BY ENZO INFANTE
Pathfinder Press has just released a new edition of Ernesto Che Guevara's Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War - 1956- 58.
To promote this book the Militant is running "Pages from Cuba's Revolutionary History." This series features articles by and about combatants of the July 26 Movement and the Rebel Army, which led the revolutionary war that overthrew the U.S.- backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista and opened the socialist revolution in the Americas. The July 26 Movement took its name from the date of an attack in 1953 on the Moncada garrison in Santiago.
This week's installment focuses on the Nov. 30, 1956, uprising in Santiago de Cuba - the second largest city of the Caribbean country - and in other parts of Oriente province. The uprising, led by July 26 Movement leader Frank País, was timed to coincide with the scheduled arrival of Fidel Castro and 81 other revolutionaries aboard the yacht Granma to begin the revolutionary war in the Sierra Maestra mountains.
Some 800 young fighters were organized to take part in the Santiago revolt, according to participant Vilma Espín, although only 200 were actually utilized. Militarily unsuccessful, the action had major political repercussions throughout Cuba that contributed to the success of the revolutionary war. Many of the veterans of the uprising were later incorporated into the Rebel Army.
Frank País was the founding leader of the Oriente-based Revolutionary National Action, which participated in the 1955 fusion that formed the July 26 Movement. País became the new organization's central leader in Santiago and Oriente. In the early months of the revolutionary war he played a key role in sending supplies and reinforcements to the Rebel Army. País was murdered by Batista's police on July 30, 1957. Some 60,000 Santiago residents attended País's funeral, and a week-long general strike shook the city and much of the island.
Enzo Infante, author of this acccount, was a participant in the Santiago uprising. He later served as the July 26 Movement's provincial coordinator in Oriente, Camaguey, and Havana, and was a member of its National Directorate. He is currently a retired lieutenant colonel in Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR).
The following is excerpted from an article published in the Nov. 27, 1966, Verde Olivo, FAR's magazine. The translation and subheadings are by the Militant.
BY ENZO INFANTE
Frank was the real and effective organizer of the July 26 Movement in Oriente. He devoted all his energy and enthusiasm to the task of building an apparatus for armed action. Through these efforts he revealed the most striking aspect of his personality: his extraordinary qualities as an organizer and clandestine leader. Whatever situation came up, he always responded with a correct answer. In every case he set an example and knew how to draw out useful experiences for himself and the organization. "My tasks in fulfilling the responsibility I have been given and honored with, require all my time. Cuba and the revolution need me. All my efforts must be devoted to them," he said.
To carry out this decision he gave up his other responsibilities, resigning as a teacher at the El Salvador School in Santiago de Cuba.
Beginning September 1955, all the energy he was capable of was given over to the revolution, which obsessed him. He continued being a teacher, but now in the highest of schools: the revolutionary struggle. And out of the many-sided aspects of practical work, he assimilated the objective logic of life, he learned and he taught.
In his work he had the assistance of a fellow teacher and fellow fighter, with an equal passion for the revolution: Pepito Tey. One can say that Pepito was a complement to Frank. Cheerful, laughing, and friendly in his personal relations, he knew how to be strict, demanding, and completely responsible as a leader. Very discreet, a good organizer, extraordinarily courageous and coolheaded, he had earned the full confidence of all the leaders of Santiago's cells even before he took over Frank's work during the latter's trip to Mexico.
He had participated together with Frank in the organizational work in the province. Having been a rail worker on an express train line, he used his contacts with this sector to construct an efficient network of distribution and communication.
