth International, likewise de-

nounced the tactics used at Lydda. A sampling of the press of the Fourth International demonstates that organization's hostility to the indiscriminate shooting of Israeli citizens.

But there is still more. The "trotskyite Fourth International" supplied Czech weapons to somebody? Surely The Economist must know that Trotskyists are jailed in Czechoslovakia, that the mere accusation of sympathy with Trotskyism is worth at least a year in jail under Gustav Husak's regime, and that the same holds true for all the other Eastern European countries, including Yugoslavia, where three students are right now serving jail terms on charges of trying to build the Fourth International in that country.

After the policy of interning "suspects" without charges in Northern Ireland had failed to destroy the Irish

people's movement against British imperialism, the civilized gentlemen of *The Economist*'s editorial board complained that "Ulster has not suffered enough." They obviously believe that the Palestinians have not suffered enough either. *The Economist*, with its repression mentality, has raised a charge that—unlike the concoctions in *Newsweek*—could be grounds for criminal prosecution against the leaders of the Fourth International. The charge is a lie, and *The Economist* knows it.

The truth is that the editorial boards of *The Economist* and *Newsweek* are participating in an international conspiracy hatched in Washington. The ultimate target is the labor movement of various countries. The immediate targets, persons of Arab origin and the Fourth International, have been selected because the conspirators think they are the most vulnerable.

As Sadat Wheedles Palestinians

Israeli Chauvinists Call for Arab Blood

By Jon Rothschild

"It is time a town crier toured our country and called out 'the war of independence is over, please emerge from the underground.'" Israeli Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel, who spoke those words in a radio interview, is worried. So is Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and a wide spectrum of the Zionist press, including even the rightwing newspaper Davar, which was founded by the Histadrut.

The problem is that sections of the Israeli population have apparently tried to usurp one of the major functions of the state apparatus—the organization of terror operations against the Arab world.

There are a number of indications that the Zionist regime has good cause for trepidation. The aftermath of the Munich events that was orchestrated by the Israeli and other Western governments whipped the Israeli public into what is, even for them, an unusually intense chauvinist hysteria. At the beginning of October, a petition signed by more than 10,000 university students was submitted to President Zalman Shazar. It called on the government "to put Israel's long arm into

action, since lack of firm and energetic measures will only encourage the terrorists to additional murders."

General Ezar Weizmann, former commander of the Israeli air force and now deputy head of Herut, the country's largest right-wing party, called upon the government "to cease self-restraint and go over to offensive methods in combating terror." Weizmann explained that a real offensive would involve not only the invasions of Lebanon that have already occurred, but strikes against Libya, Syria, and Egypt as well.

With this popular mood as a background, various groups have taken it upon themselves to initiate such an offensive. Rabbi Meir Kahane, a U.S. citizen and founder of the protofascist band of hoodlums known as the Jewish Defense League, suggested that attacks against Arabs in the occupied West Bank might be a good way to begin the campaign. His organization announced plans to hold a mock trial of Mohammed Ali Jaabari, the mayor of Hebron, for his alleged role in a 1929 anti-Jewish pogrom in that city.

Jaabari happens to be an important opponent of the Palestinian resistance movement and a collaborator with the occupation. So the government, at the request of Dayan himself, barred JDL members from traveling to the West Bank.

But the JDL's West Bank plans were merely a modest beginning. On September 26, Tel Aviv police confirmed that arms shipments sent abroad for use in terror campaigns against Arabs outside the Arab East had reached their destinations.

This admission came when police superintendent Moshe Katz applied for a court order to detain one Amihai Paglin, who is suspected of having packed submachine guns, grenades, and ammunition in a biscuit oven being shipped to the United States. Paglin, a former operations chief for the terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi (the group responsible for the Deir Yassin massacre), is now the owner of an oven factory. Paglin's package was discovered at an airport on September 14.

In the course of arguing for the arrest order, Katz informed the magistrate that other similar shipments had evaded police and reached their intended recipients. On September 27 Kahane acknowledged that the JDL had organized a "counterterror" outfit and was responsible for the elusive arms shipments.

Three days later, on October 1, Kahane was arrested in Jerusalem. The October 2 New York Times reported that police sources said that Kahane was in possession of the detonators for the grenades that had been seized on September 14.

What worries the Zionist regime is loss of strict government control over counterterror operations. In the case of the arms shipments, Israel's muchheralded efficient security system seems to have thoroughly broken down. The weapons intercepted on September 14, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported in its October 3 edition, came from official stocks that are supposed to be closely guarded. The grenades and ammunition were locally produced; the Kalatchnikov rifles had been confiscated from fedayeen and were being stored in army depots.

Somewhere there is a "leak" in the security system, one which the regime fears may spread if it is not immediately plugged.

Not that the Zionist regime is op-

posed to terrorizing the Arab world. On the contrary, simultaneously with the domestic campaign against "private armies," the government continued making threats against Lebanon. In the October 5 Washington Post, correspondent Jim Hoagland reported that one of the aspects of Israel's "war on terrorism" has been "an unmistakable intensification of the long-standing Israeli campaign of bombing and invading guerrilla-inhabited areas in the neighboring Arab countries of Syria and Lebanon.

"Military officials in Israel suggest implicitly in public and explicitly in private that Israel is prepared to pursue a scorched border policy against Lebanon, as it once did against Jordan....

"If necessary, Lebanon's south can easily be turned into a depopulated wasteland if Lebanon does not, or cannot, control the guerrillas, these officials suggest." If the Zionist government does take such a step, it will not be to limit fedayeen actions from southern Lebanon, which are already virtually nonexistent, but rather to continue its strategy of inflicting military defeats on the Arab states. Such attacks would also help pacify the current popular chauvinism and thus cut some of the ground from under the "private armies."

As the Israeli regime pressed its threats, the Palestinian resistance organizations were presented with a political attack from a different direction. On September 28, speaking to a Cairo rally commemorating the second anniversary of Nasser's death, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat suggested that the Palestinian movement create a government-in-exile, which he said would be recognized by the Egyptian regime.

The proposal was met by consternation throughout the Arab world. The Palestine Liberation Organization, an umbrella group that includes most of the resistance organizations, had not been informed of the proposal in advance. An emergency PLO meeting was held September 29 to discuss the point; it was adjourned without coming to a decision.

The October 1-2 Le Monde reported that a significant section of the PLO leadership supported the proposal, arguing that a Cairo-based government would give the movement "international legality" and enable it to dissociate itself from terrorist actions conducted by groups not affiliated to the PLO.

The opposition was too strong, however. The formation of an emigre regime, it contended, would turn the movement into an appendage of the Egyptian government. On October 2 PLO spokesman Kamal Nasser announced at a Beirut press conference that the PLO executive committee had decided that the goals of the movement could best be reached by "consolidating the existing organization."

The statement represented an extremely polite rejection of Sadat's offer. On the same day, a four-man PLO delegation was sent to Cairo to discuss the matter with Sadat.

The Egyptian president occasionally makes proposals that he does not mean to be taken seriously. Some people in the Arab East felt the government-in-exile suggestion to be such a case. It is quite possible, however, that Sadat will resurrect the proposal in the future. The formation of a "government" controlled by the right wing of the Palestinian movement that could act as a representative of the Palestinian masses in "peace" talks with Israel would be a useful left cover.

Israeli Operation Backfires in Brussels

Last September 11 Zadok Ophir, an Israeli attached to Jerusalem's Brussels embassy, was shot while sitting in a cafe to which he had been lured by an Arab who had called the embassy offering to provide information on impending fedayeen actions.

The Israeli government refused to divulge Ophir's exact function, except to say that he was an "embassy clerk." It was not explained why a minor Israeli clerk would go unescorted to a rendezvous with an Arab six days after the Munich events. The incident was ascribed to Palestinian treachery.

The assailant, it turns out, was one Hassan Joudat. He is not a Palestinian, but a former Moroccan army officer who was employed by Mossad, the Israeli counterintelligence agency.

On two occasions, Joudat tried to steal blank passports from Arab embassies in Europe. Both times he got caught and went to jail. The Israelis got fed up with the man's incompetence and fired him.

Joudat did not like that. After getting out of jail the second time, he set up Ophir for the shooting. Why Ophir? Belgian intelligence believes this "embassy clerk" was Joudat's Belgian contact.

Marcos Tells Wall Street Not to Worry

By Fred Feldman

The nationwide witch-hunt launched by President Ferdinand Marcos is continuing unabated. The October 4 Washington Post reported that 900 persons have been arrested since martial law was imposed September 22.

Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile has ordered seven civilians to be tried by a military tribunal on charges of making and selling heroin. Along with political opponents, alleged criminals have been arrested in what is being portrayed as a war against corruption and crime. As part of this "war" Marcos is trying to collect the arms held by many civilians.

Marcos has gained the support of a majority of the Liberal party members of the House of Representatives, following the arrest of the secretarygeneral of the party, Senator Benigno Aquino, and several other party leaders.

Aquino, who has been cultivating a reformist image in preparation for the 1973 presidential elections, angered Marcos by exposing the scheme to declare martial law.

According to a report in the September 30 Far Eastern Economic Review entitled "Martial Law: How It Happened," Aquino charged in a September 13 speech that "Marcos had prepared Operation Plan Sagittarius which would put Greater Manila, twelve towns in Rizal and the whole province of Bulacan under military control. . . . Aquino also said he had gained the information from ranking military officers and that word of other Draconian plans prepared at Marcos' behest had reached him."

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, this revelation may have forced Marcos to speed things up to forestall a buildup of popular opposition. Mass protests had stymied his effort in 1971 to abolish the right of habeas corpus.

On September 16, Marcos accused Aquino of conspiring with José Maria Sison, the guerrilla leader of the New People's Army. Three days later "bombs exploded in Quezon City Hall where the Constitutional Convention was meeting. . . .

"On September 21, some 30 organisations held a rally at Plaza Miranda to 'denounce the pattern of fear and repression [pointing] to an impending imposition of martial law.' For Malacañang [the presidential palace], that was D-Day. . . . In the evening, unknown to the nation and unknown to his own Cabinet, he [Marcos] signed the martial law proclamation."

While pressing his witch-hunt, Marcos has assured U.S. investors that they have no need to worry. He has announced that companies exploring for oil will not be required to apply for licences.

"In encouraging oil exploration companies," the *New York Times* reported October 4, "President Marcos announced he would soon extend simi-

lar incentives to investors in mining industries. At the same time he sought to stimulate trading in the stock market by reducing the tax on stock transfers from 2 per cent to 0.25 of 1 per cent.

"Earlier, in a briefing for the foreign press Mr. Marcos assured Americans owning lands and those managing businesses here that they would be allowed to continue doing so even after the parity provisions of a Philippines-United States trade agreement expire in 1974. Two recent decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court had placed these privileges in doubt.

"President Marcos said he would allow oil refining companies to continue selling oil in bulk to industrial users despite recent interpretations of the retail trade nationalization law that hold that such bulk sales by foreignowned companies should be prohibited. Four of the five oil suppliers here—Caltex, Gulf Oil, Getty and Esso Eastern—are American-owned.

"Mr. Marcos' assurances appeared intended to remove much of the uncertainty on investments that has

To Keep the 'Communists' From Getting In

'Formidable Pair Who Run the Philippines'

A close-up of the family of Ferdinand Marcos, who has converted the presidency of the Philippines into a personal dictatorship, appeared in the September 27 issue of the Sydney *Australian*.

First of all, it is important to get their names straight. "President and Mrs Marcos, the formidable pair who run the Philippines, are known locally as Ferdy and Meldy."

Ferdy "is a dashing lawyer, the country's most decorated war hero, a crack gunshot, and reportedly the richest man in Asia."

He has the right mate. "The First Lady, Imelda, The Steel Butterfly, is a former beauty queen, and one of the most powerful women in the world."

The couple were recently interviewed by Janet Hawley in their old Spanish-style mansion in Manila on the banks of the Pasig River. "It has the obligatory large garden, boat, plane, private golf course—and a crack regiment of guards armed with machine guns, armalite rifles and batons of assorted sizes."

Ferdy and Meldy have three children. Bong Bong, the Marcos's fifteen-year-old son goes to school in London, where he has learned to speak "just like Prince Charles." He is really popular.

"President Nixon has promised Bong Bong a place on the first commercial rocket to the moon. President Marcos last month named the Philippines' first rocket Bong Bong in his honor."

The Marcos's teen-age daughter is named Imee. Her room "would be Liberace's delight. It is smothered in white mother-of-pearl shell, even to the grand piano."

The guest room is also a delight. It has "several important mementoes." For instance, "Ladybird Johnson left behind a cushion she'd personally embroidered."

Meldy is not very ambitious. She "always denies any plans of running for President herself." Ferdy, however, has reserved a place for her in contingency planning. He "has said he might have to field the First Lady as a candidate 'to prevent a communist tool getting in.'"

Janet Hawley reports: "That's how he refers to millionaire Senator Ninoy Aquino, secretary general of the Opposition Liberal Party and top of the Marcos' list of 50-odd people just rounded up and gaoled in Camp Crane under the president's martial law order."

slowed the flow of foreign capital in recent years.

"Oil exploration, long held back by the reluctance of the Philippine Congress to improve incentives, is expected to go forward."

This will be welcome news to U.S. stockholders. The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that an independent survey of the Philippines's 1,000 biggest corporations "found that foreign firms were getting almost twice as high a return on capital employed as Filipino companies appear to."

In the Philippines, Marcos is not publicizing his assurances to foreign capital:

"Censors have barred any domestic publication of statements made by President Marcos to foreign correspondents conveying assurances to Americans with regard to American-owned properties and businesses." (New York Times, October 5.)

