The Militant(logo) 
    Vol.61/No.42           December 1, 1997 
 
 
`Aim Was To Spread Anti-Imperialist Fight' -- Interview with Manuel Piñeiro on Che Guevara's internationalist missions  
This selection is part of a series marking the 30th anniversary of the death in combat of Ernesto Che Guevara. Argentine by birth, Guevara became one of the central leaders of the Cuban revolution that brought down the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship in 1959 and, in response to mounting pressure from Washington, opened the socialist revolution in the Americas. Che, as he is popularly known, was one of the outstanding Marxist leaders of the 20th century.

In 1966 - 67, he led a nucleus of revolutionaries from Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru who fought to overthrow the military dictatorship in Bolivia. In the process, they sought to forge a Latin America-wide movement of workers and peasants that could lead the battle for land reform and against U.S. imperialist domination of the continent and advance the struggle for socialism. Guevara was wounded and captured on Oct. 8, 1967. He was shot the next day by the Bolivian military, after consultation with Washington.

As part of the commemoration of this anniversary in Cuba, dozens of articles, speeches, and interviews by those who worked with Che are being published, dealing with the Cuban revolution, its impact in world politics, and the actions of its leadership.

Many of Guevara's collaborators and family members have spoken at conferences and other meetings, bringing Che to life for a new generation and explaining the importance of his rich political legacy today. These materials contain many valuable firsthand accounts and information, some of which are being written down and published for the first time. They are part of the broader discussion taking place in Cuba today on how to advance the revolution.

The Militant is reprinting a selection of these contributions as a weekly feature, under the banner "Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution."

This week we reprint the second half of an interview with Manuel Piñeiro, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, that was featured in a special 30th anniversary issue of the Cuban magazine Tricontinental devoted to Ernesto Che Guevara. During the 1960s, Piñeiro was the head of the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior of Cuba, which among other things was in charge of relations with revolutionary movements in the Third World. The first half was printed in Militant issue no. 40. The interview is reprinted by permission. Translation and footnotes are by the Militant. IVETTE ZUAZO,

Q: During that same period, Che paid close attention to the efforts at insurgency in Peru. Is it true that this country was an alternative evaluated by him prior to selecting Bolivia?

A: Argentina, Peru, Bolivia - all of these were part of his integrated plan of advancing his strategy of a continental revolution.

Parallel to the Salta operation, in January 1963 a group of Peruvian combatants led by Alain Elías, and among them Javier Heraud and Abraham Lamas, attempted to begin armed struggle, entering Peru through the zone of Puerto Maldonado, on the border with Bolivia. The young Peruvian poet Javier Heraud and other comrades were killed there. They had the support of various cadres of the Bolivian CP, especially the Peredo brothers, who provided them with logistical support and served as guides for their column to enter Peru from Bolivia. Years later the ELN(1) reinitiated the struggle under the leadership of Héctor Béjar. The guerrilla movements of Luis de la Puente Uceda and Guillermo Lobatón, leaders of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), also emerged. Che had met with all these Peruvian leaders previously.

In other words, there was a certain degree of organization and a popular upsurge. Social struggles were going on, such as the land seizures led by Hugo Blanco. At the same time Peru was attractive to Che because it was closer to Argentina. Besides, in that period a democratic government existed in Bolivia, which had arisen out of the revolution of 1952, and it lasted until 1964. However, the guerrilla effort of the ELN, as well as those of the MIR, were destroyed. Luis de la Puente Uceda was killed (in November 1965) as well as Lobatón (in January 1966); Héctor Béjar was arrested in 1965 and the column he led was defeated...

Q: How did Che react to these reverses, which clearly postponed his continent-wide effort?

A: He seemed very impatient. He did not stop exploring the possibility of joining the armed struggle in other countries, such as Venezuela and Colombia. Nevertheless, favorable conditions did not exist to receive a revolutionary of his political and military stature, with all the consequences this would entail.

Q: When did he begin thinking about Bolivia as a scene of battle and not just as a zone of support? Why did he decide on that country?

A: In 1964 Barrientos carried out a coup d'état in Bolivia and a period of intense repression was opened. At the same time, however, there was a movement of popular resistance, particularly by the miners and students. From that time on, Che began to watch the unfolding of events. Two years later, while he was in Tanzania, Che decided to send Papi to Bolivia to evaluate the situation. The latter confirmed Che's view that this was the only viable option, in the sense that there existed the minimum political conditions and there were experienced Bolivian cadres, who had taken part in assisting Masetti and the Peruvian guerrillas. That is, there were steeled individuals who were prepared, politically and ideologically, to give solidarity to any revolutionary movement that arose in the area.