One Sunday, in the middle of November [1956], a meeting was held above the Lido Club, on the terrace in Vista Alegre, at the home of Emiliano Corrales (an exemplary fighter who later was murdered in Havana by Ventura's hordes). Attending were Frank País, Pepito Tey, and Léster Rodríguez, together with the leaders of the July 26 Movement's action cells in Santiago de Cuba. There it was explained what everyone had anticipated and expected, due to the feverish activity they had been ordered to carry out in recent days. In explaining the plan for the general insurrection, Frank spoke in the following terms:
"The moment we've all been waiting for is nearly at hand. Fidel will keep his word of returning to Cuba this year. At the meeting in Mexico, the situation was discussed, as was our request to postpone the beginning of the struggle in order to assemble the necessary minimum of equipment. Fidel felt it was more important to take advantage of the year's upheaval and the growth of the revolutionary struggle. By delaying the beginning of the action, the mood of unrest would be lost without any guarantee of attaining more organization or getting more equipment.
"Therefore, we should analyze the situation we face in order to fulfill the commitment we made. Counting on your efforts, I accepted the commitment to rise up at the indicated moment in support of the landing. I felt I could do so because I know the attitude of you all. Léster and I will explain the plan and the role of you and your groups." (A deep silence reigned. Everyone looked at one another and then at Frank, who continued.)
"The possibilities of a general strike are uncertain. Work in this direction has not advanced enough to be able to rely on it. It is possible that the strike will become generalized if the landing and our actions are successful.
"The fundamental objective of the actions must be to impede the movement of the tyranny's forces toward the landing site.
"Fidel will land in some part of Cuba between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. of the indicated day, which will be five days after his departure from Mexico. We will receive word of the day of his departure and should understand that five days later, at the hour I indicated, he will be arriving somewhere in Cuba; we don't know where. As soon as we know the landing site we must cut all communication between and within the provinces and between municipalities, to prevent the units of the large garrisons from shifting their forces or rapidly getting to the landing site. We must cut all communications and take whatever military installations we can, to seize arms for the combatants and to seize the cities, in the form of insurrectional barricades that draw in the entire people."
Pausing, he scanned the faces of everyone there. Someone asked, "Will we wait to find out the landing site, or will we act five days after the departure?"
Frank shifted himself in the chair and said, "We must have everything ready and act when we know Fidel has landed."
"But how will we find out about the landing? As soon as the army learns of it they will surely keep the news secret and take all the necessary measures. How can we help Fidel at the opportune moment if the army is the first to know about it?"
"If we know that Fidel will arrive five days after his departure from Mexico, why not coordinate the actions?"
After a general exchange of opinions, it was agreed that the exact date would be five days after receiving the notice, and actions would be carried out on that day.
It occurred to no one that natural phenomena or fortuitous events might alter the calculated time of the trip. As Fidel would say in his speech of November 30, 1959, "It's true that the instructions were to wait for our arrival. Nevertheless, the impatience and ardor of the comrades of Santiago de Cuba..."
After deciding the time to strike, Frank announced: "To give you an idea of what we must do, Pepito will read from a book that explains the Hamburg insurrection." Pepito immediately began to read aloud about the 1923 uprising in the city of Hamburg, Germany, organized by the Communist Party. After he finished-which included reading part of a proclamation by Ernst Thaelman-everyone knew that owing to the failure of a counterorder to arrive in time, Hamburg was the only city to rise up and was ferociously crushed. It was deduced that the rebels had been left on their own.
One person, who had followed Pepito's reading as closely as everyone else, said, as a joke, "And what if the same thing happens to us, and we are stood up?" At that moment Léster rose to his feet and said in a firm voice: "Fidel Castro doesn't stand anyone up!" The rapid response put a quick end to that remark and the incident dissolved without further importance. Later there was discussion on how to build barricades and establish communications between different sectors, all of it related to the reading.
It was explained that our greatest forces would be concentrated in Santiago, because a triumph in that city would provide sufficient resources to distribute arms in other places.
Plan for uprising concretized
The discussion immediately turned to the main points of the
plan of action. These can be summarized as follows:
a) Blockade, bomb, and capture the Moncada garrison.
b) Control the whole city, for which it would be necessary to wipe out the offensive positions of the enemy inside its perimeter, including the positions of the National and Maritime Police forces.
c) Take the Antonio Maceo Airport.
d) Support the prison break from Boniato jail and control access to the city.
e) Neutralize, through revolutionary contacts, the personnel of the Naval District, giving it the opportunity to join the triumphant movement.
f) Take over the public services offices and the radio stations, calling the people to insurrection and general strike.
g) Gather weapons, since our supply was insufficient for arming all the combatants.
h) Convert the city into a bulwark of the insurrection, and as an offensive post for taking other localities.