Marcos claims that he was unable to stop violence and corruption before he declared martial law. "There was no authority to stop it, because they (the people) didn't believe in the president anymore," the October 4 Washington Post quoted him as saying.

Far from being helpless in dealing with corruption, Marcos has really been rather adept at it.

"When Marcos was elected in 1965 and reelected in 1969," Lee Lescaze reported in the September 30 Washington Post, "he had a mandate for reform, but many observers believe he did not push hard.

"Instead, Marcos' personal fortune began to increase dramatically . . ."

The Far Eastern Economic Review (September 30) said in an editorial: "The vast sums which Marcos poured out in 1969 to make himself the first man in his country's history to win a second term as president bankrupted the official exchequer and forced the peso to float. The extreme lengths to which he went to secure his re-election maddened university students, who demonstrated violently in 1969, demanding the replacement of Marcos as president by the leader of the pro-Maoist New People's Army. The middle classes were outraged by the unrepentant corruption of the Marcos Administration; they were also hit financially by the economic damage he caused.

"Thus revolution became a talking point among groupings normally most solidly behind the established order of things in Asia."

Stewart Dalby in an article in the same issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review noted that the external

debt of the Philippines amounts to "a staggering \$2,000 million. Debt servicing alone accounts for over 20% of export earnings—earnings which are no longer sufficient to cover imports."

Argentina

15 to Go on Trial for Sallustro Kidnapping

Trial has been set for fifteen persons in Argentina accused of responsibility for the death of Oberdan Sallustro, the manager of a FIAT factory in Buenos Aires, who was kidnapped by guerrillas on March 21 and held for ransom under threat of execution.

The Argentine dictatorship blames his death on the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—People's Revolutionary Army] but the blame rests primarily on the government which broke up the negotiations between the ERP and FIAT. The police broke into the house where the guerrillas were holding Sallustro. During the shootout the FIAT executive was killed. It is uncertain whether the bullets that killed Sallustro were fired by the police or his captors.

Well-informed circles in Argentina are of the opinion that the tribunal that is sitting on the Sallustro case may hand down at least three death sentences.

The Comité de Defensa de los Presos Politicos Argentinos [Committee to Defend the Argentine Political Prisoners] issued a statement in Paris October 3 bringing out the following facts:

- 1. The judges sitting on the Camara Federal en lo Penal [Federal Criminal Court] trying the Sallustro case were all appointed by the dictatorship. This body thus constitutes a special tribunal, expressly forbidden by the Argentine constitution of 1853, which has not been repealed by the military government and thus remains in force.
- 2. Article 18 of the constitution says categorically: "The death penalty is banned henceforth for political crimes." The laws under which the defendants in this case are being tried were decreed by the dictatorship; they were not passed by the congress, which alone has the power to legislate.
- 3. The military government and the special tribunals created by it have

violated the prisoners' right of legal defense by shipping them to a jail 1,500 kilometers from the site of the hearings, thus making it difficult for them to communicate with their lawyers, who will get to see the brief of the prosecution (fifteen volumes containing almost 5,000 pages) just five days before the trial begins.

- 4. Seven of the prisoners were arrested a day before Sallustro was killed, and it is obvious that they could not have been involved in the decisions that led to his death. One of these, however, the youth Osvaldo de Benedetti, is being mentioned as the most likely candidate for a death sentence.
- 5. All of the accused have been savagely tortured. One of those who may receive the death penalty, José Beristain, is suffering from constant hallucinations, but has gotten no medical attention.
- 6. One of the accused, the young journalist Andrés Alsina, denies being a member of the ERP or taking any part in the kidnapping. He is known throughout Latin America for his investigation of torture and murder practiced by the police and army.
- 7. The other defendants are Giomar de Klachko (facing a death sentence), Carlos Ponce de Leon, Angel Averame, Elena da Silva, José Luis da Silva, Mirta Mitidier de da Silva, Liliana Montenaro, Marta Brego, Silvia Urdampilleta, Mirta de Menajovsky, Eduardo Menajovsky, and Lucrecia Cuesta de Beristain.

U.S. Senate Passes Safety Measure

As of last February 5,850 known manmade objects were orbiting the earth. Upon learning this, the U.S. Senate became alarmed. What if some of the trash came crashing down?

On October 6 the senators voted 67 to 0 for a treaty holding a nation responsible for damages caused by any object it has launched into space.

Danish Market Vote Leaves Deep Divisions

By David Thorstad

"A 'yes' vote is not in the interest of the working class, but now we'll have to make sure that the government makes good on everything it has promised. This 'yes' vote better bring some results," Copenhagen dockworkers' representative Erik Hansen told the daily *Ekstra Bladet* after the majority of the Danish voters decided to join the Common Market in the October 2 referendum.

And if the Marketeers do not make good on their promises? he was asked. "Then we'll have to go on strike . . . ," came the reply.

The statement was both a reflection of the deep divisions the referendum caused in the Danish electorate and a warning of the potential unrest that may be a by-product.

Voter turnout was the highest in nearly twenty years, with 89.8% participating. Of these, 1,955,932 (63.5%) voted in favor of joining the Market, and 1,124,106 (36.5%) voted against. Greenland, which has been a Danish province since 1953, voted overwhelmingly against—9,386 to 3,905. The Faroe Islands did not take part in the referendum because they have been allowed three more years to decide whether or not to join the Market.

Supporters of the Market included some powerful forces - among them the ruling Social Democratic party and the three bourgeois parties that constituted the previous governmentknown as the VKR-bloc for their ini-(Venstre-Konservative-Radikale — Liberals-Conservatives-Radical Left). They had the backing of 80% of the newspapers and received huge amounts of money, much of it from a series of big banks and businesses that made no effort to hide their generosity. They tended to play down the political implications of the Market's growth fixation and focused on economic aspects.

They claimed that Denmark had to join if it was to keep its most important customer, Britain, which takes half of Denmark's farm exports and almost 25% of its industrial exports, and which will become a member in

January. Toward the end, they even resorted to scare tactics in an attempt to stampede the voters into the Market.

Premier Jens Otto Krag, for instance, said a devaluation would inevitably result from a "no" vote—some marketeers said it could be as much as 25%.

Le Monde correspondent Camille Olsen reported in the October 1-2 issue of the Paris daily that Market supporters "zealously went about describing the misfortunes that would befall Denmark if it refused to join the EEC: unemployment, lower buying power, an increase in taxes, etc. Business executives went so far as to threaten their employees with massive layoffs—even complete plant shutdowns—if the vote was negative."

Anti-Market forces found themselves virtually shut out of radio and television, since the air waves were reserved exclusively to the parties represented in the Folketing and those with enough members to be officially recognized. "These disparities," Olsen noted. "have not failed to make an impact on the public as a whole. Little by little, the battle around the referendum has. for many, taken on the look of a battle of the poor against the rich, of the weak against the strong, of the silent and stifled majority against the powers that be. The scars of this situation will inevitably be left when it is all over."

It would be quite wrong to deduce from the vote that the opposition forces, led by the Folkebevaegelse mod EEC (People's Movement Against the EEC) with its more than ninety member organizations, did not pack a punch. The fact that it did can be seen in the demonstration of more than 100,000 persons that it organized in Copenhagen the day before the vote together with the Social Democrats Against the EEC—the largest political demonstration in nearly two decades.

It began with a march of some 30,000 through the city to the biggest square, Raadhuspladsen, where the rally had to be postponed for an hour while tens of thousands kept pouring

in. Speakers included author Carl Scharnberg; head of general planning Kai Lemberg, who charged that the Treaty of Rome was written by old men who believed in the continued economic growth of capitalist society and were not interested in things like joint management, plant democracy, and women's liberation; and John Molgaard, education secretary for the country's biggest union, the DASF (Dansk Arbeidsmands og Specialarbeider Forbund - Danish Unskilled and Semiskilled Workers' Union), who reminded the crowd that his union had said "no" to Danish membership with a big margin.

Demonstrations took place in other cities, too, among them Aarhus, where 15,000 participated in one of the biggest demonstrations in the city's history.

A week earlier, on September 24, anti-Market forces had organized what Le Monde correspondent Olsen called a "gigantic popular meeting" and "the biggest and most colorful political 'happening'" in the past two decades.

"We already spent more than three centuries trying to get out from under the Hanseatic League. . . ," the prominent historian Palle Lauring told the crowd. "Are we today going to voluntarily place ourselves under the yoke of this new Hansa represented by the 'Rome union'?"

Former British Labour minister Douglas Jay said that if a similar referendum were held in Great Britain "the response would be negative, and by a large margin."

The president of the Association of Young Greenlanders in Denmark told how the inhabitants of Thule had been deported to the far north so the Americans could build a military base. "There you've got a nice foretaste of what growth could mean for us," he observed.

The New York Times editors called the vote a "tribute to the leadership of Premier Jens Otto Krag" and his "greatest political triumph." This was the Eastern U.S. imperialist establishment's thanks for a job well done.

Krag's victory, however, was a bitter one—the "kind of victory it's rather hard to take," said *Ekstra Bladet* October 3. For it was a victory won with the solid backing of the VKR-bloc and the enormous propaganda campaign of the business community, not the workers or even his own party. Indeed, it is estimated that around

half of the Social Democratic membership ignored his appeals and voted "no." And in Copenhagen, the workers reportedly voted 58.8% against entry.

The Social Democrats constitute a minority government—they enjoy a mere one-vote majority in the Folketing only because of the backing of the anti-Market Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF - Socialist People's party) with its seventeen votes. If the VKR-bloc has kept the Social Democratic minority government in power since the September 1971 elections, asserted Soren Jakobsen in the October 3 Ekstra Bladet, it is "because of the trio's feeling that a Social Democratic government had a better chance than a bourgeois government of bringing Denmark into the Common Market."

The sizable "no" vote in the population, however, is not reflected in the Folketing, and as a result the SF (which has been calling for democracy in the plants, changes in the distribution of capital, and public representatives in the banks) can be expected to sharpen its stance vis-à-vis the Social Democracy and press for some concessions. This could lead to elections in the near future, according to some observers.

The consultative arrangement with the SF broke down toward the end of the Market campaign. There was no contact between the two parties in the final days leading up to the vote, and the SF's feathers were ruffled by the fact that Krag made his speech threatening devaluation without even consulting his ally. One of the first tasks now facing the Social Democrats, in addition to healing the deep wounds within their own party, is to smooth over the SF's feathers.

These are tasks for which Krag was not considered to be the best suited. For while the vote was a victory for Krag the Market politician, it was not such a victory for Krag the Social Democratic leader. And so he abruptly resigned the day after the referendum.

Selected to replace him was DASF leader Anker Jorgensen, who was in a minority in his own union on the Market issue. In spite of this, it is hoped that his qualifications as a trade-union leader and a member of his party's left wing will facilitate his tasks.

Among other things, Danes were promised full employment, a stable currency, and improved results from collective bargaining if they joined the Market. "The workers will know how to make the politicians make good on the glittering things they promised us if we enter the Common Market's paradise," Bent Fjellerad, the head of the Copenhagen local of the metalworkers' union, told his membership.

Another problem facing the Social Democrats will be the political relationship with Greenland in view of its "no" vote. The majority of its provincial government is opposed to the Market and is demanding a fishing limit of fifty nautical miles, which stands in conflict with the Market's policy.

The Danish vote will undoubtedly create new problems for Norway. Many anti-Market people there had been hoping for a revival of plans for a Nordic economic union as an alternative to the Common Market,

but this now seems unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. In addition, Norway has been snubbed by the Common Market Commission in its attempt to quickly negotiate a free-trade agreement with the Market similar to the ones between the Market and nonmembers Sweden and Finland.

On October 7, following the resignation of Trygve Bratteli's Labor government, Lars Korvald, head of the Christian Popular party, announced that he would attempt to form a new government.

In a related development, just after the Norwegian vote against joining the Market, a Labor party member of the Storting, Arne Kielland, left the party for the anti-Market Sosialistisk Folkeparti, which has not had anyone in the Storting since 1969.

'Outrageous and Inhuman Waiting Game'

Canada Denies Hungarian Exile Work Visa

"It was a very pleasant interview but the man seemed very ignorant," Dr. Istvan Meszaros told Norman Hartley of the Toronto Globe and Mail. Meszaros, an internationally famous Marxist scholar and former member of the Hungarian revolutionary government overthrown by Soviet troops in 1956, was describing a chat with a Canadian security official in London.

The upshot of the discussion was that Meszaros was denied a visa to work in Canada on the grounds that he was a "security risk." "He [the official] seemed to think in very simplistic terms," Meszaros continued, "and assumed that all Marxists are bombers and dynamiters. . . .

"It is horrifying to think that I may have been rejected because of someone who applies such an absurd criterion as 'all Marxists are dynamiters.'"

Meszaros applied for "landed immigrant status" after accepting an appointment at York University in Canada. "It was kind of a coup to get him," Hartley said, quoting the university's Dean of Arts, John Saywell.

The Hungarian scholar resigned his position at Sussex University in England in preparation for leaving for Canada. But he waited for seventeen

weeks after applying for resident status. No word came until he pressed the Canadian High Commissioner in London.

"They played an outrageous and inhuman waiting game," Meszaros said.
"They tried to keep me out quietly by making me despair of the whole business."

On September 19, the Hungarian scholar flew to Canada to protest against the political discrimination applied in his case.

