Dreke fought in the Cuban revolutionary war, led by the Rebel Army, that overthrew the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship in January 1959. In the early 1960s, he was a commander of the volunteer battalions that fought the U.S-organized counterrevolutionary bands in the Escambray mountains of central Cuba. In 1965 he was second in command of the column of Cuban internationalist volunteers, headed by Ernesto Che Guevara, that joined with national liberation fighters in the Congo. He subsequently carried out numerous internationalist missions in Africa.

Mary-Alice Waters, president of Pathfinder Press, and Luis Madrid, a Pathfinder editor, conducted the first session of the interview with Dreke in Havana on Oct. 26, 1999. Pathfinder editor Michael Taber and Perspectiva Mundial editor Martín Koppel joined Waters in a second interview session on Dec. 2, 2001.

This book is now available, with simultaneous editions in English and Spanish. Copyright © 2002 by Pathfinder Press, reprinted by permission.
 

To tell you the truth, I thought the information was false.

"It's a lie," I said.

I was stubborn. But I issued orders to the compañeros, "All right, let's go fire some shots and find out."

But we had a problem. We had hardly any troops right there, just one company, the famous company of the Mayaguara Horse--and part of it was on leave. This company at the time had forty-five men, and sometimes we'd wind up with thirty or so. It wasn't a company of a hundred. And it's not possible to organize an encirclement with thirty-five or forty-five men. The bandits would just slip through.

The bandits were there, moreover, because they were planning to attack Manicaragua. Imagine how embarrassing it would have been if the bandits were to get into Manicaragua, near our headquarters. I thought they were sticking their tongue out at us. I really did.

Madrid: How many bandits were there? Was it a single group?

Dreke: There were eighteen or nineteen bandits hidden there. They were part of a single band, that of Porfirio Guillén. Tartabul was second in command.

We prepared to launch the operation. With whom? With every compañero who could breathe. We got the cooks together. Rifles for the cooks. Rifles for the teachers. Rifles for everyone, including myself of course. And we headed out. We got there and clashed with the bandits.

We captured almost the entire band, among them Guillén. Tartabul escaped, but we caught up with him later. Three of our compañeros were killed.

It was a staggering blow for the bandits.

This was in 1963. It was a moment when they still had some strength. They had been located virtually inside the city itself, since we didn't have the troops to hit them with. They were confident we wouldn't be able to handle them, that they could attack Manicaragua, firing their rifles, and then flee. They weren't trying to capture it, because to do that they would've had to kill us all. But they were confident they could create trouble in Manicaragua, in the city, and then flee.

Waters: How were the bandits finally defeated?

Dreke: We used different tactics. The encirclements were always done at dawn or in the middle of the night. They couldn't be carried out during the day. You had to march at night in order to surprise the bandits sleeping or eating, or partying, as they did every so often. They would drink a few bottles of rum and we'd surround them sleeping it off.

Above all we marched during bad weather, when it was cold and rainy. Those were the optimal times to operate, since the bandits didn't move. Wherever they got to during the day, they stayed and camped for the night. When they felt secure they would spend two or three days in the same place. Those were moments of maximum opportunity during which a number of members of State Security were able to penetrate the bands. This happened throughout the Escambray.

Later the battalions were mobilized and operational divisions were created.

The LCB battalions didn't operate solely in the Escambray; they moved through various operational zones. We would move a division from one spot to another, to operate in a different area. We would move it toward Sagua; we would move it toward Camagüey, which was a very convulsive region, the Jatibonico region; Sancti Spíritus, where there were many bands, such as the zone Mario Bravo operated in. We would move these units to carry out these operations to root them out.

There's something about the antibandit struggle that I think is important for everyone to understand: Our troops never abused a single prisoner. We never mistreated a single one, even though those prisoners had committed a great many murders, and we hated them. We hated them. That has to be said. Because you saw peasants murdered, women massacred, children orphaned. You never want to hate a human being, of course, but the individuals who did these things had first and last names that we knew.

There were some bandits of whom we'd say, "We must pursue and capture so-and-so at all costs." We were all hardheaded about this, all of us involved in the struggle against the bandits--compañeros like Lizardo Proenza, the last commander of the LCB, who was a great compañero in the struggle against bandits. Tomás[sevich] too. We were all that way. They had to be captured. Because behind them was a trail of death and destruction, of crimes and murders of innocent people that we had to stop.

Pedro González was one of the bandits we were determined to get. He committed many murders and was able to create panic in the Trinidad area. One of his last acts was to attack a bus carrying paper workers leaving the factory and traveling along the road from Trinidad to Sancti Spíritus. He set the bus afire and killed some of the workers. Then he ambushed an army vehicle driving by, murdering its occupants.

Pedro González's band would attack somewhere and then he'd immediately split from the rest of the band. He would always go around with only one or two others. That's how he operated. We would capture some members of the band, but González himself always managed to get away.