The general garrison would require a house in the center of the city where the group leaders would be in permanent contact by telephone, and in which the leadership of the movement would be located. A house on San Félix at the corner of Santa Lucía was chosen for this purpose. Places needed to be selected where the members of the groups would be quartered. First-aid kits would be located in sites near where the actions were to take place. Since arms were scarce, not all the committed volunteers could participate in the initial actions; others would stay in reserve and be armed with weapons taken in the struggle and used where needed. The line of positions used for blockading the garrison was explained, as well as the means to be employed, and the invitation that would be offered to other revolutionary sectors to participate in the uprising.
Orders were given to be ready to fulfill the instructions on quartering as soon as these were given. Frank explained his decision not to go home and to observe strict clandestinity to avoid arrest in the coming days.
A general staff was announced, which would direct the actions, consisting of Frank, Pepito, and Léster. The general staff would hold specific discussions with each group, to go over the concrete details of their plan of action, for which they would be contacted at the proper time.
It was explained that once military actions began and while they were occurring, the general staff would assume command of all activities. Supplies of arms, equipment, and uniforms were verified.
The meeting ended in the afternoon. The feeling of anxiety that bothered its participants disappeared. Now the concern was to efficiently fulfill the agreements. A huge responsibility weighed on their minds. Without speaking, the look on the comrades' faces expressed their firm intent to do their duty.
Fidel Castro interview
On Monday, November 19, the day after the meeting, the
newspaper Alerta stated on its front page: "`The offensive
plans of the disrupters will not result in even the slightest
disturbance,'-Batista." Appearing on the same page was an
interview with Fidel Castro in Mexico, in which he ripped the
tyranny's attempt to make the people and the army believe that
the expeditionary army of the July 26 Movement had the support
of mercenaries and supporters of Trujillo.
In that interview Fidel stated:
"...If within two weeks of the publication of this interview there is no national solution, the July 26 Movement will feel free to initiate at any moment the revolutionary struggle as the only solution. We fully reaffirm the promise of 1956..."
In the following days meetings with the leaders selected to command the different action groups were held in the house of Arturo Duque de Estrada, on Desiderio Fajardo Street, near the Placita de Crombet. There the members of the general staff made known the objective and gave instructions on how to organize the plan of action, recommending vigilance and a check of the places where the events were to take place. Once the plans were laid out, discussion proceeded.
The actions were initially scheduled to begin at 6:00 a.m., later changed to 7:00 a.m., when there would be fewer military personnel in the streets since 6:00 a.m. was when the guards changed shifts, as did the various patrols.
Frank selected a group of comrades to inform the various provincial municipalities of the general plan, and to explain the need to carry out their tasks on the assigned day with the resources at hand, because no more could be sent. On November 25, immersed in the final preparations, the awaited news came.
On November 27 the police violently repressed students demonstrations in Havana, Guantánamo, and Matanzas, producing more than 25 wounded. The following day, as a protest, the students of Santiago organized a demonstration that was broken up by gunfire. Later they lit a bonfire near the university and threw Molotov cocktails at a small building of the Cuban Telephone Company.
As a consequence of the repression, the country's universities and high schools went on strike, carrying out protest meetings and demonstrations. The level of agitation among the students contributed to maintaining a general mood of popular unrest. Conditions clearly existed for a revolutionary upheaval. Amid this atmosphere of tension, feverish work was done, and on the morning of November 29 the call to general quarters was issued in Santiago.
Days before, Haydée Santamaría, of the Moncada assault, and Armando Hart, both representing the national leadership of the Movement, had arrived to participate in the actions.
That night in numerous houses of the city, groups of determined youth were concentrated, awaiting daybreak and with it the fight, without thinking which of them might die. In many places around the country it was the same.