After a week of newspaper stories about the incident, the minister of immigration, Bryce Mackasey, made a concession. Perhaps, remembering all the Western powers' professions of sympathy for the Hungarian revolution, he was embarrassed to be seen denying one of its leaders a basic democratic right. Mackasey offered the exiled scholar a one-year work permit enabling him to take his appointment. But Meszaros refused to accept this, demanding that the "security risk" charge be withdrawn entirely.

"As for my work in Hungary," the exile said, "I am proud of it. I was closely associated with the intellectuals who were a driving force against Stalin. I am quite happy to defend that position if I am asked to."

Sweden Extradites Taiwanese to U.S.

Chang Tzu-tsai, a Taiwanese architect accused of participating in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir Chiang Ching-kuo, in New York in April 1970, is being held in London while he fights an attempt to extradite him to the United States. He was taken into custody by British officials on September 4 as he was being flown from Sweden to the United States, escorted by two New York policemen. The officials explained that Chang's physical condition did not permit him to continue the journey.

The drama of Chang's extradition caused a considerable stir in Sweden. After being found guilty of attempted murder by a New York court in May 1971 (despite his claim that he was innocent), he skipped bail and fled to Sweden on a false passport before his sentence could be handed down. He could receive up to thirty-two years in jail.

Upon arriving in Sweden, he requested political asylum. Swedish authorities granted him a residence permit and an alien's passport.

Then, in June 1972, American authorities asked that he be extradited. Chang was taken into custody and held in Laangholmen jail for more than two months until the decision was finally reached to hand him over to U.S. officials. Upon learning of the decision on August 31, Chang went on a hunger strike. "Chang plans to continue his hunger strike until he is deported," wrote Bengt Falkkloo in the September 1 Dagens Nyheter. "It is his only chance to attempt to sway public opinion in his favor. Outside the prison, action committees have gathered to demonstrate against the decision, and inside the institution Chang's situation has aroused a great deal of sympathy among the other inmates."

Chang asserts that the Taiwan government is behind the American move to extradite him. It is not the prison term that worries him so much as the fact that "Chiang Kai-shek's agents could kidnap me and take me back to Taiwan. People have been taken

away before like that. I know what happens in such cases—either I will be tortured, or I'll be shot on the spot."

Supporters of Chang accused the Swedish government of making a deal with the United States and sealing it with the decision to extradite Chang: "For a whole year the USA knew that



CHIANG CHING-KUO: Wants his alleged assailant—dead or alive.

Chang was in Sweden. The extradition is coming at a time when the Swedish government is anxiously waiting for Nixon to send a new ambassador to Sweden. Is Chang Tzu-tsai being sacrificed for improved relations with the USA?"

On September 4, Chang was taken from the medical facilities at Laangholmen—against the advice of his doctor—and escorted by two New York cops and a Swedish nurse (equipped with intravenous feeding supplies) to the airport to begin the trip to New York. His condition was already so poor, according to a stewardess, that he had to be carried on board the Pan American plane. "Several Swedish newsmen who had

checked in on the Pan Am flight," reported K.A. Adrup in the September 5 Dagens Nyheter, "were turned away from the plane at the last minute. In at least one case, the reason was that they constituted a 'security risk.'"

During the flight Chang lost consciousness. An American doctor who was a passenger recommended that he be taken to a hospital in Copenhagen, the first scheduled stop on the flight. The New York cops refused, however, claiming that it would take as long to get to the hospital as it would to go to London. "In London there were better facilities to care for the sick man, they asserted," according to Adrup.

Soon after the plane lifted off again for London, however, it developed mechanical difficulties and had to turn back to Copenhagen. While the plane was being repaired, Chang's pulse became weaker and his condition worsened. The cops still refused to let him be taken to a hospital. They were finally overruled by the plane's captain, who insisted that a Danish doctor be called. Chang was taken to a hospital for four hours, and then returned to the plane for the trip to New York.

When the plane reached London, however, British authorities stepped in and refused to let him be taken any further until his condition improved.

On September 7, Chang's British lawyer requested that he be granted asylum in Britain. The case is expected to be tied up in the courts for some time.

The Swedish government's handling of the matter was protested in a signed statement by thirty-eight writers, among them Vilhelm Moberg and Peter Weiss.

The Swedish government claimed that it agreed to grant the American request for extradition only after receiving guarantees from United States officials that he would not be turned over to Taiwan, and that he would be allowed to return to Sweden after serving whatever prison sentence he is given. It did not indicate why Chang should still wish to live in Sweden after serving a possible thirty-two year stretch in jail.

Spirit of the Times

Steel drums containing lethal chemical wastes are stored on open land near the Albert Canal from which Antwerp draws its drinking water.

How Heath Took Advantage of Provisionals' Tactics

By Gerry Foley

"The shooting of two men in the Donegall Road area of Belfast early yesterday has brought renewed allegations from the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association that an 'Army plain-clothes murder squad' is operating in the district," the *Irish Times* reported September 28.

Daniel Rooney, eighteen years old, was shot and killed, as a growing number of Catholics have been since the early summer, by gunmen firing from a car. His companion, Brendan Brennan, aged nineteen, was badly wounded. Such regular terror killings have become part of the pattern of Northern Irish life since about May, when a decline began in the mass struggles against the repressive caste system of the British imperialist enclave.

In July alone there were thirty-one "motiveless" murders. Seventeen of the victims were Catholics, thirteen were Protestants. Several of the latter were apparently killed because they maintained social relations with members of the oppressed community.

"Apart from the list of murders," Renagh Holohan noted in the July 29 Irish Times, "there have been numerous undocumented attempted murders. It is a frequent occurrence in many areas of Belfast, especially around the Crumlin Road, for shots to be fired from passing cars at pedestrians."

On August 29, a Catholic neighborhood defense squad in Newtown abbey, just outside Belfast, captured a British soldier who, they claimed, described himself as a member of a secret "counterinsurgency" unit similar to the U. S. Green Berets, the Special Air Services (SAS).

"The vigilantes pulled the man in the back seat out of the car and found him carrying an Army issue Browning automatic in a shoulder holster," the *Irish Times* reported August 31, summarizing a statement by the NICRA [Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association]. "An attempt to get the other men out of the car failed and they

fired a shot at the vigilantes as they drove off."

The NICRA statement said: "The man taken from the car immediately sat down, put his hands on his head and said he was Peter Holmes, S. A. S., Palace Barracks, Holywood."

The NICRA issued a separate statement listing a number of incidents that it believed could be linked to undercover operations of the British army. The *Irish Times* summarized:

"Last May, Patrick Joseph McVeigh was shot dead at a civilian road check in Andersonstown and . . . Army reports of what happened conflicted. Later in the month two men, Adrian Barton and James Teer, were shot dead while walking on the Springfield Road and Whiterock Road respectively. In April two brothers, Gerard and John Conway, were shot in the Whiterock Road area and in June, Patrick McCullough was shot dead from a car on the Antrim Road."

Unlike the murder of thirteen civilrights marchers by British troops during the mass rally in Derry January 30, the assassination one by one of dozens of Catholics since April has gone almost unnoticed by world public opinion. These murders have evoked little protest even in the formally independent part of Ireland. In contrast to the Derry massacre, in these cases neither the political responsibility nor the political meaning has been clear.

In the case of Rooney and his young friend, at least, the indentity of their assailants is known.

"The Army claimed that the two men had fired five shots at a 'routine surveillance patrol,' in St. James' Park, off the Falls Road, and had been hit when the patrol returned fire. Residents of the St. James' area said the two men were shot from the Army's patrol car as they came out of a community centre. They were unarmed and did nothing to provoke the attack . . . "

NICRA argued that the pattern of apparently random, chronic violence that has been developing over the past months is being deliberately fostered by the British government:

"The incident clearly reveals the hand of a British Army plain-clothes murder squad which have been operating in the Lower Falls, Broadway and St. James' area over the last few weeks. It also bears out earlier evidence offered by N. I. C. R. A. about S. A. S.-type activity in the Bawnmore area of Belfast. When we warned the people of Northern Ireland some time ago about this possibility, the British Army scoffed at the idea. Who is scoffing now?"

The seemingly random killings and outbreaks of the last months certainly seem well calculated to serve the purposes of the British authorities by maintaining the atmosphere of terror and hopelessness among the oppressed nationalist population without providing any focus for political pressure against the regime.

In a speech to the London Press Club on September 26, British Prime Minister Heath clearly laid out a policy of wearing down the nationalist population.

"On the one hand we were urged to take immediate military action against the 'no-go' areas. On the other hand, we were told that only by ending internment at once and for ever could the 'no-go areas' be opened up.

"We took the view that the 'no-go' areas were indeed intolerable—but that the timing of an operation against them was a matter of very difficult judgment for us and for the security forces.

"We knew that it was one of the aims of the I. R.A. to provoke our forces into action which would simply renew the support of part of the Catholic community for extremist policies. In July, Operation 'Motorman' was successfully carried out with hardly any casualties and the 'no-go' areas were brought to an end.

"It is fair to say that if we had shirked this action, or if we had taken it prematurely, many more lives would have been lost. Our hopes of a political settlement would have been frustrated.

"Now our security forces are pursuing with determination and success their campaign against terrorism.

"We rely on Mr. Lynch to do his part to frustrate the cruel designs of the I. R. A. At the same time the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is pressing ahead with his plans for discussion and debate among the people of Northern Ireland of the way in which they wish their province to be governed."

By occupying the "no-go" areas on July 31, in particular Free Derry, the one place in Northern Ireland where open political activity could still be carried on more or less uninhibitedly and the one place in all of Ireland where militant republicans were secure from arrest, the British troops succeeded in removing an important focus of resistance to the imperialist system in Ireland. The barricaded areas of Northern Ireland's second largest city not only provided a unique political refuge and laboratory, the only liberated part of Ireland, but they were the symbol of the nationalist minor-



HEATH: Cheered by 'Operation Motorman'

ity's determination to decide its own fate.

The "timing" of "Operation Motorman" was quite precise, and was determined essentially by the political trend both nationally and internationally. In this, the British forces were

able to take advantage of the weaknesses in the strategy of the largest militant nationalist group, the Provisional IRA.

On June 26, the Provisionals declared a truce. The organization had clearly suffered a political defeat. The "peace" movement was gathering steam in the Catholic community, and the moderates were regaining their position as the representatives of the oppressed population.

But then, unexpectedly, the Provisionals resumed hostilities on July 9 throughout the British enclave and on an even larger scale than before. The Lenadoon Avenue incident offered them the pretext for another round of guerrilla warfare. The British army refused to confront the local UDA [Ulster Defense Association unit which was blocking some Catholic families from occupying houses in a mixed district. When the troops attacked a Provisional-led march designed to install these families in their assigned houses, the Belfast leadership of the militant nationalist group declared that the British had broken the truce. The scope of the Provisionals' action, however, seemed to indicate that the new offensive had been planned for some time.

The objective of the Provisional leadership seems, in fact, to have been to try to save a deteriorating political situation by engaging in guerrilla action and by this means establishing themselves as the negotiators for the Catholic community. These calculations were laid out rather clearly in an unsigned front-page article in the August 12 issue of the *Irish People*, the weekly paper of the American support group of the Provisional IRA:

"There are three reasons why the IRA decided to renew their campaign with added ferocity:

"The Whitelaw and Wilson talks had established that no real concessions would be made on the constitutional position. Courtesy and consideration could be had on most other issues, but on the vital issue of a declaration for a united Ireland there was no give. Both Mr. Whitelaw and Mr. Heath affirmed the constitutional position last Wednesday and Thursday. The IRA gave their answer on Friday [July 21].

"The second reason why the Provos have opted to fiercely fight on is that they believe that the longer the military campaign goes on the more elevated will become their own status. For an organisation formed only two years ago, they have come a long way—two meetings with Mr. Wilson and a third with Mr. Whitelaw. Such would have been inconceivable six months ago.

"It was a military campaign which got them to those conference tables. They believe it can get them further. This reasoning is coupled with the realisation that any settlement now would not leave them in a particularly strong position. It would still be 'Jack Lynch's and Gerry Fitt's [a prominent moderate nationalist leader] Ireland.' This the Provos will not settle for.

"Finally, the Provos are convinced they can maintain their campaign against whatever the authorities unloose against them or even against the combination of the military and UDA. They are banking on retaliatory measures by the authorities strengthening, rather than weakening, their base and support from the Catholic community."

At first the Provisionals seemed to have worked out the correct tactic. For a time, the attention of all the media was focused on them. Since the hostilities had been resumed on their orders, presumably only they could end the shooting and bombing in Northern Ireland.

But since the period of the Orange marches, which came to a close without touching off any massive communal confrontations, the British authorities have expressed less and less interest in negotiating with the Provisionals. Moreover, repression aimed against the supporters of the organization in the formally independent part of the country has been on the rise.

The turning point was marked by the Provisional actions on July 21, when twenty-two explosions occurred in Belfast within an hour and a half, starting at 2:09 in the afternoon. The bombs were all placed in easily accessible public places, on a footpath leading to a football field, on highways, in a seed merchant's shop, etc. A shopping center and a bus station were bombed. Nine civilians were killed, including a child; dozens of persons were badly injured, many horribly mutilated.

That night four Catholics were assassinated. They included the father of Tony Rosato, a well-known student supporter of the Official republican movement.

These assassinations, however, were almost completely overshadowed by the hue and cry over the wave of explosions. The capitalist press played up statements of sympathy for the innocent victims of the "Provisional blitz," portraying defenders of the reactionary established order as tenderhearted humanitarians.

The explanation of the Belfast command of the Provisional IRA that they had warned the authorities where and when the bombs would go off was drowned out by story after story on the horrible sufferings of the victims and the grief of their families.