We pursued him until one Sunday we caught him in what we called an operación de levante, a "flush-'em-out operation." We did this when we didn't have enough people for an encirclement. We would take our troops and begin combing the area, until we'd suddenly run into the bandits and they'd have to come into the open and start running. We then knew there were bandits in the area and could estimate how long it would take them to get from here to there. At that point, we could work on putting together an encirclement.

These operations were very important, because we'd manage to keep the bandits on the move, letting us know where they were. Because they were always hiding.

There were times when troops came from Oriente to Las Villas to participate in the operations. In 1963, for example, Compañero Manuel "Tito" Herrera came at the head of a battalion from Oriente. This battalion was armed with FAL light automatic rifles, the most potent gun we had.

Before getting there, the compañeros from Oriente had been told the bandits were just walking around freely in the Escambray. We've gone through forty years of revolution, but back then we were young. We believed if we were sent from Havana to Pinar del Río, then we must be the best, because they were sending us in to resolve the problem. "We're going there to finish it. We'll solve it." Not everyone thought this way, but many did. The compañeros from Oriente arrived thinking that way.

The first days came and our troops didn't see any bandits, since they were hiding. We prepared an operation to comb the area and flush them out. We deployed the Lucha Contra Bandidos battalions from Las Villas, as well as the battalion from Oriente, along the Topes de Collantes highway. That's one of the most mountainous and most difficult areas in the Escambray to comb.

All the compañeros were there. Captain Herrera was at the head of his troops from Oriente. All the people from Las Villas--the Mayaguara Horse and Olaechea--were there too, at the head of their troops. Everyone was marching in single file, mixed in one with another. We combed the area for four days.

What was the result? A number of bandits who had been hiding there heard the noise of the combing operation. Our troops were talking--even though we'd tell them to stop--plus we were using small machetes to clear trails through the undergrowth. Hearing the noise, the bandits fled. They even left their rifles behind.

That operation brought with it an important result--the unity among all the compañeros. There was no more regionalism: "I'm better because I'm from Oriente" or "I'm better because I'm from Las Villas." At moments of danger and struggle, you're not thinking about where you were born; you're thinking that the person beside you is your brother. And you don't care where he's from, only that he's another revolutionary.

Through these actions, our combatants developed a sense of identity. We were LCBers. The members of Lucha Contra Bandidos considered ourselves a single group. You still see it today. The ones who are alive still say, "I'm an LCBer."

Anyway, as we grew stronger, the hour came to eliminate the bandits everywhere.

Waters: What year was this?

Dreke: In 1964 and 1965. The bandits were eliminated by 1965. I was not in Cuba when they were finally finished off. I had left for the Congo.

But I participated in one of the last operations, as I recall. We captured Mario Bravo, one of the worst bandits, who operated in the Camagüey region, on the border between Sancti Spíritus and Ciego de Avila.

The conditions were being created to take the final step of eliminating the bandits.

State Security had planned an operation to get one of the last groups out of the country and capture them at sea. A ruse was worked out: the bandits thought they were heading to the United States, when they were actually heading straight to jail. The story is told in the movie The Man of Maisinicú, a reference to Alberto Delgado. This compañero was a member of State Security who had infiltrated a group of bandits. He lost his life in the line of duty; they murdered him. But the operation was successful.¹

As the bandits were being eliminated in the Escambray, they were simultaneously being finished off in the rest of the provinces.

At the end a very beautiful rally was held celebrating the elimination of the bandits. I was sorry I wasn't able to be at that celebration, at which our commander in chief spoke.²

How were the bandits eliminated? Through the people's unity, the people's determination. Had we not united, we could not have eliminated them, because they kept on and on.

We crushed the bandits. No doubt about it. There are people who don't like saying we crushed them, but we had to crush them. They were assassins and criminals. We never mistreated anyone; the captured bandits were never beaten or abused. But they were taken to serve their sentences, according to what each had done.

It's important to point out the work of many compañeros who pretended to be bandits for a time but who were compañeros from State Security who had infiltrated them. Like Alberto Delgado, "the Man of Maisinicú," and other compañeros who were killed.

Or take the case of Commander Tony Santiago--the same one I fought under during the revolutionary war. He had infiltrated the counterrevolutionary organizations and was an agent for a long time. As far as almost everyone was concerned, he was an enemy who had left Cuba. But he was a compañero from State Security who was carrying out a mission. And they killed him.³

Many of these compañeros faced rejection. Not even your father or mother or your wife knew anything. You couldn't even hint at the truth, because your life and the mission were on the line. People didn't know these compañeros were secretly working for State Security. You can imagine how happy these families and others were when they found out the truth.⁴

The job done by the political workers was another important factor in the struggle against the bandits. These compañeros had a big responsibility. Because in addition to combing the woods with a rifle like we had to do, they had the painful and bitter mission of giving a mother the news her son was dead.