First shots burst
On Friday morning, November 30, as the residents of Santiago
began their morning activities, the shots of the first actions
announced the beginning of one of the most heroic days in the
history of their glorious city. Groups of young men clad in
the olive drab uniforms of the new revolutionary army,
announced, by their actions, the resumption of the
revolutionary war.
In the heat of combat the revolutionaries of Santiago imagined themselves meeting the expeditionaries, landing in some part of the island, and perhaps even taking a city. Their shouts openly proclaimed: "Fidel Castro has arrived! Down with Batista! Long live free Cuba! Long live the revolution! Long live the July 26 Movement! Freedom or death!"
It has been shown that at such moments, the shouting of slogans fires people up and gives them more confidence. The enthusiasm of the revolutionaries reached levels of near paroxysm during the actions. The solidarity shown them by the people made them proud of the road they had chosen.
Meanwhile at the site of the general garrison, amid feverish activity, Frank, Haydée, Armando, Vilma [Espín], Asela [de los Santos], Gloria Cuadras, Ramón Alvarez, and other comrades of the Movement, gave instructions and directed the various actions, as reports were received.
The hours passed... One of the most emotional days in Santiago de Cuba's memory transpired, comparable in many ways to the uprising of José Maceo in the Little War [of 1879] and of July 26, 1953. The insurgent forces drew a balance sheet. In the early hours of that day, three of their best fighters had died in combat with the enemy. It is said that before dying, Pepito Tey, displaying his daring and coolheadedness, climbed the Intendente hill, hugging the wall until reaching the main door of the police station, throwing a Brazilian hand grenade at it, but it didn't explode. He leaped to recover it and then exclaimed: "I said these little pineapples weren't worth a--"
Tony Alomá, serious and rebellious, had raced up the outdoor steps of Padre Pico only to fall dead after reaching the last step of the sidewalk of Santa Rita Street. The courageous Otto Parellada, facing enemy fire closing in on him at his post after setting the police station on fire, died on the roof of the old institute. The three deaths in Santiago occurred in the most difficult action of the day, from a strategic point of view, on the top of the hill they were assigned to take. They fulfilled their promise. Cuba had three new martyrs.
Numerous comrades were wounded and some arrested; but the spirit that drove them was now stronger. Despite their understandable concerns, they felt satisfied. They had been capable of discharging their duty. The army of the tyrant, immobilized in Moncada, requested reinforcements from Havana.
Meanwhile at the Ermita sugar mill, the action groups of the Movement in the Guantánamo region assaulted and took the Rural Guard post, cutting telegraph and telephone lines, cutting the rail line, and heading off into the mountains to become a guerrilla column, which operated briefly in the Sierra Canasta zone.
In Chaparra an action group-among whose members was Paco Cabrera Pupo, who later became a commander-attacked the La Cadena munitions dump, seizing its arms, which were incorporated into the struggle in the Sierra Maestra.
In many points of the country the insurrectional action unleashed by the July 26 Movement brought into sharp relief the combative disposition of the revolutionary forces and the level of popular support.
Hope revives with Granma landing
Two days later, on December 2, the people shook with emotion
and enthusiasm upon learning of the expeditionary landing in
Niquero. Fidel had arrived aboard the Granma to fulfill his
promise; and hope revived. The brief euphoria of the tyrant
due to the results of November 30 was answered by the euphoria
of the people and the fighters over the arrival of the supreme
leader of the revolution.
The banners of insurrection were unfurled to a new combative wind and the forces quickly regrouped. Although the tyranny tried to minimize its importance and emphasized its "insignificance," the expedi-tionaries of the Granma in the Sierra Maestra were, as comrade Raú l Castro would say... "the little motor that set in motion the big motor of the masses," the correct strategy of leading the people in the struggle against Batista.
The great unknown factor now became clear.
November 30, 1956, was a link in the struggle begun on July 26, 1953. It constitutes a historic chapter whose results can be analyzed today.