The basic fallacies of the Provisional strategy were starkly revealed by the "Bloody Friday" disaster. Faced with the violent opposition of the majority of the population in Northern Ireland, up against 14,000 British troops and the indifference or hostility even of sections of the Catholic minority, the Provisionals have been placed in an impossible position militarily. Occasional sniping has done no harm to the British army. At the same time, it has apparently proved impossible to bomb major military or economic targets.

But there is a devoted and rather large republican minority in the Catholic population, perhaps 25 percent in some areas. Also, many youths have been infuriated by constant British brutality and the hopelessness of ghetto life and are apparently prepared to take any risk. There is, likewise, substantial sympathy among Catholics for acts of violence as a means of protesting against the system.

As long as it retains an important degree of support among the nationalist minority, the Provisional IRA can continue to plant bombs in public places. There is virtually no way the British and Orange authorities can prevent this. Thus, the purpose of these operations seems to be essentially political.

Unfortunately, this policy has two basic political flaws. The first is the assumption that the British army is concerned about the threat of civilian casualties. The second is the failure to realize that, given the nature of bourgeois political dominance and control of the media, the responsibility for civilian casualties in violent actions can easily be put on the opponents of the established order.

A third flaw is that once an un-

favorable reaction develops to a guerrilla action, the capitalist authorities themselves can stage simulated terrorist acts designed to deepen the isolation of the commandos. It can be very difficult to establish the responsibility for bombings in particular.

It is ironic that a British atrocity, the massacre of thirteen civil-rights marchers in Derry on January 30, resulted in the greatest political victory of the nationalist people since the start of the crisis in Northern Ireland. The reaction in the formally independent part of Ireland, in Britain, and internationally forced the British authorities to withdraw their troops for a period even from the central Belfast ghettos, which they had succeeded in controlling and intimidating.

On the other hand, the result of "Bloody Friday," a spectacular offensive operation on behalf of the Catholic population, was probably the worst political defeat the nationalist population has suffered in the last four years.

"Since the awful Provisional I. R. A. blitz on Friday, there has been a numbness in Catholic areas, even in some hitherto 'hard' areas in Belfast," the *Irish Times* reported July 24. "For example, there was little or no public hostility to the British Army searches which followed Mr. Whitelaw's tough words on Saturday in which he pledged the security forces to a path of seeking out bombers and gunmen and the 'fanatics who mastermind them.'"

After a week of probing by the British army, on July 30 at 9:30 p.m., Whitelaw announced the start of massive operations to restore the "rule of law" in all parts of the imperialist enclave. Psychological pressure was built up on the inhabitants of the barricaded ghetto areas by continual news reports of overwhelming military forces slowly closing in on these small, impoverished communities.

In the wake of the military invasion, the numbed and terrified inhabitants of the Catholic ghettos were demoralized further by another apparent guerrilla disaster. A few hours after the troops moved into the former "no-go" areas, three powerful bombs exploded in cars on the main street of the little village of Claudy in County Derry. Hugh Logue of the Derry Civil Rights Association described the effect: "A village was ripped apart and

stripped of its early morning face. If there is an absolute in innocence, then those killed and injured today were the absolute. Two surface men were going around in the early morning, street sweeping. A nine-year-old girl, a milkman's helper, and a former nurse who had been present at nearly every birth and death, both Protestant and Catholic, in the village over many years."

The focus of attention was the "nogo" area of Derry, the symbol of the victorious resistance of the nationalist population to imperialist repression. It fell to the advancing troops almost without incident. Both Provisional and Official IRA had evacuated the area before the invasion. Singly or together, they represented a tiny, almost insignificant, force in comparison to the 4,000 British troops that were moving in

"'Free Derry,' for so long the most symbolic and renowned of Northern Ireland no-go areas, last night lay apparently resigned within the iron grip which, in the space of a few hours, the British Army had established early yesterday morning," *Irish Times* correspondent Dermot Mullane wrote.

"In the Creggan, Bogside and Brandywell, the bulldozers made short work of the barricades, which had been the most evident example of the area's lengthy defiance of the Army and RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary]."

In contrast to the reaction when the British forces invaded the nationalist ghettos on August 9, 1971, when the people rebuilt the barricades faster than the bulldozers could knock them down and forced the troops to retreat by mass psychological pressure, the population was almost passive on July 31.

"For the first 1 1/2 hours or so of the operation the people in the area remained silently in their homes," Mullane wrote. "They could be seen in the gloom of the first light standing at windows and doorways watching but not, for the moment, venturing out."

Scattered incidents occurred during the next day, showing that the combativity of the people had not been broken, but no mass action took place. For a year political barriers, not the steel and concrete barricades, had held off the repressive forces. When Bloody Friday broke down the political obstacles to reoccupying the ghettos, the strongest material defenses of the people were swept away like cobwebs.

Has Pakistan a Future?

By Tariq Ali

Karachi

It is less than a year since Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became president of Pakistan. In this brief space of time Pakistan's problems have multiplied and a whole series of class and national contradictions have developed to bedevil the new regime, which has shown as little capacity to solve these problems as its two military predecessors. The essence of the matter is simple: Since the establishment of Bangladesh, Pakistan itself is tottering on the edge of a precipice. The question being asked is not whether Pakistan can survive, but how long it can survive as a separate state.

For the past two years the country's economy seems to have come to a virtual halt and the per capita income has declined (even according to official statistics) during the same period. There has been a dramatic fall in the rate of production; and the rate of investment, according to official government sources, fell from 15% in 1970-71 to 10.2% in 1971-72. In the private sector, investment has declined by 41%.

Price rises have been phenomenal, and since Mr Bhutto assumed office prices of essential foodstuffs have risen dramatically. Thus in the last week of August alone there was a 20% increase in the price of flour (from which the workers and peasants make their daily chappatis or wheat cakes), vegetable oil, and other essential commodities. This, coupled with extremely high rates of unemployment (and large-scale graduate unemployment is an increasingly important factor) vividly demonstrates the critical situation which confronts Mr Bhutto on the domestic front.

Like generals Ayub and Yahya before him, Bhutto has announced the by now familiar series of "land reforms," "educational reforms," etc. As far as the masses are concerned these have added up to zero and have clearly been seen to be somewhat pathetic attempts to cover up the blatantly naked capitalist character of the People's party government.

A short-term solution whereby the

new regime could have allocated more resources to social expenditures would have required cutting down the size of the army and drastically reducing its annual budget which amounts to Rs4,230 million for the year 1972-73, about Rs50 million more than the money allocated for development projects. This Mr Bhutto is not prepared to do, despite the decreased strength and influence of the army following the debacle in Bangladesh last year.

He realises perfectly well that the army has to be constantly flattered and "kept happy" if he is to be able to use it to quell the mass movement within Pakistan. One of the reasons Bhutto dismissed General Gul Hassan and replaced him with the man who organised large-scale butchery in East Bengal, Tikka Khan, is because Hassan refused to allow the army to be used to intimidate striking policemen and workers in several important cities of Pakistan.

Tikka Khan, it is thought, will be more amenable to such a plan; but if he shows signs of wanting to rule the roost as well (and these signs are becoming more and more clear) then even he will have to go, to be replaced by officers more loyal to Bhutto. That is why the army plays such a vital part in the Pakistani president's calculations.

Another complication which confronts Bhutto is the fact that while he holds power at the centre and the two major provinces (the Punjab and Sind), in the remaining two provinces, namely, Baluchistan and the North Frontier Province (NWFP) West power is wielded by a coalition dominated by the National Awami party of Wali Khan, which includes in its ranks most of the country's pro-Moscow "Communists," who find themselves so much at home in the solidly bourgeois environment of the NAP that they find it redundant to set up an independent party.

The politics of NAP are indistinguishable in their essentials from those of the People's party, but Mr Bhutto's megalomaniacal tendencies make it difficult for him to conceive of actually

sharing political power with politicians over whom he has little control, a fact which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh understood perfectly well after the military occupation in March 1971. As a result there is continuing tension between the two parties and it is a dangerous tension since it is seen by the Pathan and Baluchi inhabitants as the alltoo-familiar effort of the Punjabi landlord and capitalist politician to exploit the other provinces for all they are worth.

Efforts by the NAP and the People's party to come to an agreement have been thwarted by the central government and the mass media under its control. The regime's propaganda minister, Kausar Niazi, is reputed to be an old admirer of Goebbels and certainly there seems to be more than ample justification for this claim, as the National Press Trust (which Bhutto pledged to disband during his election campaign), radio, and television have become even more servile than during the twelve years of military dictatorship and are used consciously and persistently to attack the NAP and any other opposition, be it from the right or left, which happens to disagree with Mr Bhutto.

The main dispute between Mr Bhutto and Wali Khan centres on the question of the country's constitution, which is in the process of being drafted. Wali Khan believes in maximum provincial autonomy and argues that the powers of the central government should be confined to foreign affairs, defence, communications, and currency. Bhutto, on the other hand, wants as much more power to be concentrated in the centre as possible, with the provincial governments remaining governments merely in name and existing only to carry out the wishes and desires of the centre as incarnated in the person of Mr Zulfigar Ali Bhutto.

However, there is a certain air of unreality which dominates bourgeois politics in Pakistan. While the NAP and Bhutto argue over constitutional niceties, the social and economic crisis continues unabated. It is felt most acutely by the toiling masses of the country in both the cities and the countryside. The bourgeois politicians, not surprisingly, continue to talk as if things were normal. Not surprisingly, because their lives are normal. From air-conditioned houses they move in

air-conditioned cars to air-conditioned offices in the morning and return via the same route in the evening, oblivious to the problems of the workers, peasants, and increasing sections of the petty bourgeoisie that form the vast majority of Pakistan's population.

In the same cities where the bourgeois class and its political representatives live in conditions of unmatched luxury with their hordes of servants and other flunkeys, there are working-class suburbs where water—plain drinking water—is in short supply and has to be bought from travelling vendors.

In these conditions it is hardly surprising that the workers' movement has developed at a very rapid rate over the last five years. Since the mass upsurge which overthrew Ayub in 1968, the ruling class has not been able to inflict a decisive defeat on the workers. In addition the pre-election rhetoric of Bhutto further aroused the workers and poor peasants.

The People's party politicians told them that if Bhutto came to power, they would see the abolition of feudalism in the countryside and land would be distributed to the tillers of the soil; they told them that the factories would be seized from the capitalists and given to the workers; they promised that the large mansions of the rich would be emptied and converted into dwellings for the poor. Needless to say none of these promises have been fulfilled.

But the advent of Bhutto did start off a wave of factory occupations and strikes which the new regime found difficult to control in the early stages. As a result most of the country's leading businessmen began to withdraw large sums of money abroad and refused to show any confidence in the new regime.

Over the last few months both the central and all the provincial governments have been showing their skill in the art of repression. In the NWFP, the NAP government has arrested scores of peasant leaders and has aided local landlords in dealing with rebellious tenants. Most of the leaders of the small but militant populist Mazdoor-Kissan party have been arrested.

In the Punjab striking workers have been detained without trial and the government ordered the police to fire on a demonstration of a few thousand Christian women demanding protection for religious minorities as a result of which three Christians were killed

In the Sind, where Mr Bhutto's "talented cousin" Mumtaz Bhutto is in control, there are nearly 2,000 political prisoners. This follows largescale strikes in Karachi, the country's leading industrial centre, during the course of which the People's party attempted to strangle the workers' movement by ordering the police to crush the strikes. Thirty workers were killed by the police, and random firing also took the lives of innocent bystanders including women and children. In fact there are more political prisoners in Pakistan today under the NAP and People's party governments than there were under the two military dictators (excluding, of course, what is now Bangladesh, where the dictators hardly regarded the Bengalis as human beings).

The options open to Mr Bhutto, or for that matter any other bourgeois regime in Pakistan, are extremely limited. In the first place he has to help to restore confidence in Pakistani capitalism. This means smashing the workers' movement and creating a "stable atmosphere" in Pakistan via political agreements with NAP and possibly other opposition groupings.

Given the lack of any national workers organisation capable of resisting the capitalist offensive, it is possible that Mr Bhutto could succeed, even though for a very short period, in convincing the capitalists that Pakistan is worth investing in, and already the governor of the state bank of Pakistan, Mr Ghulam Ishaque Khan, has been telling businessmen not to worry too much, as things are beginning to look up. In a recent address at the annual general meeting of the bank (an address, incidentally, whose full text was printed in virtually every major newspaper) he told investors not to take the rhetoric of the People's party too seriously:

"It is significant that Government has opted for a mixed economy and has made it clear that it has no intention of extending its control beyond the industries whose management has already been taken over. These industries account for less than 20% of the organised industries which means that over 80% of the organised industries would continue to be controlled by the private sector.

". . . the need for an energetic and



BHUTTO: Can he bottle up mass unrest?

enterprising business class which did so much for developing the country's resources in the past is as relevant today as it was before."

He also gave a clear indication of the government's attitude to workingclass militancy:

"In the sphere of labour-management relations, despite the coming into force of the new labour laws providing for the amicable resolution of disputes, militancy in settlements has not altogether disappeared. Recourse is still not infrequently being taken to illegal means to get unreasonable demands accepted. The tensions resulting from such confrontations are discouraging investment and at the same time doing considerable harm to the cause of production and employment."

Nevertheless even a temporary solution to Mr Bhutto's problems requires looking outside Pakistan and not only to the United States, which controls the country's economy whatever the regime in power, but to the neighboring states of India and Bangladesh. For the United States, the Pakistani ruling class has been always slightly anachronistic and medieval in its aims. It has taken the military defeat of the Pakistani army to enable the United States to force Pakistan's most chauvinistic politician, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who not so long ago used to speak rather absurdly in terms of a 1,000-year war with India, to visit India and seek a rapprochement with the Indian bourgeoisie.

The real enemy of both the Indian and Pakistani bourgeoisies is the mass movement at home, and the United States understands perfectly well that in the long-term interests of preserving capitalist hegemony in the subcontinent it is essential that the two bourgeoisies get together well in advance of the next wave of insurrections and explosions.

This is what the Simla Summit represented. It is a charter whose main aim is to preserve the status quo in South Asia and as such it has been actively supported by the Kremlin leadership and has been welcomed by Peking. For the revolutionary movement in South Asia as a whole this means that it will have to fight alone against both its own bourgeoisie and the big powers. Thus the Simla Summit necessitates working-class unity on a subcontinental level to combat this remarkable coalition of diverse interests. The experience of Ceylon reveals exactly why the revolutionary movement has to operate on a subcontinental level if it is to achieve success even in certain zones.

Resumption of trade with India and freeing of other restrictions would certainly boost the Karachi Stock Exchange. What is unlikely is that it would in any way change the conditions in which the average Pakistani lives

Recognition of Bangladesh and the resumption of trading links would fulfill a similar need. However, the question of Bangladesh has assumed serious political overtones as the rightist politicians in the country have succeeded in pressuring Bhutto to delay recognition. Some of these politicians still seem to imagine that Pakistan can be reunited; others merely want to embarrass Bhutto by using tactics in which he was himself considered a master before political power sobered him.

The hands of Bhutto and the other leading People's party politicians are by no means untainted, as they were all firm supporters of the military action which resulted in the massacre of tens of thousands of Bengalis, and thus contradictions on this question exist within the ruling party itself. Only Wali Khan and his party have come out firmly in favour of an unconditional recognition of Bangladesh.

However, despite all these problems the long-term interests of U.S. impe-

rialism necessitate a coherent and unified bourgeoisie within the subcontinent to prevent the rise of mass movements of workers, peasants, and other layers.

If Mr Bhutto can manage to hold together Pakistan as at present constituted and use it for this purpose, the country can continue to hold together possibly for another decade. If a state of near-anarchy continues to exist and the army has to be called out again or if there is a new military

coup, then Pakistan will cease to exist and new formulas will have to be found. The only basis for the continued existence of Pakistan would be a radical change in its existing social structure which would give the state a socioeconomic unity and rally the large majority of the people behind the new system, but this at the present moment seems a utopian dream as the extreme left is weak, hopelessly disorganised, and still suffering from the aftereffects of Peking's opportunist policies in relation to the Pakistani state.□

Peasants Take Land in Dominican Republic

"Today the country is seeing more unrest in rural areas than it has in decades," the editors of *Ahora!* said in the September 11 issue of the weekly Dominican magazine. "Now it is not just small groups who are demanding land for those who work it, but hundreds of peasants who have decided that the moment has come for them to lead a stable and civilized life."

The unrest reached a high point during recent weeks with a wave of land occupations by landless or nearlandless peasants. Ever since President Joaquín Balaguer announced his agrarian reform early this year the peasants' demands for land have been building up. The land reform, which Balaguer himself called "very timid," allows the state to buy only idle land from the big landholders. The regime has no intention of eliminating the big estates but only of limiting them somewhat. (See Intercontinental Press, May 1, 1972, p. 492.)

Even Balaguer's timid reforms are being implemented at a snail's pace. Ahora! summed up the present situation as follows in its August 7, issue: "Up to now, those who have benefited from Balaguer's famous agrarian laws are the big landholders who took advantage of them to sell property at a nice profit. But the peasants who have nothing still do not see the day when they will receive the land that they need to keep from dying of hunger."

It is out of desperation that the peasants have begun to take over land. A United Press International dispatch in the New York Spanish-language daily *El Diario-La Prensa* September 29 indicated that in the eastern town of Higüey the "massive arrests" of peasants who had occupied land pro-

voked "problems" so serious that the head of the national police, General Neit Nivar Seijas, was sent in to deal with them. "Around 110 peasants jailed this week were freed by the police chief following a meeting the evening before with them in the town's jail," UPI stated.

"A police officer said that the meeting had been satisfactory and that the peasants assured General Nivar Seijas that they had not been instigated to invade the estates by any extremist organization."

The government's explanation for the turmoil is that it is the work of "subversives." Even the police officer, however, had to agree that what really motivated the peasants was the need for land.

Figures provided by the September 11 Ahora! show inpart why the peasants in the Dominican Republic are so desperate. Though the figures are based on the 1960 census (the most recent available on the agricultural situation in the entire country), they still indicate the reality in the countryside. While a small handful of 2,-500 landowners own 13,441,972 tareas of land (one tarea equals onetenth hectare or .247 acres), 310.340 poor peasants together own barely half as much land (7,242,806 tareas). Put another way, 0.7% of all those who own land hold 41.1% of it, while 87.9% own only 23.3%.

This disproportion does not tell the whole story, of course. The suffering of the peasants must be measured in other ways as well. For instance, 66% of the rural population is illiterate. Their diet is around 1,500 calories a day as compared to the 2,500 to 3,000 required. And the consumption of animal proteins is below 20 grams, or around a quarter of the minimum requirement.

Polish Workers Continue to Make Gains

By Gerry Foley

"Poland . . . might be the first socialist country to develop a system of regulating industrial disputes," Neal Ascherson wrote in a cable from Warsaw published in the September 24 issue of the London Observer. "They exist, and they are almost tolerated. Even in recent months there have been dozens - some say hundreds - of small stoppages, with workers using their power moderately to get minor grievances settled, and nobody has been punished. In Szczecin and Gdansk, the site of the 1970 riots, the spontaneous workers' organisations set up then are still influential both in the shipyards and in the city government."

In the September 15 New York Times, correspondent James Feron reported from Gdynia that the concessions made to the Baltic port workers in the wake of the 1970 rebellions continue to have a direct effect on the life of the region and an indirect one on the expectations of workers throughout the country.

"The dockworkers, whose protests flared into violence, are happy now, officials say, and a driver of one of the many gypsy cabs operating in the 12-mile strip between Gdansk and Gdynia confirms it.

"'Why shouldn't they be happy?' he asks. 'They got their pay raises and their wives can find meat in the shops. Not everyone is doing better, but the dockworkers are.'"

But if the post-December concessions have temporarily quieted the unrest in the coastal cities, they have apparently brought increased pressure on the bureaucracy from other sections of the population:

"Other working groups in Poland are earning more these days, but improvements for them have apparently not reached far enough. There are rumors of brief work stoppages or slowdowns in Lodz and Katowice, reportedly protests against poor working conditions or, in one case, the selection of delegates to a November trade-union convention.

"Some consumers in Warsaw fear that shortages will reappear this winter, or that the price rollback that was ordered in the wake of the violence at Christmastime two years ago will slowly be abandoned in the face of rising wages."

For Ascherson, the changes in Poland since the 1970 rebellions amount to a new model of socialism:

"There is nothing very coherent about what is happening. The pressures of the economy, of the industrial workers, of debates within the party leadership are producing a rather disconnected series of experiments. But Poland is now an unorthodox, vital society. What is emerging is neither the traditional pattern of party rule nor the 'New Model' type of market economy to be seen in Hungary or East Germany."

The Observer correspondent expected the upcoming trade-union congress to usher in more important structural reforms: "There may be big changes: five times more directly elected delegates from the big factories than at the last Congress; the probable replacement of Mr Kruczek as the head of the trade unions, a sounder and more egalitarian pay structure, the reorganisation of the rather ineffective 'workers' self government.'"

Since the December rebellions, Gierek has been running the economy directly, in consultation with the political organizations in the main industrial complexes:

"This special role of the big factories is a typical Polish peculiarity. The larger works, by a party decision last year, have the right of direct access to the Central Committee and Mr Gierek personally, which by-passes their local party organisations. The freeze on prices, imposed two years ago, is due to end in December, but here again the party organisations of the big factories must be consulted first."

Despite his claim that a "new model" of socialism is evolving, Ascherson makes some observations that indicate that the situation in Poland is still in a state of flux:

"And yet there is no very firm plan. Sometimes it is success which takes the planners by surprise: 'How can you say a plan exists,' one economist asked, 'when foreign trade rose twice as fast as it was supposed to?' . . .

"Warsaw suddenly has 14 extra swimming pools and cheese in fancy packaging. Foreign goods are being imported to fill the shops.

"But the basic weaknesses remain . . . and nobody knows what will happen when the price freeze ends."

The impression of drift is confirmed by Feron:

"The [Baltic] region is thriving, in a disorderly and turbulent way, through a major construction boom created by an expansion of the dock areas and by a general improvement in the ship-construction and freighthandling business."

Poland's "allies" at least are not sure where the development is leading:
". . . this nation is on the move in highly original directions," Ascherson wrote. "Its neighbours, expecially the Soviet Union, watch with interest and a touch of suspicion. . . .

"Persistent reports in Warsaw suggest that the Czechoslovak Communist Party has been raising more criticism of developments in Poland, most recently at the meeting of Party leaders in the Crimea: certainly, the opening of the frontier for passport-free travel between Poland and Czechoslovakia has been indefinitely delayed because of doubts on the Czech side."

The "normalized" Czechoslovak CP knows by experience that once the workers get any chance to organize independently of the bureaucratic machine, they can move very quickly in hope of doing away with the bureaucracy altogether and setting up their own democratic bodies to run the economy and the state. This process was also seen in Hungary in 1956.

In a system where the deepgoing division of society into classes has been abolished and where the economy has been rationalized into large units, a democratic workers' revolution can spread very rapidly. The bureaucracy's fear of this is the main reason that in previous cases of upsurges in the Stalinized workers' states the concession of democratic rights to the workers has been short-lived. If Polish workers are able to maintain substantial freedom to organize independently over a prolonged period, then the crisis of Stalinism may be entering a new phase in Eastern Europe.

High-School Students Demonstrate in Australia

By Greg Adamson

Sydney

Some 3,000 secondary school students participated September 20 in demonstrations in Australia's six main cities against bad conditions in the educational system, and in support of civil rights for students. Demonstrations in other areas involved another 2,000 students, with some estimates putting the figure much higher.

The demands generally were as follows: freedom of appearance for all students, freedom of expression, abolition of corporal punishment, complete listing of all school rules, an end to segregation in schools, more money for state education, more teachers, equalization of educational opportunities.

For most of the demonstrators, this was their first organized political action. This was not because of any sudden radicalization over the last two months, but because radicalism in the schools has been unorganized.

The organizers of the campaignwere the target of red-baiting attacks. Minister for Education Willis charged that the student strike in Sydney was "a move by only a handful of lads manipulated by communist organisers."

The Sydney Sunday Telegraph said in an editorial September 17:

"If this so-called 'strike' were a spontaneous demonstration in support of better schools, more teachers, or improved teaching methods it might be possible to laugh it off—silly and disruptive though it is—as one more high-spirited prank by impressionable teenagers.

"But of course it is not. What these militant Billy Bunters and playground radicals don't seem to grasp is that they are being led by the nose by a handful of extreme political groups, Trotskyite troublemakers and half-baked revolutionary agitators."

The red-baiting encouraged intimidation of students by parents and school administrations. This was shown most clearly in Sydney where out of more than 100 schools, only 800 students joined in the public action. Threats



Striking high-school students in Melbourne march September 20 for better educational system and for recognition of students' civil rights in Australia.

of suspension or expulsion held participation down to only a few strongly committed supporters.

Nevertheless in all areas the tone of the demonstrations was very militant, a popular chant being, "What do we want? Student rights! When do we want them? NOW!"

While a number of groups and individuals of the far right were attacking the campaign as "Communist inspired," members of the Young Communist Movement and the Communist Party of Australia condemned it as a "Socialist Youth Alliance front," sagely predicting its failure. The CPA hardly gave token support, publicizing the action in the *Tribune* only marginally and at a late date.

The only group that gave consistent support to the campaign of students fighting for their rights was the Socialist Youth Alliance. There was nothing secret or manipulative about this. SYA members openly participated in organizations formed to build the campaign and took an active part in

campaign activities.

Despite right-wing red-baiting, leftwing death-wishing, and some senior student skepticism, thousands of students recognized the campaign as their own and participated in it, while tens of thousands more looked on in watchful support.

One teacher reported that at a country school near Sydney, although students took no strike action, in one class everybody's mind was on the strike, and normal school work was impossible.

An extra problem for the educational system has risen. Second form students will find no relief from the present conditions in third form. And so, while fifth and sixth formers may be "bought off" with minor privileges, younger students will continue to demand full civil rights.

It is the responsibility of all radical secondary students to make sure that September 20 was just the beginning of the campaign for improved conditions of education and for recognition of the students' civil rights.

Danish Trotskyists Report Their Activities

[The following interview with representatives of the Danish Trotskyist organization Revolutionaer Socialistisk Forbund (RSF—Revolutionary Socialist League) appeared in the September 23 issue of the French weekly Rouge. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

Rouge. What is the current situation in Denmark?

RSF. At the moment, a lively debate is going on over the entry of Denmark into the Common Market. In the fall of 1971, the government was forced by popular pressure to announce plans for a referendum, which is scheduled to take place on October 2. Throughout the past year, political activity has centered around the question of the Common Market.

The Social-Democratic government and the trade-union bureaucrats, together with the bourgeoisie, have come out in favor of Denmark entering the Common Market, although for the most part the working class is opposed. A preliminary vote in a hundred big plants (among them the shipyards) revealed a very strong opposition—80% against, 10% for, and 10% no opinion.