Q: How did the Bolivian effort fit into Che's continental strategy?

A: In his view, that guerrilla effort was to have become a school for forming Latin American cadres, above all from the Southern Cone - among them Argentines - which would help extend the armed struggle to neighboring countries. At the same time, it would enable him to accumulate political and military forces and wait for the most opportune occasion to continue the struggle toward his native country.

This would depend on the development and growth of the mother column established in Bolivia. Without that, it would not be possible to continue toward Argentina, where a bloody military dictatorship had also been installed, supported by the United States and repudiated by the most combative sectors of the Argentine people.

In a realistic manner, Che calculated that if, beginning with Bolivia, other guerrilla columns arose and evolved, composed of combatants of various countries of the Southern Cone, this would provoke as a reaction an alliance with the governments and armies of the neighboring countries, supported by imperialism. Such a development would contribute to spreading the revolutionary armed struggle in the region, which would turn into a scene of cruel, long, and difficult battles that sooner or later would lead to Yankee intervention. It would therefore become another Vietnam, as he called for in his historic "Message to the Peoples of the World" through the Tricontinental.(2)

Q: Did the original idea and the plan for Bolivia come entirely from Che?

A: Yes, the selection of the place, the combatants, the design, and the preparation of the plan were all conceived by him. Naturally, Fidel offered all possible support and cooperation. He again raised that Che should not be part of the advance forces, but should instead go once things were in place and a minimum set of conditions had been created: logistics, weapons, an urban support network, and the incorporation of Latin American cadres, in particular Bolivians, as well as their training, adaptation to the terrain, and so on. In short, he proposed that the guerrilla movement should first pass through the stage of survival. But by now Che was eager to begin the struggle, above all in a country such as this, bordering the one he wanted to take the revolutionary battle to: Argentina.

In addition, from the psychological point of view he felt very pressed by the passage of years. He knew better than anyone that there were elementary physical conditions that were indispensable for leading a guerrilla movement. He knew it would not be easy to carry out the plan at the conjuncture Latin America was then going through, with the United States undertaking the demobilizing Alliance for Progress, and the whole counterinsurgency campaign of supporting the regimes of the area, which it supplied with arms, financial resources, and military training. They wanted to prevent at all costs the spread of the Cuban revolution's example.

Q: It has been said that after publication of his farewell letter, Che felt he had made a moral commitment not to return to Cuba, or not to take on a visible post again in the leadership of the revolution...

A: In my opinion, with or without a farewell letter, Che's plan was unalterable. He was determined to fulfill what he had laid out as his historic and strategic objective: to spread the anti-imperialist struggle throughout the continent.

Q: If we discount Ciro Bustos, only one Argentine remained in the Bolivian guerrilla movement, Tania. What do you think was the explanation for the almost insignificant presence of Argentines there?

A: Bustos was a liaison who had a series of connections and relations given him by Che, so that contact could be made with Argentines of different organizations and brought to the zone where he was operating in Bolivia. After Bustos was taken prisoner and turned informer - offering information and drawings identifying Che and the guerrillas - Argentina was "frozen." Remember too that when the army discovered the guerrilla base, the whole plan unfolded in an accelerated way. The guerrilla unit had to stay on the move constantly, and at that stage it became very difficult to maintain contact with the urban base and contact with those outside the country.

Had this not occurred, I believe, then when Che's presence in Bolivia became known, many cadres and combatants from various revolutionary forces on the continent would have looked for a way to come and participate. Che's call to action exerted a great influence on many revolutionaries inside and outside Latin America.

Q: What merit is there to the story spread around the world that Cuba's political leadership abandoned Che in Bolivia and did not provide him the support necessary for the success of his operation?

A: From the very beginning of the Cuban revolution - and much earlier, going back to our first wars of independence - the empire has practiced a strategy of trying to divide the revolutionary forces. First it circulated the story that the disappearance of Camilo was the result and consequence of differences within the revolutionary leadership;(3) later it spoke of supposed differences between Raúl and Fidel; and later between Fidel and Che. In this way it mounted a whole campaign of disinformation that has lasted up to the present, to try to sow confusion not only in Cuba but in the Latin American and world revolutionary movement, and in international public opinion. One of the centerpieces of these campaigns is the supposed abandonment of Che's guerrilla movement, which is based on questioning why we didn't send military reinforcements to support him and to help him break the Bolivian army's encirclement.