One night a compañero was killed who was one of the youngest of our fighters. That day had been his fourteenth birthday. Earlier that day, or the day before, he had been wounded, and he died on his birthday. The family was waiting at home, hoping he'd been given a leave. And the compañeros had to take the body of the young boy to them. It was terrible to see this. Terrible.

There were occasions when compañeros had to bring information to parents and families who were not revolutionaries. That's also true.

Then there was the case of Tartabul. This had a big impact on me personally. As I mentioned earlier, Tartabul had managed to escape the encirclement, the sweep of the area in Manicaragua, against Guillén's band. Tartabul was from Cumanayagua, and his brother was the head of one of our LCB companies.

On the day of the final operation against Tartabul I told his brother, "Look, don't you go," because I knew his brother was there.

"I have to go on the operation," he replied.

"Don't go on the operation. Stay away."

"No, I have to go on the operation." He insisted.

I don't want to give a false picture. He didn't actually come up against his brother face to face. But he wanted to participate in the operation. His mother was a revolutionary, a black woman who didn't understand why her son was with the bandits and not with the rest of the family, who were all revolutionaries.⁵

Madrid: What enabled the bandits to keep functioning? How were they supplied? Who paid them?

Dreke: The bandits were able to function because of the support they received from U.S. imperialism. There's no doubt about that. We don't say it for propaganda purposes, but because it's the truth.

For one thing, their weapons came from the United States. During the first stage the bandits had a large quantity of weapons--.30 caliber machine guns, and every other type of weapon. We have photos of the weapons they used. These weapons were directly supplied by the Americans. Many were seized, but others remained hidden.

Madrid: Were they sent by air?

Dreke: By air and by sea. A large quantity of weapons came in by sea along the coast extending from Corralillo through Sagua la Chica.

At that time, unbeknown to us, the head of our navy in the Sagua la Grande region, Lt. Ramos, was a traitor. One of his responsibilities was patrolling the coast in that area. And he simply didn't do it, so that weapons could be delivered to the counterrevolutionaries. Ramos eventually took a speedboat and fled Cuba.

Large quantities of weapons were also delivered by air.

The money used by the bandits was sent by the Americans, too. Much of it was sent by way of the counterrevolutionary groups in Cuba that were United States puppets.

They had cadres. They would pull people out of Cuba for training. They had a counterrevolutionary organization inside the country, and a counterrevolutionary organization abroad led by the CIA. Some of these people--such as Evelio Duque, César Páez, Ramonín Quesada, and others--fled during the first clean-up in 1960 and 1961. They were able to escape and leave the country. Others remained in Cuba.

This didn't just happen in the Escambray. The same thing happened in Camagüey. There were clandestine shipments of weapons through Nuevitas. They could do this because during the first years of the revolution, we really didn't have a navy; it consisted of two small boats. So the aid the bandits got from abroad, from the U.S. government, was essential to their murderous course of conduct and the length of time they were able to survive.
 

1. Alberto Delgado, a member of Cuban State Security operating on a farm in Maisinicú in the Escambray, had successfully posed as one of the bandits' key contacts. In March 1964 Delgado arranged to get counterrevolutionary leader Julio Emilio Carretero and his band on a boat supposedly transporting them to the United States. But the "American" boat was actually manned by members of the Cuban armed forces, who apprehended the entire band. José "Cheíto" León, a bandit leader remaining in the Escambray, figured out Delgado's role in the operation and murdered him on April 29, 1964.

The story is described by José Ramón Fernández in Making History: Interviews with Four Generals of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (Pathfinder, 1999).

2. On July 26, 1965, the rally marking the twelfth anniversary of the Moncada attack was held in Santa Clara, in Las Villas province. The rally was addressed by Fidel Castro, who spoke of the victory over the bandits.

3. In October 1959, working for Cuban State Security, Santiago pretended to break with the revolution in order to infiltrate the CIA-backed forces. In January 1961 he was killed at sea when his boat was sunk by counterrevolutionary Cuban pirates apparently unaware of his identity. Santiago was heading toward Cuba, where he was to take up a CIA-appointed post as overall head of counterrevolutionary bands in the Escambray.

4. In July 1987 Cuban television began broadcasting a series entitled "The CIA's War against Cuba," which revealed the names of 89 CIA agents in Cuba who had been working as accredited U.S. diplomats. To present this information, Cuba publicly identified 27 Cuban State Security personnel who had been functioning within Cuba as double agents for years. Most of them had had to endure being spurned by family, friends, coworkers, and neighbors. Following the revelations, the 27 were treated as heroes by the Cuban people.

5. The bandit Roberto Tartabul was killed in this raid. Three of his brothers were members of Lucha Contra Bandidos.  
 
 
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