Rouge. What is the relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the working-class parties?

RSF. For years there was a balance in the relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the working-class parties. Now we have a Social-Democratic government. The majority in parliament belongs to the Social-Democratic party along with the left-wing reformist party, the SF [Socialistisk Folkeparti—People's Socialist party].

In Denmark, the workers' movement has always been under the hegemony of the Social Democracy. This is the case with the unions, to which 95% of the workers belong. As for the other working-class parties, only the SF has any strength or influence in the working class. The SF was formed by Aksel Larsen following a split in the Danish

Communist party in 1958. Today the only difference between the SF and the Social Democracy is over foreign policy and the question of national defense: It is against the entry of Denmark into the Common Market and against NATO.

Rouge. Aside from yours, what are the leftist groups in Denmark today?

RSF. First of all, there is the Danish CP (the pro-Moscow Stalinists), which has become totally isolated since the 1958 split. Today it enjoys only a very limited influence in the trade-union bureaucracy.

Then the VS [Venstresocialisterne-Left Socialists], a left-centrist party that was formed in 1968 when the left wing of the SF split. This party is in a state of decline, with no more than 600 or 700 members. It contains several factions, each of which follows its own line. At the moment, the party's leadership is in the hands of the "Leninist faction." Even in this faction, there are two tendencies with opposing views on the class character of the Eastern European countries: One takes up the analyses and views of the Fourth International, and another defends the state-capitalist analysis. At its next convention, in December 1972, the VS will undoubtedly split into at least two organizations.

Aside from the Danish CP, the VS, and the RSF (Danish section of the Fourth International), there are only some very small groups with practically no weight.

Rouge. Aren't there any Maoist groups in Denmark?

RSF. The Maoist movement has never managed to get a foothold in Denmark. One reason is that a Trotskyist organization was formed as early as the thirties. The other reason is that as soon as the Maoists appeared they were engaged in polemical debates, in which they were defeated on a theoretical and political level. Today they exist as only small splinter groups defending Chinese policy—which is becoming more and more difficult.

Rouge. Can you tell us about the history of the Danish section of the International?

RSF. A Trotskyist organization was founded in Denmark in 1932. It was created by German communist refugees, Georg Jungclas in particular. These comrades took part in the resistance to the German occupation of the country. The first illegal newspaper put out by the resisters was a Trotskyist paper. During the postwar period and the period of the cold war, there was only a very small group. Then, during the Algerian war, the Danish section, like the other European sections, became very heavily involved in aiding the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale - National Liberation Frontl.

The section, RS [Revolutionaere Socialister - Revolutionary Socialists], then carried out entry work in the SF and its youth organization, the SUF [Socialistisk Ungdoms Forbund - Socialist Youth League, until 1968. when the section took part in the formation of the VS. The main results of entry work were felt in the SUF. where we gained hegemony. This is why it was decided (at the twelfth congress of the SUF in January 1970) to merge the RS and the SUF at the same time that it was decided to end entry work and begin building a real revolutionary organization. Both the decision to join the Fourth International and the decision to merge the two groups were voted unanimously at this congress. At the latest congress (September 1972), the name SUF, which had been retained was changed to RSF.

Rouge. What are your main activities?

RSF. Throughout 1972, we have waged a campaign against the Common Market. We have done this on an anticapitalist basis, with slogans such as "Down With the Market of Big Capital!" "For International Unity of the Workers in Action!" "For a Red Europe!" and "For a Socialist United States of Europe!" As for the Stalinists, they campaigned on a petty-bourgeois, nationalist basis in collaboration with a bourgeois party.

We are working with other left-wing organizations in holding demonstrations, etc. On May Day, we organized

four demonstrations. In Copenhagen, 10,000 persons came out.

This year we have taken part in seven demonstrations in support of Indochina.

In May, we organized on our own a big meeting with Ernest Mandel on the topic of repression in Europe. The same day, Melvin Laird (the American defense minister) was in Copenhagen. As a result, the meeting ended with a very militant demonstration reaffirming our solidarity with the Indochinese revolution.

We are the only ones in Denmark who are carrying out any activity in support of and in solidarity with the Irish fighters. We have organized demonstrations and a meeting (of 300 persons) with a member of the Official IRA.

When our comrade Ernest Mandel was expelled from Germany, we began a campaign of collecting signatures as a way of organizing a response to such moves by the bourgeoisie. A large number of trade-union bureaucrats, members of parliament, and even the leadership of the Danish CP signed the letter of protest.

Our main area of intervention up to now has been the student milieu, in which we are intervening on a large scale this month because the university term is beginning again.

We are now publishing a monthly newspaper called *Klassekampen* [Class Struggle]. The press run is 3,000.

In addition to the monthly, we publish pamphlets and documents. This summer, we began putting out a theoretical journal, *Fjerde Internationale*, which will come out on a quarterly basis.

This, then, is briefly our program for action in the coming period. Aside from our campaign against the Common Market, we are beginning to orient our work toward the factories; this will become the main axis of our intervention. In connection with this work, we have strengthened our participation in the feminist movement, since a rather significant radicalization has taken place around the problem of women's liberation.

We will also be stepping up our support to the Indochinese revolution.

high-ranking delegation of military men, headed up by Dr. Roger Shields, chief Pentagon specialist for prisoner affairs. A twenty-five minute shouting match ensued when they were informed that they were to be taken into military custody, separated from each other, and sent to military hospitals for "checkups."

Navy Lieutenant Mark Gartley objected to the demand and said he wanted to spend at least two days with his family before rejoining the service. His request was denied, in spite of what his mother, Minnie Lee Gartley, said was a military agreement to permit a family visit.

"At that point," reported Seymour Hersh in the September 29 New York Times, "Mrs. Gartley began sobbing and emotionally told the Defense official, 'I haven't cried since the day you called me and said my son was shot down' [early 1968].

"Lieutenant Gartley, obviously distressed, stepped in to tell the military delegation, 'my mother hasn't cried in years. You may have pushed this a little too far.'"

The Pentagon brass, who kept trying to shove reporters out of the plane during the dispute, were determined, however, to keep statements by the pilots out of the headlines. They soon whisked them off to safekeeping in military hospitals in various parts of the country.

When Lieutenant Norris Charles arrived in San Diego, California, for instance, he was not allowed to get near reporters, although according to the September 30 New York Times "he seemed willing and even eager to talk with the reporters. Several times when the lieutenant started to move toward the beckoning newsmen he was pulled back by Navy public relations officers."

Cora Weiss of the Committee of Liaison called the New York scene a "recapture."

The New York Times called the American welcome "unworthy of this nation's traditions" and said that "they and their families deserve better than implied threats and dark innuendos of unsubstantiated charges" contained in Laird's hint that they might be court-martialed.

The North Vietnamese accused the U.S. government of "coarse and shameless interference" with the release of the pilots. $\hfill\Box$

Tools of 'Enemy Propaganda'?

POWs 'Recaptured' Upon Return to U.S.

As Nixon has stepped up the bombing of North Vietnam, he has attempted to deflect attention from it by making an issue out of the pilots who have been shot down since the bombing began and are now being held prisoners of war. The White House and the Pentagon were therefore irked by Hanoi's decision to release three POWs in September into the custody of an American antiwar group, the Committee of Liaison With Families of American Servicemen Detained in Vietnam. Above all, Nixon feared any honest statements by the men describing prisoner conditions in the North and possibly criticizing his bombing policy. Such statements could prove embarrassing on the eve of this year's election.

The committee was concerned lest U.S. officials attempt to kidnap the men. A committee spokesman in Stockholm said on September 25 that the group "wants the prisoners to be

able to speak freely and honestly about how the North Vietnamese have treated them."

According to Charlotte Saikowski in the September 29 Christian Science Monitor, Hanoi announced that the three POWs had sent a telegram to Nixon asking that U.S. authorities not interfere with their trip home under civilian escort.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird made menacing noises about possible court-martial proceedings being brought against the prisoners, suggesting that by allowing themselves to be freed, they had served as tools of "enemy" propaganda. The noises were hardly muffled by his ignominious afterthought that any such proceedings "will be tempered with a great, great deal of mercy."

When the pilots arrived at New York's Kennedy International Airport, they were met aboard the Scandinavian Airlines System plane by a

With Leon Trotsky in Copenhagen

By Georg Jungclas

[Forty years ago—on November 27, 1932—Leon Trotsky delivered his famous speech "In Defense of October" to an audience in Copenhagen. The following account of the events surrounding the occasion was written by the German revolutionary Marxist Goerg Jungclas, who was present with Trotsky in Copenhagen. Jungclas's article originally appeared as the afterword to an edition of the speech published in 1970 by the German section of the Fourth International. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

With the approach of the fifteenth an

With the approach of the fifteenth anniversary of the October Revolution, the Danish "Social Democratic Students" decided to invite Leon Trotsky to give a public lecture on the causes and character of the Russian revolution.

These students were not party comrades of Trotsky, but they wanted a speaker for their program whose role had been preeminent in the events of the year 1917. They skillfully put their Social Democratic government in a position where it could not deny a visa to Trotsky, who had been unable to leave his place of exile in Prinkipo, Turkey, since 1929.

In individual conversations with the government ministers, the students obtained a promise from each to vote for the visa. The ministers conceded their promises because each one secretly counted on nothing coming of it since the other minister-comrades would vote against it. None of them wanted to stir up the antipathies of the students, because they viewed them as candidates for the future state apparatus.

Trotsky immediately accepted the invitation and left on the journey from Constantinople November 14, 1932. His trip through Europe was like that of a deportee. In each country through which he passed, every step was prescribed and controlled by suspicious police.

Despite this, there were several impressive displays of sympathy, of which the most splendid occurred as the ship passed through the Corinth canal. Greek workers—members of the strong Greek organization of the International Left Opposition—had posted themselves along the length of the canal and gave ovations to the leader of the October Revolution and his cothinkers.

Trotsky met with a similar display of sympathy in the harbor of Antwerp on the return journey, which took place under the same shameful control by the police. As he stood on the upper deck (together with the author of these lines), the harbor workers, who had been occupied loading and unloading the ship that brought Trotsky from Esbjerg to Dunkirk, came in single file at the conclusion of the afternoon, removing their hats in greeting. As the ship then traveled down the Schelde toward the North

Sea, from the banks there echoed through the evening fog the cry: "Leve Trotsky!" [Long Live Trotsky!]

The "greeting" from the press was quite different. The reactionary bourgeois papers and the Stalinist journals divided the labor of insulting and witch-hunting. While the first damned him as "murderer," the Stalinist editors called him "renegade," "betrayer of socialist construction," and "agent of imperialism." For the arrival in the harbor of Esbjerg the Danish Communist party called its supporters out for a slanderous demonstration. The uproar lasted only as long as Trotsky was not visible. When he appeared on deck, the shouters fell silent, and only a few insulting calls could be heard.

Because the Danish police feared—with some justification—that the arrival of Trotsky's train in Copenhagen would be the occasion for demonstrations and clashes, they arranged in agreement with the inviting group that the train would stop at a small station outside Copenhagen, contrary to the original plan. Trotsky got off and completed the remainder of the journey by car.

The Danish paper *Politiken* wrote, correctly, that Trotsky had been brought into Copenhagen "through the back door." The CP members at the main railway station thus missed their demonstration and were dispersed, while Trotsky, a few hundred meters away, undertook a stroll through the brightly lighted streets of Copenhagen. It had been a long time since he had seen the lights of a large Western city.

In Copenhagen a fairly large group of political friends from the European Communist Left Opposition movement had already gathered. They had come to protect Trotsky and the scheduled meeting against disturbances and to discuss political problems with him directly instead of in the usual way, by letter.

The Danish CP brought its supporters to the evening meeting at the Idraetshus too. The demonstrators had been incited by an all-out campaign of slander, and they assumed that the "traitor" would use the opportunity to "slander the Soviet Union." They were doubly disappointed. Once again, Trotsky did not come through the "front door," and his speech was a magnificent defense of the Russian revolution.

The meeting was attended by 2,000 persons. (That was the limit set by the students.) It was not completely public. Those who wished to attend had to ask for a ticket from the organizers and be entered on a list. Thus only persons directly or indirectly known to the students received tickets. CP members were admitted when one could assume that they would come as opponents, but not as disrupters of the meeting.

All these conditions were established, not by Trotsky, but by the Social Democratic students, who wanted to prevent disruption by all means. (They had had a bad

experience two years earlier, when they invited a Russian Menshevik emigre.)

As Trotsky, who had just finished giving excerpts from his speech by telephone for radio transmission to the United States, stepped to the podium, the audience rose and sang the "Internationale." Trotsky was moved. The "Internationale" expressed the spirit of his entire political activity and had accompanied its high points.

One of the most prominent mass speakers of the Russian revolution, after long years during which he could speak only in small circles or through his pen, once again faced a large audience, even if it was not comparable to the massive gatherings of the revolutionary period. This Copenhagen lecture on the Russian revolution was also his last opportunity to give a public speech.

Trotsky spoke in German. (This was quite an accomplishment, since he had not lived in German-speaking countries for almost twenty years.) Because of poor lighting on the podium, he could read his manuscript only with difficulty or not at all. When we later discussed the speech and its reception by the public, Trotsky mentioned this mishap and said that he had felt like a dancer who, in the middle of the dance floor, feels his trousers slipping down.

Trotsky gave a Marxist analysis of the conditions that had made possible a socialist revolution in Russia and pictured the methods that had led to victory. He interpreted the October Revolution as the first breakthrough in the direction of a culture which would belong to all and in which humanity would be freed from an alienating economy and, to a large extent, from physical labor. Trotsky's picture of the future communist society differed in a very characteristic manner from the puffed-up and false-sounding "conceptions of the goal" put forth by the reformists and Stalinists.