Anyone who knows the laws of guerrilla warfare is aware that in the initial and most difficult phase, the guerrilla column is compelled to be on the move constantly to avoid the ambushes of the enemy army, especially if it is at a disadvantage. In such a phase, the guerrilla unit depends on its own forces and the backing it can receive from the urban network, which at that time had been hard hit. Therefore, it would not have been such an easy task to send - to use their term - military reinforcements. It's pure fantasy.

Q: And is it also a fantasy to compare, as has been done, the supposed lack of support to Che with the successful Cuban efforts to get its officers out of Venezuela?(4)

A: With absolute knowledge and responsibility I can state that in Venezuela the Communist Party, the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left], and other revolutionary forces, although they had suffered some defeats, maintained clandestine structures and operational facilities that helped make possible the patient and meticulous organization of the operation to get these comrades out. Those circumstances did not exist in Bolivia.

Q: Returning to 1965, you were very closely involved in the preparations of the Cuban internationalist mission in the Congo led by Che that year. In your judgment, what did that stage represent for him in relation to his final strategic plan?

A: At that time, although there was certainly a revolutionary upsurge on a world scale, headed by the heroic Vietnamese people, and under the impact of the Cuban revolution, nevertheless the minimum conditions for Che to materialize his plan in Latin America still did not exist. Based on this, and on the request for aid that had been made of Cuba, through Che, by the leadership of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Congo, Fidel proposed that the most useful thing Che could do was to head up the group of Cuban military advisers who would be heading off to that African country. The aim would be to allow Che to gain time while accumulating experience, getting himself ready again, and at the same time preparing some of the Cuban cadres and combatants who would accompany him later to Bolivia.

Che viewed the Congo stage as a stepping stone, an intermediate phase to prepare himself for his definitive goal. There he would wait for the evolution of developments in Latin America to create favorable political conditions to carry out his strategic plans. So much so that as he was leaving the Congo, Che asked Harry Villegas, Carlos Coello, and José María Martínez Tamayo if they were willing to continue the struggle together with him, in another country, a struggle that would be long, complex, and difficult. These comrades were later part of the Bolivian guerrilla movement under the pseudonyms of Pombo, Tuma, and Ricardo.

Q: What was the role of the vice ministry you headed in the delicate operations to get Che and his comrades to Africa, later return to Cuba, and then go to Bolivia?

A: Our department was in charge of the entire technical and operational preparation for the Congo mission, supplying the documents, travel itineraries, and false identities. Starting with our embassy in Tanzania, we constituted a support group in charge of seeking information and cooperation in the shipment of logistics from that country to Che's base in the Congo, the training of the radio operators, as well as other forms of contact and communication with Che.

On Fidel's instructions, the Technical Vice Ministry of the Ministry of the Interior gave support to Che on everything he requested in relation to the future mission in Bolivia. We supplied the documents, the false passports, the information he requested on various situations in Bolivia, the training in different specialized areas, such as communications and conspiratorial methods.

All the technical details were prepared by our officials, but each step was analyzed and approved by Che: the routes chosen and who would take them; how to pass unnoticed through airports, airport characteristics and border checks, the thoroughness of immigration checks, at what times and on what days was there less vigilance by the authorities. Toward this end a study was made on the operational, border control, and immigration situation, and the methods applied by the counterintelligence forces of the countries Che and the other combatants would be passing through.

Some day, at the right moment, this story will have to be told in more detail, and recognition given to the comrades who worked on that operation, and not a single name will be omitted. More than 140 Cubans went to Africa, and more than 20 to Bolivia, without being detected by the organs of Yankee espionage, nor by the security apparatus of the countries they were passing through. The work was carried out with great meticulousness, professionalism, strict division of labor, and above all with great motivation since it involved Che and those who accompanied him.

We lived through those days in great tension; I'm speaking for the entire team in charge of these tasks. We knew that a single error of any type could cost the life of a participant in the mission. These were hours of anxiety and permanent vigilance, until we received confirmation of the arrival of Che and the rest of the group at their destination. I will never forget those moments, nor will any of the comrades who carried out that difficult internationalist task in anonymity.

Q: What was Che's frame of mind in the months between his return from the Congo and his departure for Bolivia? He came from a defeat in Africa ...

A: A defeat whose causes he explained, making a self- criticism besides, as he was accustomed to doing given his personality and standard of ethics. But one must always remember that he went to the Congo to transmit his experience and to advise, not to lead that war of national liberation. Once he was there he came up against the cultural and religious traditions, the differences among the Congolese leaders, the lack of combat experience. Psychologically this was a very difficult situation to confront, above all for our combatants who were steeled in battle, with experience of struggle, and who wanted not only to advise but to participate in direct combat against the enemy. It was not easy, understandably.