A few days later in the theaters of Copenhagen Trotsky and his political friends were able to see him on the screen delivering a portion of the speech, which had been filmed for newsreels. The film presented the passage where Trotsky spoke of the chain of capitalist countries that always breaks at its weakest link.

Trotsky's meeting with political friends from nearly every country in Europe was used for a thorough political discussion. The groups of the International Left Opposition did not at that time call themselves "Trotskyist"; they were given that name by their opponents. Since that time the epithet has become a title of honor in the revolutionary Marxist movement, associated with a clearly defined political program. On the other hand, the term "Stalinism," coined by the Left Opposition, has since the 1930s passed into general political usage as a term of opprobrium.

In addition to the plenary discussions at the improvised "conference," Trotsky still found time to discuss with individual comrades the specific difficulties in their respective countries and the possibilities for overcoming them. In the general discussions, Trotsky did not speak often, but he was an attentive listener. When he spoke, one could sense with what extraordinary exactitude he had considered and analyzed the political problems.

He did not hesitate to speak frankly about deficiencies, even when this hurt feelings. Thus he straightened out a young student comrade from Magdeburg, who in the discussion had a self-righteous and arrogant manner:

"If you discuss in that manner with the workers, I am convinced that you will win no workers for the Left Opposition."

An important question at that time was the evaluation of the world economic situation. In the United States during the preceding months signs had appeared indicating that the great crisis was growing less acute. In Germany this dawn on the dollar horizon had brought stagnation or the reversal of electoral gains for the two large working-class parties. But precisely the economic upswing might cause the German bourgeoisie to allow Hitler's movement to come to power, in order not to have the crisis end with the workers' movement still intact.

Experience has shown that neither boom nor depression provides the optimum conditions for class struggle. Rather, the periods of active class motion come either during the decline, when the workers must defend the living and working conditions won during the boom, or during the period of revival from a crisis, when the radicalized workers feel new courage and new strength.

The main problem for discussion was the situation in Germany. In November 1932, the question before Germany, "the key to the international situation," was "fascism or communism." In the years since the outbreak of the world economic crisis, Trotsky had repeatedly warned of the dangers threatening the German—and the international—proletariat if fascism should come to power:

"Worker-communists, you are hundreds of thousands, millions. You cannot flee; for you there are not enough passports. If fascism achieves power, it will travel over your heads and backs like a monstrous tank. Salvation lies only in merciless struggle."

And: "The victory of fascism in Germany would inevitably mean war against the USSR."

More clearly and plainly than other theoreticians, Trotsky analyzed the essence of fascism, which liquidates bourgeois democracy and, along with it, the scattered islands of proletarian democracy that exist in the latter. Again and again he branded the criminal policies of the two big workers' parties and called on the German workers to build a united front of their organizations against fascism. In the Copenhagen discussion on Germany, the main concern was to clarify the character of the presidential dictatorships of Papen and Schleicher and of "Bonapartism" as a form of rule of the German bourgeoisie on the road from the republic to fascist dictatorship.

Another problem was the relationship of the old ultraleft group around Bordiga to the new Left Opposition among the Italian Communists—and to the International Left Opposition. The "new opposition" in the Communist party of Italy had just come forward with a program that identified with the conceptions of the Left Opposition and that contrasted with the sectarian policies of the Bordigists. For the first time, the program of the Italian Left Opposition called attention to the importance of democratic demands in a totalitarian society.

In this situation, the problem of emigrant organizations also played a role. Trotsky encouraged the Italian comrades living in Belgium to form their own groups within the Belgian organizations. Their task was not to cultivate an emigrant existence, but to intervene in the political class struggles of the host country.

A similar problem was the desire of Jewish comrades in southern France to publish the bulletin of the Left Opposition in Yiddish (*Klaarhed*). Trotsky spoke out very energetically against this isolation of the Jewish comrades from the French workers' movement. Their "separatism" would only preserve the petty-bourgeois milieu of the comrades in question.

During Trotsky's stay in Copenhagen, leading representatives of socialist student organizations in the other Scandinavian countries came to invite him to repeat his Copenhagen speech in Stockholm and Oslo. But these plans fell through because the governments of those countries would not give Trotsky a visa. They willingly bowed to the political pressure from the Stalinist diplomats.

The Danish government also became daily more nervous under the double pressure of Moscow and the royal family. Prince Aage, at that time an officer in the Foreign Legion (which, as is well known, was used against colonial peoples and was recruited from the waste products of all social classes), protested in the Danish press against Trotsky's presence. Under the title "Something Is Rotten in the State of Denmark," Aage wrote that the Social Democratic government had given a visa to a man who bore part of the responsibility for the murder of the tsar's family. (There were family connections between the tsar's court and the Danish royal family.)

The Danish Social Democratic government, whose members hypocritically used Trotsky's criticism of the Stalinist development in the USSR to fight against communism, refused to extend his visa, even though he could show that he needed medical attention. The situation was quite different with Captain Pflug-Hartung, the murderer of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Since 1919 he had been able to escape punishment for these murders by staying in Denmark. With the occupation of Denmark by German troops, it turned out that Pflug-Hartung had for years served as a spy for the Nazis and thus helped to prepare the invasion.

In great haste, Trotsky had to leave Copenhagen—through the "back door." He was taken by car directly to Esbjerg to board his ship.

Four years later, the "Copenhagen week" played a great

role in the Moscow show trials. The defendants (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Olberg, and their comrades) were accused of meeting Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov in Copenhagen to receive instructions for murder and sabotage. Prosecutor Vishinsky (former minister of justice in a white, counterrevolutionary government, an enemy of the Bolsheviks) asserted that these conversations had taken place in the Hotel Bristol.

But no Hotel Bristol had existed in Copenhagen since 1919. The accusation had mentioned it because the hotel was often used by Russian travelers prior to the revolution. Although the world press pointed to this absurdity, and although it was proved that during this time Trotsky's son had been in Berlin and not in Copenhagen, the accusation was affirmed and the sentences were carried out.

It would have been very easy to discover where Trotsky had stayed in Copenhagen. The Danish police had the house under observation day and night. No one could approach it without permission. (Its furnishings were unusual, because it belonged to a dancer who was on a tour of South America. It was a bit grotesque to talk with Trotsky under the strip-tease pictures of the home's owner.)

The Twentieth and Twenty-Second Congresses of the Communist party of the Soviet Union have done away with the bloody ghost of the trials—without, however, having made the full truth public, without rehabilitating all the innocent victims, and without punishing those who arranged the trials.

So long as the Soviet leadership has not "overcome" this murderous past, the talk of a struggle against the "cult of the personality" will remain an empty phrase. And for just as long will the memory of the October Revolution—and the Copenhagen speech that presented a balance sheet on its meaning—stand as a condemnation of the atrocities of the Stalinist dictatorship.

The reprinting of the Copenhagen speech serves as a reminder of the suffering imposed on the Soviet Union by the civil war, of the victims of Stalinism, and of Leon Trotsky, who himself fell victim to Stalin's murderous hand

Chiao Does His Bit in UN for 'Four More Years'

Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, speaking for Peking in the General Assembly October 4, denounced the Soviet Union in terms that caused some surprise even among the most cynical representatives of the imperialist delegations in the United Nations.

He charged the Kremlin with meddling in the Indian subcontinent, with selling out the Arabs in the Middle East, with keeping a stranglehold on the East European satellites, and especially with setting traps for the world with shabby disarmament proposals. He spiced his comments with heavy irony and harsh invectives.

In contrast to his vituperative stand toward the Soviet government, Chiao spoke very mildly of the Nixon administration. He criticized the U.S. imperialist intervention in Vietnam and the supplying of arms to Israel, but only in routine style. He did not himself condemn the U.S. role in Indochina. Instead he said, "At present, the people of the world, including American people, strongly condemn the U.S. government for its wanton mining and blockadbombing, ing. . . ."

Chiao did not even call for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.

Chiao's speech coincided with the

opening of a five-minute commercial on the television systems in the United States sponsored by the Committee for the Re-election of the President. The show focused on Nixon's trip to Chi-

This was identified as "an opening of minds, an opening of hearts, an opening of doors between two great powers."

The sequence included the Western concept of oriental music played over documentary shots.

The announcer concluded by saying: "President Nixon has opened the door. Now the work must continue. That's why we need President Nixon now more than ever."

New Zealand's Early Feminist Movement

[The following review appeared in the September 15 issue of *Socialist Action*, a revolutionary socialist fortnightly published in Wellington.

[New Zealand was the first country in the world in which women won the franchise. The question of the role of women in the suffrage movement and the value of the struggle itself have been debated among the new women's liberation groups that have arisen since the new upsurge of feminism began in New Zealand in 1970.]

Women's Suffrage in New Zealand by Patricia Grimshaw. Auckland University Press. 151 pp. \$5.25. 1972.

Patricia Grimshaw's Women's Suffrage in New Zealand throws new light on the early feminist movement in this country, a movement that has often been misunderstood and underrated. Grimshaw gives ample proof that the women's franchise, introduced in 1893, was not merely the result of political manoeuvrings in the parliament of the day, or of antiliquor lobbying. The vote was won through consistent campaigning over a period of several years by a women's movement that was undoubtedly feminist in character.

Before this book appeared, the only detailed investigation of suffrage agitation was in W.P. Reeves's State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, published in 1902.

Reeves discounted the role of feminism winning the franchise, in claiming that the temperance issue was the central focus of the campaign. But while the Women's Christian Temperance Union [WCTU] was the organisational base around which the suffrage movement first formed, Grimshaw shows that the temperance cause was by no means the only issue that motivated the women in the Union. WTCU women played an active part in developing preschool child care, and in agitating for female unionism, equal pay for women, equal divorce laws, the right of women to full sexual knowledge-in fact, a broad range of issues concerning women's rights.
In Reeves's view, the suffrage move-

In Reeves's view, the suffrage movement was not widely supported by the women of New Zealand. However, Patricia Grimshaw's well-documented history gives quite a different picture. Wherever the suffragists took their petitions they were met with overwhelming support, particularly from working women. The largest numbers of signatures were obtained in Otago, where the greatest concentration of women workers was to be found. The final petition, presented to parliament in 1893, had 30,000 women's signatures, which represented about a quarter of the adult female population.

With the active backing of women workers and nontemperance feminists, the WCTU was able to launch public meetings that, in the cities, attracted very large audiences.

But the most obvious sign of women's support came when they voted for the first time in the elections of 1893. Only a few short weeks lay between the passage of the Suffrage Bill on September 19 and election day, November 28. In this period the suffragists worked tirelessly to ensure that women were registered on the electoral rolls and thus able to vote. By the end of election day, an inspiring seventy percent of the entire adult female population had voted.

Quotes from opponents of women's suffrage are sprinkled throughout Grimshaw's study. They give an amusing reflection of the reactions which the early feminist movement provoked. G. G. Stead, a former chairman of the board of directors of the Christchurch *Press*, feared the female franchise would "make the country more communistic than it is already . . . I have been amongst the poor in Christchurch quite lately and it is among the women that one hears the most democratic and revolutionary theories . . ."

The real motives of the politicians also receive good exposure. Their support for women's suffrage depended upon their estimation of the direction in which the women's vote would go. Much speculation arose concerning the political leanings of the female population and consequently there were

members on both sides of the House in favour of the franchise, though for opposite reasons. It was only because the women's movement was independent and drew massive popular support that it was able to succeed in winning this important gain for women.

Patricia Grimshaw apparently wrote the history as an M. A. thesis and though it was published only this year, it was actually completed before the current women's liberation movement began in New Zealand; that is, before 1970. In the last few lines, she says: "The feminist movement may well be poised on the verge of yet another move forward. Perhaps this time its wider objective, the full acceptance of women as equals of men, will be achieved."

This history of local feminism will encourage further progress toward that end; it shows the positive results of united action by women.

- Kay Goodger

On the Irish Revolution

The problems of the Irish revolution are especially complex. The island's society is a hybrid, combining aspects of an underdeveloped colony with aspects of an advanced capitalist country. In addition, the persistence of a tribal structure, which was broken down not so much by inner development as by the intervention of foreign armies, introduced further unusual features to contemporary Irish society. To all this may be added an 800-year-long history of continuous struggle against foreign domination.

In Problems of the Irish Revolution Gerry Foley examines the new political situation prevailing in Northern Ireland after the Official IRA declared its truce of May 29, and relates it to the history of the Irish struggle. Major questions of revolutionary strategy, from the theory of permanent revolution to the need for a Leninist party, are dealt with. The pamphlet, composed of articles originally appearing in Intercontinental Press, is a comprehensive Trotskyist analysis of the current phase of the Irish revolution. It is available for \$.60 from Pathfinder Press, 410 West St., New York 10014.

FOR GRYNSZPAN: Against the Fascist Pogrom Gangs and Stalinist Scoundrels

By Leon Trotsky

[Although it appeared thirty-three years ago—in the February 14, 1939, issue of the American Trotskyist weekly the Socialist Appeal (now The Militant)—we are reprinting the following article by Leon Trotsky because of its timeliness.

At the moment the Western imperialist powers, under the prodding of Washington and with the acquiescence of the Kremlin, are mounting a concerted witch-hunt directed ostensibly against "terrorism" but in reality against democratic rights in general and ultimately the labor movement. They have taken as the main excuse for their campaign the terrorist action at the Olympic games in Munich mounted by the Palestinian guerrilla fighters, who hoped by this means to win freedom for a number of Palestinian political prisoners held in Israeli jails.

[As part of their witch-hunt, the neo-McCarthyites have singled out the Fourth International as one of the immediate central targets. Thus Newsweek (September 18) in New York and The Economist (September 23) in London sought to make an amalgam between the Arab terrorists and the Fourth International.

This smear has been answered in leading publications of the world Trotskyist movement, including Intercontinental Press. The Fourth International understands the psychological motivations of those who are driven by intolerable conditions to strike back at their oppressors; but the Fourth International disagrees completely with such tactics, for they are counterproductive. Only the masses mobilized by the millions, tens and hundreds of millions can win freedom for the oppressed, as Trotsky points out in his article below. And Fourth Internationalists today repeat the advice Trotsky gave to fighters like Herschel Grynszpan a third of a century ago: Seek another road!

[Trotsky's appeal was written in be-

half of a revolutionary-minded youth who assassinated a Nazi official in the German embassy in Paris on November 7, 1938. After France was drawn into World War II, his trial was postponed indefinitely. Later, when the Nazis occupied France, Grynszpan was transferred to a concentration camp in Germany. His subsequent fate is not known.

The fact that Grynszpan's action was directed against a Nazi official makes Trotsky's opposition to such tactics especially clear. It might be thought that Trotsky would make an exception in the case of Hitler's regime, one of the most odious in all history. Not so. Trotsky considered that the same methods used to overthrow czarism in Russia had to be used to overthrow fascism in Germany and that there were no shortcuts. To gain power the working class had to build an adequate instrument - a mass revolutionary party like the one constructed by Lenin.]

* * *

It is clear to anyone even slightly acquainted with political history that the policy of the fascist gangsters directly and sometimes deliberately provokes terrorist acts. What is most astonishing is that so far there has been only one Grynszpan. Undoubtedly the number of such acts will increase. We Marxists consider the tactic of individual terror inexpedient in the tasks of the liberating struggle of the proletariat as well as oppressed nationalities. A single isolated hero cannot replace the masses. But we understand only too clearly the inevitability of such convulsive acts of despair and vengeance. All our emotions, all our sympathies are with the self-sacrificing avengers even though they have been unable to discover the correct road. Our sympathy becomes intensified because Grynszpan is not a political militant but an inexperienced youth,

almost a boy, whose only counselor was a feeling of indignation. To tear Grynszpan out of the hands of capitalist justice, which is capable of chopping off his head to further serve capitalist diplomacy, is the elementary, immediate task of the international working class!

All the more revolting in its police stupidity and inexpressible violence is the campaign now being conducted against Grynszpan by command of the Kremlin in the international Stalinist press. They attempt to depict him as an agent of the Nazis or an agent of Trotskyists in alliance with the Nazis. Lumping into one heap the provocateur and his victim, the Stalinists ascribe to Grynszpan the intention of creating a favorable pretext for Hitler's pogrom measures. What can one say of these venal "journalists" who no longer have any vestiges of shame? Since the beginning of the socialist movement the bourgeoisie has at all times attributed all violent demonstrations of indignation, particularly terrorist acts, to the degenerating influence of Marxism. The Stalinists have inherited, here as elsewhere, the filthiest tradition of reaction. The Fourth International may, justifiably, be proud that the reactionary scum, including the Stalinists, now automatically links with the Fourth International every bold action and protest, every indignant outburst, every blow at the executioners.

It was so, similarly, with the International of Marx in its time. We are bound, naturally, by ties of open moral solidarity to Grynszpan and not to his "democratic" jailers, or the Stalinist slanderers, who need Grynszpan's corpse to prop up, even if only partially and indirectly, the verdicts of Moscow justice. Kremlin diplomacy, degenerated to its marrow, attempts at the same time to utilize this "happy" incident to renew their machinations for an international agreement among various governments, including that of Hitler and Mussolini, for a mutual extradition of terrorists. Beware, masters of fraud! The application of such a law will necessitate the immediate deliverance of Stalin to at least a dozen foreign governments.

The Stalinists shriek in the ears of the police that Grynszpan attended "meetings of Trotskyites." That, unfortunately, is not true. For had he walked into the milieu of the Fourth International he would have discovered a different and more effective outlet for his revolutionary energy. People come cheap who are capable only of fulminating against injustice and bestiality. But those who, like Grynszpan, are able to act as well as conceive, sacrificing their own lives if need be, are the precious leaven of mankind.

In the moral sense, although not for his mode of action, Grynszpan may serve as an example for every young revolutionist. Our open moral solidarity with Grynszpan gives us an added right to say to all the other would-be Grynszpans, to all those capable of self-sacrifice in the struggle against despotism and bestiality: Seek another road! Not the lone avenger can free the oppressed but only a great revolutionary movement of the masses which will leave no remnant of the entire structure of class exploitation, national oppression and racial per-

secution. The unprecedented crimes of fascism create a yearning for vengeance wholly justifiable. But so monstrous is the scope of their crimes, that this yearning cannot be satisfied by the assassination of isolated fascist bureaucrats. For that it is necessary to set in motion millions, tens and hundreds of millions of the oppressed throughout the whole world and lead them in the assault upon the strongholds of the old society. Only the overthrow of all forms of slavery, only the complete destruction of fascism. only the people sitting in merciless judgment over the contemporary bandits and gangsters can provide real satisfaction to the indignation of the people. This is precisely the task that the Fourth International has set itself. It will cleanse the labor movement of the plague of Stalinism. It will rally in its ranks the heroic generation of the youth. It will cut a path to a worthier and a more humane future. \Box

For a United Front Against Italian Fascism!

[The following editorial appeared in the September 10 issue of Bandiera Rossa, the journal of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist groups—the Italian section of the Fourth International). The translation is by Intercontinental Press.]

* * *

The notorious episodes in Salerno, where fascist goon squads have used violence to intimidate anyone suspected of belonging to a left organization; the attacks at school gates that became so frequent in the second half of the 1971-72 academic year; the bomb attacks on offices of workers' organizations, including even unions; the proliferation of training camps for new "squadristi" [fascist commandos] - all of this has definitely put the problem of the struggle against fascism back on the agenda. In the atmosphere created by the restorationist government of Andreotti, Malagodi, and Scalfaro, it is likely that the struggles in the fall over new union contracts and the reopening of the schools will be marked by new episodes of reactionary violence that will make this problem still more acute.

The fight against fascism is, of

course, a broad political problem. To the extent that the workers' movement is able to draw the lessons of the past years, conduct the battles of this phase in a consistent way, and win successes in turning back the powerful offensive the class enemy has unleashed on all levels, the opportunities for fascist activity will be reduced and the bourgeoisie itself will drop the idea of this extreme solution. To the extent, on the other hand, that the approaching struggles have a negative outcome, that unemployment begins to have a dramatic impact, that strata of the petty bourgeoisie are thrown into desperation, the fascists will be able to acquire a mass base and begin to pose themselves as a contender for power.

The whole analysis of the situation developed in Bandiera Rossa and Quarta Internazionale leads to the conclusion that for the present phase the decisive layers of the bourgeoisie have not chosen the fascist alternative and are aiming, rather, at restoring conservative parliamentary democracy, under which the state apparatus would be able to carry out its function in a more systematic and harsh way, with the fascists being given a subordinate role both in the ruling institutions and in the field of direct

action. If this were not so, if we thought that the choice had been made in favor of a fascist dictatorship (or a military coup d'etat), that the only problem remaining for the ruling class was to decide the timing and the forms of carrying this out, then we would have to draw the drastic conclusion that we have to prepare for civil war and the possibility of a more or less prolonged period of clandestine existence.

Taking the hypothesis that seems most likely, we must then determine a line which first of all avoids increasing the enemy's margin for maneuver and, to the contrary, exploits his contradictions. To give only one example: The wrong kind of campaign against the acute problem of rising prices could benefit the fascists. If we centered on denouncing the small retail merchants or went along with such maneuvers by those really responsible for the problem, we would help to create a state of exasperation in smallbusiness circles that could be exploited by fascist demagogy.

When we speak of the contradictions of the enemy, then, we refer to two things: (1) As long as the present context continues, while sectors of the state apparatus may act in concert with the fascists, they will be opposed by other sectors with different orientations. (2) The sectors of the state apparatus that work with the fascists cannot do so openly or with full freedom of maneuver. It is a very grave tactical error to forget this or to underestimate it, indulging in the indiscriminate use of demagogic formulas about the fascists having taken over or being well on the way to taking over.

From these premises and from the fact that the workers remain combative and ready to join forces in struggles, it follows that the fight against fascism must be seen primarily in terms of mobilizing the masses. This means concretely that every move of the fascist bands must be met with a counterattack mobilizing workers, students, peasants, intellectuals, and other strata in massive militant demonstrations. This is the way, for example, that attacks on left-wing headquarters or against individual activists must be met. A demonstration of thousands and thousands of persons marching in front of MSI [Movimento Sociale Italiano - Italian Social Movement, the neofascists] offices or the

camouflaged lairs of the fascists and chanting militant slogans has a political significance and a psychological effect that isolated reprisals cannot have. If we engaged in sporadic acts of revenge, we would be taking up the fight on the enemy's own ground.

We must not forget for a minute, moreover, that as long as the masses retain their capacity for mobilizing, and demonstrate it in a timely way, there will be no coup d'etat either by the armed forces or the fascists (or at most there might be some abortive putsch, more likely to strengthen the positions of the proletariat than weaken them).

While mobilizing the masses must be the central axis of the struggle against fascism, this in itself does not exhaust our tasks. We are faced with specific and urgent problems of defense and self-defense. This means first of all measures to guarantee the security of our headquarters. More or less impulsive bombers must be made to realize that they run certain risks, that they have no assurance of being able to act with impunity. If these defensive measures are taken by everyone - revolutionary organizations. traditional parties, and trade unions - it is a safe bet that the activities of the goon squads will suffer a sudden drastic decline.

Secondly, the activists working in the schools or factories must not expose themselves passively to the attacks of goon squads. Organizing in self-defense groups is a right and at the same time an elementary political duty. In this regard also, we repeat, the mere presence of a sufficiently large nucleus of activists represents a guarantee against individuals who indulge in violence when they enjoy overwhelming technical and numerical superiority but are unwilling to take any risks. There is scarcely any need to indicate what a decisive role can be played in this type of campaign by the traditional trade-union organizations.

This line of action against resurgent fascism implies a consistent united-front policy of combining the forces of all the revolutionary left organizations and all the political and tradeunion organizations of the working class. We are aware of the obstacles in the way of such an orientation. This is not the first time we have denounced the irresponsible sectarianism and political blindness of various groups and the opportunism—itself not without a sectarian aspect—of the bureaucrats of the traditional apparatuses. And we are not losing sight of how difficult it is to achieve unity when groups have differing political analyses and opposing political strategies.

But the firm point remains that fight-

ing against a repression that spares no one (and would make still fewer distinctions if it succeeded) and against the threat of fascism is in the common interest of all components of the workers' movement. The sooner this is understood and the sooner people act accordingly, the better things will be. We must have a correct line, but we must also adopt it in time.

Amin Retreats in Dispute With Tanzania

Plight of Uganda Refugees Remains Acute

The Tanzanian and Ugandan governments announced October 5 that the dispute between the two countries, which during September had brought them close to war, had been settled. Details of the agreement were not disclosed, but the settlement appeared to be the result of a two-day conference mediated by Somalian President Muhammad Siad Barre.

A joint communiqué declaring the end of the Tanzanian-Uganda border skirmishes was signed by the two foreign ministers, Wanume Kibedi of Uganda and John W. S. Malecela of Tanzania.

Reports on the fate of Uganda's Asian residents continue to be contradictory. On October 3, Zaire President Sese Seko Mobutu announced in Kinshasa that Uganda's president, General Idi Amin, had agreed to extend the November 8 deadline for the evacuation of Asians holding British passports.

But the following day, Amin angrily reiterated the deadline. Also on October 4, the general took personal charge of the country's military forces, claiming he had unearthed yet another invasion plot, this time involving Rwanda.

Statistics on the number of Asians affected by Amin's expulsion order seem as varied as Amin's policies. The October 6 Christian Science Monitor reported that Britain would accept 30,000 refugees. But the October 10 New York Times reported that Uganda's Asian population seems to have been exaggerated and that only 25,000, rather than the original estimate of 50,000 Asians would be expelled.

Altogether, sixteen countries have agreed to take in small numbers of

displaced persons. U.S. State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray 3d said October 2 that the United States would admit up to 1,000 Asians. Bray made it clear that not just any refugee would be acceptable, saying immigrants would be chosen "with a careful eye to the professional capabilities of the applicants so as to insure that they will have means of self-support and would not affect the labor situation" in the areas to which they will be going.

While the Asians continue to be met by racism from the Western countries, they have been confronted with vet another flip-flop from Amin. The October 10 New York Times reported that Amin is now expected to issue about 5,200 "exemption" orders. That number of Asians will be compelled to stay in Uganda. Another 12,000 to 16,000 Asians have become stateless persons, Amin having revoked their Ugandan citizenship. That number far exceeds the quotas countries besides Britain have set for Asian immigrants, and Britain has said it is not obligated to admit non-British citizens to its borders.

Despite the apparent settlement with Tanzania, the possibility of new border flare-ups remains. According to the New York Times, that eventuality "grew more ominous when responsible diplomatic sources let it become gradually known that last year President Amin asked Israel for help in planning the military annexation of a broad strip of northern Tanzania to give landlocked Uganda an outlet to the sea at Tanga." That scheme would involve seizing at least 450 miles of Tanzanian territory along a strip that is not even contiguous to Uganda.