For that reason, Che directly took part in combat, and was prepared to accept the final consequences of his acts. Nevertheless, the decisions taken by the Congolese leadership and by the governments of Africa created a conjuncture where there was no alternative but to organize his departure from the Congo and that of all the other comrades.

With respect to Che's morale before leaving for Bolivia, he was like a child with a new toy. He was euphoric, happy, because he was with the group he had selected, and by then they had already been trained. He acted in a very fraternal manner with the comrades, although he was also very disciplined and demanding. They followed a plan of rigorous physical, military, and psychological training; reading of documents on that country, learning the Quechua language, mathematics classes. He was very much concerned with raising the cultural level of the combatants under him.

Q: In April 1967, when Che was already in Bolivia, a supplement to our magazine published his "Message to the Peoples of the World." Nevertheless, according to some versions, this was not written in Bolivia but in Cuba. What can you tell us about this?

A: I believe that's basically correct, that he wrote it during the time he was at the training camp in Pinar del Río province, before his departure for Bolivia in November 1966.

Q: It's noteworthy that while he devoted so many intellectual and practical efforts at internationalism, he didn't attend the historic Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, held in January 1966. What was the reason?

A: He couldn't attend because while the Tricontinental Conference was being held, he was in Tanzania. But while there he received all the materials and an assessment of the meeting.

Q: What was the impact on you of Che's farewell letter?

A: I already knew of it before it was read by Fidel in the presentation of the first Central Committee of the Communist Party in October 1965. Nevertheless, every time I hear or read it, I'm deeply moved and it brings back many memories both of Che and of his comrades, since I knew all of them and had close personal and working ties with some of them.

Q: The last time you saw Che alive, did you think it would be the last time?

A: I saw him in the early morning hours of the day he went to the airport to go join the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia. It was in a safe house where he held, I believe, his last conversation with Fidel. Raúl Castro and Vilma Espín were also there. Fidel and Che were sitting on a sofa, talking there by themselves, in low voices, for a very long time.

I didn't think this would be the last time I would see him, although those of us involved in this type of struggle know that in it one either triumphs or dies. We were very optimistic, and very confident in the determination, will, and capacity of Che, of the Cubans who accompanied him, and of the Bolivians, who had proven themselves in other tasks, to attain their objective and be able to deal capably with all the difficulties they would encounter. In reality, the Bolivian guerrilla movement was able to carry out a number of successful military actions, inflicting casualties on the army's soldiers and taking prisoners.

Che did not have a mystical view of death, as has been attributed to him. Had he survived alone or with another combatant he would have tried to reorganize the guerrilla unit and continue the battle. He was not a man to give his life easily to his enemies, nor did he have an inclination to be a martyr. Proof of this is that even when he was wounded and his rifle put out of action, he tried to escape from the encirclement to meet up again with his men. He never felt defeated or demoralized. He defended his ideas with his own flesh and blood, unconcerned about whether he might give his life in the effort.

Q: Did Che say goodbye to you? What kind of farewell was it?

A: He did so in the safe house I mentioned. He was happy, smiling. He was finally heading off to his long-awaited goal.

It was a simple farewell; he was not very effusive. Che carried his emotions inside himself; one had to know how to decipher them. But as always, the expression on his face transmitted great force and conviction.

Q: How did you learn of Che's death?

A: By a radiophoto I received on October 10, where Che's body was shown in the hospital laundry room. I called Fidel and he came to my house. I remember Fidel's expression, one of doubt. He saw some resemblance to Che in the photo, but was not completely convinced it was him. He headed home, and he was there with Comrade Celia Sánchez when I brought him a second radiophoto Íd received, which left no doubt it was Che. That moment remains etched in my memory like a photograph that I'll never forget. There was a great silence in the house. Fidel sent Comrade Celia to find Aleida, Che's wife, who was conducting research in the Escambray mountains, to give her the news personally. He then called other comrades in the party leadership and began to give instructions on how the news should be transmitted, and to prepare our people for the harsh news.

It was a tremendous blow. But on those revolutionary missions, one leaves one's life under one's pillow.

Q: How long after that did you learn there were survivors?

A: Shortly afterward, when Pombo, Urbano, and the now- traitor Benigno succeeded in breaking the encirclement, and when Inti Peredo, in particular, established contact with some members of the Bolivian Communist Party and the ELN [National Liberation Army] who took them to the Chilean border. I always remember with great affection the role played by Salvador Allende, at the time president of the Chilean senate, who despite criticism from the right wing, offered his full support and protection to the three survivors. He informed our ambassador in France, Baudilio Castellanos, that he would accompany the three survivors to Tahiti. Our ambassador flew there, and brought them to France, and then to Cuba.

Equally, the collaboration offered by the Chilean Communist and Socialist parties should be noted, as well as that of Beatriz Allende and many other comrades, among them the journalist Elmo Catalán, who would later die in combat together with Inti Peredo, trying to reinitiate the armed struggle in Bolivia.

Q: Recently you were able to read the testimony of the Chilean Manuel Cabieses, published in the magazine Liberación, about the arrival of Che's diary in Cuba. What is your opinion of it?

A: It's very objective. Cabieses is a serious journalist, rigorous in his analyses and journalistic works. In addition, he is a very consistent revolutionary, with a fraternal attitude of solidarity to Cuba and revolutionary movements in Latin America.

This question reminds me of the participation of various comrades in the publication of the Diary in other languages: the Italian Feltrinelli, a friend of the Cuban revolution and an admirer of Che; the Frenchman Francois Maspero; Arnaldo Orfila, of Siglo XXI in Mexico; and the staff of the magazine Ramparts in the United States. Also the publishers in other countries who, under the coordination of Rolando Rodríguez, then-president of the Cuban Book Institute, made an extraordinary effort to publish the Diary in Cuba and the entire world before the U.S. secret services could publish a falsified version, as they wanted to. That battle was won.

Q: What is your opinion of the biographies of Che that have recently appeared?

A: I have not read them all, although I have seen some comments published in newspapers in Latin America where one of these biographies in particular tries to present Che as purely a cultural symbol, above all among the youth, stripping him of his political and ideological message and of his example. Some - because not all of them present a negative balance sheet - emphasize that all of Che's economic, political, and military ideas have failed, that they are out of date, and that the road taken by the Cuban revolution has gone against his ideas.

In my opinion, if the Cuban revolution had abandoned Che's ideas, it would not continue being - as it is - a bastion of anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggles that are taking place in the world, and of the fight for socialism. Even in the difficult circumstances of economic, political, and ideological aggression by imperialism, the Cuban people maintain the heroism Che summoned them to, and that they are summoned to every day by Fidel, who Che called his "teacher and guide."

The proof that the ideas, thought, actions, and example of Che have not failed and that they project the future, is that there is an ever growing and conscious interest both in Cuba and the world to study and interpret his works, recovering the essence of his ideas and analyzing the differences between the historic moment he lived in and the present.

In many countries, the consumer societies have sought to turn him into a piece of merchandise. Nevertheless, the image and example of Che rises above these attempts, much to the discomfort of the triumphalists of neoliberalism and the powerful in this world.

To try to reduce him to a cultural symbol is a vulgar simplification. I do not believe that the attraction and solidarity he evokes today among young people around the world, within the revolutionary movement, and in progressive and democratic sectors of the world are a result of this narrow perception of Che's legacy. Rather, they see him as a man with tremendous moral force, very honest, sensitive, human, capable of acting on his ideas, as a symbol of internationalism and anti-imperialism, of solidarity, of genuine socialism. In short, Che is seen as an example for the current and future generations, who will see in him a banner of revolutionary intransigence, of moral values, of social justice.

I believe that as long as there are oppressed and oppressors, social injustice, and imperialist domination, and as long as there is also hope for a just and fraternal world of solidarity among human beings and peoples, the ideas and example of Che will endure.

Therefore I agree with what Fidel said on October 12, 1987, at the event commemorating the 20th anniversary of the death in combat of Che and his comrades, "Che is more alive than ever, has more influence than ever, and is a more powerful opponent of imperialism than ever."

1. National Liberation Army of Peru.

2. Guevara's "Message to the Tricontinental," written in 1966, called for creating "two, three ... many Vietnams." It is printed in Pombo: A Man of Che's `Guerrilla.'

3. Camilo Cienfuegos was a Rebel Army commander who became chief of staff in January 1959. He died October 28, 1959, when his plane was lost over sea.

4. In 1967 several leading Cuban volunteers were in Venezuela, assisting in the armed struggle against the U.S.- supported regime in that country. Most were able to return to Cuba after the guerrillas were defeated.  
 
 
Front page (for this issue) | Home | Text